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Jean Charles de Menezes

C a s e-X Friday, July 22, 2005

Given what they thought they were dealing with, Charlie 2 and Charlie 12, [1]
in running towards and getting within a few feet of a suspected suicide bomber,
and Ivor, [2] who sprang on him and pinned his arms to his sides on the Tube
train, should each have been awarded the George Medal. [3] Instead they live
for the rest of their lives with the knowledge that they took part in the killing
of an entirely innocent man.

Ian Blair 4

We open this thesis with Mr. Blairs comment that can be noted as commendable in
the mind of the British public should the reference have been for a gardener, a
postman and a milkman.

Two of those individuals Mr. Blair mentioned -codenamed Charlie- were at the
time members of the Special Firearms Division, Black Team. 5 The third individual
mentioned -codenamed Ivor also known as Hotel3 or H3- was at the time a
member of Special Branch, Grey Surveillance Team.

NOTE
Researching this case was extremely difficult; enough so that we could not put a title
to it as we could put a face to the opening quote. This is because all material gathered
from the public domain on the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on July 22,
2015, is circumstantial. No matter where we considered looking, either in the pages
of the official post-mortem report, the inquest transcripts, independent reports,
witness statements or mainstream coverage, nowhere stood solid evidence, which

1
Black team members, Special Firearms Officers (SFO) codenamed Charlie (C).
2
Grey surveillance team member of Special Branch (SO12) codenamed Ivor or Hotel3 (H3).
3
The George Medal is the distinguished medal to be offered in Great Britain to those who perform acts of
bravery or have been chosen to be merited.
4
Blair, Ian. Policing Controversy. Profile Books, 2009.
5
The Telegraph: Rod Gilmour, GB hockey team manager Andy Halliday forced to miss Rio Olympics due to
Jean Charles de Menezes shooting. Web June 2016. Web 2017.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/hockey/2016/06/18/gb-hockey-team-manager-andy-halliday-forced-to-miss-rio-
olympics/>
Case-X / Page 2

would explain what happened when Mr. de Menezes walked out of his flat that
unfortunate morning.

It can be appreciated how this case lacked conclusive evidence. Lack of evidence
usually appears in cases under the auspices of some elite group of individuals who
maintain the security of covert agents and/or a Nation. Such cases are not expected
to divulge into specific details nor release fact-to-fact information regardless what
will be stated by authority personnel at inquests, press conferences, or by what
questions will be asked in a Court of Law. Centuries of old codes, if you will,
throughout history show confidence overshadows transparency for the security of
undercover agents and/or a Nation.

We decided to take the least concealed avenue, bypassing mainstream media


coverage, to remain focused on logical elements of the material gathered from the
following resources that is presently in the public domain.

References
1. J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign 6
2. Post-Mortem Report SC:57/2005/KS.rl.
3. Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) Stockwell One Report
/November 8, 2007. 7
4. Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) Stockwell Two Report
/August 2, 2007. 8

ORDINARY FLOUR
The public was informed by the media how on Thursday, July 21st of 2005, four
failed bomb attacks had disrupted part of Londons public transport system.

The locations in question were Shepherd Bush, Warren Street and Oval London
Underground stations. The fourth failed bomb was reported as being found on a
double-decker bus somewhere in Bethnal Green.

6
Website: J7 The July 7th Truth Campaign. Web. 2017. <http://julyseventh.co.uk/>
7
Investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005.
Report submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service for consideration on 19 January 2006.
<https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/publication-stockwell-one-report>
8
An investigation into complaints about the Metropolitan Police Services handling of public statements
following the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005. <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-
concludes-stockwell-two-investigation>
Case-X / Page 3

Authorities mentioned that though detonators had exploded, the actual charges had
remained intact. Hence the event was tagged as failed bomb attacks.

Regardless if four failures could be considered unusual, the scale soon tipped when
one of the captured would-be bombers explained why the charges remained intact:
The bombs had been concocted with ordinary flour. 9

IDENTITIES
Cases, as dealt with here, are almost entirely handled by the media via direction. This
makes it pointless to dwell on the identities of these would-be bombers, being that
it is very difficult to corroborate their identity. What can be mentioned however, is
that hours after Mr. de Menezes death, it became evident the public needed to know
much more than what had been furnished to the media.

Sooner than later, the public heard from the authorities that one of the would-be
bombers happened to live in the same block of flats as Mr. de Menezes had, and that
the latter was followed by Special Branch due to this element. The result was he had
been mistaken for one of the would-be bombers, and was shot dead by the Black
Team of Special Firearms Division in a public transport system.

The inquest transcripts record how surveillance teams were on the lookout that
Friday morning for one of the would-be bombers living at 21, Scotia Road. This was
a block of eight or nine flats, two on each floor with one communal door. Within
these flats was Mr. de Menezes; specifically, in the flat below one of the would-be
bombers. Though the latter was not found in any flat in Scotia Road that day, one
of them was subsequently arrested on July 29th by Italian authorities and extradited
to England in September of 2005.

21, Scotia Road: Would-be bombers


Communal door
17, Scotia Road: Mr. de Menezes

The de Menezes inquest also revealed, how during the night of the 21st and the
22nd of July 2005, Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) footage from Stockwell
Underground -where Mr. de Menezes was shot dead- depicted at least one of the
would-be bombers had entered the transport system at Stockwell. 10

9
The Guardian: July 21 bombs were a hoax, court hears. March 2007. Web. 2017.
10
David Perry QC representing senior police officers. DE MENEZES Inquest. Wednesday, September 24, 2008.
Case-X / Page 4

JULY 22ND-FRIDAY 09:10 a.m.


An incident at 09:10 a.m. occurred on the Victoria line at Vauxhall station. This
incident would have a direct effect on how Mr. de Menezes would divert from
initially travelling to Brixton going instead for Stockwell that was being refurbished
at the time. 11 A couple on the train gave an account of what they experienced:

Me and my girlfriend were both on the actual carriage in Vauxhall that filled
with fumes after leaving Stockwell. The operation took over three hours -
significantly longer than any of the recent false alarms. The station was about
to be reopened within about 20 minutes of the incident when police realised
that the smell of the fumes was NOT the smell of the trains emergency brakes.
They then mounted a very large security operation including bomb disposal
units in contamination suits and masks.
We both stayed with the police in the cordon throughout, then were moved at
one point, completely out of sight into the street behind. I can say, and several
other witnesses will corroborate, that our carriage definitely filled with some
kind of acrid chemical smelling haze, which we first tried to ignore but
eventually became so strong that people began to cough.
The reports of hysteria in the carriage affected are wildly exaggerated, most
people managed to remain considerate and fairly calm under the circumstances.
For a false alarm this was a pretty major operation, taken very seriously by the
officers in the cordon. Its absence from any news reports from that day seems
a little conspicuous to me.

The Sharpener Blog 12

By 09:30 a.m., at least a dozen emergency vehicles had arrived at Vauxhall


Underground, but the incident got little media coverage and was put down to a false
alarm as noted by the above witness. The witness account gives us two clues that
would certify the shutdown of the Victoria line that morning for at least three hours:
From 09:10 a.m. till mid-day.

Clue 1.
The witness tells us he travelled towards Vauxhall Station after leaving Stockwell
Station, which would have been the Northbound Victoria line.

11
(a) DE MENEZES Inquest. Wednesday, September 24, 2008; (b) IPCC Stockwell One Report.
12
The Sharpener Blog, where this couple had stated those comments, is no longer available online. Web. 2017.
<http://www.thesharpener.net/?p=108>
Case-X / Page 5

Clue 2. This false alarm which mounted a very large security operation including
bomb disposal units in contamination suits and masks would have had commuters
travelling from Brixton and Stockwell Stations diverting to the Northbound
Northern line (black colour).

In the Underground image, Kilburn


Station (yellow arrow) where Mr. de
Menezes was heading to, is north-west
London. To travel there from Brixton or
Stockwell (red arrow), he would have
needed to board either the Northern line
(black) or the Victoria line (light blue),
and change for the Jubilee line (silver).

Since we know the Victoria line was


closed due to the false alarm, it is
logical to conclude that Mr. de Menezes
would have needed to catch a train from
platform 2 (Northern line), get off at Waterloo, and then travel on the Jubilee line.

Northern line Victoria line


Platform 2 Northbound Platform 1 Northbound
Platform 3 Southbound Platform 4 Southbound

Coroner Wrights opening inquest statement (excerpt below) verifies Mr. de Menezes
had been shot and killed on a stationary train at platform 2. There should be no
dispute as to which platform the shooting occurred.
Case-X / Page 6

At 10:00 a.m., just three minutes before Mr. de Menezes is seen to enter Stockwell
Underground, a report was received about possible suspicious packages 13 (being
in the plural) within the station. This raised the security alarm in and around the area,
but we find no report that the station was evacuated as a precaution. Keep in mind
the station was also being refurbished.

Whilst this false alarm unravelled, for at least 30 minutes and maybe longer, the
authorities already began following Mr. de Menezes with a composite of some
would-be bomber in their possession. It is not clear if all or just some members of
some surveillance team had the identical composite.

QC MANSFIELD 14 Were you aware that in fact some of them [members of


the surveillance teams] were out on patrol, as it were, or surveillance, without a
photograph at all? Did you know that?
WITNESS MCDOWALL 15 No, I wasnt aware of that.
QC MANSFIELD I mean, that doesnt help, does it, when you know about
the difficulties of identification, positive identification, if you dont even have a
copy of the photograph with you, and you have only seen it once back at a
briefing? Thats not exactly best practice, is it?
WITNESS MCDOWALL No, sir, no.

DE MENEZES Inquest
Thursday, September 25, 2008.

RECOGNITION ISSUES
When going through the released official reports, it can be noticed that Mr. de
Menezes ethnicity was described in four separate ways:

1. North African
2. Pakistani
3. Asian
4. Mongolian eyed -if this can be categorized within ethnicity

13
DE MENEZES Inquest. Wednesday, September 24, 2008.
14
Michael Mansfield QC represented the de Menezes family. Grays Inn. London. Web. 2017.
< http://www.mansfieldchambers.co.uk/>
15
Deputy Assistant Commissioner John McDowall.
Case-X / Page 7

It was apparent that none of the reports kept a consistency of ethnicity on who they
were following. When one turns to read what was reported regarding Mr. de
Menezes height and build, one report has him at 5ft.8in., and another has him at
5ft.10in. Inconsistency, again. Regarding his structure, one report mentioned he was
of medium build and another has him down as being of an athletic structure.

Following is the actual description of Mr. de Menezes as seen by pathologists


assigned to his post-mortem examination.

Moderately built
Mediterranean complexion
5ft. 8in. (one official report did have this correct)
70 kg (11 stone)
Short dark brown hair (no recession)
Brown eyes

But neither was it clear if Mr. de Menezes was being reported as a could be, a maybe,
or even a possible match to one of the would-be bombers. And why would a
Brazilian young man be a match, one could ask, when not even one of the would-
be bombers was mentioned as being under surveillance whose car was parked in the
neighbourhood.

The entire surveillance operation that Friday morning could be best described by
lecturer, Brian Massumi: To admit to discussing, studying, consulting, analysing is
to admit to having been in a state of indecision preceding the making of the decision.
It is to admit to passages of doubt and unclarity in a blurry present. 16

Years of experience on the shoulders of proud Special Branch surveillance officers


do not allow impossibilities or coincidences to enter their vocabulary, let alone
inconsistencies within their reports.

So when researchers detect released official reports stacked with multiple


inconsistencies and impossibilities, a bell sounds in the distance: Perhaps we are
looking at doubles. This is not so farfetched as some readers may think.

16
Genealogies of Biopolitics Conference: The Future Birth of the Affective Fact.
Case-X / Page 8

If one Special Branch officer was dressed virtually identical as Mr. de Menezes that
morning, then so could others have been dressed virtually identical as Mr. de
Menezes that morning.

QC MANSFIELD He [de Menezes] wasnt wearing any inappropriate or


unusual clothing, was he?
WITNESS IVOR/H3 He was dressed virtually identical to myself, sir, yes.

DE MENEZES Inquest. Thursday, October 23, 2008.

These elements scream out they are not coincidences. But if they are, then they are
astronomically impossible ones.
Case-X / Page 9

ASTRONOMICAL

Not identical male as above discounted. Surveillance team to withdraw to


original positions.

New Scotland Yard log 17

On Friday morning of July 22nd in


2005, the weather was reported as
being around 17C (62F). 18 Most
Londoners were dressed for such
weather as was Mr. de Menezes who
wore a black T-shirt under a blue
denim jacket, a pair of jeans and a
pair of pumps. It would be a popular attire that morning as we saw and shall see
further on.

As the day progressed, a friend and colleague of Mr. de Menezes, a Mr. Gesio Cesar
Davila, told authorities he called Mr. de Menezes at 08:45 a.m. regarding their
scheduled meeting between 09:00 and 09:30 at Kilburn Station. 19 They were meeting
about a new job, which would begin that day.

Mr. de Menezes informed Mr. Davila he would be delayed for an hour as he had
overslept; they rescheduled to meet between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m.

Thirty minutes later, which logically would have been 09:10 a.m., Mr. de Menezes
updated Mr. Davila that Brixton Underground was closed and so he would be taking
the bus instead. Undoubtedly the station was closed due to the false alarm incident
happening at that time at Vauxhall Underground. These times show that Mr. de
Menezes was still in his flat at 09:10 a.m., and he somehow knew (initial news
broadcasts?) that Brixton tube was closed due to the false alarm.

17
Coroners Opening Statement. DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, September 22, 2008.
18
Weather history for EGLL - July, 2005. Web. 2017.
<https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGLL/2005/7/22/DailyHistory.html>
19
Kilburn Station is north-west London. Travelling to Kilburn Station from Brixton or Stockwell, Mr. de Menezes
would have needed to board either the Northern line (black) or the Victoria line (light blue), and change for the
Jubilee line (silver).
Case-X / Page 10

The only alternative Mr. de Menezes now had, was to travel directly to Stockwell
station by bus, and from there grab the Underground to Kilburn station.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) released two reports on


the case, which held a different opinion on the subject.

The likelihood is, the IPCC noted -and considering they stated likelihood would
mean they did not know- this call which was placed 30 minutes after 08:45 a.m.,
was made when Jean Charles was at BRIXTON Underground station when he was
seen by the surveillance team to use his mobile phone, which was at 09:50 a.m.
Case-X / Page 11

Now, either we did not understand the excerpt report that follows, or the IPCC
authors got very confused in dealing with the subject, because it is crystal clear that
30 minutes after 08:45 a.m. comes down to 09:10 a.m. and not 09:50 a.m.

Mr. de Menezes did not leave his flat till 09:33 a.m. per the inquest transcripts. 20 He
was still in his flat at 09:10 a.m. when he placed his call to Mr. Davila informing
Brixton station was closed.

Since we do not see this call being made at a later hour as the IPCC state, we remained
open to be corrected should the IPCC had special clearance to Mr. de Menezes
phone records. However, the report does not state they had those phone records,
and, if they had, it is doubtful they would have reported in all likelihood that the
call was made at a later hour. They would have been positive as opposed to
suggesting.

But to give the IPCC some benefit of doubt, let us consider if the IPCC authors
meant the 30 minutes later call was placed approximately one hour after the first
call. If so, then the second call would have been placed at 10:15 a.m. The only
problem with this timeframe, is that at 10:15 a.m. Mr. de Menezes was already dead
(shot at 10:06 a.m.) and could not have called Mr. Davila.

We could not find in the public domain any report, or the actual statement made by
Mr. Davila, which would make this subject any clearer or more logical than our
timeframe below. The subject as reported by the IPCC is of circumstantial evidence
pointing to personal assumption of the IPCC author(s).
20
DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, September 22, 2008.
Case-X / Page 12

Timeframe based on Davilas statement


08:45 Davila calls de Menezes who reschedules their meeting for 10:00-30 a.m.
09:10 A false alarm results in Vauxhall station closing
09:10 De Menezes calls Davila updating Brixton station is closed
09:33 De Menezes seen leaving the block of flats

Now, outside Mr. de Menezes block of flats, a SO12 red surveillance team had been
placed, if remembered, to be on the lookout for one of the would-be bombers who
was supposed to be accommodating a flat at the same address.

One member of this SO12 red team, specifically someone codenamed Frank,
reported he saw someone exit the block of flats. However, being he was distracted
(as will be seen in the excerpt below) his account should have automatically become
somewhat questionable.

At 09:33hrs Frank needed to urinate in a plastic container while inside the


observation van. At this time he saw a male person exit the flats.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

The Metropolitan Police Authority report did not agree with the authors of the IPCC
report in regard to where Frank was when nature called.

That the key surveillance officer [Frank] was not at his post when Mr. de
Menezes left the block of flats on Scotia Road was unfortunate...

MPA Stockwell Scrutiny, July 2008.

Brushing Frank aside, it would have taken Mr. de Menezes between five or six
minutes to get to the number 2 bus stop 21 to catch a bus (registration number
LJO3MXL) having the time down to 09:39-40 a.m. when he got to the bus stop. The
number 2 bus would take him directly to Stockwell Underground station, passing the
closed Brixton Underground station on the way.

Always per official reports, surveillance teams then stated they saw Mr. de Menezes
board the number 2 bus, but instead of remaining on the bus, which would have
taken him directly to Stockwell tube, he was seen getting off the bus outside Brixton

21
DE MENEZES Inquest. Wednesday, September 24, 2008.
Case-X / Page 13

tube station around 09:47 a.m. even though he knew this station would be closed.
And it is here that we notice an interesting shift.

In all probability, at the time these reports were being written, the authorities did not
have Mr. Davilas information in regard to this second call that was made at 09:10
a.m. which certified Mr. de Menezes knew Brixton tube would be closed and there
would be no reason for him to get off the bus at Brixton station. Remember, this
bus had a direct route to Stockwell tube. It would be irrational to waste time getting
off the bus since Mr. de Menezes was already an hour behind schedule.

Surveillance teams then stated they saw Mr. de Menezes walk for about 20 metres
before he ran back towards the bus he had just left. He joined a queue boarding the
bus while using his mobile phone. And it is at this exact moment that the IPCC
report states they think (in all likelihood) Mr. de Menezes called Mr. Davila to
inform Brixton station was closed.

At 09:50 a.m., Mr. de Menezes is then observed to be seating himself on the top deck
of the number 2 bus.

Point 1 We are told Mr. de Menezes got off bus number 2, walked for 20 metres
(average of 65 steps), ran back to bus number 2, waited in a queue, used his mobile,
got back on the number 2 bus, went up the deck steps, sat on the top deck.

09:47 de Menezes gets off the bus and walks 65 steps


0.15 secs at fast pace 09:47:15 is 20 metres away from the bus stop if he walks fast
1.59 secs slow pace 09:48:59 is 20 metres away from the bus stop if he walks slow

Being Mr. de Menezes had rescheduled his meeting for an hour later, he would not
be in a slow-paced phase; we shall therefore have him make those 65 steps (20
metres) from the bus stop with a fast pace.

Logical timeframe
09:47 de Menezes gets off the bus and walks 65 steps
0.15 secs at fast pace 09:47:15 de Menezes is 20 metres away from the bus stop

For some reason, Mr. de Menezes runs -does not walk- but runs back to the bus
stop. If it took him, at a quick pace, 15 seconds from bus stop to cover those 20
metres, it would take him half that time -7 seconds- to run back.
Case-X / Page 14

Logical timeframe
0.7 secs running 09:47:22.05 de Menezes is back at the bus stop

Then we are told, that while Mr. de Menezes joined the queue, he used his mobile
once. It was not until the clock showed 09:50 a.m. when he was seen seated on the
top deck of the number 2 bus. In average, it took Mr. de Menezes 3 minutes to get
back on the bus again.

Logical timeframe
09:47 de Menezes gets off the bus and fast paces 65 steps
09:47:15 de Menezes is 20 metres away from the bus stop then runs back
09:47:22.05 de Menezes is back at the bus stop
09:50 de Menezes is on the bus and seated on the top deck

Point 2 We need to know which ethnicity is being reported of the person seen by
surveillance teams getting off and running back to bus number 2. It may have been
the Asian, the North African, the Pakistani or the Mongolian eyed. Whoever it was,
we need to know. We therefore remind out readers of Mr. de Menezes description
as reported in the official autopsy report:

Moderately built
Mediterranean complexion
5ft. 8in.
70 kg (11 stone)
Short dark brown hair (no recession)
Brown eyes

09:33 a.m. When Mr. de


Menezes is first seen leaving the
block of flats, he is described by
SO12 Red surveillance members
as being 5ft.8in. This coincided
with the autopsy report. But the
same team then described him as
a Caucasian (white male).
Case-X / Page 15

Per Fitzpatricks skin type charts, Caucasian is in the type 3 category, whereas the
Mediterranean complexion Mr. de Menezes had is in the type 4 category.

09:39-40 a.m. When Mr. de Menezes is seen waiting at the bus stop, he is described
by SO12 Grey surveillance members as being 5ft.10in. This description of height did
not coincide with the description of height reported 6 or 7 minutes earlier, nor does
it coincide with the autopsy report.

Further on, the same team release another description which bares the same time.
This second description still has the individual at the bus stop being 5ft.10in. but
now includes a skin type -light skinned North African- which is type 6 on the
Fitzpatricks skin type charts. This skin type does not coincide with being Mr. de
Menezes Mediterranean complexion, being in the type 4 category.

Whichever way one wishes to look at these three descriptions, they do not coincide
with each other and they do not coincide with the autopsy report. It allows us to
conclude that the Grey team had been observing 6 or 7 minutes later a different
individual than what the Red teams individual looked like.

These different descriptions can be put down as lookalikes.

09:44 a.m. Mr. de Menezes is now on the bus and is still being described as a light
skinned North African. But notice reader what is reported at 10:38 a.m. by an
Inspector ZAG as given in the IPCC Two Report: Inspector ZAG informs:
SO19 had shot dead a man at STOCKWELL tube station. A male Asian/Pakistani
had been confronted and shot.

An Asian/Pakistani is under categories type 4 and 5 per Fitzpatricks skin type


charts; two distinguishable ethnicities, therefore these official reports were stating:

North African (skin type 6) boarded bus number 2


Asian (skin type 4) boarded bus number 2
Pakistani (skin type 5) boarded bus number 2
All three got off bus number 2 at Brixton tube
All three re-boarded 3mins later after waiting in the queue and using mobiles
Asian/Pakistani (skin types 4-5) confronted and shot at Stockwell tube
Case-X / Page 16

One could put up three questions for debate:


1. Where has Mr. de Menezes gone to?
2. Where has the North African gone to?
3. What can be deduced from such reporting by officials?

5-minute dead zone


The number 2 bus had a faulty camera system and did not record during the time of
09:32.57 till 09:37.17 and from 09:56.14 till 10:01.47. At the inquest, it was stated Mr.
de Menezes first boarded the bus from his neighbourhood at 09:39 a.m., or a minute
later. He then arrived at Brixton station at 09:47 a.m.; supposedly walked 20 metres
before dashing back to the bus which he supposedly re-boarded at 09:50 a.m., and
finally got off at 10:02 a.m. at Stockwell Underground station.

09:32.57 faulty camera system on bus number 2


09:37.17
09:39 boards bus number 2
09:47 gets off bus number 2 (Brixton station)
09:50 re-boards bus number 2 (Brixton station)
09:56.14 faulty camera system on bus number 2
10:01.47
10:02 gets off bus number 2 (Stockwell station)

Per the above timeframe, footage from inside the bus should exist when Mr. de
Menezes first boards the bus from his neighbourhood, gets off at Brixton, and when
he re-boards at Brixton. Footage should also show him inside the bus for the next 6
minutes till 09:56 a.m. when the camera goes off again.

From 09:56 till 10:01 a.m. there is no bus footage of Mr. de Menezes activities, or
of those following him on this number 2 bus. This is a 5-minute dead zone until the
bus camera begins to work again only 1 minute before Mr. de Menezes gets off at
Stockwell station. . . .two five-minute time gaps were discovered for the relevant
period when Mr. DE MENEZES was travelling on the bus. The relevant periods
are 09:32.57 seconds to 09:37.17 seconds and 09:56.14 seconds to 10:01.47 seconds.
Witness XD 22 could not explain the gaps in the recordings but thought that vibration
could be a reason. [IPCC Stockwell One Report]

22
IPCC Stockwell One Report: Witness XD was an auto electrician employed by Arriva Bus Company, who was
responsible for the maintenance of CCTV on Arriva buses. He was asked by an IPCC investigator to retrieve the
available information from the hard drive.
Case-X / Page 17

09:46 a.m. A loggist at New Scotland Yard wrote: Not identical male as above discounted.
Surveillance team to withdraw to original positions. 23

09:48 a.m. A Special Branch surveillance team reported Mr. de Menezes was not the
would-be bomber, and Detective Sergeant Dingemans (SO13 arrest team) 24 was to
approach Mr. de Menezes for inside intelligence. 25

09:55 a.m. Just 5 minutes after Mr. de Menezes was supposed to have re-boarded
bus number 2, surveillance radio communicated Mr. de Menezes was positively
identified as a would-be bomber.

What happened from 09:46 a.m. till 09:55 a.m. (a mere 9 minutes) to change Mr. de
Menezes from not being identical to being positively identified as the suspect, is
unknown.

09:32.57 faulty camera system on bus number 2


09:37.17
09:39 boards bus number 2
09:46 not identical to the would-be bomber
09:47 gets off bus number 2 (Brixton station)
09:50 re-boards bus number 2 (Brixton station)
09:55 positively identified as the would-be bomber
09:56.14 faulty camera system on bus number 2
10:01.47
10:02 gets off bus number 2 (Stockwell station)

The most irregular to read was what Coroner Wright mentioned in his opening
statement on the first day of the inquest:

By the time Mr. de Menezes had actually entered the underground system at
Stockwell station, no member of the surveillance team had positively identified
him

Monday, September 22, 2008. 26

23
Coroners Opening Statement. DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, September 22, 2008.
24
Coroners Opening Statement. DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, September 22, 2008: SO13 was
the Anti-Terrorist Branch which contained officers of all ranks who specialised in anti-terrorist operations.
25
Counsel to the inquest Jonathan Hough QC questioning Detective Chief Inspector in the Counter-Terrorism
Command Angela Scott. DE MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, September 30, 2008.
26
Coroners Opening Statement. DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, September 22, 2008.
Case-X / Page 18

Logical timeline so far


08:45 Davila calls de Menezes
09:10 A false alarm results in Vauxhall station to close
09:10 De Menezes calls Davila updating Brixton station is now closed
09:32.57 Camera on number 2 bus stops recording
09:33 De Menezes leaves block of flats; spotted by Frank 5 min dead zone
09:37.17 Camera on number 2 bus begins recording
09:39-40 De Menezes seen at bus stop
09:45 De Menezes expected to meet up with Davila
09:46 De Menezes not considered the would-be bomber
09:47 De Menezes supposedly gets off at Brixton station
09:48 Special Branch surveillance team establish de Menezes not the would-be
bomber/DS Dingemans (SO13 arrest team) to approach/question de
Menezes for inside intelligence.
09:50 De Menezes supposedly re-boards number 2 bus; sits on top deck
09:55 Surveillance radio communicating de Menezes positively identified as
the would-be bomber
09:56.14 Camera on number 2 bus stops recording 5 min dead zone
10:01.47 Camera on number 2 bus begins recording
10:02 De Menezes gets off at Stockwell tube

Regrouping information
We know that a false alarm at Vauxhall Underground had the Victoria line in
turmoil resulting in Brixton station closing by 09:10 a.m. It goes to follow that Mr.
de Menezes also knew this because Mr. Davila told us this.

Since no report stated surveillance teams were following a Brazilian man who had
Mediterranean complexion, then the person who got off the number 2 bus and back
on, was not Mr. de Menezes. This, if one wishes to be particular.

Michael Mansfield QC, who represented the de Menezes family, pointed out at the
inquest, that it is possible Mr. de Menezes got off the bus, saw that Brixton station
was closed, and decided to return to the same number 2 bus to travel to the next
closest Underground station which was Stockwell.

This is all very well when we dont take into consideration the call made from Mr.
de Menezes to Mr. Davila (30 minutes after 08:45 a.m.) informing Brixton tube was
closed. This call does not have Mr. de Menezes getting off that number 2 bus at
09:47 a.m. at Brixton station; it does not have him walk 20 meters from the bus only
Case-X / Page 19

to run back to the same bus that remained there for 3 minutes; it does not have him
using his mobile whilst waiting in the bus queue; and it is definite it does not have
Mr. de Menezes being North African or Asian/Pakistani.

But even if Mr. de Menezes did get off the bus at Brixton Underground, it is
uncertain why he would do that. He knew from 09:10 a.m. that that tube station
would be closed due to this false alarm, and he knew this number 2 bus travelled
to Stockwell station. It does not make a lot of sense that Mr. de Menezes would get
off that bus at 09:47 a.m. to re-board it 3 minutes later. Of course, three possibilities
are open for debate.

(a) This was not Mr. de Menezes getting off and back on that bus, but a lookalike.
(b) Mr. de Menezes forgot about the closing of Brixton tube -highly unlikely- and
went along with his initial journey plan.
(c) The reports stating Mr. Davila received a call from Mr. de Menezes 30
minutes after the first call, were erroneous.

It depends which debate one wishes to open. We as authors could not find any
further information on the subject.

10:02 a.m. 27 Mr. de Menezes gets off the number 2 bus across from Stockwell
station. Remember reader, he is at this point positively identified as the suspect
and could not have changed turning into a victim, even if he had begged for his life.

10:03 a.m. Mr. de Menezes walks into Stockwell station. Various official reports have
him running down escalators.

Hand written report entitled Options re premises 28


27
The IPCC Report records the time a minute later.
28
Website J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign. Web. 2017. < http://www.julyseventh.co.uk/j7-jean-charles-de-
menezes-inquest/jcdm-inquest-evidence-list.html>
Case-X / Page 20

But running down escalators turned out not to be true. Our readers can see the
released CCTV footage in the footnote link. 29 The IPCC also stated that Mr. de
Menezes did not do any running down escalators.

Mr. DE MENEZES is seen on the CCTV to select a copy of the Metro


newspaper. He then walked to the ticket barrier, used an Oyster card and walked
through the turnstile. He then turned left towards the escalator to the Northern
line and walked down on its left hand side. There are no recordings, which
cover the lower end of the escalator or platform, the relevant tapes, when seized
by the MPS, [Metropolitan Police Station,] were found to be blank.

10:05 a.m. Officers are now ready to stop Mr. de Menezes.

Hand written report entitled Options re premises

Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest Transcripts & Evidence

It was calculated that from the time Mr. de Menezes passed through the ticket barrier
to when the first firearms officer leaped over the ticket barriers, 1 minute and 32
seconds had passed. 30
***

Based on the released reports in the public domain, there is a crystal-clear possibility
that lookalikes were roaming the streets the morning Mr. de Menezes was shot and

29
Youtube account ltroonster1. Video titled: Jean Charles De Menezes CCTV Footage & The Real Story.
Uploaded July 2009. Web. 2017. < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GU7nL0A6ASM>
30
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
Case-X / Page 21

killed. Two scenarios can be created; but which took place that morning, is
impossible to tell or prove.

Scenario No.1 Mr. de Menezes was covertly approached after authorities


identified one of the would-be bombers on Thursday, June 21st. Mr. de
Menezes would have been an eager (or easy) participant to help authorities
capture the suspect who was living in the flat above him for the following
reason: The Home Office had stated Mr. de Menezes passport held a visa
stamp that was not in use by the Home Office at the time. This implied forgery.

The No.1 scenario would logically explain


(a) Why Mr. de Menezes would go along with the requests of the authorities.
(b) How other individuals were seen wearing denim jackets and jeans that
morning either being Asian, Pakistani, North African or Mongol eyed.
(c) Ivor the surveillance officer dressed virtually identical to Mr. de Menezes.
(d) It was not until 11:20 a.m., a little over an hour after the shooting, that the
authorities again requested profiles of occupants of those in Scotia Road
flats. This was something they had apparently requested 3 hours earlier, at
08:20 a.m. but still not given by 11:20 a.m.

Mr. de Menezes is the bait that morning in scenario No.1. But in order to actually
prove this scenario, or elements of it, we would need to know what the authorities
knew of the whereabouts of their suspect on Thursday night or Friday morning.
Unfortunately, all we could find in the public domain was that the would-be bomber
fled England sometime after the bombings, was tracked in Italy where he was
arrested on July 29th.

Scenario No.2 Mr. de Menezes was asked by those who were associated with
the would-be bombers to shake surveillance from Scotia Road that morning.
This would not be impossible if Mr. de Menezes had been fed some story of a
jealous husband situation or some unwanted loan shark. It would have seemed
Case-X / Page 22

innocent enough. Hence, Mr. de Menezes gave an excuse to Mr. DAvila that
he woke up late as opposed to telling his friend he was late because he was
being asked to divert some unwanted people away from the block of flats. It is
possible they also arranged for various friends to dress as Mr. de Menezes (who
was the bait) to divert and confuse surveillance teams.

Should the second scenario have occurred, then these acquaintances of the would-
be bombers had to have had some inside intelligence that the block of flats was under
surveillance that morning as opposed to seeing surveillance cars and/or vans.

We say this for one reason only.

Within a small duration of 9 minutes, something went on within the depths of the
authorities communications for Mr. de Menezes to be flipped from not being
identified to positively being identified as a would-be bomber.

TIME Event Note


P.M.
Thursday-July 21st

12:36 First reports coming in of an explosion at the (MPA Stockwell Scrutiny


Oval. Others follow regarding attempted Report, July 2008.)
explosions at Warren Street, Shepherds Bush
and Hackney Road.

Night During the night of the 21st, CCTV footage (Inquest. Sept. 24, 2008.)
from Stockwell tube showed at least one of
the would-be bombers had entered the
transport system at Stockwell.

A.M.
Friday-July 22nd

08:45 Davila calls de Menezes in regards to their De Menezes overslept;


scheduled meeting at 09:00-30 for Kilburn will be an hour late
station. They were supposed to begin work at changing the meeting
a new job. to 10:00-30 a.m.

09:00 Davila and de Menezes to meet at Kilburn Time was changed.


station. (See 08:45)

09:10 A false alarm occurs on the Victoria line at Has a direct effect on
Vauxhall tube how de Menezes will
be diverted to another
Case-X / Page 23

tube station that was


being refurbished.
(Inquest. Sept. 24, 2008.)

09:10 De Menezes updates Davila: Brixton tube The IPCC assume this
closed; will be taking bus instead. call was made at an
impossible time of
09:47 a.m.

09:30 Davila and de Menezes to meet at Kilburn Time was changed.


station. (See 08:45)

09:30 Dozens of emergency vehicles arrive at Incident receives little


Vauxhall tube. media coverage; is put
down as a false
alarm.

09:32.57 Camera on number 2 bus stops recording

09:33 De Menezes leaves his flat. (Inquest. Sept. 22, 2008.)

09:33 SO12 Red surveillance team officer is


occupied by a call from nature.

There are discrepancies where Frank


urinated. The IPCC report has him
urinating in a plastic container while inside
the observation van; whereas the
Metropolitan Police Authority report the
officer was not at his post when Mr. de
Menezes left the block of flats on Scotia
Road. It depends which report one wishes
to follow. We could not verify which was
the correct report.

09:33 De Menezes described as a white male; SO12 Red


5ft.8in.; dark hair; stubbly beard; wearing blue surveillance team
denim jacket; jeans and trainers.

09:37.17 Camera on number 2 bus begins recording

09:39-40 De Menezes seen at bus stop.

09:39 1st description: De Menezes described as SO12 Grey


5ft.10in.; stocky built; collar length black hair; surveillance team
facial stubble; wide faced; wearing denim
jacket, faded jeans.

09:39 2nd description: De Menezes described as SO12 Grey


5ft.10in.; age 25-30; light skinned North surveillance team
African male; short dark hair; some facial
Case-X / Page 24

stubble; medium to well-built; wearing light- This was not the


coloured denim jacket. individual seen at
09:33 a.m. by the
SO12 Red
surveillance team

09:39 De Menezes boards number 2 bus.

09:44 De Menezes again described as a North (Jean Charles de Menezes


African male. Inquest Transcripts
& Evidence)

09:45 De Menezes supposed to meet Davila after Kilburn station.


rescheduling.

09:46 De Menezes reported not identical male as (New Scotland Yard log)
above discounted. Surveillance team to
withdraw to original positions.

09:47 De Menezes supposedly gets off the bus near


Brixton tube.

09:47 De Menezes described as 5ft.10in.; age 25-30; SO12 Grey


athletic build; short dark hair; face stubble; surveillance team
wearing faded blue denim jacket; jeans,
trainers.

09:48 Special Branch establish de Menezes is not DS Dingemans


their suspect. (SO13 arrest team)
to approach and
question for inside
intelligence.

09:50 De Menezes supposedly re-boards the same IPCC Report: De


bus. Menezes walks 20m
before running back
to bus; joined queue
while using mobile.

09:52 De Menezes positively identified as the (Jean Charles de


suspect. Menezes Inquest
Transcripts
& Evidence)

By the time Mr. de Menezes had actually (Coroners Opening


entered the underground system at Statement. Mon,
Stockwell station, no member of the Sept. 22, 2008.)
surveillance team had positively
identified him
Case-X / Page 25

09:55 Surveillance radio communicating de


Menezes positively identified as
the suspect.

09:56.14 Camera on number 2 bus stops recording

10:00 Reports received about possible suspicious (Inquest. Sept. 24, 2008.)
packages within Stockwell; station not
evacuated as a precaution.

10:01.47 Camera on number 2 bus begins recording

10:02 De Menezes gets off bus number 2 across IPCC records the time
from Stockwell tube. a minute later at 10:03.

10:03 De Menezes enters Stockwell station. CCTV footage time.

10:05 State RED alerts firearms officers to stop


de Menezes.

10:38 Inspector ZAG informs: SO19 had shot (IPCC Two Report)
dead a man at STOCKWELL tube station. A
male Asian/Pakistani had been confronted
and shot.

Night CCTV footage from Stockwell tube: At least (Inquest. Sept. 24, 2008.)
one of the would-be bombers had entered the
transport system at Stockwell.
Case-X / Page 26

BLACK ALERT

I was deeply shocked. I just couldnt believe it. This was against everything that
I had ever trained for. As a firearms instructor and as an SFO, [Special Firearms
Officer,] I knew that its an individual officers decision to fire a weapon and it
was my responsibility and I killed an innocent man. And I think about that every
day.

Witness C2 at the Inquest on Tuesday, October 28, 2008.

Mr. de Menezes entered Stockwell tube station at 10:03 a.m. Within three minutes,
a surveillance and firearms team followed suite. Names given at the inquest and
mentioned in reports were coded to protect anonymity.

H11/Geoff (first to follow Mr. de Menezes onto the platform)


H3/Ivor
H6/Ken
H8/Laurance
H9/Malcolm
H10/Graham
SFO Black Special Firearms Officer C2 who shot Mr. de Menezes
C5
C6
C7
C9/Sam
C11
SFO Black Special Firearms Officer C12 who shot Mr. de Menezes
Case-X / Page 27

CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV)

Given the significance of CCTV evidence in criminal investigations and the


widespread use of CCTV on public transport systems, the amount of potential
evidence that is missing is a matter of concern.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

5-minute dead zone


The first day of the inquest into the inquiry of how Mr. de Menezes was shot dead
began on Wednesday, September 24, 2008.

An IPCC senior investigator, Stephen Reynolds, was first to be called. He told


Coroner and Jury that the closed-circuit television footage on the number 2 bus Mr.
de Menezes got on was not complete due to a faulty camera system.

We went into this subject earlier and will not repeat it here. Should readers wish to
read the entire testimony, a link can be found in the footnote below. 31

16-day dead zone


The actual closed-circuit unit on the Underground train (inside the carriage) where
Mr. de Menezes had been shot dead, did not make any recording of the event due to
the system being removed from that particular train in common . . . and with just
about every other underground train, after the 7/7 bombings.

Before continuing, one point must be made clear. Unless a citizen, or any individual
outside an authoritative level, records an actual event, no authority will release
footage of that event especially if it portrays a disturbing death as Mr. de Menezes
suffered. So what is of concern, and should not distract us by focusing on what the
authorities should or should not have released, is the following.

All Underground trains, from July 7th when the bombings occurred, up to July 22nd
when Mr. de Menezes was shot dead, London Underground trains had no working
closed-circuit television system. This becomes serious when it is considered in what
timeframe this occurred, because Londoners and tourists had been scared out of
their wits, and felt some security, if not comfort, that at least television footage would

31
Website J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign. Web. 2017. < http://www.julyseventh.co.uk/j7-jean-charles-de-
menezes-inquest/jcdm-inquest-evidence-list.html>
Case-X / Page 28

be working on the Underground after the 7/7 bombings to capture any future event.
But this was not the case as Counsel to the inquest, Nicholas Hilliard QC, noted:

HILLIARD QC Because obviously everybody wanted to look and see what


clues there were on underground film in relation to those bombings [on July
7th.] Is this right: On this particular train, [where the victim was shot,] it had
not yet been put back?
WITNESS REYNOLDS Thats correct.

The witness however then said, that there was a cable which linked the recording
part of the system which it would appear somebody had trodden on, and we were
able to or engineers were able to ascertain that it had not been recording for a few
days prior to the 22nd. That, even though Council to the Coroner had given another
explanation just moments earlier. The IPCC Report wrote:

Witness XP 32 states that the hard drives were missing from the train entered
by Mr. DE MENEZES because they had been removed after the 7/7
bombings. He further states that he has checked the documentation for the two
units and there is no record of any replacement.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

The same report tells us that Stockwell tube station was being refurbished during
the period Mr. de Menezes was shot dead.

Witness XL is a senior communications engineer. On 26 July 2005, he was


notified of a fault on the CCTV system at STOCKWELL to the extent that
VCR number 1 was not recording. A colleague of his had reported the previous
day that a cable had been damaged and possibly severed. All eight cameras are
fed down one cable into the VCR. It was not picking up an input from the cable
and, as a result, was giving off an audible alarm. Witness XL commented that
while this was an unusual problem it could have been due to the station being
refurbished.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

32
Witness XP: Contracts Manager. His duties include the download and removal of recorded information from
Northern line trains. (IPCC Stockwell One Report)
Case-X / Page 29

Another witness termed XN who was a Senior Consultant in Forensic Video at


BSB (Forensic) Ltd., was of the opinion that the cable connector [of the closed-
circuit] had been stood on, causing it to break. 33

First important element We are told by experts that after the July 7th bombings
up till July 22nd (unknown for how long after) Stockwell trains -and just about every
other underground train- had no working closed-circuit television system inside
train carriages. Almost immediately foreknowledge jumps to mind because it would
be nave, even insulting to imagine the authorities had hoped that no other attacks
would happen during this 16-day period.

Second important element Authorities publicly announced at least four failed


bomb attacks occurred in three Underground stations on Thursday, July 21st:
Shepherd Bush, Warren Street and Oval London Underground stations. The
following day, a newspaper detailed the following which was quoted from author
Nafeez M. Ahmed:

Despite the governments official insistence that it had no prior knowledge of


the attacks of 21 July 2005, [notice the date,] anonymous British security sources
revealed that Scotland Yard had obtained precise advanced warning of replica
bomb attacks on the Tube network that would almost certainly be executed on
Thursday of that week. 34

If, however the above was true, that there were sources warning of replica bomb
attacks for Thursday, July 21st, it makes no sense of hearing how ordinary flour
was concocted and planted only to turn into failed bombs. There would be no
point in planting them in the first place. The events do not marry in well with the
intelligence. Either the four failed bombs were not concocted from ordinary
flour and due to these security sources they were located and defused in time, or
they were failed bombs concocted from ordinary flour which makes the British
security sources scenario a fake one.

Both cannot be true.

33
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
34
Nafeez M. Ahmed. The London Bombings: An Independent Inquiry. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, 2006.
Case-X / Page 30

ORDER to ORDERS

QC MANSFIELD So if the command is stop, and over to you how you do


it, that isnt synonymous with critical shot or shoot?
WITNESS CLARKE No, sir.
QC MANSFIELD Nobody could possibly make that confusion?
WITNESS CLARKE I would certainly hope not, sir, no.

DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, September 29, 2008.

The inquest into Mr. de Menezes death opened on September 22, 2008, at the John
Major Conference Room in The Oval (Kennington, London). Coroner presiding was
Sir Michael Wright.

On Monday, September 29th, Peter Clarke 35 was questioned by QC Mansfield. The


gist of this witness testimony was that the DSO at New Scotland Yard would have
decided what would be done when a suspect was spotted:

1. Stop the individual


If the command was given to stop that person, then that person would be
stopped, and then after that person stopped, you then react to the threat that
that person presents and that may then lead to somebody being shot.

2. Challenge the individual


Challenge would be where you have the luxury of distance, and you can then
call to the individual and get the person stopped in that way. So you have got
distance and you can call across and stop them safely.

3. Shoot the individual This action needs no description

The above would be based only on identification that that is the person to stop who
is a suspect and not a positive bomber.

35
DAC Clarke was head of SO13 and national co-ordinator of anti-terrorist investigations on behalf of
Association of Chief Police Officers.
Case-X / Page 31

QC MANSFIELD So if the command is stop, and over to you how you do


it, that isnt synonymous with critical shot or shoot?
WITNESS CLARKE No, sir.
QC MANSFIELD Nobody could possibly make that confusion?
WITNESS CLARKE I would certainly hope not, sir, no.
QC MANSFIELD Because officers have been trained to respond to these
different orders?
WITNESS CLARKE Yes, sir.
***
QC MANSFIELD I am going to be specific. This was known, at the central
control room, as number 21, Scotia Road, and it is said that people at the centre
did not realise that in fact it was a block of flats and that there was only one
door for the whole block for some long time, in fact well past 07.15, before
anyone at the centre realised. So its looking at a specific address. What kind of
reconnaissance would be required there?
WITNESS CLARKE In that case, sir, before my officers would go out, they
would pull off maps and plans so we understood the area we were going to go
into. If we were going to go out and undertake this armed, as this would, we
needed to make sure we had the authority in place to run this as an armed
operation. So we had a standing authority. Thats one thing. We would now
want to go out and do this specifically armed, and to that effect I would then
want to discuss with the Silver 36
various contingencies of what if, and thats
around what if we are compromised at the door, what if we are shot at in the
area, what do you want us to do. Those were the types of questions that I would
have asked in relation to that.

36
Sir Michael Wright. Coroners Opening Statement. DE MENEZES Inquest, Monday, September 22, 2008: The
Metropolitan Police generally operates a gold, silver and bronze command structure for something operations
such as the one that took place on 21 and 22 July 2005. A senior officer is designated as the Gold Commander,
and he is in overall command and he formulates the overall strategy for the operation to follow. Beneath him is
a Silver Commander, usually called Silver, who devises the tactics which will follow that strategy. Beneath him
is the Bronze Commander who directs officers on the ground and implements the tactics which have been set
by Silver.
Case-X / Page 32

QC MANSFIELD It goes without saying, none of this ever happened?


WITNESS CLARKE To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

On Tuesday, September 30, 2008, Counsel to the inquest, Jonathan Hough QC,
questioned Detective Chief Inspector in the Counter-Terrorism Command Angela
Scott. She told Coroner and Jury that two orders left New Scotland Yard in regards
to handling Mr. de Menezes. The first order had been to follow and use him for
intelligence since he was not at the time considered a suspect.

FIRST ORDER (unspecified time) 37


QC GIBBS I am interested in where the idea came from that someone had said
that the man who turned out to be Mr. de Menezes, but who was being
followed, wasnt the suspect?
WITNESS SCOTT My recollection, sir, was that that came from Mr.
Esposito.
QC GIBBS From Mr. Esposito, so there had been a possible identification with
the suspect which came from the surveillance team; is that right?
WITNESS SCOTT Thats correct, sir.

The second order countermanded the first which now put a target on Mr. de
Menezes since he was at that point considered the actual would-be bomber.

SECOND ORDER (unspecified time) 38


QC HOUGH Did a time come when a further order was given to Mr.
Dingemans?
WITNESS SCOTT There was a different order given to Mr. Dingemans, yes.
QC HOUGH What was that different order?
WITNESS SCOTT That Mr. Dingemans was not to undertake the stop of the
subject.

37
Patrick Gibbs QC represented the surveillance officers of the Special Branch. Questioning Detective Chief
Inspector in the Counter-Terrorism Command Angela Scott. DE MENEZES Inquest. Tues, September 30, 2008.
38
Counsel to the inquest Jonathan Hough QC questioning Detective Chief Inspector in the Counter-Terrorism
Command Angela Scott. DE MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, September 30, 2008.
Case-X / Page 33

QC HOUGH So the stop was countermanded. He was told pull back?


WITNESS SCOTT Yes.
QC HOUGH Why was that new order given?
WITNESS SCOTT That new order was given because a surveillance officer
conducting the monitoring, Pat, 39
then stated a surveillance team officer had
said that in fact they did believe that it was one of the suspects.
QC HOUGH Can you recall what level of certainty Pat or anybody else
attached to that identification?
WITNESS SCOTT I recall that Pat said something like, They are saying that
its him, and that Mr. [Jon] Boutcher 40 at that point moved forward and spoke
to Pat and actually said, Is it possible for the surveillance team to give us a
percentage of how sure they are? The response to that was, They are saying
that its him.

39
Pat was a loggist, the individual who types (in real time) what is being said on the surveillance channel.
40
Superintendent Jon Boutcher was to undertake what was necessary to identify and locate the suspects. DE
MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, September 30, 2008.
Case-X / Page 34

THE SHOOTING

There exist two diagrams showing where the passengers were seated when the shooting began, but not
all passengers were included. It is unknown why. One diagram is from the inquest (marked IPCC)
which depicts one individual (name redacted) sitting next to Mr. de Menezes to his right. The other
diagram comes directly from the IPCC Report; it also shows someone seated next to Mr. de Menezes,
but this time it has a codename as Witness YL. Both diagrams are now in the public domain.

The shots
Through various leaked documents, it was known two Black team firearms officers -
under the command of John McDowell- 41 shot Mr. de Menezes from a range of
between 1 centimetre and 8 centimetres. Also leaked was the total of shots fired:
Nine in total where seven penetrated the skull, one round misfired, and one round
missed altogether.

But the quantity of shots fired at Mr. de Menezes that morning would turn into a pile
of inconsistencies between the authorities, the witnesses, and those writing the
official reports on the case.

41
Metropolitan Police, Special Operations (SO13) Anti-Terrorist Command.
Case-X / Page 35

An interesting concept was raised in a blog comment in 2007: My question is,


wrote the commentator, how could the first shot not have killed Mr. [de] Menezes
since the trained shooter was kneeling in the seat next to the victim? I believe that
the first shot killed Mr. [de] Menezes instantly, hence further shots are unnecessary,
and as he was also being held down seated, [by Ivor,] he wasnt going anywhere.

The commentator also raised the point whether Mr. de Menezes was shot with a
pistol or a semi-automatic. For me, he continued, the simplest explanation for
the seven bullets to Mr. [de] Menezes head is that a machine pistol was used instead,
and set on auto; hence a less than one second burst was delivered to the head before
the shooter took his finger off the trigger. 42

It is common knowledge to those who do research in weaponry, that an automatic


weapon is a one trigger pull with a lot of rounds. A semi-automatic is a one trigger
pull with one round. But, with a semi-automatic, as the commentator believed was
used, is when the trigger is pulled quickly to fling many bullets as quickly.

It was revealed at the inquest that the officers who shot Mr. de Menezes had been
authorised the use of 9mm hollow point 124-grain ammunition that morning.
The reason for authorising that type of ammunition is that the round expends more
energy to the subject immediately on impact, and is therefore more likely to
incapacitate immediately. 43 It therefore stands to reason to consider the point made
by the commentator, how the first shot killed Mr. [de] Menezes instantly. This was
also agreed upon by Dr. Shorrocks who conducted the autopsy.

Anna Dunwoodie / WITNESS YD

But let us consider what one witness, Anna


Dunwoodie, told Coroner and Jury at her inquest
appearance on Monday, November 3, 2008. She was
seated on Mr. de Menezes left a couple of seats away.
In the IPCC Report, the witness is termed as
WITNESS YD.

42
Commentator on Aftermath News subscribed as Baby Milo. October 10, 2007. Web. 2017.
<https://aftermathnews.wordpress.com/2007/10/09/cctv-proves-police-lied-de-menezes-behaved-normally-
before-being-murdered/>
43
DE MENEZES Inquest. Friday, September 26, 2008.
Case-X / Page 36

Miss. Dunwoodie did not remember sitting as depicted in the image (taken from the
inquest). Instead, she said she was sitting one seat closer to Mr. de Menezes and next
to the SO12 grey surveillance team officer codenamed Ivor or Hotel 3.

Witness remembered she had caught the train from Tooting Bec station (Northern
Line) arriving into Stockwell station at 10:00 a.m. The journey time between these
two London underground stations is approximately 14 minutes 44 with 4 stops in
between. This would have had Miss. Dunwoodie get on the train at Tooting Bec
around 09:46 a.m.

The double doors opened on the side the witness was facing; this would mean she
was seated facing the platform -as Mr. de Menezes was. She could not remember the
duration of time the train was parked there for, but she felt it was a while.

The witness then said she became aware of Ivor the surveillance officer when he
sat next to her on her left, though Ivor is not depicted on the image that was
produced at the inquest.

He had [a] broad build, the witness said, and so he took up quite a lot of space in
the seat; he was wearing jeans and a pale denim jacket and he had a baseball cap on
of some kind. She then saw Ivor rest a small rucksack on his knee, rummage
through it, and heard a sort of a metallic noise coming from the rucksack.

At some point, Miss. Dunwoodie saw Ivor rush to the open double doors to shout
to a group of heavily built men who were just appearing; his words were either there
he is or this is it. The group of men she saw were dressed in civilian clothes and
she immediately thought they were a gang. There is no mention that she recognized
these men as being police officers.

WITNESS DUNWOODIE I was looking directly at the -I think when they


all came through [into the carriage] I had a sense of you know, lots of men, lots
of guns, sort of everything a bit fast, and then I focused and I saw that there
was a gun pressed to the place where the neck joins the head of the passenger
[Mr. de Menezes] who was sitting down to my right. And that was a very sort

44
Website: London Drum. Train route from Tooting Broadway to Stockwell station. Web. 2017.
<http://www.londondrum.com/transport/train-journey.php?from=tooting-broadway&to=stockwell>
Case-X / Page 37

of clear image. But really what I was looking at was his [Mr. de Menezes] face
and the expression on his face and the gun and the hand [pointing the gun].

Miss. Dunwoodie described Mr. de Menezes expression and demeanour: I


remember that his eyes were closed and I remember that he had, you know, its a
hard thing to try to explain but his eyes were closed and he looked almost calm,
which again I hesitate to say that, but I guess he had a gun pressed, and there wasnt
very much he could do about it.

When the first few shots began, Miss. Dunwoodie described them as coming very
suddenly; there were several of them [shots] very quickly, and in fact I think my very
first thought was that it was some kind of stun gun or something because it was so
fast and then when I saw the blood I realised that that wasnt the case. There was a
break and I have a memory of there being more shots after I had left the carriage in
fact. And there ended this witness testimony with points of relevance.

POINTS OF RELEVANCE Anna Dunwoodie / WITNESS YD


Train arrived into Stockwell station at 10:00 a.m.
Train parked in Stockwell station for a while
She sat one seat closer to the victim (diagram at the inquest was incorrect)
Surveillance officer codenamed Ivor sat next to her on her left (Ivor is
not shown on the diagrams)
The witness, Mr. de Menezes and Ivor had been seated facing the platform
Ivor wore jeans, a pale denim jacket, a baseball cap and had a rucksack
Ivor rushed to the double doors and shouted there he is or this is it
Witness thought the group of heavily built men Ivor shouted to were a gang
She saw a gun pressed to the victims neck
The victim closed his eyes and looked almost calm
Several shots were fired very suddenly
Upon leaving the train carriage she heard more shots being fired
Case-X / Page 38

Simon Dixon / WITNESS YF 45


Simon Dixon also appeared at the inquest the same day as the previous witness had.
The IPCC Report has this witness down as WITNESS YF.

In the diagram, Mr. Dixon is depicted as being seated further away from Miss.
Dunwoodie, Mr. de Menezes and Ivor.

Witness stated he also got on the train at Tooting Bec station (Northern Line) which
would have been at the same time Miss. Dunwoodie got on the train; around 09:46
a.m. He seated himself a seat second from the end of the carriage with his back to
the platform at Stockwell station. He stated the train stopped at Stockwell station,
the doors opened, and it was held there for three or five minutes before he looked
over his right shoulder towards the platform and saw four men who appeared to
have just emerged from the concourse at the foot of the escalators coming on to the
platform. He immediately recognised them as being police officers because one
of them, he said, was wearing a chequered cap and held a submachine gun like
which airport security officers are equipped with.

WITNESS DIXON Well, the next definite thing I saw was a movement of
somebody being dragged to the floor in the carriage, so I didnt see anything in
between, I dont think, between the men entering the carriage and this other
image that I describe of somebody being pushed to the floor and surrounded
by men with guns.

We could pinpoint Mr. Dixon describing Ivor being pushed to the floor, but
another SFO Black Special Firearms Officer (codenamed C5) testified that he
grabbed hold of Ivor and forced him to the ground, and pointed his pistol at his
head before Ivor identified himself as a police officer. 46 Only C5 forced Ivor
to the floor, and only C5 pointed his gun at Ivor. So who was the man Mr.
Dixon saw being pushed to the floor and surrounded by men with guns?

Was it Mr. de Menezes? No, because Ivor had pinned Mr. de Menezes back into
his seat where he was shot. As Mr. de Menezes fell to the ground, further shots
were fired at him by SFO Black Special Firearms Officer codenamed C12, which

45
Mr. Dixon mentioned at the inquest that he had been unsure at the time if he should call the police when he
arrived home but was advised by a friend of his who was a BBC journalist to call the police.
46
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
Case-X / Page 39

was revealed through his statement at the inquest: The male [Mr. de Menezes]
fell towards the floor, as he did so, I fired again.

Coroner Wright asked Mr. Dixon if he saw handguns. The answer was no. And so
this question comes up: Could a machine pistol. . .and set on auto have been the
only weapon used?

POINTS OF RELEVANCE Simon Dixon / WITNESS YF


Witness was seated a seat second from the end of the carriage
He sat with his back to the platform
Within three or five minutes after entering Stockwell station, he saw four
men who he immediately recognised as police; they were wearing
chequered caps and held submachine guns
Witness saw somebody dragged to the floor and surrounded by men with
guns
He did not see handguns

Robert Preston / WITNESS YG

Another witness, Robert Preston, also on


the train that morning was called to testify.
He was termed as WITNESS YG in the
IPCC Report. He said he boarded the train
at 09:55 a.m. from Clapham Common
(Northern Line). When shown the carriage
diagram, he did not remember anyone
sitting next to him as depicted in the
diagram. Mr. Preston had very little recollection of the event that took place on
the train mostly referring to his old statements taken in 2005, but the entire event
-the shooting and killing of Mr. de Menezes- was quick taking no more than 40
seconds.

As the witness left the carriage, he heard loud bangs and first thought they were
bombs (in the plural). As the mind processed the events of the day influenced by
mainstream media coverage, Mr. Preston realized that what he had heard were gun
shots and not bombs (in the plural).
Case-X / Page 40

The man who caught Mr. Prestons attention was the Asian man who came
through the double doors on his right. He seemed to be wearing a lot of very
baggy clothing, either that or he was very large. The body structure of this man
had also been described in such a way by Miss. Dunwoodie when she said, he
had [a] broad build, and so he took up quite a lot of space in the seat.

Mr. Preston stated: Since this incident, I have seen pictures of the Asian male but
I didnt recognise him from these pictures. He was referring to pictures of Mr. de
Menezes that had been plastered on television screens and in the newspapers,
which were not the individual he termed as being the Asian man who caught his
attention and was shot and killed.

The witness was shown still images from Stockwell station CCTV footage that
depicted Mr. de Menezes before passing through the ticket barrier. The witness
did not recognize Mr. de Menezes as the person he saw who he termed the Asian
man. So logic tells us that one simple procedure could have cleared up this
misidentification, if you will, in order Mr. Preston positively identify who it was he
was referring to. He could have been shown additional still images from Stockwell
station CCTV footage that depicted Ivor either passing through the ticket
barrier or going down the escalator behind Mr. de Menezes. This simple procedure
was not thought relevant.

HILLIARD QC 47 Thats a picture of Mr. de Menezes just before hes going


down the escalator, all right?
WITNESS PRESTON Yeah.
HILLIARD QC If we just go above that and to the middle, there is a picture
from behind, and thats his denim jacket that he has on.
WITNESS PRESTON Okay.
HILLIARD QC Now you see those pictures, and as I say, I dont know what
ones you saw afterwards, but does that bring the man you saw back at all or not?
WITNESS PRESTON No, not at all.

47
Nicholas Hilliard QC was Council to the inquest.
Case-X / Page 41

POINTS OF RELEVANCE Robert Preston / WITNESS YG


Witness boarded the train 09:55 a.m. from Clapham Common
He did not remember anyone sitting next to him as depicted in the diagram
shown to him (diagram at the inquest was incorrect)
The entire event -the shooting and killing of Mr. de Menezes- took no more
than 40 seconds
Witness heard loud bangs as he left the carriage; thought they were bombs (in
the plural)
His attention was caught by an Asian man coming through the double
doors; the Asian man wore a lot of very baggy clothing, either that or he
was very large
Saw pictures of Mr. de Menezes but did not recognise him as being the Asian
man with the baggy clothing

Mark Whitby / WITNESS YH


The next witness to be called at the inquest was Mark Whitby, referred to as
WITNESS YH in the IPCC Report. This witness said he arrived at Stockwell
station not long before 10:00 a.m. When he went down the escalators, he found the
train in question was already there with its doors open. Upon being shown the
diagram of the inside carriage, he agreed he was seated to the right of the second set
of double doors.

It should be pointed out, Mr. Whitby is the only individual who tells of a separate set
of events from other witnesses. This is what he said to Coroner and Jury:

WITNESS WHITBY My attention was drawn to my right, to the next set of


double doors and I saw an Asian guy [Ivor] come on to the train first. It
seemed like he was being pursued by a group of other men, and I saw a hand
go out and push him, he looked petrified and I saw the hand push him to the
floor, and then a couple of people sort of jump on him to pin him down.

Mr. Whitby continued to state, that since the event, he came to recognize that the
man he saw being pushed to the ground was the surveillance officer codenamed
Ivor. He said this pushing to the floor was done so the firearms officers behind
Ivor could get a clear view/shot of Mr. de Menezes. But this afterthought did not
Case-X / Page 42

coincide with what he had previously said; and that was, that Ivor was pushed to
the ground and jumped on to pin him down.

If the officers behind Ivor were pushing him to the ground to get him out of the
way, then they would not have also jumped on him to pin him down. At least this
is what a logical individual would assume.

WITNESS WHITBY . . .throughout all of this [commotion] I didnt see Jean


Charles [de Menezes] at all from where I was sitting, what with the sort of scrum
in that area of the train. I couldnt see through to Jean Charles [de Menezes]
where he was sitting on that side. But I saw him lean down. There was just
bodies everywhere. He [C12] fired five times. I saw the gun recoil five times,
smelt Cordite, and I thought it was at that time I had better get off. It sort of
hit home, you know.

The smell of Cordite after a shot is fired, as Mr. Whitby stated he detected, is more
unlikely to have been detected; Cordite has not been used since WWII. It is
referenced in fiction, but it is an erroneous reference just to indicate the recent firing
of weapons. 48

Mr. Whitby either watched too much CSI or read too many old detective novels. Of
course, if he was correct about detecting Cordite, that would mean that these officers
were using old weaponry.

Mr. Whitby then stated he only saw one officer fire shots: I only saw that; the guy
who had the black automatic. He was the only one I saw firing shots, and I didnt
see any other guns. The witness was describing an automatic weapon which is a one
trigger pull with a lot of rounds.

Half way up the escalators, Mr. Whitby heard more shots coming from the area he
had left. But there was definitely a gap between the first fires and then about 30
seconds -maybe 20, 30 seconds later- you know, getting up the stairs, distinctly heard
another three because it stopped us in our tracks.

48
Joe Moore: The Smell of Cordite in the Air of Inaccuracy. March 21, 2009. By John Ramsey Miller. Web.
2017. < https://killzoneblog.com/2009/03/smell-of-cordite-in-air-of-inaccuracy.html >
Case-X / Page 43

QC Gibbs (representing Ivor) asked Mr. Whitby if he saw Ivor getting shot. The
answer was yes.

QC GIBBS I wonder whether I have understood it wrong: Your impression


was that he [Ivor] was being shot?
WITNESS WHITBY Yeah. Yeah. Because he was bundled out the way.

POINTS OF RELEVANCE Mark Whitby / WITNESS YH


Witness boarded the train at Stockwell station not long before 10:00 a.m.
He saw an Asian guy who was being pursued by a group of other men;
the Asian guy was pushed to the floor and pinned down by a couple of
people
Upon realizing he was describing Ivor the surveillance officer, the witness
tried to reason why the pushing and pinning to the floor happened: To get
a clear view/shot of Mr. de Menezes. If true, then we must question how
the group of men knew who Mr. de Menezes was, being that they were not
part of the surveillance team
Witness never saw the victim; only that he leaned down
He saw one officer fire five times from a black automatic then detected
Cordite
When he left the carriage -20, 30 seconds later- he heard 3 more shots
fired; a total of 8 shots

Quincy Akpesiri Oji - train driver


Turning to Mr. Quincy Akpesiri Oji who was the driver that morning of this
Underground train, his statement was read at the inquest. He got to Stockwell
station just before 10:00 a.m. When boarding the train, a red light was on indicating
the train should remain parked on the tracks. Mr. Oji then saw a group of men
who he believed were fanatics.

TRAIN DRIVER STATEMENT READ I saw one of the men with a large
gun shooting and I thought they were fanatics and they were shooting at people
on the carriage. I have run [sic] into the dark tunnel. I stood there with my back
against the wall for about 20 seconds. Someone flashed a light into the tunnel.
I said, please do not shoot, I am the driver.
Case-X / Page 44

POINTS OF RELEVANCE Quincy Akpesiri Oji


Witness reached Stockwell station just before 10:00 a.m.
Walking to the train, a red light indicated the train to remain parked
He saw a group of fanatics who were shooting at people on the carriage
He hid in the tunnel
It should be mentioned, that since 2000, all personnel on the London Underground
were entitled to have a pseudonym on their badge instead of their real name. 49 It
is therefore unsure if this driver (Quincy Akpesiri Oji) ever had his real name
released to the media or if his real name was used at the inquest when his statement
was read.

As an aftermath, when a passenger gets into trouble (for any reason) with a
London Underground staff member, they have no protection in a Court of Law,
being these staff members have fake names on their identification badges.

The responsibility of a train driver is immense, from getting all passengers to their
destination without causing an accident, to keeping all passengers safe whilst in
the carriages. What this staff member of the London Underground did, was (a)
leave his passengers who were in danger, and (b), scurried into a dark tunnel to
hide whilst a group of fanatics began shooting at people on the carriage.

49
The Guardian. Diane Taylor: London Underground staff use fake names on ID badges for security.
Uploaded December 25, 2015.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/25/london-underground-staff-use-fake-names-id-badges-
security>
Case-X / Page 45

FURTHER DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE

WITNESS C2 I have left my G36K and the grenade box behind, [in the car,]
although I had one still on me, and I ran towards the [tube] entrance.
CORONER WRIGHT You had one grenade, did you?
WITNESS C2 Yes, sir.

DE MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, October 28, 2008.

Delta 9 (D9)
Looking at inquest testimony of a witness codenamed Delta or D9 and questioned
by Hilliard QC Council to the inquest, there is some relevance to be detected. The
first would be that QC Hilliard made an error as to where the shooting and killing of
Mr. de Menezes took place; he was not corrected by Coroner nor by witness. We
shall give our readers the entire section for clarity purposes.

HILLIARD QC Did you then drive into Binfield Road and stop there?
WITNESS D9 Yes, sir.
HILLIARD QC I think you put on your blue chequered cap, is that right,
marked police?
WITNESS D9 Yes, I did, sir.
HILLIARD QC You were armed, is this right, with a Glock pistol?
WITNESS D9 Yes, sir.
HILLIARD QC I think you had heard on the radio that the man had gone
down towards platform 1? [This is incorrect. The victim was shot in a train
carriage parked on Platform 2.]
WITNESS D9 Yes, I did, sir. I should also state that I was armed with a G3K
which is an assault rifle.

The other relevant point that needs to be mentioned, is how this witness mentioned
something no other witness we heard from mention.
Case-X / Page 46

HILLIARD QC So you have explained that you are approaching the doors to
the train, you can hear more shouts; correct?
WITNESS D9 Yes, sir.
HILLIARD QC Then you were telling us that Mr. de Menezes suddenly stood
up?
WITNESS D9 Yes, sir.
HILLIARD QC And then?
WITNESS D9 And tried to get away, but he was quickly grabbed hold of by
plain-clothes officers.

What D9 was referring to, that Mr. de Menezes tried to get away was not witnessed
by previous passenger witnesses we heard from earlier. But even if the victim was
seen as trying to get away, and he was supposed to be carrying a bomb, would it
not have been to his interest to trigger that bomb then and there as opposed to
fleeing the area?

Further down in this witness testimony, D9 described two SFO black team members
were on either side of the victim and one officer in front of him: Charlie 2 was on
the males, Mr. de Menezes right-hand side and Charlie 12 was on the left, and the
other male was to the front of Mr. de Menezes.

RIGHT SIDE FRONT LEFT SIDE


C2 VICTIM C12
Ivor

The autopsy report refers to all shots being fired from Mr. de Menezes right side.
But if we consider what D9 was referring to, then this would mean that C2 had been
doing all the shooting who was on Mr. de Menezes right side. This however turns
out not to be as C2 and C12 remembered it.

Charlie 2/C2
Portrayed in the still image that follows, C2 is seen going down the escalators behind
his colleague codenamed C12. The officer we are dealing with (C2) appears to be
well in his fifties. Mr. Whitby, the witness we met earlier, stated all officers he saw
were in their thirties.
Case-X / Page 47

C2 had been interviewed on November 21, 2005, by the IPCC. However, he did not
intend to answer any questions and referred the IPCC to his original statement that
was made on Saturday, July 23, 2005, at 14:57 p.m.

C2 stated in his original statement that as he ran towards the station, he climbed
over the ticket barrier and when confronted by underground staff, he shouted armed
police get back. He then ran down the escalator (still image shows C12 running
down ahead of C2) and was having constant direction of where to go by onsite
surveillance officers who were already there.

Remember, Ivor (who is identified by witnesses as being an Asian man) is already


seated to Mr. de Menezes left next to Miss Dunwoodie; a glass panel to his right.

When C2 entered the train carriage, he reported that a surveillance officer pointed
at what was described as an Asian male (Jean Charles DE MENEZES); the man who
was sitting in the second seat away from the glass position. Again, it is important to
stress that witnesses identified this Asian male as being Ivor, dressed in a bulky
jacket and holding a small rucksack.

C2 continued to state, that the man got up and advanced towards the officers with
his hands down by his side. The surveillance officer (Hotel 3) turned and grabbed
the man and pushed him back into the seat. It is noticeable that the codename
Ivor is taken out of the equation and substituted with a new codename, Hotel 3.
We now know that Ivor had two codenames.
Case-X / Page 48

Mr. de Menezes, seen in the above blurry CCTV still image at Stockwell station on
Friday, July 22, 2005, wears denim and a black T-shirt. He holds a newspaper behind
him; does not have a rucksack.

Ivor seen (again from blurry CCTV still images) at Stockwell station on Friday,
July 22, 2005, wears a denim jacket and a small rucksack carried on his left shoulder.

As for C2 and his inquest statement (October 28, 2008) further details are revealed.
For one, he tells Coroner and Jury that even though he had his gun in his holster
belt, he also had on himself a grenade.

WITNESS C2 I have left my G36K 50 and the grenade box behind, [in the car,]
although I had one still on me, and I ran towards the [tube] entrance.

50
Wikipedia article. Heckler & Koch G36. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Web. 2017.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_G36 >
Case-X / Page 49

CORONER WRIGHT You had one grenade, did you?


WITNESS C2 Yes, sir.

A grenade, being a possibility to be used within an underground public transport


system raises eyebrows. It is termed public transport because it is paid by the
public not wishing grenades to be used either purposely or accidently.

C2 then goes on to say that he personally did not announce his arrival onto the train
carriage by shouting armed police. His reason being:

WITNESS C2 I believed that he [the victim] was a suicide bomber. If I


shouted, Armed police too early, then he would be alert to our presence,
possibly he could initiate a device, so at that stage thats my reason.

His colleague (C12) however differed and was adamant that he called out armed
police as he pointed his gun in Mr. de Menezes face no less.

Though C2 did not remember at the inquest how many shots he fired, he was told
that it was six. He did not disagree.

C2 then mentioned that his gun had some stove pipe stoppage happen to it, no
doubt from bad cleaning and/or maintenance of the firearm. As we understand his
testimony (excerpt given below) C2 fired six shots, then the gun went into
malfunction.

Now, as C2 will state, he had the collective or calmness to get rid of the
malfunction, feed another live round and continue firing. This would clearly mean
more than six shots were fired from C2s weapon regardless of his agreement that it
had only been six.

WITNESS C2 The important thing here is to remain calm, so I had to stop,


tap the magazine, make sure it was seated properly, look at the slide, identify
the problem, pull it sharply to the rear, get rid of the problem, as it were, and
feed another live round.
CORONER WRIGHT So you actually reload the gun manually?
Case-X / Page 50

WITNESS C2 Yes, sir, I cleared the stoppage manually and then I carried on
firing.

DE MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, October 28, 2008.

When asked why he shot so many times, C2 stated he was not sure he could fire into
the brain stem (for immediate incapacitation) and so continued to fire. Just twenty-
six hours later (Saturday, July 23rd at midday) C2 was informed that he had shot an
innocent man.

WITNESS C2 I was deeply shocked. I just couldnt believe it. This was against
everything that I had ever trained for. As a firearms instructor and as an SFO, I
knew that its an individual officers decision to fire a weapon and it was my
responsibility and I killed an innocent man. And I think about that every day.

DE MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, October 28, 2008.

Charlie 12/C12
C12 was interviewed by the IPCC members on November 21, 2005. He also stated
he preferred his initial statement be considered, which was taken Saturday, July 23,
2005. No time specified.

C12 noted that as he was getting closer to Stockwell Underground station, he was
able to hear that the suspect [de Menezes] was acting nervously. Being this as it
may, C12 claimed he was the first specialist firearms officer to reach the station; he
jumped over the barrier; was challenged by staff who he pushed away and he drew
his handgun before running down the escalator. As he was running down, he could
hear armed police being shouted from behind him.

In the blurry still image from Stockwell station CCTV footage, it is evident that at
least four other officers are at the station when C12 is ready to jump the ticket barrier
at 10:03:03 a.m. He could therefore not have been the first to arrive inside, and may
have been referring to arriving first outside the station.
Case-X / Page 51

In the still image below, one can focus on C12 and what it is he is holding in his left
hand. It is a long object. It does not look like clothing, because it is rigid. It could
have been a long weapon in its black casing. Besides, if C2 behind him was carrying
a grenade, the long object is anyones guess as to what it was.

Coming down to platform 2, both C2 and C12 were directed further along and as
they reached the double doors of the train, a male [Ivor] standing by the doorway
gave a clear indication with his arm and said thats him.

C12 stated that an Asian man (identified by witnesses as being Ivor) looked in his
direction and stood up. The man advanced towards him. C12 then said he shouted
armed police and raised his weapon. Charlie 12 stated the man started to close
him down and he thought the man was going to detonate. He believed that he had
Case-X / Page 52

no alternative but to shoot him before he killed. C12 was unsure how many times
he fired.

At the inquest, QC Mansfield went into some detail on how C12 could have mistaken
Mr. de Menezes wearing a bulky denim jacket. This was also a description given by
C2. But something else was revealed which is worth adding, and that is that C12 had
a snapshot of Mr. de Menezes whilst the latter was seated inside the train carriage.

WITNESS C12 The appearance I saw and the snapshot I had of him when he
was sitting down, that the appearance was of a bulky thing.
MANSFIELD QC Why didnt you just say in the statement, as you put it to
the jury on Friday, he was wearing a blue denim jacket which gave the
appearance in the snapshot I had that it was bulky? You dont say any of that
there, do you?
WITNESS C12 No, I dont.

Having a snapshot of a seated Jean Charles de Menezes would mean either the train
carriage CCTV was functioning or any number of individuals on the carriage could
have taken an image of him and sent it via mobile to C12. The latter did state he had
the snapshot; he did not say it was shown to him. Of course, using the term
snapshot could also have meant a memory he had of how Mr. de Menezes was
seated. It was not made clear by any council, and so we leave the subject where it is.

Further into the inquest, C12 corroborated a statement he had made that he had
shouted armed police as he put the weapon close to Mr. de Menezes face: I
remember looking back on why I challenged him and realising that I had made a
potentially disastrous mistake, and I certainly remember that. . .After I issued the
challenge of, Armed police, it was his [de Menezes] continued movement towards
me that I thought this is almost like the point of no return, this is it now, somethings
going to happen. 51

And then the same officer tells QC Mansfield including Coroner and Jury, that he
continued to fire shots at Mr. de Menezes because he detected movement; as
though Mr. de Menezes was still alive.

51
DE MENEZES Inquest. Monday, October 27, 2008.
Case-X / Page 53

MANSFIELD QC Why do you continue firing once he falls to the floor?


WITNESS C12 Because I detected movement.
MANSFIELD QC You are quite clear about that, are you?
WITNESS C12 It might have been movement from myself, or whatever, but
he was still [alive?] there was movement there, and I had to, to stop this bomb
from going off, I had to make sure that life was extinct, I had to incapacitate
him instantaneously and because I saw the movement, the continued
movement, I continued to fire.
MANSFIELD QC The continued movement, you are clear about this, are
you?

Though C12 insisted upon seeing the person he shot in a continued movement,
and had to keep shooting even when that person fell to the ground, Dr. Shorrocks
at the inquest categorically stated it was not possible Mr. de Menezes was alive at
that point in time.

CORONER WRIGHT But whatever the sequence may be, once you get to
the first penetrative injury to the skull, was Mr. de Menezes likely to have
survived that first one at all?
WITNESS DR. SHORROCKS No. Pathologists will never say never, nor will
any doctors, but you can survive a single gunshot wound to the head if it goes
into a part of your brain which is not desperately important. I have several of
those. But in this case, they went in around the region above and behind the
ear, and they went through the centre of the brain. In this particular case,
excluding those that nearly missed, any one of those bullets, in my view, would
have killed him. So choose any one you like, and it is my view that it would have
killed him in this case.
***
CORONER WRIGHT And in effect because of the nature of the injury,
death would have been instantaneous?
WITNESS DR. SHORROCKS Yes.
Case-X / Page 54

CORONER WRIGHT Thank you.


WITNESS DR. SHORROCKS The other thing is, not only would death have
been instantaneous, but clearly once the first bullet hit his head and went in, he
would have had no perception of what was going on.

DE MENEZES Inquest. Wednesday, November 5, 2008.

No one can draw any conclusion on what went on that morning, and we only refer
to events inside Stockwell Underground station. It would be a nightmare to try to
unravel what went on at Scotia Road.

So sometimes we read how an armed officer (C5) grabbed hold of Ivor and forced
him to the ground, and pointed his pistol at his head before Ivor identified himself
as a police officer.

But then comes along a witness on the train who said he saw an Asian guy [Ivor]
come on to the train first. It seemed like he was being pursued by a group of other
men, was pushed to the ground and then a couple of people sort of jump on him
to pin him down.

Many other witnesses on the train reported a similar scene, that Ivor was mistaken
for a bomber and tackled; Ivor had a rucksack (from CCTV it is portrayed as being
on his left shoulder); Ivor wore denims; and Ivor was Asian looking, though his
ethnicity was not. One wonders if Ivor was lucky enough to make it out alive from
that carriage. At least one person the public knows of did not.

It is apparent that the actions of the surveillance officers who boarded the
carriage caught the attention of the other passengers. Some witnesses refer to a
man of Asian appearance carrying a rucksack. Although not of Asian ethnicity
it would appear that they are referring to Ivor.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

Ivor thankfully did make it out alive -regardless what is thought of his actions-
since he was present at the inquest on Wednesday, October 22, 2008.
Case-X / Page 55

Charlie 5
This firearms officer was interviewed by the IPCC on November 16, 2005, but
declined to answer any questions, and referred the IPCC to his original statement
that was made on Saturday, July 23, 2005. No time specified.

He was on the train when he saw a male wearing a baseball hat (Ivor) lurching
towards another male who was either standing or attempting to stand. Charlie
5 then saw his colleagues Charlie 2 and 12 running across the carriage towards
the scuffle. It is at this point that Charlie 5 states he heard shouts of armed
police. He then heard several shots being fired. Charlie 5 actually grabbed hold
of the man wearing the baseball cap, [Ivor,] and pushed his pistol at his head,
to which the man shouted I am a police officer.

Charlie 5 chronology
Sees Ivor lurch towards the victim
Sees C2 and C12 run towards Ivor and Mr. de Menezes
Hears shouts of armed police
Hears several shots
Grabs Ivor and pushes his pistol at Ivors head

The above scenario is inconsistent, because we are told that at the moment C2 and
C12 were already shooting at Mr. de Menezes as he is being pinned down by Ivor,
C5 grabs Ivor and nearly shoots him.
Case-X / Page 56

10:08 a.m. reports show subject has been shot.

What was required at that specific time, as seen in the above excerpt, is unknown.
But one minute later, whatever it was, was now on scene.

10:16 a.m. Stockwell tube was evacuated and shut down to the public.

10:17 a.m. Paramedics and a nursing student had been allowed onto the crime scene
after it had been secured.

10:25 a.m. DCI C entered the crime scene and was given a report by an officer
codenamed Terry:

He [Terry] stated that the man [de Menezes] had been identified by
surveillance, leaning on a yellow upright pole near the double doors of the
carriage. He was challenged but did not comply and the officers thought he was
going to escape. As a result 9-10 shots were fired at the suspect.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest Transcripts & Evidence


Case-X / Page 57

The crime scene began to be photographed and videotaped; none of this material
has reached the public domain and is not expected to do so. Jean Charles de Menezes
was legally pronounced dead at 10:30 a.m.

It was not until 11:20 a.m., a little over an hour after the shooting, that the authorities
requested profiles of occupants of those in Scotia Road flats; something that had
apparently been requested three hours earlier, at 08:20 a.m.

13:33 p.m. The Home Office Pathologist Dr. Kenneth Shorrocks arrived at the
crime scene and was briefed upon his arrival with the following information:

This mans death occurred as part of the emergency relating to the planting of
bombs on the public transport in London. On the morning of 22 July 2005 he
was pursued by armed police officers as a result of surveillance. He was followed
into STOCKWELL Tube Station where he vaulted over the ticket barrier. He
ran downstairs and onto a tube train where he stumbled. The officers then
immobilised him and a number of shots were fired. At present time I am not
sure as to any further details.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

The post-mortem was held on Saturday, July 23, 2005, with Dr. Shorrocks carrying
that duty and responsibility. Though we will be going into the post mortem further
down in some detail, we can inform our readers at this stage that an amount of
cocaine had been traced in Mr. de Menezes probably taken between 6 and 12 hours
before death. This gave an authoritative advantage when it was stated that it is
reasonable to assume that he [de Menezes] may have been under the influence of the
drug at the material time. 52

52
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
Case-X / Page 58

21:45 p.m. It was reported and in full recognition of the police that the Anti-
Terrorist Branch did not consider Jean Charles DE MENEZES to be linked to the
events of 21 July. 53

After the shooting incident, both C2 and C12 officers were taken to Leman Street
Police Station. It was there, that both were seen to have had blood on their faces,
in their hair and on their clothes. After becoming anxious and showing signs of
stress they requested to take a shower immediately. This was allowed by the Post-
Incident Manager. Thus, no forensic evidence was taken from the officers person,
only from their clothing.

53
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
Case-X / Page 59

AUTOPSY REPORT of Jean Charles de Menezes

Death will have occurred instantly on sustaining the head injuries. No first aid
or medical treatment, no matter how promptly and expertly administered, could
have improved the outcome.

DE MENEZES Post-Mortem Report SC:57/2005/KS.rl


July 27, 2005.

The autopsy of Jean Charles de Menezes was held at the public mortuary in
Greenwich on July 23, 2005, the following day of his death. It began at 09:25 a.m. 54
and concluded at 13:05 p.m.; a duration of 3 hours. [See footnote 53 for more
details] The leading pathologist was Doctor Kenneth Shorrocks (Home Office
Pathologist) who two months later was mentioned by the press, not in regard to this
case, but another case for altering a post-mortem report. 55

On the cover page of the autopsy report, it reads the police (CAD 3086/3703)
reported Oval tube station as being the place where the victim met his death. Oval
tube station has its address at 318, Kennington Park Road. The public was informed
by the authorities that Mr. de Menezes had been shot dead at Stockwell tube station,
the address being 256, Clapham Road.

Though the error can be seen to have been corrected by hand, it is unknown why it
occurred at all on an official autopsy report. Should those who corrected the error
were particular, then another correction (place of death) should also have been dealt

54
The cover page of the autopsy report reads the autopsy began at 08:00 a.m. If the autopsy commenced at
08:00 a.m., then the duration till 13:05 p.m. would be 5 hours and 5 minutes.
55
Dr. Kenneth Shorrocks was reported to be facing a General Medical Council disciplinary hearing for altering a
post-mortem report in another case that led to a surgeon being accused of manslaughter after a patient bled
to death. The article that held this report in the Daily Mail is now unavailable. Web. 2017.
< http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-361315/De-Menezes-pathologist-GMC.html >
Case-X / Page 60

with further on in the report where it continues to erroneously state Mr. de Menezes
was shot at Oval tube station. In addition, the time of death is blank and should have
been written in, since the police were informing Dr. Shorrocks at this point.

The autopsy report states early how two S019 [firearms] officers entered the tube
train and when the suspect was identified he apparently leapt towards them. The
use of apparently tends to lean towards assumption as opposed to recording from
evidence. This assumption shows circumstantial evidence was placed within an
official autopsy report.

Further on in the report, and though the place of death this time is correctly inserted,
there is now an error with the time of death.

The IPCC Stockwell One Report, including the authorities and inquest transcripts,
have Mr. de Menezes shot dead at 10:06 a.m. The inquest announced a total of nine
shots were fired, of which seven entered the victims head; one round misfired, and
one round missed altogether.

Once Mr. de Menezes had been shot through the head with seven 9mm hollow
point 124-grain bullets, being this ammunition was to incapacitate immediately,
it would have been impossible for Mr. de Menezes to be alive at 10:06 a.m. and expire
24 minutes later at 10:30 a.m., as the autopsy report claimed. But another source also
claimed that Mr. de Menezes was alive after being shot:

MANSFIELD QC Why do you continue firing once he falls to the floor?


WITNESS C12 Because I detected movement.
MANSFIELD QC You are quite clear about that, are you?
WITNESS C12 It might have been movement from myself, or whatever, but
he was still [alive?] there was movement there, and I had to, to stop this bomb
from going off, I had to make sure that life was extinct, I had to incapacitate
him instantaneously and because I saw the movement, the continued
movement, I continued to fire.
Case-X / Page 61

MANSFIELD QC The continued movement, you are clear about this, are
you?

IPCC Stockwell One Report

Further down, in the HISTORY section of the autopsy report, there is written
assumption and false information ending with how unsure the author of the report
is, though it is signed.

he was pursued
Special Branch surveillance officers not once mentioned they pursued Mr. de
Menezes. The latter was followed, discreetly, regardless of the outcome.

he vaulted over the ticket barrier


This turned out not to be true, and it was known not to be true by the date this
autopsy report was prepared on July 27th.

he ran
CCTV footage shows a calm Mr. de Menezes walking down the escalators at
Stockwell Underground station. 56 Further evidence supporting this comes from the
IPCC Stockwell One Report: Mr. DE MENEZES is seen on the CCTV to select a
copy of the Metro newspaper. He then walked to the ticket barrier, used an Oyster
card and walked through the turnstile. He then turned left towards the escalator to

56
Youtube account ltroonster1. Video titled: Jean Charles De Menezes CCTV Footage & The Real Story.
Uploaded July 17, 2009. Web. 2017. < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GU7nL0A6ASM>
Case-X / Page 62

the Northern line and walked down on its left hand side. There are no recordings,
which cover the lower end of the escalator or platform, the relevant tapes, when
seized by the MPS, were found to be blank.

it appears
When someone states it appears, it is conjecture and not fact or evidence. It is the
opinion of the author of this brief history section in an official autopsy report.

I am not sure
Though the author states he is not sure of further details, he adds what appears to
be a signature in an official autopsy document.

At the inquest, Dr. Shorrocks mentioned that


he had got the information for the HISTORY
section from the same source the media had got
it from; and that was from the officers present
at the crime scene. What was happening all
that time was that there were a number of
officers present, and we talked through it, and
this was what was told to me. 57

The following day, which was the autopsy examination, Dr. Shorrocks asked the
officers attending if the story of what he had been told at the crime scene had
changed. The answer was no, there is nothing, nothing has changed overnight in
terms of that story. The officers attending the autopsy can be seen in the above list.

The post-mortem report states how Dr. Shorrocks was called to the crime scene,
and in attendance of investigating officers, arrived at 1330hrs and leaving at about
1500hrs. This would mean that Mr. de Menezes body had been lying on a carriage
floor from 10:06 a.m., and still there by 3 oclock in the afternoon when the
pathologist left.

This alone is a duration of five hours where a dead body is constantly exposed to the
train environment, the temperature environment, and the individuals surrounding
the body. By this time, the body would have already been in a stage of Rigor Mortis
and decomposition. Any type of forensic analysis that could have been gathered by
Dr. Shorrocks and his team would have been pointless. This tells us that some other
57
DE MENEZES Inquest. Tuesday, December 2, 2008.
Case-X / Page 63

forensic team had to have come in much earlier to work on the crime scene and
body. This latter team was never called to testify at the inquest.

Regardless what was thought, told and acted upon, the 1949 Geneva Conventions is
explicit when stating that prevailing forces must search for the [enemys] dead and
prevent their being despoiled.

Post-Mortem Report SC:57/2005/KS.rl

Distorted metal jacket


The inquest (September 26, 2008) referred to how many shots were fired at Mr. de
Menezes and where in the body they were received. We give our readers that
particular section: Two specialist firearms officers of the Metropolitan Police under
Operation Theseus 2 commanded by Commander John McDowell (Metropolitan
Police, Special Operations (SO13) Anti-Terrorist Command), fired at the victim
from a range of between 1 centimetre and 8 centimetres. A total of nine shots were
fired, of which seven entered the victims head; one round misfired, and one round
missed altogether.

Now, the autopsy revealed that there is extensive bruising in the muscles of the left
shoulder girdle, from where a distorted metal jacket and core fragment were
recovered. This would mean that the victim had also been shot in the shoulder. It
was not mentioned if this shot came from the front or from the back, only that the
bullet had entered from the right and exited to the left.

This, after it had been continuously reported how suicide bombers should be shot
in the head (for immediate incapacitation) and not anywhere near the upper body in
case the bullet triggered any bomb strapped to the torso, as Mr. Blair also stated:
There is no point shooting at someones chest because that is where the bomb is
Case-X / Page 64

likely to be. 58 These additional shots bring us directly to what at least one witness
stated; and that is, that more than nine shots were fired:

The shots were evenly spaced with about three seconds between the shots, for
the first few shots, then a gap of a little longer, then the shots were evenly spaced
again. . . I would say there was 10 or 11 shots fired. The shots were evenly
spaced out (timewise).

IPCC Stockwell One Report

As a result of additional shots to the upper body, the autopsy revealed it is unlikely
that the bullet that entered the upper part of the trunk (wound no.1) contributed
significantly to causing death. It was not excluded however, the possibility that
passage of the bullet close to the spine, if it was the first shot to be fired, could have
caused a degree of paralysis.

This bullet in the upper torso excludes those reports that Mr. de Menezes was
suspected of being a suicide bomber. We are not alone in stating this: But it is true
that eleven shots at point blank range -marksmen missing altogether in three cases
with bullets lodged in the carriage, plus another shot to the shoulder- suggests that
not only was there deliberate intent to kill, but they knew full well there was zero risk
of an explosion. 59

At the time, specifically one day after the incident, Mr. Watson of Prisonplanet
reported the following: After this website [PRISONPLANET] and others pointed
out the contradiction of shooting a man who you think might have a bomb in the
torso area, the official story changed and now they claim they shot him in the head
eight times. We received e-mails accusing us of sloppy reporting for saying de
Menezes was not shot in the head. Our original article was written on Friday night.
At that point, every eyewitness the media quoted said that he was not shot in the
head, we merely related these accounts. It seems that the story was changed because
people made the logical conclusion that the secret police knew all along he was not

58
Ian Blair - July 24, 2005.
59
An anonymous commentator. Website. 2017. Andrew MacGregor who contributes quite a bit to this site,
reckons the anonymous author is Nobel-prize winning Robert Aumann, professor of the Jerusalem Hebrew
Universitys centre for Rationality. <http://www.takeourworldback.com/77suicidebombershoax/>
Case-X / Page 65

a suicide bomber, which is why they shot him in the torso. The story was then
changed to try and justify the death of an innocent man. 60

Dr. Shorrocks recovered 13 pieces of either bullet or bullet jacket and 17


independent projectiles (bone fragments) from inside Mr. de Menezes skull. A total
of 30 fragments.

mobile x-ray procedure

A hand-written list of six ticked subjects has been


written on the autopsy report. Apparently, Mr. de
Menezes body went under mobile x-ray procedure.
This is when the x-ray is conducted on-site and within
minutes of the procedure, facilitating any potential
need for retakes. It is not clarified where this
procedure was done.

According to the IPCC Stockwell Two Report, the London Ambulance Service
(LAS) and the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) was called to the
crime scene after the shooting. There is no additional information as to why HEMS
would have been needed, unless a body had to be taken away discreetly from the
scene by getting it to the station roof and into a helicopter. Another reason would
have been to transfer the mobile x-ray unit to the scene of the crime by helicopter
and taken back the same way.

The autopsy report also states that it was typed up on July 27th, five days after the
incident. By this time, not only did the main stream media on a global capacity know
where the victim lived -being 17, Scotia Road- but the authorities must also have had
his address in Brazil. For some unknown reason however, the autopsy report has
Address: Not known.

60
Paul Joseph Watson. London Bombing Aftermath: The Spin Continues. July 27, 2005. Web. 2017.
<http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/july2005/270705bombingaftermath.htm>
Case-X / Page 66

LAWS & ORDERS

Eight officers have been interviewed in respect of the use of the words Armed
Police. Some officers have indicated the words were used prior to Mr. DE
MENEZES being confronted but Charlie 12 [Black team Firearms Officer]
states it was not shouted by him until Mr. DE MENEZES had been confronted.
It is surprising when dealing with a suspected suicide bomber, that any police
officer would want to identify themselves as this would give the suspect the
opportunity to detonate any device.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

As we understand it at the time, there was a major debate as to what British laws
existed to protect innocent civilians from being shot dead by the police in a public
area. The debate was set on two levels.

#1
If the officers who shot Mr. de Menezes shouted out police and/or armed
police, then it would result in Mr. de Menezes being warned prior being shot dead.
If he had been warned, and considered a suicide bomber at the time, then he would
have instantly (without second thought) triggered his bomb before anyone could
have tackled him.

#2
If the officers who shot Mr. de Menezes did not give out a warning of police
and/or armed police, should this have been the case, then the result would have
been Mr. de Menezes being shot dead without any prior warning and this, as in most
civilized countries, is considered manslaughter. It would however justify those
involved that they shot without warning because they were under the impression this
was a suicide bomber who should not be confronted with a prior warning.

However, as noted earlier, the autopsy report stated Mr. de Menezes had also been
shot in the upper torso.
Case-X / Page 67

THE PASSENGERS

Ivor followed Mr. DE MENEZES onto the train. He entered a carriage in


front of him and turned right taking a seat facing the platform with a glass panel
to his right.

IPCC Stockwell One Report

The following witness statements were given to the IPCC. A diagram of where they
were seated on the train carriage has already been given.

Individual What was seen What was heard


Witness YA
(male)
A group of armed police officers. Someone said hes here;
another said get down.
The sound of gunshots.
Witness YB
(male)
Someone ran past him. Heard the word here spoken.
A man entering the carriage wearing
a red T-shirt pointed a small black
handgun to the head of a man sat
opposite. Gun was 12 inches away
from the mans head.
The man who was seated opposite wore a denim jacket and blue top, and was reaching for the
left side of his trouser waistband. Mr. de Menezes wore a black T-shirt underneath his denim
jacket, so it is unknown if this witness described blue for black or if Ivor was wearing a blue
T-shirt. Either way, no other witness corroborated this action from Mr. de Menezes: Was
reaching for the left side of his trouser waistband.
Witness then saw an additional three
armed men.
Witness YC
(female) seated to the
left of witness YB
Saw men entering the carriage Heard someone shouting get
carrying different types of firearms. out.
She saw the man sitting opposite her
with a wound behind his left ear.
Witness heard six or seven shots
being fired.
Witness YD
(female)
Saw a man with a rucksack who has Heard shouting coming from a
been described as Ivor. A man group of men at the door to the
seated two seats away had a gun to
Case-X / Page 68

his neck. The gun was pointed train carriage. Either this is it
directly into the joint between the or there he is.
mans neck and head. Then saw
flashes. Heard a quiet popping noise.
Witness YE
(male)
Saw a Police officer pointing to a Assumed a police officer say
man wearing a blue denim jacket, thats the man, thats the one
black T-shirt and jeans and had a
small rucksack. The rucksack was in
possession of Ivor.
Police officers entered and held the
man down; one officer shot four or
five times.
Witness YF
(male)
This witness saw four armed police Heard a noise then some shots.
officers who appeared to be pinning
someone to the floor. One officer
knelt down in a prone position
whilst another pointed a machine
gun at someone on the floor poised
ready to fire.
7. Witness YG
(male)
Saw an Asian man (Ivor) run into
the carriage and remained standing.
Seconds later, two or three They shouted down get down.
bulletproof vested police officers
entered the train carriage.
The bulletproof vested police Heard a number of loud bangs.
officers went directly to the
Asian man (Ivor) and tackled him
to the ground.
8. Witness YH
(male)
Heard some banging and the
words get down
Saw an Asian man (Ivor) run onto
the train wearing a thick padded coat
and pursued by three people who he
assumed to be police officers.
Asian man (Ivor) stumbles and
trips before he was bundled to the
floor by the police officers.
Two officers pinned (Ivor) down
and one leant forward and shot the
Asian male about five times.
Case-X / Page 69

9. Witness YI
(male)
Armed police officers enter the Heard shots fired almost
carriage. immediately at someone sat two
or three seats away from a
partition. Unable to distinguish
who was shot or if it was male or
female.

IPCC Report where Ivor sat:


Ivor followed Mr. DE
MENEZES onto the train. He
entered a carriage in front of him
and turned right taking a seat
facing the platform with a glass
panel to his right. 61
10. Witness YJ
(female)
A group of men enter the carriage. Heard someone shout get out.
Another group of men with their
backs turned.
One person down on the floor.
Heard two shots.
11. Witness YK
(female)
Armed men enter the train. Shots fired into the ceiling.

12. Witness YL Saw an Asian man with a rucksack.


(female) The IPCC Report stated this was
undoubtedly Ivor and she was
concerned enough to leave the
train.

She then saw three or four men run Heard six or seven loud bangs in
into the carriage. quick succession.
13. Witness YM
(male)
Heard shouting and footsteps
Between two and twelve people Heard someone shout get off.
enter the carriage.
Heard between three and ten
loud bangs.
14. Witness YN
(male)
Saw eight armed men board the Heard sounds of running and
carriage. shouting.
Heard one say dont move.
Heard a gunshot.

61
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
Case-X / Page 70

15. Witness YO
(male)
Armed police officers charge onto Heard a succession of bangs.
the train.
16. Witness YP
(male)
A man stood by the train doors Heard shouting.
shouting to someone outside.
Saw a group of between ten and Heard four or five bangs.
fifteen men enter the carriage.
17. Witness YQ
(female)
Heard a thud
Heard someone shout get off.
Heard a gunshot and then as she
ran away heard more shots.
18. Witness YR
(male)
Saw a man jump onto the train and Heard a lot of noise and shouting
thought he was being chased and coming from the concourse.
saw him stumble. This would have
been Ivor.
One man shouted get down, get
off.
Heard two bangs and decided to
leave the train. He then heard
another two bangs.
19. Witness YS
(female)
Saw a man holding the train door Heard some scuffling and then
who spoke to three men who ran heard shots.
into the carriage.
Saw a man about 15 feet away
pointing a gun downwards who fired
two more shots. The shots made
her doubt that they were police
officers and then seeing other
passengers running she left the
platform. 62
20. Witness YT
(male)
Saw what appeared to be a scuffle. Heard some shouting then heard
a loud sort of bang.
Saw a man with an outstretched arm Heard more shots.
pointing a gun at a man leaning back
against the seat or on the floor.

62
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
Case-X / Page 71

VERDICT OF THE INQUEST

The inquest ended on Tuesday, December 2, 2008, with the closing statement from
Coroner Wright at 11:30 a.m. Ten days later, on Friday, December 12, 2008, the Jury
had reached an open verdict.

Question 1
CORONER WRIGHT Did officer Charlie 12 shout the words armed police
at Mr. de Menezes before firing; yes, no or cannot decide?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY No.
Eight jury members agreed and two disagreed
Eight members of the Jury believed Mr. de Menezes was shot dead by the police without prior
warning; they did not believe C12 had warned him. It seems however that the Jury did not consider
the autopsy report that revealed Mr. de Menezes was indeed warned; not verbally but physically
when he was shot in the torso.

Question 2
CORONER WRIGHT Did Mr. de Menezes stand up from his seat before he
was grabbed in a bear hug by Ivor; yes, no or cannot decide?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, and thats unanimous.

The Jury believed Mr. de Menezes got up from his seat and was pinned back down into his seat.

Question 3
CORONER WRIGHT Did Mr. de Menezes move towards officer C12 before
he was grabbed in a bear hug by officer Ivor?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY No, and thats unanimous.
Again, it can be mentioned, that the Jury did not believe what C12 stated.

Question 4
CORONER WRIGHT Turning to the factors for consideration, do you
consider that any of the following factors caused or contributed to the death of
Mr. de Menezes: (a) the suicide attacks and attempted attacks of July 2005 and
the pressure placed upon the Metropolitan Police in responding to the threat?
Case-X / Page 72

THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Cannot decide, sir.


It was a majority of eight to two
The Jury could not decide whether the police were under so much stress which would result in them
killing an innocent man.

Question 5
CORONER WRIGHT (b) a failure to obtain and provide better photographic
images of the suspect Hussain Osman for the surveillance team?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, thats unanimous.
The Jury believed the police failed to provide ground team members with images of the man they
suspected was the suicide bomber, and this contributed to the death of Mr. de Menezes.

Question 6
CORONER WRIGHT (c) a failure by the police to ensure that Mr. de
Menezes was stopped before he reached public transport?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, unanimous, sir.
Jury believed the police failed to stop Mr. de Menezes in due course and the result was his demise.

Question 7
CORONER WRIGHT (d) the general difficulty in providing identification of
the man under surveillance, Mr. de Menezes, in the time available and in the
circumstances after he had left the block at Scotia Road?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY No, and thats unanimous.
Jury believed police had ample time to identify Mr. de Menezes if he was a suicide bomber or not.

Question 8
CORONER WRIGHT (e) the innocent behaviour of Mr. de Menezes which
increased the suspicions of some officers?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY No, thats a majority of eight to two, sir.
Case-X / Page 73

Question 9
CORONER WRIGHT The fact that the views of the surveillance officers
regarding identification were not accurately communicated to the command
team and the firearms officers?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, unanimous.
Jury believed there was no solid communication from Special Branch surveillance teams to command
teams and firearms officers.

Question 10
CORONER WRIGHT (g) the fact that the position of the cars containing the
firearms officers was not accurately known to the command team as the
firearms officers were approaching Stockwell station?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, unanimous.

Question 11
CORONER WRIGHT (h) any significant shortcomings in the
communications system as it was operating on the day between the various
police teams on the ground and with New Scotland Yard?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, unanimous again, sir.

Question 12
CORONER WRIGHT (i) a failure to conclude at the time that surveillance
officers should still be used to carry out the stop of Mr. de Menezes at Stockwell
station, even after it was reported that specialist firearms officers could perform
the stop?
THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY Yes, unanimous.

CORONER WRIGHT It is right that I should say at this stage that it is my


intention to make a report under Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984, as
amended by the Coroners Amendment Rules 2008.
Case-X / Page 74

Under that rule such a report may be made where a Coroner is holding an
inquest into a persons death, the evidence gives rise to a concern that
circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur, or will continue to exist
in the future, and in the Coroners opinion action should be taken to prevent
the occurrence or continuation of such circumstances or to eliminate or reduce
the risk of death created by such circumstances.

The 15-page Coroners Rule 43 Report can be found in the footnote link. 63 The
Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) response to the Coroners Rule 43 Report
can be found in this footnote link. 64

63
Rule 43 Report: < http://julyseventh.co.uk/j7-jean-charles-de-menezes-inquest/de-menezes-inquest-
transcripts/DeMenezesRule43Reportopen.pdf >
64
Metropolitan Police Authority response to Coroners Rule 43 Report: < http://julyseventh.co.uk/j7-jean-
charles-de-menezes-inquest/de-menezes-inquest-transcripts/MPAStockwellcoronerresponse20thFeb.pdf>
Case-X / Page 75

PROTECTION FOR COMMUTERS

Metronets 65 failure has cost its shareholders significant sums and damaged
the reputation of those companies involved. Importantly, Metronets failure let
down Tube travellers, London Underground and taxpayers.

Secretary of State for Transport, 2008.

The Government announced its proposals for modernising the London


Underground network by means of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) agreements
in 1998. London Underground Limited entered into three separate PPP
Agreements between December 2002 and April 2003:

a) with Tube Lines for the maintenance and renewal of the Jubilee, Piccadilly and
Northern Lines;

b) with Metronet Rail BCV for the maintenance and renewal of the Bakerloo,
Central, Victoria and Waterloo & City Lines; and

c) with Metronet Rail SSL, which is responsible for the maintenance and renewal
of the sub-surface lines: The Circle, District, Hammersmith & City,
Metropolitan and East London Lines.

2007-2008 Transport Committee


Appointed by the House of Commons

Fake names
Since 2000, all personnel on the London Underground are entitled to have a
pseudonym on their badge instead of their real name. 66 It is therefore unsure if
the driver, Mr. Quincy Akpesiri Oji, of the train where Mr. de Menezes was shot
and killed, ever had his real name released.

65
Metronet Rail was one of two infrastructure companies (the other being Tube Lines Ltd) in a public-private
partnership with London Underground.
66
The Guardian. Diane Taylor: London Underground staff use fake names on ID badges for security.
Uploaded December 25, 2015.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/25/london-underground-staff-use-fake-names-id-badges-
security>
Case-X / Page 76

The responsibility of a train driver is immense; from getting all passengers to their
destination without causing an accident, to keeping all passengers safe whilst in
the carriages. What this staff member of the London Underground did, was (a)
leave his passengers who were in danger, and (b), scurried into a dark tunnel to
hide whilst a group of fanatics began shooting at people on the carriage.

London TravelWatch Passengers Charter Staff should be helpful, informed,


alert and committed to offering high quality customer service.

16-day dead-zone on London Underground trains


Today, there are something like 12,000 surveillance cameras on the London
Underground network. All of them silently working away, barely even noticed by
the commuters who are responsible for a staggering 3.23 million journeys on that
network every single day. 67

On the day in question, July 22, 2005, London Underground had no CCTV footage
system working on the train Mr. de Menezes was shot and killed, and with just
about every other underground train, after the 7/7 bombings. [Hilliard QC]

HILLIARD QC Because obviously everybody wanted to look and see what


clues there were on underground film in relation to those bombings [on July
7th.] Is this right: On this particular train, [where the victim was shot,] it had
not yet been put back?
WITNESS REYNOLDS Thats correct.

The witness then said, that there was a cable which linked the recording part of the
system which it would appear somebody had trodden on, and we were able to or
engineers were able to ascertain that it had not been recording for a few days prior
to the 22nd.

The IPCC Report wrote: Witness XP 68 states that the hard drives were missing
from the train entered by Mr. DE MENEZES because they had been removed after

67
Atul Rajput the Regional Director of Northern Europe Axis Communications. January 23, 2014. Web. 2017.
<https://www.ifsecglobal.com/security-on-the-london-underground/>
68
Witness XP: Contracts Manager. His duties include the download and removal of recorded information from
Northern line trains. (IPCC Stockwell One Report)
Case-X / Page 77

the 7/7 bombings. He further states that he has checked the documentation for the
two units and there is no record of any replacement.
Another witness termed XN in the IPCC Report, who was a Senior Consultant in
Forensic Video at BSB (Forensic) Ltd., was of the opinion that the cable connector
[of the closed-circuit] had been stood on, causing it to break. 69

10-Minute dead-zone
The number 2 bus Mr. de Menezes had boarded on the day he was shot and killed,
had a faulty camera system and did not record during the time of 09:32.57 till 09:37.17
and from 09:56.14 till 10:01.47.

Public London Underground Transport and grenades


In regards to C2 and his inquest statement (October 28, 2008) he tells Coroner and
Jury that even though he had his gun in his holster belt, he also had on himself a
grenade.

WITNESS C2 I have left my G36K and the grenade box behind, [in the car,]
although I had one still on me, and I ran towards the [tube] entrance.
CORONER WRIGHT You had one grenade, did you?
WITNESS C2 Yes, sir.

This firearms officer was not questioned as to the purpose of carrying a grenade into
an underground public transport system.

London TravelWatch Passengers Charter Journeys should be safe and free


from crime and the fear of crime.

Mr. de Menezes case led to something called the integration of surveillance and
firearms integration Metropolitan police at Stockwell tube station on the London
Underground, Deputy Chief Constable Chesterman had stated. Interoperability
issues between firearms and surveillance officers were factors in the shooting, despite
being in the same police course, in which we train all firearms officers. 70

69
IPCC Stockwell One Report.
70
Deputy Chief Constable Simon Chesterman (QPM of West Mercia) participating in the ninth International
Law Enforcement Forum. University Park (Pennsylvania) USA. April 14-16, 2013.
Case-X / Page 78

And there it ended for the authorities. For the innocent, Case-X remains engraved
in the abyss of uncertainties. For the family, an open wound.

I have written, you have read, the matter is before you; judge of it.
Aristotle.

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