Teaching Philosophy 2:3-4 213

Teaching Hegel
ROBERT C. SOLOMON

University 01 Texas, Austin

Many philosophers and students have recently come around to the view that G.
W. F. Hegel is one of the great philosophers of the modern period. A fevr years
ago, Hegel attracted the attention of primarily Marx-inspired students who had
been urged by Lenin and lesser disciples to read his work. Now, it seerns that
the Hegel who is attracting attention is rather the less political anel more
philosophical Hegel (the metaphysician, epistemologist, cultural theoretician).
(See, for example, Richard Bernstein's admirable account, "Why HegeINow?"
Review 01 Metaphysics, March 1978). Most college and university philosophy
departments accordingly face a demand for courses on Hegel's work; yet the
problems in organizing such courses are ominous and the number of Hegel
specialists still smalI.
There are, of course, a few dozen scholars in the country who havle spent
their careers working through and teaching Hege!. These problems do not af-
fect them and nothing I want to say here is directed to them. My concern is for
the many teachers who are not comfortable with Hegel and even less comfor-
table teaching hirn, but who want to provide philosophy students and others
with a sympathetic introduction to his work. Advanced seminars dictate their
own interests and strategy. Introductions to Hegel, whether on the graduate or
undergraduate level, require special tactics and caution. What I would like to
do here is to share my own experiences in teaching Hegel to students who are in-
terested and perhaps awed but almost wholly baffled at the beginning. The idea
is to provide some kind of roadmap and cautionary signals for what Hegel
hirnself called a "highway of despair."

Caveats

First, I find that teaching Hegel, like teaching Marx or Rousseau, requires the
explosion or at least the cautious suspension of a number of myths - the
"history ends with Hegei" myth, the "you can't understand a word until you've
understood it all" myth, the Hegel as proto-fascist Prussian-apologist myth and
the Hegel as retrograde post-Kantian metaphysician mythe The concepts of
"dialectic" and "the Absolute" have attained the status of myth by therrlselves,
and they will threaten the entire course with one-word jargonizing unle~ss they
are, from the outset, presented as problems rather than answers. I usually try to
get the students to articulate their initial understanding of these concepts
through informal discussion, socratically pursuing the obvious arrlbiguities,
214 ROBERT c~. SOLOMON

even before launching into any texts. When the class is too large or too shy, 1
settle for a crude but purposively noncommital specification of a number of
different interpretations of the Hegel myths and these best known terms. The
idea is emphatically not to explain the myths or to introduce these terms, much
less define them, but rather to insure that the class begins with an open mind,
with some familiarity of the problems of interpretation to be faced and without
the disastrous but common cookie-cutter interpretations that makes a fair
reading impossible.
Hegel's language is notoriously difficult. Hut the difficulty is not, as in
other authors, specialized and unexplained jargon; on the contrary, Hegel
makes a special effort to use vernacular language, with very few specialized
terms. The problem, in other words, is that the language is underdetermining
rather than technical, often based on idiomatic expressions which do not sur-
vive translation. A paragraph often consists of a web of pronouns whose
reference is not clear. This is partial explanation of the multiplicity of inter-
pretations and it is also the reason for the difficulty in defining many of the key
terms used frequently by Hegel ( "for itself' and "in itself," "certainty," "im-
mediate," "abstract'" and "concrete.") The problem is not that these terms have
been given some ne'w and specialized meaning, nor have they simply been bor-
rowed from their :homonymous philosophical predecessors. They are most
often terms from everyday speech, with all of the slipperiness and adaptability
appropriate to casual conversation. Hegel's appreciation of the "fluidity of con-
cepts" is well-illustrated in his own text. Again, students should be forewarned;
the meaning of a term in one context may be somewhat different from its use in
another. This is not carelessness or inconsistency, but rather an intentional play
with the ways in Wllich words do in fact shift their meanings from context to
context. Knowing this, and not falling into despair or retreating to charges of
inconsistency, makes reading far more of an enjoyable challenge and is
preparation for one' of Hegel's most important philosophical points. Any ade-
quate introduction to Hegel must include a discussion and appreciation of con-
ceptual change.
The main problem in teaching Hegel, 1 find, is that students often seem to
feel that they have Inastered Hegel's difficult style when they can simply recite
it, with at most minor variations of their own. 1 am perhaps overly strict on this
point: 1 do not let students rest until they have recast a Hegelian thesis in their
own terms, familiar terms that do not depend on their stylistic source. It is not
possible to feel comfortable with Hegel until one has acquired the understand-
ing and confidence to depart from the text enough to restate Hegel in one's own
terms. This is perhaps the single most difficult pedagogical task in the course,
both for uncomfortable teacher and bewildered student. 1 spend a lot of time,
in the beginning, essentially drilling students in this kind of conceptual transla-
tion. Without it, a ~Hegel class tends to become a course in Hegel catechism.

Opening Lectures

How to start? - Without diving into the dialectic head first? 1 start with some
 TEAC::HING HEGEL 215

history. There is considerable difference of opinion about the importance of the

historical dimension of Hegel's work. Hegel sometimes says that the business of
(his) philosophy is the "eternal," that which transcends history, with the "con-
cept" and therefore analyses which can be investigated without refen~nce or
concern for the historical epoch in which they were formulated. On the other
hand, Hegel is notoriously a history-minded philosopher who insists that the'
philosopher is "the expression of the spirit of his times.,"Treating Heg~~l in his
own way, therefore, seems to require son1e understanding of his times. I often
spend the first fulliecture period (even before the basic philosophical introduc-
tion and caveats in a large or shy class, but afterward in a more comfortable or
advanced class) discussing the Gern1an reaction to the French revolution,
Napoleon, the status of "Germany" at the turn of the century, the natur1e of the
German middle class, the "reaction" following 1815 and the circumstances of
Hegel's career (subsuming these to the general historical context). On any view,
however, it is important not to let the students take the historical context so
seriously that it obliterates the philosophy. But, even if one does not believe:
that a philosopher's context effects the meaning of the work, one makes the
students feel evidently more comfortable with some kind of introduction that
locates Hegel's work in a terrain that they can easily identify. I have also tried.
doing this with Hegel biography and with a straight history of philosophy talk
(Cartesianism, skepticism, Kant, Fichte and Schelling), but I find the difference~
incomparable. The historical introduction seems to attract and c:omfort
everyone; Hegel's biography is not sufficiently exciting to generate interest in
his philosophy, and apreface by way of Kant and his followers leaves just
about everyone behind from the start. (Beware that insidious pedagogical
tendency to think that the class understands because of a few nodding heads.)
Abrief description of the turmoil of the 1790's and early 1800's, however"
seems to motivate almost everyone - at least long enough to get things started.,
By way of introduction to Hegel's philosophy as such, I find a lengthy
discussion of a few well chosen sentences far more effective than atte:mpts at
grand summaries - as is sometimes attempted with the Phenomenology's
famous Preface, for example. Let me cite two well-known passages to illustrate
this: First, at the beginning of the Preface of the Phenomenology, Hegel com
pares "the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive evolution of the
truth" with,
"the bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say
that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit
comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's lex-
istence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossonl."
(Baillie, p. 68)
The simplicity of the metaphor makes it too tempting to move on without mak
ing sure the students have understood the hard half of the analogy. True, this
"growth" metaphor forms the very heart of the Phenomenology and is an ex
cellent way to get a first grasp of the "dialectic." But the point Hegel is making
here about philosophy is also essential. For students with some background, I
216 ROBERT C. SOLOMON

use the simple progression from Locke to Hume to explain the metaphor, how
each philosopher begins with the ideas of the last and then adds and subtracts
from them, how it is not so much a question of Locke being "wrong" and
Berkeley "right," but both having an insecure grasp of certain central
philosophical insights, the later philosopher working out the implications
neglected by the former. For students not that familiar with this example, I
usually manufacture a simple-minded history of empiricism on the basis of the
Locke-Berkeley-Hume trilogy. It is not enough to teach them empiricism pro-
per, but it does suffice to make the point.
Hegel's odd rnixture of biological and epistemic terms should be
highlighted. The important thing is to give the students the time they need. The
idea of "different sides/forms of truths" is too easily sloganized ("the Truth is
the Whole," etc.) Students have understood Hegel only when they can drop the
metaphor altogether and feel comfortable with what is for them an unusual
concept of philosophical disagreement. (Most think too easily of a philosopher
being simply "wrong.") At this point, it is necessary to reconcile this growth
metaphor with the "circle" metaphor that appears elsewhere, (e.g., Baillie 81).
Again, it is too easy to parrot that "reality is at the end what it was in the begin-
ning." To explain this is essential, however, for otherwise students unthinkingly
carry with them two contradictory Hegelian metaphors. Of course, at the end
Hegel's system is not as it began; rather, it has developed certain positions from
the history of philosophy to their necessary conclusions. So stated, students can
understand what it means to say that "the conclusion is already contained in the
premises" (a not uncommon logical phrase.) But this is not at all to say that it is
"the same" as the premises. There is a sense (not a literal sense, though it may
llave seemed so in that pre-Mendelian period) in which a tree is "contained" in
the acorn, and the acorn is a potential tree, but it is sheer sophistry to then
argue that the acorn is already a tree. If Hegel is to be taken seriously, these
metaphors have to be taken seriously too.
The second example is more difficult; it is the passage in which Hegel
begins his introduction of Geist:
The living substance, further , is that being which is truly subject, or, what is
the same thing, is truly realized and actual solely in the process of position-
ing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or
position to the opposite. (Baillie, 80)
I am not even going to try to unpack this here, but the point to be made em-
phatically and again is that the teacher must not rest when the students have
mastered the slogans, "substance as weIl as subject" and "self-positing spirit,"
etc. It is not fair to the students to say what is textually pemissable, namely,
that "you won't understand this until we get to the end of the book." They will
never get to the end of the book that way. What is needed is long discussion on
the meaning of "self-actualization." (The chapter on "Spirit" in Taylor's Hegel
is excellent as a base.) A quick review of Aristotle can help a lot, so lang as one
does not give in to too scholarly temptations. Simple analogies (some are
Hegel's) work weIl. I usually use the simple example of "growing up," moving
 TEACHING HEGEL 217

from one (Eriksonian) stage to another, believing what one did not believe
before, and the sense in which self-identity cannot be simple bodily identity,
nor mental identity, either, but a complex continuity of growth stages and
memories tied together with one's present self-image. A long conversation on
such mundane matters makes the students feel comfortable, as if Hegel's saying
something that they can really identify with, and thus one can ease them into
the harder metaphysical implications. But the point is always: Better that they
really understand a somewhat personalized version of Hegel than that they
simply master a few dogmatic and ill-comprehended slogans that could not
possibly do them any good whatever except on a GRE multiple-choice type:
quiz.

Texts

With such difficult reading, large amounts of text virtually guarantele a lost
class. The European seminars which would spend a full term or more: on tht~
first twenty pages of the Preface of the Phenomenology went too far in the
other direction, in my opinion, but the emphasis on slow cautious analysis
rather than simply a race through the conceptual jungle seems far preferable..
Yet there surely is something to the claim that the "system" in Hegel must be ap--
preciated as a whole. It may not be true that one needs to read all of Hegel; but
there certainly is something to the idea that one must complete the "dialectic" irL
at least one of its incarnations. Hegel hirnself is always insisting that it is the
"process" that means as much as "results," and his well-known hesitancy to
write aPreface to his system at all (though once he overcame his hesitation, he
evidently enjoyed hirnself immensely) is testimony to the error of studying only
portions of his work, particularly those which announce only "results" and do
not force the reader to follow the procedings along. So the choice of texts is
crucial. Too much will strangle the class and condemn the teacher to a semester
of untangling a network of confusions. Too little may be mastered but without
consequent understanding of what is most important in Hegel, by his own and
most enthusiasts' count - his "method." His introductions are often the clearest
parts of his books, but focusing on introductions usually means missing the
work itself. (Thus 1 find unsatisfactory the otherwise convenient packages of
"selections" by Loewenberg (Scribner's, 1929) and earl Friedrich (Modern
Library, 1953).) The popular introduction to the lectures on the philosophy of
history, best known as Reason in History, (trans, R. S. Hartman, Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1953) presents the same problem. As apreface to further
reading, this may even be preferable to the Preface to the Phenomenology. But
as a text itself, it again places too much emphasis on "results" and little if
anything on "the process" (as opposed to merely a description of process, which
is not the same thing at all.)
My solution to these problems over the past few years has been to concen-
trate almost wholly on the single book that Hegel saw as an "introduc:tion" to
his overall system but which also represented the "process" by which one works
218 ROBERT C. SOLOMON

in that system, the Phenomenology 0/ Spirit. 1 find that getting through the
Phenomenology in a term is hard going, and 1 usually have to edit out a hun-
dred or so pages to do it. (See syllabus following.) The course outline in the next
section is one way of dealing with this single book in a one term course for
undergraduates and graduate students (not specialists). But first, there are a
few other'possibilities that are worth suggesting:
There is, of all the "selection-type" books available, one that seems to serve
admirably for a single undergraduate course. The book is Hegel: The Essential
Writing, edited by F'rederick G. Weiss (NY: Harper and Row, 1974). It com-
bines selections from the Phenomenology, the Logic, the Philosophy 0/ Right
and the usually less accessible later two books of the Encyclopedia (introduc-
tions only). (Trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon, 1970 and 1971).
Naturally there will always be disagreements about which parts of which books
might "bettel''' have been included, but for the teacher who wants something of
an overview of Hegel's work in appropriate "dialectical" form for a single
course, 1 find Weiss's selections the best solution so far. And as the book is only
some 300-odd pages, no additional organization or editing will be necessary on
the teacher's part.
Two other courses which can fairly be called simply "Hegei" are courses in
his political philosophy and his logic. Regarding the first, material is ample and
relatively easy to read and understand. The basic text, naturally, is the
}>hilosophy 0/ Right (trans. T. Knox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942),
perhaps supplement(~d by some of his political writings, e.g., Kaufmann, ed.,
/legel's Political Philosophy (NY: Atherton, 1970); or Friedrich, The
}>hilosophy 0/ Hegel. Good secondary n1aterials are available by Avineri,
Kelley, Pelcynski, Plant, Reyburn and Shklar (see section on secondary works)
and, of course, Marx's classic "Critique" of Hegel (available in several transla-
tions, including T. Bottomore, Early Writings (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1963).
1 have taught Hegel's Science 0/ Logic (trans. A. V. Miller, NY:
Humanities, 1969) only once and never will again. Students were appreciative
and worshipful, but 1 cannot claim that, in my opinion, they got anythiQg out
of it. It is still a scholars's book, perfect for a Ph.D. dissertation but suited to
little less. The "Iesser" Logic is another matter. The translation by W. Wallace
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1892- but out in a new Oxford paperback) is readable
and straightforward. Even so, 1 have found it not to work weIl with most
undergraduates; an enormous amount of background has to be presupposed.
(The one term 1 tried to use both the Logic and the Phenomenology, the sheer
amount of material overwhelmed the students.) For advanced students, the
"Iesser" Logic deserves a course of its own; perhaps a two course sequence,in an
ideal setting, following the Phenomenology.

Translations 0/ the Phenomenology: One translation into English has

monopolized the market for years. It is translated as The Phenomenology 0/
Mind, by J. B. Baillie (NY: Harper Torchbook, 1966; hardback (2nd ed.) from
Macmillan, 1931). It is woefully inadequate, confusing the most essential
 TEACHING HEGEL 219

philosophical terms with inconsistent translations (notoriously, the word

"Geist" in the very title of the book, sometimes as "mind," sometimes as
"spirit," also the word "Begriff./' sometimes as "concept," sometimes as "no
tion," an all-important distinction in Hegel's works.) Hegel's vernacular and its
idiomatic expressions are often rendered literally, making what should read as
an almost casual text appear to be ungrammatical, overly academic, awkward
and anything but casual. This situation is being changed., however, by a number
of new translations. Available now is A. V. Miller's translation, Oxford
University Press, 1977, which includes a commentary by J. N. Findlay. The
translation is excellent. The commentary, unfortunately is too terse and too
close to Hegel's own language to help confused students. A yet to be published
translation by Peter Fuss is completed. Parts of a translation by Kenley Dove
have been circulating for years, and his Introduction to the Phenomenology is
printed with Heidegger's Hegel's Concept ofExperience (NY: Harper and Row,
1970). In addition, there is an excellent translation with commentary of the
Preface by Walter Kaufmann, in the last section of his Hegel: A Reinterpreta-
tion (NY: Doubleday, 1965). I used to tell my students to read that instead of
Baillie for the Preface (and give them a page cross-reference sheet to makt~
discussion easier). Now, I use Miller.

Teaching the Phenomenology

The most important single factor in students' comprehension seems to be their

keeping up with the reading. Accordingly, the most important organizational
concern for the teacher is pacing the readings. But this presents a serious prob-
lem. I find that introducing students to Hegel requires a lot of ground-
work - the historical introduction, some outline of the philosophical climate
and the problems facing Hegel in 1804 or so, the nature of a philosop11ical
"system" and the pecularity of Hegel's organization and language. Then too
there is the preliminary explosion of the Hegel myths and at least mention of
alternative interpretations. All this takes at least several weeks, but it ~lould be
folly to let the students wait that long before beginning their reading. But
reading without help seems aB but impossible. Then again, with Hegel more
than most authors, having read the work already appears to be almost a precon-
dition for an adequate reading. (One of my colleagues has his students complet1e
the work once before the course begins. But this is impractical if not brutal for
"most students and impossible for most undergraduates, who are not even sure
whether they are taking a course until weIl after it has begun.)
The way I have tried to solve these problems after several trials and errors,
is to choreograph the course in the following way. (It sounds much more
awkward than it really is.) Simply stated, the readings are placed ahead of lec-
tures, with alternative lectures and discussions, with double-readings, and cau-
tions respectively. In the "quick" readings, I urge students to concentrate On
structure and order, paying more attention to section titles and transition
paragraphs than to arguments or content as such. And I periodically review the
220 ROBERT C. SOLOMON

table of contents, to get the general tlow. (Hegel in fact does this himself at the
beginning of many chapters.) At least one discussion section per week (on the
reading) seems minimal. It is a crude method, but it seems to work weIl to in-
itiate an orientation to the book as a whole.
The following syllabus is roughly divided into fifteen topics (for fifteen
weeks, more or less). 1 have used approximate chapter headings rather than
commit reference to any particular translation.

Course Syllabus

Week Leeture Topies Reading and Diseussioll

Topies
Introduction: Hegel's Read through Ch. 4
place in history. quickly.
Warnings and promises. (First half or less of
Preface) 1
2 Cartesianism, Kant (Preface, last halt) (ad-
(Fichte, Schelling), vanced: "Difference be-
"phenomenology." tween Fichte and
Schelling"
3 "Dialectic," "system," Introduction (possibly
Hegel's early interests, Early Theological Writ-
"alienation," "Ab- ings)
solute."
4 The structure of the Consciousness, Chs. 1 & 2
Phenomenology,
"Spirit. "
5 Hegel's Epistemology Consciousness, Ch. 3 2
6 Hegel's Epistemology Self-Consciousness (Ch. 4)
7 Self-<:onsciousness Read through "Spirit"
(Master & Slave) quickly.
8 Stoicisnl, Skepticism and Realization of Rational
Unhappy Consciousness Self-Consciousness 3
(Ch. 5B)
9 Hegel's Ethics 4 Individuality (4C); "Spir-
it" (through "Legal
Status")
10 Hegel's Politics Finish "Spirit," read
through end of the book
quickly. (Phil. of Right/
Marx's "Critique")S
11 Hegel's Philosophy of Religion (Ch. 7)
Religion
12 "The Absolute" Absolute Knowledge
(Ch. 8)
13 Review: "Dialectic," (Preface) 6
"Spirit," the purpose of
the book.
14 "What is still living in Term papers due
HegeI" (Absolutely)
 TEA(:HING HEGEL 221

Notes on Syllabus:
1. I have severe reservations about the pedagogical desirability of the Preface.
If students read the Kaufmann translation and commentary, it helps con-
siderably. I have also used tl1e introduction to the lectures on the
philosophy of history here (Reason in History) with some success, but I
usually prefer just to start with the "Introduction," fnd have students read
the Preface in the last two weeks of the course.
2. The discussion of "force" is notoriously difficult to interpret. I usually em-
phasize the first and last sections (on "the unconditioned universal" and
"the inverted world" respectively) and minimize or skip the central discus-
sion, except for advanced graduate students.
3. I skip the long first part of "Reason," which includes the Phenomenology's
version of the philosophy of nature. I sometimes hold an extra session or
two to discuss this for interested students. Otherwise, I just summarize its
argument quickly in class.
4. I usually discuss or presuppose some Kant here. This is the point of the
course where readings and discussion sections and lecture topics merge.
5. I give my students a handout translation of the Jena lectures on thc State.
For interested students, I recommend at least the opening chapters of the
Philosophy 0/ Right, and, in extra sessions (or at the sacrifice of some later
weeks) have them read Marx's Critique of the same and compare them.
6. I sometimes use the Preface here; see note # 1, above. Also, the Introduction
to either of the Logics works well here.

Secondary Sources

No teacher could hope to carry this weight alone, and other books are
absolutely necessary out of fairness if not for pedagogical support alone. Until
recently, there were virtually no books just on the Phenomenology; suddenly
there is a plentitude. What follows are the works often recommended for
courses and which I have found that students have found. most inspiring and/or
most helpful. (This is in some places very different from a bibliography on the
basis of scholarship or my own professional preferences.) I put all of these on
library reserve, order a fair number for the bookstore, and recommend students
read through at least a few of them.

Works on the Phenomenology:

J. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure 0/ the Phenomenology 0/ Spirit
(trans., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974). Hyppolite was
responsible for introducing two generations of French philosophers to Hegel
and was thus responsible for much of the current interest in hirn in Inodern
philosophy. At the risk of shooting a sacred cow, however, I have yet to find a
student who has not found this book far more difficult reading than the
Phenomenology itself. It is very expensive, and despite its historical impor-
222 ROBERT <:. SOLOMON

tance, now seems dated in the light of the work recently done on Hegel.
A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading 01 Hegel (trans. Allan Bloom, NY:
Basic Books, 1969). Another sacred cow; with Hyppolite, Kojeve deserves
much of the credit for modern interest in Hege!. His "introduction," however,
is much too brief where students need the most help, too wordy where they
should rather be referred to the text. Some of his unusual interpretations are
refreshing and extremely interesting, but they are of value to the advanced-
student and scholar rather than the beginner.
J. Loewenberg, Hegel's Phenomenology (La SaIle, IL: Open Court, 1965).
A book by one of the first important American Hegel scholars which, unfor-
tunately, is written in such a way that it is equally impossible for students and
scholars alike.
R. Norman, Hegel's Phenomenology (NY: St. Martin's, 1977). A new,
concise, and very valuable book which should prove extremely useful to
students. It pretends not to be a "commentary" at all but a "philosophical
evaluation." Whatever it is, it provides clear and detailed guides to the
philosophical issues presupposed in Hegel's not always specific references and
an excellent overview of the book as a whole. Highly recommended.
Q. Lauer, A R'eading 01 Hegel's Phenomenology 01 Spirit (NY: Fordham,
University Press, 1976). A sympathetic and enthusiastic reading of Hegel, but
also too close to th(~ work and its language to help students through difficulties.
Like most commentaries, it tries to clarify the most obscure phrases by
repeating or, at best, paraphrasing them and comparing them to other, equally
difficult authors. A helpful book for teachers, but not for students.

On Hegel in General:
J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Reexamination (Alternatively, The Philosophy 01
Hege!) (NY: Oxford University Press, 1970). This book is generally credited
with re-establishing Hegel's reputation in English-American philosophy, just
re-released by Oxford. (Formerly published by Macmillan) The discussions of
"Spirit" and "Dialectic" (two chapters each) are valuable support for the discus-
sions of those topics both at the beginning and at the end of the course. The
discussion of the Phenomenology itself is much too rushed, often explicit in its
despair with Hegel's meaning or transitions (which is just the kind of
discouragement the beginning student does not need) and so is not to be
depended upon as a commentary as such. But students who read it with the
Phenomenology generally claim that it at least gave them hope.
W. Kaufmann, Hegel: AReinterpretation (NY: Doubleday, 1965). A book
that is extremely helpful in locating the beginning student in the cultural setting
relevant to Hegel's text. It is very good on biography and anecdotal material.
Unfortunately, it has virtually no commentary of the Phenomenology and
discusses much too briefly only a few isolated concepts. It reads very weIl,
however, and again, seems valuable in giving students the kind of heartening
they usually need in this course.
H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon, 1960). Although
 TEACHING HEGEL 223

this book has often been unfairly chastized for its overly Marxist view of Hegel,
I have found it to be the most philosophically powerful of all the books on
Hegel until recently (that is, geared to the non-specialized reader.) The linkage
between the philosophy and cultural-historical events is done brilliantly, and
the account of the text, though not complete, is suggestive in ways that are-
obviously valuable for the students.
R. Schacht, Hege! and After (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1974).
Not a weIl known book, but the chapter linking Hegel with traditional lTlodern
epistemology (Descartes, Locke, Hume) and Kant, Fichte, and Schelling is the
clearest and most valuable I have read. The commentary on the Preface to the
Phenomeno!ogy is the most thorough in printe
I. Soll, An Introduction to Hege!'s Metaphysics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1969). An admirably clear attempt to relate Hegel to issues in
contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Includes some helpful discussion
of the early chapters of the Phenomeno!ogy but not general commentary.
C. Taylor, Hege! (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). A
recent arrival that is now recognized by many as the best existing Hegel com-
mentary. The writing is dense, sometimes as difficult as Hegel's own, but
students - particularly graduate students, seem to find it Uthe best thing they've
ever read on Hege!." The early chapters are an excellent introduction to Hegel's
context, with far more emphasis on the cultural and quasi-philosophical in-
fluences (Romanticism, Herder) than Marcuse and others. The chapter on
"Self-positing Spirit" is the best existing discussion of Hegel's concept in
English. The commentary on the Phenomeno!ogy is excellent. The added
glossary of German words used and index make it a valuable tool for students.
C. Butler, G. W. F. Hege! (Twayne, 1978). A good general and synl-
pathetic defense of Hege!.
There are a few general collections of essays which students seem to find
helpful: In particular, A. Maclntyre, Hege! (NY: Doubleday, 1972) and W.
Steinkraus, New Studies in Hege!'s Phi!osophy (NY: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1971).
There are a number of useful discussions on particular topics. On lIegel's
political philosophy: S. Avineri, Hege!'s Theory of the Modern State (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969); Z. Pelczynski, ed., Hege!'s Po!itica!
Phi!osophy (Carrlbridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971); R. Plant, Hege!
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973); H. Reyburn, 'The Ethica! Theory of
Hege! (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967); and J. Shklar, Hege!'s Po!itica! Phi!osophy.
For abrief but clear and concise account of Hegel's ethics vis-a-vis Kant,W. H.
Walsh's little book, Hege!ian Ethics is perfect. (In a course on ju.st the
Phenomeno!ogy, his discussion gives the students both an understanding of the
ethical aspects of that work and its relationships to the earlier and later
writings.) For biographical background, there is nothing conceivably better
than H. S. Harris's massive Hege!'s Deve!opment: Towards the Sun!ight;
(1770-1801) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), but for easy readability, Kaufrnann's
Reinterpretation will suffice for most students. There is also arecent transla-
224 ROBERT C:. SOLOMON

tion of G. Lukacs's The Young Hegel (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1976) which,
despite difficult reading and some needless nastiness, is an exciting reinterpreta-
tion. On Hegel's view of history there is Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, Hegel's
Philosophy 0/ History (Cornell, 1974).
There is no point listing the more specialized studies and collections: Any
student needing them for a term paper will presumably already be deep in the
"Heg" section of the library card catalog with specific advice of his teacher.

Despite the upsurge of popularity, Hegel still suffers from strangulation in

the current philosophical climate. This is all the more surprising as so many
American philosophers of importance (and not just Royce and Dewey, but
Quine and Goodman and Davidson, as well) display clearly compatible themes
in their work. The problem is that most Hegel scholars, and consequently most
professional readers of Hegel, and again their students, continue to insist on
approaching the great philosopher with awe instead of confidence. Although
respect is necessary for a fair reading, a good deal of personal chutzbah (not
Hegel's word) is necessary to appropriate Hegel. I find teaching Hegel one of
my most rewarding courses just because, of all the philosophers of the modern
period, he most inspires his students to stretch their imaginations and rethink
virtually everything. How ironie, therefore, that his effect has so often rather
been to stultify imagination in deference to textual exegesis. Hegel has not yet
been wholly rediscovered.

phi.~~,~. ical VOLUME VIII, Nos. 2-4

Marx W. Wartofsky, Editor
~
UA lERLY
FEUERBACU, MARX AND TUE LEFT UEGELIANS
This special issue, co-edited by ~Iarx W. Wartofsky and Hans-Martin
Sass, is a unique collection of original translations, major historical and
philosophical studies, as well as first pu blication of letters .and texts of
the left Hegelians (notably, Feuerbach, Marx, Bruno Bauer, Edgar
Bauer, Max Stirner and Moses Hess). This collection will interest both
students and scholars.

Mai) to: P.D. Box 247 The price of this tri pie
Boston University Station issue is $8.50 (300 pp.)
Boston. Massach usetts 02215 U. S. A.