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Before

THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SLP No. _____/2015 and SLP No. _____/2015

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION

GEORGE VERGHESE (APPELLANT)

V.

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND (RESPONDENT)

WITH

In Response of-

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND (APPELLANT)

V.

GEORGE VERGHESE (RESPONDENT)

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT


KANISHKA DEO STATE OF JHARKHAND
ROLL NO.- 271
SEMESTER: IV, SECTION: A

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ABBREVIATIONS 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

I. Statutes 4

II. Books Referred 4

III. Websites 4

IV. Cases 5

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 8

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 10

8. PRAYER 20

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. & - And

2. AIR - All India Reporter

3. Anr. - Another

4. Art. - Article

5. CrPC - Code of Criminal Procedure

6. Edn. - Edition

7. M.P. - Madhya Pradesh

8. Ors. - Others

9. SCW - Supreme Court Weekly

10. Supp. - Supplementary

11. SC - Supreme Court

12. SCC - Supreme Court Cases

13. SCW - Supreme Court Weekly

14. SDJM - Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate

15. U.O.I - Union of India

16. v. - versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

[STATUTES]

1. The Constitution of India, 1950


2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

[BOOKS REFERED]

1. Basu D. D, Commentary On The Constitution of India (Lexis Nexis Butterworths


Wadhawa: Nagpur 8th edn. 2011)
2. Jain M.P, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhawa: Nagpur 6th
edn. 2010).
3. Woodroffs, Code of Criminal Procedure (Law Publishers India Pvt. Ltd.: Allahabad 3rd
edn. 2010)
4. Princeps, Code of Criminal Procedure (Delhi Law House: New Delhi, 19th edn. 2011).
5. Sarkar, Code of Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhawa: Nagpur 10th
edn. 2012).

[WEBSITES]

1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.westlaw.com

[LIST OF CASES]

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I. A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27.

II. Arunachalam v. Sethuratnam, AIR 1979 SC 1284


III. Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188 (193)
IV. East India Hotels Ltd. v Syndicate Bank Ltd., 1922 SCC 29
V. Gurbaksh Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565.
VI. Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 135 (para 10).
VII. Jai Prakash Singh v. The State of Bihar & Anr. Etc., CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 525-526
OF 2012.
VIII. Khedat Mazdoor Chetana Sangath v. State of M.P. and Others (1994) 6 SCC 260.
IX. Kunhayammed v. State of Orissa, AIR 2000 SC 2587.

X. Madan Pal Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 537


XI. Mathai @ Joby v. George & Anr, (2010) 4 SCC 358
XII. Nirmal Chandra Bhattacharjee v Union of India, 1991 SCC 363
XIII. Pravinbhai Kashirambhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2010 SC 3511.

XIV. Rajkrishna Bose v. Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202


XV. Savitri Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 8 SCC 325.
XVI. Siddharam Satlinngappa Mhetre v. State of Maharastra, (2011) 2 SCC 694.
XVII. State of Maharashtra v. Sukhedeo Singh, AIR 1992 SC 2100.
XVIII. Sudam Charan Dash v. State of Orissa, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No. 8291/2013.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent humbly submits this memorandum in response to the Special


Leave to Appeal filed before this Honourable Supreme Court invoking its
jurisdiction under Article 1361 of the Constitution. The counsel for the Respondent
requests the Honourable Supreme Court to hear and adjudge the matter
accordingly.

1 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme
Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence
or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or
tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Gabriel Verghese and George Verghese are full brothers: Gabriel was working in Dubai and
George was an activist of the XYZ political party in the State of Jharkhand.
2. Gabriel purchased arable land in his native village Ganeshpur, Ranchi and the same was
entrusted to George for the purpose of cultivation and management.
3. Having dissatisfied with the George on entrustment of the land, Gabriel got the same
entrusted to the possession of one Noel Mathew.
4. On 01/01/2015 it was stated that a motor cycle driven by Noel Mathew was dashed by a Tata
Sumo which was following Noel Mathew at breakneck speed.
5. After the crush Noel Mathew succumbed to death and an FIR was registered against George
Mathew in whose name the said Tata Sumo was registered.
6. Efforts were made to arrest George Verghese, but he evaded and moved to Honble High
Court of Jharkhand for anticipatory bail and the anticipatory bail was granted to George
Verghese subject to condition that the accused must submit himself to custody within a
period of three weeks from the date of the order and apply for regular bail.
7. Aggrieved by the said order the accused moved to Honble Supreme Court of India under
Art. 136 of the Constitution of India in regards to the imposed condition on the anticipatory
bail. And on the other hand State also approached to the Honble Supreme Court of India for
special leave to appeal against the anticipatory bail order passed by the Honble High Court
of Jharkhand.
8. Since both the matter arise out of the same order they have been ordered to be heard
together.

Hence, the present special leave to appeal is before the Honble Supreme Court
of India.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

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I. Whether the special leave be granted to the present appeal under Article
136 of the Indian Constitution to the appellant George Verghese?

II. Whether the appellant is liable to get anticipatory bail under section 438
of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

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I. That the special leave be denied to the present appeal under Article 136
of the Indian Constitution to the appellant George Verghese.

It is humbly submitted before this Honble Supreme Court that the present appeal by means
of special leave under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution is not maintainable as there is no
grave injustice or substantial error in law or illegal or manipulation of law in the order dated
15/03/15 of the Jharkhand High Court. Also the condition put forward by the High Court in
providing anticipatory bail is within the consonance of the Section 438 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973. As such there is no ground for maintainability of appeal under Article
136 of the Constitution.

II. That the appellant is not qualified to get anticipatory bail under section
438 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the appellant/accused is not
qualified under Section 438 of CrPC to get anticipatory bail as he is a proclaimed offender
and does not qualify to the basic criterions put forward in many cases as to when can an
anticipatory bail be given. Also, a proclaimed offender/absconder is not to be provided with
an anticipatory bail as decided in case of State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. That the special leave be denied to the present appeal under Article 136
of the Indian Constitution to the appellant George Verghese.

It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the present special leave
to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 should not be granted to the
accused/appellant George Verghese as it fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 136. The
accused has approached the Apex Court on the pretext that the order of the Honble High
Court regarding grant of anticipatory bail is bad in law as condition was applied on the
anticipatory bail to seek a regular bail within three weeks of being granted the anticipatory
bail.

Article 136 reads out:

(1)Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or
matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2)Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination and sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.

In a criminal case, the Supreme Court will grant special leave to appeal only in those cases
where it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist or that substantial and
grave injustice has been done or that the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. 2 It would not grant special leave
to appeal on grounds which would not sustain the appeal itself, 3 that is, unless it is

2 Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169; Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462; Sadhu
Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271

3Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169

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manifested that, by a disregard of the form of legal process or by a violation of the principles
of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done.4 Broadly
speaking, it is only when some glaring error leading to grave failure of justice is made out,
that the Supreme Court would allow its jurisdiction to be invoked.5 Unless some serious
infirmity or grave failure of justice is shown, no interference will be made. Leave is granted
where the grounds or views taken by the High Court are manifestly fallacious and untenable.6

The court must be circumspect in granting anticipatory bail as it intrudes into the sphere of
investigation of crime. Hence, though the Supreme Court would not ordinarily interfere with
the discretion of the lower court in granting or refusing bail, it would interfere where,
anticipatory bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or influence
of the person accused of the offence of murder.7 Where anticipatory bail is granted on
irrelevant or extraneous grounds and the High Court also refuses to cancel the same, the
Supreme Court will rectify the illegal order by cancelling the bail on the ground that the
order granting bail has caused miscarriage of justice.8 The court looks at the conduct which
is very relevant for invoking the equity jurisdiction.9Moreover, it was observed that while

4 Mohinder Singh v. State, AIR 1953 SC 415; Jyotendresinhji v. S.I. Tripathy, AIR 1993 SC
1991

5 Rajendra Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 4 SCC 586; Gian Kaur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1024

6 State of U.P. v. Samman Dass, AIR 1972 SC 677

7 Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1985 SC 969; Jagdish v. Harendrajit Singh, AIR 1986
SC 463

8 Ibid.

9 Punjab National Bank v Virendra Kumar Goel, (2004) 2 SCC 193

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granting anticipatory bail, court could have recorded reasons therefore. 10 Thus, when the
basic requirements for the grant of bail were completely ignored by the HC, SC can interfere
to prevent miscarriage of justice if it considers it fit to do having regard to the nature &
gravity of offence & the material collected during investigation. 11 In cases where the accused
is of such a character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if
there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with
evidence, then bail will not be granted. Where the HC ignores the above principle, the SC
will cancel the bail granted.12 In the present case, George Verghese, being an activist in XYZ
political party in the State, is an influential person, and thus there is a great chance that he
may misuse his power to tamper with the evidence, may not fully cooperate with the police
which may mislead the investigation which in turn may influence the court from ensuring a
free and fair trial in this case and justice to the accused.

It is only when some glaring error leading to grave failure of justice is made out, the court
will allow its jurisdiction to be invoked13 i.e. where the impugned order is ex facie bad or
illegal or manifestly wrong, leave is granted.14 When, on proved facts, wrong inference of
law is shown to have been drawn, leave is granted. 15Moreover, it is settled principle of law
that a person who claims reliefs on equitable grounds must come to court with clean hands &
the party cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 16 No instance of grave error, injustice or

10 State of Maharashtra v Mohd. Sajid Hussain, (2008) 1 SCC 213.

11 State of Maharashtra v Ramesh Taurani, AIR 1998 SC 586

12 State through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi, AIR 2005 SC 3490

13 State of Assam v Barga Dewani, (1970) 3 SCC 236

14 Shail v Manoj Kumar, (2004) 4 SCC 785

15 Radha Mohan Singh v State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 951

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wrong inference of law is prima facie visible which thereby fails to invoke the jurisdiction of
the SC under Article 136 asking for special leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court would not allow a new point (which was not taken before the High
Court) to be raised before it, or which was sought to be introduced by filing additional
grounds to the Special Leave Petition,17 unless it is a question of pure law.18 Even in cases
where the detention in custody after arrest is wholly unwarranted, in which cases anticipatory
relief is well in order, a duty is, however, cast on the Court in such situations to examine
the facts carefully and to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the investigation.19 Grant
of pre-arrest bail to appellant on the grounds that investigating agency would not be able to
collect any material to connect the appellant with crime was held judicially condemnable. 20
In the present case, the Honble High Court vide its order dated 15/03/15 with respect to the
anticipatory bail application registered as ABA No. 123/2015 had granted the accused an
anticipatory bail subject to the condition that the accused must submit himself to custody
within a period of three weeks from the date of the order and apply for regular bail. It is
humbly submitted that such condition is in consonance with the provisions of the anticipatory
bail as envisaged in Section 437(3)(c) and 438(2)(iv) of the CrPC whereby the Court can
impose any condition which it considers necessary in the interest of justice while granting
anticipatory bail. Where anticipatory bail is granted on the condition the condition must be
ejusdem generis with the condition mentioned in Sections 437 and 438. In the case of Maya

16 S.B. Noronah v Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 372

17 Sushil v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1232 (para 4)

18 State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 SC 389 (394); State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh,
(1999) 6 SCC 172

19 Sarkar, Code of Criminal Procedure, 9th Edition, Reprint 2010, Volume 2, p. 1853 (para 5)

20 Murleedharan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 1699

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Rani Guin v. State of W.B.,21 it was held that if in exercise of its power under Section 438,
CrPC, 1973, the High Court or the Sessions Court fixes duration as a condition of bail, the
accused is required to seek regular bail under Section 437 of the Code within the said
duration. Similar decisions have been held in cases of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v.
State of Maharashtra,22 K.L. Verma v. State and Another,23 Adri Dharan Das v. State of
West Bengal24 and Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Another25 where practice of passing
orders of anticipatory bail operative for a few days and directing the accused to surrender
before the Magistrate and apply for regular bail have been held valid. Section 438 CrPC
does not mention anything about the duration to which a direction for the release on
bail in the event of the arrest can be granted. As held in the case of Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra And Ors. 26, the order granting anticipatory bail
is a direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. Once such a
direction of anticipatory bail is executed by the accused and he is released on bail, the
concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions including direction of
joining investigation. Also according to the aforesaid judgment of Salauddins27 case, the
accused has to surrender before the trial court and only thereafter he/she can make prayer for
grant of bail by the trial court. The trial court would release the accused only after he has

21 2003 CrLJ 1: 2003 (2) Cur CrR 422

22 (1996) 1 SCC 667

23 (1998) 9 SCC 348

24 (2005) 4 SCC 303

25 (2005) 1 SCC 608

26 AIR 2011 SC 312

27 Criminal Appeal No. 2271 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 7615 of 2009)

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surrendered. Moreover in the case of Ashit Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 28 it was held that
fixation of outer limit in the order is not beyond the statutory provisions.

II. That the appellant is not qualified to get anticipatory bail under section
438 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the accused/appellant George
Verghese is not qualified to be granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 of CrPC, 1973.

Section 438 of the Cr.P.C, 1973 states direction for grant of bail to person apprehending
arrest:
1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of
having committed a non- bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court
of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct
that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail
2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub- section (1), it
may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular
case, as it may think fit, including-

(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a
police officer as and when required;

(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement,
threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade
him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;

(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of
the Court;

28 1997 CrLJ 1318: 1997 Cal CrLR 32

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(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub- section (3) of section 437, as if
the bail were granted under that section.

3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police


station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time
while in the custody of such officer to give bail, be shall be released on bail; and if a
Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the
first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the
direction of the Court under sub- section (1).

In Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu29 it was observed that the
considerations which normally weigh with the Court in granting bail in non-bailable
offences are-.

(i) the nature and seriousness of offence;

(ii) the character of the evidence;

(iii) circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; (Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh, 30and Puran v. Ram Bilas31)

(iv) a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the
trial;

(v) reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with;

29 AIR 2005 SC 716

30 2002 (3) SCC 598

312001 (6) SCC 338.

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(vi) the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which
may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case32.

Also, the Supreme Court in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab,33 observed that
to bring the case under the part of the section 300(3) of IPC, which talks about
culpable homicide amounting to murder and to determine the seriousness of offence,
the prosecution must establish objectively:

(1) That a bodily injury is present;

(2) That the nature of injury that must be proved;

(3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury;

(4) That the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
the nature

In the present case, the four essential conditions mentioned for an offence to be included as
culpable homicide amounting to murder are prima facie fulfilled. The Tata Sumo bearing
registration number JH 01 N 1514, registered in the name of George Verghese (the accused)
was stated to follow the motor bike of Neol Mathew at breakneck speed at midnight, crushing
him under the wheels and resulting in his death. Going by the history between Gabriel and
George Verghese and dissatisfaction between with respect to the management of the arable
land share, prima facie investigation ought to have been done by taking the accused in
custody. Also, the conditions that weigh in granting bail in a non-bailable offence point out to
the fact that an anticipatory bail is not contemplated in the present case as provided by the
Honble High Court. The fear of tampering with the witness is very evident with the given
background of the accused, being an activist of the XYZ political party and is at a highly
influential post of spreading the partys message in the country.
32 Mohammad Masood v State of Karnataka, 2002 CrLJ 1381 (Kant)

33 AIR 1958 SC 465

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Accused is a proclaimed offender

In the case of State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma,34 the Supreme Court bench of Chief Justice P
Sathasivam and Justice Ranjan Gogoi held that anticipatory bail should not be given to an
accused who has been declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of
the Criminal Procedure Code and has not cooperated with the investigation. Once an FIR was
registered against George Verghese in relation to the present matter, efforts were made to
arrest George Verghese but he evaded the arrest and on such absconding, he was declared as a
proclaimed offender. As such, the Honble High Court in granting him an anticipatory bail
erred in law.

Blanket Order not to be granted

In Union of India v. P.N Aggarwal,35the SC held that no blanket order of a bail can be passed by
a Court while exercising power under S.438 of the Cr.P.C. Also held in the case of Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab,36 a blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause
serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of
investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by
the applicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any
description whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits a
murder in the presence of the public. Such an order can then become a charter of lawlessness and
a weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated
when the order was passed. Therefore, the court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to
specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective 37. The
power should not be exercised in a vacuum. Normally, a direction should not issue to the effect

34 Criminal Appeal No. 2049 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4102 of 2013)

35 AIR 2009 SC 254

36 AIR 1980 SC 1632

37 Ramsewak v State of M.P., 1979 Cri LJ 1485 (MP)

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that the applicant shall be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence
whatsoever". Such 'blanket order' should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or
protect any and every kind of allegedly.38

Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of investigation intended to secure several


purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facts of motive,
preparation, commission and aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any,
in the crime. It may be necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the investigation
to proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons connected with the
victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance to maintain law and order in the locality.
For these or other reasons, arrest may become inevitable part of the process of investigation. The
legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in an application under S.438 of the Cr. P.C.
The role of the investigator is well-defined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the
Court in the process of investigation limited. The Court ordinarily will not interfere with the
investigation of a crime with the arrest of accused in a cognizable offence. An interim order
restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an application under S. 438 of the Code will
amount to interference in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under S. 438 of
the Cr.P.C as given in the case of Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal.39 Moreover, it is
plain that in the case of a grant of blanket bail to a petitioner the aforesaid persons and the police,
would be rendered powerless to commit the offenders to custody as warranted by those
provisions. Again, in such a situation, if the petitioner commits an entirely fresh non-bailable
offence and a case is registered under S. 154, the investigating officer would be rendered
powerless to do his duty of arresting the offender (s) under S. 157(1) and to proceed further with
the investigation of the case as per in Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab40

38 Ibid.

39 (2005) CCR 221 (SC)

40 (1980) 2 SCC 565

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Anticipatory bail should not be granted lightly. It should be granted only after doing a careful
assessment of timing & relevant facts. Untimely bail may seriously affect investigation
process.41

The court while considering anticipatory bail, must weigh the personal liberty of the applicant on
the one hand & the interest of the investigation in the larger public interest on the other, the
former yielding to the latter in case of heinous offence of murder.42

In a similar case of N.K.S.M. Shahul Hameed And Etc. vs Mohamed Ibrahim And Another, 43
the Madras High Court held that there is no manner of doubt that the accused who had been
favoured with orders of granting anticipatory bail were accused of heinous offences of
commission of murder. And thus the successive anticipatory bail applications moved for their
release on bail had been dismissed on the emergence of stout opposition from the
prosecution.

It may be added that anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of right nor should it be
lightly granted. And, in offences like murder, dowry death, for example, which are punishable
with death or imprisonment which may extend to life, anticipatory bail ought not to be granted
unless some very compelling circumstances are made out.44

Moreover, the discretion under S. 438 is not to be exercised with respect to offences punishable
with death or imprisonment for life unless the court at that very stage is satisfied that such a
change appears to be false or groundless.45

41 State of Karnataka v Rangappa, 2004 CriLJ 3720

42 Ravish Kumar v State of H.P. 2002 CrLJ 1760 (HP)

431992 CriLJ 227

44 Manoj Agarwal v State of Chattisgarh, 2003 Cr. L.J. 3519 at pp. 3521, 3522 (Chhat.); State of
Kerala v Suraj, 2004 (1) K.L.T. 72 at pp 78, 80 (Ker.); Bharat Chaudhary v State of Bihar, 2004
(1) A.L.T. 4 at p.5 (S.C.)

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An indirect use of the power to grant bail would be an abuse of the judicial process & would
shake the confidence of the general public in the judiciary.46

Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule. It is to be granted only when the Court
is convinced that the person is of such a status that he would not misuse his liberty. It must
be remembered that an order of anticipatory bail to some extent intrudes in the sphere of
investigation of crime & the Court must be cautious & circumspect in exercising such power of a
discretionary nature. Some very compelling circumstances must be made out for granting
anticipatory bail.47

Moreover, in case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.48 it was
pointed out by the Supreme Court specifically that the courts must evaluate the entire available
material against the accused very carefully. The court must also clearly comprehend the exact
role of the accused in the case.

And as such, it is humbly submitted that the accused may be denied anticipatory bail as he fails
to qualify for the same.

45 Mahanthagouda v State of Karnataka, 1978 Cri LJ 1045 (Kant HC); Somabhai v State of
Gujarat, 1978 Cri LJ 1523 (Guj HC)

46 State v Yoginder Kumar, 1985 CrLJ 685 (Del)

47 Lilaram L. Revani v R.D. Gandhi, 1998 Cri LJ 14 at p. 15 (Guj).

48 AIR 2011 SC 312

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, in the light of facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities

cited, the Respondent humbly submits that the Honble Court may be graciously pleased to

adjudge and declare that:

1. The special leave to appeal approached by the State of Jharkhand be allowed.

2. The special leave to appeal filed by the appellant under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India, 1950 be rejected.

3. The appellant/accuseds anticipatory bail under section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 passed by the order of Honble High Court vide order dated 15/03/15 be quashed.

4. The order dated 15/03/15 passed by the Honble High Court with regard to surrender of the

appellant within period of three weeks be upheld.

5. The appeal by the accused under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 be dismissed

with costs.

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And pass any other order in favour of the appellant which may deem fit in the ends of justice,
equity, and good conscience.

(All of which is respectfully Submitted)

Date: S/d

(Counsel for the Appellant)

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