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1. Pretty v. United Kingdom


Diane Pretty was suffering from motor neurone disease and was paralysed
from the neck down, had little decipherable speech and was fed by a tube.
It is not a crime to commit suicide under English law, but the applicant was
prevented by her disease from taking such a step without assistance. It is
however a crime to assist another to commit suicide (section 2(1) of
the Suicide Act 1961).[2]

Pretty wanted her husband to provide her with assistance in suicide. Because
giving this assistance would expose the husband to liability, the Director of
Public Prosecutions was asked to agree not to prosecute her husband. This
request was refused, as was Pretty's appeal before the Law Lords.[3]


In a unanimous judgment, the Court, composed of seven judges, has found
Pretty's application under articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights admissible, but found no violation of the

Significant conclusions include that no right to die, whether at the hands of a
third person or with the assistance of a public authority, can be derived from
Article 2 of the Convention.[4] As concerns Pretty's right to respect for private
life under Article 8, the Court considered that the interference in this case
might be justified as “necessary in a democratic society” for the protection of
the rights of others.

2. People v. Cayat

Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a
member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2
and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1
gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it
unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian
tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession,
or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind,
other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat
challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due
process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

not to religious belief but in a way. 3. usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks.Ruling: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.5% by the PNRC. but upon the degree of civilization and culture. the New Tropical Medicine Foundation. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. One of the provisions of the said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity. 13.” (Rubi vs.S. namely. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable. 14. It was further found. (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only. Republic Act No. and 7. Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. with the assistance of the U. is not an argument against the equality of its application. syphilis. not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. 1639 satisfies these requirements. among other things. for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.” It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992. Provincial Board of Mindora. Beltran v. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. 64. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law on April 2. “The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers.4% by private hospital-based blood banks . (1) must rest on substantial distinctions. The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture. The classification rests on real or substantial. and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. supra. .7% by government hospital-based blood banks. 1994. Act No. Secretary of Health Facts: In January of 1994.” as counsel for the appellant asserts. to the geographical area and more directly. (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law. malaria. showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood.

and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. under Republic Act No. the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature. Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not. By its provisions. as a general rule. an act of the Legislature. comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions. is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law.” This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R. thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate.Petitioners. 7719. Republic Act No. Specifically. the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. According to petitioners. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. and conferring an authority or discretion as . broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 23 of Administrative Order No. that is. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. 1998 “based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. The Secretary of Health has been given.

etc. On the other hand. the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country. ISSUE: Whether or not. Manglapus FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs. the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. public order. Thus. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. a distinct right under international law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution. the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country. their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered. specifically Sections 1 and 6. to the latter no valid objection can be made. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by its execution. which has been ratified by the Philippines. They contended that Pres. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel. independent from although related to the right to travel. and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. the right to leave the country. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". To issue travel documents to former Pres. However. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. . as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security. The first cannot be done. They further assert that under international law. including his own. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. Essentially. public health or morals or the separate rights of others. 4. Marcos vs.

Florence filed in September 1994. 5. plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal profit. 6. In June 1995. known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties. the petitioner. a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. the State did not participate in the proceedings. Sin vs. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be. was married with Philipp. non-profit. 409. Sin FACTS: Florence. he did not actively participated therein. During the course of its ministry. the case is remanded for proper trial. non-stock. the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus. American Bible Society v. a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Other than having appearance at certain hearings. City of Manila Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign. without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit . the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1898. missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November. to the petition. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings. nothing more was heard of him. HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. religious. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On May 29 1953. 1945.

and Ordinances Nos. For this reason. With respect to Ordinance No. therefore. trade or occupation of the plaintiff. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art.45 (Annex A). cannot be applied to appellant. Tolentino v. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution.821. Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale. so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society. Held: Section 1. as amended. It seems clear. within three days. in the total sum of P5. 3000. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. as amended. 3028 and 3364. for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. nor tax the exercise of religious practices. together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953. 2529. as amended. and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant). in violation of Ordinance No. 3000. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. Sec.and municipal license. and required plaintiff to secure. because . that Ordinance No. As to Ordinance No. which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. the corresponding permit and license fees. provides that: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 2529. shall forever be allowed. 7. is also not applicable. 2529 of the City of Manila. 24 of the Constitution. VI. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. without discrimination or preference. however inapplicable to said business. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional. as amended. barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Indeed. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. H. No. VI. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. A Turkish Muslim by the name Sahin (P) alleged that the Republic of Turkey (D) violated her rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by banning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher education. Students rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are not violated . To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. Sec. That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice. No. what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. 1630. There is also a contention that S. But this was because the President had certified S. Secs. 11197 and S. the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. Turkey Brief Fact Summary. 8. Sahin v. VI. elected as they are from the districts. 1630 as urgent. tariff or tax bills. private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that. is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills. No. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House. To begin with. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. bills authorizing an increase of the public debt. No. it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.

When she was in her 5th year at the faculty of medicine of the University of Istanbul in 1998. Are students’ rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms violated when a secular country places a ban on the wearing of religious clothing in institutions of higher learning? Held.when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious clothing in institutions of higher education. Before leaving Istanbul. but to comply with the laws and regulations in force and that such compliance would be sensitive to patients’ rights. A judgment was rendered by the European Court after it heard the case. Turkey’s (D) Constitutional Court decided that granting legal recognition to a religious symbol such as the Islamic headscarf was not compatible with the principle that the state education must be neutral and might generate conflicts between students of different religions. religion or denomination. Sahin (P) filed an application against the Republic of Turkey (P) with the European Commission of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms alleging that her rights and freedom under the Convention had been violated. She later left the University to further her studies in Vienna and had lived in Vienna since then. the ban did not prohibit Muslim students from manifesting their religion in accordance with habitual forms of Muslim observance and it was not directed only at Muslim attire. the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular which stipulated that students with beards and wearing the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures. Hence. So the view of the Court should not be interchanged for that of the . In 1989. courses and tutorials. Sahin (P) was denied access to a written exam and the University authorities refused to enroll her in a course and to admit her to various lectures and other written exams because of the Islamic headscarf she was putting on. Turkey (D) is a secular state founded on the principles of equality without regard to distinctions based on sex. Facts. No. Issue. Sahin (P) had a traditional background of family practicing Muslims and considered it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. Constitutionally. Student’s rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are not violated when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious clothing in institutions of higher education. The Vice Chancellor explained the banning of the headscarf at the University School of Medicine in a memorandum which was circulated that the ban was not intended to infringe on students freedom of conscience or religion.

Justice Frank Murphy advanced a "two-tier theory" of the First Amendment. passing out pamphlets and calling organized religion a "racket. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. para. Thus. Chaplinsky attacked the marshal verbally. Writing the decision for the Court. derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place .University who are better placed to evaluate local needs. Under New Hampshire's Offensive Conduct law (chap. "the lewd and obscene. Upon seeing the town marshal (who had returned to the scene after warning Chaplinsky earlier to keep it down and avoid causing a commotion). Hence. a Jehovah's Witness. Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address "any offensive. with the exception of the name of the deity.. The right to behave in a manner governed by a religion belief is not guaranteed by Article 9 and it also does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified. He was then arrested. the profane." and (in this case) insulting or "fighting" words neither contributed to the expression of ideas nor possessed any "social value" in the search for truth. he was charged and convicted under a New Hampshire statute forbidding intentionally offensive speech directed at others in a public place. the interference here was justified in principle and proportionate to aim pursued. By giving due regard to Turkey’s (D) margin of appreciation. 9. Article 9 was not contravened. 2 of the NH. claiming that the law was "vague" and that it infringed upon his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech. Certain "well-defined and narrowly limited" categories of speech fall outside the bounds of constitutional protection. For this. in a unanimous decision. a police officer removed Chaplinsky to take him to police headquarters. 10. ROMEO DORIQUEZ FACTS: . Chaplinsky admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint." After a large crowd had begun blocking the roads and generally causing a scene. or to call him by an offensive or derisive name. upheld the arrest. The complaint against Chaplinsky stated that he shouted: "You are a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist".. the slanderous. Ruling: The Court. New Hampshire FACTS: Walter Chaplinsky. Chaplinsky v." Chaplinsky appealed the fine he was assessed. 378. was using the public sidewalk as a pulpit in downtown Rochester.

in the language of the information. In its order of March 8. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether evident. 1964 he moved to dismiss both informations. the accused must prove. 1964. and within the jurisdiction of this Court. you had to lose my case. or on September 3." so that. allegedly based on the self-same facts relied upon by Fiscal Simeon A. without his consent. Upon arraignment. that there is "identity of offenses. Six days later." which. the information charging him with the offense of alarm and scandal. unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons against the said Attorney Demaisip the following insulting and defamatory words and expressions to wit: "Tonto ka nga klase sang tao. he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. did then and there willfully. Iloilo which dismissed. you had been telling people that I paid you only P30. commit the same or frustration thereof. 1965 the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss. I spent thousands of pesos and later you allowed yourself to be sold to Purita.Romeo Doriquez.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my case. nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. in the Municipality of Batad. Province of Iloilo. For double jeopardy to attach in his favor.. in the language of section 9. the same Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm. Ruling: Doriquez’s plea is untenable. Neither may it be asserted . nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw kay Purita. disrepute and public contempt. that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal. among other things. his "conviction or acquittal ..00 lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo ang gasto ko. committed. as follows: That on or about April 22. Barranco in support of the aforesaid information for discharge of firearm. Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation. the said accused. pasuguiron ka P30. however. armed with a revolver and without intent to kill. with deliberate intent of bringing Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit. did then and there willfully. Philippines. translated into English runs as follows: "You are a foolish class of person. claiming that (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation in virtue of Republic Act 3828 which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction of city and municipal courts. and (2) the institution of the criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy or he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad. On December 3. quin pierde mo ang asunto ko. unlawfully and feloniously discharge twice said revolver at one Attorney Sixto Demaisip. or the dismissal of the case (without his express consent) shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to. 1964." and other similar words of import.

14 In the case at bar.12 A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law. in St.10 It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense11 or identical offense. and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony. The trial judge. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC FACTS: Imelda.13 Phrased elsewise. She then pursued her college degree. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit. . In sum. there can be no such "identity of offenses" as would support the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued. and that — even if it were treated as a petition for certiorari — the contentions and arguments of the appellant cannot be accorded credit. as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes. established her domicile in Tacloban. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other. 11. Firstly. Hence. while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person. Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting. an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. the indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public. Secondly. the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element). although both offenses arise from the same facts. without intent to kill. essentially different felonies having fundamentally diverse indispensable elements.that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of firearm. a little over 8 years old. they are definitely diverse in law. nevertheless. Nor could the reverse situation be true. granting that the two indictments arose from the same act — a contention traversed by the State — they describe and constitute. education. we hold that the instant appeal is premature. if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. therefore. in or about 1938. the two indictments do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons.

1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. In 1954. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. The petitioner. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959. Cirilo Roy Montejo. when Marcos won presidency. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954. which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29. she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. and acts which correspond with the purpose. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. wrote seven months under residency. 3. In 1965. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position. domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. A minor follows domicile of her parents. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. they lived together in San Juan. Rizal where she registered as a voter. . she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile.Subsequently. the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one. When Pres. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. in an honest misrepresentation. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte. 2. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin. In the absence and concurrence of all these.

2826 (Gun Ban) for having in possession one (1) . Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon. In order for Aquino to qualify he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. 13. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. her domicile of origin. 12.38 cal. COMELEC Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati stating that he has been residing there for ten months. the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks of residence for purposes of election law. When his candidacy was opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban. Lorenzo FACTS: Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No. Clearly. Marcos. with four (4) live bullets in a public place during the election period without having secured the . Rev.4. Aquino v. Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement? Decision: Petition dismissed.Agote vs. her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban. To add. which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. COMELEC decision affirmed. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. an act. as her domicile of choice. Leyte while living in her brother’s house.

People vs. 2) Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance. but was likewise dismissed. It further provides that such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance in cases of homicide or murder. Article III. The lighter penalty may be imposed to a person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition. 8294 should be applied retroactively. HELD: 1) Yes. 2991- UDK. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Ladjaalam FACTS: Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16). 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). He then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.D. the Court has already ruled in Gonzales vs. No. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 1866 had already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. 2) No. Court of Appeals that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P. of Republic Act No. “unless no other crime was committed”. But as violation of COMELEC Resolution No. claiming that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P. Moreover.necessary license and authority from the COMELEC. 8294. three of which he was found guilty. “unless no other crime was committed”. Republic Act No. No. Eventually. 8294. 2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony. the Court cannot but set aside petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of firearm. the trial court rendered judgment of conviction in both cases wherein separate penalties were imposed respectively. The following information was provided by the prosecution: .D. During the pendency of the case. 1866. No. SP No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized. 14. and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. 2826 or the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner at the same time. 2826 or the Gun Ban. Since the crime committed was in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act.R. to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A. 8294 was approved into law. Republic Act No. which the trial court subsequently denied. 8294 lowers the penalty for illegal possession of firearms depending on the class of firearm possessed.

the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them. the petitioner was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar When petitioner was five (5) years old. “unless no other crime was committed”.a. ISSUE: Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Three days after. Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Jr. On 13 May 1974. HELD: No. As he noticed their presence. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder. 2) After gaining entrance. more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the said house. In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives.k.a. 1997. 6 September 1968.1) In the afternoon of September 24. such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. 5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. Poe-Llamanzares v. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase. if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ). two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. 3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house. 4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates. celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k. Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside. Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. the trial court granted their petition and ordered that . Fenando Poe. Furthermore. 15. COMELEC Facts Mary Grace Natividad S. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized. nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.

therefore Petitioner can run for Presidency on May 2016 Elections.A. the Petitioner was found eligible for candidacy due to the new ruling that foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they are found. . hence she has complied with the law. 9225.” Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner’s foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption Issue Whether the Petitioner Poe is QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016 Held Yes. No.petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. also she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.