SEC 36 TESTIMONY GENERALLY CONFINED TO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; HEARSAY EXCLUDED
JOSE ESPINELI VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence teaches us that "for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent x x x." Thus, conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person
FACTS
On June 24, 1997, an Information charging petitioner with the crime
of
murder was filed before the RTC. The facts show that in the early
evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto
Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator
of the radio
station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body
in front of his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who
immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the NBI
arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the
group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital information
regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial
(NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and
reduced his statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed that on
December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes (Paredes)
board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite,
respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon. Subsequently, Reyes posted bail
and was released. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again
heard of.
NBI Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
The victims widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) testified that Reyes
asked financial help so he could transfer his family to the province
and protect them from any untoward consequence that may result
from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death of
Sabinas husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00
and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection
program. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that
he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his
residence which he later identified the said car from the photographs
presented to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer
who conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in
his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds
in the head and body. He also stated that based on the size of the
gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered
guns were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his
defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of
court.
The trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder. CA found
petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder. It ratiocinated
that since none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of
the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength cannot be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve
as an aggravating circumstance as the time of the commission of the
crime was not even alleged in the Information.
MR DENIED.
Petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the
alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that
the said sworn statement should not have been given probative value
because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the
affiant.
ISSUE
WON the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Truly, direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only
basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt. The rules of
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence
established. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the
offender if i) there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts
from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with one another,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided
that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual
killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render
their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as
sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. The
central issue now confronting this Court is whether the prosecution
has amply proved by circumstantial evidence petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in
part on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it
is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a
statement made by another person given for the purpose of
establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of
the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact
that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply
and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as
to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is
known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while
he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes)
heard petitioner telling Sotero Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas
yang si Berbon and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero)
armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before
boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is
considering that NBI Agent Segunials testimony was not presented
to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of
establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn
statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the
offer of the witness oral testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial
himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the
truthfulness of Reyes statement. Verily then, what the prosecution
sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of
facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the
nature of an independently relevant statement where what is
relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth
and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of
the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not
apply. Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized
document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due
execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to
Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez
v. Mendoza-Plaza, a notarized document enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, no clear and
convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such
presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation
of Reyes sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by
Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he
had sold to Sotero in September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove
that it was the very same red car used in the killing of Alberto on
December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the
gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was
identified as the same car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-
mortem examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the
victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were
caused by high-powered guns, served as corroborative evidence and
contributed in a significant way in establishing the level of proof that
the law requires in convicting petitioner. Lastly, petitioners escape
from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was pending can
also be considered as another circumstance since it is a strong
indication of his guilt.
Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together,
constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the
conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the
victim.
Besides, it is [a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the
trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect.
JALLALUDIN ABDULRAHMAN GULAM VS SPOUSES
CATALINO and RICARDA SANTOS
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Petitioner and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell on January
1994, whereby the latter agreed to sell to petitioner a 72-square
meter parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila, for the price of
P1,700,000.00, including a 2 storey townhouse to be constructed by
respondents on the property. A final deed of sale shall be executed by
respondents upon full payment of the contract price, with petitioner
bearing the costs of the taxes. Written on the contract is the note:
Received the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos only
(P500,000.00) representing Partial Payment of Full Downpayment.
Two years after the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner filed
against respondents an action for Specific Performance, asking the
RTC to order respondents to execute a final deed of sale, plus
damages and costs. Petitioner contended that he already fulfilled his
end of the bargain by paying the stipulated amount, including the
taxes, or a total of P2,050,000.00.
Respondents denied petitioners allegations, claiming that petitioner
is yet to fully pay the agreed price, having paid only P1,000,000.00,
exclusive of the P50,000.00 reservation fee. According to
respondents, petitioner paid P500,000.00 upon the execution of the
Contract to Sell, as acknowledged in the Contract to Sell, and
another P500,000,00 in two separate payments made in March 1994.
Thus, respondents set up a counter-claim by asking for the rescission
of the contract due to petitioners refusal to abide by its terms.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and ordering
the rescission of the Contract to Sell. The amount of P1,100,000.00,
the amount admitted by the defendant to have been paid by the
plaintiffs and received by herein defendant is hereby declared as
forfeited in favor of the defendants to be applied as rental of the
house from June of 1994 up to the time of rendition of judgment and
the payment of P20,000.00 a month from the time of rendition of the
judgment until the plaintiff and all persons claiming rights under him
shall have finally vacated the premises, and to pay the amount of
P200,000.00 by way of attorneys fees for unjustly refusing to
comply with their obligation in bad faith thus forcing the defendants
to litigate this matter in court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed
the RTC Decision
ISSUE
WON the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing petitioners complaint
and ordering the rescission of the Contract to Sell.
WON the trial court gravely erred in holding that plaintiff Mr. Gulam
did not or was incompetent to testify on due execution of the receipt
in the contract to sell, Norhaya, the plaintiffs wife
should have been asked instead since she would be competent on this
matter but the issue on said receipt on the contract to sell was instead
avoided on direct examination, Mr. Gulam was also declared
incompetent to testify on the march 9, 1994 receipt for the amount of
p500,000.00 since it was Norhaya who made the
payment thereof, Mr Gulam cannot testify on the due execution of
said receipt.
RULING
The RTC ruled that petitioner cannot testify on the alleged receipt of
these contested amounts as he was not present during the time that it
was made, since according to petitioner himself, it was his wife
Norhaya who allegedly made the payments. The RTC, meanwhile,
gave credence to respondents claim that petitioner is yet to pay the
full amount of the purchase price, relying on the two letters sent by
petitioners wife Norhaya to Santos admitting that the amount of
P1,100,000.00 has already been given to respondents, and a balance
of P446,036.00 in the purchase price remains, exclusive of the cost
of labor and improvements, and which Norhaya seeks to reimburse
from respondents. The CA sustained the RTCs findings, stating that
the receipt dated March 9, 1994 is a forgery. It also ruled that
respondents are entitled to a rescission of the Contract to sell as
petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the contract.
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in holding that his testimony with
regard to the payments made by his wife was hearsay. Petitioner
argues that the purpose of such testimony was merely to establish the
fact that such statement was made.
It is a hornbook doctrine of evidence that a witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which
means those facts which are derived from his perception. A
witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others
either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is
based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability
of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under
oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity, and
articulateness of the out of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
True, petitioners statements may be considered as independently
relevant statements and may be admissible not as to the veracity
thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered. However,
the admissibility of his testimony to such effect should not be
equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency
to convince and persuade.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA refused to give credence to
petitioners testimony, and the Court finds no reason to doubt the
assessments made by both courts. Even assuming that his wife,
indeed, told him that payments were made on these dates, still, it
does not follow that it is sufficient proof to establish his claim of
overpayment. These should be weighed vis--vis the other evidence on
record, which, as appraised by the RTC and the CA, do not support
petitioners claim.
Although Norhaya testified, she did not, however, give any credible
testimony regarding these alleged payments. In fact, Norhaya failed
to testify on the alleged separate payment made in the amount of
P500,000.00, which was annotated on the Contract to Sell.
LEODEGARIO BAYANI VS PEOPLE
FACTS
Bayani was charged with violation of BP 22. It was alleged that he
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out a check
dated August 26, 1992, in the amount of P10,000.00 drawn against
the PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, Quezon, payable to Cash and give
the said check to one Dolores Evangelista knowing fully well that it
had no sufficient balance. Petitioner was convicted by RTC.
Evangelista alleged that he had 2 confrontations with Bayani and a
certain Alicia Rubia, and all what the accused Leodegario Bayani
could say were flat denials of having talked with, or otherwise met
Evangelista, regarding the latters claim of payment of the value of
Check, admittedly from the check booklet of the said accused Bayani
issued by PS Bank, Candelaria Branch. CA affirmed in toto RTCs
decision.
ISSUE
The court of appeals erred in refusing to acquit the accused despite
the conviction of the trial court is utterly based on hearsay evidence
RULING
The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioners conviction by the
RTC.
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He
argues that the evidence
pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on
hearsay evidence, to wit:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the
witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the
latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.
In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was
approached by Alicia Rubia who told her that she was requested by
petitioner to have the check exchanged for cash, as he needed money
badly.
Obviously, Evangelistas testimony is hearsay since she had no
personal knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested
Rubia to have the check exchanged for cash, as she was not
personally present when petitioner supposedly made this request.
What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not
derived from her own perception but from Rubias.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of
Evangelistas testimony even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial court shall not
consider any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section 35
of the same Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness,
the offer must be made at the time the witness is asked to testify. And
under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the ground therefor becomes reasonably
apparent. Thus, it has been held that in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, the evidence offered
may be admitted. Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelistas testimony was timely made from the time her
testimony was offered and up to the time her direct examination was
conducted
then petitioner has effectively waived any objection to the
admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony
excluded for being hearsay has no ground to stand on. While
Evangelistas statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not
necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary
weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. In this regard, it has been held that although
hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection
by the adverse partys counsel, it is nonetheless without
probative value, unless the proponent can show that the evidence
falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule. In this
case, Evangelistas testimony may be considered as an
independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay
rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent
of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been
made is relevant. When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it
was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash,
Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It
does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubias statement since it
is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to
such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such
independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary,
because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2)
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Indeed,
independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelistas statement is
relevant to the issues of petitioners falsehood, his authorship of
the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the
offense charged. In any event, petitioners conviction did not rest
solely on Evangelistas testimony. There are other pieces of
evidence on record that established his guilt, to wit: the subject
check was included in the booklet of checks issued by the PS
Bank to petitioner; the subject check was made to apply to the
account of petitioner whose name appears on the upper portion
of the said check; and most telling is that petitioner never
categorically denied that the signature appearing on the check
was his.
Neither did petitioner claim that the signature was a forgery. All
these pieces of evidence, taken together, inevitably support the
finding of petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.
LEAMER INDUSTRIES INC VS MALAYA INSURANCE CO.
INC.
FACTS
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer
Industries, Inc., for the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand
valued at P565, 000. Consigned to Vulcan Industrial and Mining
Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to
Manila. On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board
Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer. During the voyage, the vessel
sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the
lost cargo. To recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its right
of subrogation, Malayan demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer,
which refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a
Complaint with the RTC of Manila for the collection the amount that
respondent had paid Vulcan. The trial court dismissed the Complaint,
upon finding that the cause of the loss was a fortuitous event. The
RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of the bad weather
condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. CA reversed the RTC
decision. The CA held that the vessel was not seaworthy when it
sailed for Manila. Thus, the loss of the cargo was occasioned by
petitioners fault, not by a fortuitous event.
ISSUE
Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez,
who had not been presented as a witness of the said report during the
trial of this case before the lower court can be admitted in evidence
to prove the alleged facts cited in the said report.
RULING
Petitioner claims that the Survey Report prepared by Jesus Cortez,
the cargo surveyor, should not have been admitted in evidence. The
Court partly agrees. Because he did not testify during the trial,
then the Report that he had prepared was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents.
The Survey Report Not the Sole Evidence
The facts reveal that Cortezs Survey Report was used in the
testimonies of respondents witnesses -- Charlie M. Soriano; and
Federico S. Manlapig, a cargo marine surveyor and the vice-
president of Toplis and Harding Company. Soriano testified that the
Survey Report had been used in preparing the final Adjustment
Report conducted by their company. The final Report showed that
the barge was not seaworthy because of the existence of the holes.
Manlapig testified that he had prepared that Report after taking into
account the findings of the surveyor, as well as the pictures and the
sketches of the place where the sinking occurred. Evidently, the
existence of the holes was proved by the testimonies of the
witnesses, not merely by Cortez Survey Report.
Rule on Independently Relevant Statement
That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, and
that their testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is
required by the rules on evidence, from which we quote:
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus
Cortezs Affidavit, which respondent had offered as evidence.
Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a
witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay. An exception to the
foregoing rule is that on independently relevant statements. A
report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove
the tenor, not the truth, of the statements. Independent of the truth
or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has
been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply. In the
instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was
admitted only as part of the testimonies of respondents witnesses.
The referral to Cortezs Report was in relation to Manlapigs final
Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey
Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part
of the testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the
trial court. At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner
has already failed to overcome the presumption* of fault that
applies to common carriers.
*common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
their vigilance over the goods entrusted to them, as required by the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy.
Consequently, the law presumes that common carriers are at fault or
negligent for any loss or damage to the goods that they transport.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
SEC 37 DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE VS GERARDO DE LAS ERAS Y ZAFRA
FACTS
An information was filed charging Gerardo de las eras with the crime
of murder alleging that he hit a certain Ursula Calimbo, a defenseless
woman, on the head and other vital parts of her body, thereby
causing her immediate death. It was alleged that Gerome Diola saw
accused Gerardo de las Eras (aka Gerry) within the vicinity of the
house of Ursula Calimbo (then 73 years old). Gerome knew accused
de las Eras since childhood. They had a short conversation, then
parted ways. When asked by Diola during the brief
and chance meeting as to his destination, de las Eras seemed unable
to give a definite answer as he was giving two different destinations:
first, that he was on his way to his brothers house; and on the
second, to the bakery of Delfina Boot, as if he were up for some
mischief Shortly after that chance meeting, Gerome learned that
Ursula Calimbo had been struck to death.
Hilaria Calimbo Binatero (Ellen), daughter of Ursula, testified that
she lived next door to her mother, their houses separated only by a
fence. In the evening of February 17, 1992, she was cooking in her
house when she heard her mother cry for help, Ellen, tabangin ko
(Ellen, please help me). She rushed to her mother and found her
bloodied near the main door. She asked her what happened and who
was responsible for her condition. Her mother replied, Gerry.
Ellen testified that on February 10, 1992, she saw accused de las
Eras hiding behind the fence of her mothers house, looking
particularly at the back of the house near the kitchen and the comfort
room. On February 12, 1992, her mother received a pension of P3,
000.00. On February 14, 1992, someone stole the money. Her mother
suspected accused de las Eras as the culprit.
Luisito Redulla testified that he rushed to the scene of the crime
when he heard Ellen (daughter) cry for help. He went to the victim
and asked what happened to her and who was responsible, and she
answered Gerry, the son of Pepe and Corning struck her (gibunalan
siya). Incidentally, accused Gerardo de las Eras parents are Felipe,
nicknamed Pepe, and Cornelia Zafra de las Eras. Luisito Redulla was
the arresting officer when, in 1989, accused Gerry de las Eras was
charged with theft.
Hilaria immediately rushed Ursula to the hospital, but after one hour,
she died.
In his defense, accused Gerardo de las Eras invoked denial and alibi.
Early in the evening of February 17, 1992, he accompanied Dedec
Carnecer to have a battery recharged, and after which, he went
directly to his grandmother to buy cigarettes and to have supper. His
grandmothers house was about one hundred (100) meters away from
the house of the victim.
RTC found Gerry guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in relying heavily on the dying declaration
of the deceased and other circumstantial evidence.
RULING
NO.
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused if the
following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence
must form an unbroken chain showing beyond reasonable doubt
the culpability of the accused.
The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to
her death constitutes evidence of the highest order of the cause of
her death and of the identity of the assailant. Under the Revised
Rules on Evidence, a dying declaration is admissible provided the
following requisites are present: (1) the statement concerns the crime
and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (2) at the
time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) the declarant would have been competent as a
witness had he survived; and (4) the declaration was offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the
declarant was the victim. When asked by her daughter Hilaria
Binatero and policeman Luisito Redulla, the victim pointed to
accused-appellant Gerry de las Eras as her assailant. This
qualifies as a dying declaration.
Denial and alibi are weak defenses and cannot overturn the positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses of the assailant, more so
when there are material inconsistencies in the testimony of the
accused denying his participation in the crime. In this case, accused
appellant gave different responses as to his whereabouts when the
crime was committed.
Accused-appellants defense of denial and alibi is further weakened
by the fact that he escaped from detention on May 23, 1992, before
his arraignment. On January 21, 1995, he was re-arrested and
detained at the Bohol Detention and Rehabilitation Center (BDRC)
for another crime. On June 7, 1997, during the trial of this case,
accused-appellant again escaped from the guard on duty. On
December 17, 1997, he was apprehended again. Such escapade is
akin to flight before arrest in the commission of a crime, which is
an indication of guilt. However, there was no eyewitness showing
how the assailant attacked the victim. Without any particulars as to
the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act
which resulted in the victims death unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated. In the absence of specific evidence proving the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength,
absorbed therein, the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
PEOPLE VS RAMIL PEA
FACTS
Accused-appellant Ramil Pea was charged with murder. In the early
morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo
Pelagio, a tricycle driver working the night shift, to take him to Paco,
Obando, Bulacan. When they reached their destination, he ordered
Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant robbed
Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head with a
gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant shot
him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the
Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that a man had been shot on
the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta.
Ana rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying
on a stretcher. SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a
question and answer method, which he took down on two sheets of
yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed his
thumbmark on both sheets. In his statement, Pelagio related how
accused-appellant inflicted his injuries on him.
The owner of the tricycle, Wilfredo Lampa proceeded to the
hospital wherein Pelagio told him that it was accused-appellant who
shot him and took away his tricycle. Francisca Pelagio, Jimbo
Pelagios mother, also rushed to the hospital. Upon advice of the
doctors, Francisca brought her son to the Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital. On February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired.
For his part, accused-appellant claimed that he was in San Isidro, San
Luis, Pampanga together with his wife on the date of the incident. He
went into hiding in the house of his uncle, Maximiano Guevarra, for
nine (9) months because he allegedly killed a certain Roger
Wininsala. He came to know that he was being accused of the
murder of Pelagio, whom he did not know, only while he was in
detention on a drug charge. Accused-appellants testimony was
corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra.
RTC rendered a decision convicting Pea guilty of murder. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the victims declaration
can be considered as part of the res gestae, hence, an exception to the
hearsay rule
RULING
The trial court ruled that Pelagios statement was a dying declaration
since it was uttered at the point of death and with consciousness of
that fact due to the serious nature of his wounds. Thus, it admitted
Pelagios statement in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have
already been established in a long line of cases. An ante-mortem
statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1)
at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the
declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the
declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to testify
to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered
in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the
inquiry.
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not
established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement
with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain
when he made his statement, he expressly stated that accused-
appellant only pistol whipped him and almost shot him. The
significance of a victims realization or consciousness that he was on
the brink of death cannot be gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement
is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death,
all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. The utterance of a
victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be
considered the incident speaking through the victim. It is entitled
to the highest credence. Granting that Pelagio, after giving his
statement, later on realized that he was dying, his statement still
cannot be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to
consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement
was made and the moment of the realization of death. The time the
statement was being made must also be the time the victim was
aware that he was dying. While it may not qualify as a dying
declaration, Pelagios statement may nonetheless be admitted in
evidence as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is
deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it
was made shortly after a startling occurrence and under the influence
thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand. In this case, it is
clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of Pelagio
qualified as a startling occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly
complained of pain in his head while his statement was being taken
by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there was no opportunity for him
to be able to devise or contrive anything other than what really
happened.
Even if there were intervening periods between the time the victim
gave his account of the incident to the prosecution witnesses and the
time the latter first disclosed what the victim told them, the same will
not affect the admissibility of the victims declaration or statement as
part of res gestae since it is sufficient that such declaration or
statement was made by the victim before he had time to contrive or
devise a falsehood.
However, this Court cannot agree with the trial court that the crime
should be murder. While evident premeditation and treachery were
alleged in the information, the trial court did not state why the killing
was qualified to murder. The prosecution failed to establish the
attendance of the qualifying circumstances with concrete proof. The
crime proved was only homicide.
PEOPLE VS PO3 AKIB NORRUDIN
FACTS
An information was filed charging accused appellant with the crime
of murder.
PO2 Carias testified that in the evening of July 7, 1995, he reported
for work at the Surigao City Police Station. He saw the accused-
appellant at the police station although the latter was already off-
duty. The accused-appellant was wearing civilian clothes and had his
firearm tucked at the side of his waist.
Carias, Morales and the accused-appellant went to Barangay Lipata
to inspect the police team assigned there. In Barangay Lipata, they
had some drinks with a friend until about 12:30 a.m. of July 8, 1995.
Thereafter, Morales, Carias and the accused appellant returned to
Surigao City. Upon reaching the city, the accused-appellant, who
was already drunk by then, got off in front of Casa Blanca, a pension
house, restaurant and videoke bar located at Narciso Street. Carias
and the others then returned to the police station as it was still their
duty. At around 2:00 a.m., while Deguino was at the police station,
he received a radio communication requesting police officers to
proceed to Casa Blanca in connection with a shooting incident which
had just occurred therein.
Kit Aguilar, a GRO testified that prior to the occurrence of the
shooting incident at Casa Blanca, she and a certain Maritess, a fellow
GRO, were entertaining a customer named Vidal Avila, Jr. The
following day, July 8, 1995, the accused appellant arrived at Casa
Blanca. Maritess, rose to meet him, as he was her live-in boyfriend.
Maritess and the accused-appellant sat at another table and ordered
beer. Not long after that, they started arguing and the accused-
appellant began shouting at Maritess, which continued even outside
the establishment. Later, after Avila, Jr. went outside. Aguilar looked
through the restaurants window and saw that Avila, Jr. turned right to
Narciso Street. Shortly afterwards, she heard a gunshot. Maritess
then went back inside the restaurant. Aguilar asked Maritess if she
knew anything about the gunshot which was fired earlier. Maritess
replied that it was her boyfriend, the accused-appellant, who fired the
shot. Subsequently, accused-appellant also went back inside Casa
Blanca, finished his drink and left the restaurant with Maritess.
Dorothy Rivera, the owner of Casa Blanca, corroborated Aguilars
testimony.
For his part, Ramil Llorado testified that he and his friends were
drinking when they heard a gunshot. Subsequently, Avila asked them
for help. Llorado recognized the man as Vidal Avila, Jr., an
employee in the Office of the City Engineer of Surigao City. They
reported the incident to the desk officer and requested for assistance.
On the way to hospital, Llorado asked Avila who shot him. Avila, Jr.
replied in a weak voice that a policeman shot him. Llorado was
shocked upon hearing Avila, Jr.s answer, but since they were inside a
police car at that time together with some policemen, he refrained
from further asking questions.
PO3 Deguino went to Casa Blanca were several witnesses told
him that the assailant was a fellow police officer. PO2 Carias
later told him that he dropped the accused off at Casa Blanca
and that he was already drunk. At the hospital, he asked Avila,
Jr if he recognized the person who shot him and whether or not
it was AKIB (accused) to which he responded, yes. The victim
was so weak that Deguino had to repeat the questions several
times. A laboratory technician in the PNP Crime Laboratory in CDO
also testified that the accused-appellants right hand tested positive
for gunpowder residue. Leva, another policeman, testified that he
went to Akibs house. Leva and Deguino went in and the accused
appellant surrendered to them.
DAMI TESTIMONIES. SHET
Accused appellant denied the allegations. He said that after their
inspection he insisted on going home, that when he got home, went
straight to bed. Also, he argued that this fellow police men picked
him up and went to station and told him that shot a man dead at Casa
Blanca. The accused-appellant said he was stunned by Levas
statement since he had nothing to do with the incident. The accused-
appellant also denied that Maritess, the GRO from Casa Blanca, is
his girlfriend. He maintained that he does not know the woman and
he has not gone inside the said restaurant.
RTC found him guilty.
ISSUE
WON the dying declaration was admissible
RULING
Court affirmed RTC decision.
Although Avila, Jr. did not expressly state that he was dying when he
made the declaration, the circumstances surrounding such
declaration show that the same was uttered by him under the
consciousness of impending death. It has been held in a number of
cases that even if a declarant did not make a statement that he was on
the brink of death, a dying declaration may be admissible if there are
circumstances from which it may be inferred with certainty that such
was his state of mind.
A dying declaration made in the form of answers to questions put by
the person to whom the declaration is made is admissible in court,
and may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard the
same or to whom it was made. Thus, the trial court did not err in
admitting the following testimony of Deguino in whose presence
Avila, Jr. made the dying declaration.
In addition to the dying declaration of the victim, there are several
circumstances which, taken together, indubitably point to the guilt of
accused-appellant. The Court has previously held that circumstantial
evidence will suffice to support a conviction where (1) there is more
than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is sufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In
other words, when the circumstantial evidence is not only consistent
with guilt but also inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is innocent and with every other reasonable hypothesis except guilt.
The accused-appellants alibi cannot prevail over the direct and
circumstantial evidence
against him, especially considering that it was not physically
impossible for him to be at Casa Blanca in the early morning of July
8, 1995.
SEC 38 DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
ALEJANDRA LAZARO VS MODESTA AGUSTIN, ET AL
FACTS
The petitioners (plaintiff) filed a complaint against the respondent
(defendant) for claiming as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land
Lot No. 10676. Alleging the following:
a. that Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, who are
the children of Simeon Santos, consented that the parcel of land of
this complaint be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the
eldest and so Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of
Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was agreed among them
that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is
the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as embodied
in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa Santos;
b. that without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title
of the lot with Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 was transferred
into another title which is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
20695 in the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia
Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and
Bienvenido Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-
Agustin who
c. that during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff
Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that
the transfer of the title in the name of Basilisa Santos into the names
of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely and
exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but
Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her
recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and
Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each
get one fourth () share of the lot;
The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be
given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she
purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property
with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant
was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements
made in her affidavit were hearsay. The RTC affirmed the decision
with modification. The CA affirmed also the decision of MTCC with
modification.
Issue:
Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa S. Agustin is a
declaration against interest which establishes the co-ownership of lot
no. 10676 by and among the petitioners and respondents.
Ruling:
No. At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners
to argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration
against interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it
is an admission against interest. Admissions against interest are
those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or
identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible
whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person
who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are
secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents'
predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal
interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly
executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have
in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a
public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The
presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular.
Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by
law to notarized documents. While indeed, a notarized document
enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption cannot be
made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings
below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly
questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed,
as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the
improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the
physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned
document was supposedly executed.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. In the instant case, the notary public should
have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of
the person executing the said sworn statement. However, the notary
public did not comply with this requirement.
DANILO L. PAREL v SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO
Doctrine: It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to
himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs. A declaration
against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute.
Facts:
Respondent, Simeon Prudencio, filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC
of baguio for the residential building to which the petitioner was
residing. The respondent alleged that he was the sole owner of the
subject house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation,
Baguio City. That he merely allowed petitioner and his parents to
live in the said building (2nd floor) when it was constructed (1975)
out of sheer magnanimity as petitioners parents have no house of
their own and since respondents wife is the older sister of Florentino,
petitioners father. In November 1985, respondent wrote a notice to
Florentino to vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement and needed the place, the petitioners parents heeded the
notice when they migrated to the US. However, without respondents
knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took
possession of the ground floor of the residential house.
Petitioner refuse to vacate the house and in his answer with
counterclaim he claims that his parents are co-owners of the
residential house (upper story belongs to the respondent, ground
floor to his parents). he is occupying the ground floor upon the
instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondents full
knowledge; his parents spent their own resources in improving and
constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the late
Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands and
as a co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the
demand to vacate was respondents attempt to deprive petitioners
parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that respondent
had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them
involving the subject house which were all dismissed. Petitioner
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and
attorneys fees.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and found that the
petitioners father and respondent were co-owners of the subject
property. Aggrieved, respondent appealed with the CA and the
decision was reversed in favor of respondent declaring him to be the
sole owner of the property. The CA found the affidavit dated
September 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioners father, stating that he
is not the owner of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive
proof of respondents sole ownership of the subject house as it is a
declaration made by Florentino against his interest. It also found the
tax declarations and official receipts representing payments of real
estate taxes of the questioned property covering the period 1974 to
1992 sufficient to establish respondents case which constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the 2
storey residential house.
HELD:
YES. The court agreed with the ruling of the CA by virtue of
the affidavit presented by the respondent which executed and sworn
to by Florentino on Sept 24, 1973 which had a statement that he is
not the owner of the subject property but merely its occupant. The
affidavit also states that the property is owned by respondent and that
Florentino is merely filing the tax declaration for respondent. Such
affidavit was deemed to be a declaration against interest, Rule 131
Sec. 38.
The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts
facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. The
affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioners father and had
adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his
statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that
while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the
owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in
Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to
himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs. A declaration
against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute.
PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS v CA
DOCTRINE: Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay
rule by invoking the exception under the declaration-against-
interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by
Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his
interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to
acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a
statement contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying
the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak
and to act for the President of the Republic can hardly be
considered as a declaration against interest.
FACTS:
Petitioner, thru Teodoro Locsin Sr. filed a case for annulment
of sale of its building, lot and printing machineries during the regime
of Martial law to private respondent, Liwayway Publishing, then
represented by late B/Gen. Menzi. Petitioner contends that there was
vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price during its
sale on Oct. 23, 1973. The RTC dismissed the petition. On appeal to
the CA, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court
hence this current petition.
One of the arguments of petitioner was that the onset of the
Martial Law should be considered as a force majeure which would
toll the prescriptive period set forth by law. This would have an
effect of counting the prescriptive period not from the execution of
the sale, 1973, but on the end of Martial Law, 1986, thus moving the
prescription period from late 1977 to late 1990 (4-year prescriptive
period)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that petitioners contention that
by reason of the Martial law they were unable to institute the
foregoing action. The Court can grant that Mr. Locsin, Sr. and
petitioner were, in the context of DBP and Tan, true oppositionists
during the period of material law. Petitioner, however, has failed to
convincingly prove that Mr. Locsin, Sr., as its then President, and/or
its governing board,
were so circumstanced that it was well-nigh impossible for him/them
to successfully institute an action during the martial law years.
Petitioner cannot plausibly feign ignorance of the fact that shortly
after his arrest in the evening of September 20, 1972, Mr. Locsin, Sr.,
together with several other journalists, dared to file suits against
powerful figures of the dictatorial regime and veritably challenged
the legality of the declaration of martial law. Docketed in this Court
as GR No. L-35538, the case, after its consolidation with eight (8)
other petitions against the martial law regime, is now memorialized
in books of
jurisprudence and cited in legal publications and case studies as
Aquino vs. Enrile.
Incidentally, Mr. Locsin Sr., as gathered from the ponencia
of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal in Aquino, was released
from detention notwithstanding his refusal to withdraw from his
petition in said case. Judging from the actuations of Mr. Locsin, Sr.
during the onset of martial law regime and immediately thereafter,
any suggestion that intimidation or duress forcibly stayed his hands
during the dark days of martial law to seek judicial assistance must
be rejected.
Evid part: The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the
testimonies of Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the
Locsins, collectively), which, in gist, established the following facts:
1) the widely circulated Free Press magazine, which, prior to the
declaration of Martial Law, took the strongest critical stand against
the Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such
declaration, which closure eventually drove petitioner to financial
ruin; 2) upon Marcos orders, Mr. Locsin, Sr. was arrested and
detained for over 2 months without charges and, together with his
family, was threatened with execution; 3) Mr. Locsin, Sr. was
provisionally released on the condition that he refrains from
reopening Free Press and writing anything critical of the Marcos
administration; and 4) Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained
fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
Per the Locsins, it was amidst the foregoing circumstances
that petitioners property in question was sold to private respondent,
represented by Gen. Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly applied
the squeeze on Mr. Locsin, Sr. thru the medium of the Marcos cannot
be denied and [you] have no choice but to sell line.
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a
testimony is hearsay if offered against a party who has no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is
excluded precisely because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons
to whom the statements or writings are attributed. One of its
exception is declaration against interest (sec. 38)
However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzis
supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that he was acting for
the late President Marcos when he purportedly coerced Mr.
Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we are loathed to give it
the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us. For,
the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses.
They are likely to gain the most from the annulment of the subject
contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like
fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid
lightly at the door of men whose lips had been sealed by death.
The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to
those acts which he knows of his own knowledge. There can be no
quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify respecting
what President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the acquisition
of petitioners newspaper, if any there be, precisely because none
of said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear what the two
talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by
invoking the exception under the declaration-against-interest
rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by Gen.
Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest
could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to acquire
the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement
contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion
that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for
the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a
declaration against interest.
SEC. 38 ACT OR DECLARATION REGARDING PEDIGREE
ROSENDO HERRERA v RESNDO ALBA
DOCTRINE: So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence
seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to
incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that
sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited
to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-
paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.
FACTS:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba
filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to
recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied
Armis allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the
parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish
whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo
Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he
claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread
acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in
court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right
against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Herreras contention is correct.
HELD:
No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe
Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines
and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is
already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as
admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the
decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA
analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining
the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,
courts should consider, among other things, the following data:
1. how the samples were collected,
2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the
samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a
doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by
courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More
specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to
peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread
acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation
cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must
state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is
the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or
higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in
the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It
does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged
father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child
(Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which
can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than
99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA
testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination. The
right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from
his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial
compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he
cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts
are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a
case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under
Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a
good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling
the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a fathers operation, or a marriage contract where
the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family
pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit
evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone.
However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of
paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although
inconclusive on paternity.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now
asked whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove
paternity.
N.B.: the case is about DNA test results admissibility as evidence
and its probative value. Since scientific progress makes it possible to
know ones filiation, evidence regarding ones pedigree need not be
limited to incriminating acts alone.
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ AQUINO v RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA in his capacity
as Civil Registrar of Antipolo City
DOCTRINE: In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the
earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have
been made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime,
and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for
several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique
died on September 4, 2005
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, Jenie (21) lived together with
Christian (19) as husband and wife without benefit of marriage. They
resided at Dominiques parents. On Sept 4, 2005 Dominique died. 2
months later, on Nov. 2, 2005, Jenie gave birth to her herein co-
petitioner minor child, Christial Dela Cruz Aquino.
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because
the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the
Father, Christian Dominique Sto Tomas Aquino, (AUSF) entitled
"Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased
father, and because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held
that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the
deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a
recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her
father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten
instrument. Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that
there must be a signature by the putative father in the private
handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the
lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,
it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier
quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been
made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant
facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie
were living together as common-law spouses for several months
in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,
Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie
gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of
Jenie is Dominiques.
TECSON v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DOCTRINE: For the rule (sec. 39 rule 130) to apply, it would be
necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy
has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
FACTS:
Is Fernando Poe, Jr.(Ronal Allan Kelly Poe, aka FPJ), the
hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the
presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in
the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented
material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that
he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being
foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a
Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue
on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11
April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by
adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship - Section 1, Article III, 1935
Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Under the 1973 constitution, it provides:
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso
in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is considered to be a natural-born
Filipino Citizen and is thus eligible to run for the highest position of
our country
HELD:
Yes. The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among the
citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather
Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified
as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to
be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship
would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to
Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue
of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate.
The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only
before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by
the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a)
the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree
of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative
of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must
be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as
Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and
his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one
family
SEC. 40 FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION
REGARDING PEDIGREE
PEOPLE v DOMINGO GALANO y JARANILLA
DOCTRINE: Crim: To convict an accused charged with
qualified rape instead of rape in its simple form not only
condemns the accused to a more serious offense but also exposes
him to an even greater liability. As such, the State is mandated to
sufficiently allege in the information and to competently prove
during trial the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship with the same certainty as the crime itself
Evid: BBB, who was AAAs aunt, was qualified to testify on
AAAs pedigree, like her age and her date of birth. Sec. 40 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court expressly states so. Yet Pruna dictated that
BBBs testimony must be clear and credible.
FACTS:
Accused was found guilty of the crime of rape qualified by
minority and relationship by RTC of Negros Occidental and was
sentence to the supreme penalty of rape. Under the information filed
against him, he was charged with having carnal knowledge with his
niece, AAA, a 12-year old minor child, against the latters will.
The victim together with her brother, was living with her
maternal aunt, BBB, who was the appellants wife, their children,
and BBBs brother in Baranggat Guimbala-on, Silay City.
On Jan. 2, 2003 BBB went to the hospital to attend to her
father and stayed there for days. At that time AAA was at home and
was about to make her brother go to sleep when appellant took her
aside, undressed her, and laid her down on the bed.
On Jan 8, 2003 BBBs brother went to the hospital and told
BBB that he saw appellant and AAA inside the room, standing and
facing each other. This prompted BBB to ask AAA about the
incident. AAA at first hesitated but later on admitted that he was
raped. She was then brought to the city health officer for examination
which found vaginal lacerations on AAAs private part.
Galleno denied the allegation and asserted the alibi that he
was working in the sugarcane field at the time of the incident.
The RTC convicted him of qualified rape contending that at
the time of the incident AAA was below 18 years of age and such
fact was not contested by Gallano. It also asserted that the
relationship by affinity within the 3 rd civil degree was sufficiently
established.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling but modified the penalty
from death to reclusion perpetua due to the intervening passage of
RA 9346 which suspends the imposition of death penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused should be guilty of qualified rape
HELD:
No, he should only be convicted of simple rape.
It is settled that the findings of fact by the trial court are
accorded great weight, and are even held to be conclusive and
binding unless they were tainted with arbitrariness or oversight.
Nonetheless, Gallano is guilty only of simple rape. The two
requisites of quialified rape: 1) victim must be below 18 yrs old; and
2) the offender must either be related to the victim by consanguinity
or by affinity within the third civil degree, or is the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim; must be alleged and proved with
absolute certainty.
 Prosecution was unable to provide with AAAs birth
certificate and also failed to present any acceptable documentary
evidence to prove the same. Prosecution merely relied on the
testimonies of AAA and BBB to establish AAAs minority.
BBB, who was AAAs aunt, was qualified to testify on
AAAs pedigree, like her age and her date of birth. Sec. 40 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court expressly states so. Her testimony on
AAAs minority and relationship with the accused would have
sufficed for qualifying the rape however, Pruna, dictated that such
testimony must be clear and credible. BBBs testimony failed this
test. BBB was contradicted by AAAs testimony when the former
claims that she had taken AAA under her wing when she was 9
months old but AAA statement was that she stayed with BBB
and accused only 4 years prior to the time she gave her
testimony. Gallano complicated the matter further when he
attested that AAA started staying with them when she was 7
years old. This contradiction cast a doubt on BBBs personal
knowledge of AAAs age and date of birth, rendering her
testimony on AAAs minority unreliable.
SEC. 41 COMMON REPUTATION
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v BELAGAN
DOCTRINE: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the
reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence
of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,[1] or at the
time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory
character or reputation can still change or reform himself.
FACTS:
2 separate complaints for sexual harassment and various
malfeasances were filed against Dr. Belagan, the Superintendent of
DECS.
1st (MAGDALENAs): She was applying for a permit to
operate a pre-school and during the inspection of the pre-school,
Belagan placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheeks.
Magdalena kept mum about the incident but when she followed up
her application, Belagan replied, Mag-date muna tayo. She only
told her husband about the incident when he asked for the status of
their application. Belagan forwarded their application, with a
recommendation for the approval of the pre-school. When
Magdalena found out that some DECS employees were suing
Belagan, she decided to complain to DECS secretary Gloria. Belagan
was placed under suspension.
2nd (LIGAYA ANNAWI): She alleged in her complaint that
on four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed
her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled
her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the
teachers salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of
substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the teachers
uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4)
failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required
by the DECS rules and regulations.
DECS joint investigation: Belagan denied sexual harassment
accusations. Presented evidence against admin acts. The DECS
Secretary found Belagan GUILTY of 4 counts of sexual indignities
or harassments committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of
sexual advances or indignities against Magdalena and ordered him
dismissed from service.
 Belagan appealed to petitioner CSC. CSC affirms DECS Sec
decision BUT dismissed complaint of Ligaya. Transgression against
Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. On MR he raised that he
has never been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service
while Magdalena was charged with 22 offenses before MTC Baguio
and 23 complaints before brgy captains of Brgy Silang and Hillside
in Baguio. (in general, these charges concern grave threats or
slander) STILL DENIED. Appealed before CA.
CA dismissed Magdalenas complaint, reversed CSC
Resolutions on the reason that Magdalena is an unreliable witness,
her character being questionable. Given her aggressiveness and
propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any male would attempt
to steal a kiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Magdalena is a credible witness
HELD:
Yes. Magdalena testified so shes considered a witness. Her
character/reputation is a proper subject of inquiry. However, (1) the
charges and complaints happened way back in the 70s and 80s while
the act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no
longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation.
Evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time
not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to
be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the
time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered
from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps
again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
(2) No evidence of conviction of the offenses charged. The
general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is
not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he
has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or
confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. This view
has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or
theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does
not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons
are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a
crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established,
and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by
evidence of particular acts of misconduct. Significantly, the same
Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful
acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and
the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness
may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts. As it
happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut
each of the charges against her listed by respondent.
(3) CSC resolution was supported by substantial evidence.
Magdalenas testimony was given weight by CSC plus corroborated
by affidavit.
*Rules on character evidence (R130.51.a.3): the provision pertains
only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it is
applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would
establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may
be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
>>>IN THIS CASE: no evidence bearing on Magdalenas chastity.
What were presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave
threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc.
filed against her.
Rules of evidence for establishing lack of credibility of the witness:
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the
testimony given. It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that
he is worthy of belief. A witness may be discredited by evidence
attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity.
SEC 42 PART OF THE RES GESTAE
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE CO. v RADIO
MINDANAO NETWORK INC.,
DOCTRINE: The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant
himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the
witness who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
FACTS:
In the evening of July 27, 1988, the radio station of Radio
Mindanao Network located at the SSS Building in Bacolod City was
burned down causing damage in the amount of over one million
pesos. Respondent sought to recover under two insurance policies
but the claims were denied on the basis that the case of the loss was
an excepted risk under condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit:
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by
or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the
following consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemies, hostilities, or
warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civic
war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular uprising, insurrection,
rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power.
The insurers maintained that based on witnesses and
evidence gathered at the site, the fire was caused by the members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army. Hence
the refusal to honor their obligations.
The trial court and the CA found in favor of the respondent.
In its findings, both courts mentioned the fact that there was no
credible evidence presented that the CCP/NPA did in fact cause the
fire that gutted the radio station in Bacolod.
ISSUE:
WON the insurance companies are liable to pay Radio
Mindanao Network under the insurance policies?
HELD:
Yes. The Court will not disturb the factual findings of the
appellant and trial courts absent compelling reason. Under this mode
of review, the jurisdiction of the court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law.
 Particularly in cases of insurance disputes with regard to excepted
risks, it is the insurance companies which have the burden to prove
that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation
set up. It is sufficient for the insured to prove the fact of damage or
loss. Once the insured makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the
duty or burden of evidence shifts to the insurer to controvert said
prima facie case.
Evid:
Petitioner however, insists that the evidence on record
established the identity of the author of the damage. It argues that the
trial court and the CA erred in not appreciating the reports of
witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO II Rochar that the bystanders they
interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA as an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived
from his perception.
A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of
the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay
evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or
solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected
to cross examination by opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or
actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to
those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae
applies when the declarant himself did not testify and provided that
the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies
with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
The court did not consider the declarations of Lt. Col Torres
and SFO II Rocher as part of res gestae. While it may concede that
these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling
occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were
made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood. The statements by the
bystanders received by Torres and Rocher were during their
investigations which was during and after the fire. It is reasonable to
assume that such bystanders had enough time and opportunity to mill
around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is usual experience in disquieting
situations where hysteria is likely to take place.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS,
MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE
(Acquitted)
G.R. No. 147649. December 17, 2002.
DOCTRINE:
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
All these requisites concur in the case at bar.
FACTS:
Felix Taylaran, a regular farmhand of Castor Guden, asked for a
leave from work saying that he had to go to the store of Teodorico
Mante. Later that afternoon, Felix returned to Castors house with
bruises on his face and injuries all over his body. He told Castor that
he was mauled by Frank, Marlito and Teodorico at the store. Felix
spent the night in Castors house and left the following morning to
go to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to heal his
wounds in the salt-water. However, the next day, Felix died.
Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day
after the mauling, her father came to her house and told her that he
was beaten up by appellants. He told her that he was in pain and felt
weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar apparently to
recuperate.
Dr. Tito Miranda conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim
and concluded that the immediate cause of death was internal
hemorrhage caused by the severe beating and mauling on the chest
portion of the victims body.
Frank and Teodorico were arrested while Marlito, Frank's
brother, remains at large. Thereafter, Frank escaped while under
detention. Thus, trial proceeded only as against Teodorico. Shortly
after the prosecution rested its case, Frank was re-arrested. Upon
arraignment, Frank pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, separate trial was
conducted against him.
The Trial Court rendered Frank guilty of the crime of Murder.
Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that there was no direct evidence
linking him as one of the assailants. He claims that while there were
ante-mortem declarations made by the victim to the two prosecution
witnesses pointing to him as one of the maulers, the trial court,
nevertheless, dismissed them as invalid dying declaration since they
were uttered by the victim not under a consciousness of an
impending death. Neither should such declarations be considered as
part of res gestae since the victim was drunk and very mad at
Teodorico Mante for confiscating his knife while he was being
attacked by his assailants. Lastly, the evidence of flight is not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
ISSUE:
WON the victims declarations to Castor Guden and Rosa Solarte
naming accused-appellant as one of the assailants are admissible in
evidence as part of the res gestae
HELD:
Partly yes. In order to warrant a conviction, direct evidence is not
always required. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial
evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the
appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. The
rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence when the following
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The circumstances clearly satisfied the foregoing
requirements. First, the victim, accused appellant and others were
together having a drinking spree on the day the mauling
happened. Second, the victim declared to Castor Guden
immediately after the incident that accused-appellant and two
others mauled him can be considered as part of the res gestae.
Third, the victim told his daughter immediately after the incident,
that accused-appellant was one of the persons who mauled
him. Fourth, Dr. Tito L. Miranda found that the victim died due to
massive hemorrhage in his thoracic cavity caused by severe beating
of his breast. Lastly, accused-appellant evaded arrest and
subsequently escaped from detention. The foregoing circumstances
knitted together proved accused-appellants culpability beyond
reasonable doubt.
 A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances. All these requisites concur in the case at
bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim, was a startling
occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the mauling
incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story
implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the
circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However,
the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not
satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were
made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold
that Rosa Solartes testimony on what her father told her
constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from
hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof,
but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the
fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or
falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence,
the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making
of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement
itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as
to the existence of such a fact.
Moreover, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained
flight of the accused person may, as a general rule, be taken as
evidence having tendency to establish his guilt.
However, there was no clear indication in this case that the
accused-appellant and his companions purposely used their joint
efforts to consummate the crime. Consequently, the crime
committed by accused-appellant was only homicide.
PEPITO CAPILA Y YRUMA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 146161. July 17, 2006.
DOCTRINE:
Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means things
done. As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those
exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately
after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement. The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been
shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or
mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a
spectator may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the
actual sensations and perceptions produced by the external shock. As
the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken as expressing
the real belief of the speaker as to the facts he just observed. The
spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may
be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than
the declarant speaking for himself.
FACTS:
Pepito Capila was a security guard of the Lanting Security and
Watchman Agency (LSWA) assigned in the Meralco Collection
Office. Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, both employees of the
Pilipinas Bank, went to the Meralco Collection Office to receive and
deposit cash collections from Meralcos 27 collectors. The total
collection for that day amounted to P1,292,991.12. They then placed
the money inside a duffle bag table and had it padlocked. Then they
waited for the Pilipinas Banks armored car to arrive. The security
guard posted at the Meralco Collection Office at the time was Dimas
dela Cruz, also from the LSWA. Two armed men suddenly entered
the Meralco Collection Office. They hit Dimas on the nape with a
handgun. Then they ordered Ariel and Lani to lie on the floor face
down and immediately took the duffle bag containing Meralcos cash
collections. They also seized three .38 caliber revolvers, valued at
P6,000 each, owned by the LSWA, including the service handgun
issued to Dimas.
After the malefactors fled, Dimas told Ariel that Pepito Capila
was one of those who robbed the office. Then Dimas called the
Makati Police and the LSWA to report the incident. The Makati
Police dispatched SPO4 Romualdo Maximo to investigate the
robbery, while the LSWA instructed its intelligence officer, Edgardo
Irigayen, to talk to the guard on duty.
SPO4 Maximo, accompanied by a police photographer, a
fingerprint technician, and another policeman, arrived within ten
minutes at the Meralco Collection Office. He questioned Ariel and
Lani, but they could not identify the robbers as they were lying face
down on the floor. Upon inquiry by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas told him
that one of the robbers is petitioner. Thereafter, SPO4 Maximo
invited Dimas, Lani and Ariel to the police station for the purpose of
taking their sworn statements. Irigayen also questioned Dimas. The
latter reported that Pepito Capila is one of the robbers.
After the incident, petitioner fled to his hometown in Northern
Samar. The police operatives arrested petitioner, his brother
Bonifacio Capila, and Deogenio Caparoso. The police found P5,000
in possession of petitioner allegedly part of the loot.
SPO4 Maximo interrogated petitioner who admitted that he
participated in the commission of the crime; that his share of the loot
is P45,000; and that Dimas is the mastermind. The trial court
acquitted all the accused, except petitioner, who was rendered guilty
of the crime of robbery. The CA affirmed the decision.
The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of SPO4
Maximo that immediately after the incident, Dimas reported to him
that one of the robbers is petitioner. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Dimas statement is part of the res gestae.
ISSUE:
WON the statements of Dimas pointing to petitioner as one of the
robbers is part of the res gestae and is sufficient to convict petitioner.
HELD:
Yes. Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means things
done. As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those
exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately
after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement. The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been
shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or
mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a
spectator may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the
actual sensations and perceptions produced by the external shock. As
the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken as expressing
the real belief of the speaker as to the facts he just observed. The
spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may
be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than
the declarant speaking for himself.
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following
requisites must be met: (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement
is made during the occurrence or immediately or subsequent thereto;
and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances. The foregoing
requisites are present in this case.
First. The principal act is a startling occurrence which is the robbery
in question. Second. Dimas Dela Cruz informed the investigating
officers that it was appellant who robbed the Meralco office
immediately after the incident occurred and before he had the time to
contrive a story. The robbery happened at around eight oclock in the
evening of August 9, 1993. Immediately after the incident, dela Cruz
called up the police station. In ten minutes, SPO4 Maximo and his
companion were in the Meralco office where they immediately
conducted an investigation. During this investigation, Dela Cruz
pointed to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Further,
immediately after the robbers fled, dela Cruz informed Ariel
Arellano (the bank representative detailed at the Meralco office) that
appellant was one of those who robbed the office. In other words,
statement of dela Cruz was spontaneous as correctly observed by the
trial court. Third. The statement of dela Cruz refers to the robbery or
incident subject matter of this case.
We cannot consider the testimony of SPO4 Maximo as hearsay
since the statement of Dimas that petitioner is one of the robbers is
part of the res gestae.
Moreover, despite the damaging testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution, petitioner did not testify to rebut them. Such posture
is admission in silence.
Section 32, Rule 130 of the New Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Admission by silence.An act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does
or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call
for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for
him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
Another factor that militates against petitioners innocence is his
flight to Samar after the commission of the crime. Obviously, such
flight is an indication of guilt.
Verily, we hold that the prosecution, by its evidence, has
established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P.
PALANAS alias ABE
June 17, 2015.G.R. No. 214453.
DOCTRINE:
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule, 4 conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is
conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as
a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On
the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res
gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay
evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
FACTS:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre
took his 5-month-old grandson outside his residence. PO3 Leopoldo
Zapanta, who slept at SPO2 Borres residence, was watching
television when 4 successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked
through the open door of SPO2 Borres house and saw 2 men armed
with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre.
He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could
not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the 2 assailants fled on a
motorcycle.
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borres stepson Ramil Ranola,
brought SPO2 Borre to hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2
Borre told them that it was Abe, Aspog, or Abe Palanas contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
referring to his neighbor, Palanas who shot him. This statement
was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre, who followed him at
the hospital. Later, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his
head and trunk.
The RTC convicted Palanas of the crime of Murder, stating that
SPO2 Borres statements that Palanas shot him constituted an ante
mortem statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus,
admissible as evidence against Palanas. The CA affirmed the
decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON SPO2 Borres statements on his way to the hospital should
be admitted as evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of
the res gestae.
HELD:
Yes. (Refer to the Doctrine for the requisites)
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borres statements constitute a dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances
of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of
his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same
under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This
declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled
to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the
declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind
is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the
law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in
court.
In the same vein, SPO2 Borres statements may likewise be
deemed to form part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact
and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part
of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. In this case,
SPO2 Borres statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him
being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his
assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the
crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas,
is adequately proven by the prosecution.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTHONY
MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR
PALMONES
G.R. No. 136303. July 18, 2000.
DOCTRINE:
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae,
the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors have
generally been considered in determining whether statements offered
in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously:
(1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the
statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made
the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events
between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5)
the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
FACTS:
Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones
were charged with the crime of murder for the death of SPO2 Asim
Mamansal. Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against
them.
Prosecution witness, Sonny Boy Redovan, nephew of the victim,
testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of April 27, 1997, his
mother and elder brother informed him that something had happened
to SPO2 Mamansal. Upon seeing his uncle in the hospital, the
witness went near him and asked him what had happened to him. His
uncle answered that he had been waylaid. The witness then asked the
victim who the perpetrators were and the victim answered that it was
Juany and Tony Palmones which were the nicknames of the two
accused-appellants. About an hour later, he saw Police Inspector
Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had
shot him. The witness then heard his uncle positively answer the
policeman that his assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones.
Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo, the surgeon on-duty, testified that before
he operated on the victim, he asked is whether the victim had known
who had shot him. He claimed that Mamansal told him that he did
not know who had shot him. He did not pursue this line of
questioning further as he was told by a companion of the victim that
the area where the victim was shot was dark. The victim developed
cardio respiratory arrest the following day.
Police Inspector Alexander Camilon Tagum testified that upon
conducting initial investigation of the crime scene, he sent his men
towards different directions to look for suspects. He then proceeded
to the hospital together with another witness, Alice Villamor. On the
way to the hospital, Alice pointed to a passing motorcycle and told
him that it was the motorcycle the assailants were riding. He chased
the motorcycle but he was not able to catch up with them as his car
ran out of gas. He was able to borrow a motorcycle and he proceeded
to chase the other motorcycle again. While riding on the borrowed
motorcycle, a certain PO3 Aniceta called him on the radio and told
him that the assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones. He and his
men proceeded to the residence of the suspects where the brother of
the accused-appellants, Triny Palmones, met them. He asked Triny
where his brothers were and the latter responded that he didnt know.
He then asked Triny whether his brothers owned a motorcycle and
the latter admitted that they owned a Kawasaki motorcycle which
matched the description of the motorcycle he had been chasing. He
confronted the victim in the hospital and asked him about his
assailants. The victim answered that it was Juany and Tony
Palmones.
Defense witness, Alicia Villamor, the alleged girlfriend of the
victim and his companion at the time he was shot, testified that she
and Mamansal were together when the incident happened. They were
on their way home when someone suddenly shot Mamansal. She was
just at the side of Mamansal when the shooting happened but she
claimed that she was not able to identify the assailants as it was
dark. Patricio Fuertes then brought the victim to the hospital but she
did not accompany him as her clothes were stained with blood. After
changing her clothes, a group of policemen arrived at the crime
scene. After conferring with the policemen, she then rode with Insp.
Tagum in going to the hospital. On the way, Insp. Tagum tried to halt
a passing motorcycle. When the passengers of the motorcycle kept
on going, Insp. Tagum fired warning shots and gave chase but the car
they were riding in ran out of gas. He then saw Alex Siago provide
Tagum with a motorcycle and again the latter gave chase. She
claimed that she was not able to see the persons riding the
motorcycle as it was moving quite fast. When she finally arrived at
the hospital, she saw that Insp. Tagum was already there. She was
then able to talk with the victim who told her that he did not see the
person who had shot him. The accused appellants interposed the
defense of alibi.
The trial court rendered the accused-appellants guilty of the
crime of murder. The conviction was based largely on the alleged
dying declaration of the victim made to two witnesses of the
prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense of alibi.

ISSUE:
WON the statements of Mamansal shall be admitted as an exception
to the hearsay rule.
HELD:
NO. The requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem
statement as an exception to the hearsay rule are: (a) it must concern
the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness
of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness;
and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide in which the decedent was the victim. In cases
where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must
be proven that that the declaration was made under a consciousness
of impending death which means simply that the declarant is fully
aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries
soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is
at hand, or there must be a settled hopeless expectation.
In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution
that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and
surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the
consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever
presented by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy
Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim
whether he believed that he was going to die out of his injuries or
any other similar question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was
able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he
revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the
victim of his two assailants. For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted
that the only question he asked of the victim was if the victim knew
who had shot him.
Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be
admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims,
or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately
after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res
gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors
have generally been considered in determining whether statements
offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made
spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the
act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place
where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant
when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of
intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative
thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the
statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements
fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly
uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of
time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the
victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the
statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later.
Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of
the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for
treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the
hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the
victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken
together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by
Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be
admitted as part of the res gestae.
Finally, after a thorough reading of the testimonies presented by
both sides, it is even doubtful that the victim ever uttered these
alleged ante mortem statements in the first place. We note that the
testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and Investigator Alexander
Tagum are contradicted not only by the witnesses for the defense but
also by the prosecutions own witnesses. Dr. Mark Aguayo, the
doctor who performed the operation on the victim and who is an
impartial and disinterested witness, categorically stated that the
victim told him that he did not recognize those who had shot him. He
likewise testified that witness Sonny Boy Redovan told him in the
emergency room that the victim was not able to recognize his
assailants because of darkness. Similarly, the wife and the daughter
of Asim Mamansal, who were also able to talk with the victim prior
to his death, likewise denied that the victim ever told them the
identity of his assailants. We fail to see why the victim should choose
to tell some people the identity of his assailants and deny his
knowledge of the same to others.
RULING: ACQUITTED.
JUANITO TALIDANO vs. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED
SERVICES, INC., SPECIAL EIGHTHDIVISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, AND LABOR ARBITER ERMITA C.
CUYUGA
July 14, 2008.G.R. No. 172031.
DOCTRINE:
Assuming that petitioners negligencewhich allegedly caused the
ship to deviate from its courseis the startling occurrence, there is
no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages were
made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates
have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical
element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part
of the res gestae of the first kind. Neither will the second kind of res
gestae apply. Petitioners alleged absence from watch duty is simply
an innocuous act or at least proved to be one.
Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax
statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has
been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made
simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon
Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and operated by
Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. Petitioner
claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against
and maltreated the vessels Filipino crew. This prompted him to send
a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the International
Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was
resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed.
He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal two years later.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several times of
dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination,
disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an
incident involving petitioners incompetence wherein the vessel
invaded a different route at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the
absence of petitioner who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As
proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
incident, reporting the vessels deviation from its course due to
petitioners neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the
report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/VPhoenix
Seven two days after the incident. Private respondent also interposed
the defense of prescription.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioners
complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of
duties. The Labor Arbiter relied on the fax messages presented by
private respondent to prove petitioners neglect of his duties.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
and declared the dismissal as illegal. The NLRC held that the fax
messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty
by petitioner have no probative value and are self-serving.
Upon appeal, the CA ruled that prescription had not set in and
that petitioners dismissal from employment was valid. The appellate
court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master shortly
after petitioner had committed a serious neglect of his duties. It noted
that the said fax messages constitute the res gestae. In defending the
non-presentation of the logbook, it stated that three years had already
passed since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of
private respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the fax messages may be admitted in evidence as part of
the res gestae
HELD:
Yes. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two
acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res
gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res
gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act. We find
that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required
that: (1) the principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Assuming that petitioners negligencewhich allegedly
caused the ship to deviate from its courseis the startling
occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in
the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged
incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine
if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful
deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax
messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first
kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites
for its admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must
be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3)
the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the
statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.
Petitioners alleged absence from watch duty is simply an
innocuous act or at least proved to be one.
Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the
fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or
time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages
were made simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are
unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is
questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax messages,
did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from
the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be
characterized as double hearsay.
In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for
dismissing an employee rests on the employer. Private respondent
miserably failed to discharge this burden. Consequently, the
petitioners dismissal is illegal.
RULING:
Petition GRANTED. NLRC Decision reinstated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGEL PRECIADOS (At
Large), ARTURO ENAD, EMIGDIO VILLAMOR, LEONCIO
ALGABRE and FLORIANO ALGABRE @ LOLOY,
G.R. No. 122934. January 5, 2001.
DOCTRINE:
Dying declarations and statements which form part of the res
gestae are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus they must be strictly
but reasonably construed and must extend only insofar as their
language fairly warrants. Thus, doubts should be resolved in favor of
applying the hearsay rule, rather than the exceptions. Under said rule,
Antonios so-called ante-mortem statement should not have been
admitted in evidence, for it is neither a dying declaration nor a part
of res gestae.
FACTS:
Appellant Arturo Enad and Antonio Hilbero are second cousins.
Appellant is also a cousin of Primo Hilberos mother-in-law.
During the May 11, 1992 elections, appellant and Antonio
supported rival mayoralty candidates of Sagbayan. Appellant was a
supporter and poll watcher of Arthur Ariana, while Antonio, a
barangay councilman of Ubujan, was a partisan of Narzal Ermac.
Appellants co-accused were also identified with Anana who won.
At around 11:00 p.m. of May 12, 1992, Antonio with his common
law wife and their two children, his brother, Primo and his wife,
Helen with their three children, Antonios mother, Dominga, and
another brother, Severino were at the second floor of the old rice mill
at Ubujan. Except for Helen, the clan had retired for the night. She
was about to go to sleep when she noticed Antonio go downstairs.
Minutes later, her husband Primo, followed him. Then she heard
someone utter, Dont move. Alarmed, she rose from her mat and
peeped through a two-inch hole in the floor. The ground floor was
illuminated by moonlight. She saw appellant holding a hand grenade
while his other arm was locked in a stranglehold around the neck of
Antonio who knelt on the floor. Nearby stood Angel Preciados with a
gun pointed at Antonio. She then heard Emigdio Villamor say Dont
move so that your family will not die. She saw the latter forcing
Primo to swallow an object. The other accused held her husband to
prevent him from struggling. Shocked, Helen then soundlessly cried
and embraced her children. Shortly afterwards, Helens mother-in-
law, Dominga, was awakened by the barking of the family dog.
Dominga went downstairs where she saw Primo lifeless on the floor,
reeking of poison. Antonio was nowhere to be found. Dominga
rushed upstairs and woke up Severino, all the while shouting for
help. Minutes later, the barangay captain and some neighbors
responded to her shouts for assistance. They found Primo dead on the
floor. Informed that Antonio was missing, they searched the
immediate surroundings for him but to no avail.
Early in the morning of May 13, 1992, the search for Antonio
was resumed. He was finally found by his uncle, Simeon Degamo,
holding on to rock in a natural well, some 300 meters away from the
rice mill. A rope was thrown to him and he was pulled out from the
well. Noticing that he smelled of some poisonous chemical, his
rescuers made him drink coconut milk. He was weak and appeared
on the verge of death and brought to the hospital at Clarin, Bohol for
emergency treatment.
The next day, prosecution witness Zosimo Viva, a defeated
municipal councilor candidate in the same slate of Ermac, Antonios
common law wife, and two police investigators transferred Antonio
to the Gov. Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital in Tagbilaran
City. According to prosecution witness Dr. Mayda Reyes who
admitted Antonio to the hospital, Antonio told her that the latter was
forced to drink a certain liquid, which smelled like
insecticide. Another physician, Dr. Maria Luisa Tage, who attended
to Antonio diagnosed, Poisoning, Etiology not determined, Brief
reactive psychosis.
Since Antonio appeared to be dying, prosecution witness PO3
Leonardo Inoc, a police investigator, took his ante-
mortem statement in which he named the aforementioned accused
as the persons responsible for poisoning him and dropping him in the
well.
Meanwhile, Ermac asked the NBI to conduct an
investigation. The toxicological examination of Primos body
revealed the presence of methamidophos, the active ingredient of the
insecticide Tamaron in Primos organs. The NBI also recovered
two empty bottles, at the scene of the incident. Chemistry tests on
them revealed that the Hoechst bottle was positive
for deltamethrine, an insecticide, while the other bottle revealed
traces of methamidophos.
 Appellant denied any involvement in the poisoning incident. He
claimed an alibi.
The defense offered a different version of the poisoning incident.
According to the defense, Antonio and Primo agreed to commit
suicide by taking poison. It presented Antonios affidavit where he
recanted his story in his affidavit of May 22, 1992. Antonio testified
that he and Primo decided to commit suicide by drinking poison to
prevent defeated candidates Ermac and Viva from harming their
families. Antonio refused to follow the orders of Viva to kill the
political leaders of Mayor Afiana, including the appellant. Thus,
Antonio said, he and Primo feared for the lives of their relatives.
After Primo and he drank poison, Primo immediately died. When he
did not succumb right away, Antonio wrote a suicide note and tried
to drown himself in the well. After his rescue, Ermac and Viva took
him into custody and bought him to Mindanao, allegedly for his
safety. The two, however, threatened to kill him and made him
falsely charge the appellant with murder and frustrated
murder. Antonio totally repudiated his ante-mortem statement and
his earlier affidavit charging the accused with murder and frustrated
murder.
To rebut Antonios testimony, Dr. Mayda Reyes was called anew
to confirm what Antonio had told her, that he was forced to drink
poison by several men. SPO1 Leonardo Inoc testified again that he
took Antonios ante-mortem statement. Apolinario Libranza, declarant can no longer be presented in court to identify the
barangay captain of Ubujan, Sagbayan was presented to refute
Antonios claims regarding Zosimo Viva. Antonios mother,
Dominga, testified that her son was not afraid of either Viva or
Ermac and affirmed the truthfulness of Helens testimony.
In sur-rebuttal, Antonio maintained the veracity of his suicide
account.
Finding the prosecutions version more credible, the trial court
found appellant guilty of the crimes murder and frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred when it admitted and gave much
weight to the probative value of the ante mortem statement of
Antonio.
HELD:
A dying declaration is the statement which refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death, made under the
consciousness of an impending death. It is admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants death makes it
impossible for him to take the witness stand and trustworthiness, for
when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is
silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak the truth. The requisites for the admissibility of a dying
declaration are: (1) the death is imminent and the declarant is
conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates
to facts which the victim is competent to testify; (4) the declarant
thereafter dies; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.
In the present case, the foregoing requisites were not met. A
dying declaration is essentially hearsay, because one person is
testifying on what another person stated. This is because the
document or confirm the statement, but more important, to be
confronted with said statement by the accused and be cross-
examined on its contents. It was patently incorrect for the trial court
to have allowed prosecution witness PO3 Leonardo Inoc to testify on
Antonios so-called dying declaration because Antonio was alive
and later even testified in court.
Where a victims statement may not be admissible as an ante
mortem declaration, it may nonetheless be considered as part of
the res gestae, if made immediately after a startling occurrence in
relation to the circumstances thereof and when the victim did not
have time to contrive a falsehood. For res gestae to be allowed as an
exception to the hearsay rule, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (1) that the principal act or res gestae be a starting
occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement is made
during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto;
and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, the element of spontaneity is lacking in the
alleged ante-mortem statement. Antonios statement was taken by
PO3 Inoc at around 3:00 oclock P.M., May 14, 1992 or some thirty-
nine (39) hours after the incident. Thirty-nine hours is too long a
time to be considered subsequent immediately (stress supplied) to the
startling occurrence. Even as contemplated by the rules, statements
given a day after the incident in answer to questions propounded by
an investigator cannot be considered part of the res
gestae. Furthermore, the testimony of the declarant, that the
statement was made under threats and with coaching from losing
candidates Ermac and Viva in order to get even with the winning
candidate, Mayor Aana, is uncontroverted.
Dying declarations and statements which form part of the res
gestae are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus they must be strictly
but reasonably construed and must extend only insofar as their
language fairly warrants. Thus, doubts should be resolved in favor
of applying the hearsay rule, rather than the exceptions. Under
said rule, Antonios so-called ante-mortem statement should not have
been, admitted in evidence, for it is neither a dying declaration nor a
part of res gestae.
RULING: Acquitted.
SEC. 43. ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR. vs. MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC.
and MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.
November 27, 2009.G.R. No. 169606.
DOCTRINE:
The Court laid down the requisites for admission in evidence of
entries in the course of business: (1) the person who made the entry
is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were
made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3)
the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were
made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
FACTS:
Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of
Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). MSSI through MPI
engaged the services of Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of
M/T Limar.
Jose, Jr. began performing his duties on board the M/T Limar on
21 August 2002. A few weeks after, a random drug test was
conducted on all officers and crew members and Jose, Jr. was found
positive for marijuana. Jose, Jr. was informed about the result of his
drug test and was asked if he was taking any medication. Jose, Jr.
said that he was taking Centrum vitamins.
Jose, Jr. was allowed to continue performing his duties on board
the M/T Limar for a few months thereafter. In the Sea Going Staff
Appraisal Report on Jose Jr.s work performance, Jose, Jr. received a
96% total rating and was described as very hardworking, trustworthy,
and reliable.
When M/T Limar reached the next port after the random drug
test, Jose, Jr. was repatriated to the Philippines. When Jose, Jr.
arrived in the Philippines, he asked MPI that a drug test be conducted
on him. MPI ignored his request. On his own, Jose, Jr. procured drug
tests from Manila Doctors Hospital, S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic,
Inc., and Maritime Clinic for International Services, Inc. He was
found negative for marijuana.
Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI
for illegal dismissal with claim for his salaries for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract.
 The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiters Decision and held that the
dismissal was illegal. The NLRC gave credence to the Sea Going
Staff Appraisal Report holding that a worker who had been taking in
prohibited drug could not have given such an excellent job
performance. Upon appeal, the CA reinstated the decision of the LA
and held that the drug test result constitutes entries made in the
ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of the
vessel.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in admitting the drug test result in evidence as
part of entries in the course of business.
HELD:
No. In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the
requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course of
business: (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the
country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made
the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4)
the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary
or regular course of business or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the
country; (2) the entries were made near the time the random drug test
was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to know the facts
made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his professional
capacity and in the performance of his duty; and (5) the entries were
made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for
marijuana. Such entries, being entries in the course of business,
enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of
the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the following facts are established (1) random
drug tests are regularly conducted on all officers and crew members
of M/T Limar; (2) a random drug test was conducted at the port of
Curacao on 8 October 2002; (3) Dr. Heath was the authorized
physician of M/T Limar; (4) the drug test result of Jose, Jr. showed
that he was positive for marijuana; (5) the drug test result was issued
under Dr. Heaths name and contained his handwritten comments.
Hence, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require
additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the drug test
was conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures.
Nothing of the sort has even been suggested in this particular case.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONETS EXPORT
AND MANUFACTURING CORP., VICENTE V. TAGLE, SR.
and MA. CONSUELO G. TAGLE
April 19, 2010.G.R. No. 184971.
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries
prepared in the regular course of business are prima facie evidence
of the truth of what they state. The billing statement reconciles the
transaction entries entered in the bank records in the regular course
of business and shows the net result of such transactions. Entries in
the course of business are accorded unusual reliability because their
regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers
in the habit of precision. If the entries are financial, the records are
routinely balanced and audited. In actual experience, the whole of
the business world function in reliance of such kind of records.
FACTS:
 Land Bank and Monet executed an Export Packing Credit Line
Agreement (Agreement) under which the bank gave Monet a credit
line of P250,000, secured by the proceeds of its export letters of
credit, promissory notes, a continuing guaranty executed by
respondent spouses Vicente V. Tagle, Sr. and Ma. Consuelo G. Tagle
(the Tagles), and a third-party mortgage executed by one Pepita C.
Mendigoria. Land Bank renewed and amended this credit line
agreement several times until it reached a ceiling of P5 million.
Land Bank claims that by August 31, 1992 Monets obligation
under the Agreement had swelled to P11,464,246.19. Since Monet
failed to pay despite demands, the bank filed a collection suit against
Monet and the Tagles before the RTC. In their answer, Monet and the
Tagles claimed that Land Bank had refused to collect the
US$33,434.00 receivables on Monets export letter of credit against
Wishbone Trading Company of Hong Kong while making an
unauthorized payment of US$38,768.40 on its import letter of credit
to Beautilike (H.K.) Ltd. This damaged Monets business interests
since it ran short of funds to carry on with its usual business. In other
words, Land Bank mismanaged its clients affairs under the
Agreement.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Land Bank. Upon appeal to
the SC, the Court remanded the case to the RTC for reception of
additional evidence. The Court noted that Exhibit 39, the Summary
of Availment and Schedule of Amortization, on which both the RTC
and the CA relied, covered only Monets debt of P2.5 million under
Promissory Note P-981, a small amount compared to the
P11,464,246.19 that Land Bank sought to collect from it. The records
showed, however, that Monet executed not only one but several
promissory notes in varying amounts in favor of the bank. Indeed,
the bank submitted a Consolidated Statement of Account dated
August 31, 1992 in support of its claim of P11,464,246.19 but both
the RTC and the CA merely glossed over it. Land Bank also
submitted a Summary of Availments and Payments from 1981 to
1989 that detailed the series of availments and payments Monet
made.
On remand, the RTC held one hearing at which the lawyer of
Land Bank told the court that, apart from what the bank already
adduced in evidence, it had no additional documents to present.
Based on this, the RTC issued an order on the same day, affirming its
original decision. Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration,
actually a motion to reopen the hearing, to enable it to adduce in
evidence a Consolidated Billing Statement as of October 31, 2006 to
show how much Monet and the Tagles still owed the bank. But the
trial court denied the motion. Land Bank appealed the order to the
CA but the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC orders.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC and the CA acted correctly in denying petitioner
Land Banks motion to reopen the hearing to allow it to present the
banks updated Consolidated Billing Statement as of October 31,
2006 that reflects respondents Monet and the Tagles remaining
indebtedness to it.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries
prepared in the regular course of business are prima facie evidence
of the truth of what they state. The billing statement reconciles the
transaction entries entered in the bank records in the regular course
of business and shows the net result of such transactions.
Entries in the course of business are accorded unusual reliability
because their regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline
record keepers in the habit of precision. If the entries are financial,
the records are routinely balanced and audited. In actual experience,
the whole of the business world function in reliance of such kind of
records.
Monet and the Tagles can of course dispute the banks billing
statements by proof that the bank had exaggerated what was owed it
and that Monet had made more payments than were reflected in
those statements. They can do this by presenting evidence of those
greater payments. Notably, Monet and the Tagles have consistently
avoided stating in their letters to the bank how much they still owed
it. But, ultimately, it is as much their obligation to prove this disputed
point if they deny the banks statements of their loan accounts.
In reverting back to Exhibit 39, which covers just one of
many promissory notes that Monet and the Tagles executed in
favor of Land Bank, the RTC and the CA have shown an
unjustified obstinacy and a lack of understanding of what the
Court wanted done to clear up the issue of how much Monet and
the Tagles still owed the bank. The bank lawyer who claimed that
Land Bank had no further evidence to present during the
hearing was of course in error and it probably warranted a
dismissal of the banks claim for failure to prosecute. But the
banks motion for reconsideration, asking for an opportunity to
present evidence of the status of the loans, opened up a chance
for the RTC to abide by what the Court required of it. It
committed error, together with the CA, in ruling that a
reopening of the hearing would serve no useful purpose.
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs. ERIC GAN, Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner
Security Bank. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with
respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his
current account and he could draw checks on said account provided
there were sufficient funds to cover them. Furthermore, under a
special arrangement with petitioners branch manager then, Mr. Qui,
respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another
persons account also within the same branch. Respondent availed of
such arrangement several times by depositing checks in his account
and even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and
transferred them to the other account. These transactions were
covered by what were known as debit memos since respondent had
no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred. Later on,
respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in
his account. Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against
respondent to recover the P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum
from September 16, 1990 until fully paid.
Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He
contended that the alleged overdraft resulted from transactions done
without his knowledge and consent.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioner was
not able to prove that respondent owed it the amount claimed
considering that the ledger cards it presented were merely hearsay
evidence.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was
the bookkeeper who handled the account of respondent and recorded
his transactions in a ledger. Based on this ledger, respondent
allegedly had a negative balance of P153,757.78. This resulted from
transfers of funds from respondents current account to another
persons account. These transfers were made under the authority of
Qui. Respondent categorically denied that he ever authorized these
funds transfers.
Issue:
Whether the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were competent
evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred.
Held:
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioners bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was In support of its recollection of the events of February 28, 2002,
presented to testify on the transactions pertaining to the account of PGIC relied on a Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report)
respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the ledger prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas (PO2 Tomas) of the
entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither justification nor Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made Police. This was attached as Annex "E" of PGIC's Complaint and
them was available to testify in court. also as Annex "E" of its Position Paper. It stated: ( yung report cinite
ko lang for reference, anyway ang issue lang is whether or not
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts admissible yung report as cited below)
constituting the entries, particularly those entries which resulted in
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of
these entries. (Entry No. 805-285-0202)
Time and date : At about 10:30 p.m. February 28, 2002
Place : along SLEX, Bilibid N/B, Muntinlupa City
Weather con : Fair
Nature : RIR/DTP/PI (hit and run)

SEC 43 ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS Inv vehicle (3)

DST MOVERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE'S

GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent. Vehicle-1 : Honda civic
Facts: Plate no. : URZ-976
In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan MA. ADELINE YUBOCO Y DELA
Driver :
Trial Court of Manila, PGIC alleged that at about 10:30 p.m. on CRUZ
February 28, 2002, along the South Luzon Expressway and in the
area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City, a Honda Civic sedan with plate (injured)
number URZ-976 (sedan) was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck Lic. no. : N03-96-213671
with plate number UAL-295 (truck). PGIC underscored that the
sedan was on a stop position when it was hit. The sedan was then 24 Hernandez st., BF Homes Paranaque
Address :
allegedly pushed forward, thereby hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The City
driver of the truck then allegedly escaped.
Reg. Owner : Fidel Yuboco was allegedly hit/bumped by V3 which was moving same direction
on the same place due to strong impact V1 pushed forward and hit
Address : same as driver
the left side rear portion of V2 causing damages and injuries thereon.
rear & front portion, whole right side After the impact, V3 escaped towards undisclosed direction and left
Damage :
portion V1 & V2 at the place of accident. During investigation V1 & V2
driver gave voluntary handwritten statement and they were advised
to submit medical certificate, estimate/photos of damages as
Vehicle-2 : Mits. Lancer annexes.

Plate no. : CMM-373 Status of the case: For

follow-up. . . .
Driver : HARRISON TUQUERO Y VALDEZ
(sgd.)
Lic. no. : 014-02-032855
PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas PNP
13-16 Carolina st., Villasol Subd., Angeles - on case -
Address :
City
Reg. Owner : Edgardo Tuquero
Following the submission of the parties' position papers, Branch 22
Address : 518 Obio st., Villasol Subd., Angeles City of the Metropolitan Trial Court Manila rendered its
Decision favoring PGIC's version of events and finding DST
Damage : left side rear portion
Movers liable. On appeal, the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
was affirmed in toto by Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
Vehicle-3 : Truck
In its assailed May 11, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Plate no. : UAL-295
the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Metropolitan Trial
Driver : Unidentified Court. In its assailed September 8, 2011 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied DST Movers' Motion for Reconsideration.
Damage : Undetermine [sic]
Hence, DST Movers filed the present Petition insisting that its
Reportee : G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX
liability was not established by a preponderance of evidence.
Specifically, it faults the Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in
favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by
FACTS:
nothing more the Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It
It appears that while V1 was on stop position facing north at asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced as it was
the aforesaid place of occurrence when the rear portion of the same supposedly "improperly identified [and] uncorroborated."
Issue:
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioner DST Movers
Corporation's liability was established by a preponderance of
evidence. Subsumed in this is whether it was an error for the
Metropolitan Trial Court to admit and lend evidentiary weight to
the piece of evidence chiefly relied upon by respondent People's
General Insurance Corporation: the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.||| (DST Movers
Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627,
[January 13, 2016])
Held:
Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44
does away with the need for presenting as witness the public officer
or person performing a duty specially enjoined by law who made the
entry.
Respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court,
and the Court of Appeals are all of the position that the Report
prepared by PO2 Tomas satisfies these requisites. Thus, they
maintain that it is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts it
states. This despite the admitted fact that neither PO2 Tomas, nor the
person who supposedly reported the events of February 28, 2002 to
PO2 Tomas the person identified as "G. Simbahon of
PNCC/SLEX" gave a testimony in support of the Report.
They are in serious error.
The statements made by this court in Standard Insurance are on
point:
[F]or the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following
requisites must be present:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance
of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third
requisite cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below,
while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as
evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was
not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge
of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally
or through official information. Neither was there any
explanation as to why such officer was not presented. We cannot
simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the
incident stated in the report was based on the personal knowledge
of the investigating officer who prepared it.
It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not
matters that were personally known to PO2 Tomas. The Report
is candid in admitting that the matters it states were merely
reported to PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX." It
was this "G. Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus, even as the
Report embodies entries made by a public officer in the
performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for
admissibility for entries in official records as an exception to the
Hearsay Rule.
To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person
who prepared the Report PO2 Tomas to have himself
presented as a witness and then testify on his Report. However,
even as the Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2
Tomas' testimony would not have sufficed in establishing the
identity of the motor vehicle and/or the person responsible for
the damage sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the
testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.
Other Issue and Resolution; Of course, we are aware that this case
was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure (considering that petitioner's total
claims amounted to less than P200,000.00). Accordingly, no trial
was conducted as, after the conduct of a preliminary conference,
the parties were made to submit their position papers. There
was, thus, no opportunity to present witnesses during an actual
trial. However, Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure calls for the submission of witnesses' affidavits together
with a party's position paper and after the conduct of a preliminary
conference:
SECTION 9. Submission of Affidavits and Position Papers.
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next
preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the
facts relied upon by them.
These affidavits take the place of actual testimony in court and serve
to expedite the resolution of cases covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus, it was still insufficient for respondent to
have merely annexed the Report to its Position Paper. By its
lonesome, and unsupported by an affidavit executed by PO2 Tomas,
the Report was hearsay and, thus, inadmissible.
As the sole evidence relied upon by respondent as to the identity of
the responsible motor vehicle or person has been rendered unworthy
of even the slightest judicial consideration, there is no basis for
holding as the Metropolitan Trial Court did that the motor
vehicle responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan was
owned by petitioner. Not only this, petitioner has even adduced proof
that on February 28, 2002, its Isuzu Elf truck with plate number
UAL-295 was undergoing repairs and maintenance and, thus, could
not have been at the South Luzon Expressway. The weight of
evidence is clearly in petitioner's favor.
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. (now known as UBP
Securities, Inc.), petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.||| (Barcelon, Roxas Securities,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157064, [August
7, 2006], 529 PHIL 785-799)
Facts: Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as
UBP Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of
securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax
Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency
income tax in the amount of P826,698.31 arising from the
disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and allowances in the
amount of P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible business expense
since petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and allowances
to withholding taxes. This assessment was covered by Formal
Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 dated 1 February
1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through
registered mail on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner denies
receiving the formal assessment notice. On 17 March 1992,
petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to
enforce collection of the deficiency income tax for the year 1987.
Petitioner filed a formal protest, dated 25 March 1992, against the
Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy, requesting for its cancellation. On
3 July 1998, petitioner received a letter dated 30 April 1998 from the
respondent denying the protest with finality.
Issue: Whether or not section 44, Rule 130 is applicable.
Held: No. Section 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must be read in
accordance with this Courts pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex
(Phil.), Inc., where it has been held that an entrant must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were
acquired by him from reports made by persons under a legal duty to
submit the same.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her
personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she
personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it
stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how and from whom
she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest
to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal
duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no
application in the present case. Thus, the evidence offered by
respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence.
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO,
and GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA, petitioners, vs. JOSE
and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, respondents.
Facts:
On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia
Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro), along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and
Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages
before the RTC, against the petitioners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion,
Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas),
together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus, Enrique, Nina,
Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The complaint alleged that
all the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna.
Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in
their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered
that there was no co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They
alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio
Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons,
Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the
northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the
heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with
the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were
initiated. One of them was a Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a
pending Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing several of the
RTC orders. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the
CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which
upheld the assailed RTC orders.
On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings,
Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or
Admit Amended Complaint. The RTC granted their motion. The
amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition
and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other
defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the
heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.
In amending their complaint, Spouses Monteiro adopted the
Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject
property had already been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated
October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, the brothers
agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-
half portion and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which
division was observed and respected by them as well as their
heirs and successors-in-interest.
Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by
Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the southern-
half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective
1/3 shares measuring 81.13 square meters each; that Pedro's
share pertains to the 1/3 of the southern-half immediately
adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as
heirs of Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was
sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming
Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of
Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity
and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of
the share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was
being occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted
that the subject property was inherited by, and divided equally
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their
original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and
northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition
mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and
share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-
ownership, contrary to their original position. The Dimaguilas
further argued that the Bilihan did not specify the metes and
bounds of the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of
the Civil Code. Even assuming that such had been specified, they
averred that the sale of a definite portion of a property owned in
common was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided
share in the property.
Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic
engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro to survey the property in Liliw,
and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject property,
subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.
Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal
Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the cadastral map of
Lilies and a list of claimants/owners.
Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources(DENR), testified that as part
of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed
land, including cadastral maps from the region.
In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses
Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the possession
of the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property.
In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling
of the RTC.
The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a
preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal
assessor's records. It noted, more importantly, that the Dimaguilas
themselves corroborated the claim of partition in their original
answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped from
denying their admission of partition after the respondent spouses had
relied on their judicial admission.
Issue:
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in admitting in evidence
exhibit c, the Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan.
Held:
The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map
and the list of claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the
ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence
rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3 (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section
7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody or the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were
presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves,
Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such
documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee,
who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed
land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of
claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall
under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in
the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR
is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the
conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as
entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as
mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
SEC 45 COMMERCIAL LISTS AND THE LIKE
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon.
SECRETARY of LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and
MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(MEWA),respondents.
Synopsis:
The Decision of the Court promulgated on January 27, 1999
modified the resolutions made by the Secretary of Labor in favor of
Meralco Employees. However, in view of the motions for
reconsideration filed, the Court herein reconsidered the matter of the
amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.
The 5.7 billion which was the Secretary of Labor's basis for granting
the P2,200.00 wage increase is higher than the actual net income of
5.1 billion admitted by petitioner Meralco. It would be proper then to
increase the Court's award of P1,900 to P2,000 for the two years of
the CBA award. On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award,
based on the letter of petitioner's Chairman and President of the
Board to their stockholders that the CBA "for the rank-and-file
employees covering the period December 1, 1995 to November 30,
1997 is still with the Supreme Court," the Court retroacts the subject
CBA awards to two years from said date as it is indicative of
petitioner's recognition that the CBA award covers the said period.
Summary:
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been
passed upon by the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new
arguments were presented for consideration of the Court.
Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein particularly
those involving the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2, 200.00 per month as
ordered by the Secretary is allowed it would simply pass the cost
covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the
rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be
threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the
prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate
regulatory government agency and does not automatically result
from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner's employees. Besides
this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a
wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union
relies to support its position regarding the wage issue can not be an
accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage
increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
"Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters
of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list,
register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein."
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a
periodical may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated
January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion
which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no
sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody
testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally
rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared
by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded
as trustworthy reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these
reports are not admissible. 6 In the same manner, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the
source of the reports is available. 7 With more reason, mere analyses
or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the
source of the report in this case can be easily made available
considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain
governmental requirements.
SEC. 46 LEARNED TREATISES
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), petitioner, vs. HON.
TEODORO A. CASIO, ET AL
Facts: ( Basta may itatayo na power plant sa Subic Bay tapos
chinallenge iyon by filing a Writ of Kalikasan arguing na dangerous
iyon sa environment maraming arguments sa case na ito but pinili
ko lang yung kay Casio kasi yun yung related, Casio argument is
found below, I think you may safely jump doon sa argument nila -
xavier )
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a
government agency organized and established under Republic
Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation
(TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay
which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP).
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU,
whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power
plant. In the said MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at Sitio
Naglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the
suitable area for the project and another site of approximately 10
hectares to be used as an ash pond. TCC intends to lease the
property from SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at $3.50
per square meter, payable in 10 equal 5-year installments.
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-
69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International
Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction,
installation, and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed
(CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the
MOU dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP
Energy), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and
operating power plants in the Philippines, among
others. Accordingly, an Addendum to the said MOU was executed by
SBMA and RP Energy.
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired
power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance of
an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
On August 27, 2008, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo
City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city
government's objection to the coal-fired power plant as an
energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer
alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay.
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired
power plant.
Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional
components in its proposed coal-fired power plant. Due to the
changes in the project design, which involved the inclusion of a
barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge pipeline,
raw water collection system, drainage channel improvement, and a
230kV double-circuit transmission line, RP Energy requested the
DENR Environmental Management Bureau (DENR-EMB) to amend
its ECC. In support of its request, RP Energy submitted to the
DENR-EMB an Environmental Performance Report and
Management Plan (EPRMP); which was prepared by GHD.
On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and
Development Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-square meter
parcel of land to be used for building and operating the coal-fired
power plant.
On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first
amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional components, among
others.
Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to
amend the ECC. Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired
power plant, as originally planned, it now sought to construct a
1x300-MW coal-fired power plant. In support of its request, RP
Energy submitted a Project Description Report (PDR) to the DENR-
EMB.
On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and
further amended the ECC (second amendment).
On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales
issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a
coal-fired thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag,
Subic, Zambales.
On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City
issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its strong
objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.
On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casio, et al and John Carlo
delos Reyes (Casio Group) filed before this Court a Petition for
Writ of Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon
Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR.
The Casio Group's arguments
The Casio Group, in essence, argues that it is entitled to a Writ
of Kalikasan as it was able to prove that the operation of the power
plant would cause environmental damage and pollution, and that
this would adversely affect the residents of the provinces of Bataan
and Zambales, particularly the municipalities of Subic, Morong,
Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo. It cites as basis RP Energy's
EIS, which allegedly admits that acid rain may occur in the
combustion of coal; that the incidence of asthma attacks among
residents in the vicinity of the project site may increase due to
exposure to suspended particles from plant operations; and that
increased sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions
may occur during plant operations. It also claims that when the
SBMA conducted Social Acceptability Policy Consultations with
different stakeholders on the proposed power plant, the results
indicated that the overall persuasion of the participants was a clear
aversion to the project due to environmental, health, economic and
socio-cultural concerns. Finally, it contends that the ECC third
amendment should also be nullified for failure to comply with the
procedures and requirements for the issuance of the ECC.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Casio Group presented three witnesses, namely: (1)
Raymond V. Palatino, a two-term representative of
the Kabataan Partylist in the House of Representatives; (2) Alex C.
Hermoso, the convenor of the Zambales-Olongapo City Civil
Society Network, a director of the PREDA Foundation, and a
member of the Zambales Chapter of the Kaya Natin Movement
and the Zambales Chapter of the People Power Volunteers for
Reform; and (3) Ramon Lacbain, the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Zambales.
Issue:
Whether the Casio Group was able to prove that the construction
and operation of the power plant will cause grave environmental
damage.
Held:
Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casio Group are
not experts on the CFB technology or on environmental matters.
These witnesses even admitted on cross-examination that they are
not competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject
project. What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical
knowledge of the project design/implementation or some other
aspects of the project, even those not requiring expert knowledge,
vis--vis the significant negative environmental impacts which the
Casio Group alleged will occur. Clearly, the Casio Group failed to
carry the onus of proving the alleged significant negative
environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP Energy
presented several experts to refute the allegations of the Casio
Group.
As aptly and extensively discussed by the appellate court:
Petitioners presented three (3) witnesses, namely, Palatino,
Hermoso, and Lacbain, all of whom are not experts on the CFB
technology or even on environmental matters. Petitioners did not
present any witness from Morong or Hermosa. Palatino, a
former freelance writer and now a Congressman representing
the Kabataan Partylist, with a degree of BS Education major in
Social Studies, admitted that he is not a technical expert.
Hermoso, a Director of the PREDA foundation which is allegedly
involved on environmental concerns, and a member of
Greenpeace, is not an expert on the matter subject of this case.
He is a graduate of BS Sociology and a practicing business
director involved in social development and social welfare
services. Lacbain, incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of
Zambales, an accounting graduate with a Master in Public
Administration, was a former Banco Filipino teller,
entertainment manager, disco manager, marketing manager and
college instructor, and is also not an expert on the CFB
technology. Lacbain also admitted that he is neither a scientist
nor an expert on matters of the environment.
Petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites
culled from the internet. However, the said scientific studies and
articles including the alleged Key Observations and
Recommendations on the EIS of the Proposed RPE Project by Rex
Victor O. Cruz (Exhibit "DDDDD") attached to the Petition, were
not testified to by an expert witness, and are basically hearsay in
nature and cannot be given probative weight. The article
purportedly written by Rex Victor O. Cruz was not even signed by
the said author, which fact was confirmed by Palatino.
Petitioners' witness, Lacbain, admitted that he did not personally
conduct any study on the environmental or health effects of a coal-
fired power plant, but only attended seminars and conferences
pertaining to climate change; and that the scientific studies
mentioned in the penultimate whereas clause of Resolution No.
2011-149 (Exhibit "AAAAA") of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zambales is based on what he read on the internet, seminars he
attended and what he heard from unnamed experts in the field of
environmental protection.
In his Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit "HHHHH"), Palatino stated that he
was furnished by the concerned residents the Key Observations and
Recommendations on the EIS of Proposed RPE Project by Rex
Victor O. Cruz, and that he merely received and read the five (5)
scientific studies and articles which challenge the CFB technology.
Palatino also testified that: he was only furnished by the petitioners
copies of the studies mentioned in his Judicial Affidavit and he did
not participate in the execution, formulation or preparation of any of
the said documents; he does not personally know Rex Cruz or any of
the authors of the studies included in his Judicial Affidavit; he did
not read other materials about coal-fired power plants; he is not
aware of the acceptable standards as far as the operation of a coal-
fired power plant is concerned; petitioner Velarmino was the one
who furnished him copies of the documents in reference to the MOU
and some papers related to the case; petitioner Peralta was the one
who e-mailed to him the soft copy of all the documents [letters (a) to
(o) of his Judicial Affidavit], except the LGU Resolutions; and he has
never been at the actual Power Plant project site. It must be noted
that petitioners Velarmino and Peralta were never presented as
witnesses in this case. In addition, Palatino did not identify the said
studies but simply confirmed that the said studies were attached to
the Petition.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to
those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness' own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters
which he or she merely learned from others either because said
witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth
of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general
rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as
oral statements. There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule
under the Rules of Court, among which are learned treatises under
Section 46 of Rule 130, viz.:
"SEC. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible
as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court
takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that
the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject."
The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the Petition cannot be
classified as learned treatises. We cannot take judicial notice of the
same, and no witness expert in the subject matter of this case
testified, that the writers of the said scientific studies are
recognized in their profession or calling as experts in the subject.
SEC. 47 TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER
PROCEEDING
MILAGROS ILAO-QUIANAY and SERGIO ILAO, as Joint
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Simplicio Ilao, and
AMBROSIA ILAO, petitioners, vs. RODOLFO
MAPILE, respondent
Facts:
Subject of the case was a parcel of land owned by the deceased
Simplicio Ilao, in a judicial settlement of Ilaos estate, the heirs
found an adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT no. 48529
claimed by certain Juanito Ibarra. Respondent filed a motion to
exclude property from inventory on ground that it does not form part
of Ilaos estate having disposed of during lifetime. Petitioners filed a
case for quieting of title and damages before the RTC of Manila.
Relevantly, Ibarra filed a petition for issuance of new owners
duplicate copy of subject property on the ground that it was lost by
fire. Respondent filed a case for specific performance and declaring a
nullity of Contract claiming that claim of Ibarra over the property
was sold to him. Trial Court rendered decision upholding the validity
of the notarized Deed of Sale due to the conflicting testimonies of
the two handwriting experts. they appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial courts decision.
Petitioners question the probative value given by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to the notarized deed of sale. They stress that
the trial court even went to the extent of admitting in evidence
the transcript of the testimony of the notary public who
purportedly notarized the document taken in LRC Cad. Rec. No.
271 in which petitioners were not named parties, while the
appellate court for its part sustained the lower court's action.
Issue:
On the objection to the admission in evidence of the testimony of the
notary public taken in another case and as regards the hearsay nature
of his testimony on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the
property to Ibarra, respondent cites the decision of the appellate court
ruling that these testimonies may be admitted as independently
relevant evidence and as part of respondent's narration.
Held:
In this connection, we have to say that petitioners' objection to the
admission in evidence of the testimony of the notary public who
supposedly notarized the deed of sale taken in another case in which
petitioners were not parties is persuasive. Such testimony does not
qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given at a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given
at a former proceeding obtains in this case. Not only were petitioners
not parties to the former proceeding and hence without opportunity
to cross-examine the notary public, there was also no proof that the
notary public was already deceased or unable to testify. Hence, the
testimony should not have been accorded any probative weight.
The same cannot be said, however, of the testimony of respondent
relevant to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed
of sale between Ilao and Ibarra. It should be noted that what was
sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in
evidence, was the fact that the statements were made by Ibarra, not
necessarily that the matters stated were true. The utterances are in the
nature of independently relevant statements which may be admitted
in evidence as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof.
It has been said that where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a
statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule
does not apply, and the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the
making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact. On this basis, the
statements attributed to Ibarra regarding the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the deed of sale related to the court by
respondent are admissible if only to establish the fact that such
statements were made and the tenor thereof.
DAMASO T. AMBRAY and CEFERINO T. AMBRAY,
JR., petitioners, vs. SYLVIA A. TSOUROUS, CARMENCITA
AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY AMBRAY-AZORES, VIVIEN
AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY AMBRAY-ESCUDERO,
MARISTELA AMBRAY-ILAGAN, ELIZABETH AMBRAY-
SORIANO, MA. LUISA FE AMBRAY-ARCILLA, and
CRISTINA AMBRAY-LABIT, respondents.
Facts:
The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of land
described as Lot 2-C of subdivision plan Psd-04-009554, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-41382 of the Register of
Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2-C) in the name of petitioners
Damaso T. Ambray (Damaso) and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. (Ceferino,
Jr.; collectively, petitioners).
Petitioners and respondents Sylvia A. Tsourous, Carmencita
Ambray-Laurel, Hedy Ambray-Azores, Vivien Ambray-Yatco,
Nancy Ambray-Escudero, Maristela Ambray-Ilagan (Maristela),
Elizabeth Ambray-Soriano, Ma. Fe Luisa Ambray-Arcilla (Ma. Fe
Luisa), and Cristina Ambray-Labit are siblings. With the exception
of Sylvia, they are the children of the late Ceferino Ambray
(Ceferino, Sr.) and Estela Trias (Estela), who passed away on
February 5, 1987 and August 15, 2002, respectively.
During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several
properties, one of which was a parcel of land located in San Pablo
City, Laguna denominated as Lot 2 of subdivision plan Pcs-12441.
On December 28, 1977, Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila
Bank for the amount of P180,000.00. The mortgage was discharged
on September 16, 1984.
Prior to the discharge of the mortgage or sometime in August 1984,
Lot 2 was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and the
subject property, Lot 2-C, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-
11259. Lot 2-C was registered in Ceferino, Sr.'s name in
accordance with his letter dated August 29, 1984 requesting the
Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register Lot 2-C in his
name. Thus, TCT No. T-22749 was issued covering the said
parcel under the name of Ceferino, Sr., married to Estela.
In June 1996, Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749
covering Lot 2-C had been cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. T-
41382 was issued in the name of petitioners. It appears that by
virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale) dated
January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela,
allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the consolidation subd. plan
(LRC) Pcs-12441" to petitioners for a consideration of
P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds of San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996.
This prompted respondents to file a criminal case for falsification
of public document against petitioners, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T. Ambray" and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 39153 (falsification case) before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City.
In a Decision dated October 30, 2000, the MTCC acquitted
petitioners of the charge for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, respondents filed the instant complaint for
annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against
petitioners and Estela (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No.
SP-5831 (01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of
Sale were null and void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr.
and Estela thereon were forgeries.
In a motion to dismiss, defendants claimed that the issue on the
authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the
Deed of Sale had already been passed upon in the falsification
case where petitioners were eventually acquitted; hence, the
matter was res judicata. In an Order dated June 6, 2002, the
RTC granted the motion and dismissed the case on said ground.
On appeal, however, the CA reversed the said disposition in a
Decision dated September 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75507,
finding that res judicata does not apply. Thus, it remanded the case
to the RTC for further proceedings.
Before the RTC, petitioners filed their answer and disclosed the
death of their co-defendant and mother, Estela, who passed away on
August 15, 2002. By way of defense, they averred, inter alia, that
respondents were aware of the conveyance of Lot 2-C to them
through the Deed of Sale. They also claimed that respondents' action
has prescribed, and maintained that it was barred by prior judgment
and res judicata.
Subsequently, citing an Affidavit dated February 18, 2008 executed
by Ma. Fe Luisa, the rest of the respondents moved that she be
dropped as a plaintiff, which the RTC granted. Thereafter, she was
ordered impleaded as a party-defendant in respondents' supplemental
complaint. Later, she adopted petitioners' answer with counterclaim
in response thereto.
Issue:
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
erred in affirming the RTC's nullification of the Deed of Sale dated
January 16, 1978 and TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot 2-C in the
name of petitioners.
Held:
In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to
prove their allegation of forgery is Questioned Documents Report
No. 266-397 dated March 24, 1997 issued by National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner II Antonio R. Magbojos
(Magbojos), stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on
the Deed of Sale, when compared to standard sample signatures, are
not written by one and the same person.
In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia, the testimony
of their mother, Estela, in the falsification case where petitioners
were previously acquitted. In the course thereof, she identified the
signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.'s, which was
fully corroborated by Atty. Zosimo Tanalega (Atty. Tanalega), the
notary public who notarized the subject Deed of Sale and was
present at the time the Ambray spouses affixed their signatures
thereon.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by
respondents and the testimony given by Estela in the falsification
case in support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater
evidentiary weight in favor of the latter. Hence, respondent's
complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages in
Civil Case No. SP-5831 (01) should be dismissed.
Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in the present
case finds basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or
the "rule on former testimony" which provides:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied:(a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by
the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness in the former case. The reasons for the
admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding
are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.
However, before the former testimony can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate
therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission
of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.
Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these
proceedings before the RTC or on August 15, 2002. Her death
transpired before the presentation of the parties' evidence could
ensue. However, she was able to testify on direct and cross-
examination in the falsification case and affirmed that the alleged
forged signatures appearing on the Deed of Sale were, indeed, hers
and her deceased husband, Ceferino, Sr.'s. The parties in the
falsification case involved respondents and petitioners herein, and
the subject matter therein and in this case are one and the same, i.e.,
the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr.
and Estela.
Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case,
being admissible in evidence in these proceedings, deserves
significant consideration. She gave positive testimony that it was
Ceferino, Sr. himself who signed the Deed of Sale that conveyed
Lot 2-C to petitioners. She likewise verified her signature
thereon. By virtue of these declarations, she confirmed the
genuineness and authenticity of the questioned signatures. Thus,
it follows that the Deed of Sale itself is valid and duly executed,
contrary to the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that it
was of spurious nature.
Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the
well-settled principle that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima
facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the
full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn
this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that
gave rise to a spurious contract.
Hence, for the above-state reasons, whatever inferences the RTC had
observed tending to defeat the existence of a valid sale in favor of
petitioners are rendered inconsequential.
SEC 49 OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA
NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN,
SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN
NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III,
MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA
NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-
REJUSO, respondents.||| (Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., G.R. No.
198240, [July 3, 2013])
Facts:
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died
in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind several parcels of
land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos,
herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their
only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the
respondents herein.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are
claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents
based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to
Andres, Jr.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through
Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting
examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2
Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.'s signature on the
affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr.
were not written by one and the same person.
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed
of donation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate,
where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez
as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the
handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting
PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due
process since no notice was given to them before the examination
was conducted. Thus, PO2 Alvarez's report is a worthless piece of
paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
In its Order dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted
respondents' motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez's supposed testimony would be
hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged
handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez
to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness,
because her testimony is not yet needed.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied
their motion in an Order dated October 11, 2005.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which however, dismissed their petition in the assailed Decision
dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez's
disqualification as a witness.
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution dated July 29, 2011. The CA refused to take judicial
notice of the decision of another CA Division which reinstated Civil
Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial
notice of decisions or matters pending before another Division of the
appellate court where he or she is not a member. The CA also held
that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it that Civil
Case No. 5215 was reinstated.
Issue:
Whether or not PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified.
Held:
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections
21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies
a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies
a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section
24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.
The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely
perceive and make known her perception to others. We have no
doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents' motion
to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was
not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC
rather confused the qualification of the witness with the
credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that
the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. CDHAcI
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamani's signature was forged after considering the testimony of the
PNP document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied
forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the
value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his
mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon
the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez's testimony
would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as
the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the
RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez's testimony is
hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to
the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have
issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC
ruling.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the courts. Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein
this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to
prove forgeries. However, we have also recognized that
handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining
forged documents. More important, analysis of the questioned
signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres
Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an
expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the
opinion of an expert witness. The value of PO2 Alvarez's expert
opinion cannot be determined if PO2 Alvarez is not even allowed to
testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.
EDWIN TABAO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE:

It has been held of expert testimonies:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they
may choose upon such testimonies in accordance
with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the trial court to decide, considering
the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the
relative opportunities for study and observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in
the case and when common knowledge utterly fails,
the expert opinion may be given controlling
effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse
of discretion.
FACTS:
Edwin Tabao was driving his car along Governor
Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly
ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was
crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown
into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo
Mendez speeding car ran over Rochelles body. Bystanders armed
with stones and wooden clubs followed Mendez car until it stopped
near the Nagtahan Flyover. Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery
boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went
inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license, and
ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order,
but his car hit the center island twice while backing up. Cielo went
out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and
the petitioner brought Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three
of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to
the USTHospital, where she died on February 6, 1993 due
to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.
The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause
and thereafter charged the petitioner and Mendez with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. The RTC, in its decision dated
September 15, 2003, found that it was very clear that both accused are
responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete, and convicted the two
(2) accused of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide
RULING:
The petitioner was
positively identified by an
eyewitness
What remain to be proven beyond reasonable doubt are the
inexcusable lack in precaution on the part of the petitioner and the
direct link of his negligence to the victims death.
An eyewitness account established that the petitioners
vehicle actually hit Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness identification is
vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure
of the prosecution. One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor Soriano,
unfortunately for the petitioners cause, saw the incident in its
entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime.
The positive identification in this case, coupled with the
failure of the defense to impute any ill-motive on the eyewitness, to
our mind, works to dispel reasonable doubt on the fact that
the petitioners car had in fact hit Rochelle. The eyewitness account
provides the necessary link between the petitioners failure to exercise
precaution in operating his vehicle and Rochelle Lanetes death.
Weight of expert testimony
The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Section
49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court when it disregarded the
testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo
Cornelio who testified that the petitioners car could not have bumped
the victim because the latters body was not thrown in line with the
car, but on its side. The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is
highly qualified in the field of traffic accident investigation, and as
such, his statements are backed-up by [the] principles of applied
physics, engineering, and mathematics.
The petitioners arguments fail to convince us.
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states
that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the word may
signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive
and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the
testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the
testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an
expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to
sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the
court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the
court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of
the attendant facts and the applicable law.
We emphasize that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an
eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was merely based on the
Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself
did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp.
Cornelios testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner
could not have been involved in the incident. For clarity, we
reproduce the pertinent portions of P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony:
Q: So, that probability is also possible aside from
the probability that you said the victim is
thrown in line or in front. So, you are now
saying it could be said that the victim can
be thrown sidewise?
A: It [may be] thrown sidewise. As I said [a while]
ago, it might be slightly offset with the
vehicle that hit the pedestrian but not too
far from the side of the bumping vehicle.
Q: Whether it is forward or sidewise, the distance
of the object thrown would depend on the
speed of the vehicle that bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: You said it could be thrown sidewise do I take
it correct[ly,] it can be thrown sidewise
also?
A: Maybe. As I have said [a while] ago, it [may
be] slightly offset with the line of the
vehicle.
xxxx
Q: So, do we take it from you that your basis only of
telling the court that Tabao is not in [any
way] responsible is the distance of the
victim from the car that bumped?
 A: I am not saying categorically that the car of
Tabao is not responsible. But as I can see
in the sketch presented today in this
Honorable Court, the position of the victim
is too far from the vehicle of Mr. Tabao. If I
were the investigator in this particular case, I
should indicate the measurement of the
victim from the car and this sketch [does] SEC 50 OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESS
not indicate the distance.
Q: Now, failure of the investigator to indicate the DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO VS REBECCA BIONG
distance, would that show that it was not
Tabao who bumped the victim? FACTS
A: I cannot say categorically that the car of Tabao
indeed, hit the victim. Because the distance
is very significant in this sketch for proper Juan dela Llana was a car along North Avenue, Quezon City. His
evaluation. sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while
a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.
xxxx
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the
Q: So, it cannot be said that when an object is signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump
bumped by a vehicle, it will be thrown truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the cars rear
forward. It will all depend on which end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars
portion of the bumper hit by object rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass
bumped? splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor
A: Yes, Maam. wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any
other visible physical injuries.
From the foregoing, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not
The traffic investigation report identified the truck driver as Joel
discount the possibility that the victim could have been thrown on the
side. He likewise admitted that the location of an accident victim in Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the
relation to the vehicle would also depend on the speed of the vehicle truck. Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent
and the point of impact. Rebecca Biong

Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side
of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days
passed by. She consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla who told her that
she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. On
October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck,
between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but
incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession
since June 2000 despite the surgery. Dra. dela Llana, on October 16,
2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay.
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of
action against her as no reasonable relation existed between the
vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. She pointed out that
Dra. dela Llanas illness became manifest one month and one week
from the date of the vehicular accident
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary
witness and Joel as a hostile witness.
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm
because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified
and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000
issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela
Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical
history and physical examinations.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has
probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that an
uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion
merely relates to matters of common knowledge. She maintains
that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation
between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial
judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common
in vehicular collisions.
The Issue
Whether or not Dra. dela Llanas medical certificate has
probative value.
RULING:
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his
allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation
between Joels negligence and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury
rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not
have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of
evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of
evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and
the whiplash injury.
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela
Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone
physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as
an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially
claimed in her testimony that Joels reckless driving caused her
whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a
physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology,
we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joels reckless driving
caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial
difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness.
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an
admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary
testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple
exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the
assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion
and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
In the present case, Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be
given probative value for the reason that she was not presented as an
expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to
testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial,
nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as
well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause
by preponderance of evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN
DOCTRINE:
Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J.
Francisco writes in his treatise:
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the
party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
....
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the
sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had
sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and
conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the
witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his
opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court
of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the
sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or
dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance,
or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness
own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the
basis for his opinion.
FACTS:
Upon arraignment, Duranan pleaded not guilty to each charge of
rape against him, whereupon he was tried.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant
AAA, complainants mother BBB, and the attending medico-legal
officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents
in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth
grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores for
her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainants family in
the same apartment in xxx where he rented a room that he shared
with several other people.
Accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged
her inside the common bathroom. She claimed that accused-appellant
was able to rape her while standing up despite her resistance.
The second incident, accused-appellant pulled her from her house
and took her to his room. Complainant said she was forced to submit
to accused-appellants lust because of his threats. After the incident,
accused-appellant sent her letters professing love for her and telling
her how beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters
after reading them.
BBB testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly
followed by accused-appellant. BBB noticed that her daughters
lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter about it,
the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. BBB
went to Camp Karingal, together with complainant and her other
children, CCC and DDD, where they filed affidavits and two
informations.
They then took complainant to Camp Crame for examination. Dr.
Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant, explained that the
term congested used in reference to the labia minora meant that there
was some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due
to intercourse. Taken together with the presence of a shallow
hymenal laceration, this finding indicates the possibility of
intercourse that caused complainants loss of virginity within the last
five days.
Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a
decision on April 22, 1998, finding the accused-appellant guilty of
two counts of rape.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since
the victims mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art.
335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the
prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation
of the complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is
under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the
retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental
evaluation be waived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AAA is mentally retarded
RULING:
In the case at bar, BBB testified on the mental condition of her
daughter, Duranan points to the mothers statement that complainant
is quite intelligent. The statement that complainant is quite intelligent
must be read in the context of BBBs previous statement that
complainant thinks like a child but from her narration or statement
we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable. Thus,
what complainants mother meant was that complainant, although she
thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others what happened to
her.
Indeed, even the trial court admonished the defense counsel not to
use inculpatory questions because complainant might give
inculpatory answers At another stage of the trial, the trial court
reminded counsel, The witness [complainant] is not very
intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish dates.
Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she
was mentally deficient. The rule that findings of fact of the trial court
should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position to
determine the findings of fact cannot be more apt than in this case.
Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes
complainant as coherent and contends that this is an evaluation of the
mental state of complainant. This contention is totally without
basis. The medicolegal report categorically states that the purpose of
the medical examination is limited to determining whether the
complainant had been sexually abused. In other words, the purpose
of the examination was to determine her physical, not her mental,
state.
In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the
testimony of her mother, the trial courts observations during the trial
of her demeanor, behavior, and her intelligence, while the fact of
sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate. In
addition, the prosecution proved the presence of force and
intimidation, and the court appreciated such. The intimidation, in this
case, is constituted by the threats that accused-appellant made to the
complainant, not to mention the force employed by accused-
appellant in placing his arm on the complainants neck and holding
her hands while undressing her.
CECILIO HERNANDEZ VS JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS
FACTS:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February
14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan
Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications
during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of
her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children,
petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun
and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of
Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan
family. Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was
then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However,
due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she
reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given
full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even
finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual
administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993,
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her
maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after
learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided
to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners
Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance
of P400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight,
unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was
occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without
running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu
urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene,
respondent brought her to several physicians for medical
examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis,
rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several
complications.
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and
accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners. However, the demand
was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for
guardianship in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify
on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez
families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-
siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land
from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated
by the Hernandez family as they lived a luxurious lifestyle. When
asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and
half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus
examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. Not
only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering
from its complications, she also had an existing artheroselorotic
cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity).
Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus
intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental
state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer
her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001, the RTC concluded
that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need
to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu.
Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as
guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA
alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive
in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. The CA granted the
petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian,
was entitled to her custody
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lulu is incompetent and requires the
appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and
property.
RULING:
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending
physicians regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence
as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to
prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should
have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of
her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live
with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family
Code, legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-
blood are required to support each other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments
before the courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined
in Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and
convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to
violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being
physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and imaginary pets
she called Michael and Madonna. The November 21, 2005 medical
report stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis
but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary
witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person
with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed
them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her
intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below
normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert
opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental
sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before
the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though
of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other
similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who
may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA
both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her
properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind.
Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an
incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence
presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of
fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a
petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case. We
thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and
appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's
appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We therefore affirm her
appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for
and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.
SPS. WILLIAM and JULIE LIM, SPS. EDGAR and JUDY
LIM, STEVENS C. LIM, EDWIN C. LIM, JOSEPH C.
LIM, RAFAEL Y. CHUATOCO, TERESITA Y.
CHUATOCO and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
MANILA, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO, JORGE, FELIPE
and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
CHUATOCO, respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Chuatoco and Leoncia Yap were the registered
owners of a 365-square meter land with improvements located at
Calle Veronica St., Binondo, Manila. On the property, the spouses
established the Binondo Maternity Hospital and School of
Midwifery, reserving the buildings second floor as the family
residence.
In November 1972, Jose died. On 20 January 1981, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13935 in the name of the spouses Jose
and Leoncia was replaced by TCT No. 142406 in the names of
Leoncia and their children. Soon thereafter, Leoncia died.
Respondents alleged that their brother Rafael had in the
meantime succeeded in obtaining title to the property in his own
name by using a fictitious deed of sale dated 27 February 1979,
purportedly executed by them and their deceased mother
Leoncia in favor of Rafael. It would later be claimed by
respondents that their signatures, as they appeared on the deed of
sale, were forged. On 15 April 1982, TCT No. 142406 was cancelled
and TCT No. 148821 was issued in the name of Rafael.
After obtaining the reconstituted title, Rafael, acting through his
wife and attorney-in-fact, Teresita, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 6 June 1986 to petitioners Lim covering the disputed
property for the sum of P600,000.00. The Lims subsequently caused
the cancellation of TCT No. 148821 in the name of Rafael and TCT
No. 169859 was issued in their names.
In 1991, after the Lims refused to heed the demands of
respondents for the reconveyance of the property, a complaint was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Manila.
Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale
purportedly executed by them in favor of Rafael, as well as the deed
of sale executed by Rafael in favor of the Lims; the cancellation of
TCT No. 169859 in the name of the Lims; and for the return of the
property to them.
Assessing the evidence before it, the RTC rendered its Decision
on 21 November 2000 dismissing the complaint. It declared that the
deed of sale dated 27 February 1979 was void only with respect to
the undivided shares of Eduardo, Jorge, and Felipe Chuatoco, whose
signatures on the questioned deed were proven to be forged.
However, the trial court ruled that since the property was already
titled in the name of Rafael before it was sold to petitioners, the latter
had the right to rely upon what appeared on the certificate of title
otherwise the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate
of Title would be rendered illusory. The trial court also debunked
respondents contention that they had no knowledge of the sale of the
property to the Lims in view of their admission that in 1989 they met
with Jaime Lim, the father of petitioners, and asked the latter to
return the property to them and in exchange, they would return the
price paid by the Lims for the property.
The Court of Appeals in its now assailed Decision reversed the
trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Wheher or not petitioners are buyers in good faith
RULING:
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that forgery
had attended the execution of the Deed of Sale, albeit in varying
degrees. The Court is persuaded by the appellate courts conclusion
that all of the signatures therein were forged, and not just that of
Eduardo, Jorge, and Felipe. The RTC had declared that the forgeries
of these three signatures had been established by the document
examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). While the
NBI expert had not formed an opinion on the genuineness of the
signatures of Leoncia and Francisco, it was merely because the
specimen signatures submitted to him were insufficient. However,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that even in the absence of
expert testimony, the falsity of the signatures of Leoncia and
Francisco had been sufficiently established by Franciscos direct
repudiation of his signature, as well as the denials by Eduardo and
Jorge of their mothers signature.
While the testimony of a person, disavowing the genuineness of
his signature may seem self-serving at first blush, such as that
proferred by Francisco, it cannot be ignored that such person is in the
best position to know whether or not the signature on the check was
his, and averments he would have on the matter, if adjudged as
truthful, deserve primacy in consideration. On the other hand, the
denials of Eduardo and Jorge of their mothers signature may be
properly appreciated in evidence, as Section 50, Rule 130 allows
the opinion of an ordinary witness to be received in evidence
regarding a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity.
The appellate court committed no error in ruling that Eduardo
would probably be the most reliable witness to testify on the
handwriting of his mother because he had worked closely with
and exchanged papers and communications with Leoncia on a
regular basis, the latter being then the administrator of the
properties left by Jose.
 The fraudulent registration of the property in Rafaels name
using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the entire
property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive
evidence of title; registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence
of such title over a particular property. Certificates of title merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as
a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of others. The Torrens sytem has never been
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.
However, it is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent
document may become the root of a valid title, if the property has
already been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the
forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals
with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a
forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title. In the final
analysis, the resolution of this case depends on whether the
petitioners are purchasers in good faith.
In analyzing this question, the initial premise should be that the
Lims had acted in good faith and therefore they are innocent
purchasers for value.
There was no demand on the part of the Lims that they become
privy to whatever arrangements or transfers the Chuatocos may have
had among themselves. The Lims had no obligation to look beyond
the face of the Torrens title.
It likewise does not escape our attention that the Lims
nonetheless exerted efforts beyond a facial examination of the title to
verify the ownership thereof. As admitted by respondents, William
and Edgar Lim, along with Atty. Apolonio Rivera, went to the
Register of Deeds of Manila to verify Rafaels claim over the
property, and saw therein the Deed of Sale executed by respondents
and their mother in favor of Rafael, as well as the certificates of title.
They discovered that indeed, TCT No. 148821 was issued solely in
the name of Rafael, canceling TCT No. 142406 issued in the name of
Leoncia Chuatoco and her sons.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
SEC 51
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL LEE
DOCTRINE:
1. x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed
of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability
of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),
such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the
killing is committed through treachery or premeditation.
The proof of such character may only be allowed in
homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable
belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and
a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action
was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases
of murder.
 2. Character is defined to be the possession by a person of
certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him
from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a
person derived from the common report of the people who
are acquainted with him; his reputation. Good moral
character includes all the elements essential to make up such
a character; among these are common honesty and veracity,
especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
measures up as good among people of the community in
which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the
average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good
behavior and upright conduct.
Facts:
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in
the living room of their house. The living room was brightly lit by a
circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was an
alley leading to General Evangelista Street. In their living room,
mother and son were watching a basketball game on
television. Herminia looked away from the game and casually
glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding
a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up
and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window
and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him,
Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously,
appellant fired his gun hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the
sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant
fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more two hit the
sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were fired,
Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a
blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned
to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for help. With
the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the
MCU Hospital where he later died.
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about
the shooting incident. Herminia told them that her son was shot by
Noel Lee.
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has
several criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. He was
charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in
1989.
Noel Lee had known the victim since childhood and their
houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their
neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death,
Lee caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph
scampered away. As proof of the victims bad reputation, appellant
presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed
to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City. In the letter,
Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation
because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief.
Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just steal but
kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal
cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989. The information for
attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims desistance
while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and
admitted his crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee is guilty of murder
RULING:
Accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in
their community.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is
regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so
that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the
issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of
the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt
to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual
inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the
court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man
may have a righteous cause. There are exceptions to this rule
however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130
provides that the accused may prove his good moral character which
is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When
the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this
strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character
and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused
did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the
theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not
likely to have committed the act charged against him. Sub-
paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad
moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such
evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused
who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he is a person of bad character. The offering of character
evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the
prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to
produce such evidence. Once the defendant raises the issue of his
good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from
refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false
character upon the tribunal.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer
to character evidence of the accused. And this evidence must be
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged, meaning,
that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind
of the act charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on
a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a
charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity. Sub-
paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of
the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim
of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in
a rape case.
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the
offended party is applied with frequency in sex offenses and
homicide. In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution
involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman
where the willingness of a woman is material, the womans character
as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented
to the mans act. The exception to this is when the womans consent is
immaterial such as in statutory rape or rape with violence or
intimidation. In the crimes of qualified seduction or consented
abduction, the offended party must be a virgin, which is presumed if
she is unmarried and of good reputation, or a virtuous woman of
good reputation. The crime of simple seduction involves the
seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation,
over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x. The burden of
proof that the complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the
prosecution, and the accused may introduce evidence that the
complainant is a woman of bad reputation.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is
admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceaseds
aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.
The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the
deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case
may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the
accused was the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove self-
defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also
admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent
danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the
victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of
his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the
aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with
his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the
positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims
bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from
whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not
necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and
premeditation.
RULE 131 BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
SEC 1 BURDEN OF PROOF
SUPREME TRANSLINER INC., FELIPE SIA and NOVENCIO
FLORES, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GLORIA
BRAZAL and minor LOTIS BRAZAL
FACTS:
Petitioners Supreme Transliner Inc. and Felipe Sia are the
registered owners of a bus driven by co-petitioner Novencio
Flores. On September 24, 1990, the bus collided with a passenger
jeepney carrying private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. At the
time of the incident, the jeepney was owned and registered in the
name of Marcelino Villones and driven by Reynaldo Decena.
As a result of the collision, private respondents suffered
injuries. They instituted Civil Case No. SP-3312 for damages against
petitioners based on quasi-delict and against Villones and Decena for
breach of contract.
Decena recounted that he was driving a passenger jeepney
bound for Candelaria, Quezon. On board, the jeepney was about
fifteen passengers, including private respondents Gloria and Lotis
Brazal. Upon reaching Sampaloc, Sariaya, Quezon, a Supreme
Transliner bus coming from the opposite direction, suddenly
appeared on a curved portion of the road and overtook another
jeepney, which it was then following. Thereafter, the bus collided
with Decenas jeepney.
Petitioners presented Novencio Flores and Moises Alvarez, the
Manager of Supreme Transliner. Both testified that the passenger
jeepney was running very fast when the accident occurred.
The trial court declared that Flores was negligent in operating
the bus, while Sia failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the choice, supervision and direction of his employees.
The Court of Appeals found that there was competent and
preponderant evidence which showed that driver Novencio Flores
negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap and that Felipe Sia
failed to perform the required degree of care in the selection and
supervision of the bus driver. It also found that the actual damages
representing the medical expenses incurred by private respondents
were properly supported by receipts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants sufficiently proved that petitioner is
guilty
RULING:
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The
party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable
judgment. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which
is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of
action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e. an
avoidance of the claim.
In this case, both private respondents as well as the jeepney
driver Reynaldo Decena and its owner Marcelino Villones claim that
the bus driver, Novencio Flores, was liable for negligently operating
the bus. For private respondents, the claim constitutes their cause of
action against petitioners which said private respondents must prove
by preponderance of evidence. At the same time, the same claim is a
matter of affirmative defense on the part of Decena and Villones who
are impleaded as co-defendants of petitioners. Therefore, both
private respondents as well as the said co-defendants had the
burden of proving petitioners negligence by the quantum of
proof required to establish the latters liability, i.e. by
preponderance of evidence.
The evidence presented by the jeepney owner and its driver,
Villones and Decena, forms part of the totality of the evidence
concerning the negligence committed by petitioners as defendants
in quasi-delict case. Preponderance of evidence is determined by
considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from
the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it. [11] Petitioners
liability were proved by the evidence presented by Decena and
Villones at the trial, taken together with the evidence presented by
the victims of the collision, namely herein private respondents Gloria
and Lotis Brazal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIUS KINOK alias
"YOS BLA-AN" and TAPANTE SALIGAN alias
"TAPANTE BLA-AN",
DOCTRINE:
x x x [The witness], of course, has a right not to do so and his failure
and/or refusal to testify shall not in any manner prejudice or be taken
against him. But when the prosecution has already established
a prima facie case, more so when the offense charged is grave and
sufficient enough to send the accused behind bars for life or may
even warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death, then in
order to meet and destroy the effects of said prima facie case and so
as to shift the burden of producing further evidence to the
prosecution, the party making the denial must produce evidence
tending to negate the blame asserted to such a point that, if no more
evidence is given, his adversary cannot win the case beyond
reasonable doubt. In such a situation, it may be necessary for the
accused to have a complete destruction of the prosecutions prima
facie case, that he take the stand since no hardship will in any
way be imposed upon him nor advantage be taken of him.
FACTS:
Luz Aguipo heard two persons calling out to buy rice. When William
later called out to Luz whether she had change for P100.00, she
answered that she had none. She went down the house and saw
accused Julius Kinok and Tapante Saligan. The duo were thus unable
to buy the rice as the couple had no change. The two accused then
asked if the couple had corn grits. They replied that there was none
available.
At around 12:30 oclock past midnight, Luz was awakened by a
muffled gunburst. She immediately got up, looked over the window
and saw the two accused both holding guns which were pointed at
where her husband, William, was later found dead. She was able to
identify the two as the moon and stars were shinning brightly and
besides there was a pile of woods and bamboos (bagacay) which
were burning around eight (8) meters away from where the two
accused were. Not long after, the two accused ran away. Thereafter,
Luz went back to lie down on her bed (p.10, id.). She could not go
back to sleep because she was scared that the two would come back
to strafe their house and kill them all.
While all these were going on, Ronel Mande, the 13-year old
nephew of the couple was himself awakened by the noise coming
from the horse and pigs. When he tried to look at the place where the
horse and pigs were, he saw the two accused both holding firearms
which were directed and poked at the walling of the store where
William was sleeping He saw both accused clearly since the moon
was shining brightly and the pile of woods he had previously set fire
earlier in the evening was burning just around eight (8) meters away
from where the accused were. Upon noticing that both accused had
pointed their guns toward the store where his uncle William was
sleeping, he tried to look at the wooden railings. As he was looking,
he heard a muffled gunburst. Thereupon, he ducked and lay down on
the floor. Feeling very much scared, he covered himself with a
blanket
After the burial of her husband on October 9, 1989, she went to the
Kiblawan Police Station and executed a sworn statement to support
her complaint against the two accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants are guilty of the crime murder
RULING:
Instead of controverting the testimonies and defending
themselves, appellants merely chose to remain silent. They relied
solely on the testimonies of their barriomates who claimed that Luz
Aguipo and Ronel Mande did not inform them of the names of
the perpetrators.
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove
beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but
likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of
the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does
not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the
trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in
discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient
to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the
information or has established a prima facie case against the
accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it
incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and
nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.
Appellants unexplainable silence, in the midst of the
overwhelming evidence established by the prosecution against them,
leads to no other conclusion than that they are guilty as charged.
Luz testified that she feared for her life as well as her
family. She was also convinced that appellants would flee to the
mountains and might no longer be apprehended. Likewise, in her
barangay, many residents have been killed in the past. Although the
culprits were identified, the barangay officials would usually fix the
cases because they themselves are afraid of the people in the
mountains. Similarly, she did not immediately bring the matter to the
police authorities because she was then busy attending to the burial
arrangements of her husband. With these things in her mind,
compounded by the traumatic shock of finding herself suddenly a
widow with five children to support, Luz could not be expected to
immediately take the proper action.
Next, appellants assail Ronels credibility on the ground that he
is a nephew of Luz Aguipo and her husband who were then sending
him to school. Mere relationship by itself does not give rise to the
presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair
the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. Antithetically, a
witness relationship to a victim of the crime would even make his or
her testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative
who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other
than the real culprit. Indeed, at 14, Ronels act of accusing his
barriomates of such a serious crime even strengthens the veracity of
his testimony.
 Appellants also vigorously contend that since there was no ill requiring minimal discussion that motive is not essential for
motive on their part against the victim, then they should be conviction when there is no doubt as to the identity of the accused.
acquitted. Suffice it to state that the prosecution witnesses positively
identified them as the malefactors. It is a settled principle