Number 13

Mercer Management Journal

The Value Growth Agenda
Setting the agenda
Finding the right drivers of value growth With so many options, which initiatives really matter?
By Ted Moser and Hanna Moukanas As growth opportunities have become more dynamic and transitory, the traditional pillars of strategy have been rendered obsolete. Senior managers need a short, coherent list of initiatives to mobilize the organization, tell outside stakeholders where the company is headed, and reach the next profit zone before it shifts again. 5 11 Assembling the components of business design Thought questions

Finding the right drivers of value growth
With so many options, which initiatives really matter?

By Ted Moser and Hanna Moukanas

E

very firm needs an effective value growth agenda, but not all firms have one. How else to explain the extraordinary number of great firms with strong brands, fine products, and great people that have struggled in recent years: Compaq, British Telecom, Procter & Gamble, and Xerox, to name just a few (Exhibit 1)?

A high-impact value growth agenda is more than the “initiative du jour.” It’s a prioritized short list of actions designed to enable a firm to meet or exceed its own value growth targets and the expectations of investors. It separates the essential “must dos” from the longer list of “should dos.” The agenda often combines a mix of significant operational improvements with focused fundamental change. It should be tirelessly communicated to all members of a company’s value growth coalition: customers, employees, suppliers, and investors. And since the company’s chosen profit zone is a moving target, the agenda needs to evolve over time. But a value growth agenda only succeeds when it focuses on the right growth levers, at the right time, and in the right sequence. And the company must execute it effectively. Take Compaq, for example. At its inception in 1982, Compaq’s “IBM killer” value growth agenda was perfect in focus, in sequence, on time, and flawlessly implemented. Compaq determined it could produce the highest performing PCs with surprisingly low prices, thanks to strong engi-

Exhibit 1 Market value collapse
Compaq
90 80 70 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 1999 2001 0 1997 1999 2001 100 80 20 60 40 20 0 1997 1999 2001 15 10 5 0 1997 1999 2001

British Telecom
160 140 120

Procter & Gamble
45 40 35 30 25

Xerox

$ billions

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1997

- 63%
MV decline from peak

- 66%
MV decline from peak

- 46%
MV decline from peak
Source: Mercer Value Growth Database

- 85%
MV decline from peak

Note: Data is for April 1997 through April 2001.

Ted Moser and Hanna Moukanas are vice presidents of Mercer Management Consulting. Moser is based in San Francisco and Moukanas is based in Paris.

Mercer Management Journal

Setting the agenda 1

neering competence, a low-cost manufacturing culture, a dedicated PC focus, and (ultimately) market share leadership. Compaq became an entrepreneurial star, breaking the business world’s record for the fastest “zero to $1 billion” annual sales ramp-up in just five years. Yet Compaq’s value growth agenda didn’t anticipate and evolve fast enough to capture the next several profit shifts in the PC market. Value was migrating to made-to-order PCs (Dell), to services-led computing solutions (IBM Global Services), and to enterprise computing (Sun, IBM). Only after allowing competitors to gain value at its expense did Compaq’s agenda change—and then in all three directions at once. In 1998, within the space of ten months, Compaq rolled out a variant of Dell’s distribution system, created a solutions sales force via the acquisition of DEC, and started an enterprise server product line using DEC’s Alpha chip design. So much agenda change in so little time starting so late created huge implementation challenges and failed to drive a turnaround in value growth. Today’s most successful companies use a high-impact value growth agenda to keep pace with or to stay one step ahead of Value Migration®1, the process by which value growth opportunities shift within and across sectors. Today, General Electric’s agenda is defined as “Globalization, Services, Six-Sigma Quality, and e-Business.” And its agenda has evolved over time. From the famous “Be #1 or #2 or get out” market leader initiative in the early 1980s, through the “Work-Out” program to enhance efficiency in the late 1980s, through the solutions and services efforts of the 1990s, GE’s internal rate of change has kept pace with the market. Every GE manager and supply partner knows these priorities and follows them. Investors, knowing and believing too, have rewarded the company with exceptional value growth.

Value Migration changes the rules of the game
Just twenty years ago, most companies had less need for such a dynamic agenda. A company was defined by what it produced, and everyone knew what it did. Nippon Steel, U.S. Steel, and Usinor made steel. General Motors, Volkswagen, and Toyota made cars. BT, NTT, and AT&T ran national telephone services. Exhibit 2 Traditional value Companies also competed in similar ways, typically relying on the same few levers to increase the value of the firm. Winning strategies started with a twin focus on product innovation to achieve differentiation and cost reduction to maximize margins. Market share was the strongest underlying value driver, as it led to scale economies in areas such as R&D and branding and a low-cost position that preserved profit margins as an industry matured and prices declined. Managing the product portfolio for market share and choosing new markets in line with internal core competencies ensured sustained value growth. A mostly silent partner in this approach was the customer (Exhibit 2).

growth management
customer purc ble ha ita se of s Pr

Market share strategy

Product portfolio managment

Core competence
Product innovation Cost reduction

2 Setting the agenda

Mercer Management Journal

Exhibit 3 High revenues and market share no longer guarantee high profit.
Aerospace 2000 20 30 Textron General Dynamics Sigma-Aldrich Hercules IMC Global DuPont Dow Chemical 10 Chemicals 2000

Return on sales (%)

Return on sales (%)

15 10 5 0

United Technologies Lockheed Martin Boeing

20

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Revenue ($ billions)

Revenue ($ billions)
Source: Mercer Value Growth Database

An agenda centered on market share served business leaders well for decades, but it no longer guarantees sustained value growth, for several reasons: T Some scale positions have lost their uniqueness. Multiple competitors in global markets have achieved adequate scale. Outsourcing providers have emerged to provide scale effects to smaller competitors. Mass markets have given way to segmented ones, and product-based value propositions to propositions based on solutions and customer economics (Exhibit 3). Industry boundaries have blurred, creating new competitors who attack from the blind side. Being the leader in telephony networks doesn’t matter if customers want data networks. And for many manufacturing applications, engineers consider the relative merits of metals, plastics, and composites, suggesting a broader “materials” definition. Customers have grown increasingly sophisticated, demanding, and diverse. The passive customer has evolved into an active customer, seeking customized products and tailored solutions, and wanting them promptly. With more options and more information on supplier economics, customers are armed and dangerous. Moreover, consolidation has made business customers larger and more powerful. And the increasing heterogeneity of customers has created huge incentives to build business designs precisely tailored to the priorities of economically attractive customer segments.

T

T

These changes have caused a dramatic increase in the rate and impact of Value Migration. With the sources of competitive advantage having shifted from inside the enterprise to the marketplace outside, the task of the business leader has grown exponentially more difficult. Business success is now determined by how well a company anticipates these shifts and by the speed with which it mounts a winning response before the window of opportunity closes. Add to this more complex environment an unprecedented level of pressure on managers to instill investor confidence in their company’s prospects, and the challenge of creating an effective value growth agenda becomes fully evident.

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Setting the agenda 3

Finding the leverage
Every company’s value growth agenda can be developed and organized around five growth levers (Exhibit 4). Which levers to pull and in which order naturally varies by situation. The levers include:

Exhibit 4 New value growth approach

T

e Migration ® Valu
Cus to m er pr io
r
es iti

So ur c

e
so
fv

Market share

Product portfolio

Business design innovation

Portfolio redesign Operational breakthrough

Customer value growth

Organizational transformation

Product innovation

Cost reduction

Business design innovation. Some of the largest value growth opportunities involve the creation of entirely new business designs responding to the emerging needs of key customer segments (see sidebar, “Assembling the components of business design”). These new business designs may supplant, complement, or be only loosely related to the core business. The traditional concern with market share remains important, but subordinate. What makes sense is to maximize the share of healthy business designs. The business design lever is particularly potent when the future value growth potential of a company’s core business has matured or when an industry is undergoing some form of fundamental change.

alu
e

T

Customer value growth. Significant opportunities can be tapped by optimizing a company’s relationships with customers. In response to the fragmentation of the mass market and the explosion of customer alternatives, the traditional focus on product innovation has become part of an overall customer value lifecycle. Companies frequently have too many of the wrong customers and too few of the right ones. Fine-tuning value propositions— offer, brand, pricing, distribution, and the customer experience—can often attract more of the most lucrative customers and change the economics of the rest. That can result in huge financial rewards. Keeping value propositions in synch with the changing priorities of customers through a test-and-learn culture can sustain these results. Operational breakthrough. The traditional focus on cost reduction has become part of an overall operational breakthrough that optimizes cost, quality, time, and assets in the context of the firm’s chosen value proposition. With business design lifecycles now increasingly measured in years rather than decades, getting the operational side right can’t wait without compromising the total return to investors. In addition, operations today can be a huge differentiator, enabling customers and suppliers to link with the company in new and powerful ways. Portfolio redesign. Significant value growth leverage can often be found through a reconceptualization and redesign of a company's portfolio. Yet traditional portfolio approaches are ill-suited to the modern business environment, as they focus on business units and seek to optimize a company's assets based only on the single dimension of product market share, using rear-view-mirror metrics. Taking other dimensions into consideration can lead to enhanced insights and better decisions. One such dimension is business design, which enables the clustering of business units into a smaller number of underlying designs across which lessons can be shared. This

T

T

4 Setting the agenda

Mercer Management Journal

Assembling the components of business design
Customer selection and value proposition Value capture/ profit model

customers. Profits may come from product sales or service charges, as well as a host of other value-capture mechanisms such as financing income and licensing fees. (3) Scope refers to how the company defines its activities and its product and service offerings. The right scope lets a company focus on what it does best while allowing others to handle activities they do better, since the company is likely to realize less value from those activities. Dell Computer focuses on marketing and assembling PCs and managing a complex supply network, leaving to other companies the work of physically producing computer components. (4) Strategic control refers to the company’s ability to protect its profit streams from being eroded by competitors (or even by powerful customers). It answers the questions, “Why should a customer buy from me? Why must a customer buy from me?” It may take many forms, from ownership of patents without which a particular technology can’t be built to control over customer relationships that determine how buying decisions are made. (5) Finally, organizational architecture defines the management structures, corporate culture, and talent leverage mechanisms that the company uses to execute its business design choices.c

Organizational architecture

Strategic control

Scope

(1) Customer selection defines the set of customers the company chooses to serve, as well as those it chooses not to serve. Like other elements of business design, customer selection may shift over time, sometimes dramatically: IBM, for example, has emerged as a major seller of basic technology to computer manufacturers, turning former rivals into a new customer set. Value propositions define the value that the company creates for customers. This may include benefits derived from products, services, information, and other sources. The more valuable—even unique—these benefits are, the more reasons that customers have to buy from one company and no other. (2) The profit model defines how the company gets rewarded for the value that it creates for

dimension incorporates the various types of customer relationships and profit models that a company has. A second dimension is economic neighborhood, a concept that acknowledges that traditionally defined industries are often parts of larger, more porous economic landscapes. Mapping business designs across economic neighborhoods creates a broader field upon which to see opportunities, threats, and potential moves. T Organizational transformation. This is perhaps the most important lever of all, since the organization is the mechanism that transforms strategy into value growth. Pull this lever when a good strategy is being held back by the organization—dearth of a critical capability, inconsistent incentive systems, inefficient processes, dysfunctional culture, or unclear leadership—or pull it when the current business design must be completely reinvented to capture the next wave of value growth.

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Setting the agenda 5

Other major sources of value can cut across all these levers. For instance, digital technologies including the Internet can help companies address critical business issues by offering significant productivity improvements as well as making possible entirely new business designs and value propositions.

Playing by the new rules
Rarely are all five levers pulled simultaneously. Typically, at any given time, one or two levers predominate in a firm’s agenda, but over time, its agenda will evolve to focus on other levers in response to changing market conditions. In any company, there are more laudable initiatives than available time; thus, prioritization and sequencing are the core arts of establishing a value growth agenda. Although value growth agendas require intensive efforts, they are well worth it. Two examples should help make this clearer.

Wal-Mart’s value growth agenda
Wal-Mart is one of the greatest value growth stories of all time. Starting in 1969 as a local supermarket in Arkansas, the company has created over $200 billion in value for shareholders. Between 1989 and 1998 alone, it represented nearly a quarter of the $726 billion in shareholder value created in the retail industry. There are four major phases in the evolution of Wal-Mart’s value growth agenda: T Capturing “markets for one.” Sam Walton’s initial idea was as bold as it was simple. He wanted to be the discount retailer for all of America’s small-to-medium-sized towns, which can only support a single superstore. These “markets for one” conferred a natural monopoly on the first retailer to the market. Walton aggressively built out a nationwide chain to ensure that Wal-Mart would be there first. A brilliant business design innovation, these stores remain a bedrock of the firm’s financial performance to this day. Streamlining operations through real-time logistics and decision management. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, Wal-Mart made significant technology investments in electronic data interchange, the automation of distribution centers, and the implementation of satellite systems to facilitate ordering, shipping, logistics, and communications. But what really mattered was how fast Wal-Mart acted on that data. In the store, management focused on capturing point-of-sale information and mining this data for insights. In addition, they worked to transform their logistics relationships with suppliers. These initiatives have helped Wal-Mart achieve an operational breakthrough—extraordinary growth with increasing inventory turns and a competitively superior return on assets (Exhibit 5). Extending into new formats and product lines. By the mid-1980s, it became clear to Wal-Mart that it had a huge value gap. Its stock valuation was not justified by the profit growth potential of its core store formats, which was tapping out as U.S. markets approached saturation. So the mid-1980s through the 1990s became a time of exceptional business design innovation and experimentation for Wal-Mart. Its Sam’s Club format focused on new customer segments such as small business owners and budget-oriented consumers by delivering a focused assortment of bulk items in a warehouse club format.

T

T

6 Setting the agenda

Mercer Management Journal

Exhibit 5 By streamlining operations, Wal-Mart improved inventory turns and ROA.

Inventory levels as % of sales
25% 20 CAGR 1990-2000 K Mart -2.1% 6 Wal-Mart -4.5% 4 10 5 Target -1.6% 2 8%

Inventory turnover
CAGR 1990-2000 Wal-Mart 3.8% 15 20%

Return on assets

Target -1.0% K Mart 2.6%

15

10

Wal-Mart

5

Target

0 1990 '92 0 1990 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 0 1990 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 -5

K Mart '94 '96 '98 '00

Source: Mercer Value Growth Database

Its Wal-Mart Supercenters focused on new purchase occasions such as grocery shopping, buying prescription drugs, and photo finishing. Management focused as well on international expansion of culturally tailored versions of its successful U.S. business designs. While the jury is still out on its international moves, Wal-Mart’s new formats effort has been a huge success. In 1990, new formats represented less than 10 percent of Wal-Mart’s stores; by the end of 2000, they represented over 50 percent. T Organizing for a consistent customer experience. In the early 1990s, Wal-Mart recognized that its nearly one million workers represented both a huge risk and a huge opportunity. The question was how to maintain a consistent corporate culture and customer experience in a low-wage industry with relatively unskilled labor and high turnover rates. The company is working to achieve this organizational transformation in a number of ways, including: - establishing rules of customer engagement such as the friendly greeter at every entrance and the “ten-foot rule” that ensures that an associate acknowledges the presence of any customer who comes within a ten-foot radius - offering both incentive compensation to reward initiative and a healthy benefits package to strengthen the basic employment relationship - sending senior management into the field every week to talk with store managers, associates, and customers Through such procedures, Wal-Mart has earned the cooperation of its associates and has engaged their emotional energy. Sustaining this exceptional performance (Exhibit 6) will be a challenge. Enhancing the international business and leveraging the Internet should both figure prominently in Wal-Mart’s next agenda. The company is already at work on a number of Internet initiatives, both customer-facing (Walmart.com) and supplier-facing. As Wal-Mart’s e-commerce moves have disappointed to date, the firm may have to make a big e-commerce acquisition as part of defining the next agenda.

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Setting the agenda 7

Exhibit 6 Wal-Mart’s evolving agenda
250 CAGR (1981-2001)

2
200
Business design innovation Portfolio redesign

1. 1980s-mid-1990s
Streamline logistics, distribution, and supplier network

Wal-Mart 30%

2. Mid-1980s-mid-1990s
Pioneer new formats and product lines

3
Organizational transformation

150

1

3. 1990s
Deliver a consistent customer experience

$ billions

Customer value growth

Operational breakthrough

100

50 Target 18% Kmart 3% 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

0 1981

Note: Q1 1981- Q1 2001 Source: Mercer Value Growth Database

LVMH’s value growth agenda
LVMH, the leading global purveyor of luxury goods, has created more than $25 billion in shareholder value in the past ten years by artfully initiating three important shifts in its value growth agenda (Exhibit 7): T Industrializing the luxury branded experience. LVMH recognized that the value growth potential of the classic “boutique” business model was inherently limited. Starting in the early 1990s under the leadership of Bernard Arnault, LVMH invested heavily in advertising and in opening more and larger stores across which to amortize its brand investments. From the beginning, the strategy was based on moving beyond the traditional carriage trade to capture more aspirational customers. That move took high-end brands to what approached a mass market, without diluting their cachet. The focus on brand has continued as the company has expanded. Some brands were moved up-market (such as Veuve Clicquot), others extended (Dior’s move into high-end fragrances), and yet others energized with new talent (Givenchy’s hiring of designer Alexander McQueen in 1996). Cornerstoning to capture a greater share of wallet. Wanting to capture a greater share of the target customer’s luxury goods spending, starting in the mid-1990s, the company embarked on a major expansion along three dimensions. First, it reinforced the core portfolio of brands in fashion, leather goods, fragrances, cosmetics, wine, and spirits with key acquisitions (Marc Jacobs) and alliances (Prada). Second, it moved into multi-brand retail (Duty Free Shops and the fragrance and cosmetics superstore Sephora). And third, it expanded into adjacent economic neighborhoods (watches and jewelry). Through these portfolio redesign moves, LVMH has captured the leading position in terms of total operating profit in three of its sectors (leather goods, specialty retailing, and wines and spirits) and the number three position in two others.

T

8 Setting the agenda

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Exhibit 7 LVMH’s evolving agenda
50

1, 3
40

1. 1990s

Business design innovation
Organizational transformation

2
Portfolio redesign

Industrialize the luxury branded experience

2. Mid-1990s
Cornerstone into adjacent economic neighborhoods CAGR (1990-2000)

$ billions

30

1
Customer Operational value growth breakthrough

3. 1997
Integrate to control distribution channels

LVMH 13%

20

Seagram 10%

10 Gucci 23%* Hermes 22%* Brown-Forman 7% 0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

*Gucci CAGR is 1996-2000; Hermes CAGR is 1994-2000. Source: Mercer Value Growth Database

T

Integrating to control distribution channels. Starting in 1997, LVMH embarked on another business design innovation: to solidify its brand positions by increasing both its number of outlets and its level of control over brand imaging at retail. Beginning with the rapid expansion of its flagship boutique stores (Louis Vuitton, Celine, and Loewe), and continuing with its acquisition of Duty Free Stores to provide access to both Asian markets and a new travel-related purchase occasion, the company has moved aggressively to be where its high-end customers are. Recent moves into mass retailing, such as its acquisition and expansion of Sephora, and into the Internet space through eluxury.com, provide LVMH with retail control over a significant portion of its product sales and ensure a great customer experience. Contrast these moves with several other fashion houses that chose to mass license their brands, only to see the value of those brands diluted a short time later.

Setting and communicating the agenda
Wal-Mart and LVMH could have made other choices. Each company was and remains confronted with a huge spectrum of strategic options. But each chose to focus the limited financial, physical, and emotional energies of their organizations on a few key initiatives that mattered—transforming a small town supermarket into a chain of superstores, then a retail occasion phenomenon, and a luxury retailer into a portfolio of powerful brands. And they renewed this agenda as new opportunities and threats arose, thereby delivering sustained and superior economic performance. Setting the right course is hard. Montgomery Ward and Kmart had access to the same data and made vastly different and less effective choices in discount retail. And in the fashion space, The Limited could have taken a similar approach to that of LVMH for The Limited’s own mid-market customer, but didn’t.

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Setting the agenda 9

While setting and renewing a value growth agenda is not easy, the benefits clearly justify investing time in its development. There are four key steps in establishing an agenda: T Identify and assess the impact of Value Migration patterns in economic neighborhoods served. In order to develop an accurate assessment of the value growth potential of an enterprise, it’s crucial to have a clear perspective on where tomorrow’s profit zones will emerge in all economic neighborhoods served or potentially served. An evaluation of which Value Migration patterns3 are likely to play out is often the best way to create a shared vision of future competitive dynamics, threats, and opportunities for the business designs the company currently operates. Evaluate the value growth potential of current initiatives. It’s critical to assess the value growth potential of all current initiatives in light of the management team’s shared insights into future sources of value. Inevitably, some initiatives will see their potential soar, while others plummet. Comparing the net value growth potential of all initiatives with the enterprise’s stated value growth goals will identify the value gap, if any, that the organization must address. Develop new growth hypotheses. Whether or not a value gap exists, management should hypothesize which new moves—from redesigning the portfolio to creating an innovative business design, achieving operational breakthrough, or building a better customer value growth system—will move the company from strategic disadvantage to strategic advantage. Then they should estimate the value growth potential of each significant hypothesis. Define the value growth agenda. Armed with a menu of potential moves and their potential value impact, the agenda-setting process begins. What combination of initiatives— whether focused on reinvention or operational improvement—in what sequence over what timeframe maximizes the firm’s value growth within the constraints of executive attention and capital availability?

T

T

T

Once the agenda has been set, the truly hard job begins. Responsibilities and deadlines must be established. The value growth agenda must be led from the top. And it must be communicated early and often to employees, investors, customers, and suppliers. In time, it will become the DNA of the company and direct a creative organization toward great results. Suppliers and customers who buy into the agenda will respond more positively and help the firm succeed. Investors who understand it will support the share price, maintain lines of credit, and resist demands for hasty, shortsighted moves in an economic downturn or after a bad quarter. The value growth agenda must remain attuned to the marketplace and thus needs to be renewed periodically. Changing market conditions—whether macroeconomic, such as an economic downturn; technological, such as the emergence of the Internet; customer-oriented, such as the emergence of a new segment; or competitive, such as the identification of a new competitor on the edge of the radar screen—will call for a review, as will the initial signs of Value Migration that threaten the current business design. Creating value is easier in good economic times as a rising tide lifts all boats. But with slowing macroeconomic growth, a value growth agenda based on real strategic insight, on time, in the right sequence, and flawlessly executed will be a competitive necessity. Times like this represent a great opportunity. While rivals struggle to regroup, great companies mobilize, disrupt the rhythm of competition, and seize control of their markets.c

10 Setting the agenda

Mercer Management Journal

As you consider building your own Value Growth Agenda, ask yourself the following questions:
Competitive position T Is our market value growing as fast as it could? T Do investors value our company fairly? T Are we as profitable as our toughest competitors? T Are we meeting our revenue and earnings growth targets? T Have we created barriers to entry for new entrants in our industry? T Can we pinpoint why customers choose us over our competitors? Patterns and trends T Do we regularly track changing customer and technology trends, emerging patterns, or new regulations in the industry? T How is our business threatened by these changes? T How are new entrants redefining the traditional rules of success in our industry? T Is our competitive “radar screen” tracking new, digitally enabled players? T How are the traditional boundaries of our industry blurring? Growth strategy development T Are our strategic goals and financial targets ambitious enough? T Do senior managers dedicate time to think about and develop new growth opportunities? T Do we have a clear set of initiatives to improve our current businesses? T Do we have an attractive set of growth ideas to develop future businesses? T Is our growth strategy driven by customer priorities rather than by internal core competencies? T Do we know which growth initiatives will create value beyond what analysts have already factored into our market value? T Do we have realistic and action-oriented plans to realize these growth initiatives? Growth strategy communication T Do employees and managers have a clear understanding of our growth strategy? T Are they excited and motivated by that strategy? T Are we clearly communicating the strategy to investors? T Are investors confident in our ability to grow?

Mercer Management Journal

Setting the agenda 11

Mercer Management Journal Editorial Board James W. Down Charles Hoban Nancy Lotane Joseph Martha David J. Morrison Ted Moser Hanna Moukanas Patrick A. Pollino Phyllis Rothschild Adrian J. Slywotzky Digital Edition Team Ellen M. Zanino Christopher Hogan Jamie Klickstein Art Director Michael Tveskov Director of Publications John Campbell

Mercer Management Journal is published by Mercer Management Consulting for its clients and friends. The contents are copyright 2001 and 2002© by Mercer Management Consulting. Value Migration® is a proprietary trademark of Mercer Management Consulting that has been registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. NexperimentTM is a trademark; Strategic Choice Analysis® is a registered trademark; Value Net DesignSM is a service mark; and ChoiceboardSM is a service mark; all owned by Mercer Management Consulting. Cover illustration by Patrick Corrigan. All rights reserved. Excerpts can be reprinted with attribution to Mercer Management Consulting. Articles can be found on our Web site: www.mercermc.com. For information on reprinting entire articles and all other correspondence, please contact the editor: John Campbell Mercer Management Consulting 33 Hayden Avenue Lexington, Massachusetts 02421 781-674-3323 john.campbell@mercermc.com

About Mercer Management Consulting
As one of the world’s premier corporate strategy firms, Mercer Management Consulting helps leading enterprises achieve sustained shareholder value growth through the development and implementation of innovative business designs. Mercer’s proprietary business design techniques, combined with its specialized industry knowledge and global reach, enable companies to anticipate changes in customer priorities and the competitive environment, and then design their businesses to seize opportunities created by those changes. The firm serves clients from 22 offices in the Americas, Europe, and Asia.

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