The Hegemony of Science and Philosophy

Author(s): Alfred Fouillee

Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jan., 1896), pp. 137-164
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL
OF ETHICS.
JANUARY, 1896.

THE HEGEMONY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.
THE cardinal point in the Kantian philosophy is, that if
science is a functionof mind,it is neitherthe sole nor the
most importantfunction. There are limits between which
scientificexpositionmay be applied,but beyond these rests a
vast territoryin which our speculationsmust be controlledby
entirelydifferent principles. Such is the fundamentalidea of
Kant. On the contrary,it is on the established or probable
data of science that Auguste Comte proposed to construct
what he denominated the cerebral unity of mankind. To
which of the two must we grant the true intellectual he-
gemony? This problemstill profoundlyinterestsminds not
only in France but in all those countrieswhich concernthem-
selves with the future. In our day, we have seen, afterthe
philosophers, critics, novelists, poets, and then professional
scientists take up the question of the relationsof science to
belief. These excursions of scientistsand men of lettersinto
the domain of philosophyhave served the purpose of reviving
interestin great problems. The single drawback is, that
neitherside has always given sufficientattentionto defining
theirterms,to properlystatingthe question at issue, to avoid-
ing hasty solutions. Men of lettersare too often unable to
go beyond the vague idealism with which Renan contented
VOL. VI.-No. 2 Io

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138 Internationaljournal of Ethics.

himself,or professionalscientistsbeyond the narrowpositivism

of a Littre. We have seen very recent illustrationsof this
danger in the discussions which have arisen on several occa-
sions between men of lettersand scientistsover the so-called
" bankruptcyof science." Those who have maintainedthis
thesishave employedsubtle tactics: they have arrayedon the
one hand the positive resultsof special sciences,-they have
confinedthemselvesin the meanwhileto physical and natural
sciences,-and then, on the other hand, they have pointed
us to religions with their replies all ready to the problems
of lifeand conduct. The scientists,in theirturn,have vaunted
the benefitsof science, and its discoveriesin the materialand
industrialorder,as if moralitywere a mere question of phys-
ical well-beingor of pure hygiene. We should indeed be led to
conclude that a philosophy or a systemof ethics had never
existed unless in theologies and mythologiesof all descrip-
tionsor in mathematics, physics,and physiology. This would
be making too cheap a disposition of history; it would
erase at a singlestroke of the pen the sciences,so justly called
moral, from,psychology and ethics to philosophy proper.
Most certainly,if it be true that physics and natural history,
as such, ever engaged to furnisha philosophy of the world
and of life,we should be justified in concluding that these
sciences have bankrupted themselves,that they have med-
dled with that which in no way concerns them. In the
same way, chemistrywould bankrupt itself,should it pretend
to explain the movementof the stars,the precession of the
equinoxes, the eclipses of sun or moon. And by the same
reasoning,theologywent into bankruptcywhen it presumed
to decide that the sun moves around the earth,since Joshua
once stopped its course. Every usurpationof one science on
a domain foreignto it, is sure to end in such discomfituresas
these. These bold adventures,it is true,are too common on
the part of scientists,who, in the pride of theirspecial discov-
eries,imagine sometimes that they have discovered the uni-
versal secret; fortunately, these scientists do not constitute
science. Should all bankers become insolvent,arithmetic
would still be as trustworthy as ever. Perfectlylegitimateas

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 139

it is to restricteach scientistto his own territory,

it is as truly
illegitimateto hold Science (withor withoutthe capital) re-
sponsible forthe false bills of exchange drawn in its name.
It is ignoranceand not science which in such cases always
goes into bankruptcy. The bankruptcyof science could by
no possibilityconsist in aught else than this pretensionto
usurp the place of philosophy; forin its own domain scien-
tifictruth is worthyof our respect,even of our love, since
it contributesto our intellectionof things. Saint Augustine
says: value ama intelleclum. Neither the gates of hell nor
those even of paradise shall prevail against science.
A few years ago, the youths in our schools were divided
betweenthe neo-idealistsand the neo-positivists. In an elo-
quent discourseto students,M. Zola declared himselfa " har-
dened old positivist,"and felt under obligations to apologize
forscience. " Did it promisehappiness?" he inquired. And
he replied: " I do not believe it. Science promisestruth,and
the question is to know whetherwe shall ever be able to
manufacturehappiness out of truth. In order to be at peace
some day, we need a great deal of sacrifice,the absolute re-
nunciationof self, a serenityof intelligencesatisfied,which,
as it seems, is possible only among the elect few. But as we
wait,what a cry rises fromsuffering humanity. Shall we ever
be able to live without lies and without illusions?" M. Zola
conceded, in the course of his address,thatin literaturethe
naturalistschool had " too much narrowed the horizon."
"Personally, I regret that I ever became a sectary in my
desire to confineart to truthsthat were capable of demonstra-
tion." Would not M. Zola be forcedto admit that in phil-
osophy also, positivismhas too much narrowedthe horizon?
And can we admit the pretended positivistdefinitionwhich
M. Zola gives us of the ideal ? " What else is the ideal," he
asks, " than the inexplicable,those forcesof the vast universe
in which we bathe without knowing what they are ?" No;
the ideal cannotsignifytheunknown; it is the direction-cog-
nizable at least in part-of the realityas it arrives at a con-
sciousness of itselfin man. M. Zola concluded by counselling
his hearersto forgetthe " malady of the infinite." He advised

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140 Internationaljournal of Ethics.

those who sufferfromthe "mysterious" to throw their life

" intosome giganticlabor," which would bring good results
even if they never saw the end of it. But thus presented as
a daily duty,without any principle to justifythis duty,work
becomes at bottom only a means of intoxicatingyourself,a
means of " diversion,"as Pascal said, more hygienic(in gen-
eral) perhaps than gaming and dissipationsof othersorts,but
the true moral sense of which escapes us forthe lack of some
philosophical doctrinewhich fixesforthe individual his place
in human society and in universal society. M. Alexandre
Dumas appeared on the scene of action,and was not afraidto
predict that men, afterhaving tried everythingelse, would
end, "and that very soon," by applyingseriously to life the
law of brotherlylove, that theywould even be swept away
"by the madness, the rage of love." He declared that he
discernedalready among those phenomenawhich seemed so
menacing to us, the signs of these love-tendencieswhich
springup among men. Tolstoi, who leans towardsan analo-
gous optimism,affirmed that " the moremen believe that they
can be led by some exterior forceoperating outside of their
own will in transforming and amelioratingtheirown existence,
with the greaterdifficulty will this amelioration take place."
M. Brunetieredemonstratedwith his habitual ardor that the
physical and naturalsciences have notsucceeded in explaining
the nature of man as man,-that is to say, as a being endowed
with feeling,thought, and will; and still less the origin of
those genuinely human attributes,of that which constitutes
man as such, and that in consequence these sciences have
failed to reveal to us the futuredestiny of the essentially
human in man. But the eloquent writerwentbeyond the goal
which he had set forhimselfby pushing the offensivetoo far;
in thus confronting religion and science,he seemed to forget
philosophy. This was in the eyes of Tolstoi the principal
defectin the address of M. Zola. " On the contrary, the more
they believe in what Dumas predicts,that the time will come,
infalliblyand soon, when men,inspiredby brotherlylove, will
modifyof theirown volition the whole of theirexistence,the
more rapidlywill this time arrive." Relying on the forceof

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 14I

ideas, Tolstoi concludedthat " by announcingthismodification

in human sentiments,we shall realize it the sooner." Very
recentlystill, this question of science and faith appeared in
France in a still more sharplyaccentuated and ringingform.
The followingare the principal argumentsproduced in this
debate. " We are not able," declares one, " to conceiveof man
without morality,withoutlanguage, and not in society; and
these are the veryelementsof the definition which surpass the
means, the methods, and the pretensions of science." Of
purelyphysical science,yes; but can psychological and moral
sciences teach us nothingas to the origin of society,which,
as it appears, springs fromthe social instinctsof men,just as
in certainanimals fromsocial instinctsless highly developed,
and which have nothing supernaturalin them? "Science,"
declares another," has not sufficiently
accounted forthe origin
of man." Nor that of the insect or of the bird. Must we for
that reason suppose a miraculous origin? "Science has not
entirelyexplained the origin of human language." Nor the
originof the nightingale'ssong. Must we then conclude that
God was its singing-master ? The questionsof historicalorigin
acknowledge a mass that is unknown,but never miraclesand
mysteries. The metaphysicaloriginof matterand thoughtis
a mysteryonly for our intelligence; but science has never
promised to unveil this mystery,nor to make known the
unknowable. The positivismof Comte and the evolutionism
of Spencerhave givento the unknowableeven an exaggerated
role. The Mosaic hypothesis of creation, we must admit,
" gives us a replyto the question,whence we come, and the
theoryof evolutionwill never give us this answer." But the
hypothesisof the emanationfromthe bosom of Brahma, and,
generallyspeaking, religious narrativesof all sorts, give us
likewise a replyto the same question. How, then,are we to
choose withoutsummoningphilosophyto our aid?
If our intelligenceis not above suspicion, what are we to
say as to our feelingsand our imagination? These faculties
whichyou declare incapable of real integritywhen philosophy
and science are concerned,will they suddenlybecome vera-
cious when the question is of religious myths? And are we

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I42 International-7ournalof Ethics.

to argue that men of science are inferiorto aboriginals like

Moses, because the latter had more imagination and knew
less ? *
Science, unfortunatelyforit,has been defendedby scientists.
One of the most illustriousof these has remindedus that we
are indebtedto science forthe telegraph,the railroad,and even
" dyestuffs"! M. Berthelotadds, that" he adheresto the moral
code of duty and of the honest man." His moralityhas its
originneitherin " egotism nor fanaticism." Of course. But
is that a reason why this code should not reston some philo-
sophical principle? Does it implynone in its principlesor
in its conclusions? That is what the scientistsdo not tell us.
To the question of what we are, M. Morselli thinks it suffi-
cient to answer,"We are vertebrates,mammals,primatesof

* Nor have thephilologicalsciencesbeen able in theirturnto keep all of their

promises. If it is true thatthe Hellenists" formallyengaged to show us in the
philosophyof Greece and Rome the whole of Christianity," the Hellenistswere
certainlyverypresumptuous.ButI failtosee thatErnestHavet has everappeared
to believe thatthewhole of Christianity is in Hellenism. Progressis undeniable
in humanity. One is justifiedin sayingthattherewill alwaysbe "somethingin
ChristianitywhichHellenism cannotexplain,"but whetherexplicablebynatural
means or not,is an entirelydifferent question. Shakespearecannotbe explained
bythe literature whichprecededhim,and whichcontainsnothingwhichadds to
his genius; butwe are notto concludefromthisthat" Macbeth" and " Hamlet"
were composedunderthe dictationofthe Holy Ghost. Likewise,the Hebraizers
have not explainedthe Bible by the Mahabharata; butwe must grantalso that
the Orientalistshave just as littleexplainedthe Mahabharatabythe Bible; all of
which doesnotgo to provethatthe Mahabharatais a supernatural work,butonly
an originalwork. "There is somethingin the historyof the people of God
which is notto be foundin thatof any other." That is certain. And we can
also say that there is somethingin the historyof the Greekswhich cannotbe
foundin thatof any other,not even in the historyof the Hebrews. It does not
seem to us thatwe have here,eitherfor Greek or Hebrew, proofof anything
" irrational"or " marvellous." History,also, has not discovered" a law of his-
tory,"and thisthoughhistoricalsciencesare mere" idle curiosity,"if theirleast
researchesdo nottendto " a philosophyof history." But thisphilosophyis the
task of philosophers;and if Condorcet,Turgot,Comte,Vico, Herder,Kant, and
Hegel have not revealed some single law of historywhich was absolute,they
have nevertheless discovereda multitudeof partiallaws which leave thisto be
inferred. Moralistsa priori can declare this law, and sociologistsa pos/eriori
can withmoreand moreease discoverits operationin thebosomofactual socie-
ties.

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 143

an orderbut slightlydifferent fromthatof the quadrumanes."*

To the question, "whence we come?" M. Morselli replies,
"We come fromearlier formswhich,in the adaptations to
the conditions of life,have acquired the small number of
specificcharacteristicsby which we distinguishother anthro-
poids." At this moment one has just discovered a form
which is probably intermediatebetween man and the pri-
mates,-the "Pithecanthropuserectusof Sumatra." M. Mor-
selli did not perceive here that he was replyingto questions
of a purely biological character which teach us nothingof
what we are morallyand intellectually.

II.
In this entire discussion,in which the point at issue is to
determinewhetheror not science is to have the final leader-
ship of humanity,one thing has been neglected,-the defini-
tion of science. This termhas a broad sense and a restricted
sense. A science,in the broadest acceptationof the term-or
at least a cognition-is a rationallyestablishedsystemof facts
and ideas which,over a given range of objects, conferscer-
tainty,assurance,probability,or even a doubt that knows why
it doubts. To know that we do not know, and why,is none
the less to know; a negative solution is, afterits fashion,a
solution. To know that a thingis possible, or,betterstill,that
it is probable by virtueof such and such reasons forit and
such and such reasons against it, is always to know. Thus it
is thatbelieffoundedon reason entersthe categoryof science.
Science is then each legitimate product of the intelligence
operating freelywith the aid of what the theologians call
" natural reason." Thus understood, science includes uni-
versal philosophyas well as special sciences. It is beliefalone,
founded on the authorityof others, not regulated, and in-
capable of demonstration, or on the imaginationor feelingsto
which a supernaturalbearingis given,which mustbe excluded
fromthe domain of knowledge and of science in the broadest
sense of the word.

* "' La PretesaBancarottadella Scienza," Parma, 1895.

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I44 InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.

Apart from the antagonism of natural intelligence and

supernaturalbelief,we can establish in the domain of the
formera new antagonism between the pure sciences and
philosophy.
Science, in the true sense of the word,hinges on the rela-
tionsof objectsto each other independentlyof theirrelationto
the sentientand thinkingobject. This last relation,at least,is
understood. Among the ancients,as M. Boutroux has excel-
lentlydemonstrated,science is the cognitionof that which is,
of that which subsists amid all changes. For them,it is the
substance,the essence, the completed form or act; it is the
efficientcause; it is, above all, the finalcause. That is to say,
science is philosophy itself. As we moderns understand it,
science becomes, by detachingitselffromphilosophy,the per-
ception of the constantrelationsbetweenthings,such as these
appear to us, independentlyof whattheymay be in themselves.
Science hinges,above all, on the laws of growthand change;
on the laws, at one and the same time both practicaland theo-
retical,of the productionof things.
Bacon confineshimselfto the problemof material produc-
tion: what phenomena must we assume, indeed,as the an-
tecedentin order to produce some consequent phenomenon,
without our being able to know in the meanwhilewhythe
antecedentinvolves the consequent. Descartes, in his turn,
assumes as a standardwhat has been termed the ideal pro-
duction of mathematics,which undertakesto explain why this
consequence is enveloped in this particular principle; con-
sidering every empirical fact as a consequence or effective
solution of a mathematicalproblem,he endeavors to ascend
to the data of the problem in order to establishthe necessity
of the sequence.
Unquestionable it is, that the positivesciences,as thus un-
derstood,will take an ever-increasingpart in the utilitarian
and even moral directionof humanity; forthe world and life
cannot present themselveswith the same uniformity to a so-
cietyin which the sciences have reachedtheirmaturityas to a
society in whichtheyare stillin theirinfancy. Scientificideas,
moreover,are the only ones which are identicalbetween indi-

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 145

viduals. The momentan elementof faithentersamong these

ideas, individualsbegin to disagree. When we appeal to the
sentimentalprejudices which frequentlyenshroud confused,
imperfectly elucidated,and in part unconsciousideas, we appeal
unquestionablyto a considerableforce,but to one whichis sure
to enclose a multitudeof individualdivergences. Sentiments
which are the correlates of scientificideas are those which
have the most chance to fuse into a single and collectivesen-
timent. The domain of peace increases,then,between minds
withthe domain of science,at thatexact pointwhere the light
shines,whateverdivision may remain possible in other direc-
tions. Science is nothingelse than that social knowledge
which is one of the essential elementsof social consciousness.
That which is scientific,no one any longer disputes; it be-
comes henceforthpart of the collective experience and the
collectivereason. Geometry,for example, is a social posses-
sion in the intellectualorder,an integral part of an universal
intelligence:societythinksand acts geometrically. Of course,
the individual must rethinkgeometryand reconstructit in
order to understandit; but while his intellectthus puts itself
in harmonywith universal truth,we can say that it harmo-
nizes also withsocial intelligencein whichthis truthis hence-
forthliving and conscious. We are justified in concluding
that each science socializes truth. While it is a step in ad-
vance towardsthe objectivesynthesis,it is .also a step in ad-
vance towards the subjective and human synthesis; it con-
tributes to the formationof the collective soul. It is not
merely social intelligence which thus becomes richer and
more systematic,morevaried and moreunified,but also social
sensibilityand social will. Finally, the sum total of social
ideas of every kind engenders,along with correlativesenti-
ments,correlativeactions, not only in the individualbut also,
and above all, in the universalconsciousness. Thus each one
has a share in modes of action which are the propertyof all;
different minds coincide in those truthswhich awaken them
to common sentiments; they formthus a spiritualorganism.
Science is one of the constitutivefactorsof society; society
is in its turnone of the constitutivefactorsof science. Man,

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I46 International of Ethics.
-7ournal
reduced to individual isolation,-if such isolationwere pos-
sible,-would be about as incapable of science as the beast;
he would have only a germ of it, imperfectly developed by a
restrictedexperience. Science impliesa societyof conscious-
nesses which are exercised reciprocallyand towards exterior
things; it is a tripleharmonywith each and with the whole.
The idea of an " organization by science" can merit only
universal assent, because, as we have just seen, everyscien-
tificdiscoveryis an enlargementof the social consciousness,
and at the same time of social sympathyand social synergy.
It remainsnow to ask, whether the individual sciences are
sufficientto found the true "cerebral unity" of the human
race. This problem,whichso profoundlyengages thethought
of to-day,is in the main exactly the one which Comte offers
in the law of the "three estates." Man, as they say, dies
when he sees his own ghost; thus,according to Comte, the-
ology sees its ghost in metaphysics and dies; and meta-
physics then sees its ghost in science and dies in its turn.
In this difficult
problemthreehypothesesare possible; we
may admit,eitherthattheology and metaphysicswill eventu-
ally be absorbed in positive science, or thattheywill continue
to co-exist with science; but that theywill have a domain
more and more circumscribed,an influencemore and more
restricted,or that,while confiningthemselvesmore and more
to theirown domain,without infringingupon science,they
will increaseproportionably with the increaseof science itself;
so much so, thateach scientificprogresswould not be a reduc-
tion, but an extensionof true metaphysicsand of true the-
ology, or if you will, of true philosophyand of true religion.
There is a developmentby negation and destruction;there is
also a developmentby affirmation and construction; there is
finallya developmentby the synthesisof the two into a single
more comprehensiveidea. It is in this methodthat true evo-
lution consists,and the dialectic of Hegel is here in accord
with the evolutionismof Spencer. If by metaphysicsyou
mean the explanation of the factsof experienceby means of
entities and of causes which cannot be verifiedby experi-
ence or established in a definiterelationwith it,then it is

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy.

manifestthat metaphysics,thus understood,ought to disap-

pear, since it is only an erroneousway of construingscientific
explanation. But we must distinguishontology,which is an
abstract mythology,from pure philosophy,which seeks its
supportin the real, embraced by consciousness.
That true metaphysicsis to grow ever poorerand then dis-
appear in the abstract,is hard to conceive when we pass from
Heraclitus to Plato, fromPlato to Aristotle,fromAristotleto
Descartes, fromDescartes to Leibnitz,fromLeibnitz to Kant,
fromKant to Hegel and to Schopenhauer. Metaphysicshas
surelybeen despoiled of its ontological character,of its enti-
ties,just as religion has been of its grosser myths; but its
contents,far fromhaving been impoverishedthereby,have
been enrichedin the meanwhileunder the twofoldrelationof
extension and comprehension. True metaphysicscontains,
moreover,an elementwhich cannot be reduced to the cate-
gory of pure science,and which thus assures its perpetuity.
We have seen that science concernsitselfwith the mutual re-
lations of objects,considered independentlyof their relation
(i) to a sentientand thinkingsubject; (2) to the whole of
existence. This duplex relationis assumed,at least,but once
for all; afterwhich the phenomena,just as they are, being
given,science engages to determinetheirobjective relations,
while it eliminatesas much as possible the subject itself,the
consciousness forwhich they exist and throughwhich they
are known. Such a point of view is partialand abstract,since
it does not embrace the whole of the reality. What we term
realitymustbe at one and the same time both objective and
subjective; it is, the unity of things with the mind which
knows them. Pure sciences are partial in still another re-
spect,in that,even in the sphereof objects and theirrelations,
they are restrictedto fixed species of objects and to fixed
categories of relations. After abstractingthe thinkingsub-
ject, they abstractstill furtherall objects other than the one
which is to be considered; the mathematiciandisregards all
relations other than those of magnitude and extension; the
mechanistall relationsotherthan those of movement,and so
on. These limits are essential to science as we understand

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148 International-7ournalof Ethics.

this in modern times,occupying,as science must,a special

point of view. It is to these very limitsthat science owes its
perfect certainty,for at the outset,it takes something for
grantedwithout mounting higher,and it stops at the given
conclusionsactuallyobtainedwithoutbeing obliged to antici-
pate what is to follow. Hence, also, its rigorous method,
which,exercised between clearly determinedboundaries,has
only to seek generous ties between particular facts or par-
ticularconcepts. Sciences considerthus simple "aspects" or
simple "phases," never wholes. Comte, therefore, observed
that to explain the slightest object,-an explanation which
must always remainincomplete,-the scientistmust summon
to his aid a multitudeof sciences: mechanicswill account for
a firstaspect,physics fora second aspect,chemistryfora third,
etc. When man is in question,nothing less than the totality
of sciences will suffice. We are warranted,then,in affirming
thatthe subjectsof science are always finite. Positive science,
contentwithmakingclear the relationof finitethingsto things
finite,never deemingit necessaryto embrace the infinite, the
whole. The world always remainsforscience a brokenmirror,
while philosophy,by piecing togetherthe fragments, strivesto
catch a glimpse of the grand image. Comte himselfhas de-
clared that abstractions and " preliminarysimplifications,"
withoutwhich therecould be no science,in the true sense of
the word,always require a correspondingprocess of recom-
posing, since we wish to arrive at previsionof the factin its
actuality. We are obliged, in order to thus previse,to re-
establish the concrete unityof nature. But what is philos-
ophy,ifnot a step furtherin the same direction? Philosophy
corrects the abstraction which has thus been made of the
thinking subject, re-establishesthe unity of nature and of
thought. It has been correctlyobserved that when science
destroysthe unityof the objectiveworld,it does so, as a rule,
consciously. The abstraction,on the contrary,which philos-
ophy endeavors to correct,is generally unconscious. The
geometricianknows well enough that the ellipse does not
exhaust a planet's conditions of existence; but in revenge,
he can very easily conceive that we can search for the laws

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Pkilosophy.

of the intelligibleworld without once taking into account

the necessaryrelationof this world to intelligence. He can
conceive,furthermore, that the intelligiblelaws of geometry
would continueto exist unimpairedeven iftherewere no sort
of intelligenceat the base of the real world. The provinceof
the philosopheris to determineto what extentthe real is thus
possible withoutthe intellectual.
Purely empiricalpsychologyisolates the mindof the world,
and considersit as an object among the objects which it must
contemplate. Metaphysicsor pure philosophyregardsmind
as " a partof all that it knows," that is to say, as conditioning
what it knows at the very momentwhen it is conditioned by
it. Philosophy is not then like science, a pure abstraction,
but rather the integral re-establishment of the concrete. To
philosophize,says Hegel, is to think the totality of things,to
conceive of things in unitywhich is greater than their di-
vergences,and accounts forthese. Philosophy,even when it
considersisolatedlythe unityand the subjectivemovementof
thought,just as geometryconsiders abstractlythe relations
of space, so acts in order to discover more surely and the
more clearlythis unityand this movementin all the objectsof
thought.*
If philosophy,as Auguste Comte has definedit,is the effort
to arrive at a full cognitionof the world,it is, according to
Hegel, the effort to arriveat a complete" self-consciousness."
The two points of view are true, and they are inseparable.
We have a completer knowledge of ourselves in proportion
as we know the world which acts on us and in us, and we
have a completerknowledge of the world in its realityand in
its intelligibilityin proportionas we possess the fullercon-
sciousness of that standardof realityand of intelligencewhich
is in us, which is ourselves, and according to which we
necessarilyjudge every other existence,everyotherthought.
Philosophy may claim, then, over against the sciences that
perennityof which Leibnitz spoke. And, furthermore, how-
ever incompletethe present philosophical conception of the

* See Caird, " Social Philosophyof Comte."

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I 50 International-7ournalof Ethics.

worldand of lifemay be, it is neverthelessto philosophythat

the intellectualhegemonyin the practical order belongs, be-
cause the rational basis of moralitydepends neitheron the
positive sciences nor on religious faith,but on philosophy
itself. Theoretically,we are unquestionablynot obliged to
philosophize; we may take the abstract point of view of
science, and say, "Movements are conditioned by such and
such laws whichwe formulatein this or that symbolical man-
ner. That which actually moves, I do not know; why and
how, I do not know." We are then like one, who, confronted
withothermen and animals,should say: " When I give a blow
to these extended and mobile forms,I receive one in return
whichcauses me pain. What thereis back of the formswhich
thus resist me I do not know; why they strike me when I
strikethem I do not know. Could it be possible that my
blows cause them something analogous to the pain which I
experience? I do not know,and I do not wish to know."
The attitudeof the pure positivisttowards nature is some-
thing like this; he is not willing to inquirewhetherbehind
the movementsof these beings which he ranges under the
category of inanimatematterthere is not something analo-
gous to that back of the movementsof beings called dumb
brutesand of beings called men. Justas he pleases ! He is
not forced to speculate on the real conditionsof phenomena,
in so far,at least,as no problemof practicalmoralitydemands
a solution of the philosophical problem.
But as regardsmenand even animals,we are indeed obliged
to assume the existence of the psychic behind mechanical
appearances. If I looked on men as machineswhich did not
feel,neithermoralitynor societywould be any longer possible.
The necessity of reasoning by analogy is here practically
obligatory,and it receivesits justificationtheoreticallyin the
factthat all takes_place just as ifothermenfelt and willedlike
ourselves. For animals,the verificationis the same, though
less sure; so much so, indeed, that Malebranche could per-
suade himselfthat his dog did not feel.
With respectto beings called inanimate,the verification be-
comes more and more difficult, and even impossible. And it

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 5'

is forthis reason that we can here dispense with inductions

and analogies. Practicallyand scientifically it is enough,then,
to act according to the abstract laws of mechanics,without
concerningourselves withthe inquirywhetherthese so-called
inanimatebeings are but the mask of some rudimentaryform
of psychic life. But as for the philosopher,this abstraction
is not sufficient forhim; his vocation is to make hypotheses,
not, of course,upon the unknowable,but upon the unknown.
When verificationis no longer possible, he declares,exactly
the reverseof Newton,"Hypothesesfingo."And thathypothe-
sis, moreover,which is the immediateand natural prolonga-
tion of experience, that is to say, sensation and impulsion,
instead of springing up suddenly fromnothing in animals,
are already existent there under less developed and more
stagnant forms,-at firstin vegetables,then in minerals,and,
generallyspeaking,in the molecules of which animals them-
selves are only more complex combinations. In otherwords,
in the domain of positive science we are contentto inferone
relationfromanother relationwithouttouching on the ques-
tion of what reality lies beneath or beyond. To positive
science, the propositionthat " a stone is heavy" has in nowise
the significationthat the stone makes an effortof any sort or
encloses in itselfa forceanalogous to thatwhich I feel; it ex-
presses merelya normal relation between phenomena; but I
am obliged to animateit,to spiritualizeit in a certainfashion,
just as I animateand spiritualizeyou in orderto conceive you
as real. When I examine objects that are supposed to be in-
animate,when I conceive them philosophicallyin themselves,
and no longer scientifically in their exterior relations among
themselves or with me, I can representthem to myselfonly
as forces,tendencies, appetites,activities,more or less obscure
wills, in a word,as rudimentarysorts of self,as sub-conscious
and quasi-mentalexistences; formental existence is the only
sort which cannot be resolved into phenomena and relations.
When it is a question of similars,as we have seen, no more
hesitation is possible: I throwmyselfcompletelyinto these,
and they are for me other egos which,like me, sufferor re-
joice, act, live, and wish to live. This inductionwhich rests

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I52 International-ournal of Ethics.

on the actual, this objection of the mental, which is the

single truth an sick which I can apprehend,because it is in
me, because it is myself,-this inductionis the firstcondition
of a systemof ethics. To act morally,then,is no longer to
act according to appearancesand the relationsof appearances;
it is to act in the world of realitiesand accordingto the induc-
tive cognitionwhich we have of this world.
This is why we have oftensaid a moral act impliesa phi-
losophy,while the constructionof a bridge or of a steamboat
implies none at all. Without question,whateverhypothesis
we make as to the " underlyingprincipleof morality,"practi-
cally we shall always be obliged to give it the wider interest
in order to reach some conclusion withreferenceto it; with-
out question,moreover,this wider intereststands in the same
relation to the unknown groundworkof moralitythat,in the
word of the Gospel, love to our neighbor seems to stand to
the love of God: the only method of determiningits con-
tents,the only way of giving it a practical expression. But,
again, we need some hypothesis or some more or less con-
scious philosophical thesis as to the ultimatesignificanceand
sense of moralityin orderto defendmoralityagainst egotism.
"In science," as has been objected,"the empirical ground-
workof thingsis confusedwith the formula; forthe physicist
heat is the movementitselfwhich permitsus to determineits
laws." Yes; because the physicisthas need of nothingmore
than this; but the moralist is bound to determinewhether
" the wider interest"is a real good instead of merelyseeming
to be a good; when we are summonedto renounceourselves,
we cannot be satisfiedwith the merelyseeming. We must
form forourselves some idea, some representationof the re-
ality and of the ideal direction which results fromthe very
nature of reality. There is nothing either truly human or
individual or social without an ideal which determines it.
There is no ideal withouta more or less explicitconceptionof
the realityitself,that is, withouta conscious or unconscious
philosophy,in a scientificor religiousform,of which morality
is only the translationinto sentimentsand acts.

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 153

III.
Does it followfromthe foregoingdefinitionsand distinc-
tions that science will have the moral hegemonyof humanity?
Purely objective science, no; science at once objective and
subjective,with philosophy as its indispensable crown, yes.
But when we affirmthat philosophyand science must have
the moral and intellectualhegemony in futuresocieties,we
do not mean by that to deny the influencewhich must also
belong to sentiment,especially to the religioussentiment. In
the firstplace, great philosophical and scientificideas are
accompanied by aestheticaland moral sentimentswhich give
them their practical worth. Then, again, practice is not
merelythe applicationof a theory; it is still more a complex
action; it is a new synthesis in view of a new end, in some
sort,a new theory; it is obliged indeed to take into account
other elements than the merely intellectual. Scientificand
philosophical knowledge,remaining,as these always must do
limited,therewill always exist beyond them a sphere which
is open to beliefswhich are based on intellectualvaluations
and on sentiments. Hence what we call moral faith,which is
the foundationof all religious faith.
According to Bossuet, " when the reason which forces our
assent is in the object itself,this is knowledge; . . . when
the reason forbelievinga propositionis derivedfromhim who
proposes it, thereresultsbelief or faith." The criterionof all
faith,according to this early theory,would be affirmation on
the testimonyof others. But,even then,faithis onlyan appli-
cation of knowledge. The reasons which determinethe assent
are always objective; the other individuals,theirmoral and
intellectualvalue, theirown relationto the factwhich is to be
established,theircompetence,theirimpartiality, etc.,all this is
the object of our judgment,whetherthis be probable or cer-
tain,but the object,in fine,of scientificjudgment.The " asser-
tions without proofsof the wise and experienced man," says
Aristotle,have great value, chieflyin moral questions; but,as
has been answered,thisis not because these assertionsare actu-
ally withoutproof,but because he who affirmsthemhas expe-
VOL. VI.-NO. 2 II

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 154 Internationaljournal of Ethics.

rienced them,and has reasons foraffirming them. Very dif-

ferentis that faithbased on testimony,thatpurelymoral belief
whichaccording to the followersof Kant constitutestruefaith.
Moral faith,they say, bringsto the philosopheran increase of
assurance, an " increase of knowledge." For example, free-
dom, from the point of view of pure reason,is at best only
possible; but from the point of view of the practicalreason,
it becomes not merelybetterknown,but certain,and is in this
sense an object of faith. Faith, as has been said, affectsthe
moral character of the judgment, it furnishesno new judg-
ment.* .But faith,even in this form,is, as we think,always
an application of knowledge,and is valid only in proportion
as it includes cognizing elements. An increase of assurance
can come only froman increase of reason, and so of knowl-
edge. That I may have the assurance of freedomfroma prac-
tical point of view, I must know some moral principle like
duty,which makes freedomnecessary,and the assurance of
freedomwill be subordinated to the knowledge of duty as
certain and as implyingpower. I shall not content myself
with changing the modality of the judgment; I shall pro-
nounce new judgments. The value of my belief will be in
directproportionto the value of my knowledge. So faras its
validityis concerned,faiththenis a sortofconfusedknowledge,
merelyprobable, or assurance limited at certain points. So
far as all else is concerned,faithis a sentiment,a passion, a
habit. We believe, indeed,not solely with our intellect,but
with our sentimentsand our innate or acquired impulses. It
is incontrovertible thatour sentimentsand our impulses,there-
sult as they are of a social actionprolonged throughcenturies,
contain a hereditarystore of truth,though a truth mingled
with much error. If it were necessarythat each individual
should with his hypercriticalreason doubt everything,and,
like a Descartes in miniature,refuseto rememberthatmen had
ever existedbeforehim,we should be in greatdangerof having
somethingvery different fromwhat Descartes was. It is then
most importantthat we should take into account the social

* M. Darlu, RezouePhilosokhique,October,I892.

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 155

heritage in those questions which concern others and our-

selves. In this sense,itwill oftenbe much betterforhim who
does not pretendto be a philosophical innovatoror creatorto
follow the dictates of his heart, not to break too suddenly
withthe " wisdom of nations." The philosopherhimself,who
has learned fromSocrates and Kant how circumscribedour
knowledge is, will hesitate to elevate his personal opinion
above the universal conditions of the society in which he
lives. In this sense, faithis most legitimate;but nevertheless
this legitimacyis still foundedon reason: assurance of a sum
of truthinherentin the moral and social discipline,assurance
of individualfallibility,assurance of the impotenceof abstract
reasoningwhen exercised on problemsthat are too complex,
etc. Moral belief remains here, nevertheless,the rationabile
obsequiumn.
In questions,even,which do not concernmorality,we cannot
always analyze all; a man of business who launches himself
into an enterprise,acts according to a belief,that is to say,
according to a probabilitywhich carrieswith it some risks.
He sees reasons forand reasons against; it seems to him that
the "fors carryit," perhaps because his desire is on this side;
and he ventures. But is the conclusion fromsuch reasoning
against science? If we could only have a veritablescience in
all practicalaffairs,we should all act scientifically. Because
we lack this,we all act just as intelligentlyas we can, and
there, where intelligencebecomes silent,we follow our in-
stinctivesentimentswhich are intelligencestored up by life;
among these instinctivesentiments,it is always surerand more
rational to give the preferenceto the altruistic,which have
been formedby the experience of the ages themselves,and
which representthe action upon us of entire society. A
" good sentiment"is collectivereason,instead of being reason
in detail; but it is none the less reasonable for never having
been reasoned out. Can you explain to a child all the reasons
of what you enjoin upon him? When this is possible, you
ought to do it; but is this always possible, his mental status
considered? When you have him learn Latin towards the
age of nine or ten, can you make him understandall the good

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156 International..ournal of Ethics.

he will derivefromclassic studies? Does he possess the ele-

mentsnecessaryforthe solution of the problem? Likewise,
these grownchildrenwhom we call the people, can they be-
gin in the morningby doubtingeverythingin orderto act for
the rest of the day in the full glare of the goddess Reason ?
We must shed abroad as much light as possible, but what if
we cannot make it penetratetherewhere that other formof
light,heat, exists? Will you extinguishthe firesidebecause
this warms the whole body but does not especiallydazzle the
eyes ? Belief is also very oftenan esthetic sentiment,with
its own peculiar evidence which it is impossible to explain
in detail. Can you prove mortegeometricothat the Venus
of Milo is beautiful? Suppose a negro should prefera Hot-
tentotVenus, by what train of reasoning will you be able
to convince him? Correctness of taste, trustworthinessof
judgment in thingsof art go as littleby systematicreasoning
as does the marksmanwho strikesthe target.
It was in this sense that Pascal could correctlysay, " The
heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." But
whose heart? The heart of the savage cannibal? The heart
of the civilizedman ? The heart of the Mussulman? or that
of the Christian? All depends on the degree of intelli-
gence in this heart,eitherin the reflectiveconditionor in the
condition of heritage received by tradition and education.
The pretendedconflictbetween intelligenceand the heart is
in realitythe conflictof one formof intelligencewithanother,
of the reflectivewiththe spontaneous. By itselfand in itself,
the word heart has no meaning: sentimentwithout intelli-
gence has no definitecontents. Only blind corporalappetite,
like that of hungerand thirst,can dispense with intelligence
and with much more! The true reasons of the heart can,
therefore,become intelligibleto the reason itself,doubtless
not to the mere abstractreason,but to the reason whichtakes
into account all the real data of a problem,that is to say, the
data of all the reasons. Because we cannot always enumer-
ate, one by one, these complex and profoundreasons which
present themselves so tumultuously to the inner glance,
and are none the less reasonable for that, must we con-

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. I57

dude that we act blindly? He, who embraces a totalityat

a single glance and acts accordingly,is not for that reason
blind.
Reason, in fine,can exist under a syntheticand an analytic
form. The lattergives account to itselfof itself. There are,
unfortunately, problemsin the moral and social order so com-
plex that our analysis,can neverbe exhaustive. In this case,
we are constrainedto trust to a syntheticview. If we had
to analyze everythingto the bottom beforeacting,we should
never act at all. The reason demi-scienceis oftenmore dan-
gerous than ignorance, is because it is an unconscious and
half-wayanalysis,whichneverthelessthinksthatit is complete
and assumes to rule our action. Such a science may be com-
pared witha merchantwho should forgethalf the columns in
his bill and act accordingly. He could not failto be speedily
ruined. Nevertheless,demi-science,withall its disadvantages,
is a necessarymoment,a stadium in evolution. The misfor-
tune is that our human science is always demi-science; and
hence, the very legitimate role of sentimentand of belief.
But never should belief revolt against science and put itself
in oppositionto it. Science remains,as we have seen, a true
social possession; it is a domain the limitsof which are un-
questionablyuncertain,but the interiorof which is none the
less uncontestedand incontestable. In ethics,thereis always
to be found a part which is trulyscientific, that part which
relates to the essential conditionsof human development,and
especially of social development. The domain of sentiment,
on the contrary,remains the most indefinite. Where is the
seat of the authorityhere? and wherethe certitude? Science,
it is objected,"concerns itselfonly with the past," and has
only a feeble,practicalinfluence; to belief belongs the future.
Those, who make this objection, forget that the peculiar
province of science is exactly this, to forecast and to
realize the future. Its two methods, induction and deduc-
tion, with the verificationwhich completes them and the
hypothesiswhich precedes them,enable science to forestall
the futureand to direct it in the line of our desire. Static
science, which seems to be only of the past, representsall

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I58 InternationalYournal of Ethics.

that is stable for to-morrowand e'i jit'; dynamic science,

trulyopens up the futureand follows change itself,but by
means of law.
It is a human dutypar excellenceto seek for the greatest
possible amount of certitude. But thereis no othertrue cer-
titudethan intellectualcertitude. Undoubtedlywe must love
truthin order to seek for it: if Pythagoras had not loved
geometricaltruth,he would neverhave discoveredhis theorem
nor immolated his hecatomb; but the preliminarycondi-
tion of intellectual exercise is not this exercise itself. So
long as Pythagorasconfinedhimselfto loving,he discovered
nothing. Love and good-will can supplement in a practical
way the imperfectionof knowledge,but they do not render
certainwhat is uncertain except by an illusion which cannot
be erected into a rule, eitherof moral or of intellectual con-
duct. The firstrule is sinceritytowardsyourselfand others.
That faithis " efficacious"is incontestable,but its efficacious-
ness does not constituteits truthfulness.We can move moun-
tains in the name of an erroras well as in the name of truth.
The Mohammedans have gained battles in the name of false
beliefs. We oftenhave personal or national prejudiceswhich
we erect into universal and permanentneeds of the human
conscience,without rememberinghow oftenthe " exigencies
of the conscience" have varied with the ages. We cannot
make these prejudices a criterionof the value of theories;
besides, it is not belief alone which engenders action; it is
action also, the fact accomplished and often accomplished,
which engenders belief. Belief,farfromhaving the rightto
always judge the act, is often itselfonly the productof the
act,ofancestralroutine. How, then,maywe accord thehegem-
ony to belief,since it may be just as trulythe product of a
secular erroras the principleof a truthwhich dominatesprac-
tical life? "Mind," said Comte, " ought to be the ministerof
the heart,never its slave." Hence the condemnationof all
dogmaticand authoritativefaith. Freedom ought to remain
the essence of belief even when this, under the name of re-
ligion,becomes collectiveand social.
According to Auguste Comte, religions become less and

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. 159

less concrete,and go on becoming more and more abstract,

until,like metaphysics,they end in complete negation. But
we must distinguishhere between the imaginativeelements
and the philosophical and moral elementsin religions. The
factis incontestablethat religionsprogressivelylay aside their
mythologyand become more and more spiritual. But it has
been rightlyobservedthat the fetichismof savages, in spite of
its apparentluxuriousnessof folly,is, in reality,verypoor and
very monotonous fromthe point of view of the imagination
and of aesthetics. Nothing is so much like the fetichismof
the Papuans as the fetichismof the Bushmen,or that of any
otherinferiortribe. But religionshave a metaphysical,moral,
and social significancewhich,far from decreasingwith time,
becomes, on the contrary,the richer for this. It has been
rightlyobserved how much more complex than the Hebraic
idea of Jehovahor the Hindu idea of Brahma,is the Christian
idea of the God-man,who lives in us and forus, and in whom
we live in our turn. We can say, therefore,that religions
themselves continue to become more universal and, at the
same time.more individual; they followthe simultaneouslaw
of integrationand specification. Then, too, if the tendencyof
mythologyis to disappear,the immediate result of this will
not be a tendencyon the part of religionto disappear,nor is
it proved that the religious sentimentlost in complexity,in
depth,in universality,when fromfetichismit became pagan,
and frompagan Christian.
Meanwhile,there is in this problem great cause of embar-
rassment. We may indeed ask ourselves whetherreligion,in
so faras it is distinctfrommetaphysicsand fromethics,is not
composed of preciselythis mythicaland imaginativeelement,
of the anthropomorphicrepresentationof the deity, and of
miracles united to mysteries. In this case it is certainthat
religionsassume in our timemoreand more of a philosophical
aspect as theylay aside theirmythicelement. In thisrespect,
we must admit that Protestantismis incontestablynearer to
pure philosophythan is Catholicism. Comte would have the
right,then,fromthis point of view, to maintainthat religion,
in so faras it is only mythologyand human representation,

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i6o InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.

tends to become absorbed in metaphysicsand ethics; these

being conceived,it is true,under the formof social and col-
lective,and not merelyindividual,beliefs. Will philosophy
and religiontake then,as Comte believes,the scientific, posi-
tive form? Here, again, all will depend upon our definition
of science. If you conceive of science as objective,afterthe
fashionof mathematicsand physics,it is impossibleto hope
forsuch an objectizingof thatwhichconcerns,on one side, the
thinkingor willingsubjectand, on the other,the finalunityof
the subject and of the object in a relationwhich is trulyuni-
versal. Philosophy even has not the same point of view as
pure science. Much less, still,can religion become objective
science if we understandby religiona belief,a sentimentboth
collectiveand personal,a union of mindsand ofwills towards
a supreme end. Religion is a philosophyof sentimentand of
imaginationwhich is chieflysocial, although it addresses itself
to the individual; it is a poetryof consciousness seeking after
the loftiestuniversalideal. Here, again, the pointof view has
no longerthe objectiveand exteriorcharacterof those verities
which Comte calls positive. Thus, Comte himselfmakes an
appeal in the religiousorder to the subjectivemethod,but one
incompletelyunderstoodand too utilitarian.
We certainlycannot demand of philosophywhatthese posi-
tive religions pretendto give,-positive knowledge as to the
mysteriesof existence. But in these religions themselves,
we see the empireof dogma ever decreasing. Protestantism
allows freedomof investigation,and freedomof investigation
extended to all, is philosophyitself. Philosophyis not an im-
mutable dogma; it is a progressivemovement. Progress is
not in philosophy a sign of inferiority, but of superiority.
There are Indian tribeswho believe that the soul of one who
sleeps, is really on a journey,and that he must not be awa-
kened beforehis soul comes back, at the risk of cuttingshort
his existence. In the same way, we must not awaken the
people too suddenlyout of their mythological dream: we
must give their reason time to return.* Philosophy like
science ought none the less to accomplish its work, to be
* See Guyan," Irreligionde P'avenir."

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 The Hegemony of Science and Philosopphy. i6i

solicitousof nothing save the truth,to cherish no feelingof

hostilitytowards positive religions, and at the same time
make no hypocriticalcompromises.
It is the consciousness of the unitybetween our true self
and the law of the universewhich constitutesreligion,philo-
sophicallyinterpreted. To admit,in otherwords,thatthe true
consciousness of self is reached only throughthe moral con-
sciousness, and thisthroughthe social consciousness,and this
throughthe law of the universe,is to admit the veryprinciple
of all true religion,underwhateverformone may representto
himselfthis moral unity of the world. He is moral who
says: Do the good, let come what may. He is religiouswho
says: The good will arrivesoon or late to all; and morality,
farfrombeing an illusion,is the true revelationof the uni-
verse. But this idea of a supreme synthesisbetween the
natural and the moral is at bottom thoroughlyphilosoph-
ical, and it pertains to philosophy to justifyit. Instead of
drawing sceptical or mystical conclusions fromthis present
debate as to the value of science, as is now done in France
and England. we should ratherforma superior conceptionof
science and its role. We have been, and that fora long time,
one of those who rebel against the conceptionof science as
purely representative;a conceptionwhichis intimatelybound
up with that of a purely reflectiveintelligenceexercised on
objects independentof itself. He who maintains that the
idea is a force,ought to maintainlikewise that science also is
a force,that is to say, an action and a production,not merely
a reflectionof objects.
One of the errorsof science and of philosophyin the intel-
lectualistformwhich they have taken in our epoch, has been
preciselythis,to overlook the fact that philosophy and sci-
ence are not solely speculations,but also actions and produc-
tions.* They are so not merelyby theirpossible consequences
or by the exteriorend which they have in view,but indeed in
themselves and by themselves,in their own essence and in
theirformation.

* See " Evolutionnismedes Iddes-forces."

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162 Internationaljournalof Ethics.
Science, indeed,discoversnew solutions only by asking new
questions, and it is here we must declare: Every question,
well asked, is half answered. Moreover,a question asked of
nature is always an idea of mind,a directingidea, an idea-
force. The question is worth as much as the idea, and the
replyas the question.
When Plato sought for universal forms in things, when
Aristotlesought therethe individualact, and its final cause,
when the middle age attemptedto findthere the quiddity,
the substance-form,-thedirectingideas led to very different
questions fromthe one which distinctivelymodern science
asks: how? according to what law? After all, then, philo-
sophical ideas govern science. In other words, it is the
subjective development of the human intelligence and the
self-consciousnesswhich it attains which permit it to pro-
pound, an objective world of new questions and to reply,
knowledgeof theworld being inseparablefromself-conscious-
ness. We have here a double development,thetwo elements
of which are in partnership. We mustknow ourselves better
and better in order to interrogatenature; we must know
nature better and better in order to interrogateourselves.
Philosophy and science, withoutever being confoundedwith
one another,are always united: the progressof one is the pro-
gress of the other. The world becomes what it is to our
cognizance only by the developmentof our own conscious-
ness: we can findin it nothingwhich we are not preparedto
ask it by virtueof our own internaldevelopment. And not
only is the power itselfof interrogatingnature characteristic
of thought; but yet more,afterhaving taken the initiativein
the question, it ought very oftento take that of the reply,
under the formof hypothesisat first,then that of verification,
then under that of application. We have repeated many
times,while givingit a broader sense,the saying of Aristotle:
"To know is to act." Bacon has declared in vain that we
must passively obey nature in order to command her. Even
in physics,we must reconstructby the instrumentality of our
thoughtan ideal nature,and act on this in order to determine
later whetherreal nature co-operateswith our action and we

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 The Hegemonyof Science and Philosophy. i63

withthat of nature. The conceptionnecessarilyprecedesthe

experimentation, and what we call truth is the resultof co-
operation,an efficaciouscollaboration,not a passive register-
ing of mere inertimpressions. Psychologyis farless passive
than physics. It also is a productionof facts,an experimen-
tationwhich combines and calls forthphenomena. We act
always in psychic facts. It is through ourselves,at least in
part,that theyexist: in observingthem,we modifythem,often
even evoking them. But some one will ask: How shall we
apprehend,then,an independentreality? We answer,thatwe
do not createpsychicfacts; and thatif our effort to know them
by reflexionmodifiesand changes them,this is by virtueof
regularlaws,by virtueofa determination whichcan become the
object of consciousness. Besides, in psychicfactsthereis the
sensitive element which is passive, and which is introduced
into us fromwithout,an object of possible study. The re-
lations of our sensations,of our pleasures, of our pains, all
this is also an object of possible study. It is doubtlessnot an
isolated subjective phenomenonwhich we are examining,as
none such exists without an objective element. But it is
legitimateand possible to studyinteriorfacts,not as the reflex
of exterior objects, but only in so far as these are the ex-
pression of the profoundersubjective phenomenon which
underliesthem. If we are unable to make of this innersub-
jective phenomenonan object of discursive science, and even
if we are obligedto considerit as an ultimatedatum,it is still
truethatwe can drawevernearerto thisremotesubjectivity and
organize interiorfacts in their relationto it, and not in their
relationto the outerworld. Thus is a psychologypossible;
not a psychologythat is separated fromall physiology,but a
psychology,whatever special name we may give to it, which
is a knowledge of ourselves such as we become, such as we
make ourselvesunderthe action fromwithoutand the reaction
fromwithin. For a still strongerreason,the active character
of intelligenceis still more manifestin general philosophy
whereabsoluteverification becomes impossible. When science
has discoveredlaw and order in nature,it has not yet acquired
its highestvalue nor its greatest interest. Science, to reach

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i64 International_7ourna/
of Ethics.

this,must appear in essential relationwith intelligenceeven

and with will. The part of universal philosophy is to re-
establish this relationwhich has been neglected or despised
by positivism. Philosophy alone is the study of the reality
itselfboth as factand consciousness. The contemplativecon-
sciousness? or the active? Not the former,forby the very
factthat it contemplatesand reflects,it changes and abstracts;
but in the second, in which we are the whole of ourselves,in
which, along with the sentimentand the action of practical
life, we obtain the most intense sentimentof reality. This
reality,moreover,is not immobileand as if crystallizedin the
past; it is in the process of becoming and determinesthe
future. It embraces then as one momentthe done and the
to-bedone,the realized and the more or less conscious ideal
which realizes it.
The reactionagainst science will not have been in vain. It
will have served to preparea philosophyof actionin which the
thought is no longer merely a reflectionand a copy of the
model subjectivelypresented,but a creationof new effectsin
harmonywith those already existing. We believe,then,that
if we attributea " force"to the " idea," we can conciliate all
that is exact in the intellectualtheoryof truthwhich makes
a "harmony" of the two, and in the volition theorywhich
makes an " action" or an " activebelief" of them; truthis the
simultaneousand individual harmonyof actions and of ideas,
the determinismof which is the manifestation,the will not
being any more unintelligentthan the intelligenceis inactive.
We conclude,therefore, thatthe true hegemonybelongs to the
intelligentvolitionof universal ends, a volition which exists
as obscure consciousnessin religion,but reaches in philosophy
and in science the clear consciousness of its goal and of its
means.
ALFRED FOUILLE'E.
Memberof the Instituteof France.

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