You are on page 1of 28



Lt Col Azman bin Jantan RMAF was commissioned as a General Duty Officer
(Pilot) on 22 August 1991. He has served in key appointments at various RMAF
tactical fighter squadrons and air bases. He holds a Post Graduate Diploma in Arts
(Defence and Strategic Studies) from Massey University, New Zealand.


This qualitative study analyses Malaysias maritime security strategy in securing its
maritime zones based on its national interests. Malaysia professes itself to be a
maritime nation and holds the maritime domain as its primary interest, but Malaysia
is yet to have a comprehensive conception of maritime security strategy to secure its
maritime interests. This study was driven by two objectives: 1) to explain the factors
influencing the perception of Malaysias maritime security strategy, 2) to examine the
capability gaps in securing Malaysias maritime domain. It is hypothesized that the
lack of general interest in maritime affairs and maritime strategic culture had reduced
Malaysias focus on its maritime security. This has resulted in the existence of the
capability gaps and disjointed strategy within the Malaysian maritime strategy.
Interviews with authority figures in the maritime security sector were conducted to
elicit information on the planning and conduct of maritime security in Malaysia.
Malaysian policies and legislations relevant to maritime security were analysed to
determine the governments direction and stance. The establishment of MMEA as the
leading agency for maritime enforcement in Malaysia was intended to be a panacea,
but there were still fierce competitions amongst the diverse maritime security agencies
of Malaysia. While there is a clear delineation between defence and law enforcement,
the maritime security is a combination of both, thus requiring a clear conception of an
integrated maritime security response. The following capability gaps were identified:
1) lack of an integrated maritime surveillance and monitoring system, 2) insufficient
assets to provide maritime security coverage and response. However, it is
questionable whether the conception of an integrated response would be workable
given the lack of political will and strategic culture within the context of maritime
governance. In order to optimize the scarce resources available for the development
and operation of Malaysias maritime security agencies, it is recommended that a
comprehensive conception of integrated maritime policy be promulgated with
consideration for employment of technologies such as airborne platforms and
networked operations as a part of the maritime surveillance solution. It is also
necessary to inculcate the maritime strategic culture in Malaysian citizens to increase
the buy-in for future maritime security development.

Malaysia is a sovereign state in Southeast Asia (SEA) that straddles the geopolitically
important Straits of Malacca (SoM), South China Sea (SCS) and the Sulu Sea. It is
constituted by two landmasses that are separated more than 700 km apart by the SCS;
Peninsular Malaysia, with the southernmost landmass just off the Asian continent, and
in the west with a larger territorial landmass of Sabah and Sarawak to the east in
Borneo Island. Consequently, all the states in Malaysia are coastal states by nature,
except the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. Malaysia also has
longer maritime borders in comparison to its land borders,1 whereby it shares
maritime boundaries with all the ASEAN littoral states, except for Myanmar and

Compared to its landmass area of 328,657 km2, Malaysia has 449,477 km2 of
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), which can be considered as a reservoir of various
economic potentials and resources.2 The SCS is the lifeline for transfer of goods by
sea between Peninsular and East Malaysia. Maritime transportation is involved with
98.4% of Malaysias total freight volume in 2014.3 Its vibrant port economy processed
approximately 23 million twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) in 2014, which ranked
Malaysia in the top four container port throughout for developing/transition
economies.4 The SoM and SCS are utilized as the passage for almost 50% of global
seaborne trades and goods, and serves as the primary nexus between East and South
Asia. Malaysias maritime domain is estimated to hold proven oil reserves of 4 billion

Malaysia has 4675 km long coastlines against 2669 km of land borders. Central Intelligence Agency,
2016, The World Factbook (online).
Pauly, D. & Zeller, D. (eds.), 2015, Sea Around Us: Concepts, Design and Data (online).
Malaysia Productivity Corporation, 2016, Reducing Unnecessary Regulatory Burden on Business:
Logistics, p. 24.
UNCTAD, 2015, Review of Maritime Transport, pp. 67-69.
barrels and 83 trillion cubic feet natural gas reserves,5 which contributed 16.7% of
Malaysias GDP in 2014,6 and this is projected to have provided more than 50,000 job
opportunities in Malaysia by 2020.7 Additionally, around 2 million tons of fisheries
were harvested from Malaysias maritime domain annually that contributed to about
1.5% of the 2010 Gross Domestic Product (GDP).8 The scenic seascape within
Malaysias maritime domain is also a part of the attraction that sells Malaysia as a
tourist destination, which is an industry that netted RM 61 billion, or 5.7% of the GDP
in 2014.9 The aforementioned facts serves as supporting findings that by places
Malaysia to be undeniably seen as a maritime nation.10

As a maritime nation, the maritime domain surrounding Malaysia is important

for the countrys survival. Malaysias territorial integrity is constituted primarily by its
maritime domain. Its maritime domain is also a treasure trove of living and non-living
resources, as well as an important aspect for Malaysias economic growth and its
potential. Thus, the preceding fact posited that the sovereignty and security of its
maritime domain are existential issues for Malaysia. This creates the impetus for
Malaysia to secure its maritime zones in accordance with Mahanian dynamics
between the generation of wealth by maritime activities and mechanism to secure sea
commerce. Malaysia articulated this importance in the Dasar Pertahanan Negara
2010 (DPN 2010) that illustrated Malaysias area of interests which included not just
the landmass and territorial waters, but also the offshore economic interests and
strategic waterways (SoM and SCS). The policy document also articulated the
primacy of achieving superiority in maritime operations from joint operational effects
of Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). From
another perspective, the promulgation of Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
(MMEA) also is seen as a movement towards safeguarding littoral maritime zones that
enables the RMN to focus on core business of defence.
Malaysia acknowledges its position as a maritime nation and sees the need for
securing its maritime interests. Despite the contemporary progress in their capabilities
and developments for the three mentioned services of RMN, RMAF, and MMEA, as
exemplified by the acquisition of capital assets, there seems to be a lackadaisical
attitude among Malaysians toward the security of its maritime zones. Maritime
security awareness mainly resides among the practitioners. The general population are
lulled by a sense of security stemming from the promises and statements of maritime

US Department of Energy, 2014, International Energy Statistics (online).
Prime Minister Office Malaysia, 2015, Economic Transformation Program Annual Report, p. 11.
Ibid, p. 61.
FAO, 2015, Global Production Statistics 1950-2013 (online).
WTTC, 2015, Travel & Tourism Economic Impact, p. 1.
Although the exact categorization of maritime nation is problematic, Malaysian Institute of
Maritime (MIMA) deems that Malaysias strategic geolocation, higher maritime to landmass area,
active economic activities using maritime zone as well as maritime facilities available denote the
attributes that qualify Malaysia as a maritime nation. MIMA, 2016, Centre for Maritime Economic
Industry FAQ (online).
security developments. Open sources indicated an increase in assets and agencies for
maritime security in Malaysia, but the effectiveness of such assets and agencies are
not transparent. Maritime security assets that can operate outside of the territorial
waters are limited and among those limited assets, there are further limitations of the
equipment. This is within the context of its interoperability, and supportability that
severely restricted the capabilities of the operations. There is a different shade
altogether in the operational capabilities, which affects the desired outcomes needed to
address Malaysias intent on securing its maritime zones. This is arguably seen as a
failure in safeguarding Malaysias national interests. The common underlying
explanation is that the national economy does not allow for increased provision.
However, considering the importance of maritime security and the impact of securing
it, the attention given to this issue is questioned. The recent incident of discrepancies
in statements by differing Malaysian agencies on the foreign fishing flotilla and naval
encroachments had also reflected the capability gap that must be critically addressed.11

This leads to the problem in question. Despite Malaysia recognizing the

importance of its maritime domain, Malaysia still does not have a comprehensive
conception of maritime security strategy in securing its maritime interests.
Malaysia is seemingly focused on building maritime capabilities via various agencies
to protect its economic interest and sovereignty, but it is argued that Malaysia lacks
the drive to implement an overarching policy for the said maritime zones. There seems
to be acknowledgement for the need of safeguarding Malaysias maritime interests but
the acceptance of the need is not seen and the distribution of responsibilities is
apparently not concerted. There are possibly additional factors at play that may allude
to the attitude of Malaysians in general towards half-measures in securing the national

This study provides an insight into the state of affairs for contemporary
maritime security strategy of Malaysia through the analysis of its national interests,
threats, policies, and response mechanisms which are related to Malaysias maritime
domain. It will also explain the factors influencing the perception of maritime security
strategy in safeguarding Malaysias national interests and examining the maritime
security capability gaps in securing Malaysias maritime domain to safeguard their
national interests. Economic viability does affect the provision of national security
capabilities, but it is argued that there is a lack of general interest domestically
towards ensuring Malaysias capability to secure its maritime zones. It is also argued
that Malaysia needs to realign its maritime capabilities to benefit its need to safeguard
national interests. They would also be needed to introduce policies that enhance
security within its maritime zones. This is in light of the various threats that has come
forth recently. Based on the arguments put forth, it is hypothesised that the lack of
maritime strategic culture in Malaysia had caused the reduced focus on maritime

Syed Azahedi Syed Abdul Aziz, 2016, Heat rises over maritime dispute, New Straits Times Online, 28
security strategy, which in turn causes the capability gaps to exist and subsequently
causing disjointed operations in maritime security. Thus, this led to the introduction of
negative effects on Malaysias maritime security strategy especially in safeguarding
its national interests.


It is posited through this study, that the maritime domain is an existential importance
for Malaysia as evidenced and emphasised in the preceding introduction. The natural
coastal of Malaysian states, the geographical separation between Peninsular and East
Malaysia, reliance on maritime transportation, as well as the economic activities
within its maritime zones has required Malaysia to possess credible maritime-related
capabilities and capacities. Furthermore, Malaysia has a legacy being a maritime
nation since the days of Malacca Sultanate, and has arguably remained to be as such
until pre-independence days of British Administrations.12 Although this bond as a
seafaring nation was loosened by the colonization legacy in Peninsular and East
Malaysia,13 the interests in the maritime domain are inevitable as it is a part of the
whole for Malaysia.

However, Malaysias geostrategic location at the heart of maritime SEA is

both a boon and a bane simultaneously. Malaysia has maritime boundaries with all of
the ASEAN littoral states, which in some cases are facing disputes and yet to be
adjudicated (see Table 1). As stated within DPN 2010, Malaysia does not perceive the
traditional state-on-state threats, but the possibility still exists not just from the
maritime boundary disputes but also from interactions of major powers within the
SCS. The porosity of its maritime boundaries also presented threats from non-
traditional sources due to the wide expanse of the border that can be penetrated and
exploited for cross-border illegal activities such as smuggling, piracy, and sea-
robbery. Furthermore, there exist certain possibilities of violent extremist groups to
export violence and criminal activities into Malaysia through the hijacking of ships,
kidnapping for ransoms, and even creation of a 9/11-like maritime incident.

This convergence of interests and threats clearly stated the need for Malaysia
to secure its maritime domain. There has always been outrage or criticism by the
public whenever a maritime security incident occurs, such as a ship being hijacked
and ransomed or encroachment related to Malaysias maritime zones by foreign
vessels or criminal elements. Incidents at sea such as the hijacking and robbery of MV
Orkim Harmony and MV Orkim Victory in June 2015 are evidence of clear and
present danger from said threats.14 Additionally, the Lahad Datu incident in 2013,
point towards the porosity and ease of movement along Malaysias maritime

12 rd
Kennedy, 1993, History of Malaya 3 edition, pp. 1-19, Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed; Andaya &
Andaya, 2001, A History of Malaysia 2 edition, Hampshire: Palgrave, pp. 44-47.
Hanizah Idris & Ruhanas Harun, 2004, Malaysia as a Maritime Situation: Prospects and Challenges,
JATI Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9(1): 19-30.
Cheng, 2015, Najib anxious over disappearance of oil tanker, The Star (online), 14 June.
borders.15 Despite a large amount of resources made available for maritime security,
such incidents are potentially recurring, thus seeming as if nothing is being done about
it. This is the problem at hand that this study had focused on in order to establish an
understanding of what could be done better for Malaysias maritime security.
Table 1: Malaysian Maritime Territorial Disputes16

Claimant Parties Disputed Area Disputed Area

Malaysia-Indonesia Sipadan-Ligitan Ruled by ICJ in 2002 as sovereignty of Malaysia.

Malaysia-Singapore Batu Puteh- Ruled by ICJ in 2008.

Middle Rocks-
Batu Puteh sovereignty of Singapore
South Ledge
Middle Rocks and South Ledge sovereignty of Malaysia.

Malaysia-Brunei Lawas-Limbang- Letter of Exchange signed in 2009 between Malaysia and

Terusan-Rangau- Brunei reaffirming the delimitation and delineation of
Louisa reef boundaries.

Malaysia-China Spratlys Malaysia claims eleven features but effectively controls only
overlapping eight of it.
China claims all of those features through promulgation of
its nine-dashed lines and routinely conducts coast guard
presence and fisheries activities up to Luconia Shoals.

Malaysia-Vietnam Spratlys Malaysia claims the Vietnam-occupied Amboyna Cay and

overlapping Barque Canada Reef (Terumbu Perahu).
Vietnam claims all features occupied by Malaysia.

Joint submission of overlapping area in 2009. Status quo.

Malaysia-Philippines Spratlys Malaysia claims the Philippines occupied Commodore Reef

overlapping (Terumbu Laksamana)
Philippines claims all features occupied by Malaysia up to
Swallows Reef (Terumbu Layang-Layang). Status quo.

Sabah claim Philippines claim on Sabah dates back to the formation of

Malaysia. Considered to be resolved based on ICJ rejection
of Philippines intervention of Sipadan-Ligitan submission to
ICJ in 2001.17

Source: Authors adaptation from Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali &
Kamaruzaman Jusoff, 2009, Malaysias Policy towards its 1963 - 2008
Anon, 2013, Malaysia stand-off with Philippines group, BBC News (online), 15 February.
Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali & Kamaruzaman Jusoff, 2009, Malaysias Policy towards
its 1963 - 2008 Territorial Disputes, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 1(5): 107-116.
Kadir Mohamad, 2009, Malaysia's Territorial Disputes Two Cases at the ICJ, Kuala Lumpur: IDFR,
Territorial Disputes, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 1(5): 107-116;
and Kadir Mohamad, 2009, Malaysia's Territorial Disputes Two Cases at
the ICJ, Kuala Lumpur: IDFR, pp.44-50.


Malaysias current maritime security strategy is organised through legislations that
created various entities and agencies responsible for enforcing those legislations.18
The leadership of Malaysia understands the interdependency between national
security and socio-economic development as evidenced by the statement within the
Fourth Malaysia Plan that said,

The interdependence of socio-economic development and national security

cannot be over-emphasised. Without security, socio-economic progress will be
affected. Likewise, the maintenance and expansion of security capability will
become difficult without socio-economic progress. To withstand external
and internal threats, the nation must not only create a just society but also
strengthen its security forces to meet any potential dangers to the country.19

This exemplifies the approach that the Malaysian government envisaged for
national development since the early days of Malaysia. 20 However, despite the
acknowledgement and emphasis on security development, within the context of
maritime security, Malaysia does not have an overarching maritime policy at the
highest level to coordinate the responses for the diverse interests and threats within
Malaysias maritime zones. Although Malaysia has some semblance of maritime
security strategy through the myriad of maritime-related policies, legislations, and the
organisations that exist, the lack of an overarching maritime policy has arguably led to
a fragmented mechanism for maritime security as individual agencies are working
towards an interpretation of maritime security based on their individual interests and
agendas. While there is a clear demarcation of authority between the maritime defence
and enforcement, it must be acknowledged that security is constituted by defence and
enforcement simultaneously. Defence would hinder the transgressors while
enforcement ensures compliance and governance, thus defence and enforcement are
two facets of the same need, which is security. However, as there are overlapping
jurisdiction and areas of responsibilities, there is a need to synchronize the efforts and
effects needed for maritime security within Malaysias maritime zones.

See Table 2 for example of maritime-related agencies in Malaysia. Appendix 1 provides a
compilation of the myriad of Malaysias maritime-related legislations and enactments.
Malaysia, 1981, Fourth Malaysia Plan, Kuala Lumpur: National Printing, p. 11-12.
Interview with Vice Admiral Tan Sri Thanabalasingam RMN (Retired) provided anecdotal evidence
that Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak were very much aware of this interdependence between
security and development.
Table 2: Malaysian Agencies in the Maritime Domain

Ser Agency/Department Establishing Act Jurisdictional Powers

1. Royal Malaysian Federal Constitution; Constitutional jurisdiction rendered onto Armed

Navy Forces Council. Enforcement powers stated in
Armed Forces Act
Fisheries Act and seconded powers in related
1972 (Act 77)

2. Royal Malaysian Air Federal Constitution; Constitutional jurisdiction rendered onto Armed
Force Forces Council. No enforcement powers
Armed Forces Act
1972 (Act 77)

3. Royal Malaysian Federal Constitution; Established through jurisdiction of policing and

Marine Police general law enforcement up to Malaysian
Police Act 1967 (Act
territorial waters (Sect 3(3)).

4. Royal Customs Customs Act 1967 Powers to enforce regulations within Act 235
Department (Act 235) including law enforcement at sea

5. Immigration Immigration Act Powers to enforce regulations within Act 155

Department 1959/63 (Act 155) including law enforcement at sea

6. Marine Department Maritime Shipping Empowered to formulate policies, coordinate

Ordinance 1952 and enforce matters regarding the commercial
use of maritime domain including ports
development, shipping industry, maritime
transport safety and security, licensing and
seafarer affairs.

7. Marine Parks National Parks Act Powers to enforce stipulated regulations within
Department 1980 (Act 226) Act 226 and Act 317, which includes law
enforcement at sea
Fisheries Act 1985
(Act 317)

8. Malaysian Maritime Malaysian Maritime Powers to enforce any Acts related to maritime
Enforcement Agency Enforcement Agency domain. Integration of jurisdiction for maritime
Act 2004 (Act 633) law enforcement within Malaysias maritime

Source: Authors compilation based on Laws of Malaysia as accessed online at

Attorney Generals Chambers portal,

The analysis of Malaysian maritime security response mechanism clearly

evidenced that there are several weaknesses in the current maritime security strategy
of Malaysia. Firstly, there is no overarching policy on maritime security, which causes
apparent competing interests instead complementary efforts, especially considering
the scarce resources available for maritime security development and operational
needs. Although, MMEA was supposed to be a panacea for the diverse maritime
enforcement agencies in Malaysia, buy-in from other agencies for MMEAs lead
agency status is lacking. The promulgation of Act 633 did not clearly provide such
exclusivity for MMEA thus resulting in the continued duplication and competing
response amongst the maritime security agencies of Malaysia. This is evidenced by
the differing nomenclature and division of maritime zones area of responsibilities
employed by the MMEA, RMN, and Marine Police.21 Additionally, the competition
for scarce resources can also be seen where MMEA and Marine Police are both eyeing
for new assets, recruitments, and renewed primacy. 22 The lack of a credible mandate
is argued to be one of the causes, as there is no tangible blueprint to guide the desired
end state for Malaysias maritime security.

Secondly, although Malaysia has various assets that can be deployed for its
maritime security, the deployment of those assets is challenged by the combination of
an aging fleet and obsolescence issues. These issues are exacerbated by the lack of an
overarching policy document that can provide clear terms of reference, demarcation of
operational responsibilities, and long-term development plans for the maritime
security in Malaysia. Currently, Malaysia is reliant upon 30 vessels from the RMN,
and 54 vessels of MMEA for maritime security response that is beyond its territorial
waters.23 These numbers are based on the vessels that are capable of patrolling and
maintaining presence at sea for at least five days.24 Considering the need for routine
periodic maintenance as well as the increased frequency of unscheduled maintenance
due to age and obsolescence, it is rationalized that at best, only 50% of the said vessels
are available for maritime security response on daily basis.25 Additionally, the
comprehensive utilization of those assets are limited considering the lack of integrated
maritime security organisation and the fact that RMN has very limited jurisdiction in

RMN and MMEA area of operations extends up to Malaysian EEZ limit while the RMP- Marine
jurisdiction is within Malaysian territorial waters; RMN maritime area of operations are divided into 3
regions that covers 7 operational areas, MMEA divides its operations area into 5 regions constituted
by 18 maritime districts while RMP-Marine operates from its 5 operational regions into 11 operational
sea territory. Sourced from interviews with the relevant senior officials.
Hariz Mohd, 2016, Boosting nations maritime security, New Straits Times Online, 9 August; Anon,
2014, Polis Marin sasar ambil 1000 anggota baru (Marine Police targets 1000 new recruits), 12
November; Anon, 2009, Polis Marin dapat 19 kapal baru untuk tingkat keupayaan (Marine Police
receives 19 new vessels to increase capabilities), Bernama, 20 November. Interview with Commander
of the Marine Police provided insight on the rationalization for this issue.
See Appendix 2 for list of RMN and MMEA vessels.
The primary criterion here is endurance rather than speed. It is also acknowledged that speed is an
important criterion for patrol vessels within EEZ so as to enable effective response but this study
considered 25 knots as an adequate response speed based on the average speed of merchant vessels
plying the EEZ is approximately 10 to 15 knots.
60% of those vessels are aged more than 30 years. Routine maintenance factored in as 30% of
available fleet.
terms of law enforcement at sea.26 Based on the preceding factors, it is argued that the
vessels available to provide maritime security response beyond Malaysias territorial
waters are limited.

However, a key enabler for such a coherent mechanism is the maritime

surveillance and monitoring capability that can provide total coverage of Malaysias
maritime domain and interests. Currently, Malaysias maritime surveillance and
monitoring are split between the Marine Departments VTMS (Vessel Tracking and
Monitoring System) and MMEAs SWASLA (Sistem Pengawasan Laut; Sea
Surveillance System). As for the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), there are
developments being made to integrate the data from various maritime surveillance
assets (shipborne, shore-based and airborne) into a recognized maritime picture. It
must be noted that these are individual systems that serve a specific function within
the ambit of its operator. In order to coordinate a coherent response, there must be a
recognized maritime picture.27 Without any integration and data fusion, triangulating a
single target among the different data sources requires extensive and at times lengthy
communication between the agencies. With the application of networking
technologies, the available information and data from various maritime surveillance
systems can be integrated into a single primary reference of a recognized maritime
picture. The recognized maritime picture can then be utilised at all levels but more so
at the political-strategic level to coordinate the necessary responses and collaborative
actions towards prevailing maritime security situation, not just within Malaysias
maritime zones but also extending to Malaysias maritime interests which are beyond
Malaysias borders. It is also suggested by this study through its findings that such
effort can be a stop-gap measure to mitigate the issue of limited assets for maritime

Only the Fisheries Act 1985 (Act 317) accord powers to the commanding officer of RMN vessel as an
authorized officer to enforce said act thus any enforcement actions by RMN is strictly the
responsibility of the RMN vessel commanding officer.
Maritime picture is a depiction of the maritime situational awareness resultant from maritime
surveillance and monitoring activities. Multiple instances of maritime pictures for a singular situation
can exist due to different platforms and capabilities performing the surveillance and monitoring
functions. A recognised maritime picture is the integration of the various information and data so as
to maintain an unambiguous and timely database of relative position and identification of all maritime
tracks. The term recognised indicates that the plot is evaluated and processed by a central
authority before being disseminated.
Table 3: Comparison of Radar Coverage per hour against a 15 ft high target

Platform Operating Radar Radar Ground Search Rate

Altitude Range Footprint Speed

Submarine Surface 13nm 591 nm2 10kts 791 nm2/hour

(50ft radar
Ship Surface 17nm 908 nm2 26kts 1,792 nm2/hour
(100ft radar
Helicopter 10,000 ft 128nm 51,472 nm2 120kts 82,192 nm2/hour
MPA 35,000 ft 235nm 173,494 420kts 370,894
nm2 nm2/hour

Source: Roberts, 2014, UK Maritime Patrol Aircraft an urgent requirement, [10
November 2016].

The need for rapid projection of maritime security response beyond Malaysias
territorial waters necessitates a discussion on the utility of airborne assets. The
characteristics of speed and height associated with airborne assets provided
advantages of time, reach and space in maritime security coverage in comparison to a
surface vessel as well as the added benefit of increased search area volume as depicted
in Table 3. Airborne assets such as the maritime patrol aircraft are already in service
within Malaysias maritime security agencies but the utility option is still limited
considering the numbers and capabilities available. It is argued that a long-range
maritime patrol aircraft is necessary for Malaysia, considering the wide expanse of its
maritime domain and maritime interests. Additionally, incidents such as the MV
Orkim Harmony and MH 370 also emphasised the need and utility of a long-range
maritime patrol aircraft due to the efficacy of response provided.

Malaysias current maritime surveillance and monitoring system are not

reaching the level of security envisaged and needed comparatively to support its
maritime domain. Incidences of encroachment and threats to sovereignty are mostly
known as an aftermath or from post-incident reports as experienced during the MV
Orkim Harmony hijacking, sea robbery of MV Naniwa Maru and Lahad Datu 2013
incident. Therefore, there is a big gap in maritime surveillance and monitoring,
especially to monitor the whole of Malaysias maritime domain. Current coverage is
concentrated closer to coastal areas especially along heavy maritime traffic density
area as well as the specific area of interests such as the east coast of Sabah.28 This
leaves a wide-open expanse of the maritime estate to be covered by patrol vessels and
other surveillance platforms. As discussed earlier, the available assets which are being
utilized for the purpose of coverage at sea is an issue due to the small number of
suitable patrol vessels. Within this aspect, the employment of airborne platforms for
surveillance and monitoring can increase the surveillance efficiency and provide
timely responses, thus increasing the maritime security coverage.

There are a few challenges in the solution of the capability gaps. Foremost
among the challenges is the question of financial implication and affordability. It is
argued through this study that Malaysia has the wherewithal to spend for its security
as evidenced by an immediate increase in defence and security budget in the 1980s,29
following the resurgence of threat from communist terrorists and in 2013, after the
Lahad Datu incident30. However, the actual challenge is to ensure that those limited
resources are spent right instead of being a knee-jerk reaction.

It is within this context that this study argued upon the two influencing factors
of strategic culture and political will towards security in Malaysia, which in turn is
reflective upon the fate of maritime security. Strategic culture is also defined as:

A distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat
and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as
geopolitical setting, history and political culture (that exists within a state or
politically relevant group.31

Macmillan et. al. suggested that a strategic culture helps to explain the
strategic character, attitudes, and behaviour of a nation. However, it must be taken
with caution as an analysis of strategic culture is a double-edged sword. Strategic
culture must be contextualised from a range of variables that constitute the national
tradition and identity. While the concept of strategic culture predisposes towards the

MAF operates no less than 12 maritime surveillance radar in ESSZONE while MMEA also operate
several VTMS based surveillance systems. Combined with the maritime picture provided by surface
vessels and airborne platform, there is sufficient data to provide a comprehensive maritime coverage
of ESSZONE. However, maritime surveillance gaps prevail as there is no overarching or centralised
authority for such purposes. Analysis confirmed through interviews with senior officials of MIMA,
RM 9.9 billion was allocated under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) compared to RM 1.5
billion allocated under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980); Jaswan S. Sidhu, 2009, Malaysias Defence
and Security since 1957: An Overview, in Abdul Razak Baginda (ed), Malaysias Defence and Security
Since 1957, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Strategic Research Centre, pp. 22-23.
RM 75 million was allocated for establishment of ESSCOM followed by RM 660 million in 2015, RM
523 million in 2016 and RM 323 million in 2017. This is on top of the operational expenditures of the
MAF, MMEA and RMP within ESSZONE; Prime Minister Office, 2013-2016, Annual Budget Speech.
Macmillan, Booth & Trood, 1999, Strategic Culture, in Booth & Trood (eds.), Strategic Culture in the
Asia-Pacific Region, London: Macmillan Press, p. 8.
conception of defence policies and aids in accounting for a nations common sense32
of the same, its utility is argued to be universal for accounting behavioural pattern
towards security as contemporarily security is an overarching context for defence.

It is posited that Malaysias strategic culture is influenced by its legacy and

history especially that which created the Malays psyche towards the ruling elites.
Amongst the Malays, there exist a social contract between the ruling elite and its
subjects which are underwritten by the concept that the Malay rulers know what is
best for their subject and the subjects shall be subservient. This is a concept that has
historical genesis from the founding fathers of the Malay sultanates. 33 Despite the
concept being constituted with monarchic reference, it evidently set the Malay psyche
for subservience to the ruler or leader with sovereign powers. This is the basis of
Malaysias general perception on policy and governance. It is the domain of ruling
elite and the general population shall abide, as long as there is no unjust occurring.
Although the multi-ethnic government of Malaysia today promotes the inclusion of
the various ethnicities, the seat of power still resides among the Malays, hence the
Malay-centric perspective of the matter. It is suggested that the Malaysian strategic
culture, in essence, is the Malay attitude towards threat perception and self-

This, in turn, created a dependency by the general population on the ruling

elite for strong leadership, which evolved into a vicious cycle that views security in an
apathetic manner. Malaysias policy formulations are often the domain of its
leadership, thus reliant upon the character of the leadership personality. Therefore,
the conception of a comprehensive maritime security strategy or policy is left to the
behest of political interests and agendas, hence being dependent upon the political will
of the ruling elites. Without public awareness of the existential importance of its
maritime domain, whatever measures of conception for Malaysias maritime security
strategy will be beset with vested political and personal interests and agendas, instead
of addressing the national interests.

Stating the problem without an option is simply passing the buck back and
forth without any point of resolution. This study opines that the conception of a
comprehensive maritime security strategy must start with a National Maritime Policy
that can create buy-in from various stakeholders. It is from this overarching National
Maritime Policy that the maritime security strategy cascades, as the presence of a
higher-level document shall guide the sustainable development for not just maritime
security but also maritime industries, maritime governance, and maritime safety. A
model of the ideal maritime security organisation is visualised in Figure 1 with the
Macmillan et al, 1999, p. 14.
A. Samad Ahmad, 2003, Sulalatus Salatin Edisi Pelajar, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa Pustaka, pp.
25-26. This referred to the ancient agreement between Demang Lebar Daun and Seri Teri Buana.
Chandran Jeshurun, 1999, Malaysia: the Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture, in Booth & Trood
(eds.), Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 225-243.
National Security Council (NSC) Maritime as the one-stop centre for maritime
security issues with buy-in and synchronisation of effort from the other maritime-
related agencies. NSC-Maritime is envisaged to be the brain that integrates and
analyses the data from the eyes and ears (surveillance sensors and intelligence data) in
order to direct the physical assets and response mechanisms to perform their duties.
The idea is not for NSC-Maritime to operate any of the assets and capabilities but
rather to coordinate the employment of available assets and facilitate collaboration
towards maritime security. The capabilities are still managed by the respective
agencies but the effect was brought about through coordination of inter-agency
collaboration and operations by NSC-Maritime. With the use of networking
technologies, near real-time information from various sources are integrated into a
recognised maritime picture of Malaysias maritime domain that is applicable for not
just maritime security but also other facets of maritime governance. It must be
reiterated that promulgation of a policy need not necessarily solve the problem. It is
but a part of the step towards realistically securing Malaysias maritime interests. A
larger part of the step includes changing the mindset of all parties involved to ensure a
sufficient buy-in to the solution, thus guaranteeing its continuity in the future.

Figure 1: Maritime Security network-centric concept

There are two capability gaps which were found through this study that contributed to
the problem of securing Malaysias maritime domain. Firstly, there is a lack of an
integrated maritime surveillance and monitoring system. While Malaysia has several
maritime surveillance systems being operated by various maritime security agencies,
it is not integrated and information sharing is hindered by competing interests and
mind-set. This is argued to be a key area that must be addressed for a comprehensive
conception of maritime security strategy to be implemented. Furthermore, the
integration and fusion of maritime information and data must occur at the highest
level in order to maximize buy-in and control authority.

The second capability gap is the limited number of assets available to provide
for maritime security coverage and response. The immediate solution for most will be
to procure more assets but this study suggests that procurement of assets is not the
problem. Rather it is how the assets are utilised that is the root cause. Without an
overarching framework of maritime security strategy at the highest level, there is no
coordination of assets tasked within an area of operation. This is aggravated by the
first capability gap as there is no recognized maritime picture that can be used to
synchronize the efforts and effects for maritime security in Malaysia.

The underlying cause for those capability gaps is the absence of a National
Maritime Policy that can drive buy-in from the various maritime-related actors and
guide them towards a sustainable and secure utility of Malaysias maritime domain.
This lack of an overarching policy is influenced by the perception of maritime security
need within Malaysia among its general population and most importantly the ruling
elites. Based on the analysis, the hypothesis presented is proven to be valid but further
studies are necessary as this study only highlighted the tip of the iceberg.

This study recommends a holistic review of what is needed for Malaysias maritime
security in line with the proposed National Maritime Policy, to ensure the formulation
of a comprehensive maritime security strategy for Malaysia. This formulation must be
done at the highest level with the participation of maritime-related stakeholders and
consideration given for the application of networking technologies and employment of
airborne assets. Simultaneously, this study also recommends that the Malaysian public
awareness and comprehension of the existential nature that the maritime domain holds
for Malaysia be increased to increase their buy-in towards the formulation of a
comprehensive maritime security strategy. Without a broad-based and inclusive
approach towards maritime security, it will continue to be at the mercy of the ruling
elites political will. Future studies are encouraged to consider defence economics and
resource management focused on Malaysias defence and security procurement
processes so as to further generate the understanding and discussion of Malaysias
formulation of security strategy and its implications for the national interest.


A. Samad Ahmad. 2003. Sulalatus Salatin Edisi Pelajar. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan
Bahasa Pustaka.

Andaya, B.W. & Andaya, L.Y. 2001. A History of Malaysia 2nd edition. Hampshire:

Anon. 2009. Polis Marin dapat 19 kapal baru untuk tingkat keupayaan (Marine Police
receives 19 new vessels to increase capabilities), Bernama, 20 November. [11 June 2016].

Anon. 2013. Malaysia stand-off with Philippines group, BBC News (online), 15
February. [21 October 2016].

Anon. 2013. Polis mahu semula kuasa di laut (Police wants back authority at sea),
Utusan (online), 18 December.
20131218/dn_21/Polis-mahu-semula-kuasa-di-laut [12 October 2016].

Anon. 2014. Polis Marin sasar ambil 1000 anggota baru (Marine Police targets 1000
new recruits), Berita Harian Online 12 November.
.my/node/17123 [7 November 2016].

Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali & Kamaruzaman Jusoff. 2009. Malaysias
policy towards its 1963 - 2008 territorial disputes. Journal of Law and Conflict
Resolution 1(5): 107-116.
_towards_its_1963-2008_territorial_disputes [18 August 2016].

Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. The World Factbook.

/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html [17 February
Chandran Jeshurun. 1999. Malaysia:the Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture. In Booth
& Trood (eds), Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region. London:
Macmillan Press.

Cheng, N. 2015. Najib anxious over disappearance of oil tanker, The Star (online), 14
harmony/ [20 October 2016].

Corbett, J.S. 2004. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: Dover

Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2015, National Accounts: Tourism Satellite

Accounts, 2010-2014.
ProductFreeDownloadSearch.seam# [4 August 2016].

FAO. 2015. Global Production Statistics 1950-2013 (online).

/servlet/TabSelector [17 February 2016].

Gray, C.S. 2015. The Future of Strategy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ham, C. & Hill, M. 1993. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 2nd
edition. London: Harverster Wheatsheaf.

Hanizah Idris & Ruhanas Harun. 2004. Malaysia as a Maritime Situation: Prospects
and Challenges. JATI Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9(1): 19-30.
ati%209.pdf [16 July 2016].

Hariz Mohd. 2016. Boosting nations maritime security, New Straits Times Online, 9
maritime-security [7 November 2016].

Hattendorf, J.B. 2013. What is Maritime Strategy. In A Maritime School of Strategic

Thought for Australia: Perspectives. Sydney, Australia: Sea Power Centre.
%2FCombined%2520(web)_0.pdf&usg=115339255,d.c2E [25 Feb 2016].
Hickey, L. 2003. Background brief - the recognized maritime picture. Presentation to
Senate Committee for National Security and Defence, Canada, Sept./Nov. [12
November 2016].

Jaswan S. Sidhu. 2009. Malaysias Defence and Security since 1957; An Overview. In
Abdul Razak Baginda (ed), Malaysias Defence and Security Since 1957.
Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Strategic Research Centre.

Johnston, I.A. 1995. Thinking about Strategic Culture. International Affairs. 19(4):
about-Strategic-Culture.pdf [31 July 2016].

Kadir Mohamad. 2009. Malaysia's Territorial Disputes Two Cases at the ICJ. Kuala
Lumpur: IDFR.
ide_ pbp.pdf [16 October 2016].

Kennedy, J. 1993. History of Malaya, 3rd edition. Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed.

Macmillan, A., Booth, K. & Trood, R. 1999. Strategic Culture. In Booth, K. & Trood,
R. (eds), Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region. London: Macmillan

Malaysia, 1981, Fourth Malaysia Plan, Kuala Lumpur: National Printing, p 11-12. [20 February

Malaysia. 2006. Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 (Malaysia) (Act
Act% 20633.pdf [10 April 2016].

Malaysia. 2010. Federal Constitution.

/Publications/ FC/Federal%20Consti%20(BI%20text).pdf [2 July 2016].

Malaysia. 2012. Fisheries Act 1985 (Amendment 2012) (Act 317).
317%20-%20Fisheries%20Act%201985.pdf [22 September 2016].
Malaysia. 2013. Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 (revision 2007) (Act 311).
311%20-%20Exclusive%20Economic%20Zone%20Act%201984.pdf [22
September 2016].

Malaysia Productivity Corporation. 2016. Reducing Unnecessary Regulatory Burden

on Business: Logistics.
/RURB-Logistics-Draft-Full-Report.pdf [30 June 2016].

MIMA. 2016. Center for Maritime Economic Industry-FAQ (online). http://www
rch-centre [17 February 2016].

Ministry of Defence Malaysia. 2010. Dasar Pertahanan Negara. http://www.mod. [11
February 2016].

Nathan, K.S. 1998. Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation. In Alagappa, M. (ed.), Asian
Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.

Pauly, D. & Zeller, D. (eds). 2015. Sea Around Us Concepts, Design and Data. [17 February 2016].

Prime Minister Office Malaysia. 2013-2016. Annual Budget Speech 2014, 2015,
2016, 2017 (online).
speech&speech_cat=2 [15 November 2016].

Rodrigue, J-P. 2013. The Geography of Transport System 3rd ed. (online). New York:
lanespacificasia.html [30 Jul 2016].

Rosenau, J. N. 1968. National Interest. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences

(online). [30 June
Royal Malaysian Navy. 2016. Portal Rasmi TLDM: Kapal TLDM (online),
[2 August 2016].

Sutarji bin Kasmin. 2009. Malaysias Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies and
Auxiliary Security Agencies. In Abdul Razak Baginda (ed.) Malaysias
Defence & Security Since 1957. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Strategic Research

Sutarji bin Kasmin. 2009. Efficiency Measurement of Malaysias Maritime

Enforcement Agencies. Bangi: Penerbitan Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Syed Azahedi Syed Abdul Aziz. 2016. Heat rises over maritime dispute. New Straits
Times Online, 28 March. /03/135558/heat-
rises-over-maritime-dispute [22 April 2016].

Till, G. 1996. Developments in Maritime Security. In Peter Cozens (ed), New

Zealands Maritime Environment and Security. Wellington: Centre for
Strategic Studies.

Till, G. 2013. Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Vancouver: Routledge.

Till, G. & Chan, J. (eds). 2014. Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Nature,
causes and consequences. New York: Routledge.

UNCTAD. 2015. Review of Maritime Transport.

Library/rmt2015_en.pdf [3 August 2016].

WTTC. 2015. Travel & Tourism Economic Impact.

2015.pdf [17 February 2016].

Ser Act Number and Title Maritime Domain Relevance

(a) (b) (c)

1. Act 44 Fisherman Establishes fisherman association to safeguard

Association Act 1971 Malaysian fisherman interests (indicates the
importance put by GoM to marine resources)

2. Act 49 Akta Lembaga Promulgate an authority to supervise fisheries

Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia 1971 development and fisherman association in
Malaysia (indicates the importance put by GoM to
marine resources)

3. Act 77 Armed Forces Act Establishes an armed forces constituted by an

1977 army, navy and air force for defence of Malaysia

4. Act 83 Continental Shelf Act Promulgates Malaysian continental shelf limits

1966 and legislates all activities surrounding it
(establishes the need of sovereignty enforcement
and security provision within Malaysian
continental shelf)

5. Act 140 Penang Port Regulates the powers for an authority to supervise
Commission Act 1955 and manage Penang Port (indicates importance put
by GoM to shipping industry development)

6. Act 144 Petroleum Establishment of an authority to supervise

Development Act 1974 development of petroleum industries in Malaysia
(indicates the importance put by GoM to maritime
based resources)

7. Act 155 Immigration Act Regulates Malaysia entry and exit procedures.
1959/63 Establishes maritime jurisdiction for the
Immigration Department.

8. Act 217 Declaration of an Declaration of an area in the Bintulu, Sarawak to

Area in the Bintulu District to be a federal port with relevant discretionary
be a Federal Port Act 1979 powers (indicates importance put by GoM to
shipping industry development)

9. Act 226 National Parks Legislates the establishment of national parks (and
Act 1980 marine parks) in Malaysia (establishing the need
of National Marine Park enforcement units)

10. Act 235 Customs Act Establishes jurisdiction of customs to enforce

1967 taxation of goods carried by sea (establishing the
need of customs maritime presence)

11. Act 243 Bintulu Port Legislates the Bintulu Port authority and
Authority Act 1981 associated powers (indicates importance put by
GoM to shipping industry development)

12. Act 302 Petroleum Establishes law on transport of petroleum by sea

(Safety Measures) Act 1984 (indicates the interest of GoM in ensuring safety
(Amendment 1991) of maritime transportation)

13. Act 311 Exclusive Legislates Malaysian exclusive economic zone

Economic Zone Act 1984 and regulates activities in the zone in accordance
with UNCLOS 1982 (establishes the need of
sovereignty enforcement and security provision
within Malaysian exclusive economic zone)

(a) (b) (c)

14. Act 488 Port Authorities Legislates the port authority and associated powers
Act 1963 (indicates importance put by GoM to shipping
industry development and safety of maritime

15. Act 317 Fisheries Act Regulates Malaysian Fisheries activities and
1985 defines such activities up to Malaysian EEZ
(indicates the importance put by GoM to marine
resources and the need to provide security and
enforcement within declared zones)

16. Act 344 Police Act 1967 Establishes a Malaysian police force with policing
powers up to Malaysian territorial waters
(establishing the need of marine police force)

17. Act 515 Merchant Regulates maritime oil pollution with powers of
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act enforcement (establishes the need for Marine
1994 (A1394 Amendment Department maritime presence and indicates GoM
2011) interest in ensuring safety at sea)

18. a. Merchant Shipping Regulates merchant shipping activities including

Ordinance 1952 licensing and certification of vessels and seafarers
within Malaysian maritime zones as promulgated.
b. Merchant Shipping
Establishes the need for Marine Department
(Amendment) Act 1998
maritime presence (indicates the interests by GoM
c. A1316 Merchant Shipping to the safety and security of maritime merchant
(Amendment & Extension) activities)
Act 2007

d. A1393 Merchant Shipping

(Amendment & Extension)
Act 2011
e. Boat Rules 1953

19. Act 527 Carriage of Regulates carriage of goods by sea within

Goods by Sea Act 1950 Malaysia (indicates the interests by GoM for the
safety and security of maritime transportation

20. Act 633 Malaysian Establishes a maritime enforcement agency that

Maritime Enforcement Agency has jurisdictional powers over all maritime related
Act 2004 laws. (indicates the GoM intention to strengthen
security within its maritime zones)

21. Act 660 Baselines Of Promulgates the datum for determining the
Maritime Zones Act 2006 baselines of Malaysia maritime zones (indicates
GoM interest in ensuring sovereignty and
territorial limits in accordance with UNCLOS
1982. Establishes the need for sovereignty
enforcement and security provision within the
maritime zones)

22. Act 750 Territorial Sea Promulgation of Malaysian territorial waters limit
Act 2012 in accordance with UNCLOS 1982 (indicates
GoM interest in ensuring sovereignty and
territorial limits. Establishes the need for
sovereignty enforcement and security provision
within the maritime zones)

23. a. Merchant Shipping Order Regulates code of conduct at sea and rules of the
(Collision Regulations), 1984 road at sea so as to ensure safety and security of
the merchant shipping industry. Establishes the
b. Merchant Shipping
need for Marine Department maritime enforcement
(Collision Regulations) Order

c. Merchant Shipping
(Collision Regulations)
(Amendment) 2000
Royal Malaysian Navy Operational Assets35

Class Year Speed /

Qty of
Ser (Vessel type) Vessels Built Endurance Range Remarks

1. PERDANA 2 2007 20.5 (12) kts 360 (6000) Data in

MENTERI nm brackets when
> 14 days

2. JEBAT 2 1994 28 kts / 5000 nm

(Frigate) 14 days

3. KASTURI 2 1983 28 kts / 5000 nm

(Corvette) 14 days

4. KEDAH 6 2003- 22 kts / 6000 nm New

2004 Generation
(Patrol Vessel) 14 days
Patrol Vessel

5. LAKSAMANA 4 1983 36 kts / 3600 nm

(Corvette) 10 days

6. PERDANA 4 1972 36 kts / 1800 nm Fast attack

craft missile
(FAC-M) 7 days

7. HANDALAN 4 1979 35 kts / 1800 nm Fast attack

craft missile
(FAC-M) 7 days

8. JERUNG 6 1972- 36 kts / 1800 nm Fast attack

1976 craft guns
(FAC-G) 7 days

9. KRIS 2 1966 27 kts / 1400 nm

Data sourced from Royal Malaysian Navy, 2016, Portal Rasmi TLDM: Kapal TLDM (online), [2 August 2016] and Till &
Chan (eds.), 2014, Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia, New York: Routledge, p. 143. Endurance
data is an estimation based on averaging of range data.
(Patrol Craft) 5 days

10. INDERASAKTI 2 1980 16 kts / 4000 nm

(MPCSS) 1983 > 12 days

11. SRI TIGA 2 2001 25 kts / 540 nm

(Fast Boat) n/a

12. MAHAMERU 4 1984 16 kts / 2000 nm Mine counter

measure vessel
(MCMV) 7 days

13. CB-90 17 1999- 40 kts / 240 nm

(Fast Assault Craft) n/a

14. BUNGA MAS 2 2003 17 kts / 9000 nm Patrol support

(Auxiliary) 21 days

Source : Portal Rasmi TLDM: Kapal TLDM (online), /mengenai-kami/informasi/sejarah-
3 and Till & Chan (eds), 2014, Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia,
p. 143.

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Assets36

Class Year Speed /

Qty of
Ser (Vessel type) Vessels Built Endurance Range Remarks

1. LANGKAWI 2 1987 15 kts / 5000 nm Ex-OPV

(Patrol Vessel) 330 hrs

2. PERWIRA 2 1999 20 kts / 1000 nm Ex-Bay

Data sourced from Sutarji bin Kasmin, 2009, Malaysias Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies and
Auxiliary Security Agencies, in Abdul Razak Baginda (ed.) Malaysias Defence & Security Since 1957,
Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Strategic Research Center, p. 210, and MMEA website portal.
(Patrol Boat) n/a Australia

3. SIPADAN 15 1964- 14 kts / 1600 nm Ex-PC RMN

(Patrol Craft) 120 hrs

4. GAGAH 15 1980 15 kts / 1200 nm Ex-PZ RMP

(Patrol Craft) 280 hrs

5. TUGAU 15 2000 15 kts / n/a Ex-PA RMP

(Patrol Craft) n.a

6. RAMUNIA 5 1983 8 kts / 2000 nm Ex-Bahtera

(Patrol Craft) 250 hrs

7. RHU 2 1990 18 kts / 486 nm Ex-P200

(Patrol Boat) 27 hrs

8. SEMBILANG 4 1986 16 kts / 160 nm Ex-P100

(Patrol Boat) 10 hrs

9. PENINJAU 1 1990 20 kts / 400 nm Ex-P300

(Patrol Boat) 20 hrs

10. MALAWALI 4 1990 35 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

(Fast Boat) n/a

11. NUSA 2 1998 35 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

(Fast Boat) n/a

12. PENYELAMAT 4 1998 25 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

(SAR Boat) n/a

13. PENGAWAL 10 1998 25 kts / n/a Ex-GRP

(Fast Craft) n/a

14. PELINDUNG 5 1982 35 kts / n/a Ex-OBM

(Fast Boat) n/a

15. PENGAMAN 1 1994 30 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

(Fast Boat) n/a Dept

16. PENGALANG 2 2007 40 kts / n/a

(Fast Boat) n/a

17. KILAT 38 2007 45 kts / n/a

(RHIB) n/a

18. PETIR 8 2010 45 kts /

(RHIB) n/a

19. MARLIN 1 2006 17 kts / n/a

(Training Ship) n/a