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Garcia vs Drilon

GR 179267
July 29, 2013

Facts of the Case:

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as
it would be an axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted
product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Vivo vs Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
GR 187854
November 12, 2013

Facts of the Case:

The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCORs Managing Head of its
Gaming Department. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the
Senior Managing Head of PAGCORs Human Resources Department, advising that he
was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that he
should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time
being placed under preventive suspension.

On February 26, 2002, the petitioners counsel, replying to Elas letter, assailed
the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension. On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the
summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before
PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002. At the petitioners
request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His
statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished the
memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the
acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its
investigation report to PAGCORs Adjudication Committee. The Adjudication Committee
summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address
questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting
because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied
the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the
proceedings. His counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request.

The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of
the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the
effect that he was being dismissed from the service. In its resolution dated April 11,
2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioners right to due process, and
accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. On February 27, 2009, the CA
promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its
finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process.
Halili vs Public Service Commission
93 Phil 357

Facts of the Case:

This is petition for writ of certiorari seeking the revocation and annulment of an order of the
respondent Public Service Commission changing part of the route of the bus service established by
the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall, Manila. Petitioner herein is the
holder of various certificates of public convenience to operate auto-truck services between Balara
and various points in the city of Manila and its suburbs. The route fixed in petitioner's certificate of
public convenience for Sagandaan-Balara, Pandacan-Balara, Bonifacio Monument-Balara, and
Balara-Piers pass through Silagan Avenue and end at Balara. Respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc.,
also holds a certificate of public convenience to operate a line of trucks between Balara and City
Hall, Manila. This certificate was obtained by it through assignment, with the approval of the Public
Service Commission, from Benjamin Encarnacion. One of the original lines granted to Benjamin
Encarnacion. now operated by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., is the Balara-City Hall
(Manila), via Kamuning line, starting at Balara fifter plant, passing through Barangka road, Marikina-
San Juan road, Highway 54, Kamuning road, etc.

CAM Transit Co., Inc., filed a petition with the respondent Commission, alleging that the route
authorized in its City Hall (Manila)-Balara line, and passing along the Marikina-Barangka road,
Marikina-San Juan road, and Highway 54, is entirely different from that supported by the evidence
presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended so that the route authorized
should be along Highway 54, Silagan Avenue, U.P. site, ending at Balara, instead of Highway 54,
Marikina San Juan road, Barangka road, ending at Balara. Acting upon this petition, the respondent
Commission on the following day and without a previous notice to the petitioner or a previous
hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in accordance with the petition.

The question now squarely is whether the order for each amendment if the route, without notice to
the petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter may be given opportunity to
be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the Commission. It will be noted that the Public
Service Act expressly defines the powers of the respondent Commission which may be exercised by
it "upon proper notice and hearing," or without previous hearing. The act of the Commission in
issuing the order of July 3, 1952, does not fall under any of the powers enumerated in the sections of
the law, and consequently the question at issue must be resolved in accordance with fundamental
principles of law and justice.
Serrano vs NLRC
323 SCRA 447

Facts of the Case:

Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann Department
Store. He was charged with the task of supervising security checkers in their jobs
(apprehending shoplifters and preventing pilferage of merchandise). On October 11,
1991, the management sent him a letter immediately terminating his services as
security section head, effective on the same day. The reason given by the management was
retrenchment; they had opted to hire an independent security agency as a cost-cutting
measure. Serrano filed a complaint for ID, illegal layoff, ULP, underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the LA. The LA rendered a decision in favor
of Serrano. It stated that Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security
division, that the petitioner was not accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the
day after Serranos dismissal, Isetann employed a safety and security supervisor with
similar duties to that of the former. The NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA but
ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service,
unpaid salary, et al. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid
exercise of management prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot
substitute its judgment in the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of
the latter; and that the security and safety supervisors position was long in place prior to Serranos
separation from the company, or the phase-out of the Security Section.
Lao Gi vs Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 756

Facts of the Case:

Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the
Secretary of Justice. However, this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was cast
aside due to fraud and misrepresentation.
Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they
refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability.
The Chias said that the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) has no
authority to deport them which was denied by the CID.
They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction
which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was
a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial
court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cannot be
contravened by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them
to register as aliens. The Chias took further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was
denied by the CFI of Manila.
They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they
werent subject to immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the
CAs overstepping of appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didnt make a
ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.
Philippine Judges Association vs Prado
227 SCRA 703

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill
in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it
is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
De Guzman vs Comelec
GR 129118
July 19, 2000

Facts of the Case:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity
of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters
Registration Act of 1996".

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who,
either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at
least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned
by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to
different stations by the COMELEC.

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the
equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the
City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in
the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is
no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore,
there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under
People vs Cayat
68 Phil 12

Facts of the Case:

Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of

the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639
for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which
is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a
member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in
his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any
kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the
constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the
equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of
police power.
Bautista vs Junio
127 SCRA 329

Facts of the Case:

The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil
crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on
week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the
above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative
of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondents denied the above allegations.