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factors, an indefinite registered content and an indefinite registering

self, and theseconsti tu te a necessary form or structure. There is a regis"
tering self only because there is an immediate content to register, and
there is a registered content only because there is a self to register it.
We are dealing with a general pattern of experience, not merely with
a singular fact of existence. (A tendency to self-correction is inherent
in consciousness and this distinguishes its subjectivity from its objec-
tivity. )
93. Not only does sense-certainty embody this subject-object pat-
tern, it also involves a claim, something gesetzt, posited, that one factor
is more true and essential than the other. The object comes before it
as the True, the essential, that which is there whether there is know-
ledge or not. Knowledge, con trariwise, is given as secondary I unessen ..
tial: it presupposes, depends on, is mediated by the object, which is
truly immediate and does not presuppose or depend on it. (Realism
is thus not an imposed theory bu t part and parcel of ourmos t elemen-
tary experiences. Weare dealing wi th something whose deeper na ture
will come out as we examine it, but is not exhaustively and finally
94. Sense .. certain tyseems, however, to involve an inheren t conflict.
Its object as.given in it does not match what that obJectis given out
as being. This content is not introduced by a reflective observer, but
is part and parcel ofsense-certainty itself. (I t is because sense-certainty
feels itself not to be the rich thing it on the surface claims to be, that
it tries to make out, to perceive, what it has before it.)
95. The immediate 'This' ofsense~certainty involves the two con~
ne<;ted forms of the 'Now' and the 'Here'. Ifwe try to pin the 'Now'
down bygivingi tdefinitc'conten t, thatcontent is quite inconstant. Wha t
nowobtains is night, but (a little Jater) what now obtains is not night,
but noon. (Since what is, always changes its appearance, we never
get at it: it is the complete thing which underlies changing appear-
96. The now ofsense-certainty reveals itself as inherently universal,
i.e. itcannotbeidentified with anyone definite state of things, though
it can alsoindifferently>he anyone such stateor another. (Universals
obey a different logicfrom their instances. Notonly the characters of
what is are universals, bud 18 generalform is itselfuniversal, i.e. the con-
crete reality behind changing appearances.)
97. In the use of demonstrative words there is a conflict between
what we really say and what we mean to say (our Meinung, was wir
meinen). We mean to express what is ultimately individual, but this
is inexpressible: all we succeed in expressing is what is universaL
g8. The demonstrative 'Here' behaves exactly like the demonstra-
tive 'Now', and always changes its application. It is therefore a case