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Document Released Under the Access to
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Table of Contents

Purpose and Objectives 2


Background 3
Toolkit for the RCMP 4
Cooperation 9
Returnees 11
Enhanced Coordination 14
Future Developmental Efforts 16
Moving Forward 17
Summary 18

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Purpose and Objectives

The RCMP, like several other departments and agencies within the Government of Canada, is
confronted with the challenges presented by individuals who travel abroad with the intention of
joining foreign conflicts where there are active terrorist elements with whom they can join, or
from whom they can receive terrorist training. The RCMP must work within its law and order
remit to prevent such persons from leaving Canada because of the threat they pose to both
Canada and other countries if they embrace the terrorist ideologies and tactics to which they are
exposed. The Canadian public wants to know how the RCMP is responding to the phenomenon
of young Canadians fighting and dying in the cause of terrorism abroad, and what we are doing
to address the risks posed by returnees from such conflicts. As part of its accountability to the
public, the RCMP must ensure that whatever its response, it is in compliance with the law,
Ministerial Directions, and the stated policy of the Government of Canada.

The RCMPs approach for preventing Canadians from travelling abroad to engage in terrorist
activities focuses on coordinating interdepartmental actions based upon reasonable grounds to
suspect that an individual, or group of individuals, intends to leave Canada to participate in a
foreign conflict. The coordination role also extends to addressing the challenges associated with
individuals who have managed to exit the country and who return to Canada further radicalized,
and possessing enhanced knowledge and skills to carry out an act of terror.

This framework will:

Outline the existing tools and authorities available t law enforcement to prevent
Canadians from travelling overseas for this purpose;
Highlight ways in which these tools and authorities interact with the mandates and
authorities of other Canadian law enforcement and security agencies;
Examine the challenges associated with returnees (i.e., those Canadians who have gone
abroad, participated in conflicts where they have become further radicalized, have gained
the knowledge and skills to carry out terrorist acts, either in Canada or abroad, and have
returned home);

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Note the importance of internal policies, governance, prioritisation and horizontaLity: key
elements of accountability to the Government of Canada, Canadian citizens and families
of foreign fighters.

Background

For at least a decade, Canadian national security has been influenced by what happens in a band
stretching from Afghanistan and Pakistan, across the Middle East and into Africa. Recently,
Syria has become a locus of interest because of the sectarian conflict pitting an array of Sunni
forces (including Al-Qaeda associates) against the Assad regime and its Shiite supporters.
According to an article in the Toronto Star (August 23, 2013), citing an anonymous security
source, at least 100 young Canadians have left for Syria in the past year. In Somalia, an AQ
linked insurgency led by al Shabaab wreaks havoc in one of the worlds most desperate places.
In North Africa, everything from AQ-linked terrorist groups to ethnic militias battle for control
of space and resources. Canadian foreign fighters are active in many of these places where
extremist activities are carried out. Canadians were shocked to learn in January 2013 that two of
its citizens were part of the terrorist assault on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria that left 37
foreigners dead.

In light of the growing presence of Canadians participating in these conflicts and acts of
terrorism, preventing high-risk individuals from leaving Canada is a challenging, but important
task. The challenge results largely from the fact that citizens have the right to enter, remain in
and leave Canada, therefore authorities require substantial grounds to physically prevent a person
from leaving. There is also the fundamental challenge of identifying precisely who poses a high
risk and what behaviours constitute a concern. Another set of challenges arises if individuals
succeed in leaving Canada to participate in a conflict, join known terrorist elements carrying out
operations, and then return home.

The issue of Canadians travelling abroad to fight in foreign conflicts or wars is not new. In the
1930s, Mackenzie Kings government passed legislation (Foreign EnlistmentAct, 1937) aimed
at preventing Canadians from fighting in the Spanish Civil War. In the current context,
Parliament has crirnirialized travel when it is undertaken for terrorist activities within the -.

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meaning of section 83 of the Criminal Code. The challenge for Canadian authorities is
distinguishing those individuals who are travelling abroad to participate in a conflict in which
they believe they have a legitimate role, from those travelling to commit terrorist actions as
defined in section 83.01 (1) of the Criminal Code. Unless there is some Legitimate reason to
prevent people from travelling to conflict zones, the rights of mobility contained in section 6 of
the Charter ofRights and Freedoms apply.

For the purpose of this document, foreign fighters will be defined as, noncitizens of conflict
. What determines the choice of preferred
states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts
1
foreign conflict for a Western recruit will obviously differ with each case, presumably depending
on a number of factors:

a) the extent of external guidance received in the course of the radicalization process and the
affiliations of the persons doing the guiding;
b) pre-existing links based on family, ethnic, or religious ties to a particular region or state;
c) the influence of a close friend or mentor whose commitment to a particular extremist
cause may inspire a potential recruits own adoption of it; and br
d) narratives that exploit and glorify the use of violence against the West.

The Government of Canada has embarked upon an interdepartmental initiative to respond to the
issue of foreign fighters in a coordinated and integrated manner. An array of agencies and
departments will use all available tools to prevent travel by Canadians who pose a high risk of
participating in acts of terrorism. These tools comprise a continuum of actions which may be
taken before an individual leaves the country, at the point of departure, while abroad, and upon
return to Canada.

Toolkit for the RCMP

The RCMP has a significant role in the continuum of actions, particularly in preventing
Canadians from leaving the country to commit acts of terrorism or to receive terrorist training.

David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnatianal Identity in Civil Conflicts. Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 9.
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Our efforts in this area fit within two of the four elements of Canadas counterterrorism strategy:
Prevent and Deny. The RCMP has experience and expertise in working with communities
and individuals to counter extremist views through engagement and outreach programs. We also
work with a range of international partners (e.g. Global Counterterrorism Forum) by sharing
expertise and providing capacity building assistance in post-conflict and/or unstable states that
have experienced civil war and terrorism. Law enforcement activities are aimed chiefly at
investigating and prosecuting terrorists through cooperation with a range of partners. We work to
deny finances for terrorist purposes, assist with the terrorist listing process, and deny access to
critical transportation.

Prevention may encompass a range of activities, including:

outreach and engagement with community groups, religious organizations, schools and
families;
interviews to warn individuals and families of the risks associated with extremist activity
or to pre-empt extremist activity before it crosses the criminal threshold;
police actions through investigative means such as surveillance and communications
intercepts;
Criminal charges, prosecution and conviction under the counterterrorism provisions of
the Criminal Code.

Each case presents unique features to which police intervention must be tailored. At the earliest
point after the RCMP has been made aware of an individual (or group) that might go abroad to
join a civil uprising where terrorist activities (or groups) have been documented, a plan should be
developed in accordance with prevailing operational planning methodologies (e.g. prioritisation
process). A team of knowledgeable personnel with previous operational and public engagement
experience responding to such cases, and with the necessary policy and analytical expertise,
should be made available to provide immediate advice (and training, if necessary) about the
continuum of actions possible for each specific case, bearing in mind the particular features of
that case (i.e. a tailored approach). This working group might also meet periodically in order to
review and evaluate actions/measures with a view to improving responses. All plans and
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subsequent operational decisions should be put into writing and should adhere to all pertinent
operational policies and standards of accountability (i.e. use of caveats, conforming to
Ministerial Directions, etc.). Partners should be consulted, and where necessary, enlisted for
assistance. The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) should also be contacted earLy in
any law enforcement-led actions to provide legal advice, and PPSC engagement should be
maintained throughout any ensuing process.

Community Engagement and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

The RCMP engages in a range of community-based activities aimed at preventing individuals


from embracing violent ideologies. Ideally, public engagement should be a collective approach
involving law enforcement, other government departments and agencies, community and
religious groups, social services and the education system. Any effective public engagement
program is dependent upon the development and maintenance of trusted and established resource
networks within vulnerable communities, coupled with implicit recognition that there is a shared
responsibility for safeguarding Canada. Where such relationships are strong and built on
sufficient trust, and entities in the resource networks have remits that facilitate such an approach,
troubled or vulnerable individuals may be diverted away from violence. There is potential to
expand the parameters of outreach and engagement to include specific measures aimed at
dissuading or preventing Canadians from travelling abroad for terrorist purposes, or undertaking
such activities at home.

Interview, Surveillance, Disruption and the Criminal Code

Peace officer powers include taking action to prevent crime, keep the peace and warn of risks.
Interviews with individuals contemplating going abroad to participate in terrorist operations can
serve as opportunities to counsel alternative courses of action, signal that the police are aware of
such intentions, and inform that such travel may be criminal. Overt surveillance is another
approach that may be undertaken in an effort to deter an individual intending to travel overseas.
Such surveillance may be undertaken where there is reason to suspect an illicit purpose is being
pursued. Other actions aimed at disrupting travel may include undercover operations, judicial
orders such as a peace bond, and search and seizure
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As previously indicated, the early involvement of PPSC is important to facilitate informed


discussions about appropriate charges and consequent disclosure obligations. There are a range
of criminal code tools related to terrorist travel available to law enforcement. These tools are
derived largely from the Anti-Terrorism Act and contained in sections 83.01 to 83.33 of the
Criminal Code. This includes sections 83.02 to 83.04 (Terrorist Financing), 83.18
(Participation), 83.19 (Facilitation), 83.2 (Commission), 83.21/83.22 (Instructing) and 83.23
(Harbouring).

The Combating Terrorism Act (2013) amended the Criminal Code providing more options to
prosecute actions associated with terrorism. For instance, section 83.3 (recognizance with
conditions) authorizes a peace officer, with the consent of the federal Attorney General, to lay an
information before a provincial court judge if that peace officer believes on reasonable grounds
that a terrorist activity would be carried out, and suspects on reasonable grounds that the
imposition of a recognizance with conditions or arrest is needed to prevent that terrorist activity.
This provision is designed to stop terrorist activity on the verge of being carried out, including
travel for terrorist purposes, by permitting arrest without warrant as long as the person is brought
before a provincial/territorial judge within 24 hours.

There are four new offences of leaving or attempting to leave Canada to commit specified
terrorism activities. One of those new offences available to law enforcement is contained in
section 83.191 which prohibits individuals from leaving or attempting to leave Canada, or
boarding or attempting to board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of
committing an act or omission outside of Canada that is equivalent to the facilitation offence
described in section 83.19. This applies to anyone who knowingly facilitates terrorism in another
country. Such actions would constitute an indictable offence punishable upon conviction by up to
14 years imprisonment.

An older section of the Criminal Code (sections 25.1-25.4) provides a limited justification at law
for acts and omissions that would otherwise be offences when committed by designated law
enforcement officers. This section could be used to infiltrate a group seeking to travel abroad for
the purpose of committing a terrorist act or for the purpose of attending a terrorist training camp.

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The Minister of Public Safety may personally designate a senior RCMP officer to approve all
uses of these sections by the Force, and must make public (through an annual report to
Parliament) the specific portions of the law enforcement justification provisions which have been
used.

Criminal Code section 810.01 is a type of recognizance that may be used when a person who
fears on reasonable grounds that another person will commit a terrorism offence may, with the
consent of the Attorney General, lay an information before a provincial court judge. This
section does not allow arrest without warrant. Nevertheless, it could allow violations of the peace
bond as a way to prevent terrorism through detention. If a provincial/territorial court judge
believes that reasonable grounds exist, he or she may order the defendant to enter into a
recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for up to 12 months. The judge may
impose other reasonable conditions. A refusal by the accused to enter into the recognizance is
punishable by imprisonment for up to 12 months. A breach of a recognizance is a criminal
offence punishable by up to two years imprisonment.

There are currently 50 groups formally listed as terrorist entities by the Government of Canada.
Public Safety Canada (PS) notes that, It is an offence to knowingly participate in or contribute
to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group. This participation is only an offence if
its purpose is to enhance the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist
activity. Nevertheless, the timely listing of any group which attracts foreign fighters to their
cause overseas is clearly advantageous from a police perspective since it provides another
potential tool for use in the prevention of such foreign travel.

Passenger Protect Program

The Passenger Protect Program (2007) may be utilised to impede foreign travel, though its use
is presently restricted to individuals who pose a threat to aviation security. PS chairs an advisory
group that reviews information regarding potential candidates for the Specified Persons List
(SPL). The RCMP and CSIS prepare case briefs on individuals which are then assessed with
recommendations concerning listing. Transport Canada (TC) provides the SPL to air carriers at
least every 30 days for the purpose of comparing it to their passenger reservation systems. If
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investigative paths that must be followed in order to avoid jeopardizing either partys
investigations, while at that same time providing the conditions for successful disruption and/or
prosecution. Paramount here is the need for early and effective coordination and de-confliction
between the two agencies to optimize timely disclosure. Such coordination preserves the right of
individuals to a fair trial but still allows for a person believed to be travelling overseas for this
purpose to be prevented from doing so.

Passport Canada

Under section 10(1) of the Canadian Passport Order, Passport Canada may revoke a passport on
the same grounds on which it may refuse to issue a passport. It may revoke the passport of a
person who:

a) being outside Canada, stands charged in a foreign country or state with the commission
of any offence that would constitute an indictable offence if committed in Canada;
b) uses the passport to assist in committing an indictable offence in Canada or any offence
in a foreign country or state that would constitute an indictable offence if committed in
Canada;
c) permits another person to use the passport;
d) has obtained the passport by means of false or misleading information; or
e) has ceased to be a Canadian citizen.

Travel for terrorism purposes would fit this definition and Federal Policing in conjunction with
Passport Canada has developed mechanisms to revoke a passport in such circumstances.

Canada Border Services Agency

The RCMP can seek investigative assistance from CBSA in the form of a lookout request. In
this case, operational policy (OM 12.2.6) applies. The request should specify whether the subject
is a person of interest or suspect; the objective, purpose and operational requirement for the
request; how the lookout will advance the investigation; and, who will have access to
information arising from the request. A lookout request can trigger secondary screening by

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CBSA officials at the point of departure. This screening may yield information or evidence that
can be instrumental in preventing a potential foreign fighter from leaving the country.

Public Prosecution Service of Canada

The PPSC is responsible for prosecuting offences under federal law and is mandated to provide
prosecution-related advice to investigative and law enforcement agencies. Given the inherent
complexity of criminal investigations and preventive actions taken with respect to prospective
foreign fighters, the expeditious engagement of PPSC is important. It is imperative that
investigating and taking preventive actions in such cases are carried out in a manner that is free
of improper influence and respects the public interest. The PPSC is well-placed to provide
objective advice about these critical aspects of conduct and provide another measure of
accountability for police actions.

Returnees

Risks

Canadians presently participating in a foreign conflict or receiving terrorist training abroad may
one day return home. For example, a possible outcome of the current Syrian conflict might see
the Assad forces victorious, thereby leading to a flood of fore in flhters returning to their home
countries, including Canada. This would pose an immediate security challenge to determine the
intentions of those fighters: are they going to return as peaceful, contributing members of
Canadian society, or will they be further radicalised and committed to carrying out acts of
violence at home or abroad?

Returnees may engage in efforts to radicalise others, and with their bonafides as combatants or
terrorists they may be highly appealing to vulnerable individuals. Such an appeal might also be
exploited to widen communal or ethnic fissures in Canadian communities. Returnees may also
engage in fund-raising for terrorist purposes, either through charities or via criminal activities
(e.g., smuggling or credit card fraud), and attempt to procure weapons or equipment. Another
possible outcome is that they return to fight again in the same conflict or in another area where

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terrorist activity and civil strife are endemic. In the worse-case scenario, one or more of those
returnees with terrorist and/or combat experience may target elements of Canadian society. They
may use Canada as a base for targeting others, including the United States of America. In all
these possible scenarios, the law enforcement community would be presented with a range of
significant challenges to preserve the safety of property and people, to keep the peace, and an
obligation to ensure that human rights are not abrogated in performing those duties.

Challenges

If, on the other hand, the RMP receives information from a foreign law enforcement
counterpart concerning 4 returnee, that information may be acted upon and form part of the
criminal investigative fik With tlie assistance of CBSA, the RCMP could place an individual on
N

a lookout so as to be notifiedf their arrival in Canada. Nevertheless, there are risks associated
with information sharing (and receiving) from countries that are recognized to pose a risk to
human rights. The RCMP should be wary of utilising information about subject X when it has
been provided by a countrys law enforcement forces that are known to use torture, unreasonable
detention, or lack of due process.

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For the reasons noted above, adherence to RCMP policies and central governance structures
around information sharing, the use of caveats, and the validation of information and
accountability by the appropriate chain-of-command are all imperative.

Range of Responses

For returnees about whom the RCMP is made aware, the first response should be determining
what they did abroad as this may reveal evidence of a crime. Amongst other things, the Force
must also determine whether they are radicalised and intent on committing crimes, including
terrorist acts. There are some basic indicators that might be assessed to provide clues about this
future posture:

is the individual working in full-time/part-time employment?


Are they in a stable relationship?
Do they have children with whom they have an ongoing relationship?
Are they attending school?
With whom are they associating?
Are they socially connected or living in isolation?
Are they raising funds linked to a little-known charity?
Are they engaged in proselytizing for a cause: religious, political or social?

It will be important to enlist the assistance of cornrnnkyenagment specialists as soon as


possible once law enforcement becomes aware of a returnee. They may have a role in conducting
the basic assessment of indicators noted above, and certainly could assist the returnee in
engaging with supportive community resources, including those who would help steer the
individual away from criminal activities associated with terrorism.

Several other investigative steps that may not be typically considered in other criminal
investigations, but that have an important role in investigating returnees are:

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monitoring social media activity (open source);


enlisting the assistance of Passport Canada to revoke the returnees passport and flag
him/her concerning future passport requests;
formally placing the returnee on the SPL if they pose a threat to aviation security.

Enhanced Coordination

The RCMP proposes to lead the security and intelligence community in coordinating the case
management of individuals who are suspected of intending to leave Canada to participate in
terrorist activities abroad, or who are returnees. Such coordination will be restricted to
individuals identified in RCMP holdings. The High Risk Travel Case Management (HRTCM)
group will:

Raise awareness amongst key stakeholders about such individuals;


Explore the full range of options to monitor and contain them;
Disrupt travel when circumstances warrant; and,
Be notified after law enforcement has utilized the Criminal Code or laid criminal charges.

This approach will facilitate important collaborative work that must be undertaken to minimize
risks to privacy rights and freedoms while optimizing the chances for a successful outcome that
is lawful and fully accountable.

To that end, the RCMP proposes that the HRTCM group be comprised of the following
stakeholders:

RCMP (Chair);
CSIS;
CBSA;
dc;
Passport Canada; and
Others as appropriate.

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The HRTCM group may be challenged to discuss ongoing cases because some agencies or
departments couLd be reluctant to reveal specific investigative information given the potential
risk for disclosure in a court proceeding. Limiting the number of stakeholders to more
operationally-focussed agencies/departments would alleviate these concerns and encourage
deconfliction efforts. Additional departments/agencies could be consulted on an as needed
basis.

Decisions taken by the HRTCM group should be guided by terms of reference developed for the
group. The terms of reference will clearly define the scope and purpose, membership, and clarify
issues such as whether individual agencies retain their authority to make independent operational
decisions outside the committee structure.

As a baseline, there should be meetings every three weeks to communicate new cases and
discuss the status of prevention efforts in ongoing cases. Exigent circumstances may warrant ad
hoc meetings as needed to de-escalate or address such high-risk cases. Personnel from each
agency who are in a position to recommend and influence appropriate actions should be
designated to participate in the HRTCM group. The HRTCM group will focus on Canadian
citizens and Permanent Residents for whom the risks posed by foreign travel are more
challenging as a result of their Charter rights.

There is a strong case for the RCMP taking a central role in the HRTCM group. The RCMPs
crime prevention and peace remit situates it at the centre of collective efforts to counter violent
extremism, prevent radicalized individuals from carrying out criminal acts, and protect
Canadians, Canadian society and its institutions from individuals and groups who seek to cause
harm. Canadian security and intelligence forces also have a responsibility to help protect the
citizens of other countries from harm by Canadians committing acts of terrorism. The RCMP has
led community engagement efforts across the country to counter messaging that advocates a
violent response to political events and a sense of injustice. it has the skills and experience to
work with families, schools, and social agencies to problem-solve and lead crime prevention
interventions aimed at groups and individuals. Furthermore, the RCMP presence in a large

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number of communities allows for consistency in approach and facilitates the sharing of
information, both tactically (operationally) with respect to effective practices.

This last point about information sharing highlights perhaps the most significant risk for the
HRTCM group. Actions taken by individual agencies or departments to prevent an individual
from leaving the country will likely generate controversy and review. Discussions and
information triggering such actions will be subject to scrutiny by the media, public interest
groups, government sanctioned formal review bodies (e.g., Commission for Public Complaints
Against the RCMP), or judicial review in a criminal or civil context. Regulatory review is also
possible. For example, if a particular action by Passport Canada resulted in a passport revocation,
the affected individual has recourse to appeal. Disclosure of information emanating from the
HRTCM group is therefore a realistic possibility.

Future Developmental Efforts

Further Policy Guidanc

It will be important to provide clear guidance around those interventions where there is presently
ambiguity or lack of policy guidance. For example, policies around preventive interviews for
pre-criminal patterns of behaviour should make sufficiently clear the need for interviewers to
follow a proportionate and measured response with the target individual, family members, peers
or friends. It may be helpful to be explicit about the fact that what is commonly regarded as a
police interview for the purpose of a criminal investigation also serves a preventive function
when a peace officers interview disrupts an individuals plans or intentions, or otherwise
dissuades him/her from carrying out criminal activities.

Another area for future policy defmition, for example, concerns the use of overt surveillance
techniques. This could generate controversy on the part of the watched individual therefore
clarification may be needed with respect to the proportionate and measured use of such a
technique by peace officers. Ongoing, periodic assessments of this approach may be required to
ensure its effectiveness in preventing crime.

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Community Engagement and CVE

The foreign fighter phenomenon presents an opportunity to enhance the community outreach and
public engagement component of the prevention model, providing for the expansion of
prevention-oriented partnerships with provincial, territorial and municipal agencies, NGOs, and
community groups. Existing community outreach and public engagement strategies should have
sufficient focus and rigour to allow valid evaluation of efforts with the aim of developing
effective and efficient programs to assist in preventing Canadians from travelling abroad for
terrorist purposes.

There are valuable lessons to be learned from the UK Channel program which could be
adapted to the Canadian context in order for law enforcement to assist other agencies or
organizations in diverting vulnerable individuals away from violence or criminal activities.

Partnerships

PS, CSIS, DOJ, PCO; arid possibly others should be engaged in a discussion about additions to
the Canadian list of terrorist entities in order to ease and expedite the laying of criminal charges
against those individuals about whom we can produce evidence of belonging to such a group.
This step of charging a person with an offence under section 83.01 prior to their travelling
abroad provides a key prevention tool for police. The option of developing additional legislative
authorities to prevent someone from leaving Canada to become a foreign fighter abroad should
be left open for further examination and proposals.

Moving Forward

1. Development of the RCMP-led High Risk Traveller Case Management (HRTCM) group
is the primary objective to address Canadas foreign fighter challenge. Personnel from
stakeholder agencies and departments will cooperate to prevent high-risk persons from
travelling abroad for terrorist purposes. This group will hold regular meetings and
convene ad hoc sessions when extenuating conditions prevail.

Time frame: Winter 2014.


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This document is the property of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is loaned to your agency on the understanding that It Is
not to be further disseminated without the consent of the originator. Distribution within your agency is to be done on a need-to-
know basis. The document is to be protected in accordance with normal safeguards for law enforcement information.

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actions ranging from soft approaches aimed broadly at community interventions or disruptions to
more hard approaches such as detention and arrest. Coordination between law enforcement and
other members of the broad community is required to ensure an interconnected approach to
address this problem, and additional program and policy development should occur. The RCMP
must be able to tell Canadians what it has done within the law to prevent Canadians from going
abroad for terrorist purposes, and must be fully accountable for its actions in this important
prevention role. To that end, we must always be guided by clear, approved written plans of
action, and we must provide adequate training for personnel directly engaged with this issue at
either end of the continuum of actions. Finally, we must engage with partners in countries
experiencing similar trends with regards to foreign fighters in order to learn from their
experience and more fully cooperate to address this global challenge.

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This document Is the property of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is loaned to your agency on the understanding that it is
not to be further disseminated without the consent of the originator. Distribution within your agency is to be done on a need-to-
know basis. The document is to be protected in accordance with normal safeguards for law enforcement information.

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