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G.R. No.

L-18390 August 6, 1971


PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER, its President; JOHN COTTON and
HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its Vice-Presidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City Engineer
of Quezon City, defendants-appellees.

Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation three (3) adjoining lots
situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City. These lots are within
an area zoned out as a "first residence" district by the City Council of Quezon City. Subsequently,
the appellant sold two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot, which was farthest from
the street-corner, whereon he built his house.

Meralco started the construction of the sub-station in question and finished it the following
November, without prior building permit. The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a current
suitable for distribution to the company's consumers. It was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20
meters from the appellant's house. The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along
the streets but along the side adjoining the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later
changed it to an interlink wire fence. It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the
substation

Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil
Code. Further contended that because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the
concentration and sleep of said appellant, and impaired his health and lowered the value of his
property. He sought a judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be
declared entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages under Article 2202 of the
Civil Code.

Court dismissed the claim finding that the sound of substation was unavoidable and did not
constitute nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not

HELD: Yes. The conclusion must be that, contrary to the finding of the trial court, the noise
continuously emitted, day and night, constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the appellant is
entitled to relief, by requiring the appellee company to adopt the necessary measures to deaden
or reduce the sound at the plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition
made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is manifestly
impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who are being
serviced from the substation. The fact that the Meralco had received no complaint although it had
been operating hereabouts for the past 50 years with substations similar to the one in controversy
is not a valid argument. The absence of suit neither lessens the company's liability under the law
nor weakens the right of others against it to demand their just due.
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA

FACTS: City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas,
Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947,
defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent and built
houses of second-class materials without the necessary building permits from the city in which
they lived thru the years to the present. the presence of defendants having previously been
discovered, defendants were given by Mayor Fugoso written permits labeled "lease contract"

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School needs expansion. ity Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's
directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to
vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. Defendants refused.
Hence, this suit to recover possession. The judgment directed defendants to vacate the premises
and to pay the pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the houses built by the defendants are considered public nuisance

HELD: Yes. The houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this,
for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school
building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. They shackle the hands of the
government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish
and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least
free public primary instruction".
G.R. No. L-24245 April 11, 1972
LEONOR FARRALES, assisted by her husband, EMILIO FARRALES
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO

FACTS: Lenonor Farnales was was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari
goods. When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city
might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another
temporary place until the permanent building was completed. She did not like the new location
where her stall was temporarily located and so she built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice
Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit or permission from any city official. The
police threatened to demolish this shack, which was built on the cement passageway. Leonor
seeks for injunction to the court. Court refused to issue the same unless Plaintiff could show
proper permit. Plaintiff could not do so, so the police demolished the shack.

ISSUE: Whether or not the shack is considered as a nuisance

HELD: Yes. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the
precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at
the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free
movement of people. Leonors contention is that the shack or temporary stall put up by her inside
the premises of the Baguio City Market was not a nuisance or if it was a nuisance at all it was one
per accidens and not per se and therefore could be abated only after the corresponding judicial
proceeding. The uncontradicted evidence does not support the appellant's contention. I
G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo,
Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling
purposes of its engine. Factory compound was surrounded with fence however, the tanks
themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were
barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is
continually open, persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said
factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8
years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory
premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks Mario sank to the bottom of the
tank having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."

The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions
to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises

ISSUE: Whether petitioners tanks are considered attractive nuisance

HELD: No. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial
as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location. The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not
considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger,
he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." The appealed decision is
reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability.
G.R. No. 114118. August 28, 2001
HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO v
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SALVACION VDA. DE BULAN

FACTS: the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan.
The original owner of the lot in question, Lot No. 2097 of the Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon,
Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners. Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero
for Three Hundred Pesos. After the death of Francsico his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de
Bacero old it (the lot) to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Upon
the execution of the Deed of Sale actual possession of Lot No. 2057 was with the vendees-
spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero. Exercising their right of
ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declared the lot in her name
in 1900 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 She paid the corresponding taxes
as evidenced by the Tax Receipts. alvacion and her co-defendants-appellees possession of the
lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when
petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them. Respondents
filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint for ejectment against petitioners. he
ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents,
tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver
possession to the respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said
respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present or in the total
amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had paid their
lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit. RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages

HELD: As a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners
liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they
vacate the premises of the land in question.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot sustain the
award. Palay is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

G.R. No. 111584. September 17, 2001


PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES SALVADOR Y. CHUA and EMILIA U. CHUA, respondents.

FACTS: Chua was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of petitioner bank, to transfer his
account from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner Producers Bank of the
Philippines. In view of Rojas' assurances of longer loan terms and lower rates of interest,
spouses Chua opened and maintained substantial savings and current deposits with the
Bacolod branch of producers bank. Spouses Chua obtained a loan of 2M from producers
bank secured by a real estate mortgage payable within 3 yrs. private respondents
deposited with petitioner bank the total sum of P960K However, petitioner bank failed to
credit this deposit due to the fact that its Branch Manager, Sixto Castillo, absconded with
the money of the bank's depositors. Also, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn
out by private respondents in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient
funds, despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents' deposit was
in the amount of P1,051,051.19. These events prompted private respondents to request
for copies of their ledgers covering their savings and current accounts, but petitioner bank
refused. private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages
against petitioner bank. On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff of
Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
RTC: favored Chua ordering Producers to pay P2,000,000 moral damages, with
legal rate of interest; P90,000/month and P18,000/month unrealized profits from his
cement and gasoline station business, to commence from October 16, 1984, with legal
rate of interest until fully paid; P250,000 exemplary damages. Offset the P960,000 with
his agricultural loan of P1,300,000 with 14% interest, to commence from January 4, 1984,
covered by a real estate mortgage, both of which shall have a cut-off time frame on the
date of this decision. Loan of P175,000 and the clean loan of P400,000 without interest
shall be off-settled by the moral, actual and compensatory damages. 15% of moral,
actual and compensatory damages as attorney's fees. Cost of suit.
CA: modified moral damages to P500,000. P100,000.00 attorney's fees

ISSUE: Whether the award of damages is reasonable

HELD: ES. affirmed with MODIFICATION. P300,000 moral damages. P150,000 exemplary
damages. P100,000 attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and
humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover moral damages in
the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be reasonable
Producer's bank failure to credit the deposit constituted gross negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation which amounts to evident bad faith
Verily, all these acts of petitioner were accompanied by bad faith and done in wanton,
fraudulent and malevolent manner warranting the award of exemplary damages in favor
of private respondents, in accordance with Article 2232 of the Civil Code
Need not prove the actual extent of exemplary damages, for its determination is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon proof of the plaintiff's entitlement to
moral, temperate, or compensatory damages (Article 2234, Civil Code)
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
-loss of what a person already possesses
-failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him
damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as "ganacias frustradas" or
"lucrum cessans," are not to be granted on the basis of mere speculation, conjecture, or
surmise, but rather by reference to some reasonably definite standard such as market
value, established experienced, or direct inference from known circumstances
When the existence of a loss is established, absolute certainty as to its amount is not
required. The benefit to be derived from a contract which one of the parties has
absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent, a matter of speculation, but
the injured party is not to be denied for that reason alone. He must produce the best
evidence of which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that
he has been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty
have anticipated but for the defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover.
evidence of private respondents insufficient to be considered within the
purview of "best evidence."
0 The bare assertion of private respondent Salvador Chua that he lost an
average of P18,000/month is inadequate if not speculative and should be
admitted with extreme caution especially because it is not supported by
independent evidence.
0 Could have presented such evidence as reports on the average
actual profits earned by their gasoline business, their financial
statements, and other evidence of profitability which could aid the court
in arriving with reasonable certainty at the amount of profits which private
respondents failed to earn. Did not even present any instrument or deed
evidencing their claim that they have transferred their right to operate
their gasoline station to their relatives.
Extrajudicial foreclosure is clearly unfounded, this does not necessarily
mean, in the absence of specific facts proving damages, that actual damage has been
sustained. It must depend on actual proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered.
Attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or
to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party
act of not crediting private respondents' deposit of P960,000.00, as well as the
premature filing of the extrajudicial foreclosure, have compelled private respondents to institute
an action for injunction and damages primarily in order to protect their rights and interests