Defense Diplomacy 2010 | United States Agency For International Development | Cyber Attack

10

ideas Defense
for

& Diplomacy

July 2010 | Featured Idea An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency

10 Ideas for Defense and Diplomacy
July 2010

National Director Hilary Doe National Network Coordinator Tarsi Dunlop Lead Strategist for Defense and Diplomacy Reese Neader Managing Editor Gracye Cheng Editor Sid Salvi The Roosevelt Institute Campus Network 455 Massachusetts Ave NW Suite 650 Washington, DC 20001
Copyright © 2010 by the Roosevelt Institute. All rights reserved. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors. They do not express the views or opinions of the Roosevelt Institute, its officers, or its directors.

10

ideas
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Defense Diplomacy
and

Congratulations to Rachel Tecott & Justin Metz, authors of American Cotton Subsidies & Pakistan: An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency Nominee for Policy of the Year

Mediating Public-Private Relationships: Increasing U.S. Cyber-Security Joelle Gamble Decreasing Restrictions for Grants to NGOs: A Reversal of the “Anti-Prostitution Pledge” Amreen Rahman Elevating Development as the Third Pillar of American Foreign Policy Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Ruhk Paracha Expanding Naval Humanitarian Aid Charlie Piggott Agricultural Development Teams as Stabilizing Forces Jay Hobbs American Cotton Subsidies & Pakistan: An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency Rachel Tecott and Justin Metz Bringing Investment Freedom to Central Asia Devin Turner A Sound Approach to European Missile Defense Jesse Hubbard Recognition of Kurdish Territory Gains Ashley Herzovi A Comprehensive Approach to Child Labor Eradication in the Bolivian Mines Marcelo A. Ostria Roosevelt Review Preview: Elevating Development as the Third Pillar - Extended Paper Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Ruhk Paracha

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Inside the Issue

p Letter from Washington
e are pleased and proud to present the second edition of the 10 Ideas Series. Comprised of six journals, these articles represent the best of our student policy work across the country. Throughout the past year, our national policy strategists have supported hundreds of students chapters stretching from New England and Michigan to California and Georgia. As a peer-to-peer network, our student strategy team is unlike any other - they are both friends and mentors, strategists and promoters. Instead of waiting for their ideas to be approved in Washington, our Washington team looks to the field for our most innovative policies - and it is the student network that votes on the best proposals of the year. Within this volume, you will find a variety of ideas in motion. Some are new proposals being spread for the first time; others have already gained traction in their local community, as our campus chapters work to enact their policies today. Some will rise to higher prominence in the months ahead, gathering momentum as the idea is adopted throughout our national network of 8000 members. A few will be adopted by state legislatures and city councils; some make it all the way to Capitol Hill. A year ago, one Colorado student published an idea about improving remote access to health care via unused television waves; the state of California is now working with him to make that idea a reality. A pair of students in Chicago postulated that their school could start a revolving loan fund for energy efficient building and development; they now help administer such a fund at Northwestern. Whether intensely localized or built for the nation at large, these ideas all have the potential to become realities. We look forward to what comes next for these authors - and if you can be a part of that change, we hope you’ll join us. Sincerely, Tarsi Dunlop National Network Coordinator

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Strategist’s Note P
for re-framing the national security debate. The progressive movement has the opportunity to define the 21st century approach to American foreign policy.

The failures of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era have created the potential

A progressive vision of U.S. foreign policy stresses the application of “smart power” to promote U.S. national security interests and ensure continued U.S. leadership in the international community. This strategy employs a “3D” approach to addressing national security challenges; balancing the use of defense, diplomacy, and development as effective tools of U.S. global engagement. In a rapidly globalizing world, the connections between inequity and conflict are clear. Poverty is a driver for ideological extremism and political violence. Increasing access to economic security (health care, education, living wages, etc.) decreases the potential for inter-state and intra-state conflict. War between states is becoming a rare phenomenon while war within impoverished, failing states is increasing. Promoting good governance (democratization, anti-corruption, etc.) increases the resilience of states that face development challenges. Promoting sustainable development in the Global South ensures that developing countries can maintain economic growth and political stability in the current global system. In addition, promoting sustainable development at home ensures that the United States can, in the future, reduce its dependency on foreign oil, maintain an independent foreign policy, and afford to continue supporting a global system that ensures American prosperity. The Defense & Diplomacy Center has stressed the importance of two critical themes in the policy writing process for 10ideas: • “Natural Security”: stresses the value of equitable access to and stewardship of natural resources, at home and abroad, in promoting U.S. national security and developing U.S. foreign policy. • “Sustainable Security”: stresses the concepts of collective defense and human security as valuable approaches to formulating a sustainable U.S. national security strategy. We promote a progressive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on the application of “Defense 3.0”; the synergy of defense, diplomacy, and development to promote global social and economic integration that provides equal access to ethical markets, encourages sustainable development, and fosters multilateral dialogue. Wage peace, Reese Neader Lead Strategist, Defense & Diplomacy

Mediating Public-Private Relationships: Increasing U.S. Cyber-Security
Joelle Gamble, University of California Los Angeles Non-governmental, third party entities should be used to connect cyberspace data from the public and private sectors. This will address private sector concerns of public harm and liability associated with sharing information on cyber-attacks and foster a much needed public-private relationship on issues of US cyber-security. In 2007, there were almost 44,000 separate reported incidents of malicious cyberactivity on US government websites. This marks a 30 percent increase since 2006 and 10 times as much activity as that reported in 2001. The private sector, particularly financial service providers, experiences cyber-attack on a regular basis. In November 2008, a cyber-attack compromised the payment processors of an international bank and permitted fraudulent transactions at over 130 ATMs in 49 different cities, all within a 30 minute time span.4 In the US, cyber-attacks have been Key Facts designed to steal valuable financial • In November 2008, the compromised payment and personal information or destaprocessors of an international bank permitted bilize entire computer networks. fraudulent transactions at more than 130 auThe CIA reported in 2008 that tomated teller machines in 49 cities within a 30-minute period.4 malicious cyber-activity against • In 2008, industry losses from intellectual information technology systems property theft through the internet estimate has caused the disruption of electo as high as $1 trillion.2 tric power capabilities, including • A 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Rea multi-city power outage. E-comview reported that the private sector is hesimerce in 2008 alone amounted to tant to work with government due to govern$132 billion in retail sales, making ment information sharing measures that could private industries a prime target cause reputational harm if shareholders were for malware.1 In 2007, a single US made aware of their system vulnerabilities.1 retailer experienced data breaches and losses of personal identifiable information that compromised over 45 million credit and debit cards. This incident brings up the question of why US government and private businesses are not collaborating on issues of cyber-security. Both are susceptible to dangerous cyber-activity and both sectors regularly develop new methods to stymie cyber-attack.4 Analysis Both President Obama and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano have expressed a desire to work with the private sector in promoting US cyber-security.6 However, private companies are hesitant to work with the US government for fear that the Freedom of Information Act and other transparency measures will harm their reputations and adversely influence their shareholders by revealing their data systems’ vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. Civil liberties groups are concerned that extending government protection and classification standards to private businesses will act as a shield against liability for private business practices. 8

In the United Kingdom, vetted information security providers link data from different members of the private sector.1 If adapted for use in the United States, the compilation of cyber-security data by a third party will allow the private sector to safely share cyber-security data without compromising their economic security and, with the proper regulation, can prevent private companies from claiming government protection as an excuse for concealing reputation-damaging information. In addition, increasing technological development in cyber-security can also reduce US reliance or foreign supplies of cyber-defense technologies and improve our global competitiveness. Next Steps The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the EOP Cyber-securiTalking Points ty Coordinator, together with private • Cyber attacks are easy to plan and execute; sector companies, could develop or because there is no immediate physical hire a third party entity to compile danger to the perpetrators, cyber attacks can be performed by almost any entity or cyberspace information that could individual.2 be utilized by both public and private • Both the private and public sector are eassectors. The Repository of Security ily subjected to malicious cyber-activity Incidents (RISI) offers a useful model and both have independently set up instifor what these third-party organizatutions to develop cyber-defense. tions can look like; RISI combines in• By combining private and public cyber-sedividually reported cyber-attack incicurity data, the US can improve its marketdents, as well as incidents reported in competitiveness and boost innovation in legal databases and news groups. RISI both sectors. then compiles reports of those incidents and distributes them only to its members, allowing them to protect themselves against similar attacks.3 Systems of this nature should be considered for mediating data between the US and private sectors. Upon development of a system, DHS and private companies must each set guidelines regarding what information should and should not be shared via the mediating firm. Shared data should mostly consist of details of cyber-attacks, with less emphasis on system vulnerabilities. Endnotes
1. ”Executive Office of the President: Cyberspace Policy Review.” The White House. www.whitehouse.gov/ assets/.../Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf (accessed December 29, 2009) 2. Clark, Wesley, and Peter Levin. “Securing the information highway: How to enhance the United States’ electronic defenses.” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009): 2-10 3. ”Unsecured Economies: Protecting Vital Information.” NAUnsecuredEconomiesReport. http://resources.mcafee.com/content/NAUnsecuredEconomiesReport (accessed December 27, 2009) 4. ”Security Central | Security Central - InfoWorld.” Business technology, IT news, product reviews and enterprise IT strategies - InfoWorld. http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/retailer-tjx/reportsmassive-data-breach-952 (accessed January 3, 2010) 5. ”Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Global Cyber Security Conference.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20427/remarks_by_secretary_napolitano_at_the_global_cyber_security_conference_august_2009.html (accessed December 19, 2009) 6. ”Obama’s Remarks on Securing the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure, May 2009 - Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20428/obamas_remarks_on_securing_the_nations_cyber_infrastructure_may_2009.html (accessed December 19, 2009)

9

Decreasing Restrictions for Grants to NGOs: A Reversal of the “Anti-Prostitution Pledge”
Amreen Rahman, University of California Los Angeles To achieve the United States’ goals of increasing global security through the eradication of HIV/AIDs and other epidemic diseases, the U.S. should eliminate clauses that restrict NGOs from engaging those most at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Public health initiatives mixed with ideology have been integrated into numerous bills directed at addressing infectious diseases, poverty, and public health over the last decade. In 2003, Congress passed the “United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act,” also known as the Global AIDS Act; Section 301 of this legislation states that no funds should go to an NGO which “does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”1 Initially this requirement was only stipulated on foreign NGOs, as the Department of Justice advised that applying it to US NGOs might violate the First Amendment. Later, the DOJ reneged on that recommendation and USAID expanded these funding restrictions to both US and foreign NGOs. This expansion sparked a series of court cases that have received conflicting rulings.2 Analysis Key Facts Initially, the Pledge seems to be an artificial • 16 drop-in centers in Bangladesh were closed when an umbrella NGO requirement that can be easily met particusigned the Pledge.5 larly since most NGOs are not “pro” sex traf• Brazil refused over $40 million in ficking. However, the vague and indetermiUSAID grants based on the Antinate wording of the pledge has forced many Prostitution Pledge.6 NGOs that deal directly with sex workers and other underserved populations to refuse to sign the pledge. NGOs have to develop a level of trust with sex workers in order to ensure efficacy of their services, whether they be drop in centers, counseling services, education outreach, etc. Research conducted by CHANGE found that directors of NGOs say their biggest challenge is identifying and creating relationships with sex workers. Thus, for many of these organizations who offer sex workers a safe place to stay or access to HIV/AIDS prevention & treatment, agreeing to the pledge threatens these hard-won relationships and undermines the NGO’s program. In testimony before a House Subcommittee, the Director of the Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons suggested that judgment from an NGO is likely to drive a sex worker away from the organization.3 Thus the Pledge, in an effort to eradicate prostitution, increases the likelihood of trafficking and abuse. Many HIV/AIDs-focused NGOs focus on sex workers in particular because of the high HIV exposure that sex work entails. As per public health strategies, these NGOs focus primarily on harm reduction strategies, so while the ideal is complete eradication of prostitution, harm reduction strategies entail dealing with immediate consequences of sex work. The Anti-Prostitution Pledge creates a “chilling effect” on NGOs, making them wary of engaging in outreach to sex 10

workers that can be misconstrued as “promoting prostitution.” Thus, key services for sex workers such as drop-in centers, contraceptive distribution, and educational outreach are avoided by NGOs who fear that their funding will get cut off. The Anti-Prostitution Pledge undermines major investment the US has made in combating HIV/AIDs, decreasing the efficicacy of those billions of aid dollars. Next Steps In light of the confusing and ambiguous language the Anti-Prostitution Pledge, the Department of Health and Human Services has proposed revisions to the wording of this policy. This revision does not entail an elimination of the Pledge, but rather a clarification of it, by including further technical and fiscal details concerning how to determine if the entire NGO gets funding cut off when subsets of the umbrella NGO violate the pledge.4 In the context of the recent repeal of the Global Gag Rule, this clarification is taking a step backwards from furthering the United States’ goals of global health Talking Points and security.
are already heavily marginalized by sociInstead of analyzing which organizations ety is a delicate task that requires trewill get funding cut off, legislation should mendous time and effort. eliminate the pledge as a requirement • Sex workers are a primary population at for USAID grants, and specify specific risk of HIV/AIDs transmission. activities involving the sex worker population which should be promoted and not restricted. Legislative action is crucial to clarifying and improving global health and global security. In order to reengage NGOs with underserved populations of sex workers, upcoming foreign aid allocation bills ought to highlight the gap that Anti Prostitution Pledge has left and allocate funds specifically towards this cause. This would entail creating a new initiative under USAID dedicated to engaging NGOs who have been denied or rejected USAID funding in the past on the basis of the pledge.

Forging connections to sex workers who

Endnotes

1. Center for Health and Gender Equality, “Implications of U.S. Policy Restrictions for HIV Programs Aimed at Commercial Sex Workers (2008), http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/ aplobrief.pdf. (accessed February 2, 2010). 2. Center for Health and Gender Equality, “Implications of U.S. Policy Restrictions for HIV Programs Aimed at Commercial Sex Workers (2008), http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/aplobrief.pdf. (accessed February 2, 2010). 3. Ann Jordan, 2007 (Director, Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons, Global Rights Before the House Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism March 20, 2007, http://homeland. house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070320165954-38416.pdf 4. OMB Watch, “How Will Proposed Anti-Prostitution Rules Impact Nonprofits?.” December 8, 2009. http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10616 (accessed 1/1/2010). 5. Taimur Khan & Devika Iyer, “Critique of the Anti Prostitution Pledge and Its Global Impact (2007), http://www.sexworkersproject.org/media-toolkit/downloads/20070330-BriefingPaperOnAnti-ProstitutionPledge.pdf. (accessed February 2, 2010). 6. Pathfinder International, “The Anti-Prostitution Loyalty Oath: Undermining HIV/AIDS Prevention and U.S. Foreign Policy.” 2006. http://www.pathfind.org/site/DocServer/HIV-AIDS3.pdf?docID=5981 (accessed 1/1/2010).

11

Elevating Development as the Third Pillar Of American Foreign Policy
Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Rukh Paracha, University of California Los Angeles Congress should extensively reform the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) by implementing critical institutional reforms and integrating it into a Department of Development that implements untied development methods. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), its policies, its programs, and especially its field representatives serve as the faces of America throughout global civil society. In recent years the quantity of foreign aid programs has increased markedly; however, the incoherent organizational structure of U.S. aid programs has led to a fragmented, ineffective, and chaotic foreign aid system in urgent need of institutional reform. While President Bush elevated development as the third pillar of national security policy, this vision has not yet been fully realized. Institutional reform is critical to ensure the effective utilization of every foreign assistance dollar. Development is soft power, but it is also an effective tool of “smart power,” and the future of our Key Facts national security strategy is equally • Under President George W. Bush’s admincontingent upon the strength of our istration, official development assistance defense, diplomacy, and development increased from $10 billion in 2000 to $22 agendas.1 billion in 2003.2
structural and organizational capacity to alCongress should establish USAID locate and utilize their resources effectiveas a cabinet-level department. The ly. In addition, many aid packages are lined new, more autonomous department with earmarks that divert money to fulfill should control its budget and increase political or military purposes. its operating account to adequately • The United States is notorious for distribstaff, review, and fund its programs. To uting tied aid, which forces recipient counmaximize the efficiency of U.S. foreign tries to purchase expensive products and aid dollars, aid programs within other services from the donor country.3 government agencies should be consolidated and streamlined under the new Development Department. This department, with its new stability and resources, should actively pursue more sustainable, long-term development goals and institute more effective implementation by increasing fieldwork, regional research, and tailoring development projects for specific civil societies to maximize benefits.

American foreign aid organizations lack the

In the past few decades, resources reserved for USAID decreased while the State Department and Department of Defense took responsibility for aid programs or started their own independent aid projects. In 2001, the State Department took complete control over USAID’s direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget. In 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established to reduce poverty through sustainable economic development. The Secretary of State was elected chair of the MCC, rather than a USAID administrator. In 2006, USAID subordinated itself completely under the State Department. Currently, USAID receives its funding through a State Department-controlled budget process and the USAID administrator 12

serves as the Director of Foreign Assistance to the State Department and head of USAID. This clearly increases political pressures and interest bias on U.S. foreign aid programs to favor national security and foreign diplomacy objectives.5 Analysis Currently, aid programs are Talking Points largely comprised of presi• Development is a key component of “smart power” dential initiatives, congressioand should serve as an independent third pillar in nal earmarks for healthcare, America’s national security strategy. HIV/AIDS awareness and pre• According to The Economist, Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID) is “a model for vention, K-12 education espeother rich countries,” because DFID established an cially for girls, microfinance autonomous development agency with an influential programs, and environmental minister position that refuses to tie aid to economic justice issues, because these or political interests. In 2003, DFID experts projecthave a direct, measurable ed that the poverty reduction impact of each dollar impact on civil societies. The of UK aid had increased fourfold since 1990.4 Secretary of Development and USAID leadership need to develop specific programs for long-term development initiatives, including anti-corruption measures, agricultural assistance, democracy-promotion programs, technical capacity building, and infrastructure improvement measures. Restructuring U.S. foreign aid assistance needs to happen from the top down. Britain’s Department for International Development provides a helpful model: experts have found that when Britain’s DFID completely untied aid from Britain’s primary economic and political interests, the effectiveness of aid increased between 15-30%.6 In 2003, the DFID projected that the poverty reduction impact of each dollar of UK aid had increased fourfold since 1990.4 As an autonomous department, USAID would control its budget and should receive enough funds to reduce the use of the ineffective contractors it currently relies on because of the lack of internal staff and technical expertise. In addition, humanitarian and development programs now assigned to the State Department (refugee projects, PEPFAR, and post-conflict reconstruction projects etc.) and to the Defense Department (democracy promotion programs, aid programs, etc.) should be reassigned to USAID staff and committees. This effectively re-organizes and streamlines aid funding and bureaucracy, creating one coherent aid strategy where there used to be several competing agendas, and eliminating some of the unnecessary costs of overlapping aid efforts. Endnotes
1. “U.S. Foreign Aid: The Need for Fundamental Reform - Brookings Institution.” Brookings Institution. Web. 14 Apr. 2010. <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2007/0727development.aspx>. 2. Atwood, J. Brian, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios. “Arrested Development | Foreign Affairs.” Foreign Affairs. Nov.-Dec. 2008. Web. 14 Jan. 2010. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64613/j-brian-atwood-m-peter-mcpherson-and-andrew-natsios/arresteddevelopment>. 3. “OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - Tied Aid Credits.” OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, Finance, Prices...). 18 Nov. 2001. Web. 14 Apr. 2010. <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3089>. 4. Barder, Owen. Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience. Diss. 2005. Print. 5. CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Aid: An Introductatory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 2004, Order Code 98-916. < http://fpc. state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf>. 6. European Commission, Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach, 2009, Project No. 2008/170204. <http://ec.europa.eu/ development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf>.

13

Expanding Naval Humanitarian Aid
Charlie Piggott, University of Michigan Expand the U.S. Navy’s hospital ship programs, including USSOUTHCOM’s Operation Continuing Promise. By providing the program with a formal place in the budget and increasing the amount of money allocated to it, the hospital ships of the Navy’s Military Sealift Command can increase the number of voyages and the duration of each stay in port so as to reach more patients. When discussed in the context of international relations, “power” is often conceived of as the use or threat of force to coerce another nation. This ignores a dimension of power known as “soft power,” which is the use of positive incentives and aid to influence another country. The United States Armed Forces, while traditionally considered an instrument of “hard power,” has the potential to be an effective carrier of soft power. The Navy in particular has a long history of providing disaster relief since 1960.1 In 2006, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates initiated a proactive humanitarian program involving sending hospital ships from port to port performing routine medical procedures in Latin America, western Africa, and Asia.

Key Facts The hospital ship programs have been suc• $250 million = Yearly cost of the hoscessful in providing much-needed medical pital ship program, less than 1/10th of aid to those who may not have access oth1% of the Defense Department’s $613 erwise, ranging from filling prescriptions billion budget.6 to performing minor surgeries. In two and • 100,049 = Number of Latin Americans a half months in 2009, medical personnel treated in a single voyage of a single aboard the USNS Comfort treated over hospital ship.7 100,000 people in seven Latin American countries.2 The Mercy treated an additional 98,000 people in 12 countries in four months.3 Yet the population served is extremely small compared to the number of people who need medical attention. In addition to only helping a small portion of the population, the impact is relatively low. While the Comfort may be able to fill prescriptions in a town once, medicines for chronic conditions cannot be acquired when the ship leaves for a new port. Additionally, surgeons aboard the ships are not able to perform procedures that require extensive follow-up care. By putting more ships into action, the Navy can not only reach a larger portion of its intended audience, but have a greater impact by staying in port longer and making return visits.
Analysis In terms of budget, the Navy estimates that it would take $250 million to properly fund its humanitarian efforts across the world in 2010. It has currently been funding the hospital ship programs through various discretionary funds, with no dedicated source of money for the programs.4 As $250 million is less than 0.1% of the defense budget, room for expansion may be found in the Pentagon’s $613 billion budget. The program already works closely with NGOs such as Operation Smile, and increasing partnerships with these agencies can help defray costs when partners provide their own medical personnel.5 14

Operation Continuing Promise is a particularly important aspect of the hospital ship program because it focuses on Latin America, a region which is both strategically important to the U.S. and also in danger of falling out of America’s sphere of influence. The leaders of Cuba and Venezuela are both antagonistic toward the United States, and lending a helping hand in the poorer countries of the region counters the demonization of the U.S. that comes from those governments. And with China making economic inroads in the region, the U.S. may lose Latin America to its growing economic rival unless it can find a service to provide that China can’t. Next Steps 1. Obtain a secure source of funds for the Navy’s humanitarian aid programs. This can start in the Senate Armed Services Committee or the House Armed Services Committee. 2. The U.S. Navy should create a liaison between itself and medical and developmental NGOs to provide more personnel and supplies. 3. Encourage our NATO allies to create programs of their own or contribute to a combined effort. (The Netherlands has already commissioned its own hospital ship for humanitarian aid.) Endnotes

• Humanitarian aid programs improve the reputation of the United States abroad by associating American troops with consistent, unambiguously humanitarian activities. • Meeting the needs of the impoverished contributes to regional political and economic stability. • In Latin America, the program reaches only a small fraction of those who could benefit from its services. • Consistent American humanitarian aid in Latin America can counter Cuban, Venezuelan, and Chinese influence in the region.

Talking Points

1. “Tsunami (Tidal Wave) Disasters and the U.S. Navy.” 10-May-2007. Naval History and Heritage Command: Frequently Asked Questions. Department of the Navy. <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/ faq130-1.htm> 2. Axe, David. September 2009. “How to Win Friends and Inoculate People: The Navy’s New Strategy for Saving the World.” Mental Floss 8:5. Pgs 35-39. 3. “Hospital Ship Returns From Four-Month Humanitarian Deployment.” 26 September 2008. Navy.mil. <http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=40027> 4. Jean, Grace. March 2009. “Greater Demand for ‘Soft Power’ Reveals Shortfalls in The Navy.” National Defense. <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2009/MARCH/Pages/GreaterDeman dfor%E2%80%98SoftPower%E2%80%99RevealsShortfallsinTheNavy.aspx> 5. Axe, 2009. 6. Jean 2009. 7. Axe 2009.

15

Agricultural Development Teams As Stabilizing Forces
Jay Hobbs, The Colorado College To build trust and increase stability in war-torn nations like Afghanistan, the U.S. military should prioritize the funding, coordination, and deployment of agricultural development teams that utilize the expertise of National Guard soldiers who work as farmers in their civilian lives. American military forces deployed to Afghanistan confront poverty and underdevelopment as key challenges to Afghan security. Farming makes up more than one-third of Afghanistan’s GDP, and provides income for nearly three-quarters of the population, but years of war and Taliban neglect have left farming techniques and infrastructure lagging far behind most other nations. In response, a handful of state National Guards have deployed agriculture development teams (ADT) to improve Afghanistan’s agriculture. These teams are made up of volunteer soldiers with a background in farming, and seek to spread modern agricultural practices, equipment, and skills. The teams increase stability and build rapport with Afghan farmers and leaders, who in turn become partners in the struggle against insurgents.

• The Missouri National Guard first deployed an ADT unit to Afghanistan in 2008, and by the end of 2009, 11 other states planned to have ADT units in the warzone.1 • Farming makes up nearly 1/3 of Afghanistan’s GDP, and provides income to nearly 3/4 of the population, but techniques are primitive, and much of the effort goes to growing 93% of the world’s opium supply.2

Key Facts

The agricultural teams are an innovative answer to severe instability and poverty, and by utilizing the civilian expertise of National Guard volunteers, they epitomize the National Guard’s concept of a citizen-soldier. ADT implementation should be expanded and should serve as a model for a reinvigorated approach to counterinsurgency. Currently, the US has deployed only 350 agricultural specialists in this nation of 31 million, covering nine of 34 Afghan provinces. In a nation where 80% of working-age males are small-scale farmers, the potential for positive impact far exceeds the capacity of current agricultural development teams.3 Background In 2007, the director of the Army National Guard announced that Missouri would deploy an ADT unit to Afghanistan in late 2008. This idea relied on the collaborative thinking and efforts of the Missouri Farm Bureau, the University of Missouri and the National Guard Bureau. The unit was further supported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Other state National Guards followed suit, and by the end of 2009, twelve states had plans to put ADT units on the ground in Afghanistan. This idea was preceded by the State Partnership Program, started in the 1990s, which pairs National Guard units with 16

foreign militaries to teach them how to function in a democracy. Analysis In general, it is the expertise of the soldiers and not high spending that makes these units useful. Currently, most of the costs are covered by military discretionary spending,3 but an increase in core, stable funding could expand their reach and efficacy. In Missouri’s pioneering effort, implementation relied on the state National Guard, support from universities, some federal support, and backing from the Farm Bureau. This success should be duplicated and further funding should be sought, particularly as ADT units are popular within military leadership, and expanding the number of state National Guard units that utilize this idea could prove beneficial to both state-based partners and embedded military units. Next Steps After states analyze their ability to deploy ADT units, they must support the teams through effective coalition building, and bipartisan action in the state legislatures. The utility of these programs should also attract funding from the federal government.

ADT units should also serve as a model for further innovation which employs the citizen-soldier’s civilian expertise. Urban police officers who serve in the National Guard could deploy to Baghdad and work with local police forces. The skills that National Guard soldiers use in their everyday lives are an important resource that should be more fully utilized. Endnotes
1. Staff Army Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy, “Agribusiness teams help Afghan farmers find simple solutions,” National Guard Bureau, http://www.ng.mil/features/ADT/default.aspx (Accessed April 29, 2010). 2. John Gramlick, “National Guard aids Afghan farmers,” Stateline.org, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=411125 (Accessed April 29, 2010). 3. David Zucchino, “U.S. Army’s farm program tackles Afghan rebuilding from the ground up,” Los Angeles Times, July 26, 2009, World section.

• These teams are developing long term stability for Afghan citizens while building positive, productive relationships between the people of Afghanistan and the U.S. military. • ADT units utilize the civilian expertise of National Guard soldiers, and have the support of upper-level Army officials.

Talking Points

17

American Cotton Subsidies and Pakistan: An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency
Rachel Tecott and Justin Metz, Wesleyan University The White House should mobilize policymakers against exorbitant price supports for cotton as part of a sustainable approach to counterinsurgency in Pakistan. The burgeoning Taliban insurgency in Pakistan, a nuclear power with a weak government, poses a profound threat to American security. American military exercises in Pakistan have fueled anti-American sentiment, facilitating Taliban recruitment. Only by implementing social and economic measures designed to strengthen the Pakistani government, ameliorate poverty conditions, and soften anti-American ill-will can the Obama administration hope to undermine Taliban advances in this pivotal country. Despite its pledged commitment to seKey Facts curity in Pakistan, the US federal gov• Cotton production accounts for 10% of ernment spends on average $2.8 billion Pakistan’s total GDP.5 a year1 subsidizing the American cotton • Cotton employs 1.3 million Pakistanis6 industry, a protectionist policy that raises and only 25, 000 Americans.7 supply and lowers the global price of cot• Cotton subsidies cost the American ton, limiting production growth by such taxpayer on average$2.8 billion a year.8 developing exporters as Pakistan. Cotton is a vital component of the Pakistani economy, accounting for 10% of GDP and 55% of export receipts.2 Through technological modernization and increased production, Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to the development of a more robust cotton industry.3 But despite its efforts, and in large part due to American cotton subsidies, Pakistan’s cotton industry remains weak. Cutting price supports for American cotton would facilitate U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Pakistan in three ways. First, Pakistani farmers could sell cotton at higher prices, increasing their income, improving their quality of life, and lessening their susceptibility to Taliban promises of advancement. Second, Pakistani GDP would rise, better equipping the Pakistani government to crack down on Taliban activities. Finally, the gesture would demonstrate America’s commitment to the Pakistani people, improving relations and facilitating future cooperation against the Taliban. Analysis Congressional support for cotton subsidies is a product of domestic interest group pressures and requisite pandering to southern state agribusiness. Since its establishment in the wake of the Great Depression, the National Cotton Council (NCC), which has been called “the most effective agricultural lobby in the industrialized world,”4 has united agricultural interests into a solid political force with considerable clout at all levels of government. Although an insignificant percentage of the southern population works in the cotton industry, policymakers who would undermine it risk mobilizing a vocal minority dedicated to the defense of their livelihood and lifestyle. Also, while the lame duck Bush administration took significant strides to scale back cotton subsidies 18

in compliance with the 2005 WTO ruling, Obama, concerned with the electoral map in 2012 and specifically with his prospects in states such as North Carolina and Virginia, has avoided the issue altogether. Given recent momentum in the inTalking Points ternational community, such as Bra• The American cotton industry is unprofitzil’s victory in the WTO against US able and on the decline. It is protected by subsidies in 2005 and increasing an antiquated agricultural policy maintained international cries for U.S. reform, by a powerful cotton lobby. the domestic economic climate, and • If the U.S. were to lower price supports for the impending crisis in Pakistan, the American cotton, it would free up the world market for developing exporters such as time to drastically reform U.S. cotPakistan, India, Brazil, Syria, and Mali. ton policy has come. Exhausted by • A profitable cotton industry in Pakistan the worst recession since the Great would strengthen the government, raise Depression, the American taxpayer standards of living, and improve Pakistan-US is loathe to bear the burden of costly relations, all of which would facilitate more and counterproductive policies. Uneffective counterinsurgency in Pakistan. settled by increasingly numerous demonstrations of anti-American sentiment, Americans are eager to rebuild foreign partnerships. Fearful of rogue states with nuclear capabilities, Americans support policies that would help to secure stockpiles. The American cotton subsidies program squanders tax dollars, stresses US-foreign relations, and directly undermines counterinsurgency in a nation that threatens a nightmarish conflagration of Taliban ascension and nuclear weapons. Next Steps The Obama administration should: • Highlight the direct connection between cotton subsidies and tax dollars, foreign partnerships, and American security in Pakistan and at home. It must thrust the issue back into the spotlight and repackage it not as a southern agricultural issue to be bogged down by congressional politics, but rather, as a matter of national economic and international security. • Allow the duty free export of Pakistani cotton into America. • Invest a portion of the tax dollars saved by cutting cotton price supports directly into the Pakistani cotton industry. Endnotes
1. Schnepf, Randy. “Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program: A Brief Overview.” Congressional Research Service (March 2009): 1-7. http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22187.pdf (accessed January 18, 2010). 2. “The Role of Cotton in Pakistan.” Pakissan. http://www.pakissan.com/english/allabout/crop/cotton/ (accessed January 23, 2010). 3. Carroll, Joe. Pakistan Annual Cotton Report. Edited by Islamabad Staff. http://www.fas.usda.gov/ (accessed January 10, 2010). 4. Heinisch, Elinor. “West Africa versus the United States on cotton subsidies: how, why and what next?” Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 2 (2006): 251-274. doi:0.1017/S0022278X06001625 (accessed January 19, 2010). 5. “Facts and Figures.” Pakistan Cotton Ginners’ Association. http://www.pcga.org/pcga_-_home.asp (accessed February 1, 2010). 6. “The Role of Cotton in Pakistan.” Pakissan. http://www.pakissan.com/english/allabout/crop/cotton/ (accessed January 23, 2010). 7. Heling, Madeline, Scott Beaulier, and Joshua Hall. “High Cotton: Why the USA Should Not Provide Subsidies To Cotton Farmers.” Economic Affairs 28, no. 2 (June 2008). doi:10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00828.x (accessed February 1, 2010). 8. Schnepf, 1

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Bringing Investment Freedom to Central Asia
Devin Turner, American University To stabilize U.S. supply lines to Afghanistan, the U.S. should develop an aid program for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that improves access to foreign direct investment and reduces corruption. General Petraeus, during his visit to Central Asia last year, declared that the increased instability in Pakistan makes NATO cooperation with the region critical to ensuring that the coalition’s forces in Afghanistan are supplied.4 An expansion of NATO supply routes in the region would require a stable region that is safe from insurgents. Unfortunately, the prospect of stability continues to be out of reach due to economic woes. Increasing economic opportunity in the region is central to building stability. The region’s poorest countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have the most potential to profit from foreign investment policy reform. Over 70% of the populations of both countries were living bellow $2.15 a day in 2003.5 These countries’ problems have only been exacerbated by the global economic crisis, as both countries faced a drop in real GDP growth of over 5%.6 Both countries also lack sufficient levels of economic freedom required for growth. Tajikistan’s investment rating is a paltry 25%, due to its numerous investment barriers and banning of private property. Kyrgyzstan fares better at 50%, but it too has placed a series of obstacles in the way of much-needed foreign investment, including barring foreign investors from owning land.7 Central Asia’s poor economic situation has Key Facts played a major role in the growth of fundamentalism and narco-trafficking. The Islamic • Over 70% of Tajiks and Kyrgyz live with under $2.15 a day.1 Movement of Uzbekistan, which has been • Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have indesignated as a terrorist organization by vestment freedom ratings of 25% the U.S., has used Tajikistan for training its and 50% respectively.2 forces to attack Kyrgyzstan and neighboring • Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have corUzbekistan. In 2006, these attacks became ruption perception ratings of 2.0 so severe that the defense minister of Kyrand 1.9 respectively on a scale of 1 gyzstan labeled them a threat to national seto 10 (ten being a country with little curity.8 As opium production in Afghanistan or no corruption perceptions).3 grew to over 43% between 2001 and 2008, the heroin traffickers began to utilize Tajikistan as base for their trafficking network to Europe. While the country has been able to make substantial heroin seizures, capturing over 500 KG in the first half of 2008, the high level of unemployment in the country has helped expand the narcotics business, as many Tajiks have no other options for economic advancement.9 Analysis Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is critical for spurring economic growth in both countries. Increased industrial production would be very effective in developing both countries’ economies, as both countries continue to have predominately rural populations. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have urbanization ratings of 26% and 36% respectively,10 suggesting that both nations have much untapped human capital for industry, and the 20

country’s extensive hydropower resources could prove enticing to businesses hoping to expand into the region. Political transparency must also be coupled with this move to expand FDI in both countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have corruption perception ratings of 2.0 and 1.9 (out of 10) respectively,11 suggesting that expanding FDI at the moment would be unwise, unless government transparency reforms were to be undertaken. Next Steps The U.S. should offer a series of Talking Points short-term development plans to • Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the least develthese countries, consisting of taroped countries in Central Asia. geted loans and grants for busi• As NATO and U.S. supply lines are further denesses and governments, which veloped in the region, Central Asia’s stability would be renegotiated ever two becomes more important for the U.S. • Islamic fundamentalism and narco-trafficking is to three years to ensure that the rampant in both countries as citizens have accountries are taking definite steps cess to few economic opportunities. towards FDI regulation reform. • The U.S. should use the March 14th, 2008 MCC The two countries would be rated agreement with Kyrgyzstan as a basis for develon a series of different economic opment aid that promotes investment policy freedoms (i.e. the ability to own reform and reduces government corruption in property), and would be rewarded the economy. with extra funds if they manage to exceed the mandate. Conversely, financial support for government institutions (but not companies) would be reduced if the country was found to be falling behind on such reforms. Through such a plan, the U.S. can ensure that it does not spend large amounts of money in the region without seeing any progress on reforms. Endnotes
1. Martha Olcott, “Asia’s Overlooked Middle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www. carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23288 (accessed April 15, 2010). 2. 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2010), http://www.heritage. org/Index (accessed April 15, 2010). 3. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” chart, Transparency International, http://media.transparency. org/imaps/cpi2009/ (accessed April 15, 2010). 4. Congressional Research Service, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol (Washington, DC, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf (accessed April 15, 2010). 5. Martha Olcott, “Asia’s Overlooked Middle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www. carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23288 (accessed April 15, 2010). 6. Martha Olcott, “Asia’s Overlooked Middle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www. carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23288 (accessed April 15, 2010). 7. 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2010), http://www.heritage. org/Index (accessed April 15, 2010). 8. Congressional Research Service, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol (Washington, DC, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf (accessed April 15, 2010). 9. “Tajikistan Tackles Drug Trafficking,” United Nations Development Programme, http://europeandcis. undp.org/home/show/E976F4E2-F203-1EE9-BCEDD34DA35723 10. The World Factbook 2009 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009), s.v. “Tajikistan” and “Kyrgyzstan” (accessed April 15, 2010). 11. Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” chart, Transparency International, http://media.transparency.org/ imaps/cpi2009/ (accessed April 15, 2010).

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A Sound Approach to European Missile Defense
Jesse Hubbard, American University To ensure the security of our European allies, the United States should build a flexible and powerful missile defense system utilizing Aegis cruisers in the Mediterranean and radar sensors in the Caucasus. The United States must undertake adequate steps to protect itself and its allies from the potential dangers of a nuclear Iran. To this end, the Bush administration began the development of a missile defense system based out of Poland and the Czech Republic. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this plan seemed like a brazen attempt to reignite the Cold War. Opinion polls in the Czech Republic and Poland showed that the public there viewed the missile shield with skepticism.1 The Obama administration has indicated it is planning on abandoning the Bush approach. This decision could provide the U.S. with the opportunity to build a new missile defense system that is flexible, effective, and popular with our allies and partners in the region. Analysis The Obama administration’s Ballistic Key Facts Missile Defense Review outlines the • No missile Iran’s current arsenal has a government’s policy priorities regardrange greater than 1,300 kilometers.8 ing missile defense. Crucially, the re• The Bush plan would not have been fully view stipulates that missile defense operational until 2013.9 systems must be realistic, fiscally sus• A single Aegis cruiser will be able to hold tainable, and flexible.2 To meet these up to 100 SM-3 missiles.10 objectives the U.S. should partner • Aegis cruisers with missile interceptors with Russia to jointly operate sensors can be deployed to the waters surrounding Europe as early as 2011.11 closer to Iran and use SM-3 missiles launched off of Aegis cruisers as the interceptor system It might seem difficult to achieve the high level of political and military cooperation necessary to operate a joint radar station, but Vladimir Putin has already proposed that the US and Russia operate a joint system situated at a military base in Azerbaijan.3 The United States should take this opportunity. This radar system would detect Iranian missiles far earlier than the proposed Czech radar installation.4 The SM-3 interceptor system would provide our allies flexible missile defense at a realistic price. Critics have justifiably attacked the reliability of Bush’s ground-based interceptor system, but SM-3 interceptors are a far more proven technology. With 19 successful interceptions out of 23 tests,5 the SM-3 system is the most reliable missile defense the United States possesses.6 Moreover, the mobility of Aegis cruisers gives the United States greater flexibility in responding to potential threats. The system would also be inexpensive in comparison to other defense projects; the CBO estimates that developing and running an SM-3 defense system for 20 years would cost approximately 18-22 billion dollars, including the cost of expanding the Navy’s Aegis cruiser force.7

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Next Steps The Obama administration should press ahead with negotiating the logistics of shared radar systems in Azerbaijan. The two sides must come to an agreement on how information from the radar sensor will be shared and what sort of presence U.S. soldiers will have at these installations. Additionally, the government of Azerbaijan must be consulted regarding the potential U.S. use of the radar. The administration should also begin the process of upgrading Aegis cruisers and deploying them to the waters of the Mediterranean and the Baltic. In the long term, more cruisers should be built in order to ensure a permanent defensive capability. Endnotes

• A flexible system based off of Aegis cruisers is less vulnerable to preemptive attack than a silo-based system grounded in Poland. • A land-based system would have been constantly vulnerable to being shut down at the behest of the host government. No such danger exists with Aegis cruisers patrolling international waters, where they answer only to the United States. • The flexible system would cover all of Europe by 2015. The Bush plan would have left crucial NATO capitals like Athens and Ankara undefended indefinitely.12

Talking Points

1. New Missile Defences in Europe. 24 September 2009. The Economist. <http://www.economist.com/ world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370> 2. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. February 2010. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/ bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.>, iii 3. Putin Proposes Joint Radar in Azerbaijan. 7 June 2007. Der Spiegel. 21 January 2010 < http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,487330,00.html> 4. Lenox, Duncan. Missile Expert Assesses Azerbaijan Radar Proposal. 8 June 2007. Radio Free Europe. 21 January 2010 < http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077011.html> 5. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. February 2010. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/ bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf>., 19 6. Time For an All New Navy Missile Shield? July 13, 2009. Wired Magazine <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/07/time-for-an-all-navy-missile-shield/> 7. Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. Febuary 2009. Congressional Budget Office www. cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf., xvi 8. New Missile Defences in Europe. 24 September 2009. The Economist. <http://www.economist.com/ world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370> 9. Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. Febuary 2009. Congressional Budget Office www. cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf., ix 10. New Missile Defences in Europe. 24 September 2009. The Economist. <http://www.economist.com/ world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370> 11. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. February 2010. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/ bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.>, 24 12. Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. Febuary 2009. Congressional Budget Office www. cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf., 38

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Recognition of Kurdish Territory Gains
Ashley Herzovi, Michigan State University The United States should call upon Iraq to honor Article 140 of the 2005 Constitution,1 which mandates a referendum and census to allow Kurdish people unfairly expelled by Saddam Hussein to be governed by the Regional Government of Kurdistan. Comparing Kirkuk to Jerusalem, W. Andrew Terrill notes that “the threat of civil war remains real.”4 Tensions between the Kurdish and Iraqis plague their border, and it is vital to international security that these tensions be alleviated. Iraqi Kurdistan is distinct from Iraq, with a unique culture, social norms, and a semi-autonomous Regional Government of Kurdistan (KRG). The biggest hurdle to peace between Iraqis and Kurds is that after almost 20 years of semi-independent rule, the Kurds do not to consider themselves Iraqis in either a cultural or legal sense. However, Baghdad refuses to relinquish Kurdistan completely, for a variety of political and economic reasons. Under the current Iraqi constitution, Article 140 calls for a referendum to potentially redistrict ethnically Kurdish communities. Stating that, “normalization and census [will] Key Facts conclude with a referendum in Kirkuk and • Drafted in 2005, the Iraqi Constituother disputed territories to determine the tion states that Article 140 shall be will of their citizens.”5 This clause extends enacted entirely no later than Dea previous order of the provisional governcember 31, 2007.2 ment initiating a commission to investigate • Kurdish people are disaggregated claims of unfair expulsion of Kurdish resiacross the borders of Northern Iraq, Southeast Turkey, and parts dents from Kirkuk by Saddam Hussein.
Iraqi Kurdistan is the only semi-auAnalysis tonomous territory belonging to the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 created Kurdish people. a new opportunity for the Kurdish people. • Kirkuk is home to approximately The unofficial Kurdish army, the Pesh Merga, 1.25 million residents.3 took the opportunity to seize additional land and expand the southern boundary of Kurdistan to include Kurdish possession of Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala.6 Under Article 140, ethnic Kurdish communities like Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanaqin, Nineveh, and Diyala would fall under Kurdish rule.7 of Eastern Syria and Western Iran.

Northern Iraq is also home to a large percentage of Iraq’s oil fields. Some estimates claim that Kurdistan could produce 450,000 barrels per day; it currently produces only 20,000.8 Kirkuk’s oil field, currently the center of Iraqi oil producation, can generate approximately 500,000 barrels per day.9 This natural conflict of economic interests makes full Kurdish indepedence problematic for Iraq, but Article 140 provides a solution that would help satisfy both Kurdish and Iraqi interests. Iraq will retain lucrative oil fields, while the KRG remains semi-autonomous and is given an outlet to express its ethnic unity. Support of this Article will allow for Kurdish gains within the scope of Iraqi rule of law. The Kurdish territory gained is that promised to the KRG within the Iraqi Constitution. 24

The United States’ support would help to ensure that the Iraqi government continues to follow the legal provisions set forth in its own constitution, upholding a critical principle in the rule of law and establishing an important precedent for this ethnically divided nation. One other factor to consider is Turkey’s response to any change in Kurdistan’s staus quo. Turkey has recently opened economic activity with the KRG but, it has yet to “[allow] the KRG to export oil and gas through its territory until Iraq has adopted a federal hydrocarbons law.”10 Negotiating this balance of interests successfully may prove critical to regional stability, and it is essential that Iraq, the KRG, and Turkey come to a stable arrangement that promotes economic prosperity without instigating further violence. Next Steps • Prior to 2003, Saddam Hussein’s army exWhile Iraq has become more acpelled Kurdish people living in Kirkuk; human cepting of the KRG in recent years, rights experts have determined that this was they have still not meaningfully adan ethnic cleansing effort. • Territory gains for the Kurdish people in Iraq dressed the egregious wrongs comwill be difficult as Kurds in Turkey, Syria and mitted by Saddam Hussein’s govIran remain in persecution. Territory gains ernment. In the 2005 Constitution, also undoubtedly complicate the oil trade Article 140 explicitly states that a between Iraq and Turkey. census and referendum will be done • The disputed Kurdish territories are historiand “de-Arabization” procedures of cally Kurdish. ethnically Kurdish communities will begin. Five years later, these processes have yet to start. It is imperative that the United States pressure Iraq to uphold the rule of law, as tensions in northern Iraq could be significantly improved with these small, but significant gestures. Endnotes
1. Iraq. Iraqi National Assembly. Iraqi Constitution. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Web. 8 Apr. 2010. <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf>. 2. “Inside the 2010 Iraqi Elections.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 12 Nov. 2009. Web. 09 Apr. 2010. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24168>. 3. “Kirkuk: 1.25 Million Population, Room Only for 450 Patients in Hospitals | Misc | AKNEWS.com.” AK News. Kurdistan News Agency, 19 Mar. 2010. Web. 08 Apr. 2010. <http://www.aknews.com/en/ aknews/3/127041/>. 4. Londoño, Ernesto. “Kurds, Arabs Maneuver Ahead of U.N. Report on N. Iraq.” The Washington Post. 17 Feb 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/16/ AR2009041604007.html> 5. Iraq. Iraqi National Assembly. Iraqi Constitution. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Web. 8 Apr. 2010. <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf>. 6. Myers, Stephen L. “Rivalries in Iraq Keep G.I’s in the Field.” New York Times, 26 Jan. 2010. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/world/middleeast/27mosul.html?scp=2&sq=kurds&st=cse> 7. “Iraq: Kurdish Official Says Kirkuk Normalization To Proceed - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty - Free Media in Unfree Societies. 21 June 2007. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. <http:// www.rferl.org/content/Article/1072472.html> 8. Holland, Ben. “Kurds’ Boom in North Iraq Imperiled by Oil Dispute With Baghdad.” Business Week. 10 Jan. 2010. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. < http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-14/kurds-boom-in-northiraq-imperiled-by-oil-dispute-with-baghdad.html> 9. “Iraq: The KRG’s Bold Moves on Oil.” Stratfor Global Intelligence. Strategic Forecasting Inc., 30 Nov. 2007. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. 10. “International Crisis Group - 81 Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation.” International Crisis Group - Conflict prevention and resolution. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?id=5777>

Talking Points

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A Comprehensive Approach to Child Labor Eradication in the Bolivian Mines
Marcelo A. Ostria, University of North Texas A multidimensional approach to reducing child labor in Bolivian mines should focus on empowering the child through education, empowering the community with alternative sources of income, and changing social norms that define child labor as normal and acceptable. Bolivian children working in mines face hazardous conditions and miss school to provide for their families. Social and economic structures condoning child labor render this exploitation perpetual. Bolivia also ignores the United Nation’s pressure to eliminate extreme forms of child labor.1 This cycle of exploitation makes parents complicit in the abuse of children who are robbed simultaneously of their childhood and of the education they need to break out of the doom-loop of poverty. Analysis The solution must address the attitude in Bolivia about the propriety of child labor. Key Facts • Child labor in mines is one of the most There should also be a more constructive exploitative and hazardous forms of channeling of U.S. foreign aid to Bolivia to child labor in the world.5 educate the Bolivian public about such • Children are attracted to working in matters. The current Bolivian incentive the mines in Bolivia because of the program, “Bono Juancito Pinto,” grants payoff can be significant. a stipend the equivalent of $15 U.S.2 to • Certain mining towns in Bolivia do not children in grades one through six. U.S. regard child labor as a problem, but foreign aid could be geared toward subrather as a societal role. sidizing grant stipends of higher amounts to families of older children (grades four through six), the age at which children usually leave school to enter the mines. Moreover, encouraging regulated microfinance institutions in the mining towns would generate income-producing alternatives for the parents, and especially for women. Grassroots organizations should likewise assist in building schools and providing other educational and employment opportunities in Bolvian mining towns. One useful model is provided by the Bolivian Instituto Politécnico Tomás Katari (IPTK), which has developed educational workshops for child laborers in the Potosi-Oruro region.3 The role of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the U.S. is essential to achieving this reform. Consider, with respect to Bolivian gold mining, an endeavor already funded by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDO) to the tune of $4,480,000, which works to eliminate child labor in Bolivian gold mines.4 Similar investment is essential for the 120,000 Bolivian children involved in small-scale mining of other resources. Next Steps Too often, Bolivians resist the notion that child labor comprises either abuse or a human rights offense. That fundamental rejection presents a formidable deterrent to reform. As long as this popular attitude remains, administrative and legislative measures will 26

• Empower the families of child laborers by providing alternative-income opportunities (such as U.S. regulated-microfinance institutes). By decreasing the need for child labor, more families may be able to keep their children in school. • Grassroots organizations should work in partnership with the Bolivian government, U.S. Department of Labor, and USAID to supply better schools and more financial incentives for at-risk youth in Bolivia.

Talking Points

falter and fail. The U.S. Department of Labor and USAID must work in tandem with the government of Bolivia and grassroots organizations to not only to supply better schools, education incentives, and job opportunities, but also to undermine and attack this pervasive idea that it is right and acceptable for children to work in Bolivia’s mines. Endnotes
1. Personal e-mail correspondence with Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze, former President of Bolivia and current Professor of Law and Politics at the Catholic University in La Paz, Bolivia. Correspondence ranged from June 2009-present. 2. United States Department of Labor, 2007 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor- Bolivia, 27 August 2008. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48caa460c. html [accessed December 14, 2008] 3. Instituto Politécnico Tomás Katari (IPTK). Iván Ramiro Arancibia Araoz, Executive Director. Sucre, Bolivia. E-mail correspondence, December 2008 – January 2009. 4. United States Department of Labor, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking, Project Status – Americas. Online available at: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/project-americas. htm [accessed December 12, 2008] 5. Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI). (October, 2008) Child Labour in the Mining Sector in Bolivia: the Children’s Perspective Final Report.

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Roosevelt Review Preview: Elevating Development as the Third Pillar in American Foreign Policy
Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Ruhk Paracha, University of California Los Angeles Abstract The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) policies, programs, and field representatives serve as the faces of America throughout the world in civil society. In recent years, support for foreign aid programs has increased markedly. However, the incoherent organizational structure of U.S. aid programs has led to a fragmented, ineffective, and chaotic foreign aid system in urgent need of institutional reform. Under President George W. Bush’s administration, official development assistance increased from $10 billion in 2000 to $22 billion in 2003. However, American foreign aid organizations lack the structural and organizational capacity to allocate and utilize these resources effectively. Additionally, many aid packages are lined with earmarks, diverting money to political or military purposes. President Bush elevated development as the third pillar of national security policy, alongside defense and diplomacy. But this vision has not yet been realized — institutional reform is critical to ensure that every foreign assistance dollar is effectively spent. To read more, visit www.rooseveltinstitute.org for the full white paper, part of the forthcoming Roosevelt Review.

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