2016 Sec Outlook-Cananda

A FORESIGHT PROJECT
>>>> Perspectives
scuritaires 2018
Risques et menaces ventuels
Potential Risks and Threats
2018 Security Outlook
TUDE PROSPECTIVE
>>>>
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Published June 2016
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Potentials Risks and Threats
A foresight project
Table of contents
The project and its objectives ........................................................................................................... 1
Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1 Chinas dangerous years ahead .................................................................................. 11
Chapter 2 Drivers of Middle East conflict: The present and future of political Islam ...................... 25
Chapter 3 Russian futures to 2018 ............................................................................................. 41
Chapter 4 Weapons of mass destruction: The evolution of the threat of proliferation .................... 57
Chapter 5 State power and cyber power ...................................................................................... 73
Endnotes ....................................................................................................................................... 91
The project and its objectives
Academic Outreach at CSIS
Canadas human intelligence agency, the Canadian Security

Intelligence Service (CSIS) established an Academic Outreach
program in 2008. The program seeks to help our own experts
benefit from a dialogue with non-governmental specialists, foster
our contextual understanding of evolving security issues and play a
catalytic role in the world of research. Several of our activities
seminars, conferences, workshopslead to the production of
reports, which we now make accessible via our web site. Although
the majority of our efforts aim to improve our understanding of
issues of immediate priority to the Government of Canada, we also
lead initiatives to explore emerging security developments that
may have repercussions for Canada further into the future.
Together, those initiatives have helped us adopt our own approach
to the practice of foresight.
A look at 2018
The Academic Outreach program ran a multi-part foresight

initiative from September 2015 to May 2016. Five leading global
thinkers were commissioned to explore the drivers influencing the
security risks and potential threats related to specific regions of the
world and themes by the year 2018. This end point may seem
arbitrary, but was deliberately selected to maximise the relevance
of the foresight project in its aggregate. It is neither too far into the
future so as to become overly abstract, and yet it is sufficiently
remote from the present to allow contributor and reader to
question current assumptions.
The result is this report. Through the examination of a broad range

of challenges linked to China, the Middle East, Russia, weapons of
mass destruction and cyber-security, it provides a glimpse into the
dynamics that may be influencing the globes near-future. It may
be that some of our interlocutors hold ideas or promote findings
that conflict with the views and analysis of the Service, but it is for
this specific reason that there is value to engage in this kind of
conversation.
1
2
Executive summary
3
4
Executive summary
Overview
Over the next two years, there is a high potential for dangerous
global instability.
Both China and Russia have leaders with aggressive foreign

policy agendas capable of generating diplomatic and
military confrontations. However, while pursuing their
objectives, both leaders must cope with structurally weak
economies.
Conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen will continue.

Multiple militia groups complicate attempts to end the
violence in these countries, while affiliates of the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda spread
insurgency and terror attacks across the Middle East,
Africa, Asia and cities in Europe. There are few agreed
principles on which to build comprehensive peace
agreements, but negotiations may lessen the intensity of
some conflicts. Neither Al-Qaeda nor ISIL affiliates are part
of negotiations.
The development and use of weapons of mass destruction

(WMDs) will be a continuing focus of concern. While
weapons technology will not leap ahead as fast as
information technology, the risks of proliferation, or
miscalculation, will continue to require constant
monitoring and attention.
North Korea as a developer of nuclear weapons and

ballistic missiles remains a country of high concern. India
and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, continue to have a
confrontational relationship. Some non-state actors have
already acquired the capabilities to produce and use
chemical weapons. Despite the challenge, they will also
likely attempt to use "dirty bombs".
The potential for the Internet and cyber technology to be a

strategically disruptive force is high, even within the next
two years. Rapidly evolving information technology and
5
cyber threats will continue to be a major preoccupation for

states, non-state actors, private companies and ordinary
citizens.
US foreign policy continues to have much influence on the

behaviour of countries in the Middle East and Asia. US
global engagement is important to countries considering
the acquisition or possible use of weapons of mass
destruction. Therefore, the foreign policy of the person
elected in November 2016 as President of the United
States will be a major determinant of international
dynamics over the next two years. Leaders of the US,
Russia and China will interact on crises in the Middle East,
the South China Sea and the periphery of Russia.
China at a crossroads
President Xi Jinping has reversed elements of Chinas collective

leadership and asserted greater personal authority. This has had
implications for both economic policy and domestic and foreign
security strategies.
Xi has asserted the importance of one supreme, visionary

leader. He is now committed to creating a personal
leadership cult which cannot be easily reversed. He is not
politically vulnerable in the short term, but the longer term
is uncertain. Both the new regime style and the man are
brittle.
The transition to an economy led by domestic consumer

demand is not going smoothly as Xi tries to combine a
market economy with central economic direction. Fear of
the consequences of arbitrary measures is leading to an
outflow of capital. This hybrid of central direction and a
market economy can survive in the next two years. In a
complex domestic and international economy, however, it
is not viable in the longer term.
Chinas policy of confrontation in the South China Sea is

tied to Chinese national pride. The reaction of US regional
allies depends on their degree of confidence that the US
will fulfill its commitments. The linkages between Chinese
policies, regional reactions and US intentions, increase the
6
potential for conflict, possibly stimulated by an

International Tribunal ruling on the South China Sea
dispute. China also faces the alienation of Taiwan from
Chinas increasingly authoritarian regime, and worsened
relations with either the US or North Korea over the latters
nuclear and ballistic missile program.
The Middle Easts political fabric
Instability in the Middle East has been driven by the unresolved

question of the role of religion in public life. The Muslim
Brotherhood model of democratic competition has been replaced
by ISILs belief in extreme violence to establish and govern a
so-called caliphate.
The coup in Egypt which removed the Muslim Brotherhood

from power, as well as the Rabaa massacre of Brotherhood
supporters in August 2013, have discredited the Muslim
Brotherhoods advocacy of democratic engagement. A
lesson from the Egyptian experience appears to be that the
demands of Islamist state-building and the requirements of
democratic power-sharing cannot be reconciled.
In Egypt and some other Muslim-majority countries, Islam

has historically been a force for national unity. This can
change when an explicitly Islamic agenda is embedded
within a political partys program. There is then a risk that a
political-religious competition for power will generate a
cycle of distrust, repression and destabilisation.
ISIL has taken territory, declared the establishment of a

caliphate, and instituted its own governance structures.
The notion of the caliphate is very popular for many within
the Muslim world. Whatever its eventual fate, the ISIL
caliphate will serve as a model for future extremist militias
which believe they can take control of territory and
establish a governance structure.
7
Predictable Russian unpredictability
Russia is handicapped by poor economic performance but there is

no evidence that this is hindering the consolidation of President
Vladimir Putins absolute authority or the program to modernise
Russias military.
Western assessments that Russia is vulnerable to economic

collapse and disruptive internal discontent are
exaggerated. Russia is adapting to adversity; the economy
is deliberately tilted to security rather than economic
freedom. Political power in Russia is being steadily
concentrated at the national level in an attempt to
overcome system dysfunction in delivery. The current
regime appears to be coherent, durable and united at the
centre.
Russia sees itself as surrounded by an arc of instability and

chaos, and engaged in a clash of civilisations. It attributes
conflict on its periphery to Western malice and
incompetence.
Two trends should be emphasized. First, Russia is not

modernising its military primarily to extend its capacity to
pursue hybrid warfare. It is modernising conventional
military capability on a large scale; the state is mobilising
for war. Second, on the important issues which generate
international tensions, the regime does not change its
policies: it reinforces them.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The risk of the use of WMDs, or of a significant increase in

proliferation, is low over the coming two years. However,
technologies and expertise will continue to proliferate. This will
increase the long-term danger that nuclear and chemical weapons,
as well as ballistic delivery systems, will reach more countries, with
a corresponding greater risk of use.
International trade, the movement of populations and

instability in some countries enable the spread of WMD
expertise. There appears to be little prospect of a
corresponding improvement in proliferation control-
8
related mechanisms. The urge to acquire WMDs will

continue to depend on: regional power balances; military
intervention, particularly from Western powers; and
whether regimes are liberal democracies or authoritarian.
Perceptions of the new US President will be an important
factor.
Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Russia

are the high-risk countries for acquisition, transfer or use of
WMDs, while Russia and North Korea are potential
exporters of ballistic missiles. North Korea remains the
most unpredictable country with a potential
nuclear-weapons capability. Tension between India and
Pakistan represents the greatest danger of a direct
confrontation between nuclear-armed states.
Irans behaviour over the next few years will signal its
attitude to the agreement on terminating nuclear weapons
development, and on its future intentions when the
agreement expires.
Some non-state actors may use drones to deploy their

WMDs. ISIL already has chemical capabilities. It and others
may be tempted in the coming years to enter the biological
and radiological realm.
Cyber Threats
Cyber-insecurity will remain a major threat to states, private sector

companies and individuals. The high rate of technological
innovation, the dominance of commercial, off-the-shelf software,
and the increasing proliferation of entities with embedded and
unchangeable software means that cyber-attack potential will stay
ahead of defence capabilities.
The continued use of commercial technology means that

system vulnerabilities can be known, traded and widely
exploited. Interdependence based on linked networks
makes important systems highly vulnerable to rapid and
catastrophic collapse, requiring a prolonged repair stage.
As the number of cyber transactions increases, the relative
proportion of attacks may go down. However, the risk of
catastrophic attacks is steadily increasing.
9
The proliferation of devices with embedded systemsthe

Internet of Thingsadds a new danger. Devices will be
long-lasting, vulnerable to attack, but unreachable for
software fixes.
The state use of cyber-attack weapons will not be

restrained as the use of nuclear weapons was because
cyber-attacks are difficult to trace to the attacker.
Considered from the perspective of the topics covered in this

review, the period 2016 to 2018 must be assessed as one with
significant risks of destabilising developments and increased
international tension.
10
CHAPTER 1
Chinas dangerous years ahead
11
12
Chapter 1 Chinas dangerous years ahead

Predicting the future of China is a risky undertaking. The accepted
wisdom is that Chinese history moves in cycles, involving long
periods of stability followed by the loss of legitimacy and either
chaos or revolutionary change. As in any authoritarian system that
produces brittle politics and institutions, it is hard to second guess
the timing of those changes. Even if one believes that something in
the system, or even the whole system, must snap at some point, it
remains possible that authoritarian mobilisation can delay the
breaking point to a later date. To the leaders of such systems, it is
in fact the whims of democracy that bring the risk of sudden and
unwarranted change.
During the Deng Xiaoping era, adaptation and reform, either in

bursts under his stewardship or incrementally with his successors,
took care of the issue. Deng in fact communicated a sense of
timefor example, a 50-year deal for Hong Kong or postponing the
resolution of China-Japan territorial issues to the next
generation. The two most influential reports on reforms under the
Hu-Wen leadership were both entitled China in 2030. Xi Jinping,
however, has not formulated such a time horizon as he tightens his
personal grip over the country. Authoritarian regimes have no
deadline; they do not entertain an expiration date, whereas
democracies live through election cycles. Instead, analysts of China
are often influenced by a combination of policy and dynastic cycles:
the former well exemplified under Mao, and again with the
vagaries of reform after 1979; the latter always uppermost in the
leaders minds, making the continuation of the regime the number
one priority at any cost.
An upheaval from below, following a visible loss of regime

legitimacy, is always possible. Yet the tools of political control
acquired by a coercive and resource-rich regime, combining mass
campaigns and technology, are formidable. Shaking the system
from above has been absolutely excluded, following Maos
initiatives that were disastrous to his colleagues, as well as to the
general population. Under Deng Xiaopings leadership, the fate of
his two successive lieutenants, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who
tried to rock the boat in 1986 and 1989, illustrates that prohibition.
Xi Jinping has pointed to former USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev as
the model of what must not happen to China and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP).
13
The first three years of what can now be called Xi Jinpings reign
have amplified these rigidities. Any move to the rule of law has
been excluded (as opposed to rule by law under the Party and state
bureaucracy), whereas there had remained previously some
ambiguity. Repression of activists of any kind, and of their legal
defenders, has intensified to a degree unknown since Maos death.
Even collective leadership has been reversed, with Xis colleagues
presumably cowed by the anti-corruption campaign, and Xi Jinping
increasingly designated as the core leader. The long arm of
Chinese state security is spreading abroad, in Hong Kong, Thailand,
Australia and even the United States. Reform, only three years ago
(2011-2012) hinting at a major top-down development, is now
bottoming out as a myriad of small administrative and technical
changes, with no visible flag bearer. Communist ideology, the
achievements of the 1950s and Mao as a primeval figure have been
revived with an increasing role for the Partys propaganda
department. If Xi Jinping denounced Gorbachev as a liquidator, he
is positioning himself as a restorationist of the CCP, to use a term
that is both Leninist and Qing dynasty parlance.
Major trends impacting the Chinese political scene that could

puncture the armour recreated by Xi Jinping
A reversal of fortune for Chinas economy
This author belongs to the school that believes international

commentary, after hyping Chinas miraculous growth, is
exaggerating today the degree of economic emergency the country
is supposedly facing. Not only was slower growth predicted, it was
actually willed by at least some reform-minded leaders in the
previous government team. But the framework for transition (from
resource- and investment-intensive growth to a consumer, service
and high-tech economy) is now being derailed. There has been a
highly visible mishandling of stock market regulatory issues and
monetary liberalisation. A continuing hesitation about the risks
from slower growth led in 2015 to another wave of credit-based
stimuli to the economy. But this came without the growth that it
previously sustained: in other words, China is getting both runaway
public stimuli and lower growth.
These are now impacting the aura of management invincibility that

has protected the Chinese leadership. At best, this is a
communication disaster. At worst, it reflects a misunderstanding of
14
economic rules at the top: the leadership believes it can run side by
side elements of an internationally attractive market system and
heavy-handed correction of these same markets. In turn, this has
created a second event: Chinas firms with international
connections, and Chinas individual citizens with assets to protect,
are both running abroad for cover. How else to interpret the
outflow of capitalUSD 1,1 trillion in a year1, now running at more
than USD 100 billion per month? Explanations, such as firms and
individuals winding down their dollar bets and anticipating dollar
purchases, or the decline of other currencies held in Chinas
reserves, or even fabricated export data, are a description of how
the outflow happens rather than a counterfactual.
There is no rational explanation for this, but two psychological

factors. One is the belief that the dollar will keep rising and that the
yuan will leave its peg and devaluate, whether that is a goal for the
leadership or not. The second factor is the growing fear of arbitrary
moves threatening acquired wealth and business. Corruption was
always seen as a cost of doing business and as a road to fortune for
Chinas upper middle class and entrepreneurs, who are usually well
connected. It is the people below who resent it. The campaign led
by Xi Jinping and CCP inspection chief Wang Qishan has triggered a
Latin American-type capital exodus by the rich.
A major international test over Chinas assertiveness in the East and

South China Sea
On the surface, the terms of the issue are reassuring. Except with
Vietnam (1974, 1988 and 2014), a nation bereft of allies, China has
certainly tested several red lines but never crossed them. For their
part, neighbourhood economies are so interlocked with China that
they act as a restrainteven for Japan, the country with the
biggest incentive to call what is still Chinas bluff rather than face
later a military superpower. Meanwhile the United States has
made the unspoken concession of grey areas where Chinese
assertive behaviour is tolerated without triggering alliance
counter-actions. There are currently three such grey areas. One
concerns intrusion in waters under Japans administrative control
around the Senkaku-Diaoyu islandswith fishing boats, then with
Chinas naval agencies lightly armed boats, and for the first time by
an armed frigate in December 2015. Another is the stand-off
around the Philippines Scarborough Shoal since June 2012: after
retreating from outright military conflict, China has blocked all
15
Filipino access to the area, and the United States has not backed its
assurances made in early 2013 to ensure free access by others to
their island features. A third grey area is freedom of navigation,
whether at sea or in the skies. Although the United States
challenges Chinas restrictions, Chinas actions remain a deterrent
to others, who confine their protests to words.
This situation is full of immediate dangers. First, the applicability of

US commitments is at least doubted by its regional allies, and most
of all by Japan. They may be tempted to test those commitments.
Second, even though the Xi regime is regaining control of Chinas
public opinion and its nationalist outpourings, it remains vulnerable
to a set-back in the area of sovereignty and national pride. It may in
fact be the fear of a larger backlash from Chinese public opinion
that has prevented Japan from devising a local pushback. Three,
the potential for accidental conflict is growing. Chinas recent
installation of surface-to-air missiles in the Paracels broadens these
possibilities.
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, US strategy in the

Asia-Pacific refocused on stability over change. The concession was
broadly successful until late 2009. It is now being challenged by
China, and remaining areas of cooperationNorth Korea, climate
politics, the IMF, accommodation at the UNare wearing very
thin. Xi Jinping also appears to have a credibility issuehis
September 2015 declaration, while in the United States, that
"China does not intend to pursue militarisation" in the South China
Sea ranks on a par with some of Vladimir Putins statements over
the Ukraine crisis.
A political challenge from within the regime
Xi Jinping seems to believe that tightening all screwsfrom media

and propaganda to surveillance, the judicial system and Party
control over all administrationsas well as taking almost all
matters under his personal authority is the only way to avoid the
weakening of the regime and ultimately the downfall of the CCP.
His closest aide, Wang Qishan, who heads the feared Party Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, had repeatedly advised
cadres in 2012-2013 to read Alexis de Tocqueville. Most relevant to
China is of course Tocquevilles observation that regimes are most
at risk when they initiate reform. The Xi-Wang teams governance
mix consists of a struggle against political corruption that doubles
16
as a tool for control, minute prescriptions to change rules that are

often not fully implemented, and a radical refusal of any political
reform.
The mix is dangerous. In one top-level Chinese experts views, Xi

Jinping attempts to be both Mao and Zhou, that is the
unpredictable Great Helmsman and the meticulous administrator
rolled into one. Prime Minister Li Keqiang has so disappeared from
view that even gossip about him is now very scarce, as if his
presence does not really matter. Lis foreign travel schedule is also
scant, whereas Xi Jinping himself is very often abroad.
Xis regressive politics are a throwback to the Mao era but not a
return to Mao. Mao is an overarching figure and a deterrent for
those tempted by political change, but he is not to be idolised
againinstead, elements of a Xi cult are setting in. This can only be
intentional. In fact, the highly unusual interview he gave to a
Chinese magazine in 2000, titled How I entered politics2", seems
like a take on Edgar Snows famous interview of Mao in 19363.
What seems clear is that Xi cannot afford to walk back from the
restoration of personal rule that he has implemented. Lifting the
fear that now hangs over his colleagues and all activists would
result in a powerful backlash from any of these quarters, as his
moderation would be interpreted as weakeness. A real question is
his future psychological balance. The man has appeared ductile,
adaptable and well able to manage contradictions, including in his
close family (with a beloved daughter long at Harvard University, a
complete oddity given his prescriptions). But sycophancy,
underestimation of economic realities, and the issue of personal
face are elements that caused Mao Zedongs and the countrys
tragedy. Interestingly, Xi Jinping has never recognised publicly
having made a single mistake.
The psychological risk from absolute power is very real. Xi has

ended the unspoken truce that forbade Party leaders from seeking
the physical elimination or jailing of their peers. A visible failure in
Chinas foreign policy or in economic policy would result in a
challenge to his power from within the regimeor an even more
pronounced turn to autocratic methods. Only two years ago, the
money was on a shift by Xi Jinping to consultative Leninism,
combining input from experts and from below with the possibility
of decision or arbitration from the top. That line of thinking is over.
17
What are the possible scenarios for the next two years?
From the bearish outlook above, but with the reservation that it is
not clear at what speed trends might set in, the following scenarios
are possible.
Economy on the skids and the consequences
Even this dark scenario does not involve an outright crash, whether
for the currency or the economy. The authorities have several fire
breakers at their disposal: spending down currency reserves which
would result in even greater trade competitiveness, rescinding
some capital liberalisation measures inside or outside China,
whether openly or through administrative guidance. The greater
risk today does not lie with the external accountstrong capital
flight is balanced by the trade surplusbut rather with the pile-up
of domestic debt. The government has a choice between an
economic crunch allowing for continued economic liberalisation,
with a strong social and possibly political fallout. Or it can opt for
further monetary loosening, which will transfer abroad part of the
burden for adjustment, and force the re-imposition of more formal
or informal capital controls. The dollars rise offers opportunities
for political cover. Other currencies, such as the yen and the euro,
are much more vulnerable to a weaker yuan in terms of trade
competitiveness.
Our scenario for the next two years has two parts. First, an
anticipation of devaluation with capital flightincluding
high-profile acquisitions abroad by major firms and accelerated real
estate purchases by Chinas wealthy class. In a second stage, the
regime reacts by re-imposing more brakes and delinking China
from global capital markets. This means fewer acquisitions abroad,
diminishing or cancelling the existing bridgessuch as the offshore
yuan market, the Shanghai-HK connect, or the swap agreements
with central banks.
In turn, this second stage lessens any incentive for China to

cooperate internationally. It would face increased opposition to its
mercantilism and dumping practices, since the countervailing
factor of capital investment would be less important.
Politically, the implications are obvious. There could be a risk with

Chinas IMF reserve currency status, which will be formally
18
confirmed only in October 2016. In the meantime, the domestic

balance between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or protected
sectors, on the one hand, and private entrepreneurship or the new
economy on the other has become more important than external
liberalisation debates. Chinas economy, once on a different course
from that of an increasingly isolated political regime, is being
realigned with the political system.
The longer term prognosis from this scenario is not good. It leaves
no argument for political liberalisation, and external sources of
growth are stifled, replaced by increased reliance on internal
market forces and public push. Still, in the short term it is viable,
even more so if the global economy tanks and other major
economies also indulge in monetary competition or mercantilism.
Also in the short term, the Chinese economy is no less competitive.
On the contrary, its ballooning trade surplus is a constraint on
global growth and could become a major liability outside China.
Chinas economy, once on a different course from

that of an increasingly isolated political regime,
is being realigned with the political system.
Xis mix of Party-driven policy at the core and laissez-faire

economics at the margins could work in the low-income economy
of ten years ago. Todays interlinked economy and finance, with its
emphasis on technology and its increased channels to the outside
world, require clearer choices. Unfortunately, they are politically
contradictory with the way Xi Jinping has developed his mandate:
he can only threaten members of his ruling class because he
guarantees their collective survival.
Calling Chinas bluff on the sea
Given Xis preference for hard management of all issues involving

public opinion and the media and his absolute rejection of
democracy, it is not surprising that the growing political hostility to
China among neighbouring Asian countries leaves him indifferent.
Rather, he must tabulate the victories on the ground scored by
China over recent years.
The problem is that China may be running out of easy victories.

Relations with Taiwan may be taken as an example. China has
drawn Taiwan much nearer. But even outgoing Taiwanese
19
president Ma Ying-jeou, who clings to the 1992 Singapore

consensus formula of one China, respective interpretations4" in
order to constrain independentist temptations after him, did not
move forward on political relations with the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) during his terms in office. The East China Sea Air
Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) may have already been a bridge
too far, although not insisting on its thorough implementation
represents a temporary phase. China has in practice gained access
to the Senkaku-Diaoyus territorial waters, while Japanese
fishermen are now constrained by their own authorities from
entering these waters. With a quasi-military ship, China is skirting
the red line againgoing one step further carries enormous risks.
In the South China Sea, Beijing is on the way to achieve the means
of surveillance and some aerial interdiction capacity. This will make
it harder to stick to vocal protests when the United States enforces
the doctrine of free navigation. Yet a practical clash would have
enormous repercussions. Meanwhile, nearly every Asian neighbour
is rearming.
A first test could come by mid-2016. If and when the International

Tribunal rules in favour of the Philippines, it is nearly certain that
China will contest the validity of the ruling and abstain from
implementing it. What next? The Philippines, eventually
encouraged by a discreet group of Asian partners who want to
recommit the United States to its alliances in the region, could
mount a practical challenge that would seem peaceful: navigation
and resupply of islets currently fenced in by Chinas Oceanic
Administration or Coast Guard ships. This challenge is more likely
to happen than the widely predicted conflict between China and
Vietnam. Although Vietnam has made a strong public diplomacy
offensive, it has refrained from going to court, effectively vying for
a separate settlement. Unlike Crimea or Donbass, this scenario
involved no runaway activist groups, and can therefore be
strategised as a way to call Chinas bluff. With the US presidential
campaign in full swing, reactions from the Washington are harder
to anticipate.
A second test is obviously over the Taiwan issue. At a time when

China has chosen to rein in public opinion in Hong Kong, it will be
difficult to let new President Tsai Ing-wen display marks of national
pride, if not independentism, over Taiwan. In both casesHong
Kong and Taiwanpublic perceptions of Chinas return to greater
20
authoritarianism have shifted opinion against the PRC to levels

unseen since 1989.
A third test may come over North Korea. It may be tempting to see
recent North Korean actionsa fourth nuclear test and a ballistic
missile-cum-satellite launch, as merely the continuation of an
existing trend. Yet the credibility of the United States is at stake,
and that of Chinas strategic cooperation too: North Korea is, with
climate issues and Chinas status at the IMF, the only three real
areas of cooperation between Beijing and Washington. Climate
cooperation has been overturned within the United States (with a
negative Supreme Court ruling) and cooperation over monetary
issues is likely to sour with Chinas new economic circumstances.
That leaves North Korea as the only positive, if China agrees to
stronger sanctions. In short, within the next year, China has a
choice between antagonising the United States on yet another
issue, or facing down the North Korean leadership, with all the
consequences it loathes: losing the card with the United States by
playing it and destabilising the Korean peninsula. In exchange,
however, China would momentarily gain unprecedented leverage
with South Korea, but this cannot be guaranteed over time. In such
a situation, our more likely scenario is a worsening of relations with
the United States.
A power struggle at the top
This is a tempting hypothesis. Xis return to personal power, his use

of the anti-corruption weapon to political ends, his growing threat
to the tranquility and prosperity of Chinas upper middle classes, as
well as the social fall-out from a sectoral and geographically
focused slowdown all point to potentially strong discontent. The
exceptional degree of control over public expression and the media
that he is achieving could act as a pressure-cooker. A challenger
with a position of legitimacy might suddenly find much support.
It is not inconceivable that such a challenge would happen. Over

the past few years, this is exactly what Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang
attempted to do, partly in cooperation and partly in succession.
But this goes against the statistical record. No Number 2 (or 3, or

4) in the CCP has ever unseated a Number 1 (except Mao in the
revolutionary phase of the Party). The only revolts from below,
beyond localised mass incidents, that have met with at least
21
temporary success were encouraged from above by the Number 1.

Factional politics rule the avenues for discontent, but as the new
core leader, Xi has enough of a deterrent to challenges from
colleagues. Opposition from the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA),
often cited in the past few years, has been cowed through large
personnel changes and the anti-corruption drive. The only surprise
happened recently when General Liu Yuan, the son of former
leader Liu Shaoqi, a stalwart nationalist and anti-corruption voice,
closely acquainted with Xi, was retired instead of being promoted
further. We hypothesise that Xi does not want a sole strongman in
the PLA, not even a close relation. In fact, Xis military purge is very
similar to the one carried out by North Koreas Kim Jong-un, minus
the physical violence, so far.
A loss of prestige or face resulting from a policy failure would

probably result in a harder stance by the top leader. The president
of everything has taken on almost all factions whose mutual
hostility allowed him to gain personal power. This leaves only room
for the promotion of personal followers from his earlier careerin
other words, cronies. Speculation that he will build up his own
faction at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 neglects the fact that he
leaves no other faction standing. The psychological risk from
absolute power is very real.
What we face is a reign which has only started and has no

predictable ending. An insightful Chinese expert noted privately
that a key feature of Xi Jinping is his ability to change his policies:
the example given was Japan, in which after having created a
disaster he just turned around and gave up the issue. So with the
Chinese Dream, and possibly with OBOR (One Belt One Road) now
that exporting currency reserves is less of a necessity, and energy
or raw materials become a buyers market. Shouldering
international responsibility, a key feature of Xis speech at the 2015
United Nations General Assembly, faded away after a reportedly
disappointing United States visit. For all their foibles, Jiang Zemin
(in 2002 over the intervention against Saddam Hussein) and Hu
Jintao (over the intervention in Libya in 2011) took on more
responsible roles.
By contrast, personality cult has risen again, and could prove

stronger than the restraints of the CCP Party Constitution or
unspoken customary law. Few observers would venture that Xi is
set to retire after ten years and two mandates in power. The same
22
observers who want to predict a reformist Xi after the 2017 Party

Congress also see him doing a Putin act in 2022 by moving to
direct elections with a constitutional rule. This is a pipe dream.
Even Russias authoritarian regime by far has more restraints and
democratic elements built into it than present-day China. Putin
rides on public opinion, even if he engineers it. Xi does not need
public opinion.
What we face is a reign which has only started

and has no predictable ending.
We are left with the long-term consequences of an authoritarian

and brittle system, which has given up the areas of flexibility that
Xis predecessors had kept alive. We do not see any short-term
alternative scenario other than would come from an issue with Xis
health. On the other hand, this does not portend stability as the
man is fickle, opportunistic and occasionally violent.
23
24
CHAPTER 2
Drivers of Middle East conflict: The

present and future of political Islam
25
26
Chapter 2 Drivers of Middle East conflict: The present and

future of political Islam
The breakdown of the Middle East did not begin in 2011. Ever since
1924, when the Ottoman caliphate was formally abolished, there
has been a struggle to establish a legitimate political order in the
Middle East. At the centre of that struggle is the unresolved
question of the role of religion in public life and Islams relationship
to the state. If we begin with this framing, then the devastating
events of the past several years (with each year seemingly worse
than the one before) begin to make more sense. The current crisis
is just the latest iteration of the problem of the modern Arab
state, a problem which is only likely to intensify.
This is not the traditional Sykes-Picot argumentabout the

untenability of arbitrary and artificial states fashioned out of
European colonial projectsthat has become fashionable of late
(although this artificiality is no doubt a problem). The arguments
made here about the drivers of conflict have more to do with
governance and legitimacy deficits that stem from the inability to
replace pre-modern caliphal structures with something with as
much, or more, legitimacy.
These drivers of conflict are not simply about politics and power in
the normal sense. If so, they would be more easily resolved. The
conflict is not primarily about economic divides (even if with an
ideological cast), as it once was in Latin America. In countries like
Chile in the 1980s, the socialist opposition could reassure neo-
liberal elites that their material interests would be protected in any
transitional process. It is one thing to split the middle on material
intereststhings that you quantify and measurebut how do you
split the middle on religion, ideology and identity?
Egypt as a representative case
Egypt is what we might call a hard case for the framework offered
above. It is one of the least artificial Middle Eastern states. Egypt
has had a relatively well formed sense of nationhood or Egyptian-
ness. A kind of Egyptian exceptionalismcaptured in the popular
phrase umm al-dunya (mother of the world)has long been part
of the countrys cultural and political discourse.
27
The idea of the Egyptian state, with its attendant bureaucratic

largesse, predates Egyptian independence. For the near entirety of
the post-independence era, the military, judiciary and the religious
establishment may have been politicised, but they at least offered
the pretense of being above the fray, nurturing an illusion of
independence and autonomy. They were widely perceived, even by
Islamists, as pillars of the state.
This state-ness, in addition to the fact that Egypt is one of the

regions more homogenous countries, would suggest, all other
things being equal, a greater likelihood of economic and political
success. This, though, has not necessarily been the case.
The politicisation of state institutions
Even for those who knew that the military had presided over any
number of failures, both foreign and domestic, there was a sense
that the military was out of bounds as a target of criticism. During
the 2011 uprising, defying orders from President Hosni Mubaraks
associates, the army refused to shoot into the crowds, burnishing
its image of non-partisanship. The army, ever conscious of its self-
image, deliberately and consistently promoted the following
message: they represented no party or faction; they were dutiful
servants of the nation; and they would guard over the interests of
Egypt and Egypt alone.
As recently as the mid-2000s, the judiciary was hailed for its

relative independence and autonomy, often resisting the Mubarak
regimes authoritarian designs. Even under the rule of Gamal Abdel
Nasserconsidered, at least before Sissi, as representing the peak
of Egyptian repressionthe courts tried to maintain at least some
distance from Nassers dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood.
After the 2013 coup, state institutions readily gave up any pretense
of neutrality. For the first time, the militarysupported by all arms
of the state, including the religious establishmentkilled large
numbers of Egyptian civilians from one particular political faction,
in this case the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies. Once the Rabaa
massacre of August 14, 2013 happened, it had become, in a sense,
too late. Too much blood had been spilled.
28
The Muslim Brotherhood and the state
In the pre-2011 period, the Muslim Brotherhood, which had

repeatedly fallen victim to the militarys manipulations throughout
its history, avoided direct criticism of the army. To oppose the
military would be tantamount to advocating revolution and
Brotherhood leaders had little interest in dismantling or purging
the state. If they needed to place blame, they could direct it at
individuals or policies, but not at institutions. There was no need to
alienate state institutions when they hoped, one day, to win them
over through the democratic process. Why defeat the state when it
could more easily be co-opted? This guided the groups strategy
during the Arab Spring. As one former Morsi administration official
told the author, looking back at that critical period: Our reformist
approach led to a self-interested pact with the military5".
In the post-coup era, young Brotherhood activists inside Egypt

many of whom lambast the groups conservative old-guard for not
being revolutionary enoughincreasingly see the state not as an
adversary to be co-opted or reformed, but as an enemy to be
undermined. The traditionally cautious Brotherhood leadership,
feeling pressure from its younger rank-and-file, has adopted some
of the same rhetoric. In this sense, the Brotherhood has most
certainly learned lessons from the failed project of 2011-2013,
even if they may not, in the view of outside observers, be the right
ones. Various Brotherhood leaders have told the author that they
do, in fact, have regrets; one of them is believing that the system
could be improved gradually from inside.
When thinking about radicalisation, we tend to focus on the use of

violence. But, intellectually and philosophically, attitudes towards
the state and how to change it often prove more important over
time. Violence is, more often than not, about means. The state is
about ends.
The implications of this shift in Islamist perceptions of the Egyptian

state are profound and are likely to haunt Egypt for a long time to
come. Whether they are justified or not, revolutionary approaches
to politics, particularly when they hit up against an intransigent
state, are likely to create more instability, at least in the short term.
Since the state has no interest in accommodating or incorporating
them, both Islamists and secular revolutionaries have a greater
incentive to play spoiler. In this sense, incentive structures are
29
woefully misaligned in a way that encourages a spiral of

destabilisation: opposition plays spoiler; the regime becomes even
more repressive; revolutionary attitudes of opposition activists
harden.
The state-centrism of mainstream Islamists
Mainstream Islamismdefined here as the political theory and

practice of the Muslim Brotherhood and Brotherhood-inspired
organisationsis often assumed to be in conflict with or even in
direct opposition to the modern nation-state and the Westphalian
order more generally6. This is not correct. If one had to sum up
mainstream Islamismthe successor ideology to Mohammed Abdu
and Jamal al-Din al-Afghanis late 19th century Islamic
modernismin a sentence, one would describe it as the effort to
reconcile pre-modern Islamic law with the modern nation-state.
This is worth emphasising: Islamism is an inherently modern and
modernist project and one that is, accordingly, state-centric. The
scholar of Islamic law, Wael Hallaq, takes issue with Islamists for
precisely this reason, arguing that they have become obsessed with
the modern nation-state, to the extent of taking [it] for granted
and, in effect, as a timeless phenomenon7".
The project of political Islam, then, wasfor better or, in Hallaqs

view, worsean attempt to resolve the ideological divide at the
centre of the struggle for a post-caliphate order. Islamists did what
they were supposed to do, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s as
they came under greater pressure from Western interlocutors as
well as secular parties at home to become more moderate8. Yet
the more Islamists came to terms with democracy, political parties,
and the nation-state, the more they found themselves rejected and
repressed.
Even in the best of circumstances (ie, Turkey), Islamist participation

in the democratic process is inherently polarising, not just because
of what Islamists themselves do, but just as much if not more so
because of the responses from domestic and international
opponents that Islamists inevitably provoke. Even when Islamists
are not the problem, they are the problem. Even when they make
historic compromises, as in Tunisia, they still provoke anti-
democratic behaviour on the part of secular and liberal parties. (In
Tunisia, leading secular parties called for the dissolution of either
30
the democratically-elected constituent assembly or the

government, or both).
In other words, polarisation is inevitable when Islam ceases to be,

as it once was, a source of unity and solidarity and becomes
instead the province of one political party. Islamism only made
sense in opposition to something else, and that something else was
secularism. Islam was no longer just a way of being. It was no
longer the natural order of things (as it was in the pre-modern
period), and so it had to be reaffirmed and reasserted. These
Islamist parties then compete for state power, and when the state
is strong and over-developed, as it has been in much of the
modern Middle East, it raises the stakes considerably, adding to the
existential tenor of political competition.
In short, state-centric solutions or solutions that privilege strong,

centralised states may exacerbate some of the challenges
discussed above. Another way of looking at it is that the demands
of state-buildingwhich require the accumulation and
centralisation of authorityand the demands of democratisation
which require the balancing and distribution of powercan often
be in conflict. Presumption that the former should always or
necessarily take precedence over the latter should be questioned.
Transcending the state
If one had to pick a single headline from the Arab Spring, it would
be the opposite of what one hoped it would be: violence actually
works. This applies not just to extremist groups like the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)9 but also to authoritarian regimes
that have been able to remain in power by doubling down on
authoritarian measures and resorting to ever increasing levels of
repression.
ISIL considers groups like the Brotherhood to be apostates, since

they have reneged on the notion of God as the sole law-giver and
insist on sharing his jurisdiction with that of elected parliaments.
But its position is not just a theological one. ISIL makes very specific
arguments about the failure of democratic processes. For example,
in one recruitment video, a young Egyptian mana judge in one of
ISILs Islamic courtstells the camera that [Islamist groups that
participate in elections] do not possess the military power or the
means to defend the gains they have achieved through elections.
31
After they win, they are put in prison, they are killed in the squares,
as if theyd never even won (...) as if they had never campaigned
for their candidates10".
This statement is not necessarily new. Al-Qaeda regularly made

similar pronouncements during the mid-2000s, particularly after
Iraqs Muslim Brotherhood took part in successive US-backed
governments following the 2003 Iraq war.
Al-Qaeda and its ilk gleefully described the Muslim Brotherhood as

al-Ikhwan al-Muflisun, or the Bankrupt Brotherhooda play on
its Arabic name. But while Al-Qaeda may have achieved a measure
of sympathy in the Middle East after the attacks of 11 September
2001, it was never, and never could be, a real threat to the
Brotherhoods model of political change. It was proficient at
staging terrorist attacks, but proved unable to carry its successes
into the realm of governance. More importantly, Al-Qaedas vision
for state-building, to the extent it had one, failed to capture the
attention of the world or the imagination of tens of thousands of
would-be fighters and fellow travellers. Moreover, during this
period, Islamist movements, despite only limited political openings,
were experiencing unprecedented success at the ballot box, in
Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere,
making Al-Qaedas jeremiads against democracy seem out of touch
with the times.
While secularists and liberals rejoiced over the 3 July 2013 military
coup in Egypt, so too did radical Islamists like ISIL who saw this as a
definitive vindication of what jihadists of various stripes had been
saying for years. ISIL clearly thinks that it benefited from Morsis
overthrow. In ISILs first statement after the coup, spokesman Abu
Mohamed al-Adnani, addressing the Muslim Brotherhood and
other mainstream Islamists, said: You have been exposed in
Egypt. He referred to democracy and the Brotherhood as the two
idols [which] have fallen11".
Unlike the Brotherhood, which believed in accepting the existing

state and Islamising itjust as they might Islamise democracy,
socialism or capitalismISIL believed in building on top of an
entirely different foundation. This was a new and rather distinctive
take on the applied Islam of modern-day Islamist ideologues. As we
saw earlier, the tensions between the mundane requirements of
governance and religious absolutism make for an uncomfortable
32
mix. One would think that such tensions are magnified tenfold
when it comes to a group like ISIL with unabashedly maximalist and
even apocalyptic goals. Yet, in superseding the nation-state and the
regional architectureit has no state patronsISIL has managed
also to supersede the endless contortions of mainstream Islamism.
In other words, the totalising nature of ISIL is no mistake: it is
inherent to the model.
There is little to suggest that this is sustainable in the long-run. As a

seasoned observer of the Middle East has elegantly put it, The
caliphate may require caution but the apocalypse requires
abandon". That this is ultimately unsustainable does not mean,
however, that ISILs model cannot inspire a small but vociferous
minority throughout the Muslim world. It has and it will. More than
that, even if it were defeated tomorrow, ISIL would stand as one of
the most successful and distinctly Islamist state-building projects
of the modern eraof course, with the caveat that the bar is
rather low. Still, this is no small feat and to the extent that one
wishes to sensationalise ISIL, it should probably be on these
comparatively mundane grounds.
the totalising nature of ISIL is no mistake: it is

inherent to the model.
Even if it is often only implicit, ISIL is making an argument about

how to establish proper Islamic governance in the context of
modern nation-states: to achieve fidelity to the text, one must
start, basically, from scratch, since whenever Islamism and the
modern state attempt to reconcile, it is always at the expense of
the former.
This brings us to the sometimes circular and tiresome debate about

whether ISIL is Islamic. A better question is: how does ISIL approach
Islamic scripture? In the view of this author, it is difficult
impossible, reallyto argue that Islamism has nothing to do with
Islam, when it very clearly does, when one looks closely at the
Islamists approach to governance. As Yale Universitys Andrew
March and Mara Revkin lay out in considerable detail, the group
has, in fact, developed fairly elaborate institutional structures12. In
the intellectual and theological realms, ISIL is not just Baathist
brutality in Islamic garb; rather, it has articulated a policy towards
Christian minorities based on a 7th century pact and attempted to
develop a novel Islamic economic jurisprudence, as well as a
33
heterodox theory of international relations. Of course, this does

not mean that ISIL is anywhere near the mainstream of Islamic
thought as practiced over the course of fourteen centurieswhat
is often referred to as the Islamic tradition. In this sense, ISIL is on
the far fringes of Quranic interpretation. This, though, is precisely
the point. ISIL is not unaware of this; it basks in this. US expert Will
McCants offers an interesting aside in this respect, arguing that
ISIL, in some ways, does horrible things to deliberately provoke a
debate about the Islamicisity [sic] of their actions, and they
welcome the ensuing argument that breaks out13".
Part of the debate in assessing the Islamic dimension of ISIL has to

do with problems of interpreting political and religious actors
outside of their original context. For example, James Madison
one of the Founding Fathers of the United States and lead drafter
of the Bill of Rightswould not be considered a liberal by todays
standards, considering that he owned hundreds of slaves over the
course of his life. Many of the philosophers of the Enlightenment in
the 17th and 18th centuries opposed universal suffrage, believed in
excluding certain groups (eg, atheists, observant Catholics) and
generally feared mass participating in the political process. Yet,
today, we celebrate them, because they were liberal in the context
of their own time and place, not ours.
If ISIL existed twelve centuries ago, they would be controversial,

and perhaps they would have been deemed heretics by some, but
at least some of their actsslavery, concubinage and waging war
against established states for examplewould not have been as
jarring at a time when brutality in warfare was the norm; when the
Westphalian order was still centuries away; when the notion of
liberal democracy did not even exist; and when the idea of
universal human rights simply would not have made much sense. In
this respect, ISIL is distinctly modern. Few things, after all, are more
modern than ISILs ostentatious anti-modernism.
How much does religion matter?
In a September 2014 statement, ISIL spokesman Abu Mohamed al-

Adnani expounded on the groups inherent advantage: Being
killed () is a victory, he said. You fight a people who can never
be defeated. They either gain victory or are killed14". In this most
basic sense, religion matters, and it matters a great deal. As
individuals, most (if not necessarily all) ISIL fighters are not only
34
willing to die in a blaze of religious ecstasy; they welcome it. It does

not particularly matter if this sounds absurd to us. It is what they
believe. This basic point about intention and motivation does not
just apply to extremist groups, but also to mainstream Islamist
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that work within the
democratic process, contest elections and adopt a gradualist model
of Islamising society. As one Brotherhood official told the author,
many join the movement so they can get into heaven. Discussing
his own reasons for joining the organisation, he explained: I was
far from religion and this was unsettling. Islamists resolved it for
me15".
It would be a mistake, then, to view mainstream Islamist

movements as traditional political parties. Muslim Brotherhood
branches and affiliates are not just acting for this world, but also
for the next. They aim to strengthen the religious character of
individuals through a multi-tiered membership system and an
extensive educational process with a structured curriculum. Each
Brother is part of a family, usually consisting of five to ten
members who meet on a weekly basis to read and discuss religious
texts. For many members, it is quite simple and straightforward.
Being a part of the Brotherhood helps them obey God, become
better Muslims, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of entry
into paradise and eternal salvation. This does not mean that
members do not care about politics; rather, they may see political
actionwhether running for a municipal council seat or joining a
mass protestas just another way of serving God.
The tendency to see religion through the prism of politics or

economics (rather than the other way around) is not necessarily
incorrect, but it can sometimes obscure the independent power of
ideas that seem, to much of the Western world, quaint and archaic.
For those who no longer see the relevance of religion in everyday
life, it can be difficult to understand how people are able and
willing to do seemingly irrational things in the service of seemingly
irrational ends. But, looked at another wayif we do our best, as
analysts, to put aside secular biaswhat could be more rational
than wanting and seeking eternal salvation?
The dramatic rise of ISIL is only the most striking example of how
liberal determinismthe notion that history moves with intent
towards a more reasonable, secular futurehas failed to explain
the Middle Easts realities. Of course, the overwhelming majority of
35
Muslims do not share ISILs rigid interpretation of religion, but that

is not the most relevant question. ISIL, after all, draws on, and
draws strength from, ideas that have a broad resonance among
Muslim-majority populations. They may not agree with ISILs
interpretation of the caliphate, but the notion of a caliphate is a
powerful one, even among more secular-minded Muslims. One of
the few surveys on attitudes towards a caliphate (well before the
rise of ISIL) found that an average of 65 per cent of respondents in
Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia agreed with the objective
to unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or
caliphate16". This transcended ideology, with even a majority of
nationalists saying they supported a caliphate17.
A way out?
The role of religion in public life has become the primary political
cleavage in much of the Middle East (although it overlaps, to
various degrees, with economic, class and even linguistic
cleavages). Party systems are products of a countrys particular
history. Over time, they become entrenched and self-sustaining.
What happens at the start of the democratisation process is not
incidental, nor can it be easily reversed. This is what makes
transitional periods particularly tense and polarising. Yet,
transitions in the Middle East, whether successful or failed, have
proven more polarising than the norm.
The tendency to see religion through the prism of

politics or economics is not necessarily
incorrect, but it can sometimes obscure the
independent power of ideas that seem, to much of
the Western world, quaint and archaic.
At this juncture, cleavages along religious, identity and ideological

lines are unlikely to recede to the background. If anything, they
have solidified in Egypt and Tunisia and intensified in Libya and
Turkey. In Syria and Yemen, ideological cleavages have also grown
in importance, although the picture there is somewhat more
complicated due to long-standing sectarian tensions between
Sunnis and Shias. Yet, in all of these cases, and in all of their
diversity, the divides in question are foundationalhaving to do
with the nature, meaning, and purpose of the modern nation-state.
36
Going forward, the best-case scenarioswhich would require

inclusive national reconciliation processes, the (re-)incorporation of
mainstream Islamist parties and a conscious move towards
consensual democracies that restrain executive power and
distribute power away from an over-centralised stateare simply
not possible in most Middle Eastern countries (the two partial
exceptions being Turkey and Tunisia).
If anything, the drivers that the author has identified in this paper
may produce further destabilisation, particularly in the absence of
a clear, strong and coherent vision of the Middle East from the
United States and other Western powers. A key variable is whether
the divide between pro- and anti-Muslim Brotherhood blocs on the
regional levelmimicking domestic polarisationeases or
intensifies. As Saudi Arabia focuses considerable attention and
resources on the war in Yemen, their rift with the Brotherhood will
likely either remain as is or perhaps further diminish. With this
partial exception, though, it is difficult to identify scenarios in
which significant improvements are likely in the short run.
A key variable that impacts any discussion of what might, or might

not, happen in the next two years or more is the role of the United
States. The overarching premise of the Obama administrations
approach to the Middle East was what some have termed the
Responsibility Doctrine: stepping back to allow others to step in.
The idea, here, was to encourage Arab allies to rise to the
responsibility and take ownership over their own affairs. Others
did, in fact, step in, but in a way that encouraged the worst
instincts of regional actors and engendered proxy wars. The US
desire to limit its involvement in the Middle East has produced a
sense of uncertainty and even panic in the region, which, in turn,
has exacerbated regional divides (whether Shia vs. Sunni or Islamist
vs. anti-Islamist). The question, then, is whether this posture will
persist after the Obama administration, or whether there will be a
course correction, in which renewed US leadershipand
importantly the perception that the US is renewing its commitment
to the regionmitigates the existential tenor of regional
competition.
Conclusion
It can be challenging to imagine the ways in which the Middle East

can further deteriorate, considering how dire things already are.
37
But it is worth remembering that this is what many observers also

thought in 2013, and then in 2014. One example is a conversation
this author had with a friend in early 2012, wondering how many
people needed to die in Syria before the US and its allies
intervened militarily (by establishing no-fly and no-drive zones, for
example). The author suggested 15,000 casualties. At the time of
writing, four years later, more than 250,000 Syrians had been
killed.
Two of the less obvious countries worth following are Egypt and
Tunisia. While Tunisia is successful in relative terms, the prospect
of more terror attacks could provoke authoritarian measures in the
name of stability and undermine confidence in a fragile democracy.
Egypt, meanwhile, is another good example of the difficulty of
imagining genuinely worse scenarios. Egypt has always muddled
through, despite suffering from troubling economic and political
indicators for much of the post-independence period. It has had
the fortuneand misfortuneof a strong state. There is a
fascinating and troubling debate within the Muslim Brotherhood
about the use of defensive violenceincluding burning police
cars, the targeting of security personnel who have committed
crimes against Brotherhood members and economic sabotage. Yet
most of these discussions have remained at a theoretical level, with
little actual follow-through from Brotherhood members. If
anything, the surprising development is not how many Islamists
have turned to violence in Egypt, but how few. For now.
Beyond specific country cases, the shifting landscape within the

world of political Islam is already proving to be one of the most
important developments of the post-Arab Spring era. For the first
time, the Muslim Brotherhood, long the largest and most
influential of Islamist movements, has been eclipsed by those on its
right flank. In any number of ways, this is the Salafist-jihadist
moment, not just in the sense of greater media impact or the
ability to influence Western societies through terrorism, but
because they are beating the Brotherhood at its own game. The
Brotherhood can no longer as easily claim to be more practical or
better at governing and providing services than Salafist and
Salafist-jihadist competitors. However, it goes even deeper than
this. In contrast to the vanguard model of political change, the
starting assumption of most mainstream Islamist groups has been
that mass sentiment and support mattered and that the Islamic
project was doomed to fail without that popular foundation. Even
38
Al-Qaeda, contrary to popular perceptions, was (and is) quite

concerned with how ordinary Muslims perceived it, which was one
of the reasons behind the tensions between Ayman al-Zawahiri and
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, over the latters brutality and wanton killing
of civilians, including Shia worshippers.
Yet, ISIL has demonstrated that a relatively small number of

ideologically-committed individualseven ones that go to the
furthest extremes of brutality and alienate the vast majority of
fellow Muslimscan capture, hold and govern territory, in a way
that very few other Islamist groups ever have.
The failures of mainstream Islamist groups, and particularly the

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have also re-focused attention on
the question of what it means to win. Even more successful Islamist
parties, such as the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in
Morocco, may be in power but their ability to change or transform
society and politics is inherently limited due to the dominance of
the monarchy. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami, one of the
few mainstream Islamist groups that hold on to a more vanguard
model, repeatedly loses elections, garnering less than 10 per cent
of the vote. They are not particularly popular, yet they are arguably
more influential than the PJD through their ties with the military
and other state institutions and their role as a kind of sharia lobby
which is able to shape the contours of public debate on key issues
of concern.
This, then, is yet another consequence of the emergence of ISIL: a

shaking of the fundamental assumptions of Islamist movements,
which had been locked into a predictable pattern in the previous
decades: form political parties, focus on elections, and gradually
work to reform state structures from within. These may be good
things in theory, but they do not appear to have worked.
39
40
CHAPTER 3
Russian futures to 2018
41
42
Chapter 3 Russian futures to 2018

Pessimism characterises much Western analysis of Russian futures.
One prominent report suggests that Russia faces "mounting
internal difficulties, including a weakening economy and a political
climate that stifle enterprise and society". Such problems, the
report continued, "imperil both security in Europe and stability in
Russia". Necessary reforms face "daunting political obstacles",
while the influences that have dragged the Russian economy into
recession are "structural, conjunctural and geopolitical" and
"market pressures and external conflict pose additional challenges
of uncertain duration". If the country "continues its current
coursein both economic management and international
relationsthis will be increasingly dangerous for Europe and
costly, if not disastrous for Russia". Indeed, the report went so far
as to say that the "new [Russian] model is not sustainable and
Western governments need to consider their responses to various
scenarios for change18".
In Russia the prognosis is also pessimistic, though some points of

focus are different. Economists note that if the economy stands at
a cross-roads, there is a 45-50 per cent probability that the future
will bring a frozen economy, in which Russia has a "semi-closed,
stagnant economy" with ageing technologies and an ever greater
concentration of resources in the defence industry, ultra-high
concentration of property, nationalisation, de-industrialisation and
low growth rates. According to Yakov Mirkin, head of the
department of international capital markets at the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations, the next most
probable outcome, with a 30-35 per cent likelihood, is a controlled
chill. This is a slightly more sophisticated version of the frozen
economy, which includes "rescue teams" of young technocrats
introducing certain elements of modernisation19.
In broader terms, the consensus appears to be that the future is

alarming. Russias struggle for its place in the world has not
finished, one Russian futures analyst has suggested, as a result of
Russias position between European, Middle Eastern and Eastern
civilisationsand if Russias civilisational border with the East is
more or less clear, it is in constant movement to the West and
South, where foreign powers constantly attempt to increase their
spheres of influence at Russias expense20.
43
Some note that developments in the world have been so "many

and so turbulent lately that one can expect every year to bring a
revolution or a major change in the global balance of power". This
year will hardly be an exception, Fyodor Lukyanov, research
director of the Valdai discussion club, has argued: the
reconstruction of the world order that began at the beginning of
this decade will continue to gather momentum, characterised by
chaos, until the new order emerges by 203021. The "major mega-
trend in global politics", Sergei Karaganov suggests, is the "war of
all against all" in the Middle East. Furthermore, the sharp
escalation of the conflict between Russia and the West has led to
increasing talk of the possibility of a new warwhich some say is
inevitableand the re-emergence of the nuclear issue22.
In attempting to adapt to the difficulties of imagining the future,

most Russian futures analysis focuses on scenario planning as a
means of stepping beyond the immediate problems of the day and
reflecting on alternative possible outcomes, including possible
black swans or wildcards, as they look a decade ahead. This paper,
however, will offer short-term foresight of Russia in the period to
2018. In this case, foresight can be usefully based on analysis of
longer-term mega-trends, the structural context in which
developments take place, and the relative certainties in specific
themes that are unlikely to change greatly over the comparatively
short timeframe. These mega-trends provide definition of possible
futures. The paper will focus on three mega-trends: economics,
domestic politics and the international environment. Woven into
each mega-trend are game-changers, developments that can affect
the course of events within these broader definitions. Game-
changers can be both active, in terms of how policy-makers are
making conscious attempts to influence the course of events, and
passive, including external, often unpredictable developments.
Together, analysis of mega-trends and game-changers serves to
frame themes to guide foresight, based on extrapolation from
more tangible evidence.
Specific predictions about Russia in 2018 cannot be made with

confidence. But the contextual trends are very clear, since they are
both structural and emphasised by the Russian governments
explicitly repeated active game-changers, and thus less likely to be
significantly altered even by adverse events. Indeed, adverse
passive game-changers may serve to emphasise them.
44
The shorter timeframe brings into sharper focus some of the major
questions being debated in Russian futures analysis. But it also
means that some of the questions central to most discussion about
Russian futures are not addressed in depth. First, the Russian
government consistently attempts to engage in long-term planning,
both in wider terms, but also in specific technical areas. During the
last decade, numerous strategies framing the period to 2020 have
been published, and discussions to plan a strategy to 2030 are well
underway. Though it is outside the remit of this paper, this
commitment provides the background to some of the active
game-changers driving the mega-trends discussed below.
Reform of the economy away from its reliance on hydrocarbons is

not at the centre of the analysis. The Russian government has
made its timeframe explicit. The Russian Energy Strategy to 2030
sets out a three-stage development plan, and only in stage three,
from 2022 onwards, is the shift to the economy of the future
envisaged. Thus the Russian policy-making community "expects oil
and gas to remain the locomotive of growth not only in energy but
in the national economy broadly until 2022". Only gradually will the
relative importance of fossil fuels decline. This also relates to
Russian plans to diversify its energy trade. The energy ministry has
stated that the main task is to speed up entry into Asia-Pacific
markets, but only by 2035 will all energy exports to Asia reach 23
per cent.
Russias demography is another often central theme to futures

analysis. The steep population decline since the 1980s, combined
with low fertility and an ageing population, has long-term negative
ramifications for the economy and military, and, given higher rates
of fertility among Russias Muslim population, the ethnic mix of
Russian society. If most of these problems will be felt only in the
next decade, two points nevertheless warrant mention.
First, the governments long-term family development and

transport policies have shown some signs of success. Life
expectancy increased to 71 years in 2013, and fertility rates
increased from 1.3 children per woman in 2006 to 1.7 in 2012.
Demographic data suggests that the decline in population was
reversed in 2012, and 2013 saw the first positive increase in natural
population growth since 1991. Serious health problems continue,
but mortality resulting from transport accidents, murder and
suicide have substantially declined.
45
Second, though Russia has a high rate of emigration, it is also the

second largest immigration nation. Some 300,000 immigrants
arrive in Russia every year on average, approximately 50 per cent
of whom are ethnic Russians. Much of this immigration comes from
within the Eurasian region and has been substantially increased by
flows of migration from Ukraine since 2014. Some 2.2 million
immigrants arrived in Russia in 2014, 89 per cent from Ukraine, and
in 2015 a further 3 million came in, also largely from Ukraine. This
is likely to sustain Russian population growth over the period to
2018, even as natural growth begins to decline again due to the
sharp contraction of the fertile population.
Mega-trend oneThe Russian economy: Slow adaption to

adversity
The Russian government enjoys a financial cushion of considerable

foreign exchange reserves, including increasing holdings in gold,
reaching USD 371.6 billion in January 2016. It also runs a
substantial trade surplus. However, 2015 saw a decline in industrial
production of 4 to 5 per cent, in retail trade of 8 per cent and in
real wages by 10 per cent. Indeed, the economy faces a wide range
of problems, from high levels of capital outflow to ageing, obsolete
industrial machinery and limited and decrepit infrastructure, which
have all contributed to a longer-term slowdown in economic
growth that began in late 2011. The combined impact since 2014 of
the fall in oil prices (decreasing export revenues23), the financial
sanctions (reducing access to capital) and economic sanctions
(affecting equipment supplies) have compounded these structural
problems.
The broad downhill trend in economic growth over the last three
and a half years accelerated in 2015, with official statistics
suggesting a 3.7 per cent contraction in GDP in 2015. Speaking in
January 2016, Prime Minister Medvedev stated that 2015 was
"perhaps the most difficult year in a decade for Russia" and the
country faced "forceful and synchronised challenges". There is
continued pressure on the budget, since the 2016 budget assumes
an average oil price of USD 50/barrel and a budget deficit of 3 per
centbut the oil price has remained below USD 50. The Russian
government is attempting again to cut back budget expenditure by
10 per cent, and Medvedev has stated that the only protected
areas will be Russias international obligations, security, agriculture
and social policy.
46
If Medvedev has stated that the stimulation of investment activity

and the removal of barriers impeding private money from entering
the market are important priorities, the most obvious active
game-changer is the Russian leaderships increasingly obvious
subsumption of the economy into its wider security concerns, as
emphasised in the recently published national security strategy.
This is because the Russian leadership is seeking to enhance its self-
reliance, both to reduce Russias vulnerability to external measures
and increase its ability to act as an independent state. This has led
to emphasis on state control of key strategic sectors, the
prioritisation of import substitution and the implementation of
shadow systems to replace the SWIFT international payment
system if necessary. It has also led to shifts in organisational
structures, such as the establishment of government commissions
to supervise import substitution. More broadly, as the government
attempts to consolidate and streamline its budgetary resources,
the finance ministrys jurisdiction was extended in January 2016 to
include the federal tax, customs, alcohol and budgetary supervision
services. In turn, the Kremlin is increasing its control over macro-
economic policy and the finance ministry itself.
the most obvious active game-changer is the

Russian leaderships increasingly obvious
subsumption of the economy into its wider
security concern
These measures were being implemented before the sectoral

sanctions were imposed by the US and the EU, and the substantial
resources and legislation devoted to them suggest that it is a long-
term policy. While the Russian economy is more open and
integrated with the global economy than before, the potential for
at least the partial reversal of either domestic liberalisation and
international integration is also much greater. This trend faces
numerous obstaclesnot the least one being a lack of consensus
across the economic block and a lack of focusand as a result,
success in measures such as import substitution to 2018 will be
uneven, limited to key areas, and likely only achieved more broadly
after 2020.
Nevertheless, over approximately the next two years, the states

economic course seems broadly set, tilting Russias political
economy towards security rather than economic freedom, with
47
numerous ramifications for resource allocation and prioritisation,

as well as the scope of Russias external economic activities24.
Two potential passive game-changers relate to the Russian

economy in the coming years, and they are the two most
important external constraints on the Russian economy. The first is
Western sanctions, and if US sanctions are likely to remain in place
for longer, it is probable that the EUs sanctions on Russia for their
part will be lifted at some point before 2018. While disagreements
over the implementation of the Minsk II agreements remain a
sticking point, senior European leaders have begun to voice their
objections to maintaining the sanctions. Vladimir Putin has also
stated that he is certain that, sooner or later, "normal relations"
with the EU will be re-established.
More important is the oil price, which is perhaps the least

predictable game-changer, depending as it does on many
interlocking factors25. There is an ongoing debate in Russia about
potential oil price fluctuations. If some see low oil prices as the
new normal, others see a tightening in the oil market by late
2016, which could lead to a slight price increase, towards USD 50 to
60 per barrel. The Central Bank of Russias (CBR) baseline scenario,
for instance, envisages a stabilisation of the price of approximately
USD 50/barrel to last for the period 2016-201826. Either way, the
predicted rise in this time frame is not considered likely to be
substantial.
In the context of the longer-term mega-trend and active

game-changer of the governments deliberate securitisation of the
economy, neither of these passive game-changers are likely to
alter substantially the broad trajectory of Russias economic
development. Instead, the economy is more likely to slowly adapt
to the adverse environment. The CBR suggests that while the
economy is gradually adapting, it needs another year to adjust to
negative external conditions. In all its scenarios, external financial
conditions will continue to constrain the growth of the Russian
economy over the period from 2016 to 2018, though their impact
will "gradually abate". Thus the CBRs baseline scenario suggests
continued GDP contraction in 2016 of -0.5 to 1.0 per cent, moving
firmly into positive territory in 2017 with growth of 1.5 per cent to
2.5 per cent in 201827.
48
Mega-trend twoRussian domestic politics: Consolidating the

system
The Russian domestic political landscape is dominated by Vladimir

Putins leadership team and, in parliamentary and regional terms,
the United Russia (UR) party, which has held the majority of seats
in parliament and the huge majority of regional governorships for
over a decade.
The leadership team dominates the strategic heights; however, the

Russian governance system is often dysfunctional. Systemic mega-
trends in domestic politics are therefore shaped by three factors:
the long-term continuity in the Russian leadership team, the
leaderships consistent struggle to shape strategic planning and
invigorate the bureaucratic system, and an electoral cycle during
this period. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for September
2016 and presidential elections in 2018.
Active game-changers will be visible in two ways. The first relates

to the election cycle, which will be guided by the leaderships
search for wider stability. While support for United Russia (UR)
dropped in the parliamentary elections of 2011, it has
subsequently consolidated its position and appears likely to benefit
from the introduction of a mixed electoral system in which half of
the Russian parliaments 450 members will be running on party
lists, and the other half on single mandate, independent
constituencies. The precise balance of the next parliaments make-
up will depend on how this legislative change affects support for
UR28, how much the Communist Party of Russia, which remains the
only substantive opposition across Russia29, can attract a protest
vote, as well as the role of the All-Russian Popular Front (ONF)30.
This sense of imposed stability will be enhanced by the leaderships

concern about anything that looks like a potential Colour
Revolution in Russia, as well as the extensive measures that have
been put in place to prevent that from happening. These measures
range from the curbing of external support for Russian NGOs and
civil society to legislation to prevent mass demonstrations, to the
preparation of the Interior Ministry (MVD) to cope with outbreaks
of civil disobedience (as demonstrated by the Zaslon-2015
exercises, explicitly framed by the MVD as preparing to deal with a
Maidan-type situation).
49
The second relates to the combination of the make-up of the

leadership team and the attempts to increase the effectiveness at
all levels of the Russian bureaucratic system. In the coming years,
there is likely to be a slow evolution of the team as it seeks to
adapt, and as younger members of the elite position themselves
for promotion. The age of many of the most senior officials means
that there are likely to be retirements31; this is likely to be
supplemented by the leadership moving officials aside if they are
unable to bring the required results. There will therefore likely be
an ongoing slow rotation as well as recruitment and promotion of
officials.
Two particular passive game-changers may contribute to the

political context in the next two years: social protest and terrorism,
but on current evidence, neither is likely to substantially alter the
broader mega-trend. Since the protest demonstrations in
2011-2012 faded away, there has been little political protest; there
have, however, remained aspects of social protest, such as the
health care protests in November 2014, and the more recent long-
haul trucker protest. These have been limited in scale, however,
and have not gained wider public supportor led to a substantive
change in government policy.
it is not clear that a successful terrorist attack

would substantially alter the political
environment or Russian foreign policy.
Similarly, the threat of terrorism in Russia, from both the North

Caucasus and international jihadism, is substantial. But the Russian
government has implemented robust, not to say brutal law-
enforcement measures against terrorism over the last decade and
poured money into attempts to address the problem. Furthermore,
given the experience of terrorist attacks in the past, it is not clear
that a successful terrorist attack would substantially alter the
political environment or Russian foreign policy. Russia has suffered
numerous major terrorist attacks, from Nord-Ost to Beslan, from
bombings on the Moscow metro and at Domodedovo airport, and,
most recently, the bombing of the Russian airliner in Egypt in
November 2015. Yet none of these have altered the wider political
context.
Over the coming years, therefore, despite potential influences, the

push and shove of political life, and some contradictions within the
50
system, the main trend in Russian domestic politics is one of

evolving consolidation. Active game-changers will continue to
influence the political mega-trends more than visible passive
game-changers throughout this period.
Mega-trend threeRussia on the world stage: Assertion in an

unstable world
The broad contours of Russias foreign policy have remained

consistent for some time and are unlikely to change dramatically in
the next two years. The Eurasian space remains a priority and the
Russian leadership has sought to cultivate its position as a hub in
the region with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the
Eurasian Economic Union. China is another priority, and the
Russian leadership has for over a decade sought to improve its
relationship with its neighbour to the east. This has resulted in an
ambiguous but burgeoning economic and security relationship,
with major energy and arms deals being signed. Despite these
deals, and although this is indeed a priority, it is most likely to
come to full fruition after this decade.
the main trend in Russian domestic politics is

one of evolving consolidation.
Although Moscow sees Western influence in international affairs to

be in strategic decline and that of Asia as increasing, it is with the
West that the main issues will arise in the near future. Long-term
contextual trends are visible here, too. Russias relations with the
Euro-Atlantic community began to stagnate in the mid-2000s, and,
despite the most recent reset of 2009-2012, they have been
deteriorating for years. The war in Ukraine only served to highlight
the range of disagreements between the Euro-Atlantic institutions
(particularly NATO and the EU) and Russia. While Russia retains
more positive relations with some member states, many of the
mechanisms for multilateral relations have been suspended.
The prospects for Russias relationship with Western institutions

therefore appear ambiguous. There are strong lobbies, particularly
in continental Europe, who seek to stabilise relations with Russia
and, as noted above, the Russian leadership has also stated its
belief that Russias relationship with Europe will return to some
form of normality sooner or later. Thus it may be that over the
next few years, EU sanctions are lifted and dialogue is resumed at
51
different levels as the parties attempt to move beyond the Ukraine

crisis.
Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine has left a deeply negative mark in

both the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, and the accelerating
deterioration over the last five years has been based on
fundamental disagreements over many issues ranging from the US
withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002 and the US-led invasion of
Iraq in 2003, to concerns about US-led regime-change operations
and the Wests rejection of Moscows initiative to draw up a new
European security treaty in 2009-10. There are clear policy
disagreements between Russia and NATO over a number of
issuesboth long-term, such as NATO enlargement and the missile
defence programme, and those heightened by the war in Ukraine,
such as the permanent basing of NATO equipment and forces on
the territory of member states in Eastern and Central Europe. All of
these issues are likely to remain serious points of contention and,
most immediately, at NATOs Warsaw summit in summer 2016.
The Alliance will endorse further enlargement (Montenegro),
probably missile defence (the Readiness Action Plan) and possibly
other related measures. The tension between the desire to move
the relationship beyond Ukraine and these fundamental
disagreements will dominate, exacerbated by differences within
the communities, but the policies set in motion in both NATO and
Russia will reflect the increasing competition between them.
As noted above, however, the main thrust of Moscows

international policy is not related to specific bilateral or even
regional priorities, but driven by the desire to enhance Russias
self-reliance in international affairs. This is the main mega-trend.
The broad consensus among expert observers and officials alike is
that the world is entering a period of considerable turbulence and
insecurity, partly as a result of both Western regime change
operations, and partly as a consequence of increasing competition
between states over resources and valuescompetition that may
result in the outbreak of war. These concerns drive two important
themes in Russian foreign and security policythe need to be able
to defend Russia against a possible strategic strike in the mid-to-
long term, and the need to be able to project power.
This underpins the active game-changer: the leaderships

programme of major military reform and investment in the wake of
the Russo-Georgia war in 2008. Since 2010, the leadership
52
earmarked 20 trillion rubles (approximately USD 640 billion at 2010

exchange rates) for the modernisation of the Russian armed forces
by 2020. The plans envisage half a million military personnel under
contract and ensuring that 70 per cent of the armed forces
weapons are modern. This includes the acquisition of 400
intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 20
attack submarines, 50 combat surface ships, 700 modern fighter
aircraft, and more than 2000 tanks and 2000 self-propelled and
tracked guns. After a sluggish start, and despite high levels of
corruption and ongoing technical problems, these reforms and
investments are bearing fruit. Russian officials have stated that by
the end of 2015, 30 per cent of weapons were new (more in some
areas) and this should reach 50 per cent by the end of 2016.
Furthermore, Russian ground forces have undergone constant

exercising at all levels over the last five years, emphasising
command and control and combat readiness. The command and
control aspect is noteworthy, as a new National Defence Centre
was opened in late 2014, the hub from which Russian military
operations are being conducted. The exercises have addressed the
quality and quantity of equipment and servicemen and were about
fighting large-scale interstate war. By 2015, therefore, a Swedish
observer has suggested that the Russian armed forces had become
"most likely capable of launching large-scale conventional high-
intensity offensive joint inter-service operations, or () to put it
simply, to conduct big war-fighting operations with big
formations". Furthermore, each of the exercises during this period
demonstrated ambitions to increase Russias military power, and
were conducted in coordination with other agencies, suggesting
that the focus was not just the fighting ability of the armed forces,
but improving the states capacity to wage war32.
Even if defence spending faces possible cuts33 and some of the re-
armament programs are being postponed into the early 2020s, by
2018 (and again by 2020) the Russian armed forces will be
transformed, with new equipment increasingly available and
combat lessons learned from exercises in Ukraine and Syria.
Additionally, the Russian leadership is investing heavily in

bolstering both its strategic deterrence and the defences of both
the Crimean peninsula and the Arctic, increasing its military
capacity in these areas and its ability to respond to emerging
threats. This is changing the strategic landscape.
53
This is the issue on which passive game-changers such as the

evolving tension with Turkey and the situation in Syria can have
most effect, since conflict can spin unpredictably. But two points
are worth making. First, although much Western attention has
focused on so-called hybrid warfare, which has emphasised the
informational and special services aspects of Russian power, it is
Russias conventional warfighting capacity that is most notably
evolving over the next few years. Second, the primary
disagreements and tensions are evident and the Russian leadership
shows little sign of softening its position, even under economic
duress. Quite to the contrary: Russia has become more involved in
Syria to seek to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime; in the
wake of Turkey shooting down the Russian bomber in late 2015,
Moscow responded not by changing course, but by reinforcing it.
Of all the mega-trends, this is the one for Western audiences to
watch most closely: it is what drives the subsumption of the
economy into security concerns and the attempt to consolidate the
Russian state and society.
Russia in 2018
More of the same is an unfashionable and, given the tense and

uncertain international environment, risky conclusion for a
foresight paper. This is perhaps especially so for Russia, when the
majority of Western observers have spent much of the last
twenty-five years looking to the future with hope for change. Since
2011, Western observers have persistently hoped to see the end of
the Putin era, asserting that Putinism was unsustainable; that
economic pressures would oblige the Russian leadership to soften
and reform the Russian domestic and international position; or that
it would otherwise face a popular revolution or an elite split or
coup to overthrow the president. In this way, some observers had
expected (liberal) change in Russia as illustrated first in their view
by the protest demonstrations in 2011-2012.
The two main passive game-changers are fluctuations in the oil

price and tension spinning into conflict with unpredictable
consequences. But on the evidence available, and given the
relationships between, on the one hand, the economic, political
and international mega-trends, and on the other, the active
game-changers of Russian government policy, evolving continuity
over the next two years is the most probable course of events for
Russia. Smaller, day-to-day, passive game-changers will play a role,
54
but they are unlikely to alter substantially the overall direction of

Russias development.
it is Russias conventional warfighting capacity

that is most notably evolving over the next few
years.
Thus change over this short period is most likely to be evolutionary,

taking place either within the system or at its fringes. These may
include the evolution of the leadership team, slight fluctuations in
the make-up of parliament and a continuation of fringe social
protest. The economyburdened by structural problems that
would take longer than three years to reverse even in favourable
conditions, and even if desired by the leadershipfaces a period of
adaptation, perhaps with a return to some slow growth (within the
overall trend of a longer-term slowdown) if oil prices increase.
Changes in the economic situation are more likely to be driven by
the governments security agenda, designed to protect Russia
against external instability, than by reform towards more liberal
efficiency.
The main direction of Russian foreign and security policy is likely to

remain consistent: numerous long-term disagreements with the
Euro-Atlantic community (even if some are temporarily patched up
with continental Europe); attempts to block and prevent the
collapse of regimes both in the former Soviet area and in the
Middle East and North African regions, which may lead to greater
tension with some states (such as the US and Turkey); and the
development of relations with China. Such issues are encapsulated
in the broader thrust of Russias foreign policy when attempting to
secure its interests in a period of international instability and to
defend its interests abroad.
55
56
CHAPTER 4
Weapons of mass destruction: The

evolution of the threat of proliferation
57
58
Chapter 4 Weapons of mass destruction: The evolution of the

threat of proliferation
The term weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was coined to
reflect modern means of mass destruction. The phrase first
appeared in a 1937 London Times article about the bombing of
Guernica. Its first political use was in a declaration issued by
Truman, Attlee and King on November 15, 1945, which called for
an international commission to be set up for the elimination of
atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction (meaning biological weapons, according to the
drafters). It later appeared in the first resolution of the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly (January 1, 1946), which
mentioned all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction. In August 1948, a UN commission gave the term a
more specific technical definition: atomic explosive weapons,
radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological
weapons, and any other weapons developed in the future which
have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of
the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.
For legal, strategic and technical reasons, the concept of WMDs

currently covers very different issues. In this text, WMDs refer to
chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological (CBRN) weapons, as
well as to ballistic missile delivery systems with a range greater
than 150 kilometres (the threshold used by the Missile Technology
Control Regime). These delivery systems may be used to launch
either conventional missiles with a powerful politico-strategic
effect, including sowing terror, or missiles carrying NBC weapons.
This is close to the definition that was used in UN Security Council
Resolution 687 (April 8, 1991) regarding Iraqi programs after the
Gulf War.
The concept of proliferation is generally understood to mean a

horizontal increase in these capabilities, i.e. an increase in the
number of WMD possessors, whether they are state actors or non-
state actors (such as the Aum Shinrikyo sect, which possessed
chemical and biological weapons). The term vertical proliferation,
which is sometimes used in nuclear non-proliferation circles, is
based on a different rationale. Actors can acquire NBC or ballistic
capabilities in three different ways: the creation of a program; a
59
deliberate transfer from one actor to another; or the dispersal of

capabilities following the collapse of a state.
There is a solid international consensus that proliferation is

dangerous. The acquisition of NBC or ballistic capabilities can foster
an arms race, embolden an actor that feels protected by its ability
to issue threats of mass reprisals, and affect crisis stability. If such
capabilities are put into use, in addition to the obvious immediate
humanitarian consequences, it is likely to affect the taboo or
tradition of non-use which is present in the nuclear and biological
fields.
The current situation and anticipated situation out to 2018 with

regard to proliferation must not be exaggerated. In the past
10 years, a number of countries (including Middle Eastern
countries) have voluntarily or involuntarily renounced their WMD
capabilities or ambitions. Concerns for the coming years centre on
about 10 countries. In terms of capabilities acquired, the names
that appear the most often in open sources are, in alphabetical
order, China, Egypt, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and
Syria. The use of WMDs is limited, in modern times, to chemical
weapons and ballistic missiles: it has been many years since the last
significant use of biological weapons or, of course, of nuclear
weapons.
Proliferation-regulating mechanisms are unlikely to change

substantially between now and 2018. Aside from the instruments
that are already known and in force (including the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones,
the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons
Convention, and the Missile Technology Control Regime), it is
doubtful that political conditions will change to the extent of
allowing, for example, the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the signing of a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the negotiation of a verification protocol for
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the establishment
of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, or the establishment of
new nuclear-weapon-free zones.
However, the spread of technology is expected to continue,

creating fears of new risks of acquisition in the short or medium
term. Increases in trade flows, the multiplication of information
distribution channels, and population movements (students,
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interns, expatriates) all facilitate the dissemination of knowledge

and capabilities. One determining factor in counter-proliferation
will be the approach used to adapt control regimes and
surveillance methods to a constantly changing world. Another
determining factor governing the proliferation supply will be the
stability of states that currently possess WMDs, since the
destabilisation or collapse of such states could put stockpiles,
technologies or expertise on the market.
On the demand side, the key determining factors will continue to

be regional balances, military (particularly Western) intervention,
and relations with those states that provide security assurances
(primarily the United States), as well as the nature of political
regimes (given that, all other things being equal, liberal
democracies today are less inclined to acquire such weapons than
other regimes). Perceptions of the new US leadership (President,
Congress) elected in November 2016 will be an important
parameter. The possible use of WMDs in the period under
consideration will also be a vital determining factor: mass use could
either reinforce the taboo or tradition of non-use, particularly if the
international community reacts strongly, or contribute to making
the use of a given WMD commonplace.
Between now and 2018, the countries that warrant special

monitoring (acquisition, transfer or use) will be Saudi Arabia, China,
North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Russia.
Nuclear capabilities
Nuclear proliferation is somewhat more predictable than the

proliferation of other types of capabilities. Nuclear technology
evolves more slowly than chemical or biological weapons
technology and requires a greater and generally more visible
investment. There are few innovations in this field. The only major
developments concern the dissemination of methods and
expertise. Centrifuge enrichment techniques were widely
disseminated by the so-called Khan network in the 1980s and
1990s (allegedly together with more or less complete weapon
blueprints). Laser enrichment, a highly discreet technique, could
become popular among nuclear candidate states. However, the
transition to nuclear energy in certain countries will lead to the
development (still limited by 2018) of civilian nuclear complexes
and therefore to basic knowledge in that field.
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Apart from Iran, no other country today is publicly known to have

both the capability and the desire to acquire nuclear weapons in
the near term. However, the issue of Iran will no doubt be a
determining factor in the future of proliferation leading up to 2018.
Laser enrichment, a highly discreet technique,

could become popular among nuclear candidate
states.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 14 July 2015

unquestionably represents a turning point in the Iranian nuclear
crisis, which has been going on since the existence of secret
facilities was publicly revealed in the summer of 2002. However,
this agreement, which is essentially intended to prevent Tehran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the next 15 years, in no way
represents a definitive resolution of this matter. Between now and
2018, three scenarios are possible: a) Iran willingly implements the
JCPOA and apparently abandons all military nuclear ambitions;
b) Iran tries to keep its options open and possibly extract new
concessions from the P5+134 and tests the resolution of the
international community, for example by obstructing access to
certain sensitive sites; and c) a major crisis leads to a breakdown,
the P5+1 attempt to re-impose sanctions, and Iran resumes its
nuclear program. Scenario b) is the most likely.
this agreement, which is essentially intended to

prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon
in the next 15 years, in no way represents a
definitive resolution of this matter.
In all scenarios, this agreement in no way eliminates the risk of

nuclear proliferation in the region. First, although Saudi Arabia has
officially ratified the agreement, it has concerns about
developments in US policy, which it finds too weak or too
favourable to Iran. Second, since the agreement legitimizes the
possession of uranium enrichment capabilities, it will be easy for
other states to demand the same treatment and to refuse any
limitation on their uranium enrichment and/or nuclear
reprocessing capabilities.
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The failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review

Conference (spring 2015) does not in itself entail new risks of
proliferation. However, some Middle Eastern states could, in more
or less good faith, use the standstill in the process for establishing a
WMD-free zone in that area (the issue that caused the Review
Conference to fail) to justify a military nuclear program.
In the Middle East, as elsewhere, US policy will continue to be the

most important determining factor in the future of nuclear non-
proliferation, second only to the behaviour of Iran. US policy plays
a role in three different ways. First, US military interventions serve
as reminders of the countrys superiority and are the reason that
the idea that the only way to protect oneself from the United
States is to acquire nuclear weapons has been commonplace since
the end of the Cold War. Second, as has been the case since the
1950s, the credibility of the protection that Washington confers on
its alliesits formal and informal security assurancesis a key
consideration for countries contemplating a potential military
nuclear program, particularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan and
South Korea. (Egypt is a special case: it does not have a security
assurance from the US but is dependent on Washington for its
military budget.) Third, the political relationship that the US has
with non-allied nuclear states (China, Russia), as well as with
Pakistan, may have an impact on the willingness of those states to
share certain technologies.
Saudi Arabia is without question the state of greatest concern. It is

the only country today that seems to have the motivation, financial
means and adequate bilateral relations (with China and Pakistan)
to modernize its ballistic systems and acquire, within a relatively
short time, the necessary technology base to contemplate a
military nuclear program in one form or another. The evolution of
the Washington-Riyadh-Islamabad triangle bears close watching,
whatever the reality of current rumours that Pakistan has allegedly
already granted a potential nuclear assurance to Saudi Arabia. That
being said, the likelihood of a break in the politico-strategic ties
between Washington and Riyadh within the timeline under
consideration remains low, as the strength of those ties has been
tested many times in the past 70 years.
In the coming years, only a few countries are likely to deliberately

transfer sensitive (dual-use) nuclear technologies: North Korea,
China, Iran, Russia and Pakistan. The first is a special case, as it has
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actually stated its willingness to deliberately carry out such

transfers. The others currently have a restrictive policy in this
regard (at least officially), ostensibly so that they can effectively
control exports of dual-use assets and technologies.
There is a risk of non-deliberate dispersal in the event that one of

those states becomes destabilized or collapses. Again, North Korea
is a possibility. The precedent of Syria showed that the risk of such
dispersal does indeed exist: the Al-Kibar site was successively
occupied by the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). The fate of all of the substances, materials and
technology related to the Syrian nuclear program is unclear to this
day.
Regarding the risk of use, if 70 years without a wartime nuclear

explosion can be considered a tradition of non-use, the risk
remains very low, but the probability is far from nil in Asia. Despite
Russian leaders current rhetoric, it is extremely unlikely that
Moscow would deliberately use nuclear weapons: Putin is playing
the nuclear card to show off his strength, but Russia has not
lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons and has no plans
to enter into a direct military confrontation with NATO. The
primary risk between now and 2018 is undoubtedly the possibility
of an Indo-Pakistani crisis degenerating into an uncontrolled
escalation. Although mutual deterrence has limited the risk of a
direct conflict between the two countries, a major new attack
against India could force New Delhi to react. If the two actors then
become unable to control the spiralling violence, Islamabad could
be driven to the extreme of considering limited use of nuclear
weapons in an attempt to put an end to the conflict, for example
by trying to involve the international community. For its part, North
Korea, which in 2018 will have acquired the capability to fit nuclear
weapons on to mid-range missiles (and perhaps also on basic
intercontinental missiles), will remain a great concern given
Pyongyangs proclivities for dangerous provocations.
The acquisition of a nuclear device by a non-state actor remains

extremely unlikely. In the event of the sudden collapse of a state
such as Pakistan or North Korea, the intervention of external actors
to prevent such a scenario would at least partially address this
eventuality. As for the risk of access to nuclear weapons stockpiles
in Europe by activists, not by terrorists it appears not to be high
despite a few episodes of facilities being penetrated. If by chance
64
this scenario should occur, it remains to be seen whether the actor

in possession of the device would be both willing and able to use it.
Other capabilities
In contrast to the nuclear field, technology evolves quickly in the

chemical and biological fields, as shown by micro-reactors in the
former case and breakthroughs in molecular biology and genetic
engineering in the latter. The chances of state or non-state actors
gaining access to chemical or biological weapons during the period
under consideration therefore seem far less remote than for
nuclear weapons35. In the future, the possibility of such weapons
being carried by sophisticated drones will have to be taken into
account.
The chances of state or non-state actors gaining

access to chemical or biological weapons during
the period under consideration therefore seem far
less remote than for nuclear weapons.
Since the weapons are discreet and the technologies considered

are very often dual-use, major uncertainties remain today with
regard to the existence of chemical and above all biological military
capabilities. Generally speaking, North Korea, Egypt, Syria and Iran
are the states of greatest concern. However, China, Israel and
Russia, among others, may at least have capabilities that could be
militarized quickly.
Biological capabilities
Biological weaponry is the field for which the greatest uncertainties

persist with regard to the existence of militarized capabilities or
capabilities that could be militarized quickly. Concerns primarily
centre on China, North Korea, Egypt, Iran and even Russia.Since
1945, there have been extremely few known instances of biological
weapons being deployed for operational or terrorist purposes. In
the former case, the last known precedent dates back to the 1970s
(Rhodesia). In the latter, the last known instances are the
attempted use of botulinum toxin by the Aum Shinrikyo sect
(1990s) and the anthrax crisis (2001).
65
The risk of dual-use capabilities being acquired by many state

actors is very high. The likelihood of a state launching a new
biological program during the period under consideration appears
to be low, although surprises are possible (such as the discovery, in
the 1990s, of the unsuspected scope of the Soviet and Iraqi
programs). However, non-state actors are likely to attempt to
acquire such weapons on a small scale.
The risk that biological weapons could be used in a conflict is

extremely limited, owing to the lack of operational value and the
scant precedent. The only exception may be North Korea, which is
known to be willing to take strategic risks, but it is difficult to
imagine this happening, other than in extreme circumstances, for
example if the regime felt that its existence was in peril. However,
the likelihood of use by a non-state group is higher. This can
include not only religiously motivated groups, but also any other
millenarian or doomsday organizations. Another scenario could see
a militant group carrying out what they intend as a
demonstration or warning. For example, an anti-globalisation
or hypernationalist group could attempt to demonstrate the
alleged dangers of opening up the borders by spreading an
infectious agent in an airport, train station or port. The situation
could get out of hand.
Chemical capabilities
In recent decades, militarization has been much more intense in

the chemical field than in the biological field. It should be noted
that until the late 1980s, many countries believed that chemical
weaponry could be used for operational (offensive or defensive) or
deterrent purposes. Since the development of the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention, most states that previously had a chemical
arsenal have renounced and destroyed their capabilities or are the
process of doing so. However, a large number of states have
retained some potential in this field. The countries regularly cited
in open sources are Burma, North Korea, China, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Iran, Israel and Syria.
Although chemical weapons continued to be used in international

conflicts (Egypt in Yemen, Iraq vs. Iran) into the late 1980s, the last
two known instances are when Iraq and Syria used them against
their own citizens. This was undoubtedly no coincidence: these two
countries, had developed sophisticated military capabilities in the
66
chemical field, primarily for what they claimed to be a deterrent

against Israel. These weapons also proved to be useful, from their
leaders point of view, for intimidating, neutralizing and terrorizing
their own citizens when some rebelled against those in power.
an anti-globalisation or hypernationalist
group could attempt to demonstrate the alleged
dangers of opening up the borders by spreading
an infectious agent in an airport, train station or
port.
The risk that states could start new chemical weapon programs
from scratch remains limited. However, the spread of existing
weapons or agents in the wake of the destabilization or collapse of
a state is a scenario that needs to be considered (see also the case
of Syria). It is a possibility in North Korea or even in Egypt or Iran.
Furthermore, as in the biological field, and for the same reasons,
the possibility that a non-state group could acquire sophisticated
chemical weapons is growing (micro-reactorssee above). After
having begun using, like other terrorist groups in the region in the
last decade, basic chemical explosives (chlorine), the Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) appears to have acquired the capacity
to build first-generation chemical weapons (mustard gas) thanks to
its ability to source industrial precursors in the Middle East. This
would be a first since the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo.
The possibility of a new use of chemical weapons remains relatively

high. Note that since the mid-2000s, rudimentary but prohibited
chemical weapons (chlorine gas) have been used on several
occasions, in Iraq and Syria. Regarding the latter country, it is
prudent to remember that Damascus has not disposed of all of its
binary weapons and could still use them, particularly in a last-
resort scenario, if the regime feels that its existence is under
threat. The same reasoning applies for a country such as North
Korea. Lastly, the probability of a terrorist group disseminating a
chemical agent remains high in the Middle East and must be
viewed as a possible scenario in Western countries, too.
Radiological capabilities
Rarely considered as weapons of mass destruction, despite being

classified as such by the UN in 1948, radiological weapons are
67
designed to cause exposure to high doses of radiation in a variety

of ways, including poisoning, dispersal by conventional explosives
(dirty bombs) or by aerial vectors, attacks on nuclear facilities,
and deliberate meltdowns.
Dirty bombs are easy to make. The most radioactive isotopes

(eg cobalt-60, cesium-137 and strontium-90) are present in many
industrial and scientific institutions and can simply be attached to a
conventional explosive36. Fortunately, the effects of such devices
on the biosphere would be relatively limited: the larger the
explosion, the more widely the material would be dispersed, and
consequently the more its radioactive effects would be diluted. No
doubt this explains, at least partly, why such attacks have not yet
been carried out. It would be not be easy to cause a significant
release of radioactivity from a civilian nuclear facility, from either
the outside or the inside (with the help of accomplices), whether
by setting explosives, hacking computer systems or taking control
of a reactor. Plots to attack such facilities have existed since the
1970s, but none have ever appeared serious enough to pose a
major threat.
The low visibility of the effects of such attacks (unlike conventional

bombs and suicide bombings) and the expertise needed to
successfully mount a fatal attack undoubtedly explain why most
terrorist groups have been relatively less interested in radiological
attacks thus far. Nevertheless, given that radiological sources are
relatively easy to access and that Western fears of dirty bombs
are unfortunately well publicised, it seems fairly likely that
attempts to use radiological weapons will be made in the coming
years, particularly by doomsday groups. In that regard, ISIL is a
particular concern because: a) some of its affiliates have expressed
an interest in the nuclear field in general (this was also the case
with Al-Qaeda in 2001); b) it has been known to use other weapons
of mass destruction (chemical weapons); c) it can mobilise
individuals with scientific expertise; and d) it likely has access to
radiological sources in the territory that it controls in Syria and Iraq.
Ballistic capabilities
Ballistic missiles (which, by convention, refer here to missiles with a

range greater than 150 kilometres) are a special case, because they
are not weapons per se but rather delivery systems that can be
fitted with conventional munitions or NBC weapons. This capability
68
is one of the main reasons that nearly all states that have acquired
or hope to acquire NBC weapons have also invested in ballistics.
The opposite is not true: most states that possess ballistic missiles
are not known to have NBC programs. The reasons are largely
historical: most of them are states that had acquired Soviet SCUD-
class missiles during the Cold War.
A total of 31 countries have ballistic capabilities. Among them, 11

have missiles with a range greater than 1,000 kilometres in their
arsenals: the eight states that have operational nuclear arsenals, as
well as North Korea, Iran and Saudi Arabia. All except Saudi Arabia
have or have had nuclear programs with a stated military aspect.
Ballistic missiles have been used many times in recent decades.

However, they were exclusively SCUD-class missiles and were
generally used for tactical purposes. The rare occasions on which
ballistic missiles were deployed for strategic purposesparticularly
for terroroccurred during the IranIraq War and the Gulf War.
(This does not include missile tests, which may be intended to
intimidate.) The last use of such missiles occurred in 2015 during
the Saudi intervention in Yemen: as was the case in the Gulf War,
Saudi forces and their allies were unable to completely eliminate
this threat, and a number of SCUD missiles were fired.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles highlights three major trends:

growing use of solid propulsion (which improves engine reliability);
enhanced accuracy; and increased range. For these reasons, and
because the ballistic missile remains a symbol of power, its
proliferation is a lasting trend. The supply of missiles and
technologies comes primarily from Russia and North Korea.
Whereas Pyongyangs willingness to export its methods and
expertise in this field has long been known, Russia could become a
more active exporter in the coming years. The SS-26 short-range
missile, which is far more sophisticated than the SCUD generation,
could prove to be an excellent export product.
The supply of missiles and technologies comes

primarily from Russia and North Korea.
The risk of acquisition therefore remains high. Since the countries

likely to be interested are primarily allies or friends of the United
States, its relations with these countries will be a crucial
69
determining factor; Western countries could use their political,

military and trade ties as leverage or pressure points.
As for the risk of use, there is a relatively high risk of low-level use
(missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometres) in Middle
Eastern crises and conflicts. A new, high-intensity open conflict in
that region or in Asia could lead to more intensive use, and the risk
of mass use of medium-range missiles carrying conventional
warheads would be an extreme, unprecedented scenario, unlikely
to occur anywhere but in the Persian Gulf or the Taiwan Strait.
Conclusion
For the coming years, WMDs proliferation still seems to be a

troubling threat, yet one that may be somewhat less significant
than 10 years ago in terms of both acquisition (programs, transfers,
dispersal) and use.
With regard to acquisition, China, North Korea, Russia and Iran

remain the potential suppliers on which concerns will focus, and
Saudi Arabia is a serious candidate. US policyas well as
perceptions of that policycontinues to be a key factor in nuclear
and ballistic acquisitions. Prospects for biological and chemical
weapons seem to be different: it is primarily a problem of
disseminating expertise and technologies, and the possibility that
non-state actors may acquire such weapons is non-negligible.
With regard to use, it can be said that there is a fragile taboo

surrounding the use of WMDs. Four main risks can be identified: a)
the use of conventional ballistic missiles by a state (highly
probable); b) low-level use of rudimentary chemical, radiological or
biological weapons by a non-state actor (highly probable); c) the
use of chemical weapons by a state (possible); and d) the use of
nuclear weapons, undoubtedly in South Asia (highly improbable,
given that every country with nuclear weapons believes that
nuclear force must remain a deterrent, not to be used except in
extreme circumstancesbut with direct and indirect consequences
out of proportion to the hypotheses mentioned above).
In closing, there is reason to doubt the relevance of retaining a

category that the collective mindset now associates with the
intervention in Iraq (2003), along with all the public mistrust that it
engendered.
70
If the classification had to be redone, a number of options would

be possible:
weapons of mass terror, under the category of poisons:

chemical, biological and radioactive weapons;37
weapons of mass effect, capable of causing rapid death to

thousands of people: nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons;
weapons of mass disruption, capable of causing social

disorder, even in low-level use: nuclear, biological,
chemical, radiological, ballistic and cybernetic weapons;
weapons of mass destruction, capable of causing large-

scale physical destruction: nuclear, incendiary and
thermobaric weapons; and
weapons of mass catastrophe, capable of causing major

biological effects on millions of people: nuclear and
biological weapons.
In all scenarios, nuclear weapons should receive special emphasis:

they are the only weapon that can have a mass effect on both
physical structures (blast and thermal effects) and the biosphere
(the abovementioned effects and ionizing radiation).
Beyond the period under consideration, these categories could be

expanded to include new technical developments, such as
directed-energy weapons (high-power solid-state lasers) or even
weapons stemming from nanotechnology research.
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72
CHAPTER 5
State power and cyber power
73
74
Chapter 5 State power and cyber power

Rapid developments in the cyber realm have caused governments
and non-state actors to reconceptualise their understanding of
security in an era of pervasive risk. Below are related trends that
the author believes may bear significant influence in this area by
the year 2018. Those are followed by an examination of structural
changes defining the future of cyber-security beyond that horizon.
The bottom line first
National security, per se
The United States and a number of other countries have

identified cyber-insecurity as the paramount national security
risk38.
Counter-party risk will be a large fraction of total risk for

primary targets both in the commercial sector and in the
governmental sector. How this affects outsourcing strategies
will depend on publicity around detected breaches39.
It was widely argued that the loss of confidentiality around

cyber armaments due to the revelations of Edward Snowden
was a militarily crippling event. "Never let a good crisis go to
waste" meant that those revelations were, in point of fact, the
initiator of a broad modernisation of cyber weaponry that is
ongoing. One may presume that considerable fruit will be
borne by 2018, and that other sovereigns are investing in
parallel.
Realpolitik
The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction, demonstrated

for industrial controls by Stuxnet, does not and will not have
the capacity to ensure threat-stasis as it did in the nuclear
world. The reason is attribution: while intercontinental ballistic
missiles have a visible flight path and a limited number of
launch-capable governments, offensive software has neither.
Governmental desire for attribution (of actions) and

provenance (of traffic) are likely to be unrequited, but those
75
desires will nevertheless be enshrined in policy such as

mandatory geocoding of the Internet and data retention
demands greater than at present. The increasing stand-off
range of non-contact biometrics could appear in a combined
mandate. (Present day: facial recognition reaches 500 metres;
iris recognition, 50 metres; and, heartbeat recognition, 5
metres).
Grey-market selling of exploit code will continue to have

governments as the primary clientele.
Major sovereigns will prevent other major sovereigns' products

from being used in some aspects of critical infrastructure.
While already evidentHuawei routers in the US v. Cisco
routers in Chinathis will extend to cryptographic gear
including any sensor product with hardware-embodied
cryptographic code. Industrial espionage will thus rise in
importance to nation states, as if it were not high enough
already.
Force and use thereof
Civilian strikeback will remain exceptional and only allowable

when a civilian entity is paired with a governmental entity, eg,
Microsoft with the US Department of Justice against Coreflood.
Pre-deployment of cyber weaponry in otherwise non-military

positions (devices, networks, etc.) is all but certain. Much of it
will be for tactical denial of information service of one form or
another, but that is likely to expand into disinformation as soon
as sensors assume a place in the critical path for autonomous
devices.
The most substantial cyber-centric crime rings will continue to

operate from a small number of sovereign jurisdictions wherein
they enjoy tolerance if not revenue sharing.
Silent failure will continue to dominate important breaches; for

those entities able to afford it organisationally, ongoing
full-network capture will at least be able to answer "How long
has this been going on40"?
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Cyber attack detection using behavioural techniques, or

anomaly detection against long-term norms for example, will
be used with greater vigour and immense side-effects.
Control
The tendency for democratic regimes to delay meaningful

response, and then to over-respond, will be demonstrated by
cyber events.
To avoid decision-making under the influence of adrenaline will

be ever harder, as demonstrated by the proliferation of
proposals with respect to cryptography put forward in the
United States in February 2016. The characteristics of financial
high-frequency tradingrapid-fire decision-making by self-
modifying algorithmswill begin to appear in other domains,
including in government.
Turning decision-making over to machines will be entirely

seductive but safe if and only if that delegation can be
withdrawn, meaning that the conditions for operating without
that delegation are maintained. Similarly, algorithms derived
from machine learning must never be trusted unless the
"Why?" of decisions those algorithms take can be usefully
examined. (The term of art is "interrogatability".)
Various baby steps towards algorithmic regulation will take

place, for example for traffic management, but none of these
will yet be critically relevant to either cyber or national security
within the period 2016-2018.
The skills shortage in cyber security will not be solved.

Governmental sectors will remain unable to retain those they
have nurtured.
Private sector
Western societies rely on infrastructure that is privately

ownedtrue today, truer tomorrow. Western governments
therefore have no choice but to call on the infrastructure's
management to perform actions necessary to national security
goals. It seems fair to characterise this extension of
77
governmental duty to private sector firms as "deputising"

them, regardless of whether it is against management's will to
be so deputised. This was, of course, the story around
telephone records at AT&T and other companies, and will be
the story soon enough around cloud computing and data
handlers.
Multinational companies will face conflicting demands from

governments, likely made more severe by governments'
increasing efforts at extra-territorial reach.
The percentage of personal communications that are

encrypted will rise, but more due to supplier actions than to
citizen actions; this will distinguish free from non-free states to
a degree.
The information given up voluntarily in social media will be

increasingly employed by governmental actors. In non-free
jurisdictions, disinformation plants in social media will continue
to rise in tactical utility to those jurisdictions' aims. In free
jurisdictions, social media will be a substantial component to
the clearance process.
Research
The mismatch between features of IPv4 and IPv6 is likely to be

exploited in unforeseeable ways, perhaps beginning with
address hopping.
Robot intercommunication, such as vehicle-to-vehicle between

self-driving cars, will become a target of research in forensics.
Companies have been formed to ensure forensic success just as
companies have been formed to ensure forensic failure.
Cybersecurity as a science will remain a goal and not an

accomplishment41.
Legal framework
A place in society for those who opt out of cyber life will have
to be protected or else the cyber world will simultaneously
increase inequality and conformity; think ADA (Americans with
Disabilities Act) but for digital rejectionists. This is not an
78
appeal from some "soft Luddite" faction and requires much

debate which will be well underway (but by no means
concluded) by 2018.
Compliance regimes will remain of little protective value even

as insurers and regulators demand ever more expensive
certifications. Few are the enterprises without cyber-related
requirements imposed in these ways.
End-User License Agreements (EULAs) that deny all

responsibility will be challenged. Autonomous vehicles may be
where such challenges draw first blood.
Enforceable guarantees for the integrity of retained

information, backstopped by some liability regime not yet
designed, will come into existence, perhaps focused first on
electronic health records (whose black market price is rising).
Discussion
Projecting from now to 1 March 2018, the raw performance of

computing hardware per dollar should triple (Moore's Law =
eighteen month doubling). There is a parallel twelve-month
doubling time for storage per dollar and a nine-month doubling
time for network bandwidth per dollar.
In non-free jurisdictions, disinformation plants in

social media will continue to rise in tactical
utility to those jurisdictions' aims.
Thirty years ago, you would take your data to where the computing
wasa university's central computing facility perhaps. Then
inventions made it possible to move the computing to where the
data was and every worker came to have something on their
desktop with which to do that processing. Now come the twin
innovations of virtualisation and software-defined networks, so the
distal end is once again a display tool while the data is again where
the computing is (only now we cannot tell where the "where" is
located). Perhaps the next oscillation will put the computing back
to where the data will then residein the sensor fabric, per se.
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Cyber power mirrors biology's punctuated equilibriumlong

periods of stability separated by short periods of rapid change,
occasional plateaus of constancy between which everything
changes. What may be happening now, however, is an increase in
the frequency of oscillation to the point where plateaus of
constancy do not last long enough to consolidate cyber policy. That
is unsurprising and now permanent; computing technology is in a
positive feedback loop. (As wind strengthens at sea, waves stop
getting higher and become closer together.)
All advanced, Westphalian governments are amassing the means to

project cyberforce, but for the state's monopoly on the legitimate
use of force within its territory to have genuine meaning,
cyberspace must be balkanised. With enough interconnections,
physical boundaries and cyber boundaries lose all correlation, so
states increasingly define cyber-territory by where their subjects
go, whether by destination control in the Chinese style or by data
control in the EU style.
All cybersecurity tools are dual use, just as are knives or gasoline.
The US Founding Fathers who wrote "[W]henever any Form of
Government becomes destructive..., it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it" also wrote "[T]he right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed", and they wrote both
statements in the US constitution at a time when the weapons of
the yeoman farmer were on par with the weapons of the
infantryman. In the intervening centuries, weapons of infantries so
surpassed those of the yeomen that any right of the people to
abolish destructive government could not rely on weapons kept at
home, but relative might between state and non-state is today
closer than it has been at any time since 1791. This oscillation in
the balance of power may be peaking, but never before could a
dozen people in their pajamas meaningfully annul the monopoly on
the use of force.
Worldwide governmental procurement of commercial-off-the-shelf

(COTS) products means that breaking the protections on a
domestic target requires the same skills and equipment as breaking
the protections on a foreign target. In a sense, dual-use COTS cyber
technology is deployed more widely amongst the civilian sector
than it is in the military sector.
80
In the 1980s, the civilian sector caught up with the military sector
in the design of survivable communications infrastructure. In the
1990s, the civilian sector caught up with the military sector in the
application of cryptography. In the 2000s, the civilian sector caught
up with the military sector in the deployment of wide-area
scalability. In the current decade, the civilian sector is catching up
with the military sector in traffic analysis, and the civilian sector has
far more listening posts than does the military sector.
Everywhere the talk is about big data and how much better an
instrumented society will be, while the rising generation cares less
about privacy than do those now in power. Among the classic triad
of confidentiality, integrity and availability, we have heretofore
prioritised confidentiality, especially in the military sector. That will
not be the case going forward. In the civilian sector, integrity will
supplant confidentiality as the highest goal of cybersecurity. In the
military sector, weapons against integrity will surpass weapons
against confidentiality.
The cumulative effect of the curves for computing, storage and

bandwidth is this: in 1986, you could fill the world's total storage
using the world's total bandwidth in two days. Today, it would take
more than 150 days of the world's total bandwidth to fill the
world's total storage, and the measured curve between 1986 and
today is all but perfectly exponential42.
In the military sector, weapons against integrity

will surpass weapons against confidentiality.
Moore's Law may have begun slowing. Reason No. 1 is physics: We

cannot cool chips at clock rates much beyond what we now have.
Reason No. 2 is economics: the cost of a new fab (fabrication)
doubles every two yearsMoore's lesser-known second law. By
2018 one new fab will be as expensive in inflation-adjusted terms
as was the entire Manhattan Project43.
Cryptographic performance is now a front-and-centre topic. The

commercial sector is adding cryptographic protections to an
expanded range of products and services; but the design question
is whether to improve cryptographic performance with ever more
adroit software or to implement it directly in hardware. The latter
option yields gains in performance not otherwise possible, but
81
embodiments in hardware close out algorithm agility as an option

for fail-safe design44.
Over time, in the desktop and handheld worlds, cost stays

constant, performance rises and upgrades dominate. Over time, in
the embedded world, performance stays constant, costs go down
and devices proliferate. Ergo, the embedded systems space makes
the attack surface of the non-embedded space trivial by
comparison. Beginning in 1997, regular attention has been paid to
the questions of monoculture in the networked environment45,
that is to say when all devices share the exact same structure. For
an attacker, this means having to write one and only one piece of
malware as it can run everywhere. But is not a deep level of
redundancy the best way to ensure resilience? Quoting the US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)'s definition
of cascade failure,
[R]edundancy is the provision of functional capabilities that

would be unnecessary in a fault-free environment. Redundancy
is necessary, but not sufficient for fault tolerance... System
failures occur when faults propagate to the outer boundary of
the system. The goal of fault tolerance is to intercept the
propagation of faults so that failure does not occur, usually by
substituting redundant functions for functions affected by a
particular fault. Occasionally, a fault may affect enough
redundant functions that it is not possible to reliably select a
non-faulty result, and the system will sustain a common-mode
failure. A common-mode failure results from a single fault (or
fault set). Computer systems are vulnerable to common-mode
resource failures if they rely on a single source of power,
cooling, or (input/output) I/O. A more insidious source of
common-mode failures is a design fault that causes redundant
copies of the same software process to fail under identical
conditions46.
That last partthat "A more insidious source of common-mode

failures is a design fault that causes redundant copies of the same
software process to fail under identical conditions"is exactly that
which can be masked by complexity precisely because complexity
ensures under-appreciated mutual dependence. In sum, cascade
failure is much easier in a monoculture, and, as such, when you
deploy a computing monoculture, you are making a fundamental
risk management decision that the downside risk of a black-swan
82
event is more tolerable than the downside risk of perpetual

inconsistency.
If we opt for monocultures, we had better opt for tight central

control, recognising the risks that come with it, including the
paramount risk of all auto-update schemesthe hostile take-over
of the auto-update mechanism itself. The trend line in the count of
critical monocultures seems to be rising and most of these are
embedded systems both without a remote management interface
and long lived. That combinationlong-lived and unreachableis
the trend that must be dealt with, possibly even reversed. Whether
to insist that embedded devices self-destruct by some predictable
age or that remote management of them be a condition of
deployment is the national policy question that is on the table. In
either case, the Internet of Things, which is to say
network-connected micro-controllers in seemingly every device,
should raise hackles on every neck47.
An advanced persistent threat (APT), one that is difficult to

discover, difficult to remove and difficult to attribute48, is
definitively easier in a low-end monoculture where much of the
computing is done by devices that are deaf and mute once installed
or where those devices operate at the very bottom of the software
stackwhere those devices bring no relevant societal risk by their
onesies and twosies, but do bring relevant societal risk at today's
extant scales, much less at the scales coming soon. As Dave Aitel
has put it many times, for the exploit writer the hardest part by far
is test, not coding49 and monocultures ease testing. Monoculture is
not an initiator of attack, it is a potentiator; it is not an oncogene, it
is angiogenesis.
In a world of rising interdependence, APT will not be about the

impressive machines; it will be about the little ones. It will not go
against devices with a hostname and a console; it will go against
the ones about which you did not even know. It will not be
something you can fix in any of the usual senses of the word "fix";
it can be avoided only by damping dependence. It cannot and will
not be damped by supply-chain regulations. You are Gulliver; they
are the Lilliputians.
Fifteen years ago, Lzsl Barabsi showed it is not possible to

design a network that is at once proofed against both random
faults and targeted faults50. His conception of a scale-free network
83
is good enough for our planning purposes, and today we have a

network that is pretty well immune to failure from random faults
but which is hardly immune to targeted faults. Ten years ago, Sean
Gorman's simulations showed a sharp increase in network-wide
susceptibility to cascade failure when a single exploitable flaw
reached 43 per cent prevalence51. We are way above that
threshold in many, many areas, most of them built-in, unseen,
silent. Five years ago, Kelly Ziegler calculated that patching a
fully-deployed smart grid would take an entire year to complete,
largely because of the size of the per-node firmware relative to the
available power line bandwidth52.
The root source of risk is dependence, especially dependence on

the expectation of stable system state. Dependence is not only
individual but mutual; not only am I dependent or not but rather a
continuous scale is asking whether we are dependent or not; we
are indeed interdependent. Interdependence is transitive, hence
the risk that flows from interdependence is transitive. If you
depend on the digital world and I depend on you, then I, too, am at
risk of failures in the digital world. If individual dependencies were
only static, they would be evaluable, but we regularly and quickly
expand our dependence on new things, and that added
dependence matters because we each and severally add risk to our
portfolio by way of dependence on things for which their very
newness confounds risk-estimation and thus risk-management.
Interdependence within society is today absolutely centred on the
Internet beyond all other dependencies, except climate, and the
Internet has a time rate of change five orders of magnitude faster.
Interdependence is likewise present at the individual scale; any

pool of synchronised data-stores is as jointly vulnerable to a loss of
integrity as is the weakest member of the pool. The Gordian knot
of our trade-offs is this: as society becomes more technologic, even
the mundane comes to interdepend on distant digital perfection.
Our food pipeline contains less than a week's supply, just to take
one example, and that pipeline depends on digital services for
everything from GPS-driven tractors and drone-surveilled irrigators
to robot vegetable-sorting machinery, coast-to-coast logistics and
RFID-tagged livestock. Are all the technologic dependency and the
data that fuels it making us more resilient or more fragile? Morgan
Stanley and The Santa Fe Institute believe that it is the latter. Is it
not, then, essential to retain manual means for doing things so that
we do not have to reinvent them under time pressure?
84
The way to think about the execution space on the web today is
that the client has become the server's server53. You take in
Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) from everywhere and everyone.
You are supposed to believe that trust is transitive but that risk is
not. That is what Javascript does. That is what Flash does. That is
what HTML5 does. That is what every embedded Browser Help
Object (BHO) does. The HTTP Archive says that the average web
page today makes out-references to 16 different domains as well
as 17 Javascript requests per page, and the Javascript on-the-wire
byte count is five times the HTML byte count54. A lot of that
Javascript is about analytics, which is to say surveillance of the user
experience. On-the-fly insertion of script code has been shown to
weaponise the browsers of innocent bystanders55.
As Daniel Bilar showed in his analysis of Conficker56, "attackers and

defenders each present moving targets to the other"; that is to say
that oscillating advantage is to be expected just as in nature's
predator-prey dynamics or in game theory. Why? Because a
sentient opponent does whatever he can to exploit your code by
way of exploiting the assumptions on which your code is built.
Sandy Clark showed that if software security is your goal, then
"software re-use is more harmful to software security than
beneficial", because a sentient opponent first has to learn how
your code works and you help him by re-using components57. In
short, is it time to give up on software security or to double down
the way the Language Theoretic Security Group [LANGSEC] shows
us58? Do we need more evidence than what LANGSEC, Bilar and
Clark, with their collaborators, have given us? Is it time finally to
accept Ken Thompson's seminal observation that you can only trust
a program you wrote entirely and to act accordingly59? At least one
NYC bank no longer buys software for that very reason.
A leading software security assessment firm is seeing machine

written code of vast sizes that contain apparent vulnerabilities
meaning even machines write vulns. In a relatively recent Atlantic
Monthly article, Bruce Schneier asked a cogent first-principles
question: Are vulnerabilities in software dense or sparse60? If they
are sparse, then every one you find and fix meaningfully lowers the
number of avenues of attack that are extant. If they are dense,
then finding and fixing one more is essentially irrelevant to security
and a waste of the resources spent finding it. Six-take-away-one is
a 15 per cent improvement. Six-thousand-take-away-one has no
detectable value.
85
In "Global Cyberspace is Safer than You Think61", Eric Jardine says

that cyberspace is getting better, not getting worse, that
cyberspace is getting safer, not getting more dangerous. His
argument is that to think cyberspace is ever worse, ever more
dangerous comes from failing to properly normalise whatever
measures of safety you have heretofore used. It is only fair to
quote its front matter directly:
This paper argues that the level of security in cyberspace is

actually far better than the picture described by media
accounts and IT security reports. Currently, numbers on the
occurrence of cyber-crime are almost always depicted in either
absolute (1000 attacks per year) or as year-over-year
percentage change terms (50 per cent more attacks in 2014
than in 2013). To get an accurate picture of the security of
cyberspace, cybercrime statistics need to be expressed as a
proportion of the growing size of the Internet (similar to the
routine practice of expressing crime as a proportion of a
population, eg, 15 murders per 1000 people per year).
Jardine demonstrates that the denominator matters, that is, that

reporting counts of anything is poorer decision-support than
reporting rates and proportions; that counts of events per unit
time can only mislead; and, that it is incorrect to talk about how
much mayhem there is without talking about how much
opportunity for mayhem there is.
Jardine's line of critique is entirely straightforward, and cyberspace

is not the only place that such arguments about the validity of
inference are taking place. Consider Stephen Pinker's The Better
Angels of Our Nature:
We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease

with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are
more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our
memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will
always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so
people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its
actual likelihood62.
This is, again, an argument for looking at rates and proportions

rather than counts. But in a direct cross, Nassim Nicholas Taleb
responded with a paper, "On the Super-Additivity and Estimation
86
Biases of Quantile Contributions63", in which he argues that when a

distribution is fat-tailed, estimations of parameters based on
historical experience will inevitably mislead:
When I finished writing The Black Swan in 2006, I was

confronted with ideas of "great moderation" by people who did
not realize that the process was getting fatter and fatter tails
(from operational and financial leverage, complexity,
interdependence, etc.), meaning fewer but deeper departures
from the mean. The fact that nuclear bombs explode less often
than regular shells does not make them safer. Needless to say
that with the arrival of the events of 2008, I did not have to
explain myself too much. Nevertheless people in economics are
still using the methods that led to the "great moderation"
narrative, and Bernanke, the protagonist of the theory, had his
mandate renewed.
And to highlight his central point:
[We are] undergoing a switch between [continuous low grade

volatility] to ... the process moving by jumps, with less and less
variations outside of jumps.
Is cyber-security getting worse or getting better? Is there anything

we are currently measuring that is leading us to conclude that we
are doing the right thing(s) as inferred from measurements of what
we believe to be outcomes? Are our inferences confounded with
little understood assumptions?
Jardine is correct that the possible event space is expanding

dramatically, accelerating in its expansion by all accounts. Part of
that is network extent. Part of that is the question of attack
surface, per se64. When we count events, we are misleading
ourselves as to whether we are getting better or getting worse. But
does changing the divisor alone really make the correction we
need?
There is a power law here, to be sure. Wikipedia's concise reminder

is that "Power-laws have a well-defined mean only if the exponent
exceeds 2 and have a finite variance only when the exponent
exceeds 3; most identified power laws in nature have exponents
such that the mean is well-defined but the variance is not, implying
they are capable of black swan behaviour". That is our situation
87
cyberspace does not have a well-defined variance for what can go

wrong, and therefore cyberspace is unarguably capable of
black-swan behaviour.
Because the near entirety of commercial Internet usage beyond

HTML v4 relies upon Turing-complete languages, the security of
these services can never be proven because to do so would be to
solve the halting problem65. As such, the pinnacle goal of security
engineering is no silent failure; it is not and cannot be no failure.
For society, then, a state of security is the absence of unmitigatable
surprise, not no surprises but rather no surprises that do not have a
mitigation within reach.
Elroy Dimson famously suggested that the definition of risk is that

"more things can happen than will66" and our rate of growth in
interdependence is absolutely making the number of things that
can happen larger. Unfortunately, complexity prevents us from
counting the number of things that can happen, hence Jardine's
argument that we divide the number of things that did happen by
the number of things that could have happened is correct in spirit
but would be irrelevant if our estimate of the number of things that
could have happened were to be wrong.
Yet if the denominator is the number of things that could have

happened and we severely underestimate that, does not that make
the news even better? Taleb says no emphatically; the fat tails of
power-law distributions enlarge the variance of our estimates,
leading to less frequent but more severe failures. The best one
could say is that most days will be better and better, but some will
be worse than ever. Everything with a power-law underneath has
that property, and cyberspace's interconnectivity and
interdependence are inherently power-law phenomena. Many tech
executives believe Taleb to be correct67.
A fat-tailed setting inherently resists prediction, but for that very

reason makes prediction ever more compelling to pursue. So we
get published predictions. Lots of them. Many of them hedge their
bets by phrasing their prediction as a question, but that only
invokes Betteridge's Law of Headlinesany headline that ends in a
question mark can be answered by the word no.
It is a quandary. Fast change means toolsets for protection always

trail the need unless the need can be forecast. Fast change makes
88
forecasts hard if that fast change is one of adding mechanisms, not

just scale, to the equation. We have both scale, such as an Internet
of Things with a 35 per cent compound annual-growth rate, and
mechanism, such as afterthought interconnection of sundry gizmos
each with new interfaces. And we have a protection deficit as the
curves for data breaches show and the number of security start-
ups corroboratesKleiner Perkins is said to be tracking 1200.
To be deadly serious about cybersecurity requires that either we

damp down the rate of change, slowing it enough to give
prediction operational validity, or that we purposely increase
unpredictability so that the opposition's targeting exercise grows
too hard for them to do. In the former, we give up various sorts of
progress. In the latter, we give up various sorts of freedom as it
would be the machines then in charge, not usthe Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)68 is betting on
increasing unpredictability. Either way, the lessons learned from
the 2008 financial debacle about institutions that were too big to
fail have to be applied to entities that are too connected to fail or
which have too much data to fail.
89
90
Endnotes
91
92
Endnotes
1
See China international reserves and capital flows, 26 February 2016,
p. 5; China, non-gold international reserves (12 month change) minus
merchandise trade surplus (12 month change), Yardeni Report;
http://www.yardeni.com/pub/chinareserves.pdf.
2
Available at http://www.nias.ku.dk/sites/default/files/l_littrup_-
_xi_jinping_interview_and_good_academic_practice.pdf.
3
Snows famous book, Red Star over China, was translated into Chinese as
early as 1938, and he remained in favour with Mao until his death in 1972.
4
Ma Ying-jeous opening remarks at a press conference in Singapore on
7 November 2015.
5
Interview with the author, Morsi administration official, 17 February 2014.
6
See for example Dennis B. Ross, Islamists Are Not Our Friends, The
New York Times, 11 September 2014; and Henry Kissinger, World Order
(New York: Penguin 2014), pp. 121-2.
7
Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernitys
Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
8
For more on the process of Islamist moderation, see Shadi Hamid,
Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle
East (Oxford University Press, 2014).
9
The group is known under various names, including Islamic State in Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS).
10
" ", Youtube clip, 29 December 2013,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFsrJADJkqY.
11
They shall by no means harm you but with a slight evil, Al-Furqan
Media, August 2013; https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/shaykh-
abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-e28098adnc481nc4ab-al-shc481mc4ab-
22they-will-not-harm-you-except-for-some-annoyance22-en.pdf.
12
Andrew F. March and Mara Revkin, Caliphate of Law, Foreign Affairs,
15 April 2015.
93
13
Will McCants, Interview: How ISIS uses and abuses Islam, Vox,
18 November 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/11/18/9755478/isis-
islam.
14
Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, In Rabbik bi-l-Mursad, September 2014;
English translation available at:
https://archive.org/stream/Mirsad_T/English_Translation_djvu.txt.
15
Authors interview with a Muslim Brotherhood official, 9 August 2010.
16
"Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda",
Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland,
April 24, 2007;
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf.
17
Douglas M. McLeod, "Support for the Caliphate and Radical
Mobilization", START Research Brief, January 2008;
http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/research
_briefs/20080131_Caliphate_and_Radicalization.pdf.
18
Giles, K. et al. "The Russian Challenge". Chatham House Report, June
2015. p. 6.
19
Mirkin, Ya. Vneshnaya politika v futlyare ekonomike, Rossiya v
Globalnoi Politike, 13 January 2016,
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Vneshnyaya-politika-v-futlyare-
ekonomiki-17921.
20
Bezrukov, A. Stsenarii trevozhnovo budyshchevo, in Rossiya i mir v
2020. Kontoury trevozhnovo budushchevo. Geopoliticheskii prognoz.
Moscow: Exmo, 2015. p. 8. Bezrukov is an advisor to the president of
Rosneft.
21
Lukyanov, F. Raspad ili pereustroistvo?, Rossiya v Globalnoi Politike,
No.1, Jan-Feb. 2016, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Raspad-ili-
pereustroistvo-17920
22
Karaganov, S. 2015: Global Tendencies and Russian Policies, Russia in
Global Affairs, No.1, 2016. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/2015-
Global-Tendencies-and-Russian-Policies-17976.
23
This has been somewhat offset by the depreciation of the ruble and the
consequent USD/Ruble exchange rate, since production costs are in rubles
and export revenues in USD.
94
24
Connolly, R. Security Above All, Russia in Global Affairs, No.1, 2016,
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Security-Above-All-17981.
25
These include the impact of (either or both) a drop in Chinese energy
consumption and Iranian oil returning to the international market, and
the impact of (either or both) a terrorist attack on a major oil installation
or transit network or the spread of regional conflict in the Middle East
affecting oil supplies.
26
CBR figures taken from Central Bank of Russias Monetary Policy Report.
No.4. Moscow: December 2015.
27
The IMF and OECD broadly concurwith both suggesting a continuing
contraction in 2016 of about -0.5 per cent, followed by 1.0-1.7 per cent
growth in 2017, and the IMF forecasts a growth of 1.5 per cent in 2018.
28
Russian observers have noted that if the 2011 elections had been run
on mixed lines, instead of proportional voting system, URs result would
have been better.
29
This is not to say that it is a viable alternative to the current leadership,
but it is the only party that challenges UR, either winning or coming
second in regional elections, and defeating UR candidates in Novosibirsks
mayoral election in 2014 and for the governorship of Irkutsk in 2015. The
so-called non-systemic non-parliamentary opposition remains divided
among itself and lacking in wider public support.
30
The ONF is a movement established by the leadership to act as an
umbrella organisation that serves to co-opt opposition. The ONF may field
candidates in areas where the UR candidate is unpopular, thus soaking up
opposition.
31
Since a number of the most senior civil servants are in their mid to late
60s, retirements and health problems are likely to feature more
frequently. The death in January 2016 of Igor Sergun, aged 58, is one
example.
32
Norberg, J. Training to Fight. Russias Major Military Exercises 2011-
2014. Stockholm: FOI, December 2015. pp. 61-62.
33
Voennie raskhody v 2016 godu budut umensheny na 5 per cent,
Vedomosti, 19 February 2016. It appears that a 5 per cent cut may be
applied to defence spending in 2016. It is not clear, however, either
whether this will not be replaced from other sources, or that inefficiencies
cannot be removed.
95
34
Group consisting of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council plus Germany.
35
In that regard, see this notable warning from the US Director of
National Intelligence: The time when only a few states had access to the
most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and chemical materials
and technologies, almost always dual-use, move easily in the globalized
economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use
them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuse rapidly around
the globe. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement
for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 February 2015.
36
Numerous incidents involving the theft or sale of radioactive elements
are reported each year. However, setting aside the large number that are
related to fraud, most of the incidents target materials that are only
slightly radioactive (eg natural uranium).
37
See US Code, title 50, chapter 40.
38
In the case of the US for example, see White House, "Cyberspace Policy
Review," 8 May 2009,
www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fina
l.pdf.
39
Ibid.
40
Verizons Data Breach Investigations Report consistently reports that 80
per cent of all breaches are discovered by unrelated third parties, not the
victim.
41
See NSA's "Science of Security" award, accessed at: cps-
vo.org/group/SoS and "T.S. Kuhn Revisited", accessed at:
geer.tinho.net/geer.nsf.6i15.txt.
42
See www.martinhilbert.net/WorldInfoCapacityPPT.html (reflecting
Hilbert & Lopez, Science: v332/n6025/p60-65) extrapolated to 2014 with
concurrence of its author.
43
"Slowing Moore's Law: How It Could Happen", accessed at:
www.gwern.net/Slowing%20Moore's%20Law.
44
D. Knuth, "Structural Programming with GoTo Statements, Computing
Surveys, vol 6. No. 4, December 1974.
96
45
See for example S. Forrest, A. Somayaji & D. Ackley, "Building Diverse
Computer Systems," HotOS-VI, 1997, accessed at:
www.cs.unm.edu/~immsec/publications/hotos-97.pdf.
46
See in Internet Archives, High Integrity Software System Assurance,
section 4.2, accessed at:
hissa.nist.gov/chissa/SEI_Framework/framework_16.html.
47
See for example Dan Farmer's work on the Intelligent Platform
Management Interface. Dan Farmer, "IPMI: Freight Train to Hell v2.01,"
2013, fish2.com/ipmi/itrain.pdf.
48
Dan Geer, "Advanced Persistent Threat," Computerworld, 12 April 2010.
49
Dave Aitel, Founder/CTO, Immunity, Miami, personal communication
with the author.
50
A L. Barabasi and R. Albert, "Emergence of scaling in random networks,"
Science, 15 October 1999, 286 (5439), pp.509-512.
51
S. Gorman, et al., "The Effect of Technology Monocultures on Critical
Infrastructure," 2004, accessed at:
policy.gmu.edu/imp/research/Microsoft_Threat.pdf.
52
Kelly Ziegler, "Grid, PhD the Smart Grid, Cyber Security and the Future
of Keeping the Lights On," USENIX, 2010, accessed at:
static.usenix.org/events/sec10/tech/slides/ziegler.pdf.
53
Mitja Kolsek, ACROS, Slovenia, personal communication with the
author.
54
Trends, HTTP Archive, accessed at: www.httparchive.org/trends.php.
55
"Baidu's traffic hijacked to DDoS GitHub.com", Insight-labs, accessed at:
insight-labs.org/?p=1682.
56
Daniel Bilar et al., "Adversarial Dynamics: The Conficker Case Study",
Springer, 2012.
57
Sandy Clark et al., "The Honeymoon Effect and the Role of Legacy Code
in Zero-Day Vulnerabilities," ACSAC, 2010, accessed at:
www.acsac.org/2010/openconf/modules/request.php?\
module=oc_program&action=view.php&a=&id=69&type=2.
97
58
LANGSEC, See: "The View from the Tower of Babel", accessed at:
langsec.org/.
59
Ken Thompson, "On Trusting Trust," CACM, August 1984, accessed at:
cm.bell- labs.com/who/ken/trust.html.
60
Bruce Schneier, "Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit
Them?", The Atlantic Monthly, April 2015.
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Eric Jardine, "Global Cyberspace is Safer than You Think: Real Trends in
Cybercrime", 2015, accessed at:
www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no16_web_0.pdf.
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Stephen Pinker, "Violence Vanquished", Wall Street Journal, 24
September 2011.
63
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, "On the Super-Additivity and Estimation Biases
of Quantile Contributions", Extreme Working Paper series, 11 November
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The halting problem is a precise formulation in computer science
describing the classes of questions for which the answer is that there is no
answer. If a problem can be shown to be equivalent to the halting
problem, then, like the halting problem, it cannot be answered. These
questions are the computer programming equivalent of saying "I always
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98

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A FORESIGHT PROJECT

2018 Security Outlook

The project and its objectives ........................................................................................................... 1

Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 3

Chapter 1 Chinas dangerous years ahead .................................................................................. 11

Chapter 3 Russian futures to 2018 ............................................................................................. 41

Chapter 5 State power and cyber power ...................................................................................... 73

The project and its objectives

Academic Outreach at CSIS

Canadas human intelligence agency, the Canadian Security

The Academic Outreach program ran a multi-part foresight

The result is this report. Through the examination of a broad range

Both China and Russia have leaders with aggressive foreign

Conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen will continue.

The development and use of weapons of mass destruction

North Korea as a developer of nuclear weapons and

The potential for the Internet and cyber technology to be a

cyber threats will continue to be a major preoccupation for

US foreign policy continues to have much influence on the

President Xi Jinping has reversed elements of Chinas collective

Xi has asserted the importance of one supreme, visionary

The transition to an economy led by domestic consumer

Chinas policy of confrontation in the South China Sea is

potential for conflict, possibly stimulated by an

The Middle Easts political fabric

Instability in the Middle East has been driven by the unresolved

The coup in Egypt which removed the Muslim Brotherhood

In Egypt and some other Muslim-majority countries, Islam

ISIL has taken territory, declared the establishment of a

Predictable Russian unpredictability

Russia is handicapped by poor economic performance but there is

Western assessments that Russia is vulnerable to economic

Russia sees itself as surrounded by an arc of instability and

Two trends should be emphasized. First, Russia is not

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The risk of the use of WMDs, or of a significant increase in

International trade, the movement of populations and

related mechanisms. The urge to acquire WMDs will

Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Russia

Some non-state actors may use drones to deploy their

Cyber-insecurity will remain a major threat to states, private sector

The continued use of commercial technology means that

The proliferation of devices with embedded systemsthe

The state use of cyber-attack weapons will not be

Considered from the perspective of the topics covered in this

Chinas dangerous years ahead

Chapter 1 Chinas dangerous years ahead

During the Deng Xiaoping era, adaptation and reform, either in

An upheaval from below, following a visible loss of regime

Major trends impacting the Chinese political scene that could

A reversal of fortune for Chinas economy

This author belongs to the school that believes international

These are now impacting the aura of management invincibility that

There is no rational explanation for this, but two psychological

A major international test over Chinas assertiveness in the East and

This situation is full of immediate dangers. First, the applicability of

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, US strategy in the

A political challenge from within the regime

Xi Jinping seems to believe that tightening all screwsfrom media

as a tool for control, minute prescriptions to change rules that are

The mix is dangerous. In one top-level Chinese experts views, Xi

The psychological risk from absolute power is very real. Xi has

Economy on the skids and the consequences