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Chapter 4



4.1. Introduction
Locke is sometimes represented as a consent and social contract theorist
(Locke 1967, 41, 324ff.) sometimes as a theorist of natural law (ibid., 28794),
sometimes as a theorist of natural rights, particularly natural property rights
(ibid., 3756). The problem is that all three characterizations are correct; the
difficulty is to find an equilibrium between them so that none is discarded in
the effort to define Lockes complete concept of right and law.
Sometimes all three of these criteria of right can work together rather than
against each other. According to Locke one sets up, by consent and contract, a
political system that guarantees the natural rights that one has as a consequence
of natural law. The right to consent in politics can even be said to express the
natural rights that natural law creates. Without a politics created by voluntary
agreement there would be no actual judge to enforce the law of nature, and
individuals would have to rely on self-help, which Locke calls inconvenient
(ibid., 31720). Without the law of nature there would be no criterion for de-
termining what deserves to be consented to. Without natural rights natural law
would lack definite and concrete content, such as natural property rights and
rights of personal security. Thus, these three criteria can work as an ensemble in
which none is superfluous or by itself altogether sufficient. Sometimes one of
these criteria of right might oppose what would be permissible according to
one of the others taken alone, as when Locke urges that a man cannot consent
to give up the natural rights that natural law confers on him; and sometimes
one of the criteria may qualify something that one of the others would have
allowed, as when Locke says that consent can modify the way in which we enjoy
natural property rights in society (ibid., 28794, 3756, 31720). But none of
these considerations makes it less necessary to find an equilibrium between
consent and contract, natural law, and natural rights.
To be sure, there are some who do try to show that consent, natural law,
and natural rights all have claims to be part of Lockes complete concept of
right; this is true especially of Hans Aarsleff (1969), Raymond Polin (1969),
and Ernst Cassirer (1955).1 Cassirer in particular provides a good statement of
Lockean right in his Philosophy of the Enlightenment:
It was Locke who declared in his Treatise on Government that the social contract entered into
by individuals by no means constitutes the only ground for all legal relations among men. All

The Aarsleff essay is especially fine.

such contractual ties are rather preceded by original ties which can neither be created by a con-
tract nor entirely annulled by it. There are natural rights of man which existed before all foun-
dations of social and political organizations; and in view of these the real function and purpose
of the state consists in admitting such rights into its order and in preserving and guaranteeing
them thereby. (Cassirer 1955, 24950)

Assuming at least for the moment that it is reasonable to treat Locke as a

theorist seeking an equilibrium between contract and consent, natural law,
and natural rights, four main questions arise: What is the exact nature of this
balance? Does Locke provide a theory of volition adequate to account for
consent as voluntary agreement? What is the nature of the natural law that
Locke wants to balance against consent? And what sufficiently constitutes
consentrepresentative government, majoritarianism, tacit consent? In exam-
ining these questions it becomes evident that it is precisely when Locke him-
self does not observe this equilibrium between his standards of right that he is
most open to criticism.

4.2. Natural and Civil Law in Locke

Some writers urge that consent and contractarianism are not central in Locke
because natural law is for him a sufficient standard of right, one that obviates
the need for consensual arrangements. We are generally prone to think of
Locke as the exponent of the social contract, says Sir Ernest Barker. It
would be more just to think of him as the exponent of the sovereignty of natu-
ral law (Barker 1947, xviii). It is of course true that if one bracketed out of
Lockes system the obligations and rights to which consent and contract give
rise, one would be left with a tolerably complete ethical doctrine based on
natural law and rights, whereas in Rousseau, by contrast, one would be left
with little, since for him obligations derive their whole force from mutual
agreements and promises.2 But surely natural law, though it is necessary for
Locke, is not sufficient to define explicitly political rights and duties: There is
a distinction to be drawn between the general moral obligations that men
have under natural law and the particular legal obligations that citizens have
through consent and the social contract. This is clear not only in the Second
Treatise but in the Essay concerning Human Understanding as well.
In Book 2, Chapter 28, of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, Of
other relations, Locke draws a careful distinction between the natural law, to
which all men as men are obliged to conform their voluntary actions, and the
civil law, to which all men as citizens are obliged to adhere because they have
created a human legislative authority by consent. A citizen, or a burgher,
Locke says, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place.

Rousseau 1953b, 31: [T]he engagements which bind us to the social body are obligatory
only because they are mutual.

All this sort depending upon mens wills, or agreement in society, I call insti-
tuted, or voluntary; and may be distinguished from the natural (Locke 1959,
31). In a commonwealth, which is what human wills institute, men refer their
actions to a civil law to judge whether or not they are lawful or criminal.
Natural law, however, is not instituted by consent, even by a Grotian univer-
sal consent, as Locke explains best in his Essays on the Law of Nature (Locke
1958, 16079). Nor does it merely define certain privileges in this or that
place. It is rather the law which God has set to the actions of men, and is
the only true touchstone of moral rectitude. But the natural law defines
only general moral goods and evils, only moral duties and sins; it cannot point
out what is a crime, in the strict legal sense, in a commonwealth, in this or
that place: If I have the will of a supreme invisible lawgiver for my rule,
then, as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it
good or evil, sin or duty: And if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by
the legislative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no
crime (ibid., 475, 481).
To say, then, that the natural law is a complete and sufficient standard of
right for Locke is to conflate sin and crime, the duties of man and citizen,
what one owes to God with what one owes to the civil magistrate. It is one
thing to say, as Locke does in Section 12 of the Second Treatise, that the mu-
nicipal laws of countries are only so far right, as they are founded on the
law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted (Locke
1967, 293) and quite another to say that natural law renders such municipal
laws superfluous, or that the latter can be reduced to the former. Locke does
not say, with Hobbes, that the natural and the civil law contain each other
and are of equal extent (Hobbes 1957, chap. XXVI, 4, at page 225). It is
true that for Locke all lawswhether divine, civil, or of reputationare
formally of one kind: All of them involve a moral relation or conformity or
disagreement of mens voluntary actions to a rule to which they are re-
ferred; and all of them must have some kind of sanction, some means
whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the law-
giver (Locke 1958, 474). But this is not grounds for saying that all laws have
the same lawgiver or the same sanctions. Indeed, Locke makes clear that the
giver of natural law is God, that of civil law the voluntarily instituted com-
monwealth, and that of reputation the public; the sanction in the first case is
reward and punishment in a future life, in the second legal punishment, and
in the third the publics power of thinking well or ill (ibid., 477).3

These distinctions are to be found not only in late works such as the Essay but in earlier
ones such as the manuscript entitled Obligation of Penal Laws, which Lord King printed in
his The Life of John Locke (King 1830, 1: 1147). In that manuscript Locke says that there are
virtues and vices antecedent to, and abstract from, society, such as the duty to love God, but
that there are others which suppose society and laws, as obedience to magistrates, or

As a result, the kind of objection to Lockean contractarianism that one

finds, for example, in T. H. Green (a society governed by [] a law of na-
ture [] would have been one from which political society would have been
a decline, one in which there could have been no motive to the establishment
of civil government; Green 1941, 72) is at best half-right. It is partly wrong
because a society governed by a law of nature would have had a motive to es-
tablish civil governmenta motive based not merely on a desire to distinguish
between sin and crime, divine and civil law, what one owes as a man and as a
citizen, but on a desire to set up some known and impartial judge to serve
as executor of the law of nature, to avoid mens being the judges of their
own cases. Locke, after all, states clearly that there are three good reasons for
allowing the natural law to be politically-legally enforced:

First, [in the state of nature] there wants an established, settled, known Law, received and al-
lowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong [] For though the law of na-
ture be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biased by their interest []
are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to de-
termine all differences according to the established law [...].
Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when
right, and to give it due execution. (Locke 1967, 3689)

Green, though he is wrong in saying that there is no motive to the establish-

ment of civil government in Lockes state of nature, is certainly right in saying
that the transition from a society truly and completely governed by natural
law, if such a society could exist, to one under political government would in-
volve a decline. In Section 128 of the Second Treatise Locke argues that under
the terms of the law of nature every man and all the rest of mankind are one
community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures. If it were
not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, Locke goes
on, there would be no need of any other society; there would be no neces-
sity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by
positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations (ibid.,
370). If Green is right in pointing out that voluntarily instituted political soci-
ety in some sense represents a decline, that does not mean that it is unneces-
sary, that there is no motive for setting it up; for Locke, as for Kant, the mere
fact that it would be better if natural law were universally observed, such that

dispossessing a man of his heritage. In both of these casesthat is, of obedience to

magistrates and dispossession of heritagesLocke argues that the rule and obligation is
antecedent to human laws but that the matter about which that rule is, may be consequent to
them. One of the consequent matters may be power of personsthat is, of definite,
namable ruling persons as distinguished from magistrates in general. Although natural law
enjoins obedience to magistrates, as Locke in this manuscript says it does, it says nothing about
the power of persons; it does not say who in particular shall be obeyed.

one could dispense with politics, does not make politics and law unnecessary,
given human life as it is.4
Indeed, there is an excellent motive for instituting a political-legal order,
assuming that men do not naturally obey natural law completely. That is that
natural law does not itself set up or pull down any government; it is men who
do so. Natural law does not translate itself into existence, as if it were a ben-
eficiary of the ontological argument: The law of nature would, as all other
laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody in the
state of nature, [that] had a power to execute that law. A government that
violates natural law may objectively deserve revolution by placing itself in a
state of war with its subjects, by using force without right, which creates a
state of war either in the state of nature or in society (Locke 1967, 289, 299).
But it is people who bring about such an event, properly through the consent
of the majority. Natural law helps them decide whether a government is acting
legitimately, but it does not tell them which is their legitimate government. It
is a criterion of right, but one that requires application. This Locke makes
clear, first in general and abstract terms in the First Treatise and then, in quite
specific political terms, in the treatment of a states right to punish alien law-
breakers in Section 9 of the Second Treatise.
In the First Treatise, in a passage as neglected as the rest of that able but
tedious work, Locke argues that since men cannot obey anything, that can-
not command, and that ideas of government, however perfect or right,
cannot give laws, it is useless to establish government, as a general idea,
without providing a way whereby men can know the person to whom obe-
dience is due. Even if, as Locke says, I am fully persuadedperhaps by
natural law injunctionsthat I should obey political powers, that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world, I am still at liberty till it ap-
pears who is the person that hath right to my obedience. Locke adds, antici-
pating Rousseau, that until one sees marks that distinguish him that hath a
right to rule from other men, it may be my self, as well as any other (ibid.,
2201).5 He then comes to the passage that matters most for present pur-

Cf. Kant 1970c, 121n: [G]overnment [...] genuinely makes it much easier for the moral
capacities of men to develop into an immediate respect for right. This does not mean,
however, that legality replaces morality; legality simply supplies a context within which self-
moralization is more nearly possible.
Cf. Rousseau 1953b, 6: I have said nothing of King Adam or of the Emperor Noah,
father of the three great monarchs, who, like the children of Saturn [...] divided the universe
between them. I hope that my moderation will be appreciated; for as the direct descendant of
one of these princes, and perhaps in the senior line, how do I know that, if titles were verified,
I would not find myself the legitimate king of the human race? Rousseaus brilliant
enlargement of Lockes sober point shows that Rousseau was as familiar with the First Treatise
as with the Second. This is confirmed by the fact that in the First Treatise Locke speaks of social
bonds as chains, as does Rousseau in the famous opening of his Social Contract.

poses, suggesting that even if natural law helps to determine what kinds of po-
litical action are legitimate, it nonetheless does not point to a particular legiti-
mate ruler:
Though submission to government be every ones duty, yet since that signifies nothing but sub-
mitting to the direction and laws of such men, as have authority to command, tis not enough
to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world, but there must
be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs, and a
man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who
is the person, who has a right to exercise that power over him. (Ibid.)

Since the person possessing that right will not be Sir Robert Filmers heir of
Adam, Locke urges, all his fabric falls, and governments must be left again
to the old way of being made by contrivance, and the consent of men [] mak-
ing use of their reason to unite together into society (Locke 1967, 2001, 162).
Sometimes, as in Lockes treatment of punishing aliens in the Second Trea-
tise (chap. II, sec. 9), it turns out that natural law is directly applied, though
not by a person recognized by the alien as one having a magistrates right to
obedience. The magistrates of any community, Locke argues, cannot punish
an alien offender against the state on the basis of the civil laws: [T]he legisla-
tive authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of the common-
wealth, hath no power over him. But since the alien offender is in a state of
nature with respect to the host state, and since the state of nature has a law of
nature to govern it, those magistrates can certainly, as executors of the law of
nature, enforce that law against the offender. A native offender, however,
would be punished under the civil law to which he had in some way con-
sented, and this law would be merely regulated by the natural law.
As a result of these distinctions, Locke says (Second Treatise, Section 87), it
is easy to discern who are, and who are not, in political society together:
[T]hose who are united into one body, and have a common established law
and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between
them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another; but those
who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of
nature (ibid., 291, 342). Sometimes, then, the natural law is directly applied
by an unrecognized person to a political end; but an alien is an exceptional
case in the state, and the ordinary case of the citizen is to be determined by a
civil law, applied by a properly recognized person, which would have to con-
form to the natural law.
Locke develops and completes these points in Section 122 of the Second
Treatise, where he says that merely submitting to the laws of a country and
enjoying privileges and protection under those laws makes not a man a
member of that society. A man is bound in conscience to submit to the ad-
ministration of a government whose subject he is not, perhaps because such a
government can serve as a known and indifferent judge and give effect to
natural law in an inconvenient world. But nothing can make a man a true

member of a commonwealth except his entering into it by positive engage-

ment, and express promise and compact. This merely reinforces what was
laid down earlier in the Second Treatise (Section 15), where Locke had argued
that all men are naturally in the state of nature and remain in it till by their
own consents they make themselves members of some political society; and I
doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear (ibid., 367,
296). This clarification, which comes in Section 22, contains one of the fullest
statements of Lockes views on the relation of natural law to consent: The
natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not
to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of
nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legis-
lative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth, nor un-
der the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what the legislative
shall enact, according to the trust put in it (ibid., 301).
It seems, then, that natural law cannot be a sufficient standard of Lockean
political right whenever mens depravity brings about less than perfect con-
formity to that law. In consequence, the great and natural community of
men under a perfectly observed natural law must give way to smaller and di-
vided associations whose civil laws must simply be regulated by natural law.
Since natural law neither appoints nor removes civil magistrates, neither cre-
ates nor pulls down particular political structures, consent, and promise, and
contract must provide this appointing, and removing, and creating, and pull-
ing down. When natural law is used directly in politics, and not simply as a
criterion of right, it will be in marginal or exceptional cases, such as those of
aliens or of rulers who place themselves in a state of war with their subjects.
Thus, when Sir Ernest Barker claims that while we are generally prone to
think of Locke as the exponent of the social contract, it would in fact be
more just to think of him as the exponent of the sovereignty of natural law
(Barker 1947, xviii), he distorts the real issue: The social contract, for Locke,
is necessitated by natural laws inability to be literally sovereign on earth, by
its incapacity to produce one society. Natural law and contractarianism, far
from being simply antithetical in Locke, necessarily involve each other, at least
given human imperfection and corruption.
It is not the case, however, that Locke placed as much weight on consent
and contract in his earlier works as in his later ones, and these differences
ought, in all fairness, to be taken into account. In his early Essays on the Law
of Nature Locke minimized consent and contractarianism. In the sixth Essay
Locke put forward his general theory, from which he departed little in later
works, that ultimately all obligation leads back to God, partly because of
his divine wisdom and partly because of the right which the creator has over
his creation. However, even if all obligation ultimately leads back to God
and to his justifiable punishments, it is still possible to distinguish between
kinds of obligations. Obligations can consist, Locke writes,

in the authority and dominion which someone has over another, either by natural right and the
right of creation, as when all things are justly subject to that by which they have first been made
and also are constantly preserved; or by the right of donation, as when God, to whom all things
belong, has transferred part of his dominion to someone and granted the right to give orders to
the first-born, for example, and to monarchs; or by the right of contract, as when someone has
voluntarily surrendered himself to another and submitted himself to anothers will. (Locke
1958, 185)

Here, the notion of contract as a foundation of right is not only distinctly sub-
ordinated but is defined in terms of voluntary surrender and submission to
anothers will rather than in terms of the egalitarianism that leads to the social
contract in the Second Treatise. A little later in the sixth Essay contractarianism
is left out of account altogether, and Locke defines legitimate authority simply
in terms of a delegation of power by the will of God: [A]ll that dominion
which the rest of law-makers exercise over others [...] they borrow from God
alone, and we are bound to obey them because God willed thus, and com-
manded thus, so that by complying with them we also obey God (ibid., 187).
This is closer to St. Paul than to social contract theory.
It is not exclusively in the Essays on the Law of Nature that consent and con-
tract play a small role. One of the papers from the Lovelace collection of Locke
manuscripts, entitled On the Difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical
Power, like the Essays dates from the early 1670s. Also like the Essays it subor-
dinates consent and contract to other considerations. Membership in a church,
Locke says, is perfectly voluntary and may end whenever anyone pleases,
but in civil society it is not so. Civil societies, far from being purely voluntary,
must rely on occasional coercion and abridgement of rights if they are to be
effective; and they do not arise only through contractarianism, since all man-
kind are combined into civil societies in various forms, as force, chance,
agreement, or other accidents have happened to constrain them. This is an ar-
gument that Hume could have accepted and turned to anticontractarian advan-
tage. Locke makes it plain that it is not voluntary consent that legitimizes such a
civil society but rather its conforming itself to its appropriate and natural
sphere, namely, civil peace and prosperity, to its avoiding what lies without
civil happiness: salvation (King 1830, vol. 2:116, 109). Here legitimacy is de-
fined in terms of appropriateness of functions, not in terms of mode of origin.
In all of Lockes mature works, however, consent, contractarianism, volun-
tarily produced polities, and obligations have a much greater weight, even if
they do not displace or replace natural laws and rights. This is true not only of
the Second Treatise but of such works as the Third Letter for Toleration (1692),
a work in which Locke, exasperated with an opponents claim that civil soci-
eties are instituted by [God] for the attaining all the benefits which civil soci-
ety or political government can yield, including salvation, finally exclaims,
If you will say, that commonwealths are not voluntary societies constituted
by men, and by men freely entered into [...] that commonwealths are consti-

tuted by God for ends which he has appointed, without the consent and con-
trivance of men .[...] I shall desire you to prove it (Locke 1812d, 212).
The most familiar contractarian arguments are found in the Second Trea-
tise. Sometimesindeed, repeatedlyLocke contents himself with the bare
claim that consent creates political right, as in Section 102 (politic societies
all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely act-
ing in the choice of their governors, and forms of government) and in Sec-
tion 192 (rulers must put the people under such a frame of government, as
they willingly, and of choice, consent to). Occasionally, however, he provides
a more elaborate argument, particularly when he wants to distinguish legiti-
mate political power from both paternal and despotic power.
Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children
during their minority, to supply, their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their
property [...]. Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governours for the
benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And for-
feiture gives the third, despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are
stripped of all property. (Locke 1967, 353, 412, 4012)

By this time the notion of a species of natural political authoritygranted by

God, as in the Essays on the Law of Naturehas given way completely to
voluntarist and contractarian language.
It is never the case, at least not when Locke offers more than mere claims
about consent, that consent and contract are treated as the whole of political
right, that whatever happens to be produced by this process would ex
necessitatis be correct. In Locke there is no general will that is always
right (Rousseau 1953b, 40). This is perfectly clear, for example, in Section 95
of the Second Treatise, which is one of Lockes best statements of an equilib-
rium between the naturally and the consensually right. Since men are natu-
rally free, equal and independent, no one can be subjected to the political
power of anyone else without his own consent. In giving up natural lib-
erty, and putting on the bonds of civil society, men agree to join and unite
into a community not for the purpose of being controlled by any objective to
which a group may happen to consent but for the purpose of comfortable,
safe, and peaceable living amongst one another, in a secure enjoyment of their
properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. Security, of
course, is authorized by natural law, which protects the innocent by allowing
defense against wrongful attacks, while property is a natural right derived
partly from Gods giving the earth to men and partly from human labor
(Locke 1967, 3489, 28996). A political order, created by consent, makes
these things possible even given the inconvenience of some mens corrup-
tion and depravity. In this passage there is an equilibrium between con-
sent, natural law, and natural rights: It is because men are made free and
equal by God, because they want to enjoy natural rights in the security of a
political society in conformity with natural law, that they consent to become

citizens, to conform their voluntary actions to the civil law as well as to the
divine law and the law of reputation. Consent operates within a context.
If Locke had built his entire theory of right on consent alone as an exclu-
sive standard, as Hume accused him of doing, he might have been open to the
objections that Hume raises against him in his essay Of the Original Con-
tract and that others have continued to bring forward. In that essay Hume
urges that Lockean contractarianism is not only historically implausible and
inaccurate but that it is needlessly cumbersome: Since the real reason for obe-
dience to government is that without such obedience society could not oth-
erwise subsist, it is useless to rest the duty of obedience on consent, on a
tacit promise to obey. We must then ask, Why are we bound to observe
our promise? For Hume the only possible answer is that observing promises
is simply necessary because there can be no security where men pay no re-
gard to their engagements. Since actual usefulness is the measure of obedi-
ence in general, as well as of promises, it is useless and awkward to base one
on the other: we gain nothing by resolving the one into the other, since the
general interests or necessities of society are sufficient to establish both
(Hume 1951a, 193209).6
Locke is not really open to this objection, formidable as it is, since he can
ground the obligation of promises and of tacit consent not in social utility but
in natural law: The keeping of faith, he says, belongs to men, as men, and not
as members of society (Locke 1967, 195). We have a duty to keep promises
faithfully because in breaking our word and in acting deceitfully we would
harm other men and thereby violate natural law, which forbids harming oth-
ers, particularly the innocent, except in self-preservation. Locke maintains
that there is a natural duty to keep promises, including political ones; indeed,
he often holds that the notion of a promise could not work without God and
his natural laws. In the Essays on the Law of Nature in particular he argues that
without natural law the faithful fulfillment of contracts is overthrown, be-
cause it is not to be expected that a man would abide by a compact because
he has promised it [...] unless the obligation to keep promises was derived
from naturethat is, from the natural law as the will of God, backed by

Hume, of course, could not have given much weight to Lockes claim that voluntary
agreement gives [...] political power to governors, since for Hume will is not a morally
consequential idea. This is especially clear in Hume 1951b, 14 (3.1.1): Let us choose any
inanimate object, such as an oak or elm, and let us suppose that by the dropping of its seed it
produces a sapling below it which [...] at last overtops and destroys the parent tree; I ask if in
this instance there be wanting any relation which is discoverable in parricide or ingratitude? Is
not the one tree the cause of the others existence, and the latter the cause of the destruction of
the former, in the same manner as when a child murders his parent? It is not sufficient to reply
that a choice or will is wanting [...] It is a will or choice that determines a man to kill his
parent; and they are the laws of matter and motion that determine a sapling to destroy the oak
from which it sprang. Had King Lear lived to read the Treatise of Human Nature, he might
well have doubted that ingratitude is sharper than a serpents tooth.

sanctions of infinite weight and duration. Much the same argument is put for-
ward in the Essay (Book 1, Chapter 2), where Locke argues that it is certainly
a great and undeniable rule in morality that men should keep their compacts
and adds that a Christian will believe this because of his conviction that God,
who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us (Locke 1959,
119). (A Hobbist, however, will believe it only because the public requires
it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not; Locke 1958, 69.) In the
Letter concerning Toleration Locke bases his refusal to tolerate atheists on the
notion that promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human
society, can have no hold upon an atheist, that the taking away of God [...]
dissolves all (Locke 1812a, 47). This may not be a particularly effective argu-
ment, but at least it meets Humes charge that Lockean promise and tacit con-
sent have no grounding and hence must always lead back to utility. And it
shows that, for Locke, natural law and consent support and even require each
other: without natural law and its eternal sanctions men would have no suffi-
cient motive to observe promises and covenants; but without the political soci-
eties that are held together by promises and oaths and covenants the natural
law would not be enforced by a known and indifferent judge.
Even in his late works Locke does not invariably define political right in
terms of consent or even of consent hedged round by natural law. At the very
beginning of the Second Treatise, for instance, he defines political power as
the right of making laws for the purposes of preserving property, defending
the commonwealth from foreign injury, and upholding the public goodand
this without even mentioning consent. In the First Treatise, in a passage remi-
niscent of the Essays on the Law of Nature, he suggests that men are equal and
ought to enjoy the same rights and privileges until the manifest appointment
of God [...] can be produced to shew any particular persons supremacy, or a
mans own consent subjects him to a superior (Locke 1967, 286, 208). Even
heresince the rest of the First Treatise is designed to show that God has not
appointed such a particular personconsent, though it comes second, wins
out by a kind of default.
Although it can be shown decisively that Locke at least meant to give con-
sent a great deal of weight as one standard of political right, this does not ex-
haust problems of interpretation. We are still left with the other questions
posed earlier, the next of which is: Does Locke provide a conception of natu-
ral law theory adequate to account for one foundation of what is right?

4.3. Locke on Natural Law

It should already be clear that Locke set a high value on natural law as a
standard to which men ought to conform their voluntary actions, even if he
did not think that, given an imperfect world, it could ordinarily be directly
sovereign. At the very least, natural law provides sanctions in the form of

divine rewards and punishments that gives one a motive to observe obliga-
tions based on promise and contract. As we have seen, contractarianism is im-
portant to Locke; and his theory of volition usually allows for the notion of
voluntary consent. However, some Locke critics argue that his natural law
theory is not very coherent. One even maintains that since Locke was a phi-
losopher of rank and sobriety, he must have recognized this incoherence
and therefore could note possibly have taken his own natural law theory seri-
ously (Strauss 1953, 20232).
Most of the charges of incoherence in Lockes theory of natural law re-
volve around the question of whether that law can be derived from reason
alone. In his most famous, if not most truly representative, passage on natural
law Locke certainly encourages the belief that natural law simply is reason it-
self: Section 6 of the Second Treatise urges that even a state of nature has a
law of nature to govern it, and that reason, which is that law, teaches all
who will consult it that men ought not to harm each other in their lives,
health, liberty or possessions. The reason for this, Locke goes on, is that men
are the workmanship of an omnipotent and infinitely wise God, that they
are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not
one anothers pleasure (Locke 1967, 289). (Here, Lockes theory that labor
creates natural property rights is carried to its most extreme point: God is en-
titled to govern what he has produced.)7 The content of natural law is derived
from what is necessary to mens lasting during Gods pleasure: Thus, natu-
ral law forbids suicide and commands men to preserve the rest of mankind
whenever their own security is not at stake. The law of nature generally
willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, and anything that can
reasonably be represented as conducive to that peace and preservation consti-
tutes one of the articles of natural law (Locke 1967, 289).
As is evident in the rest of Lockes writings, however, he was not usually
content simply to identify natural law with reason; indeed, even in the Second
Treatise (Section 135) he says that all men must conform their actions to the
law of nature, i.e., to the will of God (ibid., 376). Lockes reason for shifting
the emphasis from reason to divine will is never made clear in the Second Trea-
tisewhere it would not have been advantageous to enlarge on the difficulties
of natural law theorybut is taken up at length in the Essay, in The Reasona-
bleness of Christianity (Locke 1812c), in the Essays on the Law of Nature, and
in the unpublished manuscript entitled Of Ethick in General (Locke 1830).
In the first of the Essays on the Law of Nature Locke states his reasons for
believing that natural law is a decree of the divine will rather than a mere
dictate of reason.

On Lockes theory of divine workmanship see the brilliant study by James Tully, A
Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Tully 1980, 358). The title suggests a
limited scope; in fact the book has valuable things to say about every facet of Lockes thought.

[Natural law] appears to me less correctly termed by some people the dictate of reason, since
reason does not so much establish and pronounce this law of nature as search for it and discover
it as a law enacted by a superior power and implanted in our hearts. Neither is reason so much
the maker of that law as its interpreter, unless, violating the dignity of the supreme legislator, we
wish to make reason responsible for that received law which it merely investigates; nor indeed
can reason give us laws, since it is only a faculty of our mind and part of us (Locke 1958, 111).

In this case Locke is mainly showing that reason is a faculty or power, that the
content of a rule cannot be derived from the existence of a capacity. This is, at
least from the point of view of his philosophy, a good argument and one that
he never stated with any greater force in his later works.
Most of what Locke says about natural law is contained in the Essay (Book
2, Chapter 28) and in The Reasonableness of Christianity. In the Essay Locke
states his familiar view that good and evil are nothing but pleasure or pain,
that moral good and evil involve the conformity of our voluntary actions to
some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and pleasure of
the lawmaker. After subdividing law into the divine, the civil, and that of
reputation, Locke defines divine law as that which God has set to the actions
of men, and whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice
of revelation. In this instance, then, Locke is resolutely avoiding putting
forth a purely rational natural law, instead speaking indefinitely of a divine
law that comprises both reason and revelation (Locke 1958, 474, 475). (That
he knew exactly what he was doing is shown by his letter to James Tyrrell of
August 1690: You say, that to show what I meant, I should, after divine law,
have added in a parenthesis, which others call the law of nature, which had
been so far from what I meant, that it had been contrary to it, for I meant the
divine law indefinitely, and in general, however made known or supposed;
Locke 1976, 1133.) After recalling the doctrine of the Second Treatise that
God has a right to give laws to men because we are his creatures, Locke
concludes by saying that the divine law is the only true touchstone of moral
rectitude. It is of course intrinsically reasonable and just (pace Descartes and
his belief that Gods will creates the rightness of norms),8 but the formal
cause of its being a true law is indeed Gods will: What duty is, Locke argues
in Book 2, Chapter 2, of the Essay, cannot be understood without a law, nor
a law be known and understood without a lawmaker, or without reward and
punishment (Locke 1959, 76). In the manuscript entitled Of Ethick in Gen-
eral, written at roughly the same time as the Essay, Locke enlarges on this
point. Let philosophers discourse ever so acutely, of temperance or justice,
he says, but show no law of a superior that prescribes temperance, to the ob-
servation or breach of which law there are rewards and punishments annexed,
and the force of morality is lost, and evaporates only into words, disputes, and
niceties. Those who provide mere definitions of virtues and vices, he argues,

For the relevant Descartes passages see Kenny 1979, 1626.

mistake their business and are only language-masters, so long as they do

not prove the existence of a superior power who has the right to obligate
men. To establish morality, therefore, upon its proper basis, and such foun-
dations as may carry an obligation with them, we must first prove a law, which
always supposes a lawmaker: one that has a superiority and right to ordain,
and also a power to reward and punish according to the tenor of the law es-
tablished by him. This sovereign lawmaker who has set rules and bounds to
the actions of men is God, their Maker (Locke 1830, 122133).
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, which contains Lockes most prob-
lematical utterances on natural law, special new difficulties arise. In the works
just discussed the question was whether reason alone can supply a content for
natural law, as Section 6 of the Second Treatise had suggested. On this point
Lockes final opinion appears to be that even a perfectly rational moral princi-
ple would not be a real law unless it were willed by a superior being who has
a right, by virtue of having created everything, to govern his creation as he sees
fit, and that even if reason helps us find that law, it does not constitute that law.
What is remarkable about The Reasonableness of Christianity is that Locke
vacillates in a confusing way on the question of whether reason alone can
demonstrate a science of ethics. After observing that before the advent of
Christ human reason unassisted failed men in its great and proper business
of morality, that it never from unquestionable principles, by clear deduc-
tions, made out of an entire body of the law of nature, Locke switches tem-
porarily to the view that a science of ethics can be proven either through
purely rational demonstration or through revelation. Whoever wants his
moral opinions, however excellent in themselves, to pass for actual natural
laws, Locke says, either must show that he builds his doctrine upon princi-
ples of reason, self-evident in themselves, and that he deduces all the parts of
it from thence, by clear and evident demonstration, or must show his com-
mission from heaven, that he comes with authority from God, to deliver his
will and commands to the world (Locke 1812c, 140, 142). What is extraordi-
nary here is that Locke presents these as alternatives, apparently equally valid;
but according to his usual principles even a demonstration of the rationality
of a principle would not make it obligatory: if rationality alone were sufficient,
Gods will, and his right to govern, would be superfluous. (Cf. Descartes
1979, 1626, where roughly the same argument is made.) This is probably
why Locke, despite the fact that in The Reasonableness of Christianity he ap-
pears to believe that the moral philosophers had simply failed to demonstrate
a rational ethics that remained in principle demonstrable, finally reverted to
his more characteristic view that even if reason could be shown to require
some definite practical conduct, obligatoriness would still be necessary.
Those just measures of right and wrong, which [...] philosophy recommended, stood on their
true foundations [...]. But where was it that their obligation was thoroughly known and al-
lowed, and they received as precepts of a law; the highest law, the law of nature? That could

not be, without a clear knowledge and acknowledgement of the law-maker, and the great re-
wards and punishments, for those that would, or would not obey him. (Locke 1812c, 144)

While Locke thought that the revelation of Gods existence through miracles
was something that the many who could not know (and therefore had to
believe) could use as a grounding for natural law,9 he also thought that Gods
existence could be rationally demonstrated and that such a demonstrably ex-
tant God qua creator would have a right to govern, insofar as such a right is
contained in Lockes idea of creation (Locke 1967, 289). Ultimately, Locke
had some reason for defining the divine law loosely, as either reason or revela-
tion, in Book 2, Chapter 28, of the Essay. What matters most is that for natu-
ral law to be a real law, God must rightfully will it; it matters less whether the
few know this through reasonthrough the concept of God as creatoror
the many know it through revelation and miracles. The only thing that is truly
confusing in The Reasonableness of Christianity is that Locke keeps hinting
that if men were better at reasoning, they might hit upon a purely demonstra-
ble rational ethics in a science like mathematics, but that the greatest part
of mankind want leisure or capacity for demonstration (Locke 1812c, 146).
However the real problem is that such an ethics would lack a formal cause,
or a legislator. Either reason or revelation may discover such a legislator in
God, but in neither case does reason alone constitute the content of ethics.
Apart from this one problemand Locke was obsessed with the demon-
strability of ethics, though he never produced such a demonstrationhis
natural law theory is relatively coherent. Its content, though not constituted by
reason, is always reasonable, since God is as all-wise as he is omnipotent; that
content defends Gods creation against the voluntary wrongdoing of men and
is backed up by sanctions of infinite weight and duration in another life.
With this last point we come to the most serious attack ever leveled against
Locke as a natural law theorist. Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History ob-
serves that most commentators on Lockean natural law, such as J. L. Gough, are
content to say that it contains logical flaws but that they do not go nearly far
enough. In Strausss opinion Locke cannot have recognized any law of nature
in the proper sense of the term. Since he grants that this conclusion stands in
shocking contrast to what is generally thought to be his doctrine, he tries to
support it by a close and sometimes brilliant exegesis of a number of Lockean
texts. But the substance of his argument, stated in his own words, is this:

[Locke] says, on the one hand, that, in order to be a law, the law of nature must not only have
been given by God, but it must in addition have as its sanctions divine rewards and punish-
ments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life. On the other hand, however, he says
that reason cannot demonstrate that there is another life. Only through revelation do we know
of the sanctions for the law of nature or of the only true touchstone of moral rectitude.

Ibid., 146: The greatest part cannot know, and therefore must believe.

As a result, Strauss says, Lockes measures of right and wrong do not have the
character of a law, for they lack sanctions that reason can demonstrate, and
therefore there does not exist a law of nature (Strauss 1953, 220, 203, 212).
Strauss gains an unfair advantage by calling the law of nature, as distin-
guished from revelation, the only true touchstone of moral rectitude in
Locke, whereas Locke in fact said that it is divine law, comprising both rational
natural law and revelation, that constitutes this touchstone. Since Locke never
said that reason can demonstrate anything more than the probability of immor-
tality, Strauss distorts Locke by speaking as if Locke first said that a purely
rational natural law alone constitutes the only true touchstone of moral recti-
tude and then said inconsistently that reason cannot demonstrate immortality.
Strausss substitution of the phrase law of nature for divine law looks like a
small alteration, but in fact it is a major one that alone makes his argument
possible. He is doing exactly what Locke criticized Tyrrell for doing in 1690.
What is more, even if Lockes theory of natural law were as inadequate as
Strauss says it is, there would still be no grounds for saying that Locke himself
could not have believed it: only Strausss conviction that Locke was deliber-
ately perplexing his sense, providing an esoteric and an exoteric doctrine,
would lead necessarily to that conclusion. As Locke himself argued in his First
Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, it cannot be said that because a writer is
obliged to use imperfect, inadequate, obscure ideas, where he has no better,
he is deliberately trying to exclude those things out of being, or out of rational
discourse by making them obviously implausible (Locke 1812b, 9).
If it is the requirements of Strausss mode of interpretation rather than
anything in Locke that make him say that Locke could not have believed in
his own natural law theory, his philosophical objection still identifies some
problems. Here, a great deal turns on the word demonstration. Actually,
Strauss was not by any means the first to object to Lockean natural law on the
grounds that the immortality of the soul, on which eternal rewards and pun-
ishments would be visited, could not be demonstrated by Locke; Tyrrell had
made the same objection in 1690, and Locke at least tried to meet it. In his
reply to Tyrrell Locke said that while he thought that demonstration in reli-
gion and morality could be taken much farther than it had been, nonetheless
one sometimes had to settle for something less: The probability of rewards
and punishments in another life, I should think, might serve for an enforce-
ment of the divine law (Locke 1976, 112). Even if, Locke wrote in the Essay,
the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated, the bare possibility,
which nobody can make any doubt of, of another life governed by divine re-
wards and punishments makes it a good bargain to conform ones voluntary
actions to the divine law: [I]f the good man be in the right, he is eternally
happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing (Locke 1958,
365). If Locke did not believe that the immortality of the soul was demonstra-
ble by reason unaided by revelation, he did at least think that such immortal-

ity was probable and that a Pascalian wager on that point was reasonable; but
Strauss, by not even mentioning Lockes theory of probability, strives to create
the impression that Lockes theory of immortality is utterly groundless.
Locke did, of course, think that immortality could be proved by revelation
and that nothing in genuine revelation can contradict reason. In the Essay (Book
4, Chapter 18) Locke grants that the notion that the dead shall rise, and live
again though true is beyond the discovery of reason and that only revelation
and faith can uphold it. He adds that while everything that God has revealed is
certainly true and that no doubt can be made of it, nonetheless nothing that
is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of rea-
son, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith (ibid., vol. 2: 425).
But it is mainly in the Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester and in The Rea-
sonableness of Christianity that Locke treats immortality with care. God has
revealed that the souls of men shall live forever, he urges in the Second Reply,
and the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of what he has re-
vealed. The fact that a proposition divinely revealed cannot be demonstrated
by natural reason alone does not make it less credible than one that can;
apparently it is sufficient that there be no manifest conflict between reason and
what is revealed (Locke 1812e, 476). And in The Reasonableness of Christianity
Locke points out at length all of the passages from Scripture that suggest the
probability of immortality and eternal life and characterizes such an eternal
life as the reward of justice and righteousness only. Then, in a central passage
that reinforces his view of divine rewards and punishments as the main sanction
of the divine law, he points out the connection between those sanctions and im-
mortality: Life, eternal life, being the reward of justice or righteousness, ap-
pointed by the righteous God [...] it is impossible that he should justify those
who had no regard to justice at all whatever they believed. This would have been
to encourage iniquity, contrary to the purity of his nature; and to have con-
demned that eternal law of right which is holy, just and good [...]. The duties of
that law [...] are of eternal obligation (Locke 1812c, 107, 11129).
Locke, then, is certain that the divine law, as the only true touchstone of
moral rectitude, requires immortality and sanctions; that reason alone, though
it must not conflict with revelation, is not something out of which a complete
science of ethics can be deduced. This is probably why he always put off writ-
ing a book of offices, saying in a well-known letter to his friend Molyneux
that the gospel contains so perfect a body of ethics, that reason may be ex-
cused from that inquiry, since she may find mans duty clearer and easier in rev-
elation, than in herself (Locke 1979, 595). He might have added that without
divine will and sanctions there would be no absolute obligation to do even that
which is conformable to right reason, that it is not simply clearer and easier to
pass from reason to revelation but necessary as well (Locke 1812c, 1412).
Ultimately, Lockes theory of natural law is problematic only if one thinks
that he began by saying that such a law is derived from reason alone and later

changed his argument. However, apart from the passage in the Second Treatise
on a natural law that simply is reason, Lockes writings generally state that the
divine law depends on both reason and revelation. Locke is unlike, say, Grotius
in his effort to rationalize natural law: Locke could not have accepted even
as a Grotian hypothesis the notion that the truths of morality are exactly like
those of logic and mathematics, for obligation would be lacking (De Jure Belli
ac Pacis, 1.1.10). Still, taken on its own terms, Lockes natural law is tolerably
coherent. Perhaps the phrase divine law should always be used when dis-
cussing Lockes ultimate moral norm. But since he himself often uses the idea
of natural law, it is safe to employ that term, so long as one remembers that
when Locke is being strict, the natural law is only a part of the divine law; rev-
elation is needed as well to provide a complete touchstone of moral rectitude.

4.4. Conclusion
In the end, Lockes political and legal system is rather impressively defended.
He provides a theory of natural, or rather divine law that, taken as a whole, is
intelligible, even if one might not want to derive the validity of such law from
divine will, and even if one might wish that he had not occasionally argued as
if such a law could be derived from reason alone. He shows that the general
moral obligations under such a law need to be given political specificity
through consent and contract, through finding a person whom it is a citizens
duty to obey. He sketches a theory of volition that ultimately allows for volun-
tary adherence to natural law and for voluntary agreement as the definition of
consent, at least when the mind can suspend some pressing uneasiness. And
he suggests that consent is in harmony with natural law and rights because
that law and those rights make all men morally equal and necessitate the vol-
untary creation of superiors who are not superior. As Richard Aaron put the
matter nearly fifty years ago: The [Lockean] social contract theory was
closely linked with that of the law of nature. In one sense the former is the
corollary of the latter. In nature all men are equal, but in political society some
are rulers and others are ruled. This difference needs to be explained and is
explained by the theory of the social contract (Aaron 1936, 272).10 If Locke
had more carefully preserved the equilibrium between the criteria of right
that he had set out to keep in balance, consent and contract would be a more
obvious corollary of the only true touchstone of moral rectitude. At least the
defects of Lockes system of right can be remedied with his own concepts, and
in a Lockean spirit.

Cf. Dunn 1986, 2952, in which he argues that consent and contract in Locke are usually
misunderstood by those (such as Plamenatz) who wrench the Second Treatise out of its
seventeenth century context in order to graft it onto the contemporary shibboleth of
government by consent.