A.C. No.
5581 January 14, 2014 should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by
complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty.
Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and
Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage,
as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan,
respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration
Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was
still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled
or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba,
while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and
conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to
continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require
respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite
receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry
Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution 5 dated
March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he
file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion 7
praying that respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be
deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for
disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared
that an administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the
nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he
received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to
frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for
falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her
husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the
Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is
occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon
City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's
Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel
and her younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address,
but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent
suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him
from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation
amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry.
He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences,
i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be
furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to
the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require
Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the administrative
complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof
that a copy of the administrative complaint was furnished to respondent
at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino
Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his
comment despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, 11 reiterated that he has
yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably
had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have
received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to
furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that
he be furnished a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish
a copy of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the
dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was
supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that
the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint
and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City
as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to
respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003
despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of
the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621,
with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the
correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had
consistently indicated in his correspondence with the Court No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said
address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig
averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his
appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili
Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show
Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at
Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show
Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this
administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7,
2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5)
days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY
with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required
thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent
failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and
July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of
Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-
compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a
report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved
to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by
Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of
the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither
Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City
cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given
address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant
lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given
address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine
respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with
the Court's Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of
respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay,
Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference
and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order
dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the
IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was
submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was
received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt.
However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation,
recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of
two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of
its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit
to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite
the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer
the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent
contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage.
The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the
Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio
Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R.
Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz
Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to
prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latters
first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage
apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan
which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at
the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their
contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other
than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent
contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By
itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages
entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue
as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather
respondents defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his
repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment
on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of
more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected
only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The
Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on
the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any
answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the
complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him.
Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them
have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the
copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before
this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's
nonchalant attitude towards this case; accommodating respondent's
endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous
affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more
than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint
to different locations - both office and residential addresses of
respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of
failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer
feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the
Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the
consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents
deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We
have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as
a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts
orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of

the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is,
thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY.

ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and
willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the
Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-264 1 of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069,
which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of
one-year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being
commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a
complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty.
Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification;
(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation
of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's
admission4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had
notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and
irregular entries in his notarial registers.7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She
engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law
Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband
and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still
appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA
30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the
Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client,
Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting clients' interests.9 Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide
called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same administrative
complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where
she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his
opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental
incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these
statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language,
which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did
not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it
appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and
falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document. 13
Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear
that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended
that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his
separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients
and accommodate their growing number.14 This explains the irregular
and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she
did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services
of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of
Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo
Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this basis, the
respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients'
interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language in his pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for
mandatory conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit
their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner
Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide
administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules,
representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting
language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the
Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial
registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a
notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of
a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only
one active notarial register at any given time."19 However,
Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held
administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The
investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this
issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the
March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his admission to
the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved
that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with
Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not
personally hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case. The
retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers. 21 But
despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating
commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is
totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed
against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used
intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings. 22 For violating the
Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that
Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months
for employing abusive and insulting language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
(Board) opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of
the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the
recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission,
if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a
notary public.24
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19,
2011 resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013
resolution.26
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and
recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main
issues that the parties identified.
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any
concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002
partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and
receipt of his notarial commission.
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial
stamp that bears his name, roll number, PTR number, IBP number, and
the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document
 are his true information. However, he denied that he personally stamped
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
and signed the document. In fact, this document never appeared in
his notarial register and was never included in his notarial report Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and
used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who Affidavit of Two 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
notarized it. Disinterested Persons
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly Petition for Issuance of 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public Owner's Duplicate copy
had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2,
2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures Affidavit of Parental 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the Consent
expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date,
particularly on March 29, 2002. Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization,
leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the
Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a
document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial
notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
commission.
inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial
register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only
numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary
generated after his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002
public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time." 28
document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before us.
On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active
notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain
maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Because of this
only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are
practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly
chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in
numbered and entered:
place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to
different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on
Doc. his behalf.
Document27 Date Page Book Year
No.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public
Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005 must also personally administer the notarial acts 29 that the law authorizes
him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus,
Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005 no other person, other than the notary public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in
chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant
practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the
antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he
needed to maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices so
he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his
notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his
functions as his powers and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A
notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a
public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his
notarial commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the
Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence.
It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should
not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Anion v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a
lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among
his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased
when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged
ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any
way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno
with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide
represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title.
Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved
Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint
against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan
entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in
the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case
and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at
the time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More
importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against
Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired while he was
still their counsel in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
violating the prohibition against the representation of conflicting
interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive andabusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his
clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." 34 And in
another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following
demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against
his opposing counsel:
abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his
pleadings, must be dignified.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate,
offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year
from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND

HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of
Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her
incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear
manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35
(emphasis supplied)

This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice
of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating
but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O.
AILES, Respondent.
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 for
disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble
III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a
complaint2 for damages against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr.
(Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following
data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-
00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the
time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number
should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the
year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just
the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the
latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against
Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he
discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning
him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel,
claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees,
saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who
will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max
Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why
you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer.
He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even
prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel 7 in the complaint for
damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has never done anything to
protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging
enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing
uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise
Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature.
Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with
violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 9 and
192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award
of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed
that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground
for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and
Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo
when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case.
Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text
messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother
communication" and were uttered in good faith.12
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by
Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation 13 and, on
June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was
convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing
or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading
words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando,
finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not
a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required
information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP
Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to
warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering
that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are
brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him
to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for
reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution 18 dated
May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on
certioranri.19
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly
dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high
standards of legal proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege
burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith
in the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in
public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when
dealing with fellow lawyers.22
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR
provides:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of
any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of the judicial forum. 23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24
the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao
English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his
integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the
opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his
brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court
conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the required information
messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against
intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his
word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well
immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's as the expunction thereof from the
offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust
vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes
intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his
professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words and severely.
actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and SO ORDERED.
uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or
private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls
short of the standards imposed upon them. 26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's
brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been
more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to
another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was
highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial

proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 27 While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. 28 The Court has
consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and
reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear
how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his
client.29

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER,
Respondents.
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the
Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
(Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. Jarder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of
the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated
14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.
The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other,
the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When
Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the
signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not
his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to
such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for
comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty.
Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases
for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against
Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August
2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the
office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that
the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty.
Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that
he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-
V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency
of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a
proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay. SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged that they
were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants
stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was
not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report 6 dated
1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other
clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that
the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted
standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the
same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they
were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment
Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain
Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office,
forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by
Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman
were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being
informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare
and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to
some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to
retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial
and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane
Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006.
The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents
were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the
mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit
their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents
position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty.
Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty.
Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities
in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that
his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants
Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found
not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached
his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a
non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for
him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law
firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled
that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a
sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the
notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline and its
proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm
Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain
responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having
passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds
himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert
ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure
that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious
control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of
the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical
practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty.
Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable
under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty.
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply
to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors denied both complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-
Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal
or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under
the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1)
he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed
for delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel
alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal
effect to the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of
manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take
any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia
denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty.
Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that
prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to
file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of
the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some
minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and
Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary
to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of
law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the
case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder
for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for
violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v.
ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondents.
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged
betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent
Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election
protest case involving the candidacy of Mariecris Umaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, instituted
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC),
docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK
Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose
Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged
an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his
acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and
miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the
complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and
file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action
when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. 5 Atty. De Vera then
rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for
the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits 6 of
material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time
that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and
Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De
Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and
Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of
Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names. 7 The signing
over of Lachicas and Almeras names were done by Christina Papin
(Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately
disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own
Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the
document on his behalf. Lachicas affidavit was presented to the MeTC
and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo),
who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge
Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify
this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, 10
seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachicas and Almeras
affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since
Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest
with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were falsified.11

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out
that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although promptly
notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any
explanation as to why he was not able to attend.12
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an
explanation regarding his non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera
explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because of
the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty.
Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client.
Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the
complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give
to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing. 13
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity
and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary
relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
case.14
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Veras
disbarment.15
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the
accusations lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he
merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on
the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the
signing of Lachicas falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge
and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted
and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he
actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned
Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the
affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no
longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the
aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the
case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of
Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled
Release Waiver & Discharge,19 which, to him, discharges him and his
law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against
him, including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation 20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP
Commissioner found the administrative action to be impressed with
merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that
Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of Lachicas affidavit, the
IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification of
Almeras affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the
testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almeras sister attesting that
Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit, and
her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing,
and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera
was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and hard to
ignore.22 It was also observed that the backdrop in which the allegations
were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on November
7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election
protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and,
hence, his resort to the odious act of advising his clients campaigners
Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for
and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the
filing of the election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner remarked that the lawyers first duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of
the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence,
for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2) month
suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution27 dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their
December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension
from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held
administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were
duly substantiated by the records. However, the Court finds it apt to
increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the
courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and
trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyers Oath that every
lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member
of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. 29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Lawyers Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant
of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be
an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in
complete agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was
affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera
sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almeras affidavit,
before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for
filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to
sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioners appreciation of Elsa
Almera-Almacens credibility as a witness given that nothing appears on
record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that
the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witnesss
credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they similar to trial
courts are given the opportunity to first-hand observe their demeanor
and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the
falsification of Almeras affidavit is rendered more believable by the
absence of Atty. De Veras comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion
for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution dated
December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera
on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who
notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public, who he does
not even know or has seen in his entire life, 31 and that he had no
knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of
the participation in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera,
the Court views the same to be a mere general denial which cannot
overcome Elsa Almera-Almacens positive testimony that he indeed
participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the
affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all for which the IBP Board of Governors
rendered its recommendation is that Almeras affidavit was submitted
to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant
consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought,
prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is
highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about
the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court
when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal
and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation 34 or allow his
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.35
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document
captioned Release Waiver & Discharge which Atty. De Vera, in his
Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of
action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case,
would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It
was held in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath
and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
submitting a falsified document before a court.
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38
(Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six
(6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view of the
antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the
same here.
Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement 39 for the return
of the amount of P60,000.00, 40 comprised of Atty. De Veras acceptance
fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his professional
engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt thereof in his
Answer before the IBP.42
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in
Samonte:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones
misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice
law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary
sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is
found GUILTY of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of
the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses
Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which he
admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of further administrative penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174759 September 7, 2011
DENIS B. HABAWEL vs. CTA
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA First Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a
period of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to
the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First
Divisions finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its
discretion because the language they used in their motion for
reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was contumacious.
Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006,1 whereby the
CTA First Division disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis
B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and
Manalastas Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel
is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to
SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED.2
and the resolution dated July 26, 2006, 3 whereby the CTA First Division
denied their motion for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.
Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation
(Surfield), which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer of
Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until
2000.4 After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim
for refund,5 Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed
as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v.
Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor of
Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214.6 Surfield later amended
its petition to include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from
2001 until 2003.7
On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
the period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant
of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of
mandamus.8
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the
CTA via petition for review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield
Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City
Assessor, Mandaluyong City).9 The appeal was assigned to the First
Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate
Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006, 10 the CTA First Division denied
the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the
remedies provided under Section 25311 and Section 22612 of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of
Surfield,13 insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section
7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282;14 and arguing that the CTA First
Division manifested its "lack of understanding or respect" for the
doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R.
No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there
was no need to file an appeal before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.
On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for
reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division
explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic
Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to
appeals from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local
tax cases and did not include the real property tax, an ad valorem tax,
the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was claiming.
Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the
CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a different section of
Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No.
7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the
petitioners employed in the motion for reconsideration, required them to
explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for
indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as the
merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be considered as the
final decision on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that "it
is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it
has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this
Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the
instant case" and "this Court lacked the understanding and respect for
the doctrine of "stare decisis" as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful.
Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to "observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;" they vow
solemnly to conduct themselves "with all good fidelityto the courts."
As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its superior importance." Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby
ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution why he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or
subject to disciplinary action. SO ORDERED.15
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006, 16 in
which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless justified their
language as, among others, "necessary to bluntly call the Honorable
Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by
spade."17
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the
petitioners apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that
they chose words that were "so strong, which brings disrepute the
Courts honor and integrity" for brazenly pointing to "the Courts
alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion," to wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when
counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In
fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and
grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which
brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity. We quote:
a) "Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not
endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to
bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the
error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong
articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in
avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple
expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires
that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which the Decision was based" (par. 3 of the Compliance;
docket, p. 349);
b) "Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it
totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that
"(U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial
Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the CTA," the undersigned counsel formed a perception
that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has not
[sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of
this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest
and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally
ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction" (par. 10 of
the Compliance; docket, p. 353);18
Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners
guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of
preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to
suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,19 the petitioners submitted that they could not
be held guilty of direct contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance
of the law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of judgment
and was not directed to the character or competence of the decision
makers; (b) there was no "unfounded accusation or allegation," or
"scandalous, offensive or menacing," "intemperate, abusive, abrasive or
threatening," or "vile, rude and repulsive" statements or words contained
in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in their
motion for reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the
administration of the law into disrepute; and (d) they had repeatedly
offered their apology in their compliance.20
Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to
reconsider, which declared through its second assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in
the phrases used. The scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing
out errors of judgment almost always result to the destruction of the high
esteem and regard towards the Court.21 and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY
a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a
period of ten (10) days. SO, ORDERED.22
Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their "(z)ealous advocacy
and an appalling error" committed by the CTA First Division to frankly
describe such error as gross ignorance of the law, the petitioners now
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding
that:
I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND
COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;
II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY
AND WERE ARROGANT;
III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE
LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF DIRECT CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the
law was used in its strict legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the
error of law committed by the CTA First Division; and that the
statements described by the CTA First Division as "abrasive, offensive,
derogatory, offensive and disrespectful" should be viewed within the
context of the general tone and language of their motion for
reconsideration; that their overall language was "tempered, restrained
and respectful" and should not be construed as a display of
contumacious attitude or as "a flouting or arrogant belligerence in
defiance of the court" to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA
First Division did not appreciate the sincerity of their apology; and that
they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First
Division.
For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion
for reconsideration and the character of the words used therein by the
petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no humility, nor were
they "expressive of a contrite heart;" and that their submissions instead
"reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to
again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the
decision."23
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a
pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to
the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes
direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not abuse its
discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.24
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First
Division did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that
the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all
attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys
thus:
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the
courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms
and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to
the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re:
Almacen:25
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a
lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns
a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown
open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic
society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
(emphasis supplied)26
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following
statements, to wit: (a) "[i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the
Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant
petition;"27 (b) "[t]he grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of
the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable
Courts jurisdiction;"28 and (c) the "Honorable Courts lack of
understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis."29
The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt
of court meriting prompt penalty.
We agree.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped
the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to
respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance
against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is
a serious allegation,30 and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is
settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in
pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt
because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice.31 This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements are not read in open court.32 Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge
Ramon S. Caguioa,33 where the petitioners motion for clarification
stated that the respondent judges decision constituted gross negligence
and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and sophistry, the
Court held that "a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or
malicious statements when submitted before a court or judge in which
the proceedings are pending is direct contempt because it is equivalent
to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice."34
In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the
petitioners statements were "strong, tactless and hurtful," 35 regards the
statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of
contempt for being explanations of their position "in a case under
consideration" and because "an unfavorable decision usually incites
bitter feelings."36
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and
set aside, however, for the characterization that the statements were
"strong, tactless and hurtful," although obviously correct, provides no
ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such
"strong, tactless and hurtful" statements were used to explain their
clients position in the case.37 The statements manifested a disrespect
towards the CTA and the members of its First Division approaching
disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their "strong, tactless and hurtful"
language minimized on the basis that "snide remarks or sarcastic
innuendos made by counsels are not considered contemptuous
considering that unfavorable decision usually incite bitter feelings." 38 By
branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as "totally
unaware or ignorant" of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and
making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners plainly
assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To
hold such language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of
the petitioners to denigrate the CTA and the members of its First
Division is not altogether unwarranted.
The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division
for ruling against their side found firm confirmation in their compliance,
in which they unrepentantly emphasized such disdain in the following
telling words:
3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not
endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to
bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the
error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong
articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in
avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple
expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires
that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it
totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that
"(U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial
Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the CTA," the undersigned counsel formed a perception
that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no
jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance
of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and
frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally
ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis
supplied)39
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the
petitioners made the statements had they convinced us that the CTA First
Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of jurisdiction over the
appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions
involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA
First Division. This result became immediately evident from a reading
of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the
former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had
jurisdiction, to wit:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided:
xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment
and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the
"(d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction." The provision is clearly limited to
local tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast,
Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the "(d)ecisions
of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation
of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals." In its resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the
CTA First Division forthrightly explained why, contrary to the
petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that
a real property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a
local tax.40
It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then
retreated and simply admitted their blatant error upon being so informed
by the CTA First Division about the untenability of their legal position
on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their compliance
dated March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their
"perception" about the CTA First Divisions "being totally oblivious of
Section 7(a)(3)" due to "the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January
2006," viz:
12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this
Honorable Court was grossly ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from
the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the undersigned
counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of
Section 7(a)(3). Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15
March 2006 been articulated in the 05 January 2006 decision, there
would have been no basis for undersigned counsels to have formed the
above-mentioned perception.41 (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse
the petitioners contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no
matter his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or
judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or
legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and
temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must
eschew harsh and intemperate language that has no place in the educated
ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should strive to win
arguments through civility and fairness, not by "heated and acrimonious
tone," as the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins,42 to wit:
The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious
tone of the remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking
of the action of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that
excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force
of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language
that experience has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper
administration of justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this
court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys,
and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely
to their contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect.
(emphasis supplied)
We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of
court. They threw out self-restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most
trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all members of the Legal
Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility
of their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the
highest degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not
permit them to cross the line between liberty and license. 43 Indeed, the
Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language,
though forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must
remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity
of the Legal Profession.44 It is always worthwhile to bear in mind, too,
that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that were
emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and
illuminating, yet not offensive.45 No attorney worthy of the title should
forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls
upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or
its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First Division
was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of
propriety.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court
invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of court in order to retain
that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or
fail.46 We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited
upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and
promoted the proper respect that attorneys and their clients should bear
towards the courts of justice.
Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of
apology was probably feigned, for they did not relent but continued to
justify their contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency.
Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of
P2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court for
using contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the
vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.
The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by
counsel in pleadings and other written submissions to the courts of law,
including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with
contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or
administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has
ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern
warning against a repetition of the misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a
fine of P5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive
language is viewed as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re:
Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 47 the errant
lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and
compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law. Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the
Court prescribed no separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he
evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his actions that resulted
from cases that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re:
Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, 48 the complaining State
Prosecutor, despite his strong statements to support his position not
being considered as direct contempt of court, was warned to be more
circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded
and handed a stern warning for the disrespectful language she used in
her pleadings filed in this Court, which declared such language to be
below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty.
Arturo B. Astorga,49 Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling insulting language against
the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was dealt with
administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C.
Alar,50 the Court prescribed a higher fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a
stern warning against Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration
and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against the NLRC First Division
and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.
Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of
March 15, 2006 that they should "explain within five (5) days from
receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be held for indirect
contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action," 51 the CTA First Division
was content with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1, 52
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the
disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended courts
treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose
on each of them a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under
Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact that the CTA is a
superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals, the second
highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier
clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using offensive or
intemperate language towards a court or its judge in the future, for they
may not be as lightly treated as they now are.
ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the
resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the
penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F.
Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them
only to pay the fine of P2,000.00 each. SO ORDERED.
IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1 dismissing the
administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution,
we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adazas explanation,2 we find his account
insufficient, and find him guilty of indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect
contempt as he was merely performing his duty as Merdegias counsel
when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against
Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed
Justice Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of
immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he
counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from
the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit
himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus,
Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client,
especially when heal so believes in the merits of his clients case.
Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of
the case, fails to convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative
complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he
was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both
based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso
during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing
the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice
Velosos bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice
Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we
note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals.3 Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality
of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition
for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The
settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and
should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an
assailed decision or ruling.4 While a lawyer has a duty to represent his
client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law.5 He
is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal
action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with
the law and legal processes.6
A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint7 shows an apparent
failure to understand that cases are not always decided in ones favor,
and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source
other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the
case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to
impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the
substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and
his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an
officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before our
courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an
easy task. We have to strike a balance between the need for
accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the
need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from
vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be
made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into
inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should
we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt
practices of people who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed,
litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of
erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing
administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants be
unjustly deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court that
they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient
cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality
of the facts of the case that, when read together with the administrative
complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint is merely an attempt to
malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas penchant for
filing motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma.
Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and second,
against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his
appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments on his case. These
indicators, taken together with the baseless administrative complaint
against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverse to Atty. Adazas
client, disclose that there was more to the administrative complaint than
the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc., we cited a
litigant in indirect contempt of court for his predisposition to
indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the
Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office,
interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and
thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the
present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts constitute an improper
conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus
punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.
As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject
to disciplinary sanction as a member of the bar.10 If we do not now
proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented
from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution
of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be
cited in contempt, and not why he should not be administratively
penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty.
Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due
process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a
proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an
administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature of
the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his
side.11
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a
contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for
erring lawyers,13 and vice versa. There can be no substitution between the
two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the
Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as
legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers
of the Court. The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an
implied and inherent power granted to courts in general.14 Its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and,
consequently, in the administration of justice;15 thus, it may be instituted
against any person guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.16
Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and
summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal
proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the
charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same
manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an
accuseds acquittal.17
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis
in nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal
prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment,
but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of
practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its
officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest.18 Thus, unlike a
contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary
proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of
the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as
res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.19
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by
different procedures. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof.20
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY
OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to
pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this
judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further
similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of
disciplinary proceedings against him. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5686 June 16, 2015
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.
Before us is a letter-complaint 1 for disbarment filed before the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) by Teodulo 2 Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto
B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance
of his duties as a lawyer.
On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint 3 for
forcible entry against complainant Teodulo Enriquez before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his
interests, Enriquez engaged4 the services of the law office of Attys.
Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with
Atty. Lavadia as the assigned attorney.5
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their
position papers and affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-
trial order after which, the case would be submitted for decision.
However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the
defendants being declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision 6 in
favor of the plaintiffs. 7 Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal 8 with
sufficient bond.
In its April 26, 2001 Order,9 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon,
Bohol dismissed the appeal based on Section 7(b), 10 Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the
appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 2001
Order11 pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension and
still no appeal memorandum was filed.
On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the
OBC. Enriquez alleged that in failing to file the necessary pleadings
before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great damage and prejudice.
This constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of
his professional duties as a lawyer.12 Enriquez thus prayed that Atty.
Lavadia be disbarred. On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty. Lavadia
to submit his comment.13
On August 29, 2002, the Court received an ex parte manifestation from
Atty. Lavadia stating that he cannot file a comment because he did not
receive a copy of the complaint.14 The Court, thus, required Enriquez to
furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint within 10 days and
required the latter to file his comment within 10 days from receipt
thereof.15
On December 10, 2002, Enriquez informed 16 the Court that he sent a
copy of the complaint and its annexes to Atty. Lavadia on December 6,
2002 as evinced by a receipt.17
Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension18 citing his heavy case
load and family problems as reasons in both instances for not filing the
comment. Said motions were granted by the Court giving Atty. Lavadia
another 60 days within which to file his comment.19
On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to
file his comment due to his wifes continued illness. 20 The Court granted
another 30-day period, stating that it would be the last extension it
would grant.21
Failing to submit his comment within the period granted, this Court
required Atty. Lavadia to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt and to submit his comment within 10 days from notice. 22 Still,
Atty. Lavadia failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on him a
P1,000.00 fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to pay the fine
and ordered him to comply with its previous resolutions. 23
Atty. Lavadia paid the fine on June 2, 2005,24 and asked for additional
time to file his comment this time stating that he had moved from
Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wifes illness which was caused by
"dark-beings." He claimed that a series of unfortunate events plagued
them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire, the hard drive of his computer
crashing, and his family members falling ill due to a "dark being." 25 The
Court thus granted a 30-day extension.26
Failing once again to file his comment, the Court in its September 19,
2007 Resolution imposed a fine of P2,000.00 and required Atty. Lavadia
to submit his comment within five days from notice. 27 There is no record
to show that he complied with the September 19, 2007 Resolution.
In its August 18, 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.28
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory
conference29 on January 14, 2011 but both parties failed to appear. 30
Parties were then ordered to submit their position papers within ten days
from receipt of the Order.
On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy
of the complaint having lost his copy in a fire that razed his home. 31 The
IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint. It
also directed the parties to file their position papers within 15 days from
August 1, 2011.32
In its Report and Recommendation,33 the IBP CBD recommended that
Atty. Lavadia be disbarred and his name be withdrawn from the Roll of
Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not only did Atty. Lavadia cause
material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as counsel in
failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his clients interest, he
also displayed a willful, defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly
defying the resolutions of the Court. By his actions the IBP CBD
considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and responsibilities
as an attorney.
On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to
adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP CBD.34

Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration35 but it was denied.36
After careful review and deliberation, we agree with the report of the
IBP that Atty. Lavadia is administratively liable.
We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached
duties and obligations.37 Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the
professions exacting standards.38 A lawyer is expected to live by the
lawyers oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four
general categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to
the bar and to his client.39 A lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is
administratively liable and subject to the Courts disciplinary authority.40
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under
those duties to his client and to the court. This Court notes Atty.
Lavadias propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file
pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the
CPR which states:
Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions
precisely led to the filing of this complaint. In the course of this
administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this Court his
willful defiance and disregard for court orders.
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE
18.03
A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence. 41
Lawyers are reminded to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,42 we stated that receiving money as acceptance
fee for legal services and failing to render the services is a violation of
Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case, we also stated that a lawyers failure
to file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR. 43
We pointed to the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to his client. We
stated:
x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility
of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears
the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert
his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of
his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of
law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases
appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.44
(Citations omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,45 we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules
12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR. There, Atty. Mallari, after being granted a
total of 245 days to file his clients appellants brief failed to file the
same, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered
Atty. Mallaris act a shameless disregard of his duties as a lawyer and
found him to be unfit for membership in the noble profession. 46 In the
recent case of Figueras v. Jimenez,47 Atty. Jimenez was found
administratively liable for failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of
his client.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other
fees relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case including the
appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He failed to
file his clients position paper rendering his client in default. While he
filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file
the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court,
he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following
our pronouncement in Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him
administratively liable. As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and
was granted extensions of time to file the appeal memorandum after he
filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted
him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to
file the appeal memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of
Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without
actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under
Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO
CANON 11
Under Canon 1148 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and
maintain due respect to the court and its judicial officers. We read this
provision in relation to Rules 10.0349 and 12.03 of the CPR for this rule
does not merely affect the client but the judicial process.
In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,50 this Court reiterated its previous ruling in
Sebastian v. Bajar51 where we stated that:
x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of
the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A
Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should
it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondents
obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of
the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard
thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but
to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed
upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to
show respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia
every opportunity to file his comment to the complaint. We issued no
less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: two of
which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and
requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the
Courts resolutions. In fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days
extension to file his comment, in response to his repeated pleas
contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of eight years,
this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again
filed a motion for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless
failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we
cannot countenance his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time
and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his willful
disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge
his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa 52 the
Courts Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyers blatant disregard or
refusal to comply with the Courts orders underscores her disrespect of
the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Here,
this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave Atty.
Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended
time granted him, he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate
disobedience to the Courts orders merits disciplinary action.
We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez 53 that the determination of whether
an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period
involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court has
imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyers failure to file a
brief or other pleading.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadias first infraction.
However, given his proven propensity for filing motions for extension of
time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds that it should
impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing clien'ts engage
his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant
attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both
to his client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we find the
penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby
DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03
and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN.OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as a member
of the Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN
MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG,
MARILEN MINERALES, AND MELINDA D. SIOTING,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO,
Respondent.

For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by

complainants Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis
(Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan),
Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda
D. Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno
(Atty. Nazareno), charging him with making false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary
public in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.cra1awredjgc

The Facts

Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units

(subject properties) in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus,
Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex). 2 In view
of several inadequacies and construction defects 3 in the housing units
and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their
respective contracts to sell before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations they
had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein
complainants Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo 6 and Marquizo7
on June 10, 2002, while the second batch of rescission cases was filed
by complainants Balatucan8 on March 3, 2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M.
Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang11
on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was
represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first
batch of rescission cases.12 Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three
(3) petitions for review13 before the HLURB assailing the same. In the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the said petitions,
Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty.
Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any
similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before
any court, tribunal or agency14 this, notwithstanding the fact that
Rudex, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an
ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband,
Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the Municipal Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite (MTC).15
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno,
filed another complaint16 against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the
rescission of their contract to sell and the latters ejectment, similar to its
pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification
against forum shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of its
Credit and Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan, 17 Rudex declared
that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding
involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency.18
The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19
20
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints for rescission of contracts
to sell and ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of amortizations
due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other
complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum
shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not
commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending action before
any court, tribunal or agency.21
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno,
claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the
complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty.
Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that
no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or
remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in
fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed by
herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty.
Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented
by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants
asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public
since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in
all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately
attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and
ejectment.22
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the
administrative charges against him.23
In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 2005 24
and May 12, 2005,25 dismissed Rudexs complaints for rescission and
ejectment26 on the ground that its statements in the certifications against
forum shopping attached thereto were false due to the existence of
similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.cra1awredjgc
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period
of six (6) months for his administrative violations.
The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were
unassailable proofs that the certification against forum shopping
attached to Rudexs ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had been
erroneously declared, considering that at the time Rudex filed the said
complaint in September 2002, Sps. Siotings rescission complaint
against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it
was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so,
since both complaints involve the same transaction and essential facts,
and a decision on the rescission complaint would amount to res judicata
on the ejectment complaint.28 In this relation, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence of
his omission since he was not only Rudexs counsel but the notarizing
officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the subject
certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held administratively liable and
thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension.29
In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a
suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should
be held administratively liable and accordingly suspended for a period
of one (1) month,
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the IBPs findings with modification as to the penalty
imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping 31 is the violation
of the certification requirement against forum shopping, which was
distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. CA32 as follows:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the
certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be
misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of
the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment
between failure to comply with the certification requirement and
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of
imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The
former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to
the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after
hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
for direct contempt. x x x.33
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false
entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or
direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best
of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but
shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of
a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as
a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied)
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping attached to
Rudexs pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudexs counsel, filed, in
August 2003, petitions for review assailing the judgments of default
rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without disclosing in the
certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment case
it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the
complainants rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and
ejectment against Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications
against forum shopping the existence of Siotings May 24, 2002
rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudexs own September
9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April
1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment
complaints against the other complainants in this case without disclosing
in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of
complainants own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of
cases, Atty. Nazareno as mandated by the Rules of Court and more
pertinently, the canons of the Code should have truthfully declared the
existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty.
Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite
due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBPs
resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to
be imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBPs finding on
this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was
shown to have deliberately made false and untruthful statements in one
of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazarenos infractions are of a similar
nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the
foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court
hereby suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice
as a notary public, considering that he assigned only one document
number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission
and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been
treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every
notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of
the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the
document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or
document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register.35 Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did
not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum
shopping attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that
they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not
commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending
actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum.
The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was
clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the
case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 36 to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate
to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on
notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondents conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent
also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37
(Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document
containing false statements had his notarial commission revoked and
was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one
(1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont
to additionally impose the same penalties of such nature against him.
However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front, coupled
with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it
proper to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify
him from being commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent
ought to be reminded that:38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus making that document admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.
xxxx
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which
should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize
such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must
accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found
GUILTY of making false declarations in the certifications against forum
shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary public.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public and, his
notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise,
copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6681 June 17, 2015
VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA, Respondent.

We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-705 1 of the Board of Governors

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in Administrative Case
No. 6681. This Resolution imposed on Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa
(respondent) the penalty of three months suspension from the practice of
law for violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Antecedent Facts

A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by Melba D.

De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis) against her, father, Ricardo D. De Los
Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco (Canaco). Rodis
alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements. in the certificate of live
birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her
son's certificate of live birth that she was married to De Los Santos, Sr.
on September 1, 1974 in San Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such
marriage took place.

On April 24, 2002, an Information 2 was filed against Canaco for

violation of Sections 1 and 2 in relation with Section 9 of Presidential
Decree No. 651.3 Particularly, Canaco was charged of "willfully,
 unlawfully and knowingly making false statements in the Certificate of (signed)
Live Birth form for her son Victor P. Delos Santos who was born on ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA
June 30, 1982 by falsely stating that she was married to the father of her Counsel for Victor Canaco De
son, RICARDO P. DELOS SANTOS on September 1, 1974." 4 The case Los Santos
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 111152 and assigned to the Room 402, PNB Building,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 43 of Quezon City. City of Naga
At the preliminary conference held on May 24, 2004, the respondent, as Noted by:
counsel de parte of Canaco, objected to the Prosecutions offer in
evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of Victor Canaco Delos (signed)
Santos. As a result, the MeTC issued an order resetting the preliminary Victor C. De Los Santos" [Emphasis supplied.]
conference to October 19, 2004 in order to give the prosecution time to
file a certified true copy of the birth certificate.
On October 19, 2004, the MeTC noted the manifestation of the
5 complainant that they failed to secure a certified true copy of the birth
On May 25, 2004, the respondent sent letters dated May 24, 2004 to the
certificate of the accuseds son because of the respondents letter. Thus,
Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and
the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad
Statistics Office, and St. Lukes Hospital. The pertinent portions of these
testificandum ordering the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to produce a
letters state:
certified true copy of the live birth of Victor Canaco delos Santos who
alleged to have been born on June 30, 1982 under Registry No. LCR
RE: ALLEGED CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF
2499.
LIVE BIRTH CODED AS 6826111, COVERED BY REGISTERED
NUMBER 2499 LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, QUEZON CITY.
Canaco, through the respondent, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dated October 19,2004 directing the issuance of a subpoena
There is being distributed by unauthorized person/s a purported copy of
duces tecum/ad testificandum. In its order dated July 8, 2005, the MeTC
Certificate of Live Birth above indicated which refers to one certain
denied the motion for reconsideration.
VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS. In this connection, please be
guided by provisions of our existing laws regarding possible violation of
In the meantime, Victor D. De Los Santos II [herein complainant
the secrecy and confidentiality of records.
(brother of Rodis and son of Delos Santos, Sr.)] filed a complaint with
the prosecutor charging the respondent for obstruction of justice. 6
Assuming without admitting that such facts of birth records exists,
please be guided that my client, VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS,
In defense, the respondent argued, among others, that the name of his
has never authorized anybody to secure a copy, Xerox or otherwise, and
client Canacos son is VICTOR C. DE LOS SANTOS and not VICTOR
only upon his written authority and with undersigned counsels signature
P. DE LOS SANTOS as stated in the Information charging Canaco with
and verification may a copy be officially reproduced, if any exist.
violation of Presidential Decree No. 651.Thus, the respondent
vehemently denied that he intentionally intended to delay and obstruct
Under penalty of law. the proceedings in the MeTC.7

This May 24, 2004. The prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.8
The Case
On February 22, 2005, the complainant filed a Petition for Disbarment 9
with the Court, charging the respondent with multiple gross violations of
his oath as a lawyer and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully
obstructing and delaying the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152
against Canaco.
The complainant alleged that the respondents act of sending out the
letters dated May 24, 2004 was criminally and maliciously done to
delay, impeded, obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the prosecution of
Canaco, who is the respondents client.10
The complainant further contended that the respondents letters were not
justified by any tenable and lawful defense 11 and were made to suppress
and conceal the subject birth record to impair its availability,
authenticity, verity, or admissibility as evidence in Criminal Case No.
111152 before the MeTC.
Lastly, the complainant submitted that the acts of respondent constituted
multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer, of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, and of his duties as an attorney under the Rules of
Court.12
In his Comment-Opposition13 dated June 8, 2005, the respondent argued
that the complainant is a disgruntled litigant whose series of cases, filed
together with his group, had all been dismissed and the respondent was
the opposing counsel in these dismissals.14
The respondent further asserted that this case is a violation of the rule on
forum shopping since it is the tenth case pending on the same set of
facts.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution15 dated August 24, 2005, we referred the case to the
IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. In her Report and
Recommendation,16 IBP Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found the
respondent administratively liable for violating his oath as a lawyer and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Commissioner opined
that:
Respondents acts of objecting to the offer in evidence of a photocopy of
the birth certificate of Victor C. De Los Santos which necessitated the
postponement of the preliminary conference in order to afford the
prosecution the opportunity to secure a certified true copy thereof was a
calculated ploy to delay the successful prosecution of the case. To
guarantee its further delay, on the same day of the preliminary
conference; i.e., on 24 May 2004, he prepared the letter addressed to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, National Census and Statistics Office and
St. Lukes Hospital to prevent or delay the issuance of the certified true
copy of the birth certificate. Such conduct is unethical, improper and
inexcusable.17
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we find respondent acts of (1) writing and
sending out the letter dated 24 May 2004 and of (2) deliberately
misleading the MeTC, the Supreme Court and this Commission into
believing that Victor Canaco DeLos Santos (accuseds son whose birth
certificate is at issue in the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos
(named in the Information)are two (2) different persons as constituting
gross violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondents acts were unethical, improper and
committed with no other prompt and efficient disposition of the case.
Lawyers are reminded that as officers of the court, they have a
responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. 18
[Emphasis supplied.]
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Barbosa be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a Resolution19 dated May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
(BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the
evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. However, the IBP
Board of Governors modified the IBP Commissioners recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year to six (6) months.
Atty. Barbosa moved to reconsider the BOG resolution. In a Resolution 20
dated December 11, 2008, the BOG denied the motion but modified the
respondents suspension from the practice of law to a period of only
three months.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful study of the records, the Court approves the findings of
the IBP Commission and the IBP Board of Governors, but resolves to
modify the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
to a period of one (1) year.
Unduly Delaying the Proceedings
Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers
should uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Rule 1.03 also provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any mans cause."
Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
likewise states that "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes." As an officer of the
court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. 21
A lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and prompt satisfaction of
final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice.22
In the present case, in disregard of the METCs intent to expedite the
proceedings through its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent
letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National
Census and Statistics Office, and St. Lukes Hospital to prevent the
prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate
of Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary conference of May 24,
2004 was precisely postponed to allow the prosecution to secure this
certified true copy. Thus, the respondent committed willful disobedience
to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the
proceedings in the criminal case.
Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client
Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers
owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule
10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice."
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyers first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.23
In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the
Commission and this Court into believing that Victor Canaco De Los
Santos (Canacos son whose birth certificate is at issue in the criminal
case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the Information) are
different persons. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP
Commissioner that the difference in the middle initial is a mere
typographical error on the part of the City Prosecutor. The criminal case
involved one and the same Victor Canaco de los Santos whose birth
certificate has been at issue. Members of the Bar are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission, that might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession.24
In Molina v. Magat,25 the penalty of six months suspension from the
practice of law was imposed against the lawyer who made false and
untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Here, the respondent
committed breaches of ethical rules beyond what was committed in
Molina; his defiance and willful disobedience to a lawful order of the
MeTC and the act of misleading the MeTC, the Commission, and this
Court as to the identity of his client constitute gross violation of his oath
as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For clearly falling short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court finds that the appropriate penalty should be a
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as
originally recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon
1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year
from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Public Information
Office, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts. Likewise, a Notice of Suspension shall be prominently posted in
the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.
The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution shall forthwith be
suspended from the practice of law and shall formally manifest to this
Court that his suspension has started. He shall furnish all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance a copy of this
manifestation.
SO ORDERED.