The Case for Financial Laissez-Faire

Kevin Dowd

The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 436. (May, 1996), pp. 679-687.

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should presumably all be abolished.the history of science is full of cases where the 'obvious' turned out to be wrong. The onus of proof is on those who oppose free banking to demonstrate its undesirability. and the need for central banking is one of them. Yet relatively few could give a coherent defence of this position or have even thought that much about it. as most of us agree. 679-687. O u r education leads us to take certain things for granted. of course. Oxford OX4 IJF. The response. MA 02142. Cambridge. if free trade is good. T h e evidence also supports the predictions made by free banking theory that intervention generally weakens the financial system and causes the very problems it is ostensibly meant to cure. Most professional economists have the wrong priors on this issue. I believe this reaction mainly reflects the way we have been conditioned to think. I would like to make three general points. there is a great deal of empirical evidence on the'free banking issue. then what exactly is the problem with it? Why does this problem justify intervention? And why does it justify the particular interventions we have. UK and 238 Main Street. the evidence is also inconsistent with opposing theories that have been suggested as providing justifications for central banking. Secondly. but they deny that it applies to financial services. If the principle of free trade applies in general. Economists cannot therefore maintain that free banking has never been tried. as academic economists. For the most part. and. 108 Cowley Road. while I accept that free banking seems strange at first sight. is that what is obvious is not necessarily true .the central bank. unless we have clear reason to believe the contrary. First. on the other hand. to explore these issues more carefully and beware of assuming we already know the answers before we start. USA. and this evidence is supportive of the predictions of free banking theory. . the whole panoply of government intervention into the financial sector . If there is something wrong with laissez-faire. in particular. I t therefore behoves us.F A I R E Kevin Dowd T h e argument for financial laissez-faire (or free banking) is essentially very simple: if free trade is generally desirable. such as a central bank? Most economists take a patently untenable position on these issues.The Economic Journal. they accept the general principle offree trade. 106 may). as if its failings are obvious. why else do we initially react so strongly to what is no more than the application of the generally accepted doctrine of free trade to financial services? Finally. we must presume it to apply to any specific individual case. O Royal Economic Society 1 9 9 6 Published by Blackwell Publishers. They oppose free banking more or less instinctively. T H E C A S E FOR F I N A N C I A L L A I S S E Z . then what is wrong with free trade in the financial services sector? If nothing is wrong with it. nor that it has been tried and 'failed'. government-sponsored deposit insurance and government regulation of the financial system . there must be at least a prima facie case in favour of free banking. of its claim that unregulated banking is stable. By contrast. After all. Before getting into detail.

and the assumption of a frozen monetary base presupposes some earlier government intervention .g. by Selgin.~ currency is convertible . We can therefore think of the price level as determined by the factors that determine the relative price of gold.3 The price level in this system is then determined by conditions in the market for the 'anchor' c o r n m ~ d i t yBank . and their capital provides a buffer that enables a bank to absorb losses and still be able to pay its debtholders in full. The equityholders are residual claimants. and hence by demand and supply in the gold market. the pound). and most of these can be redeemed on demand.and so the amount of currency in circulation There is much evidence of economies of scale in banking. e. but no evidence that these economies of scale are so large that the industry is a natural monopoly. At initial prices. il'e can then think of the equilibrium nominal prices of individual comrnoditics as determined by the combination of relative demand and supply factors and thc fixed nominal price of gold. Suppose there is a gold discovery under a gold standard. and so on. and underlying the system is some rule that ties the unit of account to a unit of the 'anchor' commodity on which the monetary standard is based. Hence. THE FREE BANKING POSITION A Laissez-Faire Financial System So what would a free banking system look like. 0 Ro>-a1Economic Society 1996 .g. commodity-based monetary standard (e. if one prefers. there are non- trivial agency and coordination problems. a gold ~ t a n d a r d )Bank . These problems give rise to a financial system characterised by the presence of intermediaries that enable agents to achieve superior outcomes to those they could otherwise achieve (e. but the use of a single unit of account reflects economics of standardisation (or economies in use) and not natural monopoly. cll. there is now an excess supply ofgold and excess demands for other commodities. Gold can thus be regarded as the 'anchor' commodity that ties down nominal prices throughout the economy. We can think of this banking system as operating on a convertible. The relative price of gold against other commodities must therefore fall. Most bank debts are deposits of one form or another. These invest funds on behalf of client investors. the rule would require that banks of issue peg the exchange rate between their currency and gold (or. I t seems to me that a commodity-based system is more natural: all historical free banking systcms were of this type..g. Nor should natural monopoly be confused with the use of a single economy-wide unit of account. in a gold standard. and how would it operate? Imagine a hypothetical laissez-faire economy with an underlying 'imperfect' economic environment .the banks must redeem their currency when required to . The alternative is to assume that we have a frce banking system based on convertibility into a frozen monetary base (as discussed. 5.information is scarce and asymmetric. The banking industry exhibits extensive economies of scale.680 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL I. but the nominal price ofgold cannot adjust because the rules of the gold standard hold it fixed.. There will typically be one generally used unit of account (e.g. but not natural m ~ n o p o l y and .g. 1994). ~ liabilities are denominated in terms of the economy's unit of account (e. peg the nominal price of gold). ~ there is typically a small number of nation- wide branch banks. Perhaps the most important intermediaries are banks. For example. with a larger number of specialist banks that cater to niche markets. Many deposits are also used to make payments by cheque. I t follows that one cannot defend the central bank's monopoly privileges over the currency supply on the grounds that free banking would lcad to a currcncy monopoly anyway.an assumption that can be awkward if one is tryi~lgto assess the validity of intervention in the first place. See Dowd (1gg3). some of whom hold the bank's debt liabilities and others its equity. which necessarily involves economies of production. the relative price of gold falls by means of a rise in the nominal prices of other goods. by cutting down on transactions and monitoring costs). The industry is competitive and efficient by any reasonable standard. the pound).

depositors would be acutely aware that they stood to lose their deposits if their bank failed. Thus US banks appear to have been fairly safe in the period before the Civil War (Dowd. are willing to pay for) : banks will be exactly as safe as their customers demand. Dowd '994b). I I ) . the more losses a bank can withstand and still be able to pay off depositors in full. and for the period afterwards. 386). the safer and more attractive it is to depositors. Switzerland and various others (see. e. I t is frequently argued O Royal Economic Society 1996 . 1995. e.if the bank is adequately capitalised . Losses to depositors were correspondingly low (Kaufman. the case studies in Dowd (1992)). of capitalisation their customers demand (and. pp. They would also provide reassurance by maintaining adequate capital. and capital ratios were still around 1 5 q / ~when federal deposit insurance was established in 1933-4 (Kaufman. US banks were subject to more regulation at the turn of the century. 3-4). The conclusion that banks under laissez-faire would maintain high levels of capital is also consistent with the empirical evidence (see also Benston and ~ a u f m a n(BK). (1986)' pp. other things being equal. 1992. p. If bank customers want safe banks.1 9961 CASE FOR FINANCIAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE 68 I is determined by the demand to hold it. or because of 'contagion' from weak banks to strong ones. 1992). They would therefore want reassurance that their funds were safe and would soon close their accounts if they felt there was any significant danger of their bank failing. If the bank's capital is large enough . either because of competitive pressures. submit themselves to outside scrutiny. The precise amount of capital is determined by market forces.. Bank managers would understand that their long-term survival depended on their ability to retain their depositors' confidence. Competition between banks should then ensure that banks converge . market forces will ensure they get them (see. and depositors can be confident their funds are safe. If banks issue too much currency. but even then their capital ratios were close to 20°/.The evidence is also consistent with the associated prediction that laissez-faire banks face low probabilities of failure. The better capitalised a bank is. ch. the public simply return it to the banks for redemption. US banks in the antebellum period were subject to virtually no federal regulations and yet had capital ratios in most years of over 40 % (Kaufman 1992. They would therefore pursue conservative lending policies. but capital is also costly. and depositors need to pay shareholders to provide it (e. 1988). by implication. For kxample.g. and the excess currency is automatically retired.g.g.. The Stability of Financial Laissez-Faire But how stable is the system? With no lender of last resort or state-run deposit insurance system.on whatever degrees.Failure rates and losses were also low for other relatively unregulated systems such as those in Canada. by accepting lower interest on deposits). 53-9 report that bank failure rates were lower than the failure rates for non-financial firms. Benston et al. Scotland. The greater a bank's capitalisation. Nor is there any reason to expect banking instability arising from the ways in which banks relate to each other.the bank can absorb any plausible losses and still repay depositors. and publish audited accounts.

A bank can usually expand rapidly only by allowing the average quality of its loans to deteriorate. However. Kaufman.g. Goodhart (1988. 53-60.in aggressive expansion of the sort this argument envisages. The bank is then strongly placed to win over their customers and increase its market share at their expense. The conclusion normally drawn from this argument is that we need a central bank to prevent 'contagion' by providing lender of last resort support to a bank in difficulties. See Dowd (1gg4a) p. The underlying argument seems to be that if the bad banks expand rapidly. we would expect the difficulties of a weak bank to trigger a 'flight to quality' in which customers transfer their accounts to stronger banks. and banks could reasonably expect some form of bailout if things went bad.p p 700. episodes like these are not examples of free banking and can hardly be held up as examples of what would happen under it. Proponents of the excessive cycling theory sometimes look to examples such as the excessive bank lending to LDCs in the late 70s and early 80s (e. e. e. and a major deterioration in its loan quality will undermine its long-run financial. they can make easy short-term profits which pressure the managers of good banks to expand rapidly as well. but it would win out in the long run. as discussed already.p p 48-g).they would strengthen themselves and curtail credit to weak banks . 47-9). Instead.in anticipation of the time when they start to suffer losses and lose confidence. and perhaps even drive them out of business. 7 0 4 ) . even if other banks appear to be doing so. and this expectations is borne out by the evidence which tells us that runs occur in response to news that a .perhaps to build up its financial strength further .particular bank or group of banks has sustained major losses that call into question its ability to repay its debts (see.health and its ability to maintain customer confidence.g. There is no reason. the typical scenario is a flight to quality. 1986. Many national authorities were actively encouraging their banks to make loans to LDCs.5 Then there is the contagion argument that the difficulties of one bank might induce the public to withdraw funds from other banks and threaten the stability of the financial system.to help ensure that contagion did not in fact occur. it was therefore hardly surprising that they over-reached themselves. pp.g.g. In the circumstances. Indeed. Benston et al. A profit- maximising bank will not choose to undermine itself this way. and there is little evidence that runs are contagious (see. then. 0 Royal Economic Society 1996 .. Dow (1996. If the good banks felt there was any danger of contagion. to suppose that competitive pressures as such would force free banks into excessive cycling. they would take appropriate action . this argument ignores the earlier point that good banks have a strong incentive to distance themselves from bad ones. Goodhart 1988. if a bank believes that its competitors are taking excessive risks. However. 306. with substantial inflows of funds to the stronger banks. with the result that the banking system as a whole cycles excessively from boom to bust and back again. A serious danger of contagion is therefore inconsistent with equilibrium. Indeed. However. 1988).682 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY that competitive pressures produce instability by forcing 'good' banks to go along with the policies of ' b a d ' ones (e. pp. they would position themselves to offer the customers of weaker banks a safe haven when their own banks get into difficulties. The bank would have to forgo short-term profits.. When runs occur. a major problem with this argument is that it is not in a bank's interest to engag. the most rational course of action is for it to distance itself from them .

the LLR can then produce the very instability that proponents of central banking often claim would arise under free banking. in reality.the LLR - could easily be mistaken for its cure . less obvious way. often is. That strategy depends on the weaker banks facing ruin and cannot promise much payoff if the LLR is going to bail them out. banks to imitate the bad.both intended.I 9961 CASE F O R F I N A N C I A L LAISSEZ-FAIRE 683 Benston and Kaufman. p.to maintain depositor confidence ..that a sound banking regime should avoid. an LLR therefore protects bad banks from the consequences of their own actions. and the establishment of a state- sponsored system of deposit insurance . but two specific interventions are particularly important . I t also encourages more bank risk-taking at the margin: if a bank takes more risks and the risks pay off. Ironically. reduces institutions' financial health and makes them more likely to fail. undermining it. part of the cost is passed on to the deposit insurer. In these circumstances.the establishment of a central bank to provide lender of last resort (LLR) support to the financial system. The establishment of an LLR is meant to provide liquidity to banks that cannot otherwise obtain it. T h e fight for market share would then force the good . The contagion hypothesis is thus implausible and empirically rejected. There is no space to consider here all the ways in which governments intervene. A bank's rational response is to reduce its capital. since the main point of maintaining capital strength . Even if an individual bank wished to maintain its capital strength. but if the risks do not pay off. Since an LLR in effect tries to keep weaker banks open. unfortunately. I t therefore directly encourages the very behaviour . Dowd. Dowd 1994b). depositors no longer have any incentives to monitor bank management and managers no longer need to worry about maintaining confidence. 297).g. e. then it keeps the additional profits. Since good banks can always obtain loans to maintain their liquidity. and falsely believe that the banking system actually needs the LLR support that is. A major cause of banking instability . to stabilise the banking system.no longer applies (see.and. I t also undermines the discipline of the market in another. someone who observed this instability might easily attribute it to the market itself. These claims are borne out by the evidence: the claim that banks reduce 0 Royal Economic Society 1996 . Deposit insurance consequently transforms a strong capital position into a competitive liability. according to their proponents. The Impact of State Intervention There is also the issue of what happens to this system if the government intervenes in it. 1994.greater risk-taking and the main- tenance of weaker capital positions . Once we introduce deposit insurance. its very existence reduces the incentives for good banks to adopt the virtuous strategy of building themselves up in anticipation of winning weaker banks' market share. I n fact. it would be out-competed by competitors who cut their capital ratios to reduce their costs and passed some of the benefits to depositirs by offering them higher interest rates. Igg4a. A system of deposit insurance has comparable effects. even the (otherwise) good banks may decide to take greater risks and let themselves go. The bank therefore takes more risks and becomes even weaker than its capital ratio alone would suggest.

The relevant choice is not that between government and private deposit insurance. and I fail to understand why they insist on trying to patch up a patently unsatisfactory system when a much better one is available. they support it because they believe that the alternative of private deposit insurance is seriously inadequate (e. we agree that it should not get assistance.g. 1996. If bank customers demand safe banks . Nor is a central bank-LLR as a perfect substitute for the automatic support mechanisms of the free market. 11.684 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY their capital ratios is confirmed by the observation that US bank capital ratios more than halved in the 10 years after the establishment of federal deposit insurance (e. pp. hence.g. and handling these conflicts is costly. BK have no convincing answer to these problems. but they also support it because they believe there would be serious external effects in its absence. Kaufman. T h e record of historical central bank LLR operations does not inspire confidence either. T h e reason is straightforward: providing depositor security through deposit insurance creates conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and the insurance agency. Benston et al. p. not through private deposit insurance. as well as a need for system management and 'policy' decisions (and all their attendant problems) that does not arise under free banking. but that between government deposit insurance and the free-banking scenario outlined earlier. and other banks would grant those loans if the terms were right. ~ g g ~and ) . 83 . in which banks provide implicit insurance through strong capitalisation. cf. p.as we all agree they do . it must presumably be because of legal restrictions. as when much of the US banking system collapsed in-the early 1930s because of the Fed's refusal to grant the very support it was established to provide.the free market would provide safe banks via appropriate bank capitalisation. 0 Royal Economic Society 1996 . Kaufman. I n large part. The LLR creates serious moral hazard problems. p. BK support government deposit insurance for a number of reasons. such as the danger of a run to currency (e. O n the former issue. it presumably can get loans or liquidity provided other banks are free to provide them. there is abundant evidence that US deposit insurance has increased failure rates and associated losses. 1991.g. 1994. there should be no need under free banking to establish a central bank to provide lender of last resort assistance. because of the limited capacity or credi- bility of private insurers. B E N S T O N A N D K A U F M A N Benston and Kaufman (BK) agree with much of this analysis. but disagree on the central bank LLR function and on government deposit insurance. If a bank does not have good collateral. 4-5). 693). However. I would object that this position depends on the unjustified assumption that free banking would not provide adequate liquidity. I 986. 106). BK. in which case the first-best solution is not to establish a lender of last resort. If banks cannot provide such assistance. they argue that a central bank LLR is necessary to provide liquidity assistance and avoid banks with liquidity needs from having to sell assets a t ' firesale losses' (e.However. but to abolish the legal restrictions. BK. I believe these arguments kiss the point. but if it does have good collateral.g.

and not just those of banks. providing security through bank capitalisation does not create such conflicts. The critical issue is not whether uncertainty exists. However. how can we expect them to ameliorate cycles . So BK must argue either that bank failures are 'special' in ways that other failures are not. because doing so enables them to increase their long-run market shares. it is still open to the objections already made against the excessive cycling theory: it ignores the point that individual free banks do have incentives to go against the market trend. and banks have to live with it as much as anyone else. I t is therefore an argument in favour of free banking and against deposit insurance. Dow. Intervention has costs of its own .I9961 CASE FOR F I N A N C I A L LAISSEZ-FAIRE 685 however. One must also keep in mind that the historical record suggests that real-world intervention has destabilised the financial system rather than stabilised it (e. Yet they are unwilling to do either. 199 .). or they must be consistent and advocate a policy of preventing all institutional failures. it cannot therefore be treated as a costless process that is guaranteed to produce the result its advocates hope for. but whether uncertainty makes valuation as difficult as she suggests 0 Royal Economic Society 1996 . 111. I n any case. Her argument is distinctive in that it rests on an underlying post-Keynesian view of the uncertainty attached to valuing bank assets and not just on a herd theory of bankers following each other over the cliff. Private deposit insurance would of course be allowed under free banking. and this expectation is confirmed by the evidence.DOW'Spost- Keynesian version of the cycling argument also has its own distinctive problems. from which she concludes that there is a need for the state or a central bank to 'stand above' the market process and take action to correct the excessive cycling to which laissez-faire is prone. and applies to the failures of most other institutions as well. S H E I L A D O W Sheila Dow advances two principal arguments against free banking. The first is a version of the earlier argument that free banking produces excessive cycling (e.g. I n any case. I 993. even if free banking does produce some cycling. p. and we have already seen that the safer system is free banking. despite its distinctiveness. 702). I readily accept their point that bank failures involve third-party effects. then how can we expect central bankers to know where the private bankers are going off the rails? If they don't know. but would argue these effects merely reinforce my position. but we would not expect to see it. and is therefore a more efficient means of ensuring depositor safety. and thereby counteract it. If assets are so difficult to value. it still does not follow that it produces excessive cycling to which some form of intervention is an appropriate solution. Dowd (ed.it uses up resources. p.and not inadvertently add to them? And even if they do know. Uncertainty is intrinsic to economic life. and it is empirically falsified. 1992). and so on. 1996. because there is little evidence of such cycles under historical free banking systems. the parties involved have their own interests. the danger of third- party effects is not unique to bank failures. T h e third-party-effects argument is essentially an argument for the safer system. what can they do about it if they are as powerless over the cost and volume of credit as Dow seems to suggest they are?6 I also reject her view that the argument for free banking hinges on the ignoring of uncertainty.g.

DS.686 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY Dow also opposes free banking for another reason. 691) when they say that banks and the public do in fact find ways of valuing bank assets and liabilities that work reasonably well in practice. When a crisis occurs under free banking. in early nineteenth century Scottish free banking (e. 704. (4) And. The powers of a private bankers' club would be (and historically were) extremely limited: membership would be voluntary in a way that 'official' regulations are not. disciplining minor banks. whatever that might be. I gg4a). 21). a scramble that focuses on the banking system's ultimate settlement asset. they merely establish that free banking would be pointless. At most they establish the possibility of a private bankers' 'club'. ( 2 ) Even if there was a scramble for 'ultimate' settlement assets. e. She effectively argues that free banking is pointless because central banking would emerge spontaneously from it (e. p. T h e issuer of this asset then has great power over the system and becomes de facto a central bank (see. club officials would be accountable to the banks rather than to outsiders. and as a corollary. e. there is a scramble for safe assets. but establishing the existence of full-blown central banking is an altogether different matter. TOgive this argument empirical support. T o assume that there is only one key institution in the free banking system therefore also flies in the face of the evidence. it does not usually take the form of a scramble for some ultimate settlement asset. I n my view. pp. finally. Dow and Smithin. But whoever is right. we would it does. There are a number of problems with this argument.g. There tends to be recycling within the banking system.g. 14-5). the scope of club rules and the demands they would make on members would be far less than those implied by modern central banking (see. DS.g. rather than a flight from it. club powers would be determined by the banks themselves. 1994. T o assume that there is only one key institution consequently begs the point at issue. pp. and. Dowd. 704). not by some outside agency. perhaps most important. If they are right. and I can only agree with BK (1996. 1994. 1996.g. Dow. p. and the like. no bank ever spontaneously established its supremacy over all the others. 0 Royal Economic Society 1996 . DS establish the existence of the wrong animal. even if one accepts their whole argument. p. 25). 1994. ( I ) While it is true that crises do produce a scramble for safe assets. One must also keep in mind that the experience ofhistorical free banking suggests that there is always more than one 'big' bank. but not harmful. and the evidence confirms that it generally does. we would expect this scramble to take the form of a flight to quality. she exaggerates these difficulties. (3) Even if one accepts their logic. pp.g. 1996. it still does not follow that such assets are issued by one institution only. then free banking is best and central banking is harmful. but if I am right. they still have no substantial objection to free banking. a club that might impose 'rules' on and sometimes assist its members. Dow. or at least would do so in cases where the free banking was 'successful' and did not lead to some form of chaos (e. DS point to the role ofthe three big banks in making emergency loans.. T h e Dow-Smithin (DS) argument is that the requirement of a credit-based economy produce a degree of centralisation of power that is effectively the same as central banking.

G. (ed. J.' Cato Journal.' Journal of Financial Services Research. 7. pp. (1994). Shefficld Hallam Universit). Horwitz. Dowd. Cambridgc. C. London: Routledge. 559-87. Kaufman. MA: 141IT Press. T h e conventional view that free banking could not be stable must therefore be rejected . C. 95-1 10. this issue. (1988). The Evolution of Central Banks. Dowd. Dow. 698-707. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. no 2 (May). ( I 993). C. and Banking. 4 (April). and costs. J. and future.. Dowd. University of Stirling. no.rjerienre of Free Banking. K. J. Monograph I 988-1. and the evidence clearly indicates that historical free banking was in fact stable. vol. present. vol. Cambridge. A. ECONOMIC JOURNAL. and Kaufman. G. G. G.. E. IV. 385-402. G. G. pp.' Mimeo. (1994b). Dowd.free banking wins by Pascal's wager. (1993). G. Ontario. 3 (Winter). Kaufman. 'Change in financial markets and the "first principles" of monetary economics. G. vol. CONCLUSIONS None of the critics of free banking has presented a convincing case that free banking is an exception to the general rule in favour of free trade. Persjectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past. (1992). Graduate School of Business. G. 0 Royal Economic Society 1996 . G.. ( 1 9 9 6 ) 'T

hy thc banking system should bc regulated. one should also assess the competing theories against the evidence. and deposit insurance. J. George. Money and the Econonlic Process. no. and bank regulation. 5. Benston. G. and Kaufman. and York University. Selgin. K .' Journal of Financial Services Research. G. and Future. costly liquidation. Credit. London: Routlrdge.this issue. School of Financial Studies and Law. S.1 9961 CASE F O R FINANCIAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE 687 never choose to suppress free banking in favour of central banking . K.'Capital in banking: past. (1986). G. pp. However. 1449-59. bankers' clubs. 'The appropriate role of banking regulation'. New York: Salomon Brothers Center. E c o N o ~ r c JOURNAL. G. G. J.vol. 104. 26. Do\. (1993). 'Lender of last resort in contemporary perspective. (1gg4a). J..'Is the banking and payments system fragile?' Journal of Financial Seroices Research jforthcoming). (1992). pp. M A : M I T Press. C. The prima facie case in favour of free banking therefore still stands. Kane. Present. pp. pp.. R . Dow. P. Benston. Goodhart.'Competitive banking.Laissez-Faire Banking. Shefield Hallam University REFERENCES Benston. Eisenbeis. K . Kaufman. 2 (October). S. New York University. and Smithin. 427 (November). M. just as free-banking theory predicts. S.) The E. (1994). 'Bank runs: causes. and Kaufman. (1996). (1991). G. and Kaufman. no. 688-697. 'Banking.and with it the conventional wisdom that tries to justify central banking and state intervention in the financial system. A.' ECONOMIC JOURNAL. no. 'Free banking and monetary control'. 5. ( 1 9 8 8 ) Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depository Institz~tions: Past Policies and Current Options. pp. G.' blimeo. G.' Journal of Money. 289-308. Benston. vol. (1988). bcnefits.

Vol. No. Vol.0. 289-308. Stable URL: http://links.jstor. 106.http://www. Credit and Banking. .jstor.jstor.CO%3B2-9 This article references the following linked citations. No.jstor. 1449-1459.. 1994). pp. Stable URL: http://links. (Nov.0.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%28199405%2926%3A2%3C289%3ACBBCAB%3E2. (May.jstor. 1994). Vol. and Bank Regulation Kevin Dowd Journal of Money. No. 106. 427.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C698%3AWTBSSB%3E2. [Footnotes] 2 Free Banking and Monetary Control George Selgin The Economic Journal.0.CO%3B2-P 5 Competitive Banking. you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. 26.0. No. 104. pp. 679-687. 436. pp. (May. 698-707. 1996). If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location.CO%3B2-A 5 Why the Banking System Should be Regulated Sheila C.Page 1 of 2 - You have printed the following article: The Case for Financial Laissez-Faire Kevin Dowd The Economic Journal. pp. (May.org LINKED CITATIONS .CO%3B2-P References NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list. Stable URL: http://links. Stable URL: http://links. Vol.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199411%29104%3A427%3C1449%3AFBAMC%3E2. 436. Bankers' Clubs.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C679%3ATCFFL%3E2. 2. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR. 1996). Dow The Economic Journal.

1994). No. 26. 1449-1459. No. and Bank Regulation Kevin Dowd Journal of Money. 104. Stable URL: http://links.jstor. No. 436. 1996). pp. Stable URL: http://links. pp. (May. (May. Vol.0.jstor. Dow The Economic Journal. pp. Stable URL: http://links. 688-697.jstor.Page 2 of 2 - The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation George J. (May.0. No.0.CO%3B2-P Competitive Banking.0. Credit and Banking.jstor. Vol.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C688%3ATAROBR%3E2. Vol. . 106.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199411%29104%3A427%3C1449%3AFBAMC%3E2.http://www. 427. Vol. 2.. 698-707. Stable URL: http://links. (Nov. Benston. 1996). pp. George G. 1994). Bankers' Clubs.jstor. 436. 106.CO%3B2-G Why the Banking System Should be Regulated Sheila C.org LINKED CITATIONS . 289-308. Kaufman The Economic Journal.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%28199405%2926%3A2%3C289%3ACBBCAB%3E2.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C698%3AWTBSSB%3E2.CO%3B2-P Free Banking and Monetary Control George Selgin The Economic Journal.CO%3B2-A NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

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hy thc banking system should bc regulated. one should also assess the competing theories against the evidence. and deposit insurance. J. George. Money and the Econonlic Process. no. and bank regulation. 5. Benston. G. and Kaufman. and York University. Selgin. K .' Journal of Financial Services Research. G. and Future. costly liquidation. Credit. London: Routlrdge.this issue. School of Financial Studies and Law. S.1 9961 CASE F O R FINANCIAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE 687 never choose to suppress free banking in favour of central banking . K.'Capital in banking: past. (1986). G. pp. However. 1449-59. bankers' clubs. 'The appropriate role of banking regulation'. New York: Salomon Brothers Center. E c o N o ~ r c JOURNAL. G. G. J.vol. 104. 26. Do\. (1993). 'Lender of last resort in contemporary perspective. (1gg4a). J..'Is the banking and payments system fragile?' Journal of Financial Seroices Research jforthcoming). (1992). pp. M A : M I T Press. C. The prima facie case in favour of free banking therefore still stands. Kane. Present. pp. pp.. R . Dow. P. Benston. Goodhart.'Competitive banking.Laissez-Faire Banking. Shefield Hallam University REFERENCES Benston. Eisenbeis. K . Kaufman. 2 (October). S. New York University. and Smithin. 427 (November). M. just as free-banking theory predicts. S.) The E. (1994). 'Bank runs: causes. and Kaufman. (1996). (1991). G. and Kaufman. no. 688-697. 'Banking.and with it the conventional wisdom that tries to justify central banking and state intervention in the financial system. A.' ECONOMIC JOURNAL. no. 'Free banking and monetary control'. 5. ( 1 9 8 8 ) Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depository Institz~tions: Past Policies and Current Options. pp. G.' blimeo. G.' Journal of Money. 289-308. Benston. vol. (1988). bcnefits.

Vol. No. Vol.0. 289-308. Stable URL: http://links.jstor. 106.http://www. Credit and Banking. .jstor.jstor.CO%3B2-9 This article references the following linked citations. No.jstor. 1449-1459.. 1994). pp. Stable URL: http://links. (Nov.0.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%28199405%2926%3A2%3C289%3ACBBCAB%3E2. (May.jstor. 1994). Vol. and Bank Regulation Kevin Dowd Journal of Money. No. 106. 427.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C698%3AWTBSSB%3E2. [Footnotes] 2 Free Banking and Monetary Control George Selgin The Economic Journal.0.CO%3B2-P 5 Competitive Banking. you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. 26.0. No. 104. pp. 679-687. 436. pp. (May. 698-707. 1996). If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location.CO%3B2-A 5 Why the Banking System Should be Regulated Sheila C.Page 1 of 2 - You have printed the following article: The Case for Financial Laissez-Faire Kevin Dowd The Economic Journal. pp. (May.org LINKED CITATIONS .CO%3B2-P References NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list. Stable URL: http://links. Stable URL: http://links. Vol.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199411%29104%3A427%3C1449%3AFBAMC%3E2. 436. Bankers' Clubs.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C679%3ATCFFL%3E2. 2. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR. 1996). Dow The Economic Journal.

1994). No. 26. 1449-1459. No. and Bank Regulation Kevin Dowd Journal of Money. 104. Stable URL: http://links.jstor. No. 436. 1996). pp. Stable URL: http://links. pp. (May. (May. Vol.0.jstor. Dow The Economic Journal. pp. Stable URL: http://links. 688-697.jstor.Page 2 of 2 - The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation George J. (May.0. No.0.CO%3B2-P Competitive Banking.0. Credit and Banking.jstor. Vol.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C688%3ATAROBR%3E2. Vol. . 106.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199411%29104%3A427%3C1449%3AFBAMC%3E2.http://www. 427. Vol. 2.. 698-707. Stable URL: http://links. (Nov. Benston. 1996). pp. George G. 1994). Bankers' Clubs.jstor. 436. 106.CO%3B2-G Why the Banking System Should be Regulated Sheila C.org LINKED CITATIONS . 289-308. Kaufman The Economic Journal.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%28199405%2926%3A2%3C289%3ACBBCAB%3E2.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199605%29106%3A436%3C698%3AWTBSSB%3E2.CO%3B2-P Free Banking and Monetary Control George Selgin The Economic Journal.CO%3B2-A NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

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