DiscusSIon

BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS
SOCIALIST UNITY
WORKERS POWER

~-

An Introduction to International Sociallsts

Number 1-

International Socialists
17300 Woodward Avenue, Detroit MI 48203
Socialist Unity
33091 Mission Street, Box 163, San Francisco, CA 94110
Workers Power
45 West 10th Street, #2G, New York, NY 10011

$4.00
 ,
INTROWCTION TO MATERIAL ON I.S. PERSPEGrIVES

This collection of articles comes from Changes, the magazine published by

the International Socialists since 1979. During this period, we have published
a number of articles which amount to re-statements of rasic I.S. the<D!ry and
method. We feel that in sum, they do this job as well if not better than longer,
convoluted and harder-to-read mimeographed documents.

We have focussed in this collection on the I.S. theory on the centrality of

working class consciousness and self-activity to any successful revolution; our
evolving understanding of the union movement and the problems posed by the labor
bureaucracy; women's liberation; the nature of the Soviet Union; and because of
its relevance in the present regroupment process, one article that explains at
least on a historical level our critical attitude toward the legacy of the Fourt h
International.

Not included in this collection are several articles which are of equal
importance, l:ut ".:canr readily available from us as reprints and which we there-
fore decided to leave out for space reasons. These include our statement ''Unity
on the Left," "Building A Politics of Solidarity: Who Can Defeat The Right?"
which was written follOwing the November 1984 election, and 'The Family In The
Capitalist Crisis" by nene Winkler. Also still available is the discussion bul-
letin The Problem of The Party, which inclUdes articles by David Finkel from I.S.
and Steve Zeluck from Workers Power on the application of the Bolshevik concep-
tion of the revolutionary party to current tasks.

The I.S. was formed as a national. organization in 1969. We identify our

political tradition with the Independent Socialist Clubs of 1964-69, the left-
wing =ent in the Independent Socialist League of the 1950s, the Workers Party
of the 194Os, the American Trotskyist movement and the early Communist Party. We
are critical of aspects of this political legacy in all its periods, but nonethe-
less we can see the roots of our politics in the lessons assimilated by these pre-
vious generations of revolutionary socialists.

After a split with the RSL group in 1973, the I.S. deepened what it had begun
in the early 1970s, a turn to the working class with the expectation that a rela-
tively rapid radiCalization of sections of the class would create conditions both
for a large-scale militant rank and file movement and for creating the core of a
working class revolutionary party. Our goal was summed up as the development of
"a workers' comrat 'organization" whose leaders both in our union work and increas-
ingly, we anticipated, at all levels of our organization would be militants re-
cruited to socialist politics from the shop floor. During this period we moved
to a more disciplined method of functioning and to some degree mOdelled ourselves
on the experience of the Br1tisij IS (now British SWP) -- although in American con-
ditions we felt it necessary to "industrialize" our members in a way the British
group argued was a mistake. During the Portuguese revolution of 1974-75 we began
to build ties of solidarity with the PRP, which we saw as the best hope for the
emergence of a revolutionary leadership in that process.

The failure of the party-building side of our perspectives led to major prob-
lems which we lacked the experience to anticipate or handle well. Exacerrated by
factional manipulations by the British SWP leadership, a faction fight broke out
which resulted in the expulsion of the ISO group and the severing of our relations
with the British SWP in 1977. This damaging split was followed by the resignation
of the Workers Power group in 1979, following a discussion in which tactical dif-
ferences over the question of trade union work (especially in the matter of relating
 - 2 -
to real or potential cleavages in the trade union bureaucracy) created little
political clarity but a rising level of mutual frustration. There was no one
. incident or struggle that precipitated the resignation of the WP comrades; it
was rather a cumulative frustration and feeling that the I.S. no longer had
any potential to move forward.

The survival of the I.S. during the past several years has been due pri-
urily to our members' involvement in a wide range of activities, particularly
rank and file union work Jhose seeds were sown during the intense activity of
the 1970s. Altijaugh the immediate perceived link between this work and the build-
'ing of a party was broken, and indeed it has often seemed difficult to make
any serious link between day-to-day struggle and broader political issues, a
core of members has remained active. In the past several ;years we have campaigned
for a revolutionary socialist regroupment. We teel that such a develoj:lllent otters
the best opportunity to build the crucial political linkage between the day-to-
day struggle and the long-term goal ot revolutionary socialism.

CONS'IS

3) A REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY IN AMERICA?

8) "ECONOMISM" AND THE COMINTERN: A REV'IEIl OF CLAUDIN
ll) THE RANK AND FILE IDVEMENT
2.3f THE LEF'l' IN THE UNIONS
28) RANK AND FILE S'mA'!EGY: REPLY TO STAUGHTON LIND
37} BUILDING THE PAR'lY: THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
44) STATEMENT ON WORKERS PC1IiER RESIGNATION
46) THE LEF'l' IN THE 19SOs: SPEECHES AT ~~FT UNIfi:FORUM
58) LESSONS OF THE ERA'S DEFEAT
64} DOES CAPITALISM NEED PATRIARCHI? A REVIEW OF TWO ESSAIS
67} TOWARD UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S OPPRESSION: A REVIEW OF LISE VOGEL
70) WHERE IS !JESSE lIACKSON RUJ.'lNING: I.S. S'l'AmlENT
77} BUREAUCRATIC COLLECTIVISM, A MARXIST ANALISIS OF THE USSR
84} SOME ~ OF PERMANENT REVOLUTION
 -3-

A revolutionary workers' party

in America?
from CHli.NGES, April 1979 by Kim Moody
This is the third, andfinal article £n a series by Kim
J generation after generation. This is the American
Moody on the Marxist theory afthe revolutionary party. tradition of . 'socialist evangelism." It never called its.elf

N
o revolutionary socialist organization of signi-
ficant size exists today within the working class,
or even at its fringes. And none has existed for over a
quarter of a century. There is not even an active on-going
socialist tradition roored in the working class.
Socialist organizations, ideas and traditions were
destroyed and uprooted by a long and complex process.
And the results are devastating. While there are
individuals, and small groups of working class socialists,
there is no cominuous tradition shared by even a section
of the American working class.
For socialists, inside or outside the working class, this
has meant starting from scratch. With no active tradition
to appeal to. with few experienced socialist workers.
socialists have appeared as .' outsiders" - even when
they come from working class families. The job of going
against the highly active anti-socialist traditions of the
American working class has been difficult. The question
of what experiences and ideas will change the minds of
American workers, continues to perplex American
socialists.
Even though there is no active socialist tradition within
the working class. that does not mean that there is no
socialist tradition at all. In both reformist and
revolutionary variants, there are a number of past
traditions which socialists in the United States look to.
These traditions have been carried down through the
years by small groups of political activists, or by
intellectuals, or strangely enough in the political
memories of a few top labor leaders. Indeed, every
socialist grouping in the U.S. has its lineage. its "roots".
that it can trace back over I 00 years to the first socialist
organization, the International Workingman's Associa-
tion of Karl Marx.
Unfortunately, these traditions are the product of
other times and circumstances. After 25 years of
inactivity they tend to be lifeless - even when they are
not downright harmful. Any number of individuals or
groups could agree on the theory of how socialist
consciousness develops. Revolutionary class conscious-
ness is the result of an interaction between experience in
the class struggle and revolutionary socialist theory.
But American Socialism has a poor record when it comes
to the practical application of this theory.
, "- hen it comes to the question of how workers are to
Y "Y be won to socialism, there is one regrettable
tradition that returns to haunt the socialist movement
that, but that is its proper name. (A discussion of the
other important tradition in America-that of the
Communist Party-will be taken up in a future issue of
Changes.)
It may accept or reject revolution or class struggle. It
may be an extension of the social gospel. or it may be
violently anti-religious. But its method is evangelist all
the same. For just as the great preachers of the
nineteenth century converted millions to Methodism or
Baptism through fire and brimstone preaching, so the
socialist evangelist converts by preaching.
This faith in the transforming power of the spoken and
printed word was common to an wings of early American
socialism. It was hardly exaggerating when the Socialist
Campaign Book of 1900 stated, "it is the conviction of a11
socialists that the presentation of the facts of our
economic and industrial conditions is sufficient in itself
to expose the uselessness and falsity of the capitalist
parties." (I)
Before World War I, when the Socialist Party was
strongest. the analogy with evangelism was carried out
with thoroughness. Massive camp meetings were held
on the great plains, in imitation of Christian evangelism.
But for the Socialist Party of those years the heart of their'
evangelism was the election. Federal, state, and local
elections provided the bulk of party activity. Elections
provided a mass audience, a pre-requisite of any
evangelism. and a simple goal- a vote for the Socialist
Party.
Socialist evangelism implied then, as now, a division
of labor between the party (preachers) and the trade
union. The party did the preaching, it fought for the
minds and souls of the workers. The unions led the
economic struggle. They fought for the pocket books of
the workers. Trade unionists could, and should, be
members of the party, to be sure. But their political
activity was carried out in the electoral arena, or other
places where the debate over political ideas was though
suitable.
The party did not see that it should organize its
members in any given union, or in the labor movement
as a whole. in order to carry out the ideas and strategies
of the party. The economic struggle was left solely to the
whims of the trade union leaders. Some trade union
leaders were socialists, of course. Max Hayes, President
of the International Association of Machinists, and
Socialist Party member, ran for President of the
American Federation of Labor and got a third of the votes
at its 1912 convention. (2) But neither Hayes. nor any

18
 other Socialist Party members in the unions acted under
the direction, much less the discipline. of the party
leadership. Nor were the trade unionists generally
leaders of the party. In other words, the leaders of the
economic struggle tended to be divorced from the
leaders of the political struggle.
Class struggle was assumed to exist. Preaching would
highlight this struggle and point the way past it. But this
preaching, precisely because that is what it was, did not
extend to policy on the day-ta-day conduct of that
struggle. The separation of political and economic
struggle meant two things. The economic struggle would
tend not to become political. And politics remained
detached from the actual struggles of the workers.
P
olitical preaching can have a ·certain effectiveness
when an audience is already receptive. Thus, the
socialist evangelism of the early Socialist Party found an
audience among many immigrants from Europe who
brought their own socialist traditions with them. and
among western farmers and workers who had been
involved in the Populist movement only a few years
before.
But in America today. there exists no such prior
political experience within the working class. Support for
various Democratic Party candidates is a "political"
experience that has bred only passivity and cynicism. as
one candidate after another does the opposite of what
they promise. The alleged ··populism·· of Jimmy Carter
and others has no real similarity, even superficially, with
the agitational·activist populism of the 1890's. In any
event, American party politics of the last 30 years could
hardly provide an experience that can be appealed to by
socialism evangelists. . new situation, and they must be organized in such a way
This does not preclude precisely such a theory from
arising. G. William Domhoff. who ironically has done
more than anyone to show how thoroughly the capitalist
class dominates the life of the Democratic Party, has
produced a strategy of socialist evangelism within the
Democratic Party. The mistake that leads Domhoff down
this welI·worn road is not primarily his views on that
Party, but his utterly sincere socialist evangelism.
In an article in Socialist Review, formerly Socialist
Revolution, Domhoff rejected a third party strategy for
socialism on the grounds that you couldn't get enough
votes that way to make socialism attractive. He argues,
. 'Thus, a third party cannot contribute to the breakdown
of ideological hegemony by piling up a large vote for a
socialist platform, and giving the hope and the
encouragement to people that comes when they realize
there are others in the country who agree with
them.·' (3)
In other words, the ideological domination of the
working class by the capitalist class is to be broken down
b-y '''piling up a large vote for a socialist platform .. , This
is- surely classical socialist evangelism of the type
practiced by the early Socialist Party-only this time
without a socialist party.
This odd hybrid is the direct decendent of a recent
attempt to imitate the Socialist Party of the Debs era, and
its evangelistic approach. Pioneered by James Weinstein
of Socialist Revolution, the idea was the the old Socialist
Party was the only real American tradition of socialism.
19
Its naive use of elections and preaching style were to be
copied. Both the Weinstein group. and in its earliest
stages, the New American Movement. believed they
could recreat the experience of the Debsian Socialist
Party.
This strategy has been abandoned by most of its
previous adherents. There was no receptive audience.
outside of a few university towns, for socialist preaching.
Preaching gave way to other activities, some more
positive. activist and linked to the realities of the class
struggle, others reformist utopian. For the group around
Socialist Review, it meant packing up the old evangelism
and carrying it into the Democratic Party, where it
became its opposite-not socialist preaching. but
support to "lesser evil" capitalist candidates.
S ocialist evangelism cannot build a socialist
movement in the working class because it lacks a
receptive audience. Furthermore. American workers
have good reason to distrust preaching politicians with
big promises. An approach that begins by preaching in
the electoral arena, in the belief that the biggest
audience is there. truly misunderstands the whole
problem of "ideological hegemony." As we pointed OUt
in the first of this series, the ideological hold of the ruling
class over the workers is not based on their persuasive
abilities, but on the perpetuation of institutions and
modes of existence that make capitalist ideas appear
valid in everyday life. For the ideas to change, the hold to
be broken, the situation must change. For the changing
situation to be interpreted in a class conscious manner,
bearers of socialist ideas must be present to explain the
as to do it eff~ctively.
As most people on the left now realize, the
conservatism· of the American working class-or the
ideological hegemony of the ruling class - was sustained
by a long period of capitalist expansion and relative
prosperity that followed World War II. What capitalism
said about itself appeared to be true-or true enough to
swallow. Today the situation is changing. Capitalism has
been in crisis for a decade or more. That crisis is driving
the capitalist class to get nastier with the workers. The
material basis for a changed consciousness is in the
making .
But a new class consciousness, certainly socialist
consciousness, is by no means inevitable. The capitalist
class does not sit still as the situation changes. It seeks to
convince the workers that this is the way things must be,
or even that they-the workers-are to blame for it.
Often the capitalists are successful. A lot of workers, for
example, buy the notion that it is their wages that cause
inflation. Sometimes the capitalist enlist the labor
leadership to convince the workers to go along with the
program. For example. the selling of protectionist
policies to steel workers.
In his latest book. G. William Domhoff, who we earlier
criticized. pointed out correctly. that it is not so much a
question of the capitalists convincing the workers of their
world view as it is in preventing a counter world view
from developing. Domhoff shows that the capitalist class
controls an "ideology network" of organizations and
 -fi-
programs directed at that task. And he notes: "Thus, the
most important role of the ideology network may be its
ability to help ensure that an alternative view does not
consolidate to replace the resigned acquiesence and
disinterest that are found by pollsters and survey
researchers to permeate the political and economic
consciousness of Americans at the lower levels of the
socio·economic ladder." (4)
The problem is further compounded by the weIl known
fact that consciousness usually lags behind events. The
Italian Marxist. Antonio Gramsci. gave some thought to
this while he was in a fascist prison in the 1930·s. In his
Prison Notebooks, he wrote that "mass ideological
factors always lag behind mass economic phenomena.
and that therefore. at certain moments. the automatic
thrust due to the economic factor is slowed down,
obstructed or even momentarily broken bv traditional
ideological elements." (5) The cominuatio~ of "tradi·
tional.·' that is capitalist and defeatest. ideas in the
American working class goes a long way to explain the
slow and. as yet, limited response to the growing
capitalist offensive against labor.
Preaching, or even genuine socialist propaganda are
not enough to break through this situation. Gramsci.
goes on, however, to point toward what can move
consciousness. Taking up from the last quotation.
Gramsci goes on to say: •• ." hence that there must be a
conscious, planned struggle to ensure that the exigencies
of the economic position of the masses, which may
conflict with the traditional leaderships' policies. are
understood. An appropriate political initiative is always
neccessary to liberate the economic thrust from the dead
weight of traditional policies." (6)
In other words, there must be a concrete action that
the workers, given their current awareness, can take in
order to break through the present situation and allow
their actual experience to advance. On the basis of that
advance. new ideas can take root.
For the American left today, this must mean an
increased participation in the actual struggles of the
working class. To put it more precisely. the lack of an
independent class political tradition. means that the only
real handle on advancing working class consciousness in
America lies in the strategic focus on industrial and trade
union struggles of the moment. This is not to say that the
only issues the left can raise or talk about are trade union
or economic issues. But the industrial and trade union
struggles are the only context in which any sort of
political fight can be made to advance class
consciousness, because they are virtuall the only form
that working class self-activity has taken in America. as
yet. Socialist propaganda can only be effective on the
basis of workers self-activity. In turn, socialist ideas held
by workers have meaning only when the workers are in
motion.
M ass conversion to socialism is possible only
when a "critical mass of active worker
leaders - those who are opinion makers at the most basic
level and in the most important sections of the working
class-have already been won to socialist politics. This is
20
been a slow and painful process in its early stages. In
most advanced industrial countries this process was well
under way, or nearly accomplished a hundred years ago.
The reasons for this historic lag in the United States are
beyond the scope of this essay.
Much of the American left would simply prefer to
ignore this uncomfortable fac[. The various tendencies of
the left strain to leap over the lack of class consciousness
and the absence working class socialist organization. For
many groups on both the Maoist and Trotskyist left, a
type of socialist evangelism is joined to phoney
vanguardism. Not only do these groups attempt to
convert workers by preaching at them, but they posture
as the political leadership of their potential flock. The
main result of this approach has been to increase the
number of socialist organizations rather than the number
of socialist workers. As they trip over the reality of
working class consciousness, these groups tend to
splinter racher than grow.
The socialist left must realize that all of it together
would not compose a genuine revolutionary workers
party. It lacks the numbers and the roots in the working
class. The task that faces the left is not a simple
re-groupment. nor the declaration of The Party. It is far
more difficult task of relating to. providing some
direction for, and participating in the actual struggles of
workers in order to draw lessons about the system. The
task is to become an integral part of the process that
impels workers into self·a~tivity and to use that process
to advance consciousness. It is to end the separation of
economic and political snuggle by bringing political
understanding of today's struggle to the active workers.
As most people on the left are aware. there is both a
general crisis of the system and an intensifying
employers' offensive against organized labor. This is the
lash which drives people to activity and resistance.
vVorkers are restrained in this activity as much by their
passin' tradition and a fragmented view of the vlo'orid. as
by tht, resistance of the labor bureaucracy" One"s class
position is always experienced. bur seldom are its
politit'al ~lIld social implications understood. This
becomes hoth a cause and effect of the lag of
consciousness hehind evems. If. howe,:er. there are
socialists alllong the active workers to present a coherem
explanation of eV('llts in class terms and to poim the way
forward. the eHen of an~ gIven struggle on
consciousness can be entirel\" different.
W ile there is no continuous" actin' socialist
tradirion within the American working class. there
are traditions of class struggle and nade union acri\"it\""
Marxists are fond of poiming ro the limits of trade uni(;n
struggle or tradition. Some even regard thcst' as a
barrier to revolutionary consciousness Certain!\" the
ideology of American bu"siness unionism is anti·oSoe"ialist.
But there are traditions of struggle that run roumer to
business unionism and to the passi\"ity that charactcrizes
trade unionism today. Part of hreaking the lag in
consciousness involves an appeal [Q these traditions" For
often. these remembered moments of struggle. of mass
participation. membership im"oivt'mt'nt in the union. can
be a transition from the passive and defeatist ideas of the
-esent to a new way of seeing things and a new way of
:ting.
, Active involvement in trade union struggle does not
ltomadcally lead one to draw socialist conclusions. But
·tiv; involvemem in class struggle activity. like
vn1vement in almost any social movement. does change
~o.. It changes the range of things they think about
Id tile way they think about them. Once a worker
~gins to think in class terms. the ideas that he or she is
len t.9 changes qualitatively.
We have seen this happen in the reform movemems
~,t have arisen in various unions, notably the Steel
orke'rs and the Teamsters. As militams become aware
the class struggle traditions of their unions. they
uallv become aware of the role of socialists in many of
:" ea'rlier struggles that built the union. This tends to
ange their minds about the role of socialists in the
}or movement today. Socialists are no longer seen
nply as .. infiltrators," or .. troublemakers." These
:ivists begin to understand that socialists of various
Ids played a big role in the organizing of the
ion - just as they are playing a role in building the
~\'ement to make those unions militant again. The class
uggle traditions of the union provide a bridge to the
.g' buried traditions of the American working class.
'JaturaUy. it is not just a matter of linking traditions,
:' of helping people see the true structure of the
,tern. how it is rigged against the workers, and how to
mge it. All of these ideas involved in this task make
re sense when they conform to or at least converge
h the actual experience of the workers. People in
.lggle learn faster and draw the right lessons more
ily. The example of Eugene V. Debs is instructive in
i respect.
Vhile Debs might be thought of as the greatest
nitioner of socialist evangelism. he neither came to
ialist politics as a result of preaching. nor did he view
activity in lhat way. Debs was a product of the
erican class struggle. It was in the wake of the
!man railroad strike of 1894 that Dehs began to
stion the nature of the svstem. The use of troops to
ak the strike had a big i~pact on him. As he put it.
[he gleam of every bayonet and the flash of the every
~ rhe class struggle was revealed." (7) While he was
Jrison for leading that strike he studied socialist
'alUrc and held conversations with a number of
alist leaders, He was not immediately convinced. In
S. he actively supported the Populist Party, breaking
I !hf" Demoaa[ic Party in \\'hich he had been active
)rt'" the Pullman strike, With the collapse of Populism
~111 independent forcl'. Debs decided American
kef'S ne{'"ded a socialist party of their own.
took Debs a while to draw socialist conclusions. and
hC'ip from somt" who already had, But his journcy ro
~lis' political ac:ti\'ity was charanerized by growing
-; c':>nS('iOllSness based on experience, and by a
~' ~ indept'n<ience from both capitalist ideas and
lL !ons, in partintlar the Democratic Party, Debs. of
."t', was a I("alier. so he not only become active as a
dist. hUI took on the responsibility of heing ont' of
tountiers of the Socialist Party, even afte'r some
)urag-ing- false !Harts.
T he unions are the only mass organizations of U.S,
workers today. Just as the intensified class
struggle of his time made it possible for a trade union
activist like Debs to become a socialist. so the intensified
attack on the unions and the response to that attack open
the possibility of winning workers in significant numbers
to socialism in the coming years. But this requires a
strategiC focus on the actual struggles, organizations,
and tentative steps toward class independence that
workers take. It means that socialists must be active in
the unions, in the life of the local, in opposition caucuses.
women's caucuses, Black caucuses, and broad reform
movements as well as in strikes and other specific
struggles where they can bring the socialist movement
into contact with the self-activity of [he working class.
Socialists who are not in trade unions can playa political
role in aiding these movements and in organizing the
types of socialist activities that bring workers into contact
with socialist ideas, and with ocher social movements.
There must be a clear political focus on working class
self-activitv.
The Am~rican left today is poorly organized to carry
out such a task, h is small, fragmented, often sectarian.
and often not focused on the working class at all. Much of
the activity of the revolutionary left is concerned with its
own educ~tion. and [hat in a ~lass vacuum. Its external
political activity tends to be focused on movements lilat
still draw their activists from [he middle class. Socialists
should he active in middle class based movement.
CI('arl\', the women's movement, to give one example,
has p~ofound implications for working class women and
for the struggle for socialism. But. these movement, in
themselves, do not provide a strategic focus for building
a sot'ialist trend in the working class.
The size of the left and its fragmentation are barriers
[0 winnning workers to socialism and laying the basis for
a revolutionary party in America, Very fe ...... workers are
willing to join a tiny group, while many are simply
repelled by the seemingly useless sectarianism of the
left, A simple re-groupment of the existing left would nor
solve the problem by itself. The intensification of c1a ... s
struggle and the growth of independent working class
self'at,tivit\' must be the basic process on which \'ariou ...
stages of It:ft re·groupment are based. At the same time.
how('\'t·r. the revolutionary left cannot let its st'ctarian
heritage stand in the way of viable initiatin's !Oward
UOIl\',
Todav there is a crisis on the revoimionan' left. It is
charact~rized bv (he attraction of the right fri~ges of {he
r("volutionarv le'ft to the Democratic Socialist Organizing
Committee, ~n the one hand. and growing fragmentation
of the rest on the other, But this crisis also offers an
opportunity to the left. since the pre\'ious perspective of
so many groups are collapsing or stagnating. it is
possibie for socialists active in the unions to begin (Q
carve out a common strategic focus and a common
"ocialist program for the U.S.
T o create a political worke.rs' movement in America
requires concentration and focus on the trade
union anti industrial struggles of wday and the coming
years. This is not. as some would say, "economism." but
its opposite. For political struggles cannot be left to
middle class activists. while the workers carry on the
economic struggle-that is economism! The point is to
win worker activists to political ideas and, thereby to
politicize the struggles of the day - whatever they begin
as. Active workers' involved in prolonged struggle or in
union politics think about political question. The problem
is sometimes what people think about these matters.
Thus. the active intervention of socialists in that thinking
is required if socialist conclusions are to be drawn. The
key element in the strategy for building a revolutionary
workers' pany in the United States is panicipation in
active workers' struggles over wages, working condi-
tions, etc. The tempting illusion of mass conversion
through evangelism offers no hope for the beleaguered
revolutionary left in America. A strategy focused on the
self-activity of the working class may not be easy. but
unlike any other strategy. it has, at least once in Russia,
produced a successful workers' revolution. tJ
FOOTNOTES:
1. Ira Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement, 1897·1912.
Columbia University Press, 1952, p. 115.
2. Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism,
Viking Press, 1957, p. 42.
3. G. William Oomhoff, "Why Socialists Should Be Democrats:
A Tactic For The Class Struggle In America," Soci~list
Review, p. 29.
4. G. William Domhoff, The Powers That Be, Vintage Book.,
1979. p. 192.
5. Antonio Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks.
New World Paperbacks, 1978, p. 168.
6. Ibid., p. 168.
7. Howard Morgan, Eugene V. Debs: Socialist For President,
Syracuse University Press, 1962, p. 10.
 from C1IA.NGES, liay 1982
A Troubled History: Did Economism
Wreck the Communist Movement?
The Communist Movement,
From Cominlern 10 Cominform.
,By Fernando Claudin.
Monthly Review Press, 1975
By Kim Moody
Though written over ten years ago. Fer o
nando Claudin's The Communist Move o
~ent is a study of enormous relevance to
revolutionary Marxists in the United States
today, for more than one reason. It is. first
and foremost. an eloquent and penetrating
analysis of the transformation of the Com-
munist International from a revolutionary
socialist movement to an impediment and
barrier to socialist revolution.
It is an historical analysis of Stalinism.
not only as a political movement embodied
in the Comintem and Cominform - but as
a theoTetical corruption of Marxism. as a
political method embodying the worst
elements of reformism and opponunism in
its subordination to the foreign policy re~
quirements of the Soviet bureaucracy. and
finally as a social system.
The study is all the more valuable
because it cannot be viewed as a Trotskyist
rehash or Third Camp polemic_ Claudin
was a life-long Communist. a leader of the
Spanish Communist Pany from the 1930's
until 1965. The Communist Movement is,
in fact. an eloquent plea for independent,
revolutionary organization and creative
Marxism.
While the book does not present an ac-
tual analysis of the nature of the Soviet
Union and allied nations. it is based on
such an analysis, the conclusion of which
Claudin reveals at the end.
Claudin concludes about the Soviet
Union:
"Neithn capitalist nOT socialist, it was
based on the exploitation of the main
means of production by a new type of
social class which began to grow u.p out of
the elements capable of taking on the most
useful and most urgent functions in a ruin-
ed and starving country, the organization
and control of the economy. Believing sub-
jectzwly-at least for a urne-that it was
bu.tlding socialism and embodied the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, that it was put-
ting Marmm into practice. this new ruling
class became the real beneficiary of the
- -means of production, immune to any in-
tervention OT control by the mass of the
workns, and gradually acquired the sub-
jectz've characteristics of a dominant class. "
(pp. 559, Vol. II)
The central theme of the study is that
Kim Moody is a contributing editor of
Changes.
- '3' -
the subordination of the national sections
of the Comintern to the will of the Soviet
bureaucracy led to the corruption and
failure of the Communist movement - as
seen from the vantage point of revolu~
tionary socialism. But unlike many of the
Maoist or even Trotskyist views of this pro·
cess, its explanation does not fall back on
subjective factors.
That is, the behavior of the Soviet
bureaucracy towards the various Com·
munist Panies- panicularly Spain from
1936, and Europe during and immediately
following World War II-is not simply
seen by Claudin as a result of some
theoretical failure, but is based in the
material position of the Soviet bureaucracy
as a ruling class.
None of this is to imply that there are no
political problems with the study or with
Claudin's own politics. Claudin, for exam·
pie. seems unable to apply the same social
analysis [0 China or Yugoslavia. simply
because Mao and Tho pulled off revolu-
tions against Stalin's wishes. Also he exag-
gerates the alleged inflexibility of the Com·
intern under Lenin. He does not seem.
aware, for instance, that Comintem policy
for the United States was not the same as
that applied in Europe. In fact, the Com-
intern in the early 1920's had to force the
tWO competing U.S. communist parties to
unite and to abandon their sectarian at-
tempts to mechanically apply the "Soviet
model" in a country that was not teetering
on the brink of revolution.
While it is not explicit in The Com-
munist Movement. Claudin is generally
know as a left Euro-Communist. In short-
hand. this means he favors the parliamen-
tary road to socialism but sees the necessity
for mass working class action and institu-
tions as well. This perspective is not spelled
out, even in the conclusion where he pre,
sents his critique of Leninism (far less
thorough and less enlighting than his criti-
que of Stalinism) which he sees as embody-
ing the danger of substitutionism.
Far most imponant for American social-
ists today than this discussion of the
organizational aspects of Lenin's thought is
Claudio's discussion of the basic method
and theory of Lenin and the early Com-
intern. It is imponam both because it
raises questions very real to American
socialists. and because it involves Claudin's
theoretical justification for drawing Euro-
Communist (i.e. refonnist) conclusions
from what stans out as a plea for a gen-
uinely revolutionary socialist movement.
The question he raises is: how do revolu-
tionary socialists (workers as well as in-
tellectuals) and their organuat£ons raise
23
the consciowness of reformist workers.? Or
put anothn way. how does the revolution-
ary movement break the mass of workers
from reformism!
There is hardly a question more basic to
revolutionary Marxist politics. This was, of
course, precisely the question that the new-
ly formed Comimem faced in the wake of
the Russian Revolution and the failure of
the first German Revolution in 1918. This
was, in fact, the reason the Comintem was
fonned. The failure of the Comintern to
break the masses from refonnism in the
years immediately following the Russian
Revolution quite naturally leads Claudin
to question the basic theory and method
with which the Comintem approached
that task.
DEPTHS OF REFORMISM
Early in the opening section of Vol. I en-
titled. "The Crisis of Theory," Claudin
says:
"But what is interesting to note here in
this transposition of the Russian model [to
other countriesJ is Lenin s grave under-
estimation of the influence of reformist
politics and the reformist mentality among
the proletariat of the advanced countries. I
do not mean to say that Lenin underesti-
17Ulted the wide ~tent of the reformist
phenomenon. but rather its depth, the
ft'rm roots that it possessed in the working
class ma.sses of 'he West. "(p, 58, Vol. I)
The point is well taken. For it was not
only the early Comimem and Lenin who
underestimated the depth of reformism.
but much of the subsequent socialist move-
ment that views itself in the Bolshevik
tradition. How else. for example, could
Trotsky write in the opening lines of the
"Transitional Program:" "The world
political situation as a whole is chiefly
characterized by a historical crisis in the
lea,uTsh,p of 'he proletariat, "
Claudin's basic critique of the early
Comintem in Lenin's time is of its theory
for moving the masses, based on its analysis
that the material underpinning for reform-
ism, capitalism's ability to produce gains
for sections of workers. had evaporated.
The' first aspect of this theory that
Claudin points to is the assessment of the
first Three Congresses of the Comintern
that capitalism had reached the end of its
rope. Even then, the Congress resolutions
were careful to point OUt Lenin's frequent
warning that. as the Third Congress said,
"The collapse of capitalism is not in-
evitable," (Claudin, p, 606) They did,
nevenheless, insist on "the impossibility of
restoring capitalism on the old foundation"
(p. 606) at the First Congress in 1919 and

that in "our time the curve of the capitalist
evolution proceeds through temporary
rises constantly downward . ... " (p. 607) at
the Third. Capitalism was in its irreversible
"death agony."
The core of Caludin's argument is that
this theory of catastrophe links the Lenin-
ist and Stalinist Comintems. despite the
enormous political gulf he recognizes
between them. The catastrophe perspec-
tive. he maintains. underlay the idea of a
unified world revolutionary strategy and
"leading center" which he considers to
have been disastrous from the beginning.
Claudin also argues that this economic
assessment itself was wrong. His argument
is that capitalism did resume a period of
expansion in the 1920's that was more than
the "relative stablization" that the Com-
intern acknowledged in 1925. An addi·
tional problem is that after 1923, the
economic analyses became increasingly ra-
tionales for a series of disastrous political
zigzags, rather than results of serious in-
vestigationo
Given. however, the fact that Britain
was in a depression for most of the 20's,
that Germany was an economic shambles.
that the whole expansion collapsed in
1929. and the drive toward a new world
war was already apparent in the early 30's,
the analysis of the early Comintem was not
so far off the mark as Claudin makes out.
Nevenheless. taken from the long-range
view of today. it is dear that capitalism was
able to "restructure" itself. as Claudin puts
it. following the Second World War. From
today's vantage point it is easy to see that
the news of the death agony of capitalism
was indeed exaggerated.
The mechanism for creating the post-
WWIl expansion. however. was by no
means automatic or easily reproducible. It
was the mass destruction of capital produc-
ed by World War II. the rise of the United
States as the hegemonic. organizing power
of international capitalism (something
lacking in the 19205). and the persistence
of the permanent arms economy that pro-
duced the expansion.
The second aspect of Claudin's critique
of early Comincern theory is of its political
method. To illustrate it Claudin quotes a
tactical thesis from the Third Congress of
the Comintern. It says:
"The eS.!ence of the revolutionary
character of the present penod consists in
the fact that the most modest living condi-
tions for the proletanat are incompatible
with the existence of capitalist society. As a
result of this the struggle fOT the most
modest demands takes on the prOportIOns
of a struggle for Communism." (p. 610)
What the Comintern appeared to be
saying was that in a situation of deepening
crisis. when the capitalists are unwilling to
concede even the "most modest" demands.
and the reformist leaders are unwilling to
-t:t-
go against the capitalists, the Communists
can seize the leadership and lead the
masses of workers toward a break with
reformism and the fight for Communism.
Claudin terms this approach "econo-
mist-catastrophist". In his view it is this
political method, connected with the
economic theory of imminent collapse.
that was responsible for the failure of the
revolutionary offensive of the early 19205 in
Europe. He argues. in fact. that it was the
Social Democracy that benefited from the
general economic struggle of the '20s.
While admitting that economic struggle
has some (unspecified) "importance for
revolutionary action against capitalism,"
he argues that economic struggle is "com-
patible with the functioning of the
system." that it "swelled, rather than
reduced. refonnist illusions," and. in any
event. "it did not have the significance at-
tributed to it in the economist-catastro-
phist view." (p. 611)
In other words, class struggle based on
economic issues, even severe economic cir·
cumstances. even led by rewlutionanes,
does not lead to a break with reformism or
reformist c01l.Scrowness.
This is a critically important proposi.
tion. Here, Claudin has moved from his
ongoing critique of the Comintern to a
much more far-reaching idea. The core of
a successful revolutionary strategy, he sug-
gests. lies outside the issues of class struggle
that arise most naturally from workers'
economic needs.
It is a viewpoint far from unique to
Claudin. Indeed, the fear of "economism"
has come to be almost a common
denominator for much of the left. non·
revolutionary and revolutionary alike. It
ranges from Marxist-Leninists whose
understanding of "economism·· rests on
what they think Lenin said in What Is To
Be Done'. to historians of the American
left (such as James Weinstein in Am-
biguous Legacy) who attribute its failures
to the economist sin.
In its broadest aspects the question of
what "economism" really means lies out-
side [he scope of this review. But much can
be learned from Claudin's discussion of the
supposed alternative - since we find the
same ideas not only in Claudin's left·wing
version of Eurocommuism. but in other
modem socialist strategies far to the right
of his. Claudin writes: "For a different
result, the economic struggle wo.uld have
had to be made part of a paliticai Qnd
ideoiog;ad CQmptlig" ..... (p. 611. em-
phasis added.)
The content of the campaign he pro-
poses is the "practical struggle for real
democracy in all aspects of life. in the con-
text of bourgeois democracy. This is all
pretty vague, but what interests us here is
not his specific (typically Euro-Communist)
suggestion for a period that held far more
24
revolutionary content than democratic
reforms. but rather his method.
First of all, his separation of the
economic class struggle from the political
class struggle - in a period of both'
economic and political crisis such as that
that followed WWI - is quite stark. While
he quotes Rosa Luxemburg for other pur·
poses he forgets her remarkable contribu- ~
tion to Marxist understanding in The Mass
Strike, the Political Party and the Trade
Unions.
Here Luxemburg pointed out. on the
basis of the 1905 experience in Russia, that_
mass economic strike movements, under
conditions of crisis. tend to grow over inco
political struggles. The political content
will depend on the role of the party and the
quality of leadership, but the phenomenon
is undeniable when the economic struggle
takes on the proportions of a mass confron·
tation between classes.
Funhennore. based on what she wrote
about the inability of any leadership to
tum on and off mass struggle, we can
assume she would have been the first to
point out the absurdity of the notion that
the economic struggle can be "made" part
of an ideological campaign. Claudin has it
all backward.
The task of revolutionan'es is. in reality,
to introduce ideological struggle into the
economic struggle. For the truth is that it is
the economic struggle that is always with
us, and which first heats up under condi·
tions of severe and desperate crisis. It is this
that forms the natural ground of the class
struggle. This is nO{ less, but more true in
the u.s .. where there exists no indepen,
dent vehicle of political class snuggle.
One does not have to support or
apologize for aU the crude redunions of
Leninist strategy that floated around the
early Comintem to understand that their
approach was ba.ied on the revolutionary
Marxist idea that revolutionary con-
sciousness emerges. if it emerges at all, in
the context of actual struggle - self-
activity.
The greatest defeat of the period
Claudin is discussing was the German
revolution. A large part of the inabili-
ty of Rosa Luxemburg"s Spartacis[s to
break the German workers from their
reformist leaders was precisely the fact that
the Spartacists abstained from the
economic struggle. Long on ideological
campaigns. they did not play the sort of
role in the struggles of the day that could
have won them the respect of the Revolu- ..-
tionary Shop Steward movement (the main
leadership of day-to-day activism) in time
to make a decisive difference.
To most reformists the economic strug- ~
gle. even those whose job it is to manage it
as union leaders. is an annoyance. Their
"real" struggle is the "political" struggle -
meaning the electoral and legislative
"struggle." Unfortunately, there are all tOO
 many socialists and leftists around to justify also clear today that serious capitalist crisis else in that tradition. It is the same fun-
this attitude by telling us that intervention can coexist with a significant degree of ex- damental core of method that separates
in the economic struggle is mere pansion (in some advanced capitalist coun· revolutionary politics from the retreats
economism, or something that takes care of tries and a number of areas of the Third from the day·to-daY economic struggle into
itself. while the political (electoral) struggle World) for a prolonged period. varieties of reformism - whether that be
is~ where it's at. What matters is the Additionally, it seems undeniable that parliamentary cretinism, class collabora-
"political and ideological campaign." both the capitalists and the refonnist tionist labor leadership, or the idealism of
Economic and political struggle has leaders have more latitude within this son merely "talking socialism."
become counterposed in practice, if not of crisis than they would under conditions That core is the understanding that it is
always in theory. Claudin tries to avoid this such as the Russian Revolution from the day-to-day confrontation of capital and
counterposition but clearly offers economic February through October of 1917 - labor - sometimes dramatic. often prosaic
class struggle no role in the transfonnation which is, after all. the experience on which - that provides the context for the
of consciousness. It is not that he doesn't the Comintem's method was largely based. ideological struggle. that provides the ex-
like to see workers fighting for their needs, However. there is a fundamental core of perience of the mass of workers which
it'~ just that he doesn't attribute any political method in that approach which opens them to the ideas of revolutionary
significance to it when it comes to class underlies all of the great advances in workers and activists. The inversion of this
consciousness. In fact. he goes so far as to revolutionary politics in the twentieth cen- understanding inevitably leads on to refor-
imply that socialist consciousness is a prere- tury - whether we are speaking of Lenin. mism, sectarianism, or simply the arm-
quisite to making economic struggle impor- Luxemburg, Gramsci, Trotsky or anyone chair. o
tant.-
This, of course, is an inversion of reality.
The fact of uneven consciousness in the
working class means that far broader
elements will be drawn into economic
struggle than simply those who are already
revolutionaries.
If one is to arrive at a genuinely revolu-
tionary strategic fonnulation. rather than
Claudin's step toward refonnism or the ad-
mittedly crude reduction of Leninism
presented in the early Comintem theses.
one would have to reverse Claudin's recom-
mendation and conclude that the political
and ideological campaign needs to be
made part of the economic struggle.
"TALKING SOCIALISM"
Unfonunately, Claudin's approach. not
really full fonned in The Communist
Movement, is now generally current in
Euro-Communist circles as it has long been
in social democratic circles. It fmds its ex-
pression in the American left as well -
panicularly. in the inheritors of the new
left. the New American Movement (now
joined with the Democratic Socialist
Organizing Committee) and sometimes in
the pages of In These Times.
The American version is the theory that
the economic, trade union struggle is
economist. although generally suppor·
table, and offers little opportunity to talk
about socialism. The theory, most explicit
in NAM. was that one had to talk socialism
to America and that so long as you are talk-
ing to politically interested. people, no one
context is better than another 0

Whatever loyalty to the working class

_these comrades may have. the political
method is essentially classless. It not only
df?eSIl't break workers from reformism, but
it· seems to have led much of the NAM
leadership toward it.
The agitational method built on revolu-
tionaries' panicipation in economic class
sttuggle. as developed by Lenin and the
early Comintem, like all revolutionary
political methods and tactics, is not equally
applicable at all times and all places. It is

from CmmlES
July-A.ug.
(l'WJ])
JilINI' &
""I()VI~"'\I~~lr
Confronting Labor's Crisis in the 1980's
BY KIM MOODY
In Octolier 1980. Teamsters Local 337 held elections for
local officers. During the course of the c.ampaign some
people were beaten - at least one sent to the hospital- and
some: were shot at. The victims were members of the "Rank
and. File Slate" fielded by Teamsters for a Democratic
Union (TOU).
There were popular opposition slates before. but this
time- there was a movement and an organization with deep
roo~ throughout the local. Violence and intimidation.
alOng with a good deal of employer cooperation in busing
Holmes supporters to the polls. were the best the in·
cumbents could do to hold their offices in the face of age·
nniite- rank and file movement.
The- iIKUmbents had a lot at stake. The incumbent
president was (and unfortunately still is) Bobby Holmes.
an fntemational Vice· President. head of Michigan Joint
Council 43,>- a member of the National Freight Bargaining
Committee.. and chief negotiator of the national contract
with. Kroger. Holmes pulled down $138.661 in 1979 for
holding these posts. In short. Bobby Holmes is a top level
American, labor It''ader and bureaucrat with a lot to lose.
There is a third force that is key to understanding the
explosive- cronfrontation that characterizes life in ~ocal
33'];-th" employers. The employers of most of the 12.000
members:, of this local are in the grocery business. some
smalr~. some big. and all reflecting the current pressures of
an:economyin long term crisis. Business failures. shrinking
profit margins. and shifting markets have aU swept die sag·
ging::-economy of southeastern Michigan. The employers.
or-course. have turned on their workers with demands for
concessions; in contract terms and. most recently. in wages
as- welL They have turned to the union leadership. ·and
Bobby Holmes in particular. for help in imposing those
concessions~ They have not been denied that help.
T;
he- 337 elections were not simply an internal
: _ political contest between two factions of the union.
nor,' were they seen that way by most TDU activists. They
were 'part' of, a long-standing clash with the employers and
13
..
-1/-
I~II~I~
their allies in the- union, Holmes and his legion of overpaid
business agents.
TDU in Local 337. as in most places. grew out of a long
series of fights against contract concessions and other con-
flicts with the employers. Many of these were lost. but
there have been some important victories along the way.
Win or lose. TDU fought: and because TDU fought they
grew and became a real force in the local.
Only two candidates of the "Rank and File Slate"
won-one of them defeating Holmes' son. Bobby Jr.
However. the slate averaged 48% of the vote. In any event.
this election was only one milestone in an ongoing struggle.
That struggle may see ups and downs. but it is unlikely to
end without a decisive victory for one side or the other.
There is much about Local 337 and the Teamsters that
is unique. But cenain features of the forces in motion in
this Local can be found throughout most of the labor
movement and much of American industry.
T he idea of a rank and file movement arises from two
very material facts of American life and history: the
employers' offensive spurred by the economic crisis of the
past and present decades. and the bureaucratization of
American trade unions. Much has been written in
CHA NGES and elsewhere about the crisis and the
employers' offensive and I won't dwell on it here. But
before assessing the state and prospects of the various rank
and file movements, something does need to be said about
the bureaucratization of the unions.
1. What Is The Bureaucracy?
Bureaucracy in the unions is not just a matter of having
a big staff. a fleet of cars, fat salaries. or using heavy-
handed measures in dealing with the membership. These
things, in fact. derive from the more fundamental mean-
ing of a labor bureaucracy.
The labor bureaucracy it a social stratum within the
unions that is separated from the mass of the membersh!p
by various institutional baTTiers, as well as by lIfe-style and
income. Its existence as a distinct social stratum within the
institutions of the working class, with developed matenal
interests different from those of ordinary workers, deter-
mines much of the consciousness of the bUTeaucTacy.
As a relatively well·tQodo group in daily contact with
professionals ("other professionals" in their own view of
themselves) and with employers. they come to share much
of the outlook of the middle class and some of the assump·
[ions of the employers themselves-such as the view that
the workers' well·being is tied [0 the company's profitabili-
ty.
At the same time. as an "employee" of the workers and
their organizations. the labor bureaucrat tends to carry
these middle class and pro-em ployer views around in a
liberal or even social democratic context. Revolutionary
views are rare 3!I10ng bureaucrats partly because, as
Michels long ago pointed out in his classic study of the Ger-
man labor movement, the bureaucrat has already made
his or her "social revolution" by rising above the condition!;
of the class s/he represents.
Of course. there is a wide variety of thinking and
methods among -today's labor leaders - from gangster
unionism, through business unionism, to various forms of
social unionism. But these all share the central feature of
the consciousness of ,he I"bor bureaucracy: the deeply held
belief that ordinary wOTkers are incapable of running their
own oTganizations or of making the Tight decisIOns
concerning complicated m.atters of stTategy. tactics OT
politics.
B ureaucracy is also largely the product of a par-
ticular practice-that of class collaboration. In the
U.S., where union bureaucracy seems to have achieved
greater heights and extremes than in most countries. the
origins of bureaucracy in the major non-craft unions go
back to the 1940's and involve two levels of class collabora-
tion - industrial and political.
With the beginning of World War II 'he decision was
made, throughout the labor movement, to end the period
of confrontation between labor and management. Collec·
tive bargaining was no longer designed to increase che size
of labor's slice of the pie, but was to depend on the growth
of the pie. This meant tying bargaining goals to produc·
tivity _increa~es and the expansion of profit margins. (This
has remained the practice until recently when tht"
employers began to try [0 limit even farther the boundaries
of bargaining).
The political side of this turn toward class collaboration
involved labor's links to the Democratic Party. Although
this alliance began even before the CIO got off the ground,
it did not really achieve its institutional form until the
1940's. During that decade the debate over whether to stay
with the Democrats or launch a new party of labor was ter-
minated and the new labor Political Action Committees
were set up. Supposedly set up as arms of labor in the
political arena, they were, in fact, and still are. function-
ing subcommittees of the Democratic Party, influenced by
more often than influencing the party_
II. Collaboration and Bureaucratization
Both industrial collaboration and the alliance with the
Democratic Party demanded bureaucratization. Orderly
14
bargaining v.:ithin well understood, though seldom ar·
ticulated, limits required the exclusion of the mass of
members. After all, ignorant of the rules of the game, the
rank and file ~ight make "unrealistic" demands,
Thus over 'he years, the higher levels of leadership.
those who actually carry out relations with the employers,
have been insulaced from che direct (ontrol oi lower la yers
of the union.· At the same time, in many (perhaps most)
unions, the power of the lowest levels, the locals and the
shop floor organizations. has been gutted.
The only real exceptions to this are those unions dealing
with decemralized industries or with a wide variety of
employers. and which do not have national or regional
comracts. In these unions, regional or local baronies tend
to develop. forming geographic bureaucracies. as was the
case in the Teamsters before Hoffa.
T he alliance with [he Democratic Party was also a--
force for bureaucratization. This alliance was not a
democracic expresSion of labor's self-interest in politics. -It -
was an alliance with people from other classes, whose basic
interests were nO[ the same as labor's, even if they oyerlap-
ped at times. These were politicians loyal to their own
political organizations. whether that was an urban
machine, a refonn club, a more or less clean party
organization. or most importantly a fund raising network.
usually business dominated, of which labor was only one
small piece.
Labor's political activists never controlled the politi-
dans; rather they had to negotiate wich them, cajole, flat-
ter, beg, or pressure them. As in the "delicate" relations
with the employers, these sorts of politics do not call for
mass involvement, except on election day --long after all
. meaningful decisiqns have been made. So the important
political activists, those at or near the top presumed to
have the most influence with the politicians. had to be seal-
ed off from the membership.
This elitism not only dictates the workings of the AFL-
CIa and UAW political committee, (COPE/CAP). but
reaches into the structure of the union itself. Today, all
rnajar decisions on political strategy or legislative policy
arc made at the level of the national or international ex·
ccutive board. Conventions rubber·stamp these decisions.
As with most things in real life. there is no simple line of
demarcation denoting the borders of the labor
bureaucracy. It is a social phenomenon. not a geographic
one. The top officials must create a political machine that
reaches down to the locals.
The entirety of this machine cannot be regarded as the
bureaucracy. The union structure reaches through every
level of leadership and into the rank and file at the local
ievel. But neither can it be doubted thac the international
and regional officials. with their annies of usually ap-
pointed reps or agents. compose a bureaucracy in both the
sociological and political sense of the word.
III. Bureaucracy's Consequences
The consequence of bureaucratized unions is more than
just the conservative thought and behavior of the top
leaders. though those in themselves are a crucial barrier to
 -r,-
C1! gfi'"nuine defense of the the rank and· me of the
rm:ett'I1ht·rs;'- inlt'rt"sts. It means unIOns . though not hy thrir
that! tite unions as oTf{aniza· own choice.
!'lJml.'i..,. r"f(..ltnllt'sJ (~f thf' sllbjpc- Thr rmploy("rs, at lrast those
I;"p atlit",I" of the leadership, in the' crisis-ridden srctors of
amv unfit to wage effective the economy. have no intC'ntion
st7mgp;le. of backing off. Inaerd. thr Vf"ry
<D£ cou:rse-~ all unions are not willingness of some traditional-
tfur same in terms of structure. ly strong unions-notably the
tnd'itiom, or heavy· handed UAW, Teamsters, and
@1l3'cic... The U A W is not the UR W - to grant concessions
Teamsters... Some unions· like has whetted the employers' ap-
tin?- Rubber Workers or th.e Oil petites and visibly accelerated
ChemicaL and Atomic Workers the movement towaTd wage
(@(CAW) maintain a fairly high cutting· and concessions. Fur-
dI!gree of formal democracy. thermore, the Reagan victory
BUtt bureaucracy and the has opened a new floodgate of
ong;anizational oSsification that employer boldness in every
ffOWS; from. it are not simply a area_
qp1!!tion of democrati.c forms. Even the labor bureaucracy
important' as those are. has launched a few opening
Bllreaucracy can be as effee- shots. Marches and demonstra-
tirrel'l' nurrured and guarded by tions .this year by the United
pm:tttices- that create passivity Mine Workers, the railroad
irn tin?- membership ("leave the workers. and the Amalgamated
bm!gaining ta the experts") as Clothing and Textile Workers
by. goon, "'luads. Just as the were the first such action in
capitalist. class rules as much years. They will help legitimize
tbt:ough ideofogy as by force, '0 the idea of mass direct action.
d_the labor bureaucrat. The The March 28 anti·nuclear
diffirrence- in structure. in march on Harrisburg and, of
political. traditions, in methods United Mine Workers marched on Washington to protest course. the May 3 march in
ofT bureaucratic rule. will caU Reagan's threatened cuts in Black Lung benefits. Washington were also signs
fon different forms of rank and that times are changing. What
filft- motiorr.- and involvement. But the changes needed to then of the rank and file movement?
rnake-·even' the most formally democratic union into an ef-
fective- organization can never be accomplished without IV. Rank and File Movement
substantial; rank and file participation.
I have used the. term "rank and file movement"' to

T ~ his. means that making the unions effective again

involves more than just electing new people with
gpod: ideas-: to office. It means more than having a good
Cat1Q.US; to:; ic.ep your candidates honest and on the pro-
gram:. k rl!tfUires a restrucl\lring of the unions from bot-
torm. to' top.
Democratizing the structure; rebuilding workplace
organization: and returning power to the shop floor and to
th~'Ia-c,:al;-_building solidarity into the structure, rather than
t~ purposeful disunity now built into most unions;
diminatin~- the- subtle and not so subtle barriers to par·
tioipation,bywomen and minorities- these are some of the
things" that: must be done to make the unions fighting
OrmunzatiODs:... It will also be necessary to rewrite and
redefine most' contracts so they become instruments for the
protection:: au workers rather than proscriptions on worker
activity;_
These' are-- big tasks and it is diffi~ult to imagine ac-
complishinw them without a more intense level of class
stTU~tnhan:lwe have seen so far in the U.S. Hut that class
~tTUQtp-'is;prrcj.5("ly thl' ("Ont('Xl rhat is most likely to face
denote a specific form and aspect of class struggle. To be
perfectly accurate there is not yet one rank and fiie move-
ment aware of itself as such. Rather there are many rank
and file movements, taking many different forms.
Only one of these, Teamsters for a Democratic Union
(TDU). has a defined organizational form. Another, the
refonn movement in the Unitro SteelworkeTs. is large
enough to contest for significant power at the Inuarna·
tional level though it possesses little national organization.
And so far only one, the rank and file of the United Mine
Workers. is capable of sustained strike activity and massive
contract rejections on a national scale. though it has no
organizational form and only a poor series of networks in
geographical1y isolated are'as.
Most of today's rank and file movements are confined to
the local level and to a loose network of like-minded people
in other locals of the same union. A handful of people in
these many and diverse movements are conscious of events
in other unions and think of themselves as pan of a broad
movement. A significant portion of this last group are
sOl'i;,i ists.

15
 -14. -
Yet it is possible to see a movement in the making. To
say this means mOTe than lumping together disconnected
events, caUC'WBJ. or un;un elections and In'onouncing them
similar enough to, be regcn'dsa as a movement. whBther Of
not the participants aTe aware of themselves as a move-
menl, It is pOSJiblelo trac. the direction and dynamics of
some of the majar rank. and file developments of the last
decade or so, and some recent events that point toward a
broaan movement consciou.mess.
T he 1970's opened with a burst of rank and file ac-
tivity. The opening months of 'he decade saw ma-
jor national wildcat strikes of Teamsters. postal"workers
and coal miners. S.trike statistics in g~eral soared in the
laie '60's, reaching a climax in 1970. Large-scale rank and
me organization appeared in the form of the United Na-
tional Caucus (UNC) in the UA W, the Miners for
Democracy (MFD), and Teamsters United Rank and File
(TURF).
Within tWo or three years these organizations had disap·
peared_ Each, of course, had its own particular history and
reasons for decline_ But it also seems clear that the general
conditions that brought about the rise in strike activity, as
well as much of the impetus for these rank and file
movements, changed.
This first burs, of rank and me motion was a response to
the very early years of economic crisis. The twO major ef-
fects of 'he early unfolding of the crisis were inflation and
'he first phase of 'he employers' offensive-the a!lack on
working- conditions,
In some cases, deteriorating conditioJU were associated
with technolosical change, For example the rill! of mack
Lung, which played an important role in the birth of ,he
MFD. was a result of the mechanization of the coal mines
during 'he 1950's and was not widely recognized until 'he
mid-60's. The attack on working conditions was usually
gradual. and not often experienced universally or at the
same time by members-of the same union-in those days.
On the other hand, inflation, very universally experienc-
ed, abated for a period following 'he imposition of· wage-
price contTols in August. 1971. In any event, at that time.
the larger unions managed to stay ahead of inflation.
The conditions under which Dew rank and file activity
arose in the second half of the 1970's, and srill more so
those unfolding in the 'SO's. are both more severe and more
varied. Auto, trucking. coal. and many others were still
growth industries in 1970. Now many of these industries.
though not coal. are in crisis and decline.
Unemployment is twice the average level of the late 60's.
Inflation_ is about twice what it was in those }rears. Perhaps
most important is that ten years of crisis have pressured the
employers not only to broaden and deepen their at-
tacks- from conditions to wages. pension plans. medical
benefits. and just about everything they can get away
with - but in one case after another to break the whole
basic deal upon which post-war labor relations WeTe built.
Wages and benefits can no longer be assumed to rise.
even with the productivity rate, In 'pile of inllalion, waKe
cuts are on the agenda [see CHANGES, March 1981}. Pat-
16
tern bargaining has c.orne undone in several major in-
dustries.
Choked with bureaucratic structures and practices. the
UniOllj have been unwilling and unable to resj~t. The
pressures for rank and file militants to enter the vacuum
are enormous.
O f course, many of the problems facing workers to-
day are also at certain stages a deterrent to action.
. Unemploynient, plant closings, the apparent growth of
employer power bOlh on 'he job and in politics, all breed
caution as well as resistance. When fear will turn to anger
or frustration to action is impossible to predict. The rela-
tionship between changing conditions, consciousness, and
action is far too complex for this article to deal with.
The basic point is that the rank and file .movements.
organization and leaders that are taking shape in the early
1980's face a qualitatively different situation than 'he
. movements of the la,e '60's and early '70's.
It is not simply a matter of economic conditions, plus
growing employer hostility. It is, ralheT, the unravelling of
the entire Amencan system of LabOT relations in the con-
1.",/ of a significant swing to the Tight in the political think-
ing and actions of the American capitalist clas,.
It is not simply wages and conditions that are at stake. A
vacuum is being created out of which a new system of labor
relations will emerge. If the unions are mortally weakened,
then the new system will be one of nearly absolute
employer domination. with the remnants of the old unions
serving as a companymunion fig-leaf (perhaps under the
"Quality of Work Life" banner?). '
If this ia to be prevented lhe union~ wiil h~ ve '0 b.
remolded, as they were in ,he 1950', when a basic change
in labor relations occurred. This is inconceivable without
mass rank and file involvement.
V. Resistance: A Case Study
One of the first unions to experience the unravelling of
traditionallahor relations was the Teamsters. ]n particular
this inv.olved dismantling the Master Freight Agreement
(MFA) and the pattern it set for numerous other jurisdic-
tional contractso Contract conceSsions began as early as
1970, shordy after Frank Fitzsimmons double-crossed Jim-
my Hoffa,
TDU. the rank and file organization discussed at the
beginning of this anicle, was born out of the fight around
MFA and related contracts in 1976. Most of its subsequent
growth has come from fights around scores of national and
local contracts.
Of course, TDU is often most known for union reform
activity - bY laws campaigns. elections. getting elected
9
stewards, pension reform, membership rights. And TDU
has accomplished much in these areas. But the emphasis of
TDU activity is on the fight with the eIT.. ployers, both a[
contract time and daily on the job.
While TDU began as a fight for a better contract, today
the bulk of its effl)rts is resistance to the cascade of conces·
.ion••weeping .1111001 every branch uf the trucking in:
9ustry-and many other jurisdictions covered by 'he IBT
 ,,"
- :J: 7 -
as well. Sometimes. these fights are successful. as in the
fight against "flexible work week" at Consolidated
Freightways in Columbus, Ohio and sev~ral other places.
The main focusofTDU activity at the 1981 IBT conven-
tion was around a resolution calling for an end to conces-
sions, defense of pattern bargaining, and laying out a pro-
gram, for accomplishing these ends.
Teamsters for a Decent Contract. predecessor to TDU.
was born in 1975 at a meeting attended by 30 Teamsters.
mostly from the mid-west. TDU now claims about 8.000
members in 40 chapters in the U.S. and Canada. TDU's
1980 Convention was attended by about 500 Teamsters.
TDU-backed candidates have won local executive board
or top officer seats in about two dozen locals. including
some very important locals in the mid-west and on the west
coa••. A few of these candidates have "defected" after be-
ing in a pn.itinn of pow.r for a while. rollecting the dilem-
ma of reformers operating in a bureaucratic: set-up. Most
have heJd (rue, helping to strengthen the position from
which TDU carries out its campaigns. At the 1.976 IBT
convention both PROD (Professional Road Drivers Coun-
cil, an earlier Teamster reform group that has since merg-
ed with TDU) and TDe were represented by one lone
delegate. Pete Camarata. This year. in spite of a system
that makes it almost impossible to elect rank and file can-
dida.es. TDU will have about 25 delegates.
•
T he dynamic behind TDU's growth is the same as we
saw in the example of Local 337 that opened this
essay. The employers' offensive. combined with union
cooperation with that offensive, intensifies to the point
where it can't be ignored. Rank and file activists. few in
number to begin. more as the fight unfolds. attempt to fill
the vacuum. But it is a vacuum surrounded by a wall. The
rank and file activists must fight their way in. Hence they
take on the union leadership in order to fight the
employers more effectively.
Numbers alone don't explain how a rank and file move-
ment such as TDU, and probably most others. begins laef-
feet change. In its early days, and still in most locals and
areas, TDU attempted to influenl:e eVents through
pressure tactics. This explains the enlphasis on contract
campaign- and hy-Iawa campaign •.
Essentially an active minority. with no positions of
powrr. mmlt tty to mohilil(" gTe'3tf"r numhrrs to prt"ro.t;urr
the incumbent leadership to act righl. TOU had above-
average succes with such campaigns. But sometimes it
doesn't work out. The 1979 Master Freight campaign. for
example, never got much momentum.
But as TDUers get elected and actuany hold a measure
of power, the possibilities-and the frustrations- become
greater.
In effect, it appears that rank and file movements work
their way up the structure of the union, until they have tht'"
power base to contend at the Int('rnational level. In the
IBT this scenario is imposed by the union's constitution.
There is no referendum vote for International officers. and
except for very large locals only local officers go to conven-
tions.
17
As we shall see this notion of building from the bottom
up appears to have some validity in the Steel Workers and
Mine Workers as wen, even though those unions have the
referendum vote for top officers.
For at least some TOUers this notion is explicit. In a
speech to the Association for Union ~ocracy's con-
ference last fall. TDU international organizer. Ken Pafr
~d: ' .
There's a lot of talk about refonning the unions. That is. of
coune. what we say we are doing. But I really think you can
understand when I say that what we are reany doing is
rebuilding the union from the bottom to the top.
In this context. sometimes I think we are really lucky to
have so few rights. That may sound ridiculous. and I cer·
tainly don't mean it literally. There is. howf'v~r. an element
or truth to it. In a way we're ronunate that we don't have
such rights as voting on our top officers, because we don't
have the option oC rallying around one individual and try·
ing to make a quick change. If we could vote Cor Frank Fitz·
simmons. he couldn't win an election for anything. Not for
dog.catcher. Anywhere. But we don't have that option. We
have to build rrom the bottom. among the grassroots. and I
think. we are building on a sounder roundation as a result.
A n important part of that foundation is leadership.
Contrary to the old Wobbly phrase "we are all
leaders here". movements. th~ Wobblies included. have
always needed leaders. From the start TDU has always put
an emphasis on leadership training. One of the worst con-
sequences of bureaucratic unionism has been the attempt
by the officials to mon,?polize the skills needed to run a
union.
The mere act of building TDU has helped innumerable
rank and' file Teamsters break that monopoly. But TDU
has also conducted a conscious leadership training pro-
gram over the years open to all. As a result TDU does
possess a national leadership cadre. as well as many
talented local leaders. It is this. among other things. that
makes TDU a durable and viabJe nation~l organization.
Such a development takes years of experience. in strug·
gles and in acquiring skill.. It i. qui.e likely that the
relatively quick win achieved by the Miners for Democracy
in a little over two years. from 1970 to 1972, contributed to
the collapse of the MFD leadership once it took office in
th~ UMW. and 10 Ih~ Iragic demiar of MFO iuelf.
VI. Other Movements Slowly Growing
The reform forces in the Steelworkers first emerged as a
visible national force during Ed Sadlowski's campaign for
International President in 1977. Sadlowski did well. carry-
ing basic steel, but was not able to win. After that the
reform movement seemed to disappear as a national force.
but in reality it did not disappear at all. It grew. but its ac·
tivities were localized except for a moderatt"iy effective in-
tervention at tht' 1978 International convention. By 1981
these localized forces grew enough to mount a serious
challenge at the International level in several District elec·
tions held in May.
The results of the elections were mixed. but overall a
 defeat. Jim Balanoff, director of District 31 and the first
open ft·rormt~r to win lnternatiomd office, was narrowly
defeated.
Along with Balanoff, four other open reformers ran as a
group. They held a national press conference and declared
a joint program: Joe Samargia (District 33), Ron Weisen
(District 15), David Patterson (District 6) and Marvin
Weinstock (District 27). Only one of these four won, Dave
Patterson of Canada's District 6. His victory seems to have
been largely a result of Canadian issues and was one of the
few elections to show a larger than average turnout; in
District 31, for example, about 6,000 fewer people voted
this time than in 1977. The Q[her three reformers iost,
although most did well.
Two other candidates, who did not run in association
with Balanofr but whose programs and approach to
unionism are similar. won. Dave Wilson from Sparrow's
Point (Baltimore) Local 2609 and Harry Lester in District
29 (Michigan) beat pro·international candidates. Lester
won by a big margin, Wilson by • plurality in a three way
race.
The reasons for reform candidates' defeat are
numerous. BalSically. though. they underline the fact that
even where reform forces are large there are still vast
numbers of union members willing to vote for and support
a conservative approach to unionism.
Before the election Balanoff stated that he hoped ana·
A 1976 rally of Teamsters tor a Decent Contract atl8T headquarters in Washington. D.C. The '76 contract fight was a first step in building a
national Teamsters rank and file movement.
18
tional reform organization would" come out of the cam-
paiJ{n. It is an t'lll"our4lginK siKn that Ill" has rt"ptOattod this
idl'a fullowing hi,s defeat. Indeed. this could make aU the
diffeJ;cnce as far as the future of this movement is can·
cerned.
The inability of reform forces to effectively intervene at
the national level probably hun the credibility of the
reform .caRdidates. The reformers. were not seen as a force
to change International policy, which is a prerequisite to
changing the deteriorating balance of power between work
and company in an industry like steel, but as individuals.
In cases like this people will often vme for the "safer"
choice rather than a rebel who can be i~olated by the Inter-
national. and whose district can be rendered ineffective
because of the disfavor of the lnternationat A bigger idea,
a. projected national force. is often required to break
through this all toO materially-based worker conservatism.
T he rank and file movement in the United Mine
Workers is even more difficult to assess because of
the shadow cast by the failure of the MFD and its leader·
ship. which has created a suspicion of reformers as ineffec-
tive people. At the same time, the initial successes of MFD,
its fairly thorough· going democratization of the structu're
of the UMWA. has lessened the need for union reform in
the most conventional sense. Nevertheless, opposition to
c.
 -17-
the CUTrent leadership of Sam Church is undoubtedly
widespread.
The surface signs of this are the miners' 2·1 rejection of
the first contract approved by Church, and the results of
some of the district elections that occurred during the
strike. The first contract was viewed, quite correctly. as a
further erosion of the basic integrity of the union.
Indeed. the issues that united militants in the UMWA.
without any national rank and file organization. are those
related to the declining power of the union. This concern
was reflected in the district elections, where several incum-
bants associated with the first contract and generally. sup-
portive of Church were turned out by morc militant can-
didatc5.
In December, a rank .and file slate in District 6 (Ohio)
put Ed Bell in as District President and Tony Bumbico as
International Executive Board member. Rich Trumka. a
miner who earned a law degree and served on the UMWA
staff in Washington for a time. was elected Board
representative from District 4 (Western Pa.) by an 11·1
margin in May. Cecil Patterson, the popular vice· president
of District 17 (West Virginia), the union's largest, was the
initiator of tht" rany - which was originally to be directed
against the oil companies-in Pittsburgh early in the
strike-~ These are some of the leaders who could become
prominent in a reborn rank and file movement in the , which was the first response of many auto workers to the
UMWA.
Yet there is little or no coordination between districts
and no organization within district. The sweep of ap'
parently more militant candidates was not coordinated
(even to the extent of the reform candidates in the
Steelworkers) and it is by no means clear that these new In-
ternational Executive Board members wi11 represent a
unified force.
Part of the lack of organization stems from the relatively Region 6 (California) delegates. One oppositionist was a
democratic set·up of the UMWA. It has always been possi-
ble for militants to controllo_cals and. since the changes in-
stituted by MFD, for local leaders to function together at
the district levf"l.
Hence a separate caucus seems superfluous to the
militants. But this perception has made it'all the more dif·
ficult for them to maintain control at the national
level--at first over Miller. then to pr~vent Church's con·
solidation of power. It has also retarded steps toward na'
tional coordination.
Still. it must be considered that there is a rank and file
movement in the UMW A. It is as yet disorganized, which is
the case in most unions, and without any recognized na·
donal leadership. The hope is that leaders at the local.
district and even International levels will see the nero for
greater coordination and organization if the disastrous
decline of that union is to be stopped.
A fter the United National Caucus (UNC) declined
and died in the early 1970's, the rank and file move·
ment in the UAW seemed almost to disappear. Opposition
at conventions was minimal, attempted contract cam·
paigns ineffective. opposition to the Woodcock- and Fraser
leadership confined to the local level.
19
The Independent Skilled Trades Council (ISTC), led by
a number of former UNC leaders. arose in the mid-1970·s,
It has had considerable support at various times and is
definitely critical of the International leadership, but it is
not a national opposition caucus and represents only skill-
ed tradesmen.
In the last year or so, a national network of locally-based
oppositionists has taken some modest steps toward
rebuilding a national rank and file movement. In 1980,
the Rank and File Exchange was set up. This is not an
organization and has no formal program. Its function is to
exchange local literature-newsletters, leaflets, etc. More
recently, short "editorials" on UAW policies have been ad·
ded. While extremely modest in its goals, the Exchange
has helped to re·establish a national network of activists.
One outcome of this network building has been a plan·
ned series of national meetings of rank and file activists
and oppositionists. The first of these, held last Spring. was
called a "think tank" and attempted to deal in an educa-
tional manner with the crucial and difficult issues facing
the auto industry and the union. The next national
meeting is set fOT the Fall and will attempt to bring a
broader group of militants.
It also seems that this year's local elections represented
some small break with the generally conservative trend
crisis of the industry. Last year's df"legate and local elec·
tions had seen conservative. pro-International candidates
sweep most contests. This year, while no mandate for op· .
position appeared. militants generally did better and in
many cases, though still a minority of cases. won.
Another significant development occurred at last year's
UAW convention. For the first time in ages a genuine op'
position to a Regional Director was mounted, among
staffer. who was'subsequently fired after he lost. The other
was Bob Berghoff, leader of a large caucus in aerospace
Local 148. The two oppositionists together got 40% of the
. \'Of~, R('"rghoff was fir('"d hy his employ~r shortly aft~r the
con\'cntion, but has won a favorable arhitration award.
Other networks of dissidents exist in the two transit
work('rs unions. the Transport Workers Union (TWU) and
the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU). In both these
unions there has been considerable reform and opposi-
tional activity. In both New York and Philadelphia signifi-
cant opposition groupings have challenged old leadership.
both in elections and at contract time.
In Philadelphia, a rank and file caucus called Driving
Force worked with others to elect a new leadership and
played a leading rolf" in the recent victorious transit strike
th('rc. Much of the opposition in New York and
Philadelphia is based among Black workers.
There is also a group in Milwaukee. in the ATU, around
a newsletter called "Running Hot." Most of these groups
are based among city transit workers. but there is some ac·
tivity among Greyhound drivers in the ATU. A step toward
national activity was taken when a Transit Network,
basically a sharing of information and newsletters based on
the model of .a Rank and File Exchange organized by
UA W activists, was set up last year.
 -J9-
National networks of dissidents exist in the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and the
Laborers International Union. In the case of hoth these
building trades unions the networks are extremely loose.
consisting of little more than exchanges of letters acca'
sionally.
While the local rebellions upon which these networks are
based are real- a couple in the Laborers have taken local
office - the networks themselves exist largely as a result of
contact with outside forces. These are the Association for
Union Democracy (AUD) in the caSe of the IBEW
reformers, and the writing and publishing of the August
1980 Mother Jones article on the Laborers. Yet, as loose as
these may be thc::y represent a step toward a movement in
the future.
While both AUD and Moth .. Jones have. documented
the fairly widespread existence of opposition within these
unions. the lack of national contracts and the regional and
local nature of construction work have held back the
development of a national consciousness. However. the
growth of large·scale national and even international can·
struction finns. a general crisis in large pans of that in-
dustry. and a vicious and highly coordinated union-
busting drive organized by the Big Business users of con-
tract construction. all point toward the need and growing
likelihood of national coordination.
I n addition to the more or less national rank and file
movements and networks we have described. and
some we may have overlooked. there are countless local
rebellions. groups and organizations that represent a mili-
tant. democratic rank and.m,e unionist outlook.
Some have achieved important electoral victories. These
include the rank and file group in Local 2 of t1"!e Hotel and
Restaurant Workers in the Bay Area. and those in the west
coast Inland Boatmen's Union (an autonomous affiliate of
the IL WU). Many more have won one or two spots on a
local e~ecutive board.
What does seem dear is that the militants. dissidents
and reformers who compose the emerging rank and file
movements are no longer simply critics with a newsletter.
They h'ave become contenders for and increasingly holders
of power at the local union level. They bring not only a
negative critique of union functioning to office. but in
most cases a program for fighting the em ployer and for
making the union an effective instrument in that fight.
Within the last year. another step forward was taken
toward a genuine nadonal rank and file movement con-
sciousness in the form of two importanc events: the
Association for Union Democracy (AVO) Conference in
Occober 1980 and the LaboT Noles conference in April
19H1. Both of these meetings brought together rank and
file militants for the first time in a national context, [0
tlj!iCUS5 shan'u problems. The AUU cunference was attend·
ed by over 300 people. while the Labor Nules conference
attraC[ed almost 600 regi~trams.
The compositions of the twO conferences overlapped as
might be expected. but there were also differences. The
AUD. which concentrates almost exclusively on issues of
20
union democracy and membership rights. attracted more
building trades dissidents. The LaboT Notes conference
was attended by a generally younger group. with a concen-
tration in the big industrial unions and a higher propor-
tion of political leftists.
The differences. however, can be overstated. For both
the building trades dissidents and the younger
radicals - and of COUfse. everyone between the two on the
political scale-share an understanding of the employers'
offensive. Both understand that the rightward shift in the
political atmosphere and policy·making is part of the at·
tack on workers and their unions. and see the unions as the
central vehicle in the immediate future for resisting these
trends and turning matters around.
N o doubt there is disagreement on larger goals. Like
any social movement the rank and file movements
of today have a left, right and center. Most important at
this point in the development of a rank and file movement,
however, is the common immediate goals and the will·
ingness and desire [0 work together. to draw strength from
cooperation and unity.
The significance of these two conferences did not lie in
any of the speeches or workshops. although many were ex·
ceHent. It Jay in the fact that hundreds of rank and file in~
surgents could get together and become conscious of
themselves as part of something bigger. They were
evidence of the emerging movement, and events aiding the
construction of that movement. Bor.h AUD and LaboT
Notes are planning more conferences.
Neither of these conferences provided :J single strategy
or perspective for the broader movement. The AVD con-
ference limited itself mostly [0 questions of democracy and
rights. The LaboT Notes conference attempted to deaJ with
a much broader range of strategic. tactical. and political
questions, but still did not project what many who came
wanted: a coml!lonly held direction for this movement.
The reasons for this do not lie in the intentions of the
conference organizers, but in the nature of the emerging
movement itself. While there are easily articulated com·
man goals and analyses of the general situation (nature of
[he bureaucracy, crisis and employers offensive), the
American trade union movement is very diverse.
Structures, political tradicions. the quality of leadership,
and the nature of the industries bargained with, all differ
from union to union. As the waves of the emp!oyers' offen·
sive hit these unions. some as a tidal wave, some as only a
vigorous surf. they affect the internal lives of these unions
in different ways-calling for somewhat different tactics
and strategies in rebuilding the unions from [he bottom
up.
he "TDU MOth·I" i5 one pu~iuiJjty. III ulhn ulliuns
T , a more sociolugically "mixed" movement· may
t"nlt·rg-e. One example.' of this is the Oil Chemil'ai and
Atomic Workers (OCAW). The campaign of OCAW
Health & Safety Director Tony Mazzocchi for President
reveaJs a split in the hierarchy of that union. But it is by no
 -,.~- ~
a;;
.J WITH,'llJKF.
,'II\rlm
lOOl UNION 6787
'.t:"
Steelworkers join anti·nuclear march in Harrisburg. Pa on March 28, 1981.
means just a contest between two top bureaucrats. one
more to the left than the other.
Mazzocchi has led over the years a growing movement
within the union over health and safety issues. Mazzocchi's
popularity (hr moarly won la!t timt") !trm!ll from hi! will·
ingness to unleash the· rank and file. Because it is a
relatively democratic union, the local leaders who support
him tend to be genuine rank and file leaders. the same sort
of people you lind leading a TDU chapter. or heading up a
UMWA local.
While both the health and safety movement and the
campaign are not rank and file movements in the usual
sense of the term, they do have a certain Tank and fiI("
aspect and can be part of ending bun~aucratic practices
and thinking in that union.
Similar developments could unfold in some other
unions. This is panly because a great many bureaucrats
realize that their organizations are incapable. as currently
constituted. of resisting the growing attack on union power
and. in more and more cases, on unionism itself. Most of
the thinking that follows this realization is itself thoroughly
bureaucratic - mergers that create bigger unions. but also
even more grotesque structures; organizing drives directed
at workers with no relation to the major jurisdictions of the
union but which increase the treasury; letterhead coali-
tion~ "representing" millions of p('opie but shrinking from
the mobilization of those people.
However, it is possible that some bureaucrats, perhaps
those at slightly lower levels of the hierarchy. will take a
genuine left tum. In that case, it would make sense for
rank and file miJitants to support that deveiopmeRt.
21
kfAGAN ~~;
1010'- IDle
_·USWA·
BURNS HARBOR.-IND.
VII. The Common Denominator:
Organization
None of this. however. is to say that genuine grass roots
mov("mf'nt and organization can or should be bypa~s('d. It
is evident that as long as the structure of the union is out of
the hands of its members. to whatever degree· and in
whatever form. the need for some level of organization and
coordination i. needed. Thi. i. true both in the light with
the employers and in the arena of internal union ..aairs. It
is also likely to prove true in the realm of politics and coali-
tions.
A part of the dire-ction for the rank and me movement as
a whole. then. is the question of organization. The next
step for the insurgents or refonners in almost any union is
to improve the level and quality of organization. For some
unions, the Steel Workers for example. this may mean
founding a national opposition organization. Whereas in
the IBT this became possible and necessary because of the
exclusion of the members from that union's political struc-
ture, it is the reform forces' penetration of the hierarchy of
the USW which makes that sort of step possible and
necessary in that union.
In unions where actual organization among the more
conscious militants is not yet possible. networks of the
Rank and File Exchange sort now operating in the UA W
should be considered. Premature organization can be
isolating. An information network. a national contract
campaign. or some form of inteTVention at a national con-
vention may be more appropriate, given the forces that ex-
ist in most unions right now. But the direction should be
 "The main thrust for the labor party idea:comes
from the lower echelons of labor.
Sympathy for this idea diminishes as one moves up
the ladder toward those most intimately involved
with the higher layers of the Democratic Party.
The major exceptions to this are among a small
group of top leaders who see the need for broader
change within the unions, like Tony Mazzocchi,
whose keynote speech at the Labor Notes
conference focussed on the labor party issue."
~ Tony Mazzocchi

toward higher levels or organization. filers. local officials. and sometimes organizers, who are
engaged in a snuggle for democratic, collective ends for

T he need for this sort of organization does not flow

from the need to insulate the militants from the
temptations of progressive bureaucrats, or from the desire
[0 remain pure and honest. Consciousness of masses of
workers. not organizational structure, is the only ultimate
defense against bureaucratic practice.
The need for rank and file organization flows simply
from two very basic facts. The first is the very material fact
that. on a national or'International scale. the union struc-
ture is not accessible to the ranks. Thus. if the insurgents
are, in fact. going to conduct struggle against the
employers, coordinate activity, carryon education and
train leaders. it will require organization.
The second. perhaps even more important. reason for
this is that the struggle to rebuild the unions is a political
struggle. in spite of 'he fac' ,hat much of 'he language of
this political struggle is sociological ("bureaucracy" versus
"rank and file"). The content of the fight between Tanks
and bureauCTats, between two social strata in the unions, is
a Left veTSUS Right struggle.
The rank and file movement represents a left-right fight
between [he historic values of the working class movement
and those of conservativisffi, class collaboration. in fact, of
bourgeois ideas in the labor movement.
It is a political fight in its most embryonic and inconsis·
tent form. but it is political nonetheless.
Bureaucracy is a conservative phenomenon which
breeds conservative thinking. On the spectrum of
American bourgeois politics - the only kind currently
practiced in the major electoral arenas ~ bureaucratic
labor politics usually fall well left of center. But this is
simply a relative characterization. Bureaucratic politics.
the politics of class collaboration, are, in the context of the
labor movement and of the interests of the working da~ as
a whole, right· wing politics.
VIII. The Political Struggle
And The Role Of Socialists
Within the institutions of the working class. primarily
limited in the U.S. to trade unions. the basic values of the
left. the fundamental content of a genuinely working class
uutlouk. arc.' t'mbudied in the valul's of those r~lOk. and
their union. .
It is not that all rank and mers are to the left of all
bureaucrats in all situ~tions. And certainly, the vast rna·
jo-rity of rank and file activists do not view themselves as
socialists. Indeed, a higher percentage of labor
bureaucrats than union members would call themselves
"socialists," either active or sentimental.
We are not speaking of how people view themselves at
any moment. but about the actual content and direction of·
their views and consciousness. Democracy. collective
responsibility. solidarity. the drawing of clear class lines.
sqcial equality (in this case within the institutions of the
class), and mass action are all fundamental values of the
historic socialist movement. They are aU abhorred in prac-
tice-if not in rhetoric-by coday's labor bureaucracy.
T his leads us to the next important difference be·
tween the presently emerging rank and file
movements. on the one hand. and those of the early '70's
on the uther. That difference is [he existence of a signifi-
cant socialist left within the major industrial, service and
public employee unions at the local and rank and file
levels.
A slice of this trade union Left showed up at the LaboT
Notes conference discussed earlier. It is relatively young,
Out has achieved considerable seniority. experit'ncc and
maturity. A surprising proportion have gained lo(.'al union
office above the level of steward and appear to have a gen-
uine following with varying degrees of organization.
The vast _mqjority at the conference were not in groups.
though some had probably passed through one or another
socialist organization. Many of these people were radicals
who had gone into industry years ago, mhers were
radicalizt'"9, workers. In age. style and political outlook this
distinction did not seem to have much operational mean·
109 anymore.
Reflected at the LaboT Notes conference was a desire for
a unified direction for this trade union Left. In·spite of the
fact that these people came from a variety of political
backgrounds, representing a broad spectrum of views on
the nature of the Soviet Union or China. party· building,
and no doubt reVOlutionary strategy. there was also broad
.lgrt·('IIH·lIt Oil dw issu('!\ of tilt" day solid~Hity with EI

22
 Salvador and the workers' movement in Poland, for exam-
ple.
This Left trade union milieu does not yet repres~nt a
cohe-Trnt politic-a) trt'nd in tht' unions. But it dOt'S r("pr('-
sent. in the longer run. a part of the human material for
socialist regroupment. and in the shorter run a key element
in the Iradrrship of the emerging rank and fil(" mov("mrnts.
This is not to imply some sort of phony vanguardism in
which the Left dreams up an elaborate program. sets its
own agenda, and attempts to impose this on the various
opposition organizations. The spectacle, common enough
a few years ago. of tiny caucuses with platforms embracing
an or most of the Left's favorite planks and then remaining
isolated. is familiar enough to most trade union radicals
that they want to avoid a repetition.
Rather. the role of the Left - at this point - is to provide
the "Big Picture." It must construct, for the emerging
movement as a whQle. a picture of the crisis in America.
the collapse of traditional labor relations. the nature of
bureaucracy and its role in this process, the alternative
systems of labor relations that He ahead. and the most
pressing political directions that flow from this picture.
This understanding can become the glue for the day-to·
day tactical leadership provided in the scores of separate
u!lions and hundreds of locals. and the overall guide for a
p·olitical strategy for labor that can be carried out as the
movements actually gain some power at the various levels
of the union.
IX. Labor Party: A Coming Idea?
The rank and file movements, like labor as a whole. ex·
ist in the context of a general crisis. Foreign policy. social
questions. basic economic policy and the whole alignment
of American politics are matters of pressing concern to
labor and the working class as a whole.
A broad program on a new system of labor relations can
be a useful tool for building rank and file consciousness
now .. In only the slightly longer run, the emerging move·
ment needs an outline of goals on the broader questions
and the fundamentals of a political strategy to achieve
them.
In particular. we believe that the notion of a laboT par-
ty. and of some initial steps toward that goal. aTe central to
this strategy and to a qualitative step forward in political
class consciousness.
Labor party sentiment is on the rise in a number of
unions. As militants and radical!!; gain influence and power
at the local level. it becomes possible to project concrete
action on this question at the local and state levels-which
is. historicaJIy where labor party JJlovements begin in the
U.S. This was illustTated recently at the May 15 meeting of
120 California local union officials. called to discuss steps
toward a labor party.
In the U.S. the question of the labor party does not arise
primarily as an extension of the interests of the labor
bureaucracy. a~ it did in turn·of-the-century 8ritain or
Canada of the 1950's, although elements of this may enter
into it. Primarily. the rise of labor party sentiment heTe has
occurred in periods of mass struggle initiated to a large ex·
23
tent at th(" r'ank and file level.
This was true in the early CIO days and remained tTue
. until the top levels of the union hierarchy stifled that
debate in th(" late '40'5. It is true again today. where the
main thrust for the labor party idea comes from the lower
echelons of labor. Sympathy for this idea diminishes as on("
mov('S up th(" ladder toward those most intimately involved
with the higher levels of the Democratic Party. The major
exceptions to this are among a small group of top leaders
who see ·the need for broader change within the unions,
. like Tony Mazzocchi. whose keynote speech at the LAbaT
Notes conference focused on the labor pany issue.
None of this is to say that some or even many top
bureaucrats will not jump on the bandw~gon or be con-
verted down the road. What it does mean is that the fight
for such independent class politics. for realignment on
class lines. will depend on a dynamic from below. which in
tum will significantly depend on the role of the Left.
This is not a call for a shower of labor party resolutions
within rank and file organizations or movements. The rank
and file movements. insofar as they are real. depend on be-
ing much broader than the Left.
Neither TDU, nor the reform forces in the USW or th~ .
UMWA, could agree on this question. As we said. the rank
and file movments have a left. right and center: and the
unity of these around a program fOT the union and fight
against the employers gives the movement its strength. To
blow this apart with clumsy political moves would be a
disaster.
T he role of the Left of these movements on questions
like the labor party is. right now, primarily an
educational one. Activity around the labor party need not
have the stamp of approval of the opposition group. In-
deed, without formally identifying the labor party as an
oppositional platfonn. one may get more support from
those who do not necessarily view themselves as opposi.
tionists. such as local or state officials.
In carrying out the tasks of buiJding a more political
rank and file movement. the Left should not fall into the
formalism of seeing one organizational form (the opposi.
tion caucus) as necessarily the vehicle for all these tasks.
To put it another way. the rank and file group, be it na-
tional or local, is not "the party." "Other organizational
forms embodying somewhat different forces at various
times can be found for different tasks. For example. one
can think of a labor committee against intervention in EI
Salvador, such as was set up in New York before the May 3
March on Washington; an independent committee to
organize discussion and/or initiatives where possible
toward independent politiCal action by labor as in Califor-
nia: or the many local miners support committees set up
recently to aid that strike.
X. A Program For Industrial Action
Between th~ specific program of change for each union
and the big questions of political stratt"gy for the ·RO·s. lies
another level of program that is important in the develop·
 'ment of rank and file unionism. A movement that projects
itself as an alternative leadership of a new kind of union
must also have something to say about what the labor
movement as a whole can do to reverse the degenerating
balance of power between labor and capital.
Labor power in the electoral arena is based on its
numbers and its ability to marshal resources. But a far
more fundamental power - for industrial. social and
political change -lies in its ability to bring industry" com-
merce and even government to a halt. It is this power. most
of all. that is key to a positive change in the balance of
forces in society. This power is also the most feared and
fragmemed by the bureaucracy_ Yet it is doubtful if the
unions can be saved without the skillful use of this power.
The growth of multi national corporations, can·
9
glomerates. and the flight of capital to the south and
abroad have all weakened labor's traditional strength in
'many industries. Yet there are obvious steps that could be
taken. yet have not been_ Organizing the sou,h and other
unorganized workers in ilew elements of conglomerates is
one step. This is not a matter of the slight increments in
such activity that some unions make from year to year, but
of a coordinated crusade.
To be successful this will involve using the power of
.organized workers to pressure the company into accepting
the union in unorganized units. in the case of con·
glomerates that have moved South. Such actions. not
technically a secondary boycott. could have been used by
uI\ions like the Rubber Workers to prevent the growth of a
majority non-union sector in an industry that was once
nearly 100% union_
Combined with coalition bargaining, the use of the
strike weapon in more powerful units of a conglomerate
could help smaller units win quicker victories. Such action
in the case of Colt Industries, for example, could mean vic-
tory for the strikers at Colt's Menasco steel subsidiary.
Steps have been taken toward coordinated bargaining at
Colt. but there is still an unwillingness by other unions to
strike in support of the Machinists at Menasco. Indeed. the
whole set·up of coordinated bargaining spelled out by the
Industrial Union Dept. of 'he AFL-CIO i. a nightmare of
protocol and red tape that precludes tactical t1exibility.
Organizing the unorganized calls for the rcptaal uf Stat.--
tion 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act which
governs strike activity, including the prohibition of tht"
"secondary boycott" - a basic traditiunal tool of labor
solidarity _ Given the current political atmosphere such a
repeal is unlikdy \ and in a.ny case is [lot even part of labor's
official legislative program. This being the case labor
must, in Sidney Lens' words, choose morality over legality
and use the secondary boycott where it can make a dif-
ference.
O rganizing the unorganized. coalition bargaining,
and the judicious use of the strike weapon and
secondary boycott co build solidarity are all things that
could improve the balance of power between labor and
capital. But the stumbling block of political conservativism
now in power in Washington calls for something more.
24
Part -of building a labor party involves the mobilization
of the union membership in mass direct action:
demonstrations, marches. rallies, and the political strike.
both general and specific. Apathy and cynicism can be
broken thro'Ugh such mobilizations. directed at political
goals_
Labor has not won anything of significance for so long
because no one in political power takes it seriously or
believes' it will break [he gentlemanly rules now governing
labor's relation to the legislative process. It is time to be
taken seriously.
As much as these steps would benefit the labor
bUTeaucracy by incTeasz"ng its own poweT and influence,
and as awaTe as they aTe of all these ideas, they aTe paTalyz-
ed by theiT own proceduTes, feaTS. and pTaclices fTom caT-
rying them. out.
Hence these ideas, which are reasonable in the eyes of
most union activists let alone oppositionists. tend to
underline the need for a new leadership and a different
kind of unionism_ They are part of the rank and file
movements' program for remaking .the unions.
The period we face is one of great change. The institu-
tions, good and bad, of American labor relations are com·
ing rapidly undone. Traditional. conservative means of
resistance are increasingly ineffective. The te~ under
which the bureaucracy held its authority over the union
membership are being eroded for all to see_
These trends are accompanied by a significant shift [0
the right by 'he employers and their politicians. With it
goes the unravelling of the political rules of the game
under which labor has functioned. and around which it
has developed its gentlemanly modes of political behavior
for the past 40 yeaTS_
It is, in shoft, a time of great danger and of great oppor-
tunity for the American working class and its most active
elements. Rank and file movements. mostly still weak or
embryonic. a few strong ~nough to achieve public visibility
and contend for higher union offices. can move into the
vacuums that will be created and open up situations that
still appear closed.
They can, over the course of this decade, become a new
generation of leadership for a union movement that cries
out fur rt·shapiIlK. Alollg- with the rise ill Uiack at.-tivism.
dlC.~ WOfllt"'U'S movemcnt. and the uew anti-war and anti·
militarist movement that has exploded on the scene, this
rauk and filt.· movement provic.lc~ Ullt." of the be~a hupes fur
political and social change in [he 'MO's.
The Left in the traue unions has a specific responsibility
to build these rank and fik movements, and to move the
consciousness of their activists toward broader class con-
sciousness. That means building lhe self-awareness of the
rank dUO tile movement across union lines. as a class move·
ment wich the historic tasks of rebuilding the labor move·
ment and launching the fight for labor's political in-
dependence.
These are tasks that fall short of the achievemem of
socialism. But the struggle required to achieve these goals,
whether or not they are ever fully achieveu. are most cer·
tainly among the preconditions for the longer-range strug-
gle for workers' power and socialism. 0
 from CRAJroES,. Oct. 1981.

II~ lrltil~
BY KIM MOODY
This article is taken from Kim Moody's presentation on
the Tole JOT the left in the trade union movement to an
educational conference on "Tasks for the '80s" sponsored
by the International Socialists and Changes magazine. The
conference explored two themes. The first, "The Left in
the Unions," discussed the responsibl1itz"es and OPPOT·
tunities facing socialists organizing in the trade unions.
The second, "Strategies Towards a LaboT PaTty, "focuss·
ed on one particular area of work in the labor
movement: building sentiment JOT independent
political action, for breaking labor away from
the Democratic Party and for building an inde·
pendent political party of the working class.
The 160 people who attended "Tasks for the '80s" in·
cluded many who aTe active in various unions, including
the UA W, USW, IBT, UE, AFSCME, etc. and many com·
munityactivists. The conference provided the opportunity
to exchange ideas and strategz'es as the left enters the
challenging period ahead. We in the International Social-
ists were pleased by the number of people attending from
diverse organizations because we believe that increased
cooperation and unity on the left are key to
meeting the challenges that face us zn
the 1980s.

T he organized working class. and the

revolutionary left, face the most severe
challenge that organized capital has mounted
in the U.S. since the 1920s. How that
challenge is met in the 1980s will determine
the socialist possibilities in this country for a i l
long time to come.
The institutionalized channels of class
struggle politely known as "collective
bargaining" and "labor relations" are go-
ing through their third major transforma·
tion in the twentieth century. Political sen·
timen' in the ruling class has taken the
most spectacular leap to the right in our
political lifetime. And now an administra-
tion backed by a Congressional majority
has come to power, intent on implemen-
ting social reaction, union busting, and a
corporate riot in the streets called "free
enterprise ...
On our side of the fence stand unions in
retreat, restrained from action by the
sclerosis of bureaucracy, and - it must be
admitted - by large sections of the rank and
file who are for the moment paralyzed by
fear for their jobs and welfare, and confused
by a rapidly changing world their leaders
seem unable to explain. Nor are there the
highly visible social movements that challeng-
ed [he structure of America in the 1960s.
Alongside and amidst the ranks of labor
stands a .imall revolutionary left in no less
disarray. Dashed hopes, failed perspectives
and collapsed organizations characterize
some of the best elements of the left. In
response, we see a somewhat reluctant drift
toward social democracy among many, the
reemergence of classical Stalinism among
others, and even the ever-present
phenonmenon of irrelevant sectarianism.
:.
Y et viewed from anocher angle, there is
reason for hope, there is potential for
[he ranks of labor to turn [he situation
-'l:_~' around and for the left to rise to the occa·
.....L • ..::::.,.!i1!11! sian.
Q....-;::::....~ ... First. there are a number of rank and file,
UNION If progressive and union reform movemenc~ in
LA BUSTING important unions. and countless local
Boll -. UNITE caucuses and reform groups throughout the
union movement. Their level of organiza·
tion is generally low. Teamsters for a
Democratic Union (TDU) IS the only
organization of its kind in an international
union as yet. Bue strong networks of activists
and visible forces exist in many places.
Union elections are not a good indication of
the internal strength of a movement, but [hey do
tell us something of the body of sentiment in
which the activists must operate. In [his regard.
1981 can be called the year of [he close election.
Local and district elections in Teams[ers, aueo
workers, and mineworkers' unions saw some militants
and oppositionists win, and more come close.
The 'election for top officials of the Oil Chemical
and Atomic Workers (OCAW). where Tony \,Iazzoc-
chi lost. was very close. The Steelworkers elections for
district directors saw a major setback for reform forces
with Jim Balanoffs close loss in District 31. but also
saw some victories. Except for Canada all contests
tended to be close.
It would appear that union reformers. progressive
and militant oppositionists have become a serious
I force. but - measured in terms of the sentiment of me

9
 ranks-clearly not a majority force. In most cases we are
talking about movements that have gone from locally·
based to nationally· based. from small to larger, frolI). the
status of gadfly to contenders for power in a growing
number of unions.
At the same time. there is no doubt that fear and uncer·
tainty are strong among the ranks and produce barriers to
the growth of rank and file movements. Conservatism that
"comes from fear exists throughout the labor mov~ment.
The desire to fight, and the desire to hide. exist side by side
in the minds of many workers today. Overcoming the fear
and paralysis is, to a large extent, a function of leadership
and organiz.ation-and this fact determines much of the
challenge that faces us.
T he function of leadership in building movements is
every bit as important in social and reform strug-
gles as it is in revolutionary strategy. I will return to this
point several times.
A look at the rank and file movements of the late '60s
and early '70s illustrates this. The United National Caucus
in auto, Teamsters United Rank and File, Miners for
Democracy, along with a tremendous rise in strike activity
throughout industry, all reflected a militant response to
the earliest symptoms of economic crisis. Our own perspec·
tives for the International Socialists in the early '70s were
based on these movements and militancy.
Yet within a couple of years these large and volatile
movements disappeared. I would argue that a major
reason (not the only one, of course) for this rapid decline in
rank and file activity and organization was the lack of ex-
perienced leadership - that is. there was not an adequate
infrastructure of activists at the rank and file level with a
clear understanding of the forces they were dealing with.
Historically, in America as elsewhere. this sort of leader·
ship has come from the socialist left. But in the postwar
era, although American workers have displayed a high
degree of creativity at the workplace level in dealing with
the bosses, the monopolization of political skills by the
union bureaucracies and the defeat of the left in the unions
created a tragic political vacuum at the lower levels of the
labor movement. Workers who have been willing to step
out and become leaders have lacked, for the most part, the
political skills that rank and file leaders of earlier genera-
tions learned in the socialist and communist movements of
those times_
Now. however, there is a small section of the rank and
file that have developed political skills. through the reform
movements or through the organized or semi-organized
left. This layer of activists includes both people from the
left who went into industry or public employment for
political reasons, and those workers who drew political
conclusions from their experiences and their contact with
the left. We can call these activists a "broad trade union
teft." It is important to keep in mind. we are talking
primarily of people at the rank and file and local union
level. with a very tiny handful of people higher in the
union structure, not top-level liberal labor officials.
- This broad trade union left, in the sense we're using the
term, numbers well into the thousands, though it is still a
tiny minority in all unions and scarcely exists in some. Yet
in the past several years, this left has accumulated a respec-
10
table amount of experience. The sectarian responses and
tactics of the earlier attempts have been largely outgrown.
A richer understanding of the difficulties of trade union
work is evident.
Furthermore, in a number of cases leftist have been able
to win and hold union office, at least -at the local level. As I
will discuss later, this can make a critical difference.
There is as yet no organization, network or consciousness
of the broad trade union left as a force-which, of course.
means that it is not yet a force~i-n--rea-lity;- R-arh-er,-iris-a:
force in its potential, one which needs an organizing prin-
ciple. We believe that organizing-principte-is--a- seC6ftasks
that can be mutually agreed on: tasks determined not by
the subjective agendas of the left, but by the situation and
conditions the unions face. One of the first and most im·
portant tasks is to provide an analysis that gives activists an
understanding of what contract giveaways, plant closings,
union· busting, attacks on affirmative action, all alongside
the mammoth right· wing social offensive are about - in
short, putting the vicious employers' offensive, into a "big
picture. "
T he capitalist class. in its majority, is engaging in a
more or' less systematic dismantling of the e~~iEt:.~._
postowar system of Jabor reIationS~ ·Tl1e·p·rocess~t-hat is 'un-
folding, while it may take years. is directed at producing
(as I mentioned before) the third major shift in the institu-
tionalized relations of class struggle in this century. The
first occurred in the 1920s. when unionism was reduced to
near-powerlessness in all but a couple of industries. The
open shop regime and company unionism held sway. and
the general system of bargaining established with craft
unions in the late 19th century ended. The second major
shift occurred with the rise of the CIO in the 1930s and
'40s, and was institutionalized (and bureaucratized) into
the postwar system we've known most of our lives~ Under
this system large industrial unions set national patterns in
their own industries, and for others as well. The arrange-
ment allowed stability for both employer and union, with
regular and general increases in the standard of living for
most organized workers.
As Marxists, of course, we have long been critics of this
system. We know that bureaucratization of the unions,
based on class colIaboration, was as essential for this system
of collective bargaining as was the stability which the
employers allowed the unions. I would be scarcely exag-
gerating if I said that most of us in the left have denounced
almost every major contract this system produced. Yet it is
undeniable that. given capitalist expansion and business
prosperity. this system provided an expanding standard of
living for millions of organized and unorganized workers.
Today the employers have decided that this system, and
the deal it was based on, is too expensive a price to pay for
"labor peace." So pattern bargaining is being attacked and
in places dismantled. The once unbreakable three-year
contract is now re-opened at will. not by the workers but by
the employers in order to grind out concessions. Labor's
right to organize the unorganized - a right chat was part of
the postwar deal, though labor often failed to use it - is be-
ing revoked. In a growing number of industries the ex-
istence of unions themselves is now in question. These
related trends. added together, represent an anempc to
 -:;l~- -
unravel the old system.
I do nO[ think the employers as a class have a clear or
agreed· upon conception of a new system of labor relations,
except that it will be thoroughly employer·dominated and
that the unions will be relegated to a minor role. There are
some key elements which we can see, however:
• Decentralization of bargaining, which means- given
the present levels of workers' confidence and com-
bativity-a weakening of industrial unionism.
• So-called "Quality of Work Life" and fake workers
"participation" as a means of circumventing real unionism
in the workplace. This would also be combined with:
$ The "new technology" which actually consists of
phenomenal mechanisms for controlling the workplace.
S Outright union-busting.
All these represent an attempt to fragment unionism.
subjecting the unions and their members to the mercy or
vengeance of larger and larger units of capital that are tak-
ing shape through corporate mergers and conglomerates.
B oth the "Quality of Work Life" fraud and the new
technology require a thorough overhauling of
unionism at the workplace. The shop steward system has
become weak and ineffective in most industries. The fight
for workers' control does not begin. as some would have it.
with joint labor-management therapy sessions or by put-
ting agreeable union leaders on corporate boards of direc-
tors. It begins with building aggressive workplace
oTganizations.
A crusade to organize the unorganized in new industries
and occupations. as well as old. could make all the dif·
ference in the coming decade; the aggressive use of the
sympathy strike and the secondary boycott will be needed.
The 1978 coal miners'
strike revived traditions
of labor militancy as
strikers defied 'Carter's
Taft-Hartley injunction
(right). Also during the
strike renewed labor
solidarity emerged, as
shown in auto workers'
food convoy to the coal
fields (above).
11
Equally important is the defense of national pattern
bargaining, preserving national contracts and extending
them internationally when dealing with transnational cor-
porations. In a period when our ultimate goal-socialist
revolution and the abolition of wage labor - is not on the
agenda. most of us could agree on these and related objec-
tives. Taken together. they outline an alternative to a
fragmented and totally employer-dominated system of
labor relations. But presenting this broad program also
raises some difficulties .
Constructing a new unionism and a new set of institu·
tions for the defense of the working class is no small job.
There is the question of how we get there. We believe that
part of the answer lies in the kind of organizations we have
already described: the rank and file reform and progressive
movements in the unions. These movements are not simply
the carriers of union democracy. though that is crucial.
They represent the potential for reviving all the militant
ideas and traditions of the past - the ideas that can provide
the alternative to the fear and despair so common today.
I have already indicated that we believe that rank and
file movements contending for. and ultimately winning.
power in the unions is crucial. As the movements win office
and move up the structure of the union. they gain the
forces to take on the employers in areas of struggle chat
emerge as the old system of labor relations breaks down.
They give. in fact, life to the new unionism.
Such possibilities depend largely on the quality of the
new leadership, their ability to grasp and act on the
possibilities for action. and the degree of communication
between activists in different locals or unions. One can see.
though. that the potential would be greater if some of the
recent close elections which were lost had been won. \Ve
can see that even here in Detroit. where militants in
_________________ 'j () II (".\ r 1
Ml
 Teamsters Local 337 were narrowly defeated_ When the
reform movement begins to reach this level on a general
scale in a few cities. the possibilities for solidarity work, for
organizing the unorganized (very relevant in. Local 337's
jurisdiction for example). and in the future. we believe, for
political action, will become qualitatively greater.
°L et me digress here to point out a problem we will
face and the nature of the fight we want.
Since the employers are confronting the very integrity of
unionism as we know it, the idea of the uncn'tical united
iTont with the laboT leadeTship will arise. Indeed. in a
number of ways. some innocent, some quite insidious, the
labor bureaucracy is pushing this line today: "Don't rock
the boat. After all, we're all in trouble, so stand by us to
save the union."
Naturally, insofar as union leaders fight the employers
and the right wing we should stand by them-indeed. push
them. But the problem is that not only are they by and
large incapable of doing this. but increasingly it would
seem they are happily joining in the process of fragmenting
and circumventing unionism. Some unions are celebrating
a new "spirit of cooperation" between company and union,
management and worker.
Quality of Work Life and protectionism play into the
hands of the employers' conception of a new labor relations
set·up. The readiness with which unions now make conces-
sions, without a fight and demanding no repayment in bet-
ter times. is a major factor in the speed at which unionism
is fragmenting and losing ground. The implications of
these policies of cooperation are far·reaching. For exam-
pie. how are you going to organize new millions into unions
whose main functions seems to be the orderly granting of
concessions and the reduction of wages?
The fact is that a new unionism requires a new genera*
tion of union leaders, risen from the ranks and tied to them
through organization, consciousness, and unity around a
program for labor. This kind of leadership is being built in
the movements that are arising. and to some extent in the
broad trade union left.
W eare arguing, in short. that the rank and file
movements are essent£al in rebuilding the unions;
and this has specific implications for revolutionary
The Rank & File~
Movement
. BY KIM MOODY
The employers have launchea an attack on the
jobs, living standards and unions of American
workers. This pamphlet discusses why the labor
~ bureaucracy is unable to lead an effective fight
back, how rank and file union reform movements
are emerging to fill the vacuum, and what role
. socialists can play in this process.
Copies aTe available for 25'each.
Send orders to;
CHANGES / 17300 Woodward / Detroit / MI / 48203
12
socialists in the unions. In particular. it means that the
tTade union left must be willing to take responsib.lity fOT
bu.lding the rank and file movement. I do not mean
substituting for the movements; or merely participating in
such movements as arise without our intervention; or at-
tempting to lead through political pronouncements. I
mean takz"ng responsibility for the organizational, tactical
and polit1:cal details that are required to advance the state
of oTganization of the working class - building local
caucuses, constructing national networks within unions.
advancing those networks to higher stages of organization.
running and electing candidates, and training broader
leadership at all levels throughout the unions.
For the left. this responsibili~y means coming to grips
with the nature of the immediate period and with the
failures of the left in the 1970s.
First we must understand and state frankly that the
failure of the various party-building movements' of the '70s
was not due to tactical errors or mistakes in emphasis,
though we in the International Socialists and other groups
certainly made enough of those. They failed for the reason
that the level of self*activity, organization. and con-
sciousness of the American working class could not provide
the level of self-confidence and the political understanding
to make the emergence of a working class-based revolu-
tionary socialist party possible.
Marx. writing during the years of the birth of the Euro-
pean working class movement. was dear that in its struggle
to become a conscious class for itself, i.e. a class capable of
ruling society. the growth of self-activity, organization and
consciousness were indivisibly intertwined. He saw a class
move from simple mutual aid societies, to trade unions,
through a bewildering variety of parties, toward mass
revolutionary parties. Unlike so many of the idealists of
that era, Marx understood that the working class had to go
through various stages. History would not be cheated.
Many of the organizational gains and advances in con-
sciousness made by the American working class in the 30s
and 40s have been lost or eroded in the last 30 years. The
rank and file movements are, in effect. attempt~ to regain
this ground. The various attempts by the left to by-pass or
crudely exploit this process (especially through so*called
"revolutionary caucuses" or grotesque front groups) served
neither to advance the level of organization of the class nor
to produce the party.
W hile event.s are movirig rapidly and the employers'
attacks getting bolder, we must recognize that no
qualitative leap of the SOrt required to produce revolu-
tionary consciousness is on the agenda in the near future.
Qualitative leaps in consciousness are always the results of
prior gains in consciousness, self-activity and organization.
To put it bluntly, the next few years will not be a period
fruitful for "party·building."
This is not to say that we should not build socialist
organization. seek steps toward socialist regroupment. or
confine these activities to middle class arenas. The recruit-
ment of workers to socialism and [he advancement of
socialist organizations are a necessary part of the process.
But the term party· building implies a great deal more than
this. and in many versions, it has meant an approach that
hinders real advances in class organization. If the left is to
 --;).
take responsibility for building the rank and file move-
ment, i.e. for advancing the level of class organization, it
will have to abandon some of the party building practices
of the 70s. These include:
• The notion. intentional or not, that working class
organizations. whether unions or rank and file groups, are
primarily pools for recruitment drives.
• The related notion that the shop floor or union are
places to run down the latest line (a form of behavior
which has been most destructive to many revolutionaries
whose organizations discipline them to engage in it).
The common denominator of both these errors. and
others. has been the tendency faT the left to set Its own
agenda fOT the wOTking class. TegaTdless of the objective
natUTe of the peTiod OT the actual challenges facing the
class.
Party-building inevitably involves a high degree of
"voluntarism": that is, very intense levels of activity based
on a conviction that one's own organization represents the
alternative to the capitalist crisis. If rooted in objective
conditions, this can be very positive. In periods and cir-
cumstances where revolutionary organization on a mass
scale is possible, voluntarism can produce results. When it
is not possible it produces erratic behavior and political
flip-flops that often leave the workers who have been the
objects of one or another exercise in line execution
bewildered or disgusted. In many cases, the members of
. the party-building groups themselves wind up equally
disgusted, as the activity of the last decade shows.
I believe the '80s to be crucial to future revolutionary
developments in the U.S. The outcome will. to a large
extent, determine whether revolution in this country- is
possible in our political lifetime. If the capitalist class suc-
ceeds in its plan to fragment unionism and eliminate the
slim gains made by Blacks and women, then advances in
political independence for workers and the oppressed are
unlikely. This in .tum would certainly postpone revolu-
tionary possibilities.
The building of the rank and file movements, like the
rebuilding of the movements of the oppressed and the fight
for a labor party, is the alternative to this grim scenario.
For the International Socialists these activities are also an
indispensible part of the process of building a revolu-
tionary movement, because of what I said earlier about the
interrelation of self-activity, organization and con-
sciusness. Nevertheless, they are not the same thing as
party-building in terms of immediate activity-and we
have to be willing to say so.
Today's rank and file movement is, in reality, a refoTm
movement. not a revolutionary one. If it is to be a suc-
cessful refoTm movement that actually advances the level
of working class organization and self-confidence. revolu-
tionaries must be prepared to build and participate in it as
such.
The relationship of revolutionaries to reform movements
has always confounded the American marxist left. In the
New Left this dilemma was solved by dubbing every reform
and social movement a "revolutionary" one. In the '70s the
difference between the two was recognized, but the reform
movements became- for much of the left - arenas to be
used. It is to be hoped that in the '80s the left will learn
13
-1-
that reform movements are movements to be built and led.
not used or mischaracterized.
One of the ironies of history is that it is often the refor·
mists who are incapable of leading genuine mass refonn
movements, while those who view themselves as revolu-
tionaries have often proven themselves imaginative and
powerful leaders. In periods such as today, reformist
leaders often prove too timid to make a difference. Of
course, workers will follow timid leaders when they see no
real alternative. But if the left, broadly conceived, can
provide a credible alternative in a growing number of
situations, it can advance the movement in ways no refor-
mist could.
Part of the reason revolutionaires can. under certain cir-
cumstances, provide superior leadership and direction for
reform movements lies in their approach to society and the
working class. We do not wish to preserve this system. so we
do not fear the collapse of institutions that protect it. As
Marxists, in particular, we are able to provide a long view
of things in a way reformists usually cannot. We do not
fear struggle. or view it as disruption. we are for it. We
would not hinder the democratic demands and actions of
the workers. we fight for them. We are not interested in
appeasing the political establishment or its liberal wing, so
we encourage struggle independent of it.
Of course, many militants and progressives share much
of this approach and many more can be won to it in the
dire times ahead. That is what gives the trade union left. in
its broadest definition, the potential to play an important
role in the events and struggles of the '80s. In particular,
the left can make the difference if it can combine its will·
ingness to fight with the three general tasks I have talked
about: providing the big picture that shows the rank and
file the nature of events and the directions to be taken;
putting forth a broad program for labor as a whole to fight
the employers' scheme for fragmenting and mortally weak·
ing unionism; and taking responsibility at every level for
building and advancing union reform and progressive
movements.
O ne thing that has made it difficult for the left to see
itself as a force with the potential for unity in action
has been the fragmented nature of much trade union
work. It is difficult. sometimes impossible, to conceive of
joint actions when much Qj.-p~r work is !oc~liz_e~.~when t~e
internal situation in various unions is so different and the
detail of our work so different. Yet there are some things
that can be done that reach beyond our day-to-day work
and point toward a broader movement consciousness
among activists.
One of these is solidarity work around key strikes or
struggles. such as the miners strike and now the PA TeO
strike. These struggles not only provide the opportunity for
national campaigns, but they concretely point to the
methods of struggle that could beat [he employers, and
that compose much of our alternative to the employers new
system of labor relations.
Another type of campaign we must be willing to con-
sider is more political in nature. These could be campaigns
around attacks on OSHA, affirmative action. or other pro-
grams and legislation of vital interest to many workers.
This sort of campaign ties in:with-whaf'+would~-regard as
 the political side of the tasks I have mentioned, the fight
- the '70s are leary of perspectives that create grand roles for
for a labor party.
Somewhat more distant from the day-to-day work of
building a trade union opposition movement, but still im-
- portant to the overall nature of the situation, will be the
role of the trade union left in bringing labor forces into the
social and an~i-imperialist movements that develop in
,response to the escalation in right wing reactionary
pOlicies.
Then, of course, there is the matter of the role of the left
in building and setting the tone of officiallahor events like
September 19th. Solidarity Day. It is my impression that
o trade union leftists were among the most vigorous in
organizing for this important event. The current level of
disorganization and localism, however, prevented us from
having any real impact on the character of September
19-for example. giving support for PATCO a more cen-
tral place in that event.
I am keenly aware that most of us in the left have been
through a number of years of hectic, difficult activity,
based on great hopes and ending in disappointment. I'm
sure that many who have been through the experience of
14
the left, or ehat pose things in such a way that it seems,
once again, the fate of humanity rests on the shoulders of
America's tiny left.
Naturally, whether the employers get their way may not
be up to us at all. The working class may suffer defeats in
spite of our best efforts, or win striking victories without
our help. But we in the International Socialists have learn-
ed that while all the voluntarism in the world won't get you
what history is not yet willing to grant, our actions
alongside those of others working in the same direction can
make a difference. In a few situations, as you know, we
have made a difference, and we have learned why methods
of struggle and non -sectarian functioning are needed to
make successes possible.
We did not begin by understanding all of this. we began
like many of you with a plan to build the party - or in our
case the embryo of the party. But we did learn these
lessons. We believe others have learned or are learning
these lessons as well. This fact and the process of unified
struggle against the employers and for a new unionism is
what allows us to flirt with great hopes once again. fi
 - :.,~
A Response to Staughton Lynd
What Strategy For
Rank And File
Struggle?
MIKE PATRICK from CHANGES, Sept. 1979
Mike Patrick's article is a c01ltributi01l to an important
discussi01l current in the Socialist movement. In
response to the failures of the trade Uni01l leadership,
rank and file wOTkers are building movements to reform
their unions. These movements provide socialists with
the opportunity of again playing a significant Tole in the
labor movement.
At -the same time~ these movements are reform
movement.. Their goals are nol the transformation of
society, but the reform of the ·union movement. Hence,
many sympathetic observers feel therB is the dDnger that
these efforts wiU ultimately reproduce the conservative
bureaucracies they are attempting to dismantle.
In the' MarchiApril issue of Radical America
Siaughton Lynd addressed himself to this problem in
"Where is the Teamster Rebe/ljon Going". Mike
Patrick's article begins by taking up the questions Lynd
has raised and then goes on to layout a strategy fOT
socialists in the reform movements.
23
I just came back from a meeting in Youngstown.
and it was one of the most exciting things I've ever
seen. We've got a hell of a group of leaders together now
after the steel haul strike." That was how TDU organizer
Ken Paff staned an interview of "Where is the Teamster
Rebellion Going?"
"We had people from seven steel hauling centers
together after the strike to talk about the future and
evaluate the strike. There was considerable criticism of
ourselves, but we were all damn proud of this victory. This
is really one of the first and certainly the biggest national
victory we've had. Out of these victories we're building a
movement. and we're building some damn good rank and
file leaders who know where we're headed' and how hard'
it's going to be. In this strike we had to fight the com·
panies. the Teamster hierarchy from Fitzsimmons down to
Cassidy (a T earnster Local president significant in the s,eel
hauling division of the union) and the government to boot. •
And we won, because we were organized in key areas, link-
ed together nationally and had a winning strategy. Now
hundreds are joining us and getting active .....
 -30-
The Teamster rebels have a victory to savor, and the
fan:es to build a new section in their movement. One more
example of them leaming their power, organizing to
~RRrVe and extend their gains.
How are they organizing? Where will this rebellion lead?
B!>w will this lead to socialist consciousness?
m. Radical America Staughton Lynd argues that
:Iimgers face the Teamster rebellion: that it might end up
'" a new union bureaucracy. He urges a strategy of
''''ganizing "horizontally" - toward city-wide
ll""'P"- rather than nationally as the way to prevent this.
Hir li!as raised some important questions.
Organizing: National"•. Horizontal
tile struggle. Consider some examples:
• Kroger Foods has 19 centers nationally and has
become adept at playing tilem off agaimst each other.
When Detroit drivers refused to agree to a mileage
requirement last year. Kroger transferred a good part of
its warehouse operation to tile Grand Rapids center.
At tile same time, Kroger has also been subcontrac-
ting deliveries out to companies which have sweetileart
Teamsters contracts and pay tileir drivers CUt rates. This
is all made possible by agreements made by tile
Teamsters union nationally, not in each individual city.
The Teamster national leadership has just agreed to
anotiler contract witil Kroger. Not only does it do

S'
DOming about tilese problems. but now they are
proposing to pay new hires only 75% for tile fust
taughton Lynd suggests the following guidelines:
two-and-a-half year., To fight tilis. Kroger rank and
"In a nutshell, I suggest that it i. right to run for
f'IIers have organized Kroger-wide witil a regular
:Dr oft"",. of steward and local union president, despite
newsletter. tile KYogeT Connection and a good amount of .
~ ~ real compromises involved, and wrong to seek
travel and communication between the centers. Despite -
tigher position or to control the union on a broader scale.
recommendation by tile Teamster leadership, the ranks
bdic:aJS in local office, according to tile view urged here,
overwhelmingly voted down tile contract. .
.muId tilink horizontally: tiley should reach out to tileir
tmmterparts in other locals of tile same international • One of the special features of trucking compared to
miIm, and otiler locals and rank·and-f'IIe groups in otiler industries is tile high proportion of capital
tif£erent unions in the community. Their aspiration. in investment that can so easily be moved. New warehouses
!N;Jibstance. should be a "parallel central labor uniOD7' or, are relatively cheap. and you can drive most of your
m >are' situations, control of tile official central labor capital investment to its new home. Freight companies
~ to which all unions in a locality send delegates. sbop around and relocate tileir barns in areas where they
"Such imstitutions should be seen as places where can get sweet-beart contracts. It has to be stopped
'eklS; in. various work settings can meet one another. regionally or nationally.
mdl educate each other into a consciousness which. • The trucking industry has changed drasticially in the
iJMa!lSC s.ensitive to the circumstances of all involved, is past ten year.. Mergers and buyouts and national
class
:t.ei!fin:ce a consciousness." bargaining have created a national industry. While local
contracts can still win some concessions on a few issues.
'Jlie question is whetiler such guidelines are relevant:
h£ is" do tiley grow out of tile needs of tile rank and f'IIe tilis i. becoming Ie•• and less true, The base terms for
D:a.v..ement itself? the major issues are DOW determined nationally by
Ch>ganizers are not free to set tile direction of real national bargaining and by interpretations made by
<>ciaJj movements any way tiley would like. To be sure, company national officies. Talk to a Teamster and fmd
ll7pllizers who insist on the wrong ideas can head out why he i. mad: loss in real wages, poor pension
llOVements into temporary dead ends or even into system, unsafe working conditions. job security and so
f1l3Nqards. But if a movement is successful it is because on. Of cours" the.e i. a local aspect to tilese. And you can
, was; ahie to speak to and meet tile needs of its fight locally to secure tile best possible interpretation of
ltem:bers-._ The good organizers are the ones who national agree,m"nts.
mme:crly.' understood what tilese were, and were able to
Il1iiIg; inta leadership the ,alents developed by a real
~~ Such is the case with the Teamsters for a
llmtncratic Union (TDU).
ClIne, of the problems witil the popular mystique of tile
",mil: driver that Lynd so well describes is tilat it
~ important realities. The image of tile
~raad driver hardly fits tile majority of Teamsters
.dlm actualIy- work in warehouses. drive city routes or
nlli! dozens of otiler jobs.
~even the relatively well-paid macho. lone cowpoke
uiding;his rig off into the sunset has some really serious
robiems;. seventy hour weeks on the road; mined family
~,kidneys taking a beating, "good" pay for 40 hours
lIruOaut;,aitertaxes and inflation. to be only slighdy more
iamwliatrthe U.S. government calls moderate level for a
imifl'"
..JUli5t""'''~erss ioined TDU to deal witil some of tilese
1rtl\
mIIlent$ to fight tile class struggle. The form and Nighthawk Becomes Checker Express:
inmtiJm,ofthe organizing has to be that which best fits One Of The Mergen Which Are Designed To Eliminate Jobs.

24
 The main local complaint is about poor representation
from stewards and BA's. But even here the grievance pro-
cedure quickly takes power out of the local. It is hard for a
good steward or Business Agent to keep winning when the
International is knif'mg them in the back.
There i. no neat dividing line between local and
national struggles. Often it is national campaigns that
give rise to local organizing. Many TDU chapters have
apparently started when people in a particular area gOt
involved in a national contract fight or campaign. For
example, the Youngstown chapter is composed largely of
carhaulers who got involved in TDU's Carhauler
Contract Committee, and steel haulers who got involved
in and helped lead the recent strike. Usually, once people
are brought together in this way, local organizing
follows, as in Youngstown.
Similarly, local struggles turn into national struggles.
Struggles over work rules, harrassment. or local
contracts take place locally. But as they are often the
result of a national or industry-wide crackdown,. they can
best be fought if the struggle spreads. Recently TDU was
involved in spreading a local grocery industry strike in
Northern California to LA and to other states, even
though the contract is local. The same industry-wide
"productiviry drive" is occuring throughout the grocery
industry. which is a major sector of the Teamster
membership. Rank and me organizing is both local and
national in this area.
The strategy is not "national" or "local", or "horizontar
- it is a strategy of building the class struggle.
25
A further word should be said here about "horizontal"
organizing. Where it is a way of extending the class strug·
gle in concrete circumstances, it should be pursued
vigorously. This could include a range of possible issues
from major plant closedowns to police interfering in the
right to strike. But sometimes. so-called "horizontal"
movement can be deceiving. It can become a substitute
for the class struggle. This is a favorite trick of liberal
union bureaucrats. Walter Reuther supponed commu-
nity civil rights activities while he smashed Black rank
and me opposition in his union; The Doug Fraser who
tries to link up with all "progressive" forces is the same
person who sold out in -the contracts and organized
hundreds of UA W goons -to smash- an autoworkers
wildcat strike over safety conditions. Sf. Louis- Teamster
leader Harold Gibbons whom Lynd cites for community
involvement. at the same time put a tight lid on rank and
rtIe initiative in his territory, including cooperating with
UPS in firing militant stewards in 1972.
Capitalism is not neutral turf for the class struggle. The
capitalist class controls all the major institutions - the
economy, the government, the media. the ideological ap·
paratus. Workers enter the struggle with no real power as
individuals. Collectively they have mighty power if they
can only become conscious of that power and decide to use
it. But until that time the initiative is with the capitalist
class. The workers' struggle is mainly a resonse. It is the
capitalist class which opens factories, decides line
speeds, introduces technological changes, makes
decisions about production which ultimately translate
 --,.).-
into expansion and hiring or layoff. and moves plants
around.
At times the working class can and does take the in·
itiative and as it grows stronger. more self-conscious of its
power and better organized. can challenge capitalism
more directly and more often. But until "the fmal
conflict,"it is the capitalist class which controls the general
ground on which the class struggle is fought.
Good organizers understand that the. frrst task.is ~o
organize along the lines best suited for waging the
immediate struggles and going on to build that struggle
and win real victories. There is no timeless blueprint for
this.

Union RefOTm {I Class Struggle

T he struggle has led naturally to a focus on the

national Teamsters union because there is no way
around. it.
Staughton Lynd argues: "I believe groups like Miners
For Democracy or Teamsters for a Democratic Union
Harold Gibbons. St. Louis Teamster Boss. . . .
conditions to wage the class struggle . To do this they
need organization. They particularly need to control their
own class wide institutions - their unions. In order to
get their unions to fight JOT them they must fight for
democracy within the union locally and nationally. Most
workers are probably for cleaning up and making their
unions more democratic in an abstract sense. But the
motion to reform the Teamsters union now is coming
from the need to fight back more effectively against the
employers. It is this need which produces the amount of
time spent and energy given to union reform.
Union reform. is a part of the process in waging the
class struggle rather than an end unto itself. but it is an
imponant part. The connection is critical 0

The Fraternal Order of Steel Haulers (FASH) was

organized in 1967 to win a better Teamster contract for
steel haulers, and particularly owner~operators. Until
then. steel haulers had been taking a beating. By
organizing, they were able to win pay for .. detention"
(waiting) time and significant rate increases. F ASH
continued winning gains for steel haulers thr~ugh well
drift into an expectation that their ultimate objective is to
take over and clean up the international union. I believe
this perspective to be in error. For this great expectation
union reformers are repaid in broken hopes and inactive
co~workers ...
"The more oppressive the union, the greater the
temptation to forget that the employer is the main
oppressor. American labor law offers the extraordinary
worker far more tools and freedom with which to combat
his or her union, than to engage the company. Union
politics can become a sandbox wherein workers vent
frustrated energy against one another."
But this argument misunderstands the reason why
"union politics:' and the national and international
llnion structures, become a focus of concern in the first
;:>lace. Workers need their union in order to fight
mc.cessfully. Lynd is wrong in suggesting that the main
lim of the Teamster rank and -m.e rebellion is to "take
>ver and clean up the international union. ,. Workers
lave begun to organize because they are being forced to
19ht to defend themselves. They are' forced by ... And TDU Democracy.

26
publicized militant struggles. You thought twice about
messing with a FASH strike.
But the FASH strategy was to ignore the national
Teamster union in a period when both the IBT and the
trucking industry were moving to consolidate things on
the national level. When FASH finally had to deal with
the union, its strategy was to try to get out. a strategy
which not only failed to link up with other Teamsters
but also tended to divide the owner·operators from the
other steel haulers. The F ASH strike last winter failed.
The highly successful steel hauler strike in April took a
different form. It was organized around the conttact; it
understood the necessity of independent organizing and
action, and the need at the same time to force the official
union to back them; and out of it a new, more effective
vehicle for struggle has been formed, TDU-SHOC (Steel
Haulers Organizing Committee). TDU organizers played
an important role in providing organizational network.
communication. information and direction. But the
motion was that of rank and me steelhaulers. The leaders
were steeIhaulers. The national organization and the
national strategy toward the union fit.
Thus the steel haulers kept that section of the industry
closed down tight after> the International ordered
everyone back to work. They forced the International to
sanction their continuing strike, and to come back with a
good contract.
--:5:3 -
powerful than any of the freight companies. Through the
development of the Master Freight Contract, the IBT
was able to provide some regulation to the trucking-
industry and at the same time make significant
improvements for most Teamsters. But by the 70's~ the
trend in the industry was merger and buyout. The.
stronger freight companies combined into stronger
national associations and began to go on the.
counter-attack. They demanded work rule chana;es. time
studies and productivity rules (MTM), flexible schedu-
ling, and· a free hand in mergers and change. of
operations. This. combined with inflation, amounted to a·
giant takeaway campaign against the Teamsters union.
In battles like this, victory for the workers was
sometimes just managing to stand still.
Now the skimming and the gangsterism made a
difference. While most Teamsters would have preferred
a democratic union under Hoffa, they were able to close
their eyes to what was going on. But now they simply
cannot afford to ignore it.
The same thing is true at the local level. With 'he
employers on the attack, you really need your Business
Agent and steward to fight for you, rather than malting
their own deals with the company. The campaigns in
many locals for elected stewards and BAs reflect this_
Effective representation is the issue. In some locals, the
proposal to elect BAs has been defeated because the

A nother organization of rank and me Teamsters has

also missed the connection between the struggle
for reform in the union and the class struggle. The
Professional Drivers Council (PROD) was originated by
bureaucrats have been able to convince enough barns
that they would not get good representation from
someone chosen by the majority (i.e. the other barns).
The old stoty: where a movement is weak, workers think
Ralph Nader and headed by liberal attorneys. PROD in their individual self· interest, and "divide and
attacked cOITUption.ln the Teamsters with exposes in the conquer" works.
media, court cases and Congressional testimony. This
attracted a following among Teamsters. especially the
interstate drivers concerned with safety laws. PROD has
organized numerous meetings and publishes a good
paper for Teamster members. But because PROD is not
organized to fight contract struggles, on the shop floor,
and in the locals. TDU has surpassed it as the dominant
rank and me force.
A few years ago this would never have happened. An
Organization based on the dyoarnic of the class struggle,
led by no big names, and red· baited by the union
leadership would not have overshadowed an organization
based on a legal strategy of reform-from-above. with its
connections to Joseph Raub, Ralph Nader, and the
establishment media.
Corruption and gangsterism are nothing new to the
Teamsters. Why the large reform movements now and
not 20 years ago when the spotlight was put on the
connections between the Teamster leadership and the
racketeers? Under Hoffa and before. the Teamsters
union delivered the gOOds to its members. Actually, they
only delivered a part of the goods with another good part
skimmed off, but at least they delivered something. It
was not because Hoffa and the others were better, but
because the trucking industry would give more. U.S.
capitalism was in the midst of prolonged economic
prosperity> The trucking industry, although growing
wildly, was still made up of a large number of smaller
companies. The national Teamsters union was way more

27
 The Employers' Offensive

E conomic forces have shaped the changes in the

trucking industry which in turn have produced
the Teamster revolt. These same forces are being felt
throughout the entire economy with generally the same
results.
For SO years, American capitalism had maintained an
era of prosperity through world war. imperialism, and a
permanent arms economy. But by the 1970'., the
continuous high level of arms spending had produced
still new contradictions for the U.S. At the same time,
world economic development and political and militaty
defeats meant the U.S. was no longer able to regulate the
capitalist world to its advantage. The energy crisis.
balance of trade problems, collapse of the dollar. and
foreign competition are all part of the collapse of
American hegemony in the world.
What was true in trucking was true throughout the
economy. The companies had to move to increase the
surplus value. This meant productivity drives, more
efficient operations, getting rid of the troublemakers. At
the same time they could not offer their old trade·off of
higher wages in exchange for more employe. conll'Ol
over working conditions. The old deals with the trade
union bureaucracy were off. Trade unions were no longer
automatically accepted by the dominant wing of
capitalism in return for labor peace. There was a
resurgence of outright union busting and shifts to
non· union areas. GM followed the pattern of the low
wage industries like garment, trying to get a docile.
non·union labor force in the south. "Takeaways"

NOW YDU KNOW WHY WE:

WEREN'T WORRIEDAt30UT
THE (x)TCOME CfF Tt;{S
ELE<::rION.

Socialist Consciousness'

I n the course of a strike it is not

unusual for workers to smash
company property, defy court orders,
and battle the pOlice. These sanie
strikers believe in America. Free
Enterprise, and Law and Order. Lynd

28
asks how will groups Ilke mu, PROD or FASH avoid
becoming new corrupt bureaucracies and' 'move on from
union reform to socialist transformation."
The heart of Staughton Lynd's concern is the fear that
self·conscious socialists in the reform movements may be
acting io contradiction to their own long· term goals of
socialism:
"Accordingly, Marxists who organize withio the
Teamsters union face a familiar dilemma. Only with their
energetic aid, seemingly, can the bourgeois revolution
(Lynd uses this term to mean "democracy") io the union
be effected. Yet the fruits of successful democratic
busioess unionism are all too evident. The maiolioe CIO
unions - UAW. Steelworkers and so on - offer one set
of examples. Arnold Miller's election to the presidency
of the United Mioe Workers and its sequel is another.
"One need go no further than the history of the
Teamsters themselves to prove the point still agaio. The
IBT bad guys Hoffa, Fitzsimmons, Rolland
McMaster, Dave Johnson - were one and aU rank and
me reformers io the 1930's ... What happens to such
iodividuals? Can it be prevented? Must union
organization endlessly reproduce dull and corrupt
bureaucracy as a result? Why should mu, or PROD, or
F ASH, avoid the same fate, much less move on from
union reform to socialist transformation? It
To properly address these concerns, and they are
genuine ones, we have to take a look at the Marxist view
of how working class consciousness is shaped in
struggle.
What we are seeing now_is •'militancy" • as Lynd says.
but how do we get "radicalism"? Or, io the traditional
Marxist terms, how do we get from Trade Union
Consciousness to Revolutionary Consciousness 1
Further, it is not enough that the workiog class simply
agree to the ideas of socialism. How will the working
class train itself to run society - the factories. the
economy, everything?
This is a tall order when we stan with a working class
composed not of some romantic noble heroes but of real
people mistraioed from day one under capitalism -
"braiowashed" through schools. the media. and
misleaders, to believe that they are just ordinary folk
who better leave running thiogs to those qualified.
Marx's contribution was an understanding of class
struggle. The class struggle was not a series of events
which marked time until the socialist revolution took
place. It was the dynamic which produced socialist
consciousness and the training ground which prepared
the workiog class for rule.
But Marx and Engels mistakenly believed that process
was almost automatic. In the Communist Manifesto,
after describiog how the development of iodustry forces
workers to form combinations - trade unions - they go
on:
"Now and then the workers are victorious. but only for
a time. The real fruit of their battles lies not in the
immediate results but in the ever expanding union of the
workers. This union is helped on by the improved means
of communication that are created by modem industry
and that place the workers of different localities in
contact with one another ... This organization of the
29
proletarians into a class and consequently into a political
party, is continually beiog upset again by competition
between the workers themselves. But it rises up again
stronger, fmner, mightier." (C.M. p.1S). Since th~
working class was on the inevitable road to socialism.
there was no need for any separate communist party. All
that had to be done was to organize the class struggle.
Lenin held the same view io his early work.
This dynamic that Marx and Lenin relied so much on
was certainly real. Struggle was the key to changiog
consciousness.
There are many barriers to stripping away false
consciousness of the working class and achieving
socialist consciousness. These include the hegemony of
bourgeois ideology throughout the society, the lack of
education and knowledge. nationalism, racism, and
sexism.
But inter-related with all of these is the most critical -
that the working class is unawaTe of its poweT to
challenge capitalist hegemony and remake society.
Workers like all people tend to limit their range of
desirable choices to what they can reasonably expect to
win. which in tum is a reflection of their sense of power.
Workers who are isolated have no senseJ)f the power of
the working class. Their consciousness reflects this and
manifests itself by attempts to get -ahead within the
system by such means as dealing individually with the
bosses. or dreams about escaping from the working class
(saviog up and owniog a small shop).
Workiog class struggle changes the objective
conditions which shape cc;>nscious_ness by changing the
context from the powerlessness of the individual to the
power of worker soli~arity. G.:nce __~~p~1"ienced, this sense
of power opens new possibilities for the struggle.
Thus the smallest victory in th~. class struggle has
significance beyond capturing a tiny piece of the surplus
value. In the act of winning a few cents more, or slowing
down the speed of the production line, workers learn to a
greater degree first that they do have- power and second
how to organize themselves.
But while this dynamic always seeiIfed -to -be at work it
was not an inevitable process as Marx and the early
Lenin seemed to conclude. The cla_$,s__ struggle always
continued on at some level, but socialist conclusions and
activity did not always follow. _-
Lenin made an important att~mpt to deal theoretically
with this problem in 1902: in· the struggle with the
"Economists" . In brief. he argued that the working class
as a class could not- develop beyond trade union
consciousness simply as a result of its trade union
struggles. Class and revolutionary consciousness
required understanding beyond the workers' own direct
experiences. For this.~~r.kers had to rely on what they
were taught and heard. Therefore they were even more
at -the mercy of the bourgeoisie which controlled the
schools. the press. the established "leaders" etc., which
presented the bourgeois interpretation of the facts as
well as the framework for interpretation (bourgeois
ideology). . .
The class struggle wa~ stIlI dre underlying dynamic in
developing political consciousness. It was just not
enough.
 -70-
" ... The working class spontaneously gravitates
mward socialism, nevertheless the more widespread
(and continuously revised in the most diverse forms)
lmurgeois ideology imposes itself spontaneously upon
the working class more than any other. (What Is To Be
Done p42)
Contrary to Marx's writings Lenin argued for a
distinction between the organization of the working class
and the organization of revolutionaries. The organization
of the working class had to be as broad as possible to
engage effectively in struggle. At the same time there
had to be a self-conscious revolutionary leadership
organized around its ideas. The tasks of the
revolutionary organization in addition to helping advance
the actual class struggle were to counter the influence of
Bourgeois ideology and institutions in the working class
in two ways. One was education and propaganda. The
other was through training working class leaders to lead
;;" other struggles in society.
But note, Lenin was always clear that the base on
which socialist consciousness could be built was the class
struggle. Therefore the organizations of class struggle
had to correspond not with the consciousness of the
most advanced workers but with that of the broadest
mass of workers ready to struggle at the time.
C onfusing the organizations of class struggle with
the organization of conscious revolutionaries is at
the root of numerous setbacks over the years, both big
and small. It was part of the issue in the failure of the
German Revolution following World War I. and the
collapse of the national opposition group (UNC) in the
UAW in the 1970's. Attempts to collapse the reform
struggle and revolutionary politics into one organization
on one road more often than not leads to the destruction
of both.
One tendency is to reduce all questions of
revolutionary politics to the questions of refonn struggle
at the current level of class consciousness. The ideas of
socialism become reduced to something vague and bland
(like "what they have in Sweden"). Rather than
organUing so that there is some force to a socialist
presence, individual socialist. floating around. .. doing
theirthing," leave a giant vacuum in the working class.
Althongh the class struggle opens up possibilities for
changiog consciousness, the field i. left to bourgeois
ideology and leadership to provide the range of
interpretations. The net result is that working class
leaders as they emerge are not trained in leading broader
struggles and have little opporttiliity '0 develop a
perspective beyond the struggle for reforms.
Alternately, trying to force the organization of working
class straggle to adopt a part of revolutionary program
because it fits some abstract conception of advancing
consciousness is not the solutioDG If such a program
results. m dividing off part of the class so that i. weaker
and cannot struggle as effectively, then the group loses
its vitality and goes Out of existanceo And then what have
you accomplished? While class struggle cannot
guarantee advancing mass consciousness, it is the
necessary precondition for it.
30
This doesn't mean that additional struggles cannot be
brought into the working class. On the contrary, it is
vitally necessary that self-conscious revolutionaries
champion within the working class the range of general
struggle from abortion rights and affirmative action to
the battle against nuclear power and imperialism.
Further, working class leaders must be won to the idea
that thes" fights are their own. The mistake often is
posing these issues in such a way that they prevent
broader united struggle around other immediate class
issues.
EcOftomism.'
T
here are some on the left (not Lynd) who criticize
groups like the TDU or PROD in the Teamsters,
the Independent Skilled Trades Council in the UAW, and
similar organizations and movements in the steel-
workers. miners and other unions as .. economist ... The
very charge shows a misunderstanding. TDU and the
others are not ,. economist. .. They are not even
.• economist ... They are not and do not pretend to be and
should not be socialist groups. They do not and cannot
have a perspective for becoming such.
This charge about .. economism" is just the opposite
side of the same coin as the economists themselves. Both
try to collapse the process of developing socialist
consciousness into one convenient package. Lynd knows
better and does not make this charge. But because he
apparendy does not have a perspective for building a
revolutionary group. the confusion creeps into his article
when he phrases the question in terms of how groups like
TDU, PROD or FASH "will move on from union reform
to socialist transformation?"
The task for revolutionaries is not the transfonnation
of TDU into a socialist organization. One of the strengths
of mu is that as an autonomous organization,
Teamsters just getting involved can think of it as their
organization because it really is. Our goal must be to
develop within the working cla... leaders who
understand that the struggle has to go beyond TDU and
similar organizations. These militants will be the basis of
a revolutionary socialist party.
The Failure of the Left
I
t is understandable that for most socialists
actively involved in working clas. struggles the
notion of a revolutionary party rarely enters the picture
in trying to deal with real problems. The sad truth is that
there is no revolutionary party which today stands as a
pole in the working class. There is no group which by its
size. experience, and connections as well as its ideas can
be treated as a serious alternative to all the forms of
capitalist leaderShip. There is no group which itself can
serve as the link between the most conscious leaders of
th.. working class so that struggles can be joined up
across trade union lines. Instead there are probably a
dozen self·proclaimed miniature caricatures of a
 revolutionary party. Most function as though the others
-3'1-
among real forces in the labor movement about a labor
are greater enemies than the capitalist class. But we can
try to learn from our mistakes and move on. MteT years
of various approaches sections of the left are rejecting
sectarianism.
We believe that there is sufficient agreement on the
important questions for a larger. united revolutionary
organization that can present itself as a more serious
force in the working class. We think that this is
necessary not just because it would be nice to be in an
organization with more people. but because effective
work in the class struggle requires the most strength we
can muster. (This view is laid out more fully in Changes
magazine June 1979).
But unity on the left is only part of the road to a
revolutionary party. The left today is still largely middle
class. With some important exceptions it is still on the
fringes of the class struggle. No revolutionary party will
be real unless its core is working class leaders trained in
actual struggle. While no large number of working class
leaders have yet joined socialist organizations. there has
begun to emerge a working class leadership who see
beyond their own trade union issues and who have come
to identify with the struggles in other unions and in
society as a whole.
They are a developing class leadership. They were in
evidence in the strong solidarity activities for the miners'
strike. They understood that the Teamster contract was
also a battle for all workers. They understand that
nuclear and oil energy policy is something that they
haves to address as workers, They are beginning to talk
about how labor can effectively intervene in politics. For
the first time in years. discussions are taking place
TDU Picket Line Outside The 18T Convention In Las Vagas In 1976.
31
pany.
These working class militants will not develop into_,
self-conscious revolutionaries overnight. But the process
can begin with these militants beginning to link up with
one another in more organized forms including some
forms of joint work, conferences. and possibly some form ~
of periodical. A national newspaper where worker
activists could share experiences and analyses could"
provide the means by which participants of disparate
struggles could recognize each other as an emerging
force in politics. This will not work as a front group for a,
particular sect or even something controlled by a broader
left formation. What is needed is something which both
truly belongs to these class leaders and develops with
them. As the working class continues to struggle against
the employers' offensive it is likely that these class
militants in dialogue with today's socialists will down the
road become the leaders of a real revolutionary socialist
party,
I Right now we are still almost at the beginning. Thus
far the employers' offensive has produced rank and file
struggles in the whole range of industries from steel and
auto to chemical and clerical. But we are still fighting on
capitalist terrain. There is no guarantee that there wi1l
not be setbacks and more defeats. But there is no easy
way to hasten events or sidestep the process of building a
real working class movement and a real socialist party.
There is no choice except to keep working because the
alternative is barbarism.
Mike Patrick is a trade union activist and a member of
Ihe Intemational Socialists.
 ---'38-
Building The Party:
An Assessment of
the Trotskyist Experience
MICHAEL URQUHART from eRA-NOES, Sept. 1979
The revolutionary movement today has inherited a rich
tradition that was kept alive by the Trotskyist movement in
the 1930's. It is an invaluable legacy. Like all legacies it is
not to be worshipped, but critically applied to the world as
it exists today.
In 1933 the Trotskyist movement launched a campaign
to build a new, Fourth International. While it ended in
failure, their experiences are rich in lessons for those who
are taking up, today, the tasks of organizing mass revolu·
tionary parties.
The following article argues that much of the experience
of the Trotskyist movement has been miSinterpreted by its
own historians who fail to recognize that Trotsky was aim·
ing at two goals: not only preserving the movement's
cadres and political principles, but also bUilding parties
which could actually take a lead in working class struggles.
The article also argues that part of the reason why this
party·building goal failed, is that the conception that such a
party could be built /rom scratch starting with a ''fuji inter·
national program" was wrong and could only contribute to
failure.
U nlike the Third International (also called the Com-
munist International or Comintern) which had
been born as a result of the victorious Russian Revolution,
the movement for a Fourth International was born out of
the greatest defeat yet suffered by the working class. It was
symbolic of the whole period.
In January 1933 Hitler came to power in Germany and
proceeded to destroy the most powerful labor movement
in Europe. He did so without a serious fight from the Ger-
man Communist Party (which, acting on Comintern in-
~ctions, had refused to build a united front of all
workers' organizations against fascism).
Such a disastrous defeat should have forced a re-
evaluation of policy upon the Third International. Yet in
April the leadership of the Comintern met and declared
that the poliCies of the German CP had heen entirely cor-
rect! The lesson for Trotsky was clear:
"The Moscow leadership has not only proclaimed as
infallible the policy which guaranteed victory to Hitler:,
32
but has also prohibited all discussion of what had oc·
cUlTed. And this shameful interdiction was not violated
nor overthrown. No national congresses; no interna-
tional congress: no diSCUSSions at party--meetings; no
discussion in the press! An organization which was not
roused by the thunder of fascism and which submits
docilely to such outrageous acts of the bureaucracy
demonstrates thereby that it is dead and that nothing
can ever.-revive it . ..
Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1932-33, p. 305. Hereafter
Writings will be referred to only by date. (Emphasis ad-
ded).
In 1928, Trotsky had been expelled from the Com-
munist Party in Russia for opposing the growing internal
bureaucratization and opportunist foreign policies of
Stalin. An international campaign of vilification and even
terror was launched against him and his supporters. Any
who spoke out in his defence were expelled.
Trotsky had organized his followers into the Interna-
tional Left Opposition (lLO). There was no thought at this
time of organizing new parties. For five years they had
considered themselves a faction of the Third International,
though they had be~n expelled. They would fight for read-
mission and struggle to change~ the policy of the Com-
intern.
They had still believed that the Communist Parties were
revolutionary, no matter how bad the leadership, and that
the bulk of revolutionary workers were members of those
parties. Toward the thousands of revolutionary workers in
those parties, they had aimed their propaganda and their
hopes that the workers would rise up against their leaders
and reform the Communist [nternationai. But the
castastrophe of 1933 changed their perspectives.
T he International Left Opposition renamed itself the
International Communist League (lCL). No longer
considering themselves a faction of the Comintern, they
were now the embryos of new, revolutionary parties. In-
itially these emOryo, were qutte small, contrasting starkly
with the tremendous tasks that faced them. They would be
further weakened by defections.
 -39-
One of the largest sections of the ICL, the Greek
Archeo-Marxist group, claimed 2000 members and was in
the process of splitting away to the right. The most impor-
tant section was organized around Nin and Andrade, in
Spain. They would soon leave to organize with Maurin the
Workers Party of Marxist Unity (POUM), which accepted
the Comintem point of view that the Spanish revolution
would be a bourgeois democratic one, not a proletarian
revolution.
For the rest, the French section was initially most impor-
tant, yet it had only about 200 members and was riven with
cOl;npeting factions. One hundred and fifty four members
had been reported in the U.S. in 1931. Elsewhere there
were slmilar small groupings or handfuls.
This initial weakness of the movement was unavoidable
given its origins:
"The victory of fascism seizes tens of millions.
Political prognoses are accessible only to thousands or
tens of thousands, who, moreover, feel the pressure
of millions. A revolutionary tendency cannot scorE
stormy victortes at a time when the proletariat as ~
whole is suffering the greatest defeats. But this is no
justification for letting one's hands hang. Precisely in
the periods of revolutionary ebb tide are cadres form
ed and tempered which wiD later be caned upon to
lead the masses in the new assault." (1932·33, p.
306)
With such meager forces at their disposal it was not a
matter of proclaiming the Fourih International. That was to
come later. For now, the immediate task was to build a
movement for a new International. Could these small
groups build such a movement?
Trotsky argued against any fatalistic pessimism. The
future would depend not only upon the march of historic
events, but also on the role played by revolutionaries In the
unfolding of those events. "An organization that is armed
with a reliable compass, but has for a long period remained
in an insignificant minority, can with the advance of a
historic tum suddenly rise to a higher level." (1933-34, p.
44).
Bleak as the present moment might appear to be, it was
bound to change as a result of the threat facing the work-
ing class.
THE THREAT OF FASCISM AND WAR
"The position of world capitalism; the frightful crtsis
that plunged the working masses into unheard-of
misery; the revolutionary movement of the oppressed
colonial masses; the world danger of fascism; the
perspective of a new cycle of wars which threatens to
destroy the whole human culture - these are the con·
ditions that imperatively demand the welding together
of the proletarian vanguard into a new (Fourth) Inter-
national." (1933·34, p. 51).
N
oone, at the time, could be unaware of the dangers
thai the international working class faced. There
were, indeed, to be heroic battles. But if history has shown
that the crisis did not usher in a new era of world revolu-
tion, it was certainly a realistic prospect at the time.
Nor could the parties of the Second (the social·
democratic Socialist Parties) and Third Internationals be
depended upon to change their policies and lead the
working class in battle. Time and again they had proven
33
their bankruptcy. Trotsky's perspective for the Fourth In-
ternational was fundamentally based upon the inability of
these parties to respond to the danger facing them. The
troops for the Fourth International would come from the
thousands of workers who were abandoning the Second
and Third Internationals, and a new gereration of young
workers:
"It must not be forgotten, on the other hand, that in
every country there are thousands of revolutionaries
who have abandoned the official party (e?) or been
expeUed from it, who did not join us chiefly because tQ
them we were only a faction of that same party with
which they were disgusted. An even greater number
of workers are breaking right now with reformism. and
seeking revolutionary leadership. Finally, amid the
putrefaction of the Social Democracy and the wreck of
Stalinism, a young generation of workers that needs a
stainless banner is rising." (1933·34, p.23).
Throughout the thirties, as defeat followed defeat, Trot·
sky never wavered in his belief that these setbacks were
only temporary. Given time the working class would leam
the lessons of its defeats, and when it did so a new revolu-
tionary upsurge would inevitably ·resulr.:lfyesterd~.Ger­
many was the key to the Situation, tomorrow it would be
Spain, then France, and lastly, perhaps, the United States.
At some time the tide of history would tum. The tasks of
revolutionaries was to be ready when it did.
TWO THEMES
T here were two themes in Trotsky's campaign to
recast the political orientation of the International
Communist League in order to enable it to fulfill its historic
tasks, and these themes remained fairly constant
throughout the thirties.
First, the ICL must give up its narrow, sectarian orienta-
tion and methods of functioning and tum to the masses.
Secondly, while engaging in mass work it was necessary to
defend the programmatic purity of the movement, its un-
stained banner, without which success would be impossi-
ble. These two themes were combined as complementary
aspects of a common perspective.
The turn to mass work would mean breaking with the
whole previous orientation. For five years the ILO had
functioned as a propaganda group trying to convince
members of the Communist Parties of their point of view.
Many had grown comfortable with this orientation, which
emphasized ideas, instead of action. The ILO was made
up preponderantly of intellectuals without any mass base
or following in the working class. They had Virtually no
presence in the trade unions.
The new perspective would require mass agitational
work, penetrating and winning influence in the trade
unions and other mass working class organizations. At
times, it would even mean- entering centrist or reformist
organizations in order to gain a wider hearing for their pro-
gram. To accomplish all this, it was imperative to "pul an
end to narrow propagandism." (1933·34, p. 24).
The initial program of the ICL had been adopted al a
time when they were still trying to reform the Comintern. It
included as basic points the following:
1. Independence of the Proletarian Party;
2. Recognition of the international and thereby of
 -If()~
the Permanent character of the Proletarian Revolu-
tion;
3. Recognition of the Soviet state as a workers state;
4. Condemnation of the [domestic] economic poncy
of the Stalinist faction;
5. Recognition of the necessity of systematic com-
munist work in proletarian mass organizations;
6. Rejection of the formula of the 'Democratic dic-
tatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' as a
separate regime distinguished from the dictatorship of
the proletariat;
7. Recognition of the necessity of mobilizing the
masses under transitional slogans;
8. Recognition of the necessity of a developed
united front policy with respect to the mass organiza-
tions of the working class;
9. Rejection of the theory of social fascism;
10. Recognition of the necessity of the creation of a
genuine Communist International (this version of
pOint 10 adopted after the tum)'
11. Recognition of party democracy not only in
words but also in fact." (1932-33, p. 53)
(Several of these points have importance because of the
current line of the CP's at that time, what has been called
the "Third Period". This was a classic ultra-left line, em-
phasizing the immediacy of revolution, denouncing the
Social Democratic parties as soda! fascist, and rejecting
any joint work with them, even in defensive struggles
against fascism. This was the policy which had allowed
Hitler to take power. The Comintern also urgued for leav-
ing the reformist unions. and setting up instead "Red" or
revolutionary unions. In the U.S. this led to the attempt to
organize independent unions around the Trade Union
Untty League. This Une would be changed to that of the
"Popular Front" in 1935.)
In carrying out mass work it would be important to em-
phasize points 5. 7 and 8. Several programs of action in-
volving partial, democratic and transitional demands were
developed by Trotsky for particular countries, culminating
in the Transitional Program in 1938.
T rotsky emphasized that a smaD group would need a
reliable compass in order to successfully navigate
the long journey to SOCialist revolution. The program
would, he believed. be that compass. Summing up the
lessons of the past 15 years, it represented the only revolu-
tionary policy that would lead to victory. Time and again
Trotsky would fight against any attempt to change the pro-
gram, or reduce it to a more minimal program, as a
capitulation to centrism or reformism.
In France, Trotsky would attack the idea of organizing
the revolutionary youth around a minimal program of
Marxist principles. "The formula [of a minimal program) is
almost classic as the beginning of a downsliding on the op-
portunist incline." (1934-35, p. 90)
It is hard not to see a sectarian, all-or-nothing attitude in
Trotsky's intransigence on the program. But Trotsky could
argue, with reason, that it was precisely upon these fun-
damentals of program that the success of the whole ven-
ture depended. The perspective of a new International
made little sense otherwise.
He was also partly motivated by a fear of the political
dissolution of the ICL as it turned to mass work. The
pressure of the more conservative masses would create
strong centrifugal pressures on the small forces in the ICL.
This was not an idle fear. There are,sadly, far too many
34
examples of those who split with Trotsky finally
capitulating to reformism, and not only individuals but en-
o tire groups.
The continuing series of defeats would take its toll in
political disorientation:
"A revolutionary organization whose cadres have
not absorbed into their blood and bones the strategic
lessons of the last decade cannot possess, under pre-
sent conditions. the necessary force of resistance to
the decomposing tendencies; and in any case, it will
prove incapable of leading real masses." (1933-34, p.
201)
Any numerical success, without the necessary political
program, would be short lived:
"In the epoch of dissolution. ferment and confu-
sion. political half-heartedness may sometimes register
great successes that are of the greatest surprise to itseH
and blind it; but these successes are not trustworthy;
they disappear together with the political conjecture
that gave birth to them." (1933-34, p. 230)
Trotsky felt that the international discipline of the ICL
would be strong enough to overcome any problems of
adaptation in the national sections. In the final analysis this
meant that Trotsky became the international arbiter and
guardian of the unstained banner. He would be dragged
into every dispute, no matter how petty (which partly ex-
plains the voluminous quantity of his writings during this
period).
In the hands of his followers these two themes were
sometimes turned around against Trotsky. More than once
he would complain that "some comrades, homesick for
the mass organizations. exhibit a desire to gather frUits that
are still unripe. Others, anxious about the purity of the
principles of the Left Opposition. regard all attempts to ap-
proach the larger mass organizations with distrust."
(1932-33. p. 276)
Throughout the thirties Trotsky would play upon these
·themes. depending on whether or not he felt the greatest
danger to the movement consisted in its isolation and sec-
tarianism, or rather in the reformist pressures of its mass
work. First he would bend the stick one way, then the
other, which explains why some of his writings have a par-
ticularly one-sided character.
I t Is easy today to questioll whether these two
themes are in fact compatible in a party-building
perspective. It is hard to see how a small group can create
a mass party while maintaining its programmatic intran-
sigence. It appears to expect the mountain to come to
Mohammed.
Trotsky justified his perspective by the entire historical
character of the epoch; not only its revolutionary poten-
tialities, but also its reactionary and dissolving tendencies
as well. It is on the basis of those historical conditions that
one must evaluate Trotsky's attempts to build the Fourth
International.
TO THE MASSES I
Any immediate prospects for building new parties
depended upon various centrist organizations and cur-
rents. (The term "Centrism" has a specific meaning for
revolutionary Marxists. It has nothing to do with middle-of-
the-road politicians in the center of the political spectrum
 from right to left. Rather it refers to parties and groupings
whose politics represent a middle ground between social
democratic reformism and revolutionary Marxism.
Typically, centrists talk revolution whUe practicing refor-
mism. While their heart may be in the right place, their
courage is lacking. Faced wtih great tasks calling for
decisive action they tend to vacillate between the poles of
revolution and reform.)
During the summer of 1933 an international conference
was called by the Independent Labor Party of Great Bri-
tain, a left centrist group which had recently left the Labor
Party. The purpose of the conference was to discuss how
to respond to the recent victory of Hitler in Germany.
Fourteen parties and groups, including the ICL, par-
ticipated. The largest party by far was the left reformist
Norwegian Labor Party (NAP). While it was a significant
mass party, it was also the most conservative, and was
shortly to form a reformist government in Norway.
The Trotskyists hoped to get enough other groups to
join them in a call for a new International to enable them to
launch a serious international campaign. Only three other
groups were wUling to do so. These were the German
Socialist Workers' Party (SAP), an emigre group which
had recently left social democracy; and two Dutch groups,
the Independent Socialist Party and the Revolutionary
Socialist Party. A permanent commission was set up to
continue the work of these four groups in promoting a new
International.
This initial success qUickly evaporated. While the four
were to caU a conference of their own later that year, short-
ly afterwards nothing was left. The SAP quickly moved to
the right, breaking with the ICL in order to maintain its ties
with the NAP and other reformist and centrist organiza-
tions. The two Dutch organizations meanwhile merged to
form the Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party. It too,
however, shortly split in support of the POUM against
Trotsky.
A year later the ICL was back where it started. It was
time for a new turn.
TO THE MASSES Il- THE FRENCH TURN
The construction of a new international seemed as dis-
tant as ever. Indeed. even historic events were working
against them now. In February of 1934 Austrian clerical
reactionaries smashed the Austrian Social Democratic Par-
ty and set up a dictatorship wtih fascist trappings. Unlike
Germany, the Austrian social democrats fought· back, be-
ing defeated after bitter resistance. As a result parliamen-
tarism suffered a blow, and there was a shift to the left in
other social democratic parties.
In France the fascists organized a riot during that same
February in an attempt to bring down the government. Its
near success resulted in a general strike in Paris. Changing
directions, the Communist Party even took part, marching
shoulder to shoulder with the social democratic workers
they had only yesterday denounced as social fascist. By
June the Comintern had dropped its line of the "Third
Period", in favor of building People's Fronts of all anti-
fascist forces.
T he desire for unity in the fight against fascism now
gripped the working class. Indeed, it appeared to
3S
confirm everything Trotsky had written on Germany. Yet
it also worked against the call for a new International. After
• all, to many workers it seemed that would mean new
splits, and more divisions, when what was necessary was
unity.
With no immediate prospects for a new International,
the main danger facing the ICL was its isolation, and
hence its inability to influence events or even numbers of
workers.
"In the unity of the ranks, the masses now see their
only means of salvation. Everyone who remains out-
side the common ranks, everyone who criticizes from
the Sidelines, the masses look upon as an
-oOstacle ... With the rise of the movement, the task of
the Marxists consists in, supported by the wave, bring-
ing the necessary clarity of thought and method."
(1934-35, p. 42)
Trotsky's solution was to propose a radical new
turn-the actual entering of the reformist social democratic
, parties. Trotsky gave several reasons for this new strategy.
First, it was still necessary to overcome sectarian prac-
tices that members had developed in isolation (a serious
problem in France).
Secondly, the Socialist Parties were developing strong
left wings and attracting thousands of revolutionary
workers, who thus were not being attracted to the ICL.
Thirdly the ICL was too inSignificant to participate in the
coming united front as an independent organization. To be
on the inside, it would have to be inside one of the larger
mass parties, and that meant the social democratic parties.
Fourthly, the CP's would not let them join, and in any
event would be losing members.
Lastly, he emphasized that the ICL was entering the
reformist organization, not to give up the fight for a new In-
ternational, but to be able more effectively to carry out that fight.
There was tremendous opposition throughout the ICL
to this proposal, which did not auger well for its success.
Over a year of endless debates would take place before
Trotsky would win a majority, and this led to the inevitable
splits.
In France the turn became a farce, as the group split on
the way in, while they were in, and when they came out,
only to reunite and then split again, all of this drearily
recorded in "The Crisis of the French Section". Yet in spite
of this they met with some initial success. By the summer
of 1935 they had 300 members and were receiving as
much as 20% of the vote in the Paris sections of the SFlO
(French Socialist Party) and the bloc in the youth group
had about a third of the delegates.
It must have come as quite a surprise that at preCisely
this moment Trotsky was arguing for leaving the SFlO.
Less surprising was the fact that the SFlO was taking steps
to expel or force out the Trotskyists. (Reformists, always so
ardent in their support of "democracy", are quick to deny
democratic privileges to their left wing).
In "A New Tum is Necessary" Trotsky argued that the
French section, "thanks to the entry, has changed from a
propaganda group into a revolutionary factor of the first
order." (1934-35, p. 315)
Nothing could have been further from the truth. By
April 1936, after splits and reunifications, the French sec-
tion still reported only 615 members. They were never to
be a serious factor in French political life. If so little had
changed in the strength of the ICL, why argue for an in-
dependentcou~e?
 -l-/l.-: ,
T rotsky'sreasons were partly based upon the new in-
ternational situation, and partly by contradicting his
· motivation for entering.
The rightward drift of the Comintern , Trotsky felt, was
the prelude to the outbreak of a new world war. The threat
of war made it imperative for the ICL to carry out pro-
· paganda for a new international. Since the SFIO was try-
ing to mllZ2le the Trotskyists, this meant leaving and set-
. ting up an independent organization.
He also now argued that the workers were, in fact, not
in the SFIO . To carry their message to those workers they
· would have to leave.
Lastly, there was the danger of the political adaptation
of some elements of the French section to centrists they
were working with, primarily the grouping around Marcel
Pivert. (This primarily concerned negotiations with Pivert
on condtlions for the Trotskyists remaining in the SFIO).
Upon leaving, however, wouldn't the masses of workers
once again view them as an "obstacle", as mere outside
critics? Trotsky admitted that this might initially be the
case, but he felt that the unfolding of the crisis would soon
justify them in the eyes of the advanced workers. In any
event, given that the SFIO was intent on silenCing them at
a minimum, any attempt to stay in would probably have
meant capitulating on their ability to raise and fight for their
program.
. This entire process was then repeated one year later in
the U.S. With the departure of their right wing, the
Socialist Party appeared to be moving left. Again Trotsky
argued that thousands of revolutionary workers were join-
ing the party. (He mistakenly believed that the SP had
reached a membership of 25,000. It was probably less
than half that figure. No matter, it did not approach the
130,000 in the SFlO.)
U nlike France, however, the American Trotskyists
were meeting with some success. In 1934 they had
led the tremendous struggle of the Minneapolis Teamsters
which resulted in victory. They had also successfully car-
ried out a merger with another small socialist organization
led by A.J. Muste, to form the American Workers Party.
With the mass industrial workers' movement for the CIO
just beginning, prospects for the Trotskyists were certainly
improving.
This very success, combined with the weakness of the
American SP relative to its European counterparts, caused
considerable oppOSition to carrying out entry in the U.S.
Once again, after a year of debate and the inevitable split,
the majority of Trotskyists did finally enter the SP in 1936.
They would be expelled in September 1937, after hav-
ing gained a few hundred members. This was not soon
enough for Trotsky, who had been urging a split since
May. His reasons were similar to those in France.
He was again worried about the political adaptation of
his followers to the milieu of the SP. In "A 'Critical' Adap-
tation to Centrism" he attacked the line of the American
comrades as "opportunistic". These comrades believed
-the SP was closer to the politics of revolutionary socialism
than any other party in the Second or Third International
(certainly. an exaggeration) and that consequently it was
possible for the Trotskyists and others on the left to gain a
majority.
36
For Trotsky, the SP was a "miserable centrist political
abortion" and it was a dangerous illusion to talk of con-
quering it. Such a policy of passive adaptation "threatens,
on the contrary, the loss of members of your own faction."
(1936-37, p. 307)
He called for denouncing the leaders of the SP as
"traitors and rascals", .as "agents of the Stalinist-reformist
hangmen of the Russian revolution as well as the Spanish
revolution." (1936-37, p. 335) Furthermore, only by such
an attack "can we prevent hesitations among our sym-
pathizers and the best elements of the Clarity faction." (p.
335) (The Clarity faction was a caucus which won a ma-
jority at the 1937 convention and was pledged to oppose
any expulsions. Under pressure from the right, it eventual-
ly did expel the left in September.)
Trotsky also defended his recommendation for a split on
the basis of the international situation, which, as previously
in France, necessitated an independent organization.
Primarily his analysis concerned the CP. The defeat in
Spain, the failure of the Popular Front government in
France, and the repression (massive purges and show
trials) in Russia would combine to cause a crisis in the CP.
"This party cannot possibly be left intact by the above-
mentioned political factors . Crises and splits are inevitable.
It is possible that by fall we can prepare an amalgamation
of a part of the CP with our own independent organiza-
tion." (1936-37, p. 335)
Here Trotsky's internationalism got the better of him.
Certainly international questions must be considered when
developing a national policy, but they are hardly sufficient.
As Craipeau noted: "For a rank and file worker the discus-
sion on the hlnglo-Soviet Committee or the Kuomintang
appeared completely abstract. Their preoccupations were
elsewhere." • (Cited in Hallas, International Socialism 53,
p.32).
Eventually, in fact two years later, with the Hitler-Stalin
pact in 1939 there was indeed a crisis in the CP, and
thousands left in disgust. But this brought no benefit to the
Trotskyists. Throughout the thirties it was to remain the
case that workers, disgusted with the betrayals of the Se-
cond and Third Internationals, lacked the energy to try
once again, and simply gave up.
I t must be remembered that all these tactics had two
basic goals, not just one. James P. Cannon, a main
leader of the American Trotskyists during the thirties, em-
phasized only the first conSideration, the need to preserve
the cadre, in his history of that period. (History of
American Trotskyism, p. 249). But to do so is to recognize
the relative failure of the entry into the SP. As an attempt
to achieve the second goal, that is to change the balance of
forces. to change from a propaganda group into at least a
small party. no serious headway was made.
In fact, Cannon was forced to admit in 1940 that the
whole experience of two years of factional struggle had
caused them to "let the great movement of the CIO pass
over our heads." • (Struggle for a Proletarian Party. p. 59).
Justifying the split from the SP solely on the need to
preserve the cadre was contrary to Trotsky's own inten-
tions. In fact, in a letter to Cannon in October 1937 he
criticized the pessimism of some members. and insisted
that the "development of the Fourth International will be
connected in the next period with a new crisis and the in-
 evitable disintegration of People's Fro"t policies and the
Third International." (1936-37, p. 488) ..
TO THE MASSES 111-
THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL?
By 1937 pessimism was understandable. After almost
five years of activity the movemllnt for a Fourth Interna-
tional did not have much progress to report.. Nowhere was
it even on the verge of emerging as a real party able to in-
fluence events. WhUe in the U.S. there had been some
pr-ogress, elsewhere there was only stagnation or collapse.
Conditions got grimmer as the Stalinists unleashed an
international campaign of terror against the Trotskyi~,
and against any internal opposition in RU$Sia. Numerous
leaders of the Fourth International were assassinated, in-
cluding Trotsky's son, Leon Sedov, and eventually Trot-
sky himself in 1940.
Furthermore, the increasingly right wing policy of the
Comintem did not lead to its disintegration, but rather to
tremendous growth. In France the CP grew from 34,000
in 1934 to 150,000 in 1936, with another 100,000 in the
youth. In Spain it grew from 1000 in 1934 to 117,000 by
July 1937. In the U.S. the CP would also reach 100,000
during the late thirties.
In fact, the entire workers' movement had shifted to the
right as defeat followed defeat. Trotsky was well aware of
this:
"We are not progressing politically. Yes, it is a fact
which is an expression of a gener~ decay of the
workers' movements in the last fifteen years. It is the
more general cause. When the revolutionary move·
ment in general is declining. when one- defeat fQllows
another. when Fascism is spreading over the world.
when the official 'Marxism' is the most powerful
organization of deception of the workers, and so on, it
is an inevitable situation that the revolutionary
elements must work against the general historic cur-
rent." (1938·39, p. 63)
I n this time of demoralization and defeat, Trotsky
declared that it was time to proclail1) the Foutth In-
ternational. Only a year before he denounced such an idea
as idiotic. Had he now gone mad?
It must have appeared that way to some of his followers.
At the founding conference of the Fourth International in
September 1938, only 11 countries were represented.
Only the Americans had any strength at aU, claiming an in-
flated 2500 members. For the rest only tiny groups ex-
isted. Some delegates represented only themselves. (The
delegate from the USSR, where the Trotskyists had been
physically exterminated, was 'Etienne' a Stalinist police
agent.)
Pierre Frank, a leader of the French Trotskyists, has
written more recently that the formation of the Fourth In-
ternational was necessary to defend the political integrity
of tha movement. "For him [Trotsky] the most important
consideration was not the numerical size of our forces, nor
the readiness of a more or less large sector of the workers
to understand our decision; but above and beyond aU, it
was a question of political perspective and political con-
tinuity. Trotsky was acutely aware that the workers move-
ment in general, and our movement in particular, was
about to enter an extremely difficult period-the im-
perialist war-in the course of which we would be sub-
37
jected to extraordinary pressures by the class enemy and
b\!.powerful centrifugal forces. These pressures could very
well destroy an organization as weak as our own."
• (History of the A, in Intercontinental Press).
Like Cannon before, such an approach reinterprets the
entire experience of the thirties in terms of defending the
cadre, rather than buUding mass parties. It is to focus on
only one side of Trotsky's writings, misrepresenting his
fundamental perspective.
"Reactionary epochs like ours," he wrote in 1937,
"not only disintegrate and weaken the working class
and its vanguard but also lower the general ideolOgical
level 01 the movement and throw political thinking
back to stages long since passed through. In these con-
ditions, the task of the vanguard is above all not to let
itself be carried along by the backward flow: it must
swim against the current. If an unfavorable relation of
forces prevents it from holding the positions that it has
won. it must at least retain its ideological poSitions,
because in them is expressed the dearly purchased ex-
perience 01 the past. Fools wUI consider this policy
'sectarian', Actually it is the only means of preparing
fOT a new tremendous surge forward with the coming
historical ude." 11936-37. p. 416. Emphasis added)
With the coming historical tide! To the end, Trotsky
never wavered in his belief that in spite of all defeats. in
spite 01 Stalinist and social democratic betrayals, the com-
ing imperialist war would once again force the working
class onto the road of revolution. Once on that road it
would need leaders armed with a program of socialist
revolution. For that, they would tum to the unstained ban-
ner of the Fourth International.
T his perspective was summed up in the rising tones
of the transitional program adopted at the 1938
convention, and called "The Death Agony of Capitalism
and the Tasks of the Fourth International."
The "objective prerequisites for the proletarian
revolution have not only 'ripened'; they have begun to
get somewhat rotten ... The historical crisis of mankind
is reduced to the crisis of the revolutionary
leadership ... The laws of history are stronger than the
bureauaatic apparatus. No matter how the methods
of the social betrayers differ (i.e. the reformists and
Stalinists] ... they will never succeed in breaking the
revolutionary will of the proletariat. .. The strategic task
of the next period-a prerevolutionary period of agita-
tion, propaganda, and organization-consists in over-
coming the contradiction between the maturity of the
objective revolutionary conditions and the immaturity
of the proletariat and its vanguard ... The advanced
workers, united in the Fourth International, show their
dass the way out.of the crisis ... They offer a spotless
benner." • (Founding Documents of the FI pp 181-2.
218).
Duncan Hallas aptly summed up the foundation of the
Fourth International as a desperate gamble, required by
the desperate conditions facing the working class. If the
odds for success were not great, no one was offering better
ones. If it began without the necessary forces, it was
organized in expectation of the development of those
forces in the future.
THE BALANCE SHEET
All Trotsky's attempts to buUd new revolutionary parties
 during the thirties ended in failure. They had to, for his It would be hard to find one mass party which has
analysis of key factors in the nature of the period were pro- developed from such Q perspective. Mass parties are not
ven faulty. built through recruitment of individuals to the full program,
The Stalinist bureaucracy in Russia and the Communist but through the identification of the party with certain
. Parties throughout the world were not destroyed by the issues that are of decisive importance to the masses.
war, but emerged stronger than ever. The continuing Today a new crisis grips capitalism. Once again we are
defeats of the working class, culminating in the slaughter of faced with the tasks of organizing mass revolutionary par-
World War II, finally did break the revolutionary will of the ties. As important as the party's program is the authority of
"working class. This defeat, of world historical proportions, the individuals who carry it, and that authOrity can only be
paved the way for a restoration of capitalist prosperity developed over years of participation in the ongoing strug-
~ollowing the war and put an end to revolutionary oppor- gles of the working class.
tunities in the major capitalist countries for an entire Exactly what the crucial issues are, what the character of
generation. the program must be, depends on the specific historic con-
The thirties was, indeed, a "reactionary epoch". The juncture and the immediate tasks facing revolutionaries.
historical tide never did come in. The Fourth International The key test of revolutionary leadership is the ability to cor-
was still-born. rectly grasp these issues, and to determine what the next
In the final analysis one of Trotsky's main successes, and steps are, not the ability to repeatformulas learned by rote.
a remarkable one at that, was keeping alive the revolu-
tionary tradition, the fundamental intellectual capital of the
working class movement. But the fact that this was a suc-
cessful defense of the cadre does not justify interpreting his
policies as solely aimed at that accomplishment.
Throughout the period, the two themes remained as
complementary aspects of a common party-budding
perspective. That perspective made sense if one accepted
Trotsky's entire analysis of the period.
It was only later that leaders of the Fourth International,
unwilling to accept its failure, would be forced to defend its
party building perspectives as correct for any time and
period. Desperate measures would be reinterpreted as the
highest revolutionary wisdom.
Cannon would write in his history: "r think one of
the most important lessons that the Fourth Interna-
tional has taught us is that in the modern epoch you
cannot build a revolutionary political party solely on a
national basis. You must begin with an international
program, and on that basis you build national sections
of an international movement ... You organize people,
no matter how few there may be in each country, on
the basis of the international program; you gradually
build up your national sections." " (,History', p.42)
Or more schematically: "We worked out our program,
formed our cadre, did our preliminary propagandistic
work first. Then, when opportunities arose for activity in
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the labor movement, we were ready to put our activity to
some purpose." (p. 104). Subscribe!
History has announced its verdict on such a
perspective-it is bankrupt. It is a perspective, not
for building mass parties, but only for organizing numerous
CJrANTGES
small insignificant sects.
Today, the Fourth International continues, still more fic- Name .................... .
tion than fact. Its survival signifies, not the triumph of Trot- Street. , .................. .
skyism, but its degeneration. It has turned the program in- State ............. Zip ..... .
to a dogma, to be defended like holy writ. It also defends .... Regular subscription
the independent existence of the Fourth International with
a,sectarian intranSigence that has prevented it from in- $10.00
fluencing any of the real revolutionary movements that ..... Supporting subscription
have developed, but does not prevent it from sharp inter- $25.00
nal disputes and divergent political lines on almost every
important issue.
Fundamentally, the mistake is one of believing that the
nucleus or embryo of the revolutionary party already ex-
ists, organized around the full international program, and
that the task is Simply one of recruiting more numbers.
313

from CHANGES, June 197
I.S. statement
on minority's
resignation
A political minority within the Interna-
tional Socialists has unilaterally an-
nounced its intention to leave the IS as a
group. This minority. formerly known as
the Political Solutions Caucus and the
Rank and File Caucus, has been
organized for over a year around a
critique of some of the trade union work
of the IS. These differences were
intensely debated at the IS convention
last November, as well as at the previous
convention two years ago. The minority
is not claiming that any new differences
on these questions have arisen.
These political differences between the
minority and majority are real. They have
been the subject of discussion, and
unfonunately rumors, between conven-
tions. They concern primarily differences
over the importance of elections in the
process of building a rank. and file reform
movement. and the degree and circum-
stances under which rank. and file forces
should cooperate with reform-minded or
progressive union officials. We would be
the last to deny that in practice such
differences can be very ·important.
Nevertheless. on the scale of political
ideas and perspectives on the American
left. it is perfectly clear that these
differences are containable within one
socialist organization. There is no concei-
vable political justification for a split over
these existing differences.
Furthermore. the minority's decision to
split was taken after the Executive
Committee (Ee) of the IS had already
circulated a proposal to loosen the
structure of the organization, which
would allow the minority greater freedom
of activity around its own views. Further,
upon hearing that leaders of the minority
were discussing a split, the EC proposed
further modifications. At a meeting of
minority leaders a representative of the
EC argued that this was not the time for
splitting. but for broadening and re-
groupment on the revolutionary left. It is
clear to us that the different views
existing in the IS, and others as well,
would necessarily exist within any
foreseeable viable socialist organization.
We pointed out that the minority, which
has at most forty members, could not
possibly exist as an effective organiza-
tion. The leaders of the minority.
-ttf-
however, refused any dialogue with the chance of bearing fruit in a more
IS majority, and later unilaterally decided favorable clime.
to split and form their own group. For the IS the crisis of the left is not
The organizational and political something we could ignore if we wanted
changes proposed for the IS by its EC to. As revolutionary Marxists our fate
were in large part directed precisely at depends on the dynamism of a self-active
allowing more flexibility of action and a and self-emancipating working class
more open public debate. At the heart of _ movement. We are not immune to the
these proposals for a more decentralized . ·process around~ us:The left. and we, have
structure is the prespective toward been unable to expand and become a vital
revolutionary regroupment. (Our views factor in working class political life.
on the politics of regroupment and the We have had to draw a balance sheet of
problems of the revolutionary left are the last decade. of our efforts and those of
spelled out in a feature article by Mark the rest of the left. Despite pride in what
Levitan in this issue of CHANGES). we have achieved and our exemplary
The minority's unilateral action and its work in the labor movement. we
stated position on our regroupment recognize that those efforts alone are
proposal have made it clear that this split much too weak to create a revolutionary
is not over labor policy, per seA Nor is it workers' party. Ind.eed the whole left is
over their right to publicly state their too weak-in numbers as well as
views-that right was clearly spelled out ideas-to create a serious revolutionary
by the EC's proposals. Rather, their pole within the labor movement. It is
decision to split is over the question of further debilitated by unrealistic perspec-
revolutionary broad regroupment. The tives. by fantasies that the American
minority has opted for the direction of the working class can be the tail to its kite if
smaller, "purer" sect, the same direction only the right program. method, tactic
which has failed for the American Left in and leadership were adopted. The left
this decade. They reject extended and we face a fork in the road-either a
cooperation and eventual merger with new approach to building a revolutionary
other forces on the left, in the belief that workers' party. or increasing left irrele·
only their nuance on socialist politics is vance and further disintegration.
genuinely revolutionary. Everyone else is For a start. the lesson of the
seen as drifting to the right, tOO loose revolutionary experience of the 70' s has
organizationally, politically soft. This is a to be assimilated_ The attempt of every
caricature of Leninism and of Marxist political tendency and nuance to organize
perspective. but one that is all to common itself as if it were the embryo of the
on the left today. To their own detriment. revolutionary party has to be rejected.
as well as ours, the minority's split from The original goal, the creation of a party,
the IS simply continues the current has been lost-replaced by a.vertible host
process of disintegration being ex- of competing sects pretenq.lng that they
perienced by most of the revolutionary are the party-in-ovo. They are long on
left. program and organizational structures-
Throughout the left there is a sense of something the left of the 60' s was totally
crisis, of questioning and rethinking. The ignorant of to its peril- but antithetically
post-Vietnam period has marked a short on movement and potential. To
political shift to the right. notwithstand· those workers and activists from social
ing the return of capitalist crisis. With it . movements actually being radicalized-
has come isolation for the left and an and they are the harbingers of the next
internal crisis for many of its cadres. wave of radicalization-there is a new
Some have abandoned revolutionary obstacle to be hurdled; the plethora of
politics. Others have been attracted to a mini-sects instead of a movement; the
resurgent refonnism-to the growth of a almost insurmountable complexity of
social democratic fringe within the competing groups to wade through before
margins of the Democratic Party or in revolutionary activism can be organized.
local reform organizing projects. A few The existence of revolutionary sects no
have chosen the classic denial of longer prevent the decline of the left,
reality-the retreat to pure propagandis- but are its symptom. Nor are they any
tic criticism that is so prevalent and barrier to the revival of social democracy.
recurring in periods of left isolation in Sectarianism and sect life die hard. But
America. This is accompanied by a we believe they have run their course in
growing political inflexibility, organiza- the present period. and are wiping out
tional rigidity and sectarian self-isolation. whatever progressive content they once
As is so common, social democratic had in keeping alive the cadres of the
opportunism and sectarianism in this movements of the 60' s.
case are two sides of the same coin. the Until about a year ago, the IS held the
inability in a difficult period to develop a perspective, like many other groups. that
revolutionary perspective that has a it would be the embryo of the future
33
 workers' party-even though it was a
small embryo indeed. We expected a
'more rapid intensification of the class
strUggle_ in the 70's, and based our
perspectives on that expectation. We
We realize that some activists on the
left will be inclined to view the current
split as just one more example of the
problems of the IS-and for some,
perhaps. another reason to reject Lenin o

recognize that both the expectations and
-the high level of centralist norms of
organization based on them, cannot be
maintained.
For us the fork in the road leads to a
new direction. to the building of a new
,left. of a strong, united. revolutionary
regroupment. We are committed to
uniting those sections of the left who
stand for the working class, revolution,
democracy and all the struggles of the
oppressed. We recognize that a broad.
revolutionary organization will not have
the organizational norms of a Leninist
group. nor the ideological clarity that
produces those nonns at least for the
start. But a Leninist party will not
develop from the existing sects. It can
come only from a regrouped, strengthen-
ed revolutionary left able to grow through
successful interactions with a new.
working class movement. We are con-
vinced that it can develop OUt of uniting
those elements on the left who champ-ion
the rank and file of the Jabor movement,
whose goal is clearly the revolutionary
ism. But the question for the left today is
not whether tightly organized. small
revolutionary groups lead to splits
under all circumstances. regardless of
time or place. The question is how the left
in America today can reorganize to go
forward. The truth is that in their
dedication to define themselves by what
is different ramer than by what they have
in common with the rest of the left. and to.
maintain (or attempt to maintain) tight
nonns of organization. the IS minority
takes with them precisely those elements
of the failures of the revolutionary left in
the 1970's, and of our own past. which we
now reject.
In the movement for regroupment that
we believe can unfold in the coming
period we win argue that the potential for
building . working class socialism in
America lies in the rank and file and
union reform movements slowly develop-
ing in the Jabor movement. The left win
succeed or fail in building a revolutionary
workers' party in America depending on
whether it provides a vehicle for these I

reconstruction of society and the rule of movements and their leading activists to j

me workers. We are for a united become stronger and politically con-

revolutionary left. able to counter the seious. There is no future in retreats to
claims of social democracy and stalinism, sectarianism and isolationist purity.
with their elitism and bureaucratic &ec:utive Committee
politics from above~ with the approach of
a working class socialist revolution from
below. Such a broad revolutionary
organization would have to have an open.
experimental attitude as it develops its
organizational forms.

We have for OUf part already started to

act on this perspective politically and
organizationally. Politically we have
initiated discussions with other organiza·
tions and individuals on the left to start a
debate on the left for a revolutionary
regroupment. We enter this dialogue
with our own views. but with an openess
ro the apporach of others. Organizational·
Iy we are modifying the nonns of the IS to
make them more amenable to take part in
a regrouped left. And we are altering
Changes. to make it a magazine which
champions regrouping and is open to
other views and dialogue on revolutionary
, regroupment as one contribution to unity.
This direction was established before
we had any knowledge of the minority's
intentions to split. Thus. this split is
- unfortunate in both fact and timing. We
cannot imagine on what political basis the
minority would abst~ from a broader
regroupment should that become possi.
ble in the foreseeable future.

34
 Manning Marable: "For beH_r
or wor••, only J •••• Jackson
has seized the opportunity to
lead the ne"t stage of the ci"il
right. mov.ment to the very
center of national politics. Can
the left afford to stand outside
of this mass movement?"
Ells. . Cla,ke: "The idea that
you can win a bigger audience
tor socialist politics by
attaching yourself to the
Democratic Party is an illusion.
What heppens, Instead, is that
the left lose. its voice."
John Trinkl: "Ideological strug·
gle is still important, but to fake
it as an end in it.elf is a fecipe
tor building a sect. Re"olu·
tionary organization has to be
built in practice, not by selt·
declared vanguard/sm."
BY Manning Marable
Manning Marable is a widely syndicated columnist and Direc-
tor of Africana and Hispanic Studies at Colgate University.
He edits the journal "Third World Socialists" and is a Na-
tional Vice-Chairperson of Democratic Socialists of America.
His most recent book is "Race, Reform and Rebellion: The
Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1982."
8 o CHANGES
Three Socialists Look At
The Left in the 80s:
"Prospects for Left Unity: 1984 and Forward" was
the title of a forum sponsored by the Detroit Left Uni-
ty Committee on January 21. Over 200 people came
out in what was officially Detroit's coldest day of the
20th century to hear a lively and wide-ranging ex-
change.
The three speakers. Manning Marable. Elissa
Clarke. and John Trinkl. gave Changes permission to
print the texts of their presentations. We are grateful
for this opportunity to present the talks to a Wider au-
dience.
The forum was the fifth. and largest. meeting so
care and jobs_
The point here is obvious. although constantly
overlooked; the political "center" of the Black movement
is essentially an American version of -social democracy.
Whenever the Black movement is actively challenging the
state, other nonminority social protest movements
-from feminists to disarmament activists, lesbians and
gays to organized labor militants-are also pushed for-
ward_ The entire boundaries of American politics have
been pushed to the left since 1954 by the struggle for
desegregation and Black equality.
Even a Black "moderate" like Wilson Goode is further
left than 90% of any potential white candidates. Of
course. distinctions must be made here. In the British
political context. Ron Dellums would be a Tony Benn.
while Andrew Young would be a Roy Jenkins.
It remains true that the civil rights movement is not as
organized as it could or should be. despite the recent
stride forward in the August 27th march. But all things
considered. the bulk of the Black community is much fur-
ther to the left on the decisive issues (e.g .. nuclear arms
proliferation and war spending vs. human needs spend-
ing) than the great majority of whites. in both the petty
bourgeoisie and in the proletariat. The progressive core
of any prospective Rainbow Coalition must of necessity
be the Black movement and political movements of oth;r
national minority groups.
I n understanding the relationship between the militant
reform currents of the Black movement and other
nonminority forces. I generally identify the latter as the
"democratic left." And by the democratic left. I mean all
of the broadly-based social protest movements and
reform movements which challenge_ the existing status
quo and in doing so help prepare the ideological terrain
necessary for a socialist transformation at a later
historical conjuncture.
These trends would obviously include the civil rights
continued on page 10
 (Of the three presentations included here, only Elissa Clarke1s re-
flects~ an lS perspective. Including all three helps to set thE!'
context of the discussion and also to indicate the political problems
the IS encountered in our early 1980s regroupment ~ampaign -- ed.)
Its Lessons, Its Visions, and Its Future
far sponsored by the Detroit Left Unity Committee.
Th·e Committee includes activists from diverse
organizations and perspectives within the DetrOit left.
Gloria House, a community activist, chaired the
forum.
There is no need to elaborate on the differences in
political position and viewpoint expressed by the
speakers. These wm be immediately evident, and the
views of this journal on the issues in debate are
known to most of our readers.
More important to observe, perhaps, is the fact
that a serious exchange of views-even without
BY Elissa Clarke
LIKE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of others, I
became political during the Vietnam war, more
specifically when Nixon invaded Cambodia and the Na-
tional Guard killed students at Jackson State and Kent
State.
Our enthusiasm was very high in those days. Where I
went to school, we used to ride all night to Washington in
the back of a U-Haul truck, get beaten up and tear..gassed
by cops (of course, we didn't call them cops), and then
tum around and come home. We had high expectations
of what we could accomplish. And we did end the war
... and we also drove a president crazy, no small ac-
complishment either.
Like many thousands of others, I became a revolu-
tionary socialist. I didn't know much about socialism,
but I knew that fundamental change was needed. I drop-
ped out of school and joined the 1.5., the International
Socialists. Again, we had high expectations. There were
massive social movements-the Black power movement,
the women's movement the anti-war movement, and we
l
thought we saw the beginning of a working class upsurge
in.events like France in May '68, the Hot Autumn in Italy
in 1969, and in the V.S., the formation of Dodge Revolu-
tionary Union Movement in '68, national wildcats in the
Teamsters and post office, the formation of Teamsters
United Rank and File in '71, and the Miners for
Democracy victory in 1973.
That summer, in Detroit, we thought we were witness-
ing a rank and file explosion when two Black production
workers shut down the Jefferson plant by locking them-
selves inside the power cage, and throwing the switch
that ran the main line. Then Chrysler's Detroit Forge
continued on page 14
Elissa Clarke, a contributing editor of Changes, is a feminist
writer and author of "Stopping Sexual Harassment: A Hand-
book." She is a member of the Political Committee of the In-
ternational Socialists, and is studying to be a nurse.
immediate prospects for political agreement, let
alone common organization-could take place among
activists from quite different political traditions, The
fact that such a discussion can take place reflects a
process pointed out by one of the speakers, John
Trinkl-a willingness of socialists to seriously ques-
tion and reassess aspects of their own political tradi-
tions, and to take into account the positions and in-
sights of others without abandoning their principles.
As was to be expected, the meeting raised more
questions than answers_ Comments from our readers
are most welcome.
BY John Trinkl
LEFT UNITY IS a very broad topic. What! want to do
here is to talk not primarily about what principles of uni-
ty there might be among particular Marxist organiza-
tions-I might touch on that a little-but rather to speak
to the concerns of individuals who aren't members of
Marxist organizations, and to look back on the problems
of people who have tried to build organizations in the re-
cent past. I'd like to make some general remarks, throw
out some thoughts, rather than to present a complete
strategy.
Wove been at this business a long time-about 140
years. The first scientific statement of socialism, the
Communist Manifesto, was published in 1848; and there
has been a great deal of historical experience accumulated
by the world socialist movement since that time.
Activists in the V.S. left often tend to look back at the
last five or ten years of the Marxist movement and throw
up their hands in despair, and go all over the board. Mass
movements have ebbed, organizations have collapsed
and Marxism doesn't seem to provide all the answers. But
this isn't the first "crisis of Marxism." There has never
been a golden age when the international proletariat
marched arm in arm to triumph after triumph, without
any problems. There have always been serious setbacks
and reversals, as well as advances,
The collapse of the First international was followed by
the organization of mass socialist parties in many Euro-
pean countries. The breakup of the Second International
was followed by the victory of the October Revolution in
Russia. Fascism triumphed in several countries, but later
continued on page 17
John Trinkl is a staff writer for the Guardian, and a member
of the paper's political co-ordinating committee. He covers the
left, the anti-nuclear movement and struggles in Central
America. He has been active in the anti-war movement in
South Carolina and Chicago and was a co-founder of the
Guardian Boston bureau.
CHANGES 0 9
 Marable-continued from page 8
-'-t1.-take-all electoral districts, the absence ot a socialist or
organizations, feminists, abortion rights activists, gay
and lesbian activists, militant rank-and-file union
members, peace and disarmament organizations, com-
munity-based refonn groups such as ACORN, Hispanic
and Native American groups, environmentalists, and so
forth., Some leftists would classify these forces as
'1iberals" rather than as part of the left; but in tenns of
their broad political outlook, they represent a type of
American social democracy, with some minor elements
also representing what the West German Greens are.
Some of the key organizers in these various social
movements are "nonorganizational socialists." However,
the typical political world view of most civil rights, or en-
vironmentalist or feminist activists is not explicitly Marx-
ist. But given the Marxist left's miniscule size, this is the
basic social force, despite all of its internal contradic-
tions, which will be a central factor in moving the larger
white electorate to the left.
What is the political responsibility of Marxists in the
current period? I think our major goals should be 1) the
breaking of the right's political and ideological hegemony
within American political culture and its domination of
the state apparatus; 2) the strengthening of the most pro-
gressive or left social refonn movements within this
broadly defined democratic left; 3) taking a leading role
in all antiracist campaigns within electoral and nonelec-
toral politics and; 4) extensive solidarity work inside the
U.S. in conjunction with major national liberation
movements and in support of socialist states in the Third
World-Nicaragua, Angola's MPLA, Zimbabwe, Nam-
ibia's SWAPO, the African National Congress, etc.
I raise these four concerns because they are inextricably
linked within the current political culture. Over the long
run, it seems clear that the essential precondition to the
construction of a left-wing electoral majority in the U.S.
is the creation of a permanent multiracial, multiclass
front which not only opposes Reaganism, but also ad-
vances an anticorporate and progressive agenda which is
taken from the programs of the existing democratic left
movements. One cannot predict when or whether the
next phase of the American political system will generate
an independent electoral vehicle which is tantamount to a
labor or socialist party. It is clear to me, however, that
the contemporary currents of this democratic left are the
nucleus of the future left majoritarian bloc.
Moreover, for the right, the cutting edge of their offen-
sive against the American working class is racism.
Therefore, socialists must emphasize work which pro-
motes the· development of new and effective national
minority leaders; which attacks institutional racism and
the bankrupt urban policies of Reaganites; and which
creates the possibility for Black and Latino-initiated
coalitions with white socialist and other elements of the
democratic left. It is only when the left elevates antiracist
struggle to the level of primacy that the basis for a gen-
uine Rainbow Coalition is possible; which, in tum,
creates the eventual possibility of a left-wing majoritarian
political bloc.
O ne of the principal fronts in the antiracist
struggle is in electoral politics. For historical
reasons-the lack of a parliamentary system, the winner-
100 CHANGES
labor-party-these antiracist campaigns are taking place
within the Democratic Party. Perhaps m<;>re accurately, I
would characterize the Harold Washington campaign as
a Black revolt against the Democratic Party, but inside
the Party.
The Washington campaign, in which DSA played a
small but effective part, was a blow to the racist and
elitist leadership of the Democratic Party machine; and it
pushed the programmatic boundaries of that city's
politics to the left. It provided the vehicle for white
socialists to develop new links with national minority ac-
tivists, and it set the foundation for more extensive
nonelectoral social protests in the future.
We must understand that in the context of Chicago
politics, a vote for Harold Washington was a vote
againstthe Democratic Party-its fifty-year old legacy of
corruption, police brutality, and bossism. It was a protest
against a police force which was more than 85 % white in
a city that is majority Latino and Black. Black voters op-
posed former mayor Jane Byrne's gift of $205 million to
subsidize white real estate developers; they opposed the
firing of half of the city's physicians seeing adult patients,
and the closing of "well baby" clinics and publicly funded
shelters for battered women.
A few sectarians, notably the Socialist Workers Party,
ran their own candidate in the general election against
Epton and Washington, stating that there was no mean-
ingful difference between the two. But Harold's 99%
Black mandate is the most convincing counter-argument
to this sectarian position, which in reality assists the
racist backlash.
Corporate leaders didn't funnel $10 million to Jane
Byrne out of "civic charity." They understood that the
Washington campaign was in essence an anti-<:orporate
movement, a working class protest movement which
created unprecedented links across the color line in that
racially-divided city. The social prerequisite to many ma-
joritarian bloc for socialism in the U.S. is the the creation
of a permanent anti-racist coalition, which is initiated by
national minorities themselves.
The recent Mel King campaign in Boston represented
different problems for the left. Mel of course has a very
rich history of progressive work within multi-racial
movements in Boston. King worked for 15 years as an
organizer for the United South End Settlements in the ci-
ty. For four years, he was executive director of the Urban
League of Greater Boston. From 1973 to 1982, King was
the State Representative of Boston's Black community,
Roxbury, and for other mostly white neighborhoods.
King is an unabashed socialist, and in fact had resigned
from the Democratic Party. During his campaign. a radio
talk show host asked him to choose beween Ronald
Reagan and Fidel Castro; King replied that he would
choose Castro because of his commitment to helping the
poor. In 1979's mayoral race, he came in third with 15%
of the vote. This time around he came in tied for first in
the first race, and finished with over 35% of the vote in
the run-off.
I'd like to see any white candidate with Mel's socialist
credentials run for· mayor of any major U.S. city and ob-
tain over a third of the vote. Thus, in the sense that Mel's
running helped to increase the Black, Asian and Latino
 (HM"'6 .. ,;)
electorate, and that if forced the eventual winner Ray
Flynn to take many positions similar to King's, the race
was a real success.
The left, broadly defined, responded to the Mel King
ra<e in one of three ways. The Socialist Workers Party
ran its own candidate in the first race, despite the fact
that Mel's policy positions were virtually identical to
their own! But we may dismiss this handful of zealots as
particpants in revolutionary theatre.
The second impulse, which essentially was that of en-
thusiastic endorsement and work for Mel. was shared by
a broad left spectrum: the vast majority of DSAers, in-
dependent Marxists, progressive union members, the
Communist Party, the Communist Workers Party, many
feminists and the majority of white community-based ac-
tivists. I should also add that two of Mel's major fund-
raisers were organized by DSA members. I spoke for Mel
before the first election, and Michael Harrington spoke
before the second race with Flynn.
However, about one-third or more of the broadly-
defined left chose to work for Ray Flynn. Flynn's sup-
porters, including some DSA members, admitted that
their candidate had first become prominent as an antibus-
ing leader. When both were serving concurrent terms in
the state legislature, Flynn had voted yes for
reestablishing the death penalty, for the limitation of
abortion rights, and for corporal punishment in schools,
while King had voted no. Flynn opposed handgun
registration, taxing landlords for violations of the hous-
ing code, prohibiting sexual preference discrimination by
the state, and increases in state enviromental funds.
To be fair to Flynn, in the past six years he had a
measurable shift to the liberal-left, principally on bread-
and-butter issues. During the campaign he was the only
Jesse Jackson campaigning for Mel King in Boston's mayoral race.
-:50-::- .
city coucilperson to vote against weakening the city's fair
housing law. Flynn was endorsed by Local 26, a hotel and
restaurant workers union with heavy Black membership,
and the UFCW and ACTWU also endorsed Flynn.
T here were two basic considerations at work-both
of them faulty. Nanly Snyder,. staff director of 9 to
5, stated that Flynn, not King, was the only "progressive
candidate who can win both the preliminary and the final
election for mayor." There was a tacit admission that Mel
could finish in the run-off, but that he stood no chance
whatsoever in being elected mayor. Flynn was not the
"lesser evil," but the "more-electable progressive."
Since such a sizable share of the feminist, community
and labor activists shared this perception, Mel's defeat
was something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this
regard, a certain amount of intellectual dishonesty was at
work. Flynn's left supporters stressed that he "had a
powerful city-wide constituency in Black, Hispanic and
white neighborhoods alike." Implicitly, the Flynn cam-
paign would permit leftists to develop coalitions and
closer relations with the city's national miniorities, more
so than the King campaign! This analysis is contradicted
by Mel's more than 90% vote within the Black communi-
ty.
The second problem, however, was the principal dif-
ference between the two candidates-the subject of
racism. Flynn tended to skirt the term "racism" in his
speeches, declaring that "economic discrimination" is the
real problem, and that it affects poor white people in
South Boston or Charlestown just as seriously as it does
poor Black people in Roxbury. This "economistic"
posture allowed Flynn to pick up the votes of the consti-
tuency of a James Kelly, of the racist South Boston Infor-
mation Center, while holding the allegiance of white
liberals. It also confronted some leftists who told
themselves that class (narrowly defined as common
economic interests) was the cutting edge for organizing a
permanent left movement in Boston capable of winning
office. The less Flynn discussed racism, the better.
An analysis of greater Boston's labor market reveals
the reason that thousands of Blacks and Hispanic viewed
Mel King's campaign as a significant battle against
racism. 22.3 % of all Black workers in Boston are found
in low-paying service jobs, compared to only 8.7% of the
white labor force. Almost two-thirds of all Black workers
(64.2%) are in either service, unskilled, semi-skilled, or
clerical jobs. Conversely, 38.3 % of whites and only
19.7% of Black employees are either managers, profes-
sionals or technicians.
Side by side, two distinct political economies exist in
the city of Boston; an underpaid labor market for the
poor and racial minorities, and a labor market of the
white, upwardly mobile middle-to-upper classes. This is
the root cause of the racist rhetoric, the anti-busing
polemics of the recent past, and the regular outbursts of
racist-motivated violence against people of color. Any
political economy which systematically super-exploits
the nonwhite and the poor, which maximizes profits at
their expense, must also foster a type of social relations
and political culture which divides neighborhood against
neighborhood, Black against white. So in this context,
socialists who minimize the role of racism as the key for
CHANGES 011
 -5-#
c...H<'
SimpSOrv
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will never be able to
develop ongoing, principled with national minority
movements for equality and self-determination.
H OW did Chicago and Boston relate to the Jackson
race a year later? It is clear that Harold
Washington's unprecedented victory against the Dem-
ocratic Party sparked Black interest in challenging local
Democratic machines; it gave renewed vigor to the
August 27th mobilization. This led to a social movement
calling for a basic redefinition in the relationship between
Blacks and the Democratic Party at the national level.
Like many Marxists, I opposed the candidacy of Jesse
Jackson throughout most of 1983. The basic reason was
that Jackson had never been known as a "progressive" or
'1eftist" within the context of Black politics. In fact, the
economic program of Jackson's Operation PUSH (People
United to Serve Humanity) is an updated verson of
Booker T. Washington's "Black Capitalism." For exam-
ple, PUSH's response to the loss of Black workers' jobs in
the auto industry was the purchase of one hundred shares
of stock in Chrysler, Ford, and American Motors and
General Motors Stock ownership, which according to
Jackson, "assure(s) us the right and the platform to voice
our concerns."
PUSH's "corporate covenants" with Seven-Up, Burger
King, Coca Cola and other corporations have produced
headlines for Jackson, but relatively few jobs. As recently
as July, 1982, at the convention of the New Orleans
Business League, Jackson insisted that Blacks had to
move beyond "Civil Rights to Silver Rights and from aid
to trade. We want our share of opportunities for risks
and rewards."
Inside Black political circles, Jackson has represented
the personification of opportunism and ambivalence. At
the crucial National Black Political Convensiton in Gary,
Indiana, on March 10-11, 1972, for example, Jackson
delivered a keynote address and promised to help build
the militant all-Black force: once he left the stage, he and
PUSH were never heard from again. During the Miami
race rebellion of 1980, Jackson flew into the city to "cool
off" Black militancy-only to be denounced by local
community leaders and activists. Given this checkered
record, why should Blacks or the left support Jesse
Jackson's bid for the Democratic presidential nomina-
tion?
In September, my basic outlook was changed by two
discussions. The first, which was with Ron Dellums, con-
vinced me that we had to separate Jackson's gross per-
sonal inadequacies from the broad social movement
which had come together behind his not-yet announced
candidacy. The second conversation occurred in
Kingston, Jamaica. I was invited to speak at the People's
National Party's convention, and I had the opportunity
12 o CHANGES
~
to meet (Grenadian revolutionary leader) Vincent Noel,
head of the New Jewel Movement's trade unions. Both of
us stayed up most of Saturday night, guzzling beer and
watching the polemics between the PNP's left and right
wings.
I asked Vincent what the American left could do which
would most aid Grenada's Revolution .. Without hesitaC
tion, he replied, "Defeat Ronald Reagan next year." I
raised the classic objections to lesser-€vilism, that the
Carter regime had set into motion the political embargo
of Grenada. But Noel insisted that GrFnada, along with
Nicaragua, would be crushed unless a more centrist
government was in power. Less than one month later,
comrade Vincent was executed, along with Jackie Creft
and Maurice Bishop. With their deaths, the invasion was
accomplished all to easily.
What is our responsibility to the international left, to
the national liberation Vincent's position on
the presidential race is echoed by SWAPO, the ANC, and
the revolutionaries in Central America. Are these forces
wrong?
Is there a qualitative difference in the context of world
politics between a reactionary Republican like Reagan,
and a centrist like Mondale? Or to paraphrase a member
of the International Socialists, is this support a "new low"
for the international left?
I should emphasize that I was a supporter of (Citizens
Party candidate Barry) Commoner in 1980, and that in
principle I have not embraced the Democratic Party as
the "savior" of the Black masses. Our immediate political
goal must not be simply the defeat of Ronald Reagan, but
the entire reactionary philosophy of Reaganism-the
elimination of public programs in health care, jobs,
public housing, and welfare; the buildup of both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons; an expansionist and im-
perialist foreign policy abroad; and the repudiation of the
very concept of social justice for national minorities,
women, gays and lesbians, the elderly, poor people and
the disabled.
Politically, this requires that the democatic left target
Reagan's supporters for defeat in the November, 1984
election. It also demands support for representatives of
the democratic left who challenge centrists inside the
Democratic Party primaries this coming spring and sum-
mer. I am much more optimistic about the defeat of Con-
gressional Reaganites than I am about the removal of the
incumbent president. As things stand now, either Walter
Mondale, John Glenn or Reagan will be inaugurated in
January, 1985-and Reagan is the clear favorite.
A word about Walter Mondale is in order here.
First, Mandale's strategy is not new: we are
witnessing a revival of Hubert H. Humphrey's 1968 and
1972 presidential campaigns. Mondale's crucial base of
 (HIfret'tfP.. f,)
support is organized labor, big city Democratic Party
organizations, and the most moderate elements of na-
tional minority leaderships. His speeches and policy
statements clearly indicate that he is not of the
democratic left, but a "liberal centrist" in the Cold War
Liberal tradition.
Leftists who have now comitted themselves to Mon..
dale's campaign insist that he is the "most liberal" can-
didate who has any hope of derailing Reagan. This is pro-
bably true: if Mondale wins the nomination, a larger
number of minorities, labor, and other liberal consli-
tuents will tum out than if Glenn is the nominee. But this
obscures the more fundamental issues-how can we build
a stronger democratic left, and how can we reverse the
advances of mass conservatism? Moreover, how can we
seriously expand the electorate in 1984 to include millions
of young people, national minorities, women and poor
people?
Working for Mondale in the Democratic primary does
not do this-and, in fact, it virtually guarantees the
defeat of either Glenn or Mondale in the general election.
Given our meager resources, socialists should be involv-
ed in campaigns which build coalitions with liberal and
left constituencies within national minority communities,
and which raise political issues from a democratic left
perspective. Electoral politics mus! be used to help build
masS movements across racial, gender and class boun-
daries.
As socialists, we have the responsibility to articulate an
alternative vision of a culturally pluralist, democratic
society, and to seize every opportunity, no matter how
flawed with internal contradictions, which advances the
goals of the democratic left and social movements in the
larger polity.
The candidate who comes ciosest to accomplishing
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these strategic goals is "the country preacher," jesse
jackson. Indeed, if he were white, the media would por-
tray jackson as the most left candidate for the presidency
.since Eugene V. Debs. Unlike Cranston or Mondale,
Jackson recognizes that the cutling edge of white conser-
vatism is racism-attacks on affirmative action, civil
rights and economic opportunities for people of color.
. Only jackson calls for a left social democratic economic
program which calls for the total restoration of the
1981-84 budget cuts, tax increases on the corporations,
and massive public works programs.
On foreign policy, Jackson is again the left wing candi-
date, strongly condemning the Grenada invasion, U.S.
troops in Lebanon, the placing of Cruise and Pershing II
missiles in Europe, and U.S. support for apartheid. At a
national level. the jackson campaign is the Harold Wash-
ington/Mel King coalition, bringing together represen-
tatives of every element of the broad democratic left.
~9J.-:-
Some white progressives have even said to me, ''I'd
love to support a Ron Dellums or julian Bond, but jesse
jackson isn't the right kind of candidate." This position
strikes me as metaphysical at best, and at worst pro-
foundly ethnocentric. The white left isn't in a position to
choose which protest candidates emerge from national
minority communities. The internal dynamics of the civil
rights movement have culminated into an electoral pro-
test against the Democratic Party within its ranks.
For better or worse, only Jesse has seized the oppor-
tunity, riding upon the popular enthusiasm of the
Washington victory, August 27th, and local electoral
movements to lead the next stage of the civil rights move-
ment into the very center of national politics. Can the left
I
afford to stand outside of this mass movement?
t is unlikely that jackson will win more than 250
convention delegates, given the changes made to
reduce the impact of the McGovern reforms. However,
Jackson's race will increase the number of registered
voters (especially within the Black community), and in-
crease their turnout rates in both the primary and general
elections. The race will increase the number of Blacks
who will run for local and statewide office, and will
strengthen the potential progressive bloc to undermine
the right. Local "Jackson-for-President" coalitions of na-
tiona! minorities, feminists, environmentalists, etc. could
survive the 1984 campaign as progressive, multiracial
united fronts. Jackson himself is elevating political issues
(racism, U.S. militarism, etc.) which centrist candidates
like Mondale would ordinarily ignore. And, finally, the
1984 effort of Jackson sets the stage for another· race by a
Black, Hispanic or feminist candidate in 1988.
Jesse is not my ideal candidate-far from it. But it
would be extremely shortsighted for any socialist to stand
outside this historic movement of civil rights and poor
people's activists within national electoral politics. Most
of the social forces which embodied the "Coalition of
Conscience" at the August 27th March on Washington,
D.C., and which elected Harold Washington mayor of
Chicago, are now coalescing behind Jackson. We must do
likewise, and we do not have to give up our voice, or our
commitment to Marxism to do so.
So much of the American left is shackled to the
ideological dogmas of past struggles, bound to isolation
and political irrelevancy from actual struggles in both the
international and domestic context. If we join the lunacy
of denouncing a Harold Washington as a "social fascist,"
as some have, or retreat from the Jackson campaign
because of an inordinate fear of tactical struggle via the
Democratic Party, we will further ourselves
from the very social will create a
socialist America. 0
CHANGES 013
 Clark&-continued from page 9
wildcatted for a week over safety and forced overtime,
and soon after workers at Mack Stamping Plant sat down
in the welding department and occupied the plant over-
night-a strike where I personally lost the best-paying
job I ever had, and got black-listed in the auto industry.
Less than a year later, the forced overtime gave way to
massive layoffs in the '73-'74 recession, but still we were
optimistic. I had a new baby, whose dad was a laid off
autoworker. I remember a friend expressing sympathy,
and adding that of course the recession would be good
politically because workers would become more militant
as the crisis got worse.
We in the I.S. said-and sincerely believed-that we
were the "nucleus" of the revolutionary party. We ex-
pected to recruit out of the working class in numbers suf-
ficient to build a real party.
Needless to say, we were wrong. The era of party-
building which lasted the greater part of the '70s, was a
failure, not just for the I.S., but for the entire party-.
building movement. The generation of socialists that was
created out of the mass movements of the '60s was, ten
years later, exhausted and demoralized. "Bum out" has
become a popular word in the movement's vocabulary.
Many of the groups did not survive. Those that did are
fragile and fragmented. Many more people gave up on
trying to build the socialist movement. A section turned
to social democracy. Some stayed active, but as in-
dependents. Others picked up their lives where they had
been interrupted when politics came along.
B ut politics are not static. I remember how elated I
was in 1978 when 100,000 women demonstrated in
Washington for the ERA. It was the first big demonstra-
tion I had been in since the anti-war movement. In 1981,
the labor movement organized Solidarity Day, which
brought out half a million to protest Reaganomics. A
year later, a million demonstrated in New York City for
disarmament. Last summer, a quarter of a million came
to Washington to commemorate the civil rights march of
1963.
I don't mean to imply that the level of activism is the
same as the '60s, it's not, but new people are becoming
radicalized by today's movements.
Millions around the world have participated in the
disarmament movement. Some have expressed the depth
of their commitment with civil disobedience-last month
53 people in Michigan went to jail for blocking the gate at
Williams International where engines for the cruise
missile are made. The women's movement has added a
creative dimension with the Seneca Falls Peace Encamp-
ment, Greenham Common in England, and earlier, the
Pentagon actions. There is a range of politics within the
disarmament movement, but the point is that the issue is
radicalizing, and many come to the idea that the arms
race is a feature of imperialism that will only be stopped
by socialism.
Anti-war and solidarity movements have grown in
response to the threat of war in the Middle East and Cen-
tral America, and in solidarity with the revolutionary
struggles in Nicaragua and EI Salvador-small now, but
with tremendous potential for growth.
140 CHANGES
But one big difference between the '60s and the '80s is
that the people becoming radicalized today don't see the
relevance of socialist organization to their work.
When I became active in the women's movement about
a dozen years ago, we realized that if we wanted to
change personal relationships, to find alternatives to the
privatisation of childrearing and housework, to control
our bodies, to fight for equality, and to imagine libera-
tion, then we had to change the whole system. The gap
between fighting for reforms and becoming a socialist
was one we crossed easily. It seemed like a natural con-
nection.
Today it's not such an easy step. For one thing, sec-
tarianism has led to splits between the left and the social
movements. The women's movement, even the section
that calIs itself socialist-feminist, is deeply hostile to the
left-and for some good reasons: the leff s support of
women's liberation has been inconsistent at best,
manipulative at worst.
F urthermore,the 'SOs are far more conservative than
the '60s. The social movements created a radical
background in society-today the right-wing has the in-
itiative and liberalism is just a few steps to the left of
Reagan.
A lot is said about how American politics are shifting
to the right. Well, the left is becoming more conservative
too. I was reading 1984 over Christmas. lf you
remember, the party language was called "Newspeak." It
was a kind of double-talk. For example, the party slogans
were, 'War is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is
strength."
The left has its own Newspeak. It used to be that if you
said you were a socialist, it meant something. Now, you
have to modify socialism with a string of adjectives.
Revolutionary socialist is distinguished from socialism
without revolution, which must mean social-democracy;
but social democrats call themselves "democratic
socialists" which, -in this country, means supporting
western imperialism and voting for a capitalist party (at
least in Europe, social democrats have their own parties).
I always feel compelled to describe myself as a revolu-
tionary democratic socialist-three words to say exactly
what I used to mean when I first called myself a socialist
in 1970.
The left used to have a vision of socialism, of what a
better society might look like. Despite the excesses of the
'60s, that vision was one of the things that people found
inspiring, that attracted people to the left. Sections of the
left have retreated from that vision. Today, every flicker
of life left in liberalism is heralded by the left as its own
victory. The campaigns of Black Democrats have gener-
ated a lot of enthusiasm on the left; the fact that these
campaigns (with the exception of Mel King) remain
squarely locked within the Democratic Party, a capitalist
party, does not- cause many socialists to pause.
We in the I.S. oppose supporting Democratic Party
politicians not because we are against incremental
reforms, but because we believe that the Democratic Par-
ty is the biggest political obstacle to building class con--
sciousness in this country, and because history has
demonstrated that every social movement that ties itself
 to the Democratic Party, dies.
The enthusiasm over the Jesse Jackson campaign has
led some to predict that Jackson will reinvigorate the left
and the Black movement, that it will be the basis of a new
'1eft majority coalition." I predict that after the
Democratic Party convention in July, almost all the
forces that supported Jackson-including the left-will
go on and support Mondale, with the logic that we have
to get rid of Reagan at all costs. That's a pathetic pros-
pect, and in my opinion, a new low for the left.
There are good reasons why the working class is disaf-
fected from the Democratic Party; we should be capitaliz-
ing on those sentiments, not winning people back.
There are healthy reasons why the left is attracted to
"mainstream" politics: the desire to have a bigger au-
dience, more impact, to see things change. But the idea
that you can win a bigger audience for socialist politics
by attaching yourself to the Democratic Party is an illu-
sion. What happens, instead, is that the left loses its
voice. We contribute to the rightward drift in American
politics by joining it. The Democratic Party does not
need the time, talent or vision of the left. It will continue
on quite well without us. But we will not continue If we
give up our politics, our principles, our independence.
The left will first become a mockery of socialism, and
then it will disappear.
W•
hatever criticisms one wants to make of the mass
movements of the '60s, they were radical. They
were outside the spectrum of capitalist politics; they
mobilized hundreds of thousands of people, and they
made left politics a visible force that was discussed,
debated, disputed mostly-but we had an impact.
Today, the left is marginal-to-irrelevant. For example,
we're supposed to be in a recovery now, while unemploy-
ment in Michigan is 11.5 %, near 18 % nationally for
Blacks, and still going up for Black teenagers ... and
those are the government's figures. Where is the
unemployed movement? Ronald Reagan just announced
another cut in social spending and a 15 % increase in
military spending (I thought he had already gone as far in
both directions as possible)-yet the left is barely a force
in the disarmament movement, and has done even less to
organize the poor. Greyhound, a profitable company,
hires scabs, threatens to smash the union, succeeds in cut-
ting workers pay and benefits by 15 % -what was the left
able to sio? The U.S. invaded a country last month
-where were the massive protests7
The question that confronts us is: How can we make
socialist politics relevant in the 'SOs7
The 1.5. concluded from our experiences in the '70s
that party-building is not on, but we do believe that
socialists need their own organizations if we are going to
have an impact.
Sure, any of us can work as independents in the social
movements or the labor movement. Our work may be
very successful, important, worthwhile. But- socialism
isn't just an idea we believe in-it's a goal toward which
we are working. Whether we are active in the women's
movement, the Black movement, a Latin group or
Palestine solidarity group, the labor movement, the
freeze. or the anti-war movement, we're attempting to in-
volve others in the fight against the effects of capitalism,
and against capitalism itself.
When we give up on organization, we demonstrate
that we have no avenue to socialism. Without organiza-
tion, we have no way of recruiting other activists.
Socialism becomes a nice idea, but not one that we expect
to be able to do anything about.
History teaches us that there is a relationship between
the level of class struggle and the level of socialist
organization. In the 1930s, the Communist Party and
other groups with cadres in industry were able to lead the
CHANGES 015
 Ct. .. tttl.~"')
strikes which triggered the organizing that built the CIO.
When things need to be organized, even today, it is often
socialists who get the ball rolling. For example, it was
socialist. in Pittsburgh who started the Mon Valley
Unemployed Committee. Imagine how much further un-
employed organizing might be if the left were less
fragmented.
Organizations help us develop political ideas; we can
draw on the talents of our comrades in areas where the
individual is weak. Rarely is one person a cracker-jack
organizer, a stirring speaker, and an expert in history, in-
ternational politics, and economics ... with organization,
we can share our skills and teach others. Organizations
develop understanding and interpretations of national
and international events and trends. The individual
stands to gain as much as he or she gives.
But what kind of organization for today's conditions?
For what is, frankly, not a revolutionary period? How
can the revolutionary left form a pole that is an attractive
alternative to social democracy?
W e in the 1.S. have given a lot of thought to these
questions, and we have discussed our ideas with
hundreds of other socialists. We've traveled to some 30
. cities, and met not only with nationally organized
groups, but local collectives, bookstores. study groups
and individuals. We've published our ideas in our
magazine; Changes, and opened its pages for others to
put forward their ideas.
The proposal that we made for unity on the left was the
creation of a broad, multi-tendencied organization, but
one with clearly stated revolutionary politics.
What wouid such an organization look like? Imagine
-if I can be a bit visionary-a socialist organization with
perhaps a few thousand members, drawn from the
fragments of the existing left, sure, but also from the
movement activists who are becoming radicalized today,
and the thousands of independent socialists, socialist-
feminists, and Black revolutionaries. This organization
would have a of views on from
"Unity on the
A statement by the International Socialists
presents the argument for a multi·tendencied revolutionary
socialist regroupment: "If socialists don't find a way to go
forward together, we may not go forward at all."
Copies 50- from 17300 Woodward, Detroit MI 48203
160 CHANGES
strategy to principle, but it wouid have agreement on
building a revolutionary, democratic socialism, rooted in
the working class and the liberation struggles of the op-
pressed.
Imagine the impact this organization could have. for
example, on the Greyhound strike. Undoubtedly the
group would have some kind of labor fraction, and many
of its members would be union activists', committeepeo-
pie, or local officers who would be in a position to initiate
strike support in their cities. They could organize ad hoc
committees that would help to swell the picket lines, staff
strike kitchens, organize plant gate collections and sup-
port rallies ... maybe even sabotage a few buses. Presum-
ably this organization would also be active in the com-
munity, and could reach groups that serve Greyhound's
traditional ridership-the elderly, the poor, students
-explain the strike, and win support. This organization
could prepare literature outlining the importance of the
labor movement taking a united stand in support of the
Greyhound workers as a first step in ending the drive for
concessions.
Some of these things were done by union activists,
many of them socialists. But not enough. If there had
been more coordination and a larger number of cadre to
carry out the strategy, support for the ATU would have
been much more effective.
Such a group could have a similar impact when
women's rights or gay rights are attacked. It could be a
force in the Freeze, raising the political questions that
push people's politics to the left. When workers in eastern
Europe organize a labor movement such as Solidarnosc,
this group could organize support. in the women's move-
ment, this group could develop a radical pole, both in
practice as an alternative to the electoral strategy so
predominant today, and in theory, developing a feminist
theory that is class-based and can explain the relevance of
Marxism in the fight against women's oppression.
We realize that the idea of forming a new organization
is an ambitious proposal. Too ambitious, in the opinion
of many of those we have discussed it with. But, as one of
the groups responding to our initial statement said, "The
most powerful argument for 'Unity on the Left' is
undeniable: necessity."
We found the warmest response to the·ideas of ending
sectarianism and creating an authentic Marxist analysis
and politics. Our proposals have been welcomed as gen-
uine and unpretentious, and people have seemed to ap-
preciate our willingness to commit time and energy to
this project.
One question we've been asked repeatedly is if we see
left unity as a step to a party. The answer is simple: no.
We don't think the left should be looking towards
building a party today, rather it should try to create a
broader political vehicle that can make socialist politics
relevant to the struggles of a working class that is still
groping towards class independence.
Clne complexity of this type of left unity is that it
would be ideologically diverse; but those labels-Maoist,
Trotskyist, Marxist-Leninist-often serve to obscure
areas of agreement and disagreement, not clarify them.
However, only if those involved have a real commitment
continued on page 19
 .... z:: __
-;:>0'
Trinkl-continued from page 9
there was an upsurge of united front struggles and the
defeat of fascism.
The next upsurge was the revolutionary struggles of
the 1960s and early '70s, sparked largely by the
worldwide movement against the Vietnam war, but also
in the U.S. marked by the explosion of the Black libera-
tion movement, a mass student movement, and the
women's movement. This wave, by and large, has now
exhausted itself.
The problems of the U.S. left are not unique. The
movements that radicalized a whole new generation oc-
curred worldwide. 1968 saw a massive student and
worker movement in France that nearly toppled the
government. There were strong movements in Italy, Ger-
many, Japan and other countries. Most of these have eb-
bed. The current situation of the left in the U.S. is
reflected in many other countries, and in discussing them
I'm going to focus on the developed capitalist countries.
Because there have been enormous problems in the last
decade, there has been a growth of cynicism and despair.
Some have abandoned the struggle. Some don't consider
Marxism relevant, some don't consider Leninism rele-
vant. Others have drifted toward social democracy, some
have embraced the pro-Soviet Communist Parties. But
because of these recent reversals, and reacting against
many of the ultra-"Ieft" errors of the recent past it would
be a mistake to fall into the opposite errors of reformism.
There is a great deal of impatience on the left. In 1965
in Chicago I remember one group of leftists drew up a
program for a "socialist Chicago in five years." Well, it
didn't happen. People want quick fixes and short cuts,
but it's going to be a long struggle.
The struggle for socialism is a long process and
socialism itself is a transitional stage containing elements
of capitalism. In the recorded history of the world so far
the conscious socialist movement is only an eyeblink.
Mao once remarked in his military writings that people's
war takes place in the dimension of lime rather than
-....
space. This referred to the importance of perseverance, of
outlasting the enemy, even if territory were lost. From
someone who fought for thirty years before victory was
won, this point is well taken.
T here has been a great deal of turmoil on the left in
the U.S., and internationally, in the last five to ten
years. I'd like to talk a little specifically about the move-
ment the Guardian has been associated with and placed
high hopes in-the party-building of "new communist
movement," as it was called, of the 19705.
In 1973 the Guardian sponsored a forum called "What
Road to Building a New Communist Party?" It was at-
tended by 1,200 people. At least in certain sectors of the
left, people looked to the possibility that in the next two
or three years, several groups and many individuals
could come together and form a new party.
That did not happen. This isn't the place to go into an
extended summary of the reasons, but I would like to cite
a few. Few groups are left from that period; most have
dissolved. One of them was the October League, later the
Communist Party Marxist-Leninist. It had one kind of
problem-its international position. The CP-ML held the
"Three Worlds" theory, following the Chinese analysis.
They said the Soviet Union was an equal danger to the
world's peoples as U.S. imperialism, and soon after that
they said the Soviet Union was the greatest danger.
The group was caught in a contradiction, generally
wanting to fight against the U.S. ruling class, and yet be-
ing caught by their feeling that there was a greater danger
than that. Harry Haywood, a long-time communist
(closely associated with the CP-ML during the 1970s)
recently wrote a piece some of which the Guardian will
probably be printing soon. It think it's important,
because of the depth of his experience in the struggle-he
first joined the Communist Party in the 1920s-to see
how he talks about the kinds of problems that arose at
the time this theory was held:
To a large extent we simply tried to ignore this basic con-
tradiction in our line. But the pressure of international
Antinuclear demonstration in Toronto in October 1983.
-;;~~'~'7'-- -·~'-_8 UN
.. ····'';1
CHANGES 017
 C"'1 fl. ........ '-)
developments meant we could not ignore these problems
for long. In practical tenns this meant answering some
complicated questions. For example: should U.S. com-
munists support the draft? Should we support increased
military budgets7 Should we support the Shah of lran7
Should we oppose or support Cuban "intervention" in
Central America7 Contradictions in [our I polltical line
became apparent.
That was one particular problem of a section of the
new communist movement of the 1970s. I'll sum some of
this up at the end, but now let me skip to mention some
developments in Canada, which in some ways paralleled
what happened in the U.S.
I was at a conference last year in Canada, to mark the
centenary of Marx's death. Seven hundred Canadian
Marxists got together to discuss what was happening to
the Canadian left. This came in the wake of the dissolu-
tion of two important Canadian organizations, both bas-
ed in Quebec, which by Canadian standards were large
and had some working class base, called "In Struggle"
and the "Workers Communist Party."
Both were formed in the early '70s, and at their height
had several thousand members. In Struggle dissolved in
1982, and the WCP early last year.
One person from In Struggle summarized what they
. themselves said about their dissolution. They saw the im-
portance of'the working class, but their idea of the work-
ing class was largely male, preferably industrial workers.
"Family, wives, children were nowhere."
In hanclling differences within the organization, "we
believed one side had to be a bourgeois line, and the other
a revolutionary line." The way democratic centralism
functioned was, to quote her, "Our leaders know better."
The catalyst that exploded the organization was the
subservient position of women in the party, and how the
organization related to the women's movement. The
women almost spontaneously revolted and said, "We
won't take it any more!" -and that was what precipitated
the organization's collapse.
The other group, the Workers Communist Party did
write an official sum-up after they dissolved. It mention-
ed four questions. One was their male chauvinism and
practice on women's issues. Another was English Cana-
dian chauvinism in regard to Quebec; they were a
Quebec group, but most of the leadership was English-
speaking students. They did not relate to Quebec na-
tional sentiments. A third issue was intellectual
chauvinism toward worker members, and finally there
Salvadoran rebels relax in front of former national guard post.
180 CHANGES
_5f'/~
w~s a lack of democracy in internal functioning. Also, as
they described it, an extreme preoccupation with trade
union questions led to marginalization of work on other
b d
issues, for example the national question (Que ec) an
women.
They practiced an extreme form of centralism over
democracy-one of the most extreme I ever heard of.
Members did not know who was elected to the Central
Committee. Members did not know what debates were
taking place in the upper reaches of the party. Members
were discouraged from having contacts with party
members outside their cell. So there were no real struc-
tural guarantees of democracy -quite the opposite.
On the brighter side, in reaction to these policies
something has arisen in Canada called the "Socialism and
Independence" trend, at least in Quebec. It's not an
organization itself, but a trend involving several
organizations and basically rooted in mass movements.
One of these groups is the Mouvement Socialiste, which
stresses the idea of unity as something in the process of
being built, rather than handed down at the outset.
It has four principles: democracy; feminism; in-
dependence for Quebec, which is of parallel importance
to supporting the Black struggle here in the U. S.; and
socialism. These experiences and conclusions drawn by
Canadian activists have something to teach us, I believe.
N OW I will skip back to the U.S. and touch on a dif-
ferent part of the left. The largest Trotskyist
organization in the U.S., the Socialist Workers Party, in
1976 took a tum toward industry, which I think in
general is healthy. It also moved toward much more sup-
port for the Nicaragua FSLN (Sandinist National Libera-
tion Front) and Cuba. But in doing this, they developed
an extreme workerism, their united front work and their
work in mass movements was drastically cut. They have
gone from 2,000 members to maybe 1,000 by now.
I had a long discussion and did an interview with Peter
Camejo, a leader of the SWP from that period, who has
gone through a sort of evolution and tried to come to
grips with that part of the movement which he came
from. He told me:
The conception that there is a continuity of ideology since
Marx is obViously true. But the manner in which the Trot-
skyist movement, and others, has app roached the ques-
tion has strong overtones of dogmatism and ideal-
ism . .. The very concept of the party of Lenin is of a party
that is itself a product of the living class struggle; not of
cadres who ideologically defend ~h.~_ 'true' program.
This is an example of someone heavily involved in one
tradition, analyzing and re-thinking some aspects of it.
Let me give another example, from a different ideological
tradition and a different country: El Salvador.
Shafik Jorge Handa!, a member of the general com-
mand of the Farabundo Marti Front for National libera-
tion (FMLN) and also the Secretary General of the Com-
munist Party of El Salvador (PCS)' has analyzed the
situation of the Communist parties in Latin America. In
December 1981 he wrote:
In Latin America. two great revolutions have taken place,
that in Cuba and in Nicaragua, and in neither of these
cases was the Communist Party at the head . .. The old
dogmatic conception that the Communist Party is, by
definition, "the party of the working class, the vanguard
 ("'7I'<.IN,<'1- )
of the anli-imperialist struggle and the struggle for
socialism," etc., reduces and even blocks our capacity to
comprehend that in the social and political conditions
engendered by dependent capitalism in Latin America, it
is impossible for these organizations [e.g. the FSLN and
Salvadoran popular organizations-ed.j not to arise.
That is, there is a recognition on Handa!'s part of truly
revolutionary organizations arising outside the c.P. Peo-
ple who are familiar with the c.P. in this country know
yery well that there is no such recognition by the
American party. I think it's a healthy development that
somebody who came out of the CP tradition is acknow-
ledging that organizations ouside that tradition can be
revolutionary .
In Central America, because they are in a Iife-arid-
death struggle, there are tremendous pressures for unity.
Both the FSLN in Nicaragua, and the FMLN in EI
Salvador with all its problems have reached a lot of uni-
ty.
Now for another, very different case: the Green Party
--;rrt:ll!rttfany. That whole experience is not just going to be
transposed to the United States, but survival issues are
very important, in a way Marxists have not always grap-
pled with. Issues of war and peace and technology-
capitalism's destruction of the planet-should be stronger
issues for the left.
the grouping were attacked in what became an orgy of
self-destruction. Pretty soon, nothing was left of this
group.
T his example, like some others, shows that relations
to the mass movements in general has been an enor-
mous problem for the left. Organic links have not been
developed. In particular, any formation that would come
together has to take up women's issues and grapple with
feminism, in a much deeper way than in the past.
Democracy within organizations is also extremely im-
portant. I do not believe that democratic centralism, by
definition, will always mean centralism triumphs over
democracy. But I do think that much more than in the re-
cent past, there have to be democratic procedures. Lastly,
environmental issues have to be addressed much more
thall they have been.
That's a brief overview of some of our primary tasks.
Thank you. 0

I will try to summarize some of the problems I have

discussed. The history of the socialist movement in
the U.S. has been marked by swings back and forth be-
tween dogmatism and pragmatism, between purifying
Marxist teachings and "American exceptionalism," be-
tween left and right errors. Ideological struggle is still im-
portant, but to take it as an end in itself and starting point
is a recipe for building a sect. A great many who pattern-
ed themselves after Lenin and Marx forgot that Lenin and
Marx waged sharp struggles but were also leaders of
movements. A revolutionary organization has to built in
practice. not by self-declared "yanguardism."
For any coming together of the left there are several
key issues. On international questions, I think it is totally
impossible to hold that the Soviet Union is the greatest
enemy and still be a revolutionary group in this country.
And I think it's very unstable, and unlikely, for a group
to be able to function on the basis of a belief that it is an
eqW1.Z danger.
I think groups should have roots in the working class,
but in much of recent left history this has been done by
marginalizing other issues, especially the women's move-
ment. For an example, let me briefly mention a grouping
called the "Trend," part of the movement with which the
Guardian was associated, which was self-consciously
anti-sectarian and set about trying to lay the groundwork
for building a new party.
,One factor in the 'Trend's" disintegration was the
classic form of sectarianism-the leading group in this
movement (the Organizing Committee for an Ideological
Center) came to adopt the position that membership in
their grouping was the dividing line between those who
were revolutionary Marxist and those who were not.
They waged a campaign around the idea that "feminism
is racist." Another development was a disastrous "cam-
paign against white chauvinism," in which individuals in

CHANGES 0 19
 What's Ahead for the Women's Movement?
ERA: The Lessons of a Defeat
from CHANGES', Septa 1982 BY Elissa Clarke
F rom the Wall Street Journal to the Guardian, every-
body has a theory about why the Equal Rights
Amendment failed. Some credit Phyllis Schlafly; others
the insurance industry. Some say the draft dealt the death
blow; others that abortion was too closely linked to ERA;
and still others that ERA activists did not make enough
links with other issues and movements.
Some say the movement alienated "ordinary house-
wives;" others say it wasn't radical enough. Some blame
"a handful of white men in a handful of state
legislatures;" others a massive, grass-roots, right-wing
movement. Some say the women's movement was politi-
cally naive and did not know how to run an electoral
campaign; others believe feminists concentrated too
much on lobbying and electing sympathetic politicians.
Of course, no one factor is responsible for the demise
of the ERA. But at the same time, it would be incorrect to
conclude that the defeat was inevitable. Movements can
make huge gauis in difficult periods, just as there are
times when it seems easier to win crumbs because the
system has a bit of fat on it. It could also be worthwhile
to pursue a g"al even if it is unattainable to raise political
ideas or to build a movement.
Some feminists are already drawing conclusions from
the ERA defeat and moving on to the next battle front.
For example, Ellie Smeal, president of the National
Organization for Women (NOW), advocates getting
women elected to office so that the state legislatures will
be more sympathetic to women's issues.
Elissa Clarke is an activist in the women's movement and a
contributing editor to Changes.
"Give Mom the ERA for Mother's Day" was the theme of a 75,QOO.strong demonstration in Chicago in 1980.
19
A debate is taldng place within the women's movement
over why the ERA failed, and where to go from here. The
debate is a useful one. I hope it will be prolonged, and
that feminists will reject hasty conclusions. We should
demand an analysis of the defeat before we troop on to
the next front. And we need to integrate these lessons into
our future strategies and directions.
This article is one contribution to the discussion.
Changes welcomes other contributions.
T he ERA has always been the province of the conser-
vative section of the women's movement. Authored
by Alice Paul of the National Women's Party and first in-
troduced in Congress in 1923, the ERA immediately split
the women's movement along class lines. Trade union
and socialist women, who had been active in the suffrage
movement, opposed the ERA because they believed it
would be used to wipe out protective legislation (state
laws which helped to protect women in the workplace).
At any rate, the ERA languished in Congress for de-
cades. 11 wasn't until the rebirth of the women's move-
ment in the 19600 that interest in the amendment was
renewed. In 1967, Paul, then 82, convinced the National
Organization for Women to endorse the amendment. In
1970 it passed the House, and in 1972 the Senate. By the
end of the year, 22 states had ratified. Within three years,
33 had.
It seemed that the ERA would pass by virtue of its own
merits; it didn't need a movement to monitor its course.
But then the momentum died. The last state to ratify was
Indiana in 1977, bringing the total to 35, three states
-.
 ervatism
"The cons "ran up
that the ~Rthe state
against \0 s is a
\egis\a~ureat the
reflection h·tt in
figh~a~~
erlc
~~litiCS.
"m be
This cantn~'simp\'I b'l
ob\itera e re
elE!crnft
'd'" mo
to ottice."
'tnen s
short of the three-quarters needed to pass a constitutional
amendment. There it stopped.
The ERA was caught between a rightward political
shift in American politics on the one hand, and a lull in
the women's movement, on the other. In the period
(roughly) between 1972 and 1977, feminists debated
whether the movement was dead, or just in remission.
Women's "rights" organizations grew slowly, but the
more radical women's '1iberation" groups all but disap-
peared. As the leadership of the ERA campaign, NOW
had no strategy that could overcome these factors.
NOW's strategy was based on electoral politics. It was a
numbers game against the right-wing. It had no chance.
For the first several years, NOW saw no need to inter-
vene much in the ratification process-it looked as if the
ERA would pass, and that was the goal, after all. To
NOW, the victory was equally worthwhile if it came
through the courts, through Congress, through the elec-
toral apparatus, or through a vigorous movement that
mobilized women in their own behalf.
It wasn't until the deadline for ratification approached
that NOW realized that more organization would be nec-
essary to push the ERA over the top. NOW declared a
"state of emergency" in 1978 and launched a successful
campaign to extend the ratification deadline. Later the
state of emergency was extended. The sense of urgency
rallied more women, but NOW never altered its basic
. strategy.
. I n fact, while NOW has always been the organization
.of the middle class women's movement, the decision to
focus on the ERA marked the conclusion of a skirmish
between the right and left wing of that organization. In
1975, Karen DeCrow was narrowly elected president of
NOW, campaigning on the slogan: "Out of the main-
stream, into the revolution." As one journalist reported:
'The majority of NOW's leaders expressed a desire to
take the movement 'out of the mainstream into the
revolution,' including emphatic support for blue collar,
ethnically and sexually oppressed women. A more con-
Servative arm urged traditional priorities like ratification
of the Equal Rights Amendment, enforcement of existing
equal rights laws, and insistence upon nonsexist educa-
tion." aennie Phipps, Evening Journal, Wilmington, DE
11/24175)
NOW's right-wing threatened to form its own
organization, but by the next (1977) convention, the fight
was over: DeCrow's caucus had disappeared, and
20
DeCrow dropped her references to revolution. There was
no contest for the presidency; Ellie Smeal won by a vote
of 526-66. Smeal proudly told a press conference that she
was a "typical housewife," 37 years old, and "never
worked a day in my life for wages." She promised to
direct NOW's resources to the "suburban housewife who
wants to end her house arrest." This convention prioritiz-
ed the ERA as NOW's fOcus.
The ERA passed the House in 1970, while the women's
liberation movement was alive and well. But while it was
winding its way through the state legislatures, the
women's movement itself was at a low ebb. It was not un-
til the deadline for ratification approached that broader
numbers of women got interested. Most saw it as an
ideolOgical defeat; they were spurred to action by the
thought that the country might not endorse the principle
of women's equality.
NOW's strategy made it difficult for women to do
anything for the ERA. Supporters were called upon only
for the most lackluster tasks-writing letters to state
legislators, phonebanks, lobbying if you were a real ac-
tivist. There was no attempt to broaden the activists
beyond NOW's middle<lass constituency, to challenge
the passive supporters to take action.
Meanwhile, NOW kept cutting off the left wing of the
movement. Every attempt was made to disassociate ERA
from the abortion rights movement, and socialists within
NOW were redbaited mercilessly. (The Socialist Workers
Party intervened in NOW for several years, until they
concluded that NOW was hopelessly tied to the Demo-
cratic Party.) So suspicious was NOW of leftists that any
ideas they proposed had a difficult time getting a hearing.
Therefore, the dynamic that might have pushed NOW to
try a more radical or creative strategy was never there.
T he first (and only) national demonstration for the
ERA was held on July 9, 1978 (commemorating the
first anniversary of Alice Paul's deathY. It was part of the
campaign to extend the deadline. July 9 was evidence that
reports of the death of the women's movement had been
exaggerated. 100,000 marched, which may seem small in
the light of recent demonstrations, but it was the first
large national demonstration on any issue since the anti-
war movement, and remains the largest feminist demon-
stration in history.
In addition to numbers, _there was-breadth of society
represented-including working women marching under
their union banners (from AFSCME and 1199 to women
miners wearing t-shirts that read: 'Women can dig it,
too.") There was a significant proportion of Black
women, maybe 10%. For so long the women's movement
had appeared to be a middle class movement; finally
there was evidence that it had made deep inroads.
Women's liberation was part of the fabric of American
society.
But the demonstration was a decidedly offbeat tactic
for NOW. In fact, it was largely because of the Socialist
Workers Party that the idea of a big, national demonstra-
tion was raised at all. NOW's leadership toned down the
march to a "processional," and demonstrators were asked
to wear white, in memory of the suffragists (who chose
 -t,J- .
~
"I
"'~ic'L/_
~~,~... _ ........
100,000 marched in Washington on July 9, 1978 for an extension of the ratification deadline. Many marched
under union banners, from AFSCME and 1199 to miners wearing t·shirts that said "Women can dig it, too."
that color to demonstrate their purity). Only signs pur-
chased through NOW were supposed to be carried and
the marchers were to proceed in silence. (These rules
broke down due to the sheer size of the demonstration.)
The demonstration was important in that it mobilized
women and gave them the opportunity to make a public
stand for the ERA and for women's liberation. The
challenge to NOW was to bring these new supporters of
women's liberation into the movement. But no attempt
was made. That simply was not NOW's conception of its
role, or of the priorities for the women's movement.
After July 9, the demonstrators went home and NOW re-
verted to its strategy of getting friends elected to office.
Only two innovative tactics were used during the en-
tire campaign. The first was the boycott of conventions
in unratified states. NOW claims the economic impact of
the boycott was considerable, though I'm not sure how
one would measure that. Chicago, in unratified illinois,
leads the nation in convention dollars spent, 2S % over
second-running New York, and 50% over third-running
Washington. Atlanta, though boycotted, is also in the
top ten convention cities. At any rate, the boycott had no
impact on votes. But it was important because it allowed
other progressive organizations and movements to make
a public stand in solidarity with the women's movement.
The second was the missionary campaign. In the last
year, women were urged to "take a year off for the ERA,"
and thousands were sent to unratified states, where they
went door to door explaining the issues. In my opinion,
this was a high point of the ERA campaign. It mobilized
thousands, many of them young college students. It en-
gaged them in a common and creative task (as opposed to
licking envelopes), and gave them the opportunity to
work with other feminists, building a sense of solidarity
and community.
21
.-(-'
B y the twilight hours, the number of women active on
behalf of the ERA snowballed. But despite the com-
mitment, energy and money that was poured into the
campaign, the ERA was never approved by another state,
and five states rescinded their votes (an indication that
reintroducing the ERA at this time would be a lost cause).
At rallies held -around the country on June 30, women
declared that the women's movement is not defeated. Of
course, it is pretty unconvincing to say that the defeat of
the ERA was not a defeat for the women's movement. It
was, and a resounding one at that. But by the time it was
over, a movement had been built around the ERA. Not
only did opinion polls indicate constant support for the
ERA at around ¥, of the population, but by the time of its
death, millions of women felt like they had a stake in the
outcome. And they are angry. ---
The ERA rebuilt a section of thewomen's movement:
NOW's membership jumped from 55,000 before July 9 to
100,000 after the 1978 demonstration, to almost 200,000
today. NOW has become an incredible money-making
machine, reaching an untapped source of funds that has
the Democratic Party drooling. (NOW raised $1.3
million a month for the last six months.) -
The women's movement is coming out of the ERA
campaign with tremendous potential. Whether that
potential is realized or not depends a lot on what kind of
assessment is made of the ERA defeat, and what future
direction feminists decide upon.
O ne could argue that the ERA was ahead of its time.
Gloria Steinem's analysis in the August issue of
Ms. is that the "first wave" of feminism took 100-150
years'to accomplish its goals, so feminists should expect
the "second wave" to take more than 10 years (actually,
 ......t.,'J~
''The right has me-
, mpUshed SO
aCCo t the
thin~ ~h: movement
tem,nl~ d to do.
. has tal\e nizations
. 'Their orgt~re in the
.. have sta dscape
ilr4q···· po\\tica\ \~~e'l have
\)ecaUS~nto a grass:,
tapped I \ituenc'l'
foots cons
the ERA has been on the agenda since 1923-59 years,
and long enough). But the women's movement was able
to make tremendous changes in American society in 10
years. Why not on ERA, seemingly one of the more in-
nocuous of the demands of the movement?
Abortion, for example, was (and is) a far more con-
troversial issue, with less widespread support. But abor-
tion was legalized in 1973. Why did one pass, and the
other fail7
Most obviously, the ERA is a constitutional amend-
ment, not a judicial decision. A constitutional amend-
ment must win approval through the state
legislatures-bastions of conservatism. Amending the
constitution is not an easy road to go. The ratification
procedure can be blocked by a minority, since three-
quarters of the states must ratify. Illinois even requires a
3/5 majority. The tactic itself may be doomed, unless
there is a significant change in American politics.
Second, abortion was the key demand of an active and
vigorous movement. While the Supreme Court ruling
came in 1973 when the women's movement was quiet, the
decision was the direct result of that movement. Court
decisions often come in the aftermath of vigorous
organizing because they lag behind the social process. No
similar movement for the ERA emerged -until it was too
late. Women were complacent about the ERA; they did
not rally to its defense until it appeared threatened.
Third, the growth of the right-wing balanced the social
forces. In the 19605, progressive social movements were
the only social movements. Liberal politicians looking for
voters had to move to the left. Today, the right-wing is
more active and organized. Under these circumstances,
liberalism itself moves to the right in pursuit of the
center, whatever that is.
The right was clever enough to set up a women's
organization against the ERA, Stop ERA. Although Stop
ERA never seemed to have the grass roots flavor that the
anti-abortion movement has, the emergence of a
"women's movement" against the ERA made it much
easier for politicians to vote against it. They were not (so
·they said) against women's demands; they were just sup-
porting one group of women over another. There was no
similar movement against abortion, until it was legalized.
. Fourth, abortion was won during an era of prosperity.
All the social movements of the '60s made substantial
gains. During the ERA campaign. prosperity gave way to
chronic economic slumps, and now crisis. In the 198Os,
ratification of the ERA would raise women's expectations.
at the very time that the government and employers are
22
attacking the rights of the oppressed and the standard of
living of the middle and working classes.
T he most relevant issue raised by the defeat of the
ERA is the question of strategy and the future direc-
tion of the women's movement.
Speaking at a rally on June 3D, Ellie Smeal said that
women should become a "third force" in American
politics. Some hopeful radicals have interpreted this to
mean that the women's movement is considering laun-
ching a new political party (while others, like Roberta
Lynch writing in In These Times (7/14/82) warn that
"such an idea seems manifestly impractical"). The
women's movement did end the ERA fight disillusioned
in the Democratic Party, but without a hint of what to do
about it. NOW recently published a list of 101 Democrats
who voted against the ERA in four key states, and the
National Women's Political Caucus·published a list of the
"dirty dozen" who they say blocked the ERA's passage.
Ten of the 12 are Democrats. But the strategy Smeal is
promoting to address this problem is depressingly
familiar-elect more women, elect more men who sup-
port women.
But what alternative does the left propose7 The left
often treats strategy as a timeless question. The formula
for social movements is more and bigger demonstrations,
an orientation to the working class and minorities, and a
labor party. There may be a lot of validity to this
strategy, but it is so well worn that no one wants to hear
it anymore, and it cannot convince anyone. What is
needed is an effective strategy for the time, coupled with
a convincing and fresh analysis.
Electoral politics would certainly be a component of
any strategy the women's movement adopts, but to rely
solely on electing liberal politicians is a loser. The conser-
vatism that the ERA ran up against in the state
legislatures is a reflection of the rightward shift in the
country. This cannot be obliterated simply by electing
more "friends" to office.
The ERA itself is a rich illustration of what is wrong
with a strictly electoral approach. There are countless ex-
amples of pro-ERA politiCians (who accepted money, en-
dorsements. and volunteer labor from feminists) trading
off their support, backing out or disappearing on impor-
tant votes, or simply turning coat. There are also
countless times that women were quoted in the papers
after such incidents saying, "We really learned our
lesson." But the strategy was never altered.
Two examples come to mind:
In June 1978 a critical vote for the ERA was up in the Il-
linois House of Representatives. It looked as if the
amendment would pass. But when the roll was called,
five legislators-all ERA supporters-did not vote. They
were involved in a dispute over who would represent
them in the House leadership next year. They withheld
their votes on the ERA in order to pressure the outcome
of a completely unrelated question. Afterwards. the five
immediately issued a statement saying they were in favor
of the ERA, and would vote for it in the future. Thanks a
lot; never again was the vote so close in that state.
Likewise, when Jimmy Carter ran for president, he
 The 1980 Republican Nalional Convenllon dropped support for Ihe Equal Rlghls Amendmenl from ils platform. 10,000 marched
Ihe Convention site in downtown Detroit, demanding "ERA GOP."
promised that he would "see to it" that the ERA became
law. NOW folded its resources into his campaign. But
after election day, Carter barely lifted a finger for the
ERA. During his radio call-in show (remember the early
days of the "open" administration?), Carter soothed an
anti-ERA caller: "Although I've made a few telephone
calls since I've been in office, and have talked to some
(legislators) personally .. .I haven't tried to interfere or
put pressure on them."
The strategy of single-issue politics is becoming more
prevalent in the women's movement. NOW was formed
as a multi-issue organization, but for the past five years it
has poured almost all of its resources into the ERA. One
of the fastest growing organizations in the women's
movement today, the National Abortion Rights Action
League, also proclaims proudly that it is the single-issue
group for abortion.
The model of single-issue politics comes from the right-
wing, which has organized successful movements against
abortion rights and the ERA. The women's movement re-
sponded by trying to build organizations that mirror the
organizations of the right.
In one sense, the right has had a positive impact on the
women's movement. It has inspired a reaction. There's
the feeling: 'If they can do it, we can do it, too: Feminists
looking at the successes of the right conclude that they
should follow the same strategies. If the victories of the
right are attributed to their success in getting anti-
abortion legislators elected, then the women's movement
should get pro-choice legislators elected. It's the mirror-
image of the right's strategy. But it cannot be applied.
T he mirror-image strategy seems like the most exped-
ient route (and expediency is certainly called for),
but the issues are far more complicated. First of all, the
23
to
right is a lot more than the sum total of its single-issue
groups. The right presents a coherent and appealing
world view-more visionary than feminists dare to be.
Part of the success of the right must be credited to its
ability to speak to the real needs and concerns that people
have. Yes, they play on people's fears, and yes, they pro-
mise an illusion of the good old days that· never were. But
feminists need a vision more il'Ispiring than electing
friends to office, and re-fighting the issues of the '70s.
As Paul Weyrich, founder of the Committee for the
Survival of a Free Congress, puts it: 'We talk about
issues that people care about like gun control, abortion,
taxes and crime. Yes, they're emotional issues, but that's
better than talking about capital formation." (Allen
Hunter, "In the Wings: New Right Organization and
Ideology." Radical America, Spring, 1981)
Furthermore, the right is active on a variety of fronts,
and ties issues together. mile the right has been able to
mobilize people around the ERA and abortion, these are
not the only issues it addresses. Phyllis Schiafly has
already announced that she plans to go on to sex educa-
tion and the nuclear freeze. 'The atomic bomb," Schiafly
says, "is a marvelous gift that was given to our country
by a wise God."
Finally, the right has accomplished something that the
feminist movement has failed to do. The right-wing or-
ganizations have a certain stature in the political land-
scape because they have tapped into a grass-roots consti-
tuency, not just because of their well-<locumented ties to
the highiy-organized and highly-financed New Right.
The women's movement on the other' hand, remains a
white, middle-class movement. There is obviously sup-
port for women's demands that reaches far into American
society, but the women's movement has been unable and
unwilling to take the .steps that would transform those
passive supporters into activists.

Right-wing social movements are a reflection of the
politics of the ruling class. No matter whether the
Democrats or Republicans are in office, the right will get
a sympathetic hearing. Therefore, the model of the anti-
feminist organizations is hardly one which can be applied
tQ feminist organizations. Progressive movements suc-
ceed only if they can create a dynamic in the society.
When the Supreme Court ruled on abortion, feminists
were surprised. It was not a carefully calculated numbers
game. but the impact of a social movement, that resulted
in that victory.
The strategy of single issue politics has two com-
ponents. The first is support of individual politicians
because of their stand on one issue. In itself, this is pretty
useless because a politician's promise is like the old joke
about a cup of coffee (that and 50¢ ... ). But worse, a can-
didate who is for the ERA may be against abortion, or
against unions, or against welfare rights. This is the se-
cond level of single issue politics. By trading off priorities
in this way, movements become isolated. The ERA
movement cannot depend on support from the pro-
choice movement if abortion is not a criterion in suppor-
tingacandidate. Instead of a single-issue approach, what
is needed is a new coalition that can bring together pro-
gressb<e forces both in the streets, and in the electoral
arena.
NOW made a brief attempt at coalition building. One
of· the themes of its 1978 conference was the "alliance"
between the women's movement and the labor move-
ment. The convention boycott was part of the alliance
strategy. But, by and large, what NOW meant by this
. was an electoral alliance where progressive organizations
could work together to defeat Republican candidates who
were anti-ERA and anti-labor. (This illustrates another
point about singl.e-issue politics-it's easier to agree on
what. you're against, than what you're for.) The alliance
turned' out to be mostly rhetoriC, because NOW's
strategy did not include mobilizing the support of union
members, It was an alliance at the top that never meant
., anything
. to the union membership.
T:.
&eseare the best and worst of times for the women's
. movement. On the one hand, winning never looked
so. difficult. The ERA defeated. Abortion rights whittled
away-, and in danger of being outlawed again. A power-
fuLright-wing movement that sees women's liberation as
the.scourge of American society. Affirmative action go-
24
ing by the boards of economic crisis.
And yet, never before have the ideas of women's
liberation been supported by so many. The women's
liberation movement has had an impact on all out lives.
It is obvious that women will never go back to the "good
old days" exalted by the right-wing.
It is impossible to say whether the ERA would have
passed if NOW had built more and bigger demonstra-
tions, brought working class and minority women into
the movement, and declared independence from the
Democratic Party. What can be said is that the potential
for the women's movement would be brighter today if the
strategy had been designed to build the movement, not
just to win.
What is interesting today is, despite the defeats, the
economic crisis, and the growth of the right, that on some
issues the women's movement is winning. Three come to
mind: sexual harassment, comparable worth, and union
organizing in traditional women's jobs, particularly of-
fice workers. Generally, a political strategy maps out a
route to get to some goal. What if we begin at the end,
and ask ourselves why these issues have been able to win
in such a gloomy climate?
What these three issues have in common is that they
address women as workers, While some of the traditional
battles of the women's movement are going down in
defeat, issues that address women as workers have made
gains. .
Employment issues touch on a fundamental contradic-
tion in right-wing politics. Women are told that they
should go back into the home; the family of the Big Red
Storybook is held up as the model. But at the same time,
it is transparently obvious that women are not going
back. No longer do you hear women justifying their right
to work; no one questions why women work anymore.
The same right-wing politician eulogizes the traditional
role for women on the one hand, and slashes the standard
of living of the working class with the other. The crisis is
becoming so acute that no one can miss the contradic-
tion. Women, of course, experience this contradiction in
a very personal way as they struggle to support
themselves and their families. Employment issues are so
concrete, the stake in them is so clear and immediate, that
women see the urgency in fighting back.
Obviously, employment issues are not the only ones
that feminists need to address. But they do meet some of
the criteria for organizing around issues that can build the
women's movement. Campaigns around work-related
issues can help to bring into the women's movement
working class women who are now passive supporters.
They are issues which take on the right-wing. They are
issues around which the women's movement can build
coalitions with the labor movement and the Black move-
ment .
The '80s present a challenge, but they also present an
opportunity. Women do not have to go back to begging
for favors from politicians. The debate now taking place
around strategy for the women's movement is important.
Whatever conclusions are reached, it does seem that the
movement is well-positioned to move forward. The ques-
tion is: will feminists seize the opportunities that present
themselves? 0
 from CRl\.NGES, May-June 1984
~i':~s: Does Capi"talism Meed Pa"triarchy1
"The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and
Feminism: T awards a More Progressive
Union," by Heidi Hartmann.
"Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A
Critique of the Dual Systems Theory,"
by Iris Young.
Both essays included in Women and
Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhap-
py Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.
Edited by Lydia Sargent, Boston: South
End Press, 1981. $7.50
By Jane Slaughter
DOES CAPITAUSM NEED sexism, and
how do the two work together7
The purpose of this review is to com-
pare two specific approaches to this very
broad question. I will lay out Heidi Hart-
mann's theory of the relationship between
capitalism and patriarchy, then look at
Iris Young's critique of what she calls
Hartmann's "dual systems theory" of
women's oppression. These authors' work
appears in the book, Women and Revolu-
tion, which is organized around Hart-
mann's essay and 12 responses to it.
I will explain why I find Young's posi-
tion more convincing, and, as an exam-
ple, discuss how both approaches view
the fight for the "family wage."
Critique of Sex-Blind Marxism
Hartmann's criticism of Marxism is that
it is sex-blind (and race-blind as well). Its
categories of wage worker, capital. class,
value and surplus value have nothing to
do with gender. They say nothing about
why women are subordinated to men,
rather than the other way aroundo
Feminist analysis, on the other hand,
has been blind to history, Hartmann
says-not materialist enough, overly con-
cerned with the realm of the psychological
and ideological. Hartmann's goal,
therefore, is to apply a "materialist
analysis to the relations of patriarchy,"
just as Marx did to the economic relations
of production. (I use the term
"patriarchy" here as it is used throughout
the book, to mean any SOCiety in which
men dominate women, not in the tradi-
tional sense of the "rule of the father"
re£erring to pre-industrial societies.)
Patriarchy itself, Hartmann wants to
show, is a social and economic structure.
Our society represents an evolved part-
nership of capitalism and patriarchy, in
Jane Slaughter is a feminist and labor
joumali$t. She is the author of the book
"Concessions and How to Beat Them."
- (;.,-
which sexist ideology has assumed a work. The work women do in the home,
peculiarly capitalist lorm. That is, sexism apparently for men, is really for the
today is different from sexism in the Mid- capitalists. Cooking, sewing, feeding and
dle Ages, for instance. taking care of men and children, all this
Taking what she regards as three serves to reproduce the working class for
representative Marxist analyses of "the the capitalists. Like Engels, Hartmann
obsexves, Zaretsky focuses on women's
woman questioJ)," Hartmann argues that
they concern themselves with women's relation to capital, not to men.
relationShip to the economic system-and Third is the "wages for housework"
not with women's relationship to men, theory of Mariarosa Dalla Costa. House-
which she calls the "feminist question." wives, through their labor, create surplus
Early Marxists, following Engels, value. (This theory is by now discredited
recognized women's inferior status in among most feminists, who understand
capitalism and attn"buted it to the institu- that work can be important and useful
tion of private property. The "world- even if you can't show it produces surplus
historic defeat of the female sex," said value.) Dalla Costa argued that women
Engels, carne when women were forced to should demand wages for their work in
be monogamous to produce heirs for the home rather than get paid jobs and b.
men's property. Thus (says Hartmann), forced into a "double day."
Engels believed that among the pro- Here again, Hartmann objects that the
letariat, who didn't own property, women analysis falls to acknowledge that men
weren't oppressed. (not just the capitalist system) have a
Actually, Engels said something dif- material interest in women's continued
ferent. He argued that the working class oppression, that housework as a social
family (which did oppress women) no relation perpetuates not just capitalism
longer had a material basis when workers but male supremacy. She also points out
owned no property. He believed that as that Dalla Costa and Zaretsky igoore
capitalism drew women into the labor women's role as wage workers, which I
force, women and men together would would agree is a very large omission.
Abstractly, it is immaterial to the capitalist class how
the working class reproduces itself, as long as we get to
work in the morning with the right attitude. In South
Africa, because of the covergence of capitalism,
patriarchy, and national oppression, capitalists
encouraged one form of reproduction for white workers
-the nuclear family-and another for many Blacks-
women and men are forced to live separately, often
the men in barracks and the women in the Bantustans,
fight for proletarian revolution. In fact, Hartmann then moves on to a critical
the question of what keeps the family go- assessment of radical feminism. That
ing turned out to be much more complex. theory holds that the original and most
Second, Hartmann looks at the "capit- basic division is between the sexes. The
alism and everyday life" analysis of Eli motive force of history is the striving of
Zaretsky, who does focus on the dif- men for power over women-the "dialec-
ferences between men's and women's lives tic of sex."
under capitalism. Zaretsky's main thesis is
that capitalism has created a separation While Hartmann sees materialist Marx-
between private and public life, between ism as sex-blind, she sees radical feminists
family Ihome and the workplace, and that as non-materialist. In their discussion of
because of this separation women are male and female traits-men dominant
more oppressed than under earlier modes and individualistic, women nurturing-
of production. they see these qualities as more or less in-
Says Zaretsky, while men are oppressed herent. Their use of history is usually
by wage work, women are oppressed limited to providing examples of the ex-
because they're excluded from wage istence of patriarchy at all times and in all
CHANGES 0 23

pIaces-a characterization which is not
terribly helpful precisely because it is so
universal.
Hartmann, then, proposes to define pa-
\riarchy as "a set of social relations be-
tween men, which have a material base,
and which, though hierarchical, establish
or create interdependence and solidarity
"",ong men that enable them to dominate
women. Though patriarchy is hierarchical
and men of different classes, races or
ethnic groups have different places in
patriarchy, they also are united in their
shared relationship of dominance over
!heir women; they are dependent on each
other to maintain that domination." (p.
14) Thus, while there is inequality among
men, all men are bought off by getting to
have control over some women.
Hartmann says the material basis of
patriarchy, the missing element in the
radical feminist theory, is men's control
over women's labor power. This control is
maintained by excluding women from ac~
cess to some essential productive re-
sources (under capitalism, for example,
women by and large don't have jobs that
pay a living wage), and by restricting
women's sexuality.
In this way, men can make women
serve them-in housework, for sexual
purposes, and to bear their children.
Following Gayle Rubin's 'The Traffic in
Women," Hartmann calls the structures
that enable men to control women's labor
power a "sex/gender system," or "the set
of arrangements by which a society
transforms biological sexuality into pro-
ducts of human activity, and in which
these transformed sexual needs are
satisfied. "
Thus, together, economic production
(Marx's object of analysis) and the pro-
eduction of human beings within the
sexl gender system determine what society
-. is: like. Hartmann claims there is no
necessary connection between changes in
:.one and in- the other; the economic mode
of prOduction could be transformed from
capitalism to socialism, for example,
without dislodging patriarchy.
Her examples are China, Cuba and the
Soviet Union, where, she says, socialism
exists but patriarchy persists. Hartmann
presumes that these societies are in fact
socialist because "they regard themselves
as socialist and so do most other folks."
To summarize her argument, Hartmann
says, 'The material base of patriarchy is
men's control over women's labor power.
Men exercise their control in receiving
personal service work from women, in
not having to do housework or rear
children, in having access to women's
Dodi.. for sex, and in feeling powerful and
being powerful. The crucial elements of
patriarchy as we currently experience
them are: heterosexual marriage (and con-
sequent homophobia), female childrear-
ing and housework, women's economic
24 0 CHANGES
-~r;-
dependence on men (enforced by ar-
rangements in the labor market), the
state, and numerous institutions based on
social relations among men-clubs,
sports, Unions, professions, universities,
churches, corporations and armies. All of
the.. elements need to be examined if we
are to understand patriarchal capitalism."
Alternative Model
Should male dominance in capitalism,
then, be understood as a separate system
from capitalist relations of production
with its own laws of motion (hence the
term "dual systems"), or as part of the ino
temal structure of capitalism itself7
Iris Young argues that if Marxism can o
not, or if feminists don't force Marxism
to, incorporate an analysis of the subor-
dination of women into the core of its
theory of capitalist production relations,
two negative results follow. First, Marxist
MYSALAR,.V?
TWICE AS MUCH
AS I EXPECTED .••
SUT ONLY HALF OF
WHAT I'M WO~!
theory will remain sex-blind, and there-
fore unable to adequately analyze produc-
tion relations. Second, the whole question
of women's oppression and labor will re-
main on the margins of radical economic
theory.
Young's solution to the problem is that
"feminism must take over Marxism," i.e.
that Marxism must take the gender divi-
sion of labor and the situation of women
as core elements in its analysis from the
beginning.
Hartmann assumes, like Engels, that
capitalism tended to homogenize the
workforce, reducing the importance of sex
differences. This assumption leads her to a
dual systems analysis: if the internal
dynamic of capitalism itself were towards
homogenization, then only the operation
of a separate systern-patriarchy-could
explain the fact that women remain un~
equal and oppressed under capitalism.
Young argues that capitalism is nat
gender-blind. Rather, the marginalization
of women's labor is an essential and fun-
damental characteristic of capitalism. She
points out that capitalism was the first
economic system whose nature dictated
that not all potentially productive people
be employed, and also required that the
proportion of the population which is
employed should fluctuate. Capitalism
needs marginal workers, a "reserve army
of labor."
Given the pre~xistence of patriarchal
structures and ideology when capitalism
was emerging. it was "natural" that
women became one of the groups of
marginalized workers. (Today, young
people and minorities are others.) Women
could go into and out of the workplace,
into and out of the home, according to the
needs of capitalism. The use of women
workers during World-War nand the pro-
paganda campaign to glorify housewifery
afterwards are examples.
Thus Young concludes that the devel-
opment of a capitalism that was inherent-
ly patriarchal was the only historically
grounded possibility.
Hartmann, on the other hand, believes
that the "mere historical convergence [of
patriarchy and capitalism] is not suffi-
cient" to explain their inherent connec-
tion, if they have one. She prefers to see
the two as "somewhat autonomous." She
says that unless we can discover a theor-
etical reason for the inherent connection
between patriarchy and capitalism, "we
don't get very far trying to analyze them
as one system."
To this I would respond that "mere"
historical reality ought to carry a great
deal of weight in a materialist analysis.

Capitalism did not step onto the stage of
history and fiod that stage empty. It en-
countered patriarchal social relations and
ideology. Although capitalism changed
and shaped the way in which patriarchy
was manifested, it was also shaped by that
pnHOCisting patriarchy.
Take the nuclear family-please. Ab-
stractly, it would be immaterial to the
capitalist class how the working class
reproduces itself, as long as we get
ourselves to work in the morning with the
right attitude. In South Africa, for exam-
ple, because of the particular convergence
of capitalism, patriarchy, and national
oppression, capitalists encourage one
form of reproduction for white
workers-the nuclear family-and
another for many Blacks-women and
men are forced to live separately, often
men in company barracks and women in
the Bantustans.
But because of the particular conjunc-
tion of early capitalism and the patriar-
chal structures remaining from preeapital-
ist society, the nuclear family became the
main way in which the working class in
the United States and Europe reproduced
itself. And the arrangements which enable
tlie nuclear family to exist and which flow
from it got built into the internal structure
of capitalism. These included the "family
wage," consumer industries based on
large numbers of separate households,
and Social Security payments for old pe0-
ple who were no longer cared for at home.
(This is not to say that any of these ar-
rangements could not change due to
feminist struggle, working class struggle,
or the changing needs of capital.)
A similar argument about historical
convergence holds true for racism. There
is nothing in Capital's categories of
analysis that says racism has to exist. But
capitalism as it developed in Western
Europe and the United States was in-
timately bound up with the slave trade.
The development of capitalism and
slavery at the same time led to a particular
form of racism, which persists and has
become integral to capitalism in this coun·
try. Capitalism benefits from racism both
to superexploit Black workers and to keep
the working class divided. Theoreticaliy,
there need not be a connection between
racism and capitalism, but historically
there was and is, and that is what we are
contending with now-one racist, sexist,
capitalist system.
Young notes that the same features re-
inforce both patriarchy and capitalism.
We may recall that Hartmann includes in
her list of the crucial elements of patriar-
chy: women's economic dependence on
men (eniorced by arrangements in the
labor market), the state, corporations,
and armies. She admits that "it is hard to
isolate the mechanisms of patriarchy."
Young says that the mechanisms cannot
be isolated: "If patriarchy and capitalism
,..,f..,.'1-
are manifest in identical social and
economic structures, they belong to one
system, not two."
One can easily think of examples in
which patriarchy and capitalism appear to
be operating simultaneously: the use of
sex in advertising, women's relegation to
lower-paying jobs.
The Family Wage Debate
Hartmann and Young apply their dif-
ferent theories of the partnership of
patriarchy and capitalism to the struggle
for the "family wage," the idea that the
man of the family should be paid enough
to support a wife and children.
For Hartmann, the fight for the family
wage came out of a "conflict over
women's labor power which was occur-
ring between patriarchal and capitalist in-
terests at that time," that is, in the 19th
century.
She argues that the partnership between
patriarchy and capital was not inevitable.
The majority of men wanted to keep their
wives in the home to perform personal
services for them. But capitalists wanted
to bring women into the factories in order
to lower wages.
The capitalists were successful at first.
Women and chidren were paid so little,
and men's labor was cheapened so
drastically, that the whole family earned
less than the man alone as breadwinner
had taken home before.
Working class men, therefore, fought
for the family wage, against the interests
of capital. Instead of fighting for equal
wages for men and women, men sought to
exclude women from the workplace and
to raise their own wages. By the end of the
19th century, the family wage was the
norm, at least for stable working class
families.
Hartmann describes this process as
"allowing one part [of the working class]
(men) to be bought off at the expense of
the other (women)."
Young, on the other hand, believes that
one can understand the sexism of men
workers by seeing the essentially patriar-
chal character of capitalism itself, without
positing a system of social relations in-
dependent of capitalism.
Capitalism is an economic system in
which a division of labor by gender
marginalizes women's labor. It thereby
gives men a specific kind of privilege and
status, which they have fought to main-
tain. Although Young doesn't spell it out,
this privilege presumably includes both
keeping the better jobs for themselves and
being waited upon in the home.
Hartmann says that capitalism was able
to adapt to the family wage and even
benefit from it~ven though it was
patriarchy's idea. Young insists that
capitalism did not just use or adapt to
patriarchy but was founded on it. She
argues that the specific forms of oppres-
sion of women which exist under
capitalism, including both lower wages
and women's relegation to the home
under the "family wage" system, are
essential to the nature of capitalism as it
developed historicaliy.
On the Practical Level
Two issues which feminists have taken
up recently point to the integrated nature
of the system we are fighting.
One is "comparable worth," or equal
pay for work of comparable value. Com-
parable worth activists argue that a
secretary's job is "worth" as much as a
truckdriver's and that women's traditional
jobs, such as clerical work, should b.
brought up to men's pay lev.ls.
The demand is by nature very radical,
although it has sometimes been argued
and fought for in a fashion not calculated
to raise consciousness very much, such as
"objective job evaluation" and lawsuits.
The comparable worth movement chal~
lenges the patriarchal nQJion that ~
women's work is not worth as much as
men's simply because women are-doing it.
And it challenges a very important prop
of capitalism-its ability to get away _with
paying millions of clerical and· service
workers a barely living wage, or less. On.
judge ruling against a comparable worth
suit calied the concept "pregnant with the
possibility of disrupting the entire
economic system of the United States- of
America."
Organizers have found the comparable
worth demand very appealing to women
workers on an immediate intuitive level,
both as women-"it's not fair that we're
paid less than men" -and as workers-- ----
"it's not fair that we're paid so little."
(Heidi Hartmann, by the way, made an
important contribution to the comparable - ~ ~­
worth movement with her National
Academy of Sciences study which back,,-
up the arguments for comparable worth.)
Sexual harassment is also both a
feminist and an anti-capitalist issue. Many
organizers and writers against sexual
harassment have shown how harassment
is a product both of sexism and of authori 4
ty relations in the workplace.
Sexual harassment lets individual men
feel more powerful. and it functions to
help employers keep women workers in
their place. Feminist organizers who also
want to strengthen workers' hand against
employers have argued that a woman can
and should deal differently with harassing
co~workers than with a harassing boss.
It seems to me that activists who
organize around comparable worth or sex-
ual harassment are dealing with patriar-
chal capitalism as one system, and that it
is more useful for socialist feminists to ap·
proach the issues that way.
What matters is that we continue to
carry out our politics in a way that raises
women's (and men's) consciousness about
both battles. 0
CHANGES 0 25
 from CHA.NOES, September-October 1984)

Toward U
Marxism. and the Oppression of
Women: Towards a Unitary
Theory. By Lise Vogel.
New Brunswick. NJ: Rutgers University
Press. 1984. 218 pp, $25 (hardcover).

By Elissa Clarke
THE STRONGEST PART of Use Vogel's
new book, Marxism and the Oppression
of Women, is its scholarly review of
Marxist answers to the "woman
question."
Chagrined by feminists' tendency to
misinterpret or reject Marxism, Vogel set
for herself the task of reviewing the major
:Marxist: contributions to feminist theory,
from the early writings of Marx and
Engels through the Second International.
and then ahead to the rebirth of the
discussion under the rubric "socialist
feminism" in the last fifteen years.
Vagel shows how this body of theory
evolved and built upon itself. By relating
it: to the cultural biases and scientific
limitations of its day, and by locating it in
the 19th and 20th century socialist
J:l101Irerrtents, Vogel gives the reader a basis
for understanding some of the theory's
shortcomings and an ability to appreciate
its, strides forward.
Manism and the Oppression of
Women is a complete account of the
evolution of Marx and Engels' thoughts
on women's liberation. While Vogel is the scope, it is concisely written, although "According to the materialistic concep·
dear that she begins from the perspective you may have to run over some of the tion, the determining factor in history is,
that Marxism provides a framework for sentences more than once to translate the in the final instance, the production and
understanding women's oppression, she theoretical verbiage into English, mentally reproduction of immediate life. This,
does not gloss over the weaknesses of this exchanging "worker" for "direct again, is of a twofold character: on the
body of literature. Therefore, Marxists producer" or. "family" for "generational one side, the production of the means of
have a valuable resource that not only replacement process." existence, of food, clothing and shelter
critiques but helps to advance socialist and the tools necessary for that -produc-
Two Schools tion; on the other side, the production of
theory.
Vogef5 account of the debates in the Vogel divides socialist feminist theoreti- human beings themselves, the propaga-
contemporary socialist feminist move- cians into two schools. The first, the "dual tion of the species." (Vogel. p. 31)
ment (this seems to be an obligatory systems" theorists, claim that two motors Indeed, that incredibly po'puj,ar
feature of socialist feminist theoretical ar- drive history-class oppression and sex
ticli5 these days) is particularly sharp. oppression. The mode of production and
Ameasure of Vogel's seriousness is that class enter as important variables, but
she not only analyzes Engels' The Origin variables all the same. They are seen as ex-
of tJl£ Family, Private Property and the ternal to the workings of women's oppres-
State:" but also Morgan's Ancient Society, sion. Dual systems, then, suggests that
the: ,anthropological study upon which women's oppression is essentially in-
Engels- based his work. Origin is tedious dependent from class oppression, and that
enou~;.- reading Morgan is indeed im- there is some other mechanism (patriar-
pressIVe.. chy) that is the main force behind
B!,lt don't get the impression that this is women's oppression.
""'impossibly detailed book. Considering Although popular today, dual systems
was not an invention of the modem
Elissa Oarke- is active in the women's women's movement. Engels was an early
movement,. and is a contributing editor proponent, to wit, the often-quoted
taChanges. preface to Origin:
CHANGES c: 23

has left a flawed legacy for the socialist
movement. Vogel makes a very convinc~
ing argument that Engels himself was con-
fused and vacillated betw.." dual systems
and a more materialist theory. Therefore,
Origin has been drawn on to prove very
contradictory theories.
A theme in Origin is the idea that there
is a "natural" division of labor based on
sex in the primitive, communistic
household where family duties are the ex-
clusive province of women. In positing
two separate modes of production, Engels
was taking the distinction between natural
and social phenomena to its logical con-
clusion. This dichotomy was never en-
dorsed by the socialist movement, in
Engels' day or today. Socialists rejected
the implication that the family represents
an autonomous center of social develop-
ment separate from the economic system.
But it was precisely this formulation
that "caught the imagination of contem-
porary socialist feminists, often tempting
them into a quite cavalier reading of the
Origin," Vogel writes. (p. 91)
Vogel suggests that socialist feminists
turn their attention from dual systems to
developing concepts set forward in Marx's
"mature" writings. The Marx of Capital,
Vogel says, "had more to say of relevance
to the issue of women's liberation than
either he or his socialist followers ever
realized. Three concepts are key: in-
dividual consumption, the value of labor
power, and the industrial reserve army."
(p. 63)
Marx never fully developed the idea of
individual consumption, but Vogel main-
tains that a discussion of the reproduction
of the working class lies "just below the
surface" of this concept. Marx contrasts
individual consumption to productive
consumption, which involves the bringing
together of the means of production-raw
materials, tools, machines, and workers.
In contrast, individual consumption refers
to the processes by which producers
(workers) consume the means of subsist·
ence-food, housing, clothing, etc.
According to Marx, the value of labor
power is determined in the same way as
the value of any other commodity. That
is, its value represents the socially
necessary labor required for its produc-
tion. Necessary labor has two com·
ponents-material production (wage
work) and domestic labor. Domestic
labor is that part of necessary labor that
falls outside of wage work.
To illustrate, the worker's wages can
purchase food, but even a frozen dinner
has to be bought at the store, put in the
oven, carried to the table, and thrown in
the garbage can (afterwards, naturally).
The traditional counterposition between
domest~c work and wage work (or its
various manifestations-home vs. mar-
ket, private vs. public, unpaid vs. paid,
240 CHANGES
~b1-
etc.) are transcended by looking at both as
components of necessary labor.
This opens up a new way to explore
women's oppression, which does not
automatically counterpose men to wom-
en. Rather, both are components of
necessary labor and play a role in the
mechanics of capitalist expropriation. The
important point is that women's oppres-
sion has a material root.
The third concept, the industrial reserve
army, ties a surplus population of the
unemployed (including, but not exclusive-
ly, women) to the process of capital ac-
Cumulation. Marx stated that the greater
the social wealth, the greater the surplus
army. An expanding capitalism draws
more workers into the workforce, but
simultaneously, there is a drive to increase
productivity by introducing machinery,
thus creating an opposite force that in-
creases the surplus of labor.
Analyzing Reproduction
In this sense, the final two chapters of
Vogel's book, comprising only 40 pages,
fonn the crux of her thesis. There are cer-
tainly valuable ideas here, as worthy of
discussion as the debates that have con-
sumed the socialist feminist movement
over the past 15 years, but in no way has
Vogel set forward a theory that is com-
plete.
The subtitle of the book-Towards a
Unitm1/ Theory-makes clear Vogel's
goal, a new
In p~:~;:Ji~~~' Vogel states
systems.
reproduction
that women's oppression has a material
basis which is rooted in women's duferen-
tiallocation within social reproduction as
a whole.
Of the three aspects of necessary
labor-maintenance of direct producers
(read: workers), maintenance of
dependents (children, elders, non-
working adults), and generational
replacement (read: childbearing)-only
the last requires a sex division of labor.
Therefore, it must be biological reproduc-
tion that lies at the root of women's op-
pression.
It is women's dependence on men for
subsistence during pregnancy and lacta a
tion that forms the basis for that differen-
tiallocation, not the sex division of labor'
itself, Vogel says.
I can hear the single mothers of the
world heaving a collective sigh of ex-
asperation. Is that all there is? '
Vogel's emphasis on '1actation" is
rather cold-hearted, and an anachronism ~
besides. Babies, after all, are depende"t
whether they are breastfed or not.
Women, through history, have been so
manipulated over breastfeeding that I
cringe to think that socialists are going to
jump in. My daughter was born at the
onset of the '73-'74 recession, so I
graphically remember the sudden wave of
newspaper articles on breastfeeding,
quality time versus quantity time (10 .and
behold, it was found that quality doesn't
make up for quantity), increasing baby's
IQ with mother~ild interactions, the
dire ramifications of letting a day care
center bring up your child, etc.
I suppose that Vogel chose the term
'1actation" to emphasize that women's op;.
pression is, in the distant past, rooted -in
the immutable differences between the
sexes. However, emphasizing breastfeed-
ing at this point implies that men and
women cannot share equally in the care of
infants. This implies that there is less
potential for change (both today and
under socialism) than we have
In Vogel's defense, keep in mind that
childrearing used to be a lot more in-
capadtating than it is now. In the mid-
19th century, women spent the greater
part of their adult lives pregnant or caring
for small children. Poor living conditions
and primitive medical care meant that
many children died; in London in 1850
nearly 60% of children died by the age of
five.
The advent of contraception, improved
medical care, bottled baby foods, canned
formulas, disposable diapers have made
childrearing a different thing.
But even so, childrearing is not as sim-
ple as the women's movement originally
painted it. The supposed political solu-

tions to the working mother's burden
(childcare, maternity/paternity leaves,
etc) really are not solutions. Caring for a
10tlng child remains an incredibly con-
suming and awesome responsibility.
Dependence
V\J~ers ar~ument thdt women's oppres-
s-ion is nlllteu in a period ot dependence
Juring pregnancy and lact.ation hinges on
the rl'idtionship n~ childbearing to the dp-
prnpri..ltion ot surplus !clbor. Childbearing
diminishes the contribution to production
,J; w'orking clds-s woman Cdn m..lke because
she IS incapacitated while pregnant clnd
((.Iring tor intants.
For the capitalist class, there is a con-
tradiction between long term and short
term interests as regards childbearing. In
the long term, childbearing is the only
solution to renewing the working class.
BUt in the short term, childbearing entails
ilIcostly decline in the mother's capacity to
work, and requires that she be maintained
iuring the period of diminished contribu-
tion.
Women's oppression develops in the
grocess of the class struggle over the long
term and short term contradictions of
C'ai:litalism's needs. Out of this struggle, a
wide variety of forms of reproduction of
labor power have evolved in the course of
history _ In our own lifetimes, we have
seen the norm go from housewife to work-
ing mother. Other solutions implemented
oy the capitalist class to reproduce labor
powerinc1ude immigration, slavery, labor
camps, dormitory facilities (as in the early
textile mills or South Africa today).
In virtually all cases, the forms of
reproduction of labor power entail men·s
greater responsibility for domestic labor.
Also in virtually all cases, they include in-
stitutionalized forms of male domination.
He,wever, the sexual division of labor
~lved historically; it cannot be deduced
theoretically. "The social significance of
divisions of labor and of individual dif-
ferences is constructed in the context of
the actual society in which they are
,mbedded," Vogel writes. (p. 148)
The resolution is the socialization of
:iomestic labor, which Vogel feels cannot
::7e accomplished under capitalism because
:he costs are too high for childrearing and
:lousehold maintenance.
Vogel also focuses on the idea that
women across class lines are denied
:iemocratic rights. This commonality
:eack. her to project the importance of a
:ross-dass women's movement.
Hasty Extrapolation
Vagel's conclusions in the last pages of
'he. book about the conditions for
lIIomen's liberation appear to be a hasty
~)ttrapolation from "existing socialist
;otieties." (p. 174) The complexity of the
heoretical material is abruptly and inex-
-'It) -
plicably narrowed down. For example,
noting that none of these (unnamed)
societies have abolished the family (a
"drastic demand"), Vogel says, "Socialist
society does not, it is clear, abolish the
family in the sense of doing away with in-
dividual social units in which domestic
labor is performed." She goes on,
"Neither does it eliminate the sex division
of labor." (p. 174)
These conclusions are the weakest part
of the book and demonstrate a theoretical
vacuum in Vogel's work. These societies
are not socialist because they say they are.
If one views these societies, instead, as ex-
ploitative (of whatever stripe; it is the
view of this journal that the so-called
socialist countries are bureaucratic collec-
tivist). then it is obvious why they have
not eliminated domestic labor, eradicated
the sex division of labor, abolished the
family, or liberated women.
These countries, like capitalist coun-
tries. are motivated to get the most
surplus product out of the working class.
To call these countries socialist, or to ex-
trapolate a program for women's libera-
tion from them, does irreparable harm to
the cause.
As a result, many of the conclusions
Vogel draws are unconvincing, and in
some cases antithetical to the traditional
positions put forward by the socialist-
feminist movement.
For example, Vogel stresses the idea
that the sexual division of labor is not in-
herently oppressive. "Divisions of labor
exist in all societies. Even in the most
egalitarian hunting and gathering society,
a variety of tasks is accomplished every
day, requiring a division of labor. Dif-
ferences among people arising out of
biological and social development also
characterize every society." (p. 148)
Are we to conclude that we need not
address the sexual division of labor?
In fact, it is oppressive to divide roles
along gender lines. I can't imagine a socie-
ty where this would not be true. The fact
that men and women do not share
chiIdrearing limits children's views of
themselves.
In the workforce, the ramifications are
even more obvious. Even if work is com-
pensated equally, some kinds of work are
more challenging, engaging. creative,
fulfilling than others. This is so obvious I
can 'f believe it needs to be restated. Fur-
thermore, the sexual division of labor can
be challenged now, in the capitalist
market and in the socialist movement,
and can be changed, at least to an extent.
It should be eliminated under socialism.
Vogel also draws a sharp line between
what she sees as two separate sets of
issues. The first, women's responsibility
for domestic labor, affects primarily
working class women. The second, wom-
en's lack of democratic rights, affects
women across class line.
I don't understand the importance of
drawing this kind of distinction. It doesn't
strike me as accurate, anyway. Ruling
class women are not all on the corporate
career ladder, Many define their lives as a
social appendage to their husbands, so
even if they have servants, their lives are
limited. And furthermore, democratic
demands are not just about the Equal
Rights Amendent, but flow from the sex-
ual division of labor, which arises from
women's role in the family.
Nor do I understand the current fashion
among socialists to advocate building
cross-class women's organizations. (See
also Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future
of Liberal Feminism and Meredith Tax,
The Rising of the Women.) Middle class
women have already organized. Socialists
need to evaluate where their time can be
used most effectively. The need is to build
a working class women's movement.
Finally, I am very uncomfortable with
Vogel's equivocation on the family,
another issue on which the socialist
femininst movement appears to be unclear
of late.
At one point, Vogel suggests that the
relative oppressiveness of the family must
be weighed on a moment by moment
basis. "In a successful strike, for example,
solidarity within and among working-
class families may be a major factor,
although this defensive aspect of working-
class family life may recede after the con-
clusion of the battle, Elsewhere, a strike of
male workers may be lost in part because
organizers fail to involve dependent wives
and children in support, thereby heighten-
ing already existing tensions in the
family." (p. 171)
What is good for the class struggle is
good for women -even if they remain
"dependent." The implication seems to be
that the family itself is not the problem,
that without capitalism "the patriarchal
family and the oppression of
women ... will wither away," (p. 175)
These glib conclusions and extrapola-
tions undermine the thoughtful analysis in
this book. The contribution that Vogel
has made to the socialist feminist move-
ment is found in the earlier part of the
book. She has helped to guide the
theoretical debate away from dual systems
and redirect it to an analvsis rooted in the
best traditions of Marxi~m. I only hope
that enough people read this book that we
might leave the dual systems discussion
behind us.
Vogel has also made an attempt to
carry the discussion beyond its fonner
boundaries by fleshing out the ideas of
necessary labor and the reproduction of
the working class. Despite the weaknesses
of the conclusions she draws from these
concepts, the ideas merit discussion. L.l
CHANGES c: 25
 from CHANGES,. Jan.-Feb. 1984-
Where is Jesse Jackson Running?
A Statement by the International Socialists
JESSE JACKSON FOR PRESIDENT? From the day
Jackson officially launched his campaign for the
Democratic Party presidential nomination, to the day
when the nomination is given to either Walter Mondale
or John Glenn, his campaign will be-by far-the most
interesting affair in the American political picture.
Jesse Jackson's candidacy stimulated mass interest in
the Black community, and excitement on the left, months
before the formal announcement. The attractiveness of
the campaign is, itself, a political factor that cannot be ig-
nored. There is a diversity of views across the breadth of
the political spectrum on the Jackson campaign: among
Black Democrats as to whether his candidacy will inspire
Black voters or split the Black-liberal coalition, among
political activists in the National Black Independent
Political Party and other organizations in the Black
freedom struggle, and of course, within. the left. This
statement will, we hope, contribute to an important
debate and hopefully to at least a modest program of ac-
tion.
The following analysis will argue that Jesse Jackson's
campaign, and the well thought-<>ut political strategy
that underlies it, is a contradictory phenomenon. It has a
radical and inspirational character which will raise Black
expectations and consciousness. It will appear, in the
minds of many people, as·a confrontation between Black
America and the institutions of racism for the first time
since the 19605. It is also, at least in a limited sense, a
mobilization which may significantly change the political
landscape through the entry of several million previously
unregistered and politically marginalized, primarily
Black people into the electoral process.
Jackson's entry into the presidential race temporarily
displaced one of the long-standing laws of American life:
that serious presidential politics must be dominated by
the Worst and the Dullest, the whitest and blandest men
with no ideas or programs aside from who can race the
fastest to capture the electoral "middle ground."
That's one side of the campaign. The other side,
tragically, is that the strategy behind Jesse Jackson's cam-
paign-a quite conscious strategy, not an accidental one
-guarantees that on Election Day 1984, the choice be-
tween the Worst and the Dullest, Ronald Reagan and
Walter Mondale to be precise, will reassert itself with
redoubled force. The Jackson strategy means that in
November 1984 and perhaps years to come, Black
America, other oppressed nationalities, the poor, the
unemployed, and labor will have no candidate and no in-
This statement was written by the P~liticizl Committee of the
lntemah'onal Socialists. Changes welcomes any comments or
other views on this issue.
10 o CHANGES
dependent political alternative. This is especially tragic
because, in principle, it doesn't have to be that way,
The International Socialists (1.5.) do not believe that
socialists should participate in the leadership contests of
capitalist, imperialist parties, even when popular or pro-
gressive figures are candidates in those contests. We don't
think the left can advance the goals of independent
politics by supporting Jesse Jackson or any other
Democratic candidate. We do think it is important for
socialists to understand and actively solidarize with the
sentiments and aspirations of the millions of primarily
Black and other oppressed people who will support Jesse
Jackson's campaign. We will argue that there is, in fact, a
way to do precisely this.
J esse Jackson is not acting like a normal bourgeois
politician, chasing the middle ground or spending
millions (which he doesn't have in any case) to cultivate a
smooth media image and welI-<>i1ed campaign organiza-
tion. Instead, he aims to change the location of that mid-
dle ground-through a massive voter registration drive
primarily of the seven million unregistered Black voters,
out of a total Black voting-age population of 17 million.
Jesse Jackson is not going to change his style or strategy
to cater to the norms of media politicking, and there is no
reason why he should. Since network television is
disinclined to show voter-registration rallies conducted in
Black churches-which is what most of Jackson's cam-
paign events will be-most people outside the Black com-
munity will never see what may be the most significant
political events of 1984.
But with or without high media exposure, Jesse Jackson
has a strategy for a Democratic victory over Ronald
Reagan in 1984-perhaps the only strategy. Speaking at
the August 27 March for Jobs, Peace and Freedom in
Washington, 0, c., Jackson reeled off what has become a
standard litany, the list of states where unregistered
Blacks outnumbered Ronald Reagan's margin of victory
in 1980. In ten states, including a crucial Southern block,
that Black unregistered vote, if cast for the Democrat,
would have kept Reagan out of the White House.
The strategy for 1984 and beyond, then, is to break up
that "unholy alliance of the rich and the unregistered"
that elected Reagan. Alone among the Democrats, Jesse
Jackson insists that this strategy depends crucially on of-
fering something-at least a sentiment and a hope, if not
a very concrete program-to vote for. That hope is em-
bodied first and foremost in the figure of lesse Jackson,
the first Black leader, aside from the short-lived 1972 can- •
didacy of Shirley Chisolm, to run for the Democratic
presidential nomination.
The strategy, therefore, depends on lackson's cam-
paign maintaining its inspirational and radical tone and
its appeal to Black pride and Black power, Further, if sue-
cessful, it would be the first political development in well
over a decade to shift the center of gravity in U.S. politics
to the left instead of the right. It would be foolish to ig-
nore this potential, and the openings it might create for a
different kind of politics in America.
It would be equally mistaken, however, for the left to
suppose that such a new politics could arise spontaneous-
Iy. _ or out of the Jackson campaign itself-for as we will
show in more detail below, the campaign proposes to
shift the center of gravity within the Democratic Party,
an4 in the process to stabilize the Democratic Party's
political framework rather than in any way go beyond it.
issues of both domestic and foreign policy as well as
racial pride and equality, the image is accurate. While the
other Democratic candidates give feeble lip service to op-
posing U.S. military intervention-except where the U.S.
is actually militarily intervening-Jesse Jackson con-
demns the U.S. war drive in Central America, and means
it. He has called for peace in the Middle East with justice
for the Palestinian people, and refused to back down
from that stand in the face of vicious personal attacks
from powerful forces in the traditional Democratic coali-
tion.
There are areas where Jackson's record is less positive.
His views on women's right to abortion have been

W hat, precisely, does Jesse Jackson stand for7 He

is regarded, of course, as a committed champion
of social justice for the poor and disenfranchised in
general and Black people in particular-and on central
retrograde, although pressure from feminists has pushed
him to an essentially pro-<hoice position. In the October
Chicago Teachers' Union strike, his PUSH organization
was part of the strike-breaking coalition against the ma-

-
'IIIr"'"
jOrity-Black union. Examples of
this kind of reactionary
behavior should not be swept
under the rug, or apologized
for-but they must also not be
taken out of proportion to
Jackson's total record of strug-
gle for civil rights and social
justice.
It is, of course, in the struggle
of the Black community against
racism and discrimination that
Jackson has made his greatest
mark. His program is a kind of
synthesis of the Black middle
c1as5 political and economic
aspirations with a populist
(rather than class) and radical
appeal to the poor and margin-
alized of all races and na-
tionalities.
Especially in his home base,
Chicago, Jackson has sought to
mobilize economic and political
leverage to win business fran-
chises for Black entrepreneurs
and jobs for Black youth, and
pushed a message of self-help to
strengthen Black education and
i (, !1 family life. His boycott of
,
\ ,I· -, Mayor Jane Byrne's 1982 Chica-
1 goFest helped generate initial
momentum for Harold Wash-
4" ington's mayoral campaign.
_. While not a career party politi-
cian, Jackson has a history of
involvement in Democratic Par-
l)RI\LL ty affairs-he played a powerful
role, for example in the
unseating of Mayor Richard
Daley's delegation at the 1972
party convention.
In short, within the American
bourgeois political spectrum,
Jesse Jackson can be seen as a

CHANGES 011
Jesse Jackson speaks at a PUSH convention in Atlanta as other
Democratic presidential hopefuls listen-Walter Mandale, Alan
Cranston. Ernest Hollings (aU seated).
maverick who brings to the Democratic Party a reputa-
tion and following he has won primarily outside (and
well to the left of) the party-political framework. He is by
no means anti-capitalist-indeed, only the more self-
deluding elements of the radical left are likely to think
they can inject anti-capitalist content by entering his cam-
paign. Jackson's populism-for-all classes in the Black
community includes Black capitalism as a central
tenet-the perspective that Black business will provide
the jobs, the political and financial muscle that enables
the community as a whole to make social gains.
These facts, both positive and negative, about Jesse
Jackson's politics and program are important, but in our
view, they are not the decisive criteria for determining a
socialist attitude toward his candidacy, Far more impor-
tant are the questions of what kind of political and social
dynamics his campaign might open up-a concrete anal-
ysis of whether this campaign, or some fraction of the
forces within it, are fighting for independent political ac-
tion of the Black community and its potential allies, and
if so how the left can most constructively maximize that
possibility ,
J esse Jackson himself has left no doubt about where
he stands on this central question. Immediately
after announcing' his candidacy for the Democratic
nomination, he made clear that he would not run outside
the Democratic Party as an independent following the
120 CHANGES
convention. In his November 3 speech in Columbus,
Ohio, Jackson explicitly spelled out that the center of the
strategy is directed toward November 1984-toward
"Ronald Reagan's retirement party." Further, if you ex-
amine the political evolution that led to the Jackson cam-
paign, you discover that his campaign is a tactic toward
achieving a well-defined strategy which has been worked
out over many years by a section of the Black leadership
and articulated by some of its spokespersons such as John
Conyers and Ron Dellums,
The strategy envisions an electoral mobilization of
Black people to restore the Democratic Party's national
majority, to re-negotiate the place of Black people in the
Democratic voting coalition, and to put Black people's
concerns higher on the agenda of that coalition.
It is not only a question of the pivotal role of the Black
vote in electing a Democratic president. It includes a
"New Southern Strategy," as Jesse Jackson himself refer-
red to it in one article: the importance of Black members
of Democratic Party state organizations, especially in the
South, would become much greater. The trend toward
white conservatives in the South supporting, or even
joining, the Republicans would thus be countered by
making the Democratic Party in the South a uniquely
liberal, even in places a Black-led, party.
Once this thinking is understood, a number of facts
about the Jackson campaign fall into place.
First, the campaign is not, except very secondarily,
about building a multi-racial popular "Rainbow Coali-
tion." (In a certain vague sense, of course, the
Democratic Party itself has claimed for SO years now to
 be such a coalition, but that is only rhetoric.) As far as
practical politics and concrete organization is concerned,
what the Jackson campaign is trying to build is not a
Rainbow Coalition, but a Black voting block which
might be a component of such a coalition at some future
time. Jackson's statements about a Rainbow Coalition are
not what make his campaign important, and in any case
seem to be his own language for reviving what others call
the "New Deal coalition."
In fact, given financial constraints and media hostility,
Jesse Jackson is hardly even building a campaign
organization at all in the traditional sense, but rather bas-
ing his candidacy on the existing Black church (and Black
business) networks that already support him. Some on
the left, who would like to read into Jackson's candidacy
the potential of a "Rainbow Coalition" organization in-
side the Democratic Party, have criticized him for a too
narrow and Black-oriented appeal; but given what the
underlying strategy is, this criticism is quite misplaced.
Second, the Jackson campaign, quite contrary to the
fears expressed by some of the more conservative en-
trenched Black figures (like Andrew Young) in the Dem-
ocratic Party, is in no way contradictory to the aim of
electing Walter Mondale as president in November.
In fact, it is precisely in the general election that the
viability of the whole strategy will be tested-not in the
number of delegates that Jackson commands at the Dem-
ocratic convention. "Register and Vote for Me': is not
Jesse Jackson's message to the Black community-rather,
it is "Register and Vote in November." From Jackson's
pont of view, it is not at the convention that he will fun-
damentally show the power to leverage concessions from
the Democrats, but in the general election through the
votes of millions of Black people, registered and mobiliz-
ed under his auspices.
There seems little doubt that Jackson is right, and his
critics wrong, in their tactical difference over how to ad-
vance Black interests within the Democratic Party struc-
ture. The critics of Jackson's candidacy seem, above all,
to be defending their own entrenched relations with the
liberal establishment. But the fact of a clear political split
in the Black leadership has obscured the deeper fact that
there is no dissent in that leadership over whether the
place to pursue Black interests is inside the Democratic
Party.
T he most narrow and cynical interpretation of
Jackson's campaign from the standpoint of his con-
servative Black critics was offered by Chicago columnist
Vernon Jarrett, who said:
Jesse is not running for president. He's running for the of-
fice of chief power broker for Black people at the
Democratic convention, where he will be televised and
portrayed as a Black power broker. His agenda is the pro-
motion of Jesse Jackson as the king, the emperor, the most
important Black person of this century. (Quoted in New
York Times, September 22, 1983).
~ The "power broker strategy" analysis, however, seems
to us to be seriously off the mark. It gives the Jackson
campaign too little and too much significance, at the
same time. Too little because, as we have already pointed
Qut, Jackson proposes to permanently alter the contours
of political debate by bringing millions of disenfranchis-
ed Black people into it. And too much because there is no
reason to think Jackson will have anything like the
strength needed to broker the Democratic nomination.
"Power brokering" implies the old-fashioned horse-
trading of votes for promises-promises of the number of
appointments, job programs and other legislative gains
the Democratic contenders might be willing to grant in
exchange for the votes of Jackson's delegate block. This
Jackson-in-the-smoke-filled-room scenario would be
plausible if there were the slightest doubt about how
either the Jackson delegates, or later in the general elec-
tion, the masses of Black Americans will vote. But there
isn't the slightest doubt!
First, the actual candidate selection process has been
re-rigged to make sure the candidate is selected by the
party powers-that-be at the convention, not through
primary delegate elections, which have been reduced.
More than a third of the delegates will be chosen in
bureaucratically-run caucuses where Jackson's forces
have negligible influence. With perhaps 200 delegates at
maximum, out of total of 3900, Jesse Jackson will almost
certainly have a smaller delegate block than any other
"brokering" force. But even if he had the muscle, it seems
inconceivable that Jackson would use it in such a way as
to create a victory for John Glenn.
In essence, Jackson is every bit as committed to a final
vote for Walter Mondale as are those who vote for Fritz
on the first ballot. But if you are not able, or willing, to
be a real "spoiler" then you have no real bargaining
power.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that Blacks will vote
Democratic in the November 1984 election-what really
counts will be whether the numbers will be high enough
to elect the Democrat. Mondale's forces certainly under-
stand all this. Whatever the clash of rhetoric during the
campaign, things are likely to go more or less smoothly at
the convention-because the Jackson and Mondale strat-
egies harmonize perfectly. Mondale does need a massive
Black turnout to defeat Reagan, and so far only Jackson
has a strategy to accomplish this. Institutionally and
politically (as opposed to emotionally), the Jackson cam-
paign is not a dash between Black America and the white
liberal establishment, as many of the struggles of the
1960s were,
Of course, Jackson obviously cannot afford a humilia-
tion at the convention, like the one suffered by the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party in 1964. Further-
more, to mobilize such a massive voting Black turnout
that it would be impossible for the Democrats to dismiss
Black demands it is important for Jackson to play up the
radical, inspirational, racial pride and populist character
of his campaign, as opposed te' the usual slide to the
center and horse-trading maneuverism characteristic of
most candidates.
All this means that Jackson is likely to end his cam-
paign not in a posture of helpless submission to the win-
ning candidate, nor with his radical image badly tarnish-
ed by compromises, but rather with an enhanced
credibility, with a major role to play in mobilizing the
Black vote for November, and with the appearance of
greater clout to wield in Democratic Party affairs in years
to come.
continued on page 24 ~
CHANGES 013
 JackSOn-continued from page 13
-,5-
H.
owever, there is a deep contradiction at the very
heart of this perspective. For exactly the same
reason that Jackson can hope to have little short-term im-
pact on the Democratic convention-being unwilling to
be a "spoiler" -his campaign will be fundamentally in-
capable of forcing a basic long-term renegotiation of
Black influence in the Democratic Party's ruling circles.
The irony is that Black people will still have "no other
place to go." They can elect the Democrats by voting in
massive numbers, but they cannot threaten the Demo-
crats except by failing to vote at all.
Despite its tactical flair and originality, the core of the
Jackson strategy is not very different from the tradi-
tional, increasingiy ineffective labor strategy-deliver a
big vote, negotiate appointments and legislative agenda
afterward. Unfortunately for the Black community, what
is won after the election depends on what the voting
block as a social force is willing and able to do in-
dependently of the new administration. Given its current
state of organization and political dependence, the Black
community has very little to bargain with after the elec-
tion.
Even though Martin Luther King was willing to declare
a moratorium on civil rights activity before the 1964 elec-
tion, he understood that action after the election was
essential for winning the movement's legislative agenda
in 1964-5. The current strategy of the Black leadership,
whether for or against Jesse Jackson's candidacy, is pure-
ly electoralist and dependent on making deals from a
position of subordination to the Democratic Party's pro-
gram and leadership.
So long as that strategy remains unchallenged, the
Black community will not be able to translate being on
the winning side of an election battle into serious social
gains. When you consider that the Democrats main
charge against Ronald Reagan in 1984 will be Reagan's
runaway budget deficits; when you consider that
everyone in the Party except Jesse Jackson himself has
proclaimed that the days of "big social spending" are over
forever; when you consider that Reagan's ax could not
have been wielded against the Black community without
the votes of the Democrat-controlled House -how much
will the Black community really gain by restoring the
Democratic coalition to its majority status?
Without underestimating the profound potential im-
pact of the Jackson strategy on the composition and
balance of forces in some state Democratic organizations,
the fact remains that the Democratic Party is decisively a
party of American capitalism and its ruling class. This is
not some abstract definition: there is more than one pro-
cess of "realignment" taking place in the party. While its
active dynamiC base might become Blacker, its policy-
making echelons are becoming ever more directly busi-
ness-<lriented and business-controlled.
The ascendancy of Walter Mondale-the same Mon-
dale whose election Jackson's strategy, to be successful,
must achieve-is precisely the expression of this trend.
Mondale's campaign banner of "industrial policy" is a
thin disguise for austerity and for tight business direction
of government economic policy-which also means con-
24 o CHANGES
trol of social policy, the destiny of the Black community
included.
The Jackson strategy is tragically self-defeating because
the very activity on which it centrally depends-massive
voter registration-is divorced from independent
organization of any variety (not even in the distorted
sense of building an "independent" organized center of in-
fluence within the Democratic Party).
Jackson himself has not hidden the fact that the goal is
to reestablish the Democrats' national majority status. It
is the opposite of a "break-out" strategy or of indepen-
dent politics. Everyone seems to understand this-except
the left.
T he Jesse Jackson campaign will test theory and per-
spectives across the American political spectrum.
The right wing-intellectual neo-conservatives,
economic monetarists, New Right supply-siders and
purveyors of anti-feminist, anti-Black and other forms of
social bigotry, union-busting employers, so-called Chris-
tian fundamentalists and the computer-banked direct-
mail operators who finance the lot-have been crowing
ever since the election of Ronald Reagan that they were
the only people with "ideas."
The real political dynamism and intellectual excitement
in America, they boasted, lay in the re-discovery of the
curative powers of free enterprise and the market, de-
regulation, individual initiative and restoring national
pride through a re-arming that wouldn't let the U.S. be
pushed around any longer.
The perspective of the righ t wing has been tha tit had
not only the ideas, but a long-term new working political
majority. The new political center of gravity would lie in-
side the Republican Party, and the future trajectory of
American society would be decided by how the pie of
power was sliced up among the various interest groups
and social policy lobbies within that new conservative
ruling coalition.
The perspective of the center and of mainstream
liberalism has been little more than to move rightward
themselves. The only answer from those sectors to the
ravages of Reaganism has been a vague and very
uninspiring slogan called "industrial policy," the leading
code word for a Chrysler-type refitting and downsizing
of the U.S. economy and work force. Liberalism in
America had accepted almost without question the
operating assumption that the electorate had moved per-
manently rightward. The most liberals could hope for
was a rear-guard institutional defense of the advances
won by Black people and women; and in the long run to
demonstrate that they, through the Democratic Party,
could administer economic austerity and a redistribution
of power in favor of corporate capital. more effectively
than the Reaganites.
Jesse Jackson's candidacy and the long-term strategy
behind it challenges the assumptions of a permanent
rightward tilt in the U.S. electoral terrain. That is one
factor, of course, which gives his campaign inside the
Democratic Party a tremendous attractiveness to much of
the left. The other attractive factor, closely related, is
Jackson's appeal to a potential new social and political
coalition, with the Black community as its vanguard and
organizational backbone, to tum back the right-wing,
 anti-Black, anti-women, anti-labor and militarist tide.
The challenge which this development poses to the
theory and perspective of socialists is how to fight for
'that kind of social alliance against the right, in a way that
opens up the possibilities for progressive and independent
politics rather than cutting them off.
A commonly held view in the left is that the way to do
this is to build Jackson's "Rainbow Coalition" during the
course of the Democratic primaries, with perhaps the
vague idea that it will live on as an organized caucus or
pressure group afterward. It is the newest form of one of
the oldest of all illusions.
Working within the Democratic Party primary frame-
work, all the left will accomplish will be a small contribu-
tion to an effort to restabilize the Democratic Party itself.
That restabilization is exactly what will cut off future
progressive possibilities, precisely at the point when
millions of politically marginalized, oppressed Americans
may become part of political life for the first time in this
country.
It is exactly at times like this, when the political land-
scape may be starting to shift, that the arguments over
the "realism" of working inside the Democratic Party or
breaking away from it become critical. The conventional,
"realistic" argument, of course, is that mass political pro-
cesses take place inside the Democratic Party and there-
fore the left must be there, too. That is exactly how the
left continually re-<:onvinces itself, election year after
election year, not to do anything that might lead any sec-
tion of society out of the trap of bourgeois politics.
In 1984 this course of action is a disaster even in prac-
tical, short-range terms. By throwing its energy and
political support to a Democratic Party leadership cam-
paign, where will the left be after that campaign is over,
and the momentum and organization of the Jesse Jackson
campaign is transferred to Walter Mondale's election?
That scenario would leave the left, in November 1984,
impotent and irrelevant-or ultimately even supporting a
Mondale in order to "defeat Reagan at any cost."
That, surely, would be the ultimate statement of
political bankruptcy: for the American left to collapse in-
to mainstream liberalism precisely when a certain social
momentum toward the left was emerging.
I t doesn't have to be that way. In the minds of the
masses of people who respond to the radical side of
Jackson's message-the demand for political and social
enfranchisement for the oppressed-there is no logical
reason why Jackson should not run for president-all the
way, not just part way.
The International Socialists believe that the left-
.activists in the new organizations of the Black struggle, in
the unions.. the antiGwar movement and other socialstrug-
gles-should call on Jesse Jackson to run for president as
an independent. That call could reach a larger audience
than the left usually can attract, with a convincing,
powerful and radicalizing vision of independent politics.
. We don't believe Jackson would run independently,
although it would be a fantastic development if he did.
The reason we don't think he will is not that the left is too
weak to influence him-he could after all make such a
decision on his own with no "advice" from the left-but
simply because it runs counter to his entire strategy of re-
negotiating the position of Black people within the
Democratic Party. This does not change "the fact that the
most advantageous time to put the issue of independent
political action up for debate is today, not at the last mo-
ment when only small protest-vote gestures are possible.
It isn't necessary to call on Jackson to quit the
Democratic primary. He should only be asked to be con-
sistent in his fight to put Black, anti-war and other issues
onto the political agenda, by continuing his campaign in-
to the general election. In raising this call, the left would
also be showing its solidarity with the democratic strug-
gle for the unregistered Black voters for the right to
register and vote without racist harassment.
We in the 1.5. are for an independent radical presiden-
tial campaign in 1984, with or without Jesse Jackson. In
practice this will mean, unfortunately, without him. But-
we are political realists, and we know the potential au-
dience for the message for independent political action
will be the greatest precisely during the period when
Jackson's campaign is most visible.
Many socialist activists and organizations sincerely
believe there is a place for socialist activity "both inside
and outside" the Democratic Party, at the same time. We
in the 1.5. don't share that view-but if there was ever a
time for that perspective to be tested in practice, this is it!
If there is any "outside" part to the operation of the "in-
side and outside" strategists, the time to prove it is now.
If it is "premature" to call for an independent Jesse
Jackson campaign, it will be too late when the Democrat-
ic nomination is sealed. If the argument is that the left
must then go on to support Mondale instead of breaking
to the outside of the Democratic Party, then the "outside"
part of the strategy is non-existent, a window dressing for
lesser-evil liberalism, pure and simple.
T here is a deep, historic and multi-level tragedy in
the politics of Black America. Black people, as an
oppressed nation and as the most _eavily proletarianized
sector of the American population, ultimately hold the
key to their own liberation and to the revolutionary
transformation of America. .
The potential power of the Black masses has been crip-
pled by a double political subordination: the subordina-
tion of the masses of Black peop'le to the petit-bourgeois
leadership of the Black community, and the Black leader-
ship's subordination to the white, capitalist ruling class
and its political parties. It is as profound an obstacle to
social change in America as the subordination of the rank
and file of labor to the trade union bureaucracies, and of
the latter to the very same Democratic Party.
A central task of the left in America is to break that
subordination. But the Jesse Jackson campaign, by virtue
of its strategy of cementing even more firmly the relations
between Black America and the Democratic Party, rein-
forces it. In the final analysis, it awakens and politicizes
and inspires the politically marginalized sections of the
Black masses, to ultimately strengthen the system's
domination over them.
There is no simple, one-step way of breaking the tragic
cycle of labor and Black political dependency, just as
there is no formula for "instant revolution." But a crucial
problem for socialist theory and politics is to understand
the dimensions of this problem-the central problem,
CHANGES 0 25
 -/1-
perhaps, of revolutionary politics in America-and how
to attack it in practice.
We know that many on the socialist left who do not
share our political conclusions fully share our concern
with the centrality of the issues we are discussing here.
We urge them to respond to the analysis we have pre-
sented here. The resulting dialogue and debate can only
be to the benefit of us all.
There is an unusual relevance and urgency to this
discussion. Events far beyond the left's ability to in-
fluence brought Ronald Reagan and the right wing to
power. Events equally far beyond our influence have pro-
duced a wracking economic and social crisis-and now in
26 o CHANGES
1984, to our potential good fortune, a political
phenomenon which may awaken Black America and its
potential allies.
The left can take no credit for making the Jesse Jackson
campaign happen, but it can take advantage of a unique
and timely opportunity to present the case for indepen-
dent politics to an audience that has never heard it
before. If we ignore the opportunity, or if the left chooses
to sink itself into the Democratic Party in yet another il-
lusory search for mainstream electoral relevance, then it
will be once again marginalized and impotent in 1984 and
some time beyond-and in that case, it will not be objec-
tive conditions but ourselves who are to blame. 0

Bureaucratic
Co llecti vism:
A Marxist Theory
of the Soviet Union
The following is based upon a presentation at the Union
of Radical Political Economists (URPE) conference on the
nature of the Souiet Union in New York City on March 17,
1979.
I n March 1979, 1,500 people attended a conference
on the Soviet Union sponsored by the Union of Radical
Political Economists. The large audience was an indication
of the growth of interest and controversy concerning the
nature of the Russian system and its relation to the struggle
for socialism. Only 20 years ago such a conference could
not have been held.
Since Stalin's ascendancy in Russia during the 1920's
and the subsequent liquidation of all opposition inside the
international Communist Parties, all criticism of the Soviet
Union had been denounced as counterrevolutionary. To-
day the international Communist movement is in disarray,
and one of the biggest disputes concerns the Soviet Union.
The major event in the reopening of the "Russian Ques-
tion" was ceriainly the split between China and Russia. In
1964, Mao declared that "The Soviet Union is today under
the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the
'German fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type."
From then on Russia was to be considered an example
of revisionism and social imperialism by the Chinese and
their international supporters. China never developed a
26
Michael Urquhart
theoretical analysis to justify its new attitude, nor to explain
how a counter-revolution had succeeded in Russia. As a
result for some time there was no serious discussion, only
two different "lines" emanating from Moscow and Peking.
Less dogmatic followers of China did attempt more ade-
quate explanations during the 1970's. Chief among them
were Charles Bettelheim, Paul Sweezy, and other writers
around Monthly Reuiew. Other publications would also
carry more articles discussing the issues involved. And one
journal, Critique, is almost solely devoted to the Russian
question.
The discussion is now no longer confined to Russia and
its satellites. With the death of Mao, and the fall of the
"Gang of Four," Bettelheim and others have concluded
that China, too, is no longer socialist. Indeed, the conclu-
sion seems inescapable that there are no socialist countries
at all left in the world today.
The renewed interest in the nature of the Russian system
is not misplaced. At the heart of the dispute is the question
of the nature of socialism itself and the type of struggle
necessary to achieve it. The fact that this discussion is no
longer confined to the fringes of the revolutionary move-
ment is a development that should be welcomed by all
socialists.
The following is a contribution to that discussion. While
it only discusses the Soviet Union, it applies equally to all
of the so-called socialist countries. The focus on Russia is
justified, however, since iI,like Britain in the 19th century,
represents the future of the other regimes. It is the most ad-
vanced and developed example of this new, exploitative
social system.
OUR METHOD'
Hal Draper wrote years ago about the two souls of
socialism-socialism from below and socialism from
above. These still characterise different methods of ap-
proaching the issues. Our method, of socialism from
below, begins with the working class, its position in society
and production, its conditions. its struggles. Is it ruler, or
ruled? For Marx the revolution and the construction of
socialism could only be achieved through the self-activity
of the working class, through its own institutim. and par-
ties, through its conscious control over the conditions of its
existence. This is the view of socialism from below.
Sadly, this must be considered a minority viewpOint to-
day. The starting point of much radical analysis today is
not the working class and class relations, but the political
line or program of a particular group, party or govern-
ment. The working class is often viewed merely as the
beneficiary of socialism, not the creator. In fact, it is even
allowed that socialism may be constructed by a "substitute
proletariat.'"
This viewpoint, of socialism from above. is very clearly
expressed in the discussion between Sweezy and Bet-
lelheim on the transition to socialism. How can one deter-
mine if the transitional society is moving in the direction of
socialism? Sweezy writes:
"If I understand him correc~y, BetteIheim's answer is
thai il depends on whether the proletarial is in power. If
it is, then movement will be in the direction of socialism
. . . This schema seems to me not so much wrong as
simply not very helpful. So far as I can tell, Bettelheim
offers no criterion for judging whether or not the pro~
letariat is in power other than the poliCies pursued by the
government and the party . . . there should be an In-
dependent method of establishing the identity of the
class in power. "2
It is a good question which cuts 10 the heart of the mat-
ter. In his reply Bettelheim makes clear his approach has
nothing to do with which class is in power. "One can speak
of proletarian state power only if its actual practices reflect
specific characteristics, and if the ruling party follows a pro-
letarian line. ". (emphasis in original)
Later, when Bettelheim broke with China he maintained
Ihis approach. "Documents which are nOw being pUblish-
ed in China give expression to a certain political line , and it
is the existence of this line which has led me to the conclu-
sions I have drawn.'" (emphusls in original)
T here are of course, independent methods of
establishing which class is in power. They are by and
large the same ones employed to determine if the working
class is in power in the U.S. Such methods are important,
however, only if one agrees that the question of class rela-
nons, of working class power, are central to an under·
standing of the Souiet Union and the struggle for socialism.
An examination of the actual class relations in the
U.S.S.R. wtlliead to the inescapable conclusion that it is a
new exploitative system-Bureaucratic Collectivism. The
27
defining characteristics of this new system are collectivized
state property, where the state is controlled by a
bureaucracy that is a new ruling class. Furthermore, it is a
system of use value production based on the class needs of
the bureaucracy.' It Is an expleitative system because the
working class has no control over its surplus labor, over the
process of production.
As an economic system it is common to all the so-called
socialist countries. Like capitalism, it also has considerable
variation from country to country, due to local conditiens,
history, etc.
WHY NEW?
For Marx it was the method of appropriation of surplus
labor that distingUished one economic -system from
another. "The essential difference between the varieus
economic forms of society, between, for instance, a society
based on slave labor. and one based en wage labor. lies
only in the mode in which this surplus-labor is in each case
extracted from the actual producer, the laborer ;'5
Under capitalism. surplus labor is appropriated as prefit
of the indiVidual enterprise through sale of commodities on
the market. For Bureaucratic Collectivism, however, the
surplus labor is not taken as a profit of the individu.1 enter-
prise, nor is it realized through the market. Rather it is
taken as a surplus product of society as a whole on a na-
tional scale. Hence the appropriation of the surplus occurs
directly, through the planning and control of the economy.
Ross Gandy, however. is wrong to argue that this ap-
propriation occurs through the higher salaries 0(-the
bureaucrats.' This represents only a small part of the
surplus product (as does the consumption of the capitalist
class). The surplus labor or product also includes the funds
for accumulation and investrnent,alIaetense-spending,
unproductive state expenditures, as well as the luxury con-
sumption of the bureaucracy.
Exploitation continues to exist under Bureaucratic Cel-
lectivism because the surplus that is produced by the
laborer Is not centrolled by him, but by the bureaucracy.
Even under socialism some surplus labor will have to go
towards the general needs of society, for expansion of pro-
dUction, etc. This would not be exploitation, however,
because the working class weuld collectively central the
surplus, determining both its size and the social uses to
which it would be put.
It is this lack of central by the working class ouer its own
labor and ouer its surplus labor which makes the class rela-
e In Marxist theory, commodities in a capitalist economy have
two basic qualities, called "use value" and "exchange value." The
use value of any commodity. from a loaf of bread to a steel plant
to a nuclear submarine, is simply its specific use as an object of
production or consumption. Its exchange value. the quantity of
SOcially necessary labor required to produce it. determines how it
is exchanged with other commodities in the capitalist market. In a
non-market system like bureaucratic collectivism, where products
of labor (and labor power itself) are not bought and sold through
capitalist market laws. there is not "exchange value" ~Jut only a
use value for each product. It is the central state bureaucracy. i. e.
the ruling class, which determines how much of each use value
will be produced and how surplus labor is used to increase tho
bureaucracy's power, privilege. military might, etc.
 -8(1-
tionships of Bureaucratic CollectiVism fundamentally an-
tagonistic, representing a new exploitative system that
must be overthrown if socialism is to be built.
THE PLAN
Marx began his analysis of capitalism with the commodi-
ty, within which was encompassed the entire capitalist
, system. For Bureaucratic Collectivism we must begin our
analysis with the plan.
Marx and Engels never developed in any detail their
conception of the functioning of a socialist society. While
they talked about planning under socialism, no perspective
. on how this would be organized was presented. However,
in Anti-Duhring Engels does provide some hints.
"In making itself the master of all the means of produc·
tion, in order to use them in accordance with a social
plan, society puts an end to the former subjection of
men to their own means of production. It goes without
saying that society cannot itself be free unless every.. in-
dividual is free. The old mode of production must
therefore be revolutionized from top to bottom, and in
particular the former division of labour must disappear.
Its place must be taken by an organization of production
in which, on the one hand, no individual can put on to
other persons his share in productive labour, this natural
condition of human existence; and in which on the
other hand, productive labour, instead of being a means
to the subjection of men, will become a means to their
emancipation. by giving each indiVidual the opportunity
to develop and exercise aU his faculties, physical and
mental, in all directions; in which therefore, productive
labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden."7
Later on Engels returns to the question of planning:
"It [society} will have to arrange its plan of production in
accordance with its means of prodUction, which in-
clude, tn particular, its labour forces. The useful effects
of the various articles of consumption, compared. with
each other and with the quantity of labour required for
their production, will in the last analysis determine the
plan. People will be able to manage everything very
simply, without the intervention of the famous 'value'."8
with centralized planning alone, leaving out the
democratic, social content.
If socialism is identified with centralized planning, then
all economic problems can be reduced to the working out
of the proper plan, or the search for the "optimal" plan.
This is further assumed to be a technical problem.
In this way the plan is given a supra-societal existence,
abstracted from the class relationships which underlie it,
and suspended in mid-air. Indeed, many discussions of
planning occur as if it had a reality of its own, its own law,
etc. In this way the fetishism of commodities under
capitalism is replaced with the fetishism of the plan. The
plan then appears to dominate man, rather than man
dominating the plan. This fetishism is made necessary in
order to disguise the actual class character of the planning
process in Bureaucratic Collectivist countries.
Here is one description of the planning procedure in the
Soviet Union:
"The Central Planning Commission first collects infor·
matian up the ladder of agencies from the enterprise in
order to evaluate the last year's performance and the
present conditions and possibilities. Then the Commis-
sion is told by the Council of Ministers what goals it must
strive to meet. On these bases. it draws up a general
plan for the whole economy, although details of pro-
duction and allocation are provided only for a couple of
thousand commodities. The draft plan is then shown to
all agencies in the hierarchy from the Ministry to the
enterprise. After all these units have added their detailed
modifications and suggestions, the Central Planning
Commission draws up the final draft . . . The Central
Planning Commission hands the plan over to ap·
propriate government bodies to enact into law, and it is
then passed on with detailed expansions at each in·
termediate level until the enterprise receives a for·
midable document. This document is supposed to tel!
the enterprise for a year, or some other period, exactly
what to produce. how to produce it, what prices to
charge, and what funds it may use. "\0
Nowhere in this procedure are there any institutions or
organizations of the working class that partiCipate in
developing the plan. Nor can it any longer be argued that
working class control is still exercised through the govern-
ment, and through the Communist Party's control of the

M arx and Engels did not elaborate on the method

for arriving at the plan. However, it is clear from
their other writings on the Paris Commune and elsewhere
that they expected this to be the result of the conscious
control of the working class organized democratically in its
own institutions. The comparison of the "useful effects"
would be essentially the comparison of consumer
preferences, man would dominate the productive forces
because of his conscious control over them. Such control
could only be exercised democratically.
"Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man,
the associated producers, rationally regulating their in-
terchange with Nature. bringing it under their common
control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces
of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure
of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and
worthy of, their human nature."')
No blueprint was or could be offered. Yet what they
wrote makes clear their differences with the top-down,
bureaucratic, centralized planning under Bureaucratic Col- Stalin, the organizer of the bureaucratic
lectivism. !.1nder the latter, socialism came to be identified counter-revolution.

28
 government. These institutions ceased to be workers' in-
stitutions during the twenties and thirties, with the various
purges, outlawing of soviets, etc. Today the part!) and
government are dominated by the central political
bureaucracy, managers, technocrats, etc.
Trade unions do still exist. They are not independent,
however, lacking all basic trade union rights, and function
mainly as production arms of the government. Even so,
they are denied any say,over the plan, or over questions of
fundamental importance to workers, such as wages.
In 1940, Shvernik, chairman of the Central Council of
Trade Unions, justified this policy by once a.gain appealing
to the "logic" of planning.
"When tile Plan becomes the decisive element of
economic development, questions of wages cannot be
decided indopendentiy of tt. Thus the collective agree-
ment as a form of regulating wages has outlived its
usefulness."tl
T he lack of workers' most elemental democratic rights
is no accident. For the Bureaucracy's position as a
ruling class, indeed its very existence as a class, is based on
its exclusive control of the state. As the Polish Marxists,
Kuron and Morlaewleski have correctly noted, "the pro-
perty of the bureaucracy is not of an individual nature, but
constitutes the collective property of an elite which iden-
tifies itself with the state. This lact defines the principle of
the bureaucracy's internal organization, but its class
character does not depend on its internal organization or its
mores, only on its relationship, as a group-to the means
of production and to other social classes (above all the
working class.}"tZ
In order to ir,sure that the plan is drawn up to meet its
own class needs the bureaucracy must of necessity have
total control over the planning process. In spite of all
reforms, liberalizations, experiments, etc., this control has
always been maintained.
All of the prr.{)lems associated with planning in the
Soviet Union are a result of the fundamental contradiction
underlying bureaucratic planning: the contradiction oe-
tween the need for planning in a nationalized economy,
and the need for authoritarian restrictions on any initiative
from below in order to defend the class position of the
bureaucracy.
Under capitalism the market acts as a feedback
mechanism, enforcing a measure of rationality on the
system. Under bureaucratic collectivism there is no similar
mechanism. (For a brief description of some attempts at
finding such a mechanism and their failure, see the attach-
ed box. "Prices, Profits and the Plan.") It is simply impOSSi-
ble in a modern economy for the Central PlanMrs to
foresee everything, to plan everything. Since production is
not carried on to meet the needs of the working class. and
since there is severe repression aimed at preventing them
from having ant, influence over the plan and over the
methods of proJuction, they clearly have no stake in im-
proving the plan, improving the methods of production,
improving the rationality of the system.
T,) repeat, the bureaurcratic ruling class in Russia needs
to plan the economy. But the authoritarian measures
necessary to defend itself means that it cannot plan well. In
fact, the more developed the economy, the more com-
plex, the less capable is it of plannng what goes on.
29
THE GOAL OF PRODUCTION
B ureaucratic Collectivism is then a system of use
value production. Exactly what is produced is deter-
mined by that class which controls the plan, and controls
the surplus labor of the working class. The purpose of pro-
duction, what guides the planners, is the class needs of the
bureaucracy.
Each ruling classsels the goals of production, goals bas-
ed on the need to strengthen and extend its authority over
production and society.
"The material power of the bureaucracy, the scapp. of
its authority over production, its international position
(ver)' important for a class organized as a group identify-
ing itselt with the state) all depend on the Size of the na-
tiollaJ capital. Consequently, the bureaucracy wants to
increase capital, to enlarge the producing apparatus, to
accumu:ate. "17
Given the fact that bureaucratic collectivism has trium-
phed where capitalism is weak, in less developed coun-
tries, the class goal of production has been rapid in-
dustrialization and the development of a modern defense
system of huge proportions. Such goals are absolutely
necessary to the continued existence of the local
bureaucratic ruling class, to its independence from outside
imperialist control. Hence consumption is kept to a
minimum.
Bukharin was wrong to assume that in such a system the
only dynamic would be the level of consumption of the rul-
ing class, and that growth would be slow since the ruling
class would increase in numbers slowly." While this does
enter into it, much more important has been the need to
develop an economic basis to ensure the continued in-
dependent existence of the system and the ruling class, to
defend it from external attack from rival ruling classes and
economic systems.
The emphasis on rapid industrialization has led to the
development of the primary sector (capital goods) of
pathological dimensions. According to Carlo,
"a century was required for the American capitalist
system to increase its primary sector from 18.2% to
55.8% of total industrial production, while in RUSSia a
more impressive jump (from 39.5% to 73.1 %) was
made in only 33 years. In 1%3 about 81 % of all in-
dustrial resources were destined for the primary sector,
and irom the period 1959 to 1964 the growth rate of the
consumer sector was about 6.6% as opposed to 10.3%
for the primary sector. "19 --
Similarly, military and defense spending regularly take
up between 15% to 25% of the entire national product
(depending on whose figures you use), compared to only
about 7% in the U.S.
CONTRADICTIONS
As with other economic systems, the fundamental con-
tradiction of the system r8sults from the fact that at a cer-
tain level of development the productive forces come into
conflict with the existing relations of production.
This appears to have happened qUite rapidly in the
Bureaucratic Collectivist system, after an initiai period of
success. The turning pOint appears to have come when the
system had to move from expansion based on extensive
factors, to expansion based on intensive factors. By exten-
sive growth we are referring to growth based on bringing
 more forces into production under existing methods of
, -'3"--
production. more people into the industrial labor force.
more factories built on the same technological basis. etc.
By intensive growth we refer to increasing productivity and
efficiency primarily based on new technology.
This contradiction can be expressed in a number of
ways: as that between the high development of socialized
production combined with bureaucratic appropriation; the
tremendous growth of the primary sector combined with
the restricted growth of the secondary (consumer) sector;
and most fundamentally of all. the need for central plan·
ning that is in conflict with the need for totalitarian control
over the planning process.
PRICES. PROFITS AND THE PLAN
The first plans were fairly primitive and covered
only about 300 products. According to Dobb, the
original plans were based on a combination J)f three
methods; "static and dynamic coefficients;". "expert
estimates". and "comparative study of pre-war
data"." The overall plan that resulted was a result
largely of educated guesswork. and the results were
as to be expected.
This was replaced in the thirties by the method of
material balances. a primitive forerunner to linear
programming and imput-outpout analysis. At the
heart of the method was an attempt at a detailed
"costing of output-programmes ... that is, a costing
intially in real terms-in terms of the actual input of
resources required at each stage of production to
yield a given output."" Nove pOints out that it was
"carried out very largely in quantitative (physical)
terms. "15
Up to now it is clear that the plan is based on the
production of a certain amount of use values; the
discussion is in terms of physical characteristics and
physical quantities. The introduction of the "liber-
man" reforms. however. changed all this. Prices
came to playa greater role. and profit was rein-
troduced as a consideration in production. These
reforms have led some observers to argue mistakenly
that capitalism has been restored.
The Liberman reforms were instituted in the
1960's. Basically. they tried to overcome problems in
planning by introducing incentive back into the
system, and decentralizing authOrity more than in the
past. It was hoped that material incentives along with
greater control at the local. plant level would result in
the establishment of better plans. more rational fulfill-
ment of plans. and an improvement in the quality of
products.
Programming was now based on the prices of
goods, and individual enterprises were at least par-
tially evaluated on the basis of profits. However. pro-
fit was not the sole, or even the main consideration
of the enterprise. For it was only after meeting the
output targets set by the central planning authority
that profitability would take prime importance. We
are still far from the capitalist principle of production
30
The inability of the system to overcome these contradic·
tions has resulted in a tendency towards stagnation
throughout the system, as the following figures for annual
percentage of economic growth show.
1950-55 1955-60 1960-65
East Germany 11.4 7.0 3.5
Czechoslovakia - 8.0 7.1 l.8
U.S.S.R: 11.3 9.2 6.3
Hungary 6.3 6.5 4.7
Poland 8.6 6.6 5.9"
The various reforms and liberalization schemes were a
response to this stagnation, attempts to find a way to pro-
for profit. But there is a more fundamental problem.
It is generally agreed that in order for profits to
serve as an effective evaluator of enterprise efficiency
they must be based upon a "rational" price system.
Otherwise the amount of profits may only be the
result of the peculiarities of the administered prices.
The search for a rational basis for prices has led to the
debate over the applicability of the law of value to the
Soviet economy.
While an examination of the issues in this con-
troversy are beyond the scope of this paper, it can
safely be said that to date no rational price system
has been found. Prices remain adminstered. and the
system remains fundamentally based on the produc-
tion of use values.
Nor is it likely that any of the proposed reforms
that have not yet been tried would be any more suc-
cessful. Most are based either on marginalist assump-
tions. or supply-demand theories. No one really sug-
gests the kind of reforms necessarily to actually allow
the law of value to operate and to provide "rational"
prices.
For that would necessitate nothing short of the
destruction of the existing economic system. The law
of value assumes the production 0/ commodities by
individual producers or enterprises who compete
with each other to sell those commodities in the
market place.
It is the market which enforces the "rationality" on
capitalist prices. the equalization of the rate of profit.
etc. Such reforms would mean the destruction of
central planning, and with it the power and position
of the bureaucracy.
Bettelheim, in a thoroughly dense work called
"Economic Calculation and Forms of Property". has
argued that rational prices are possible-though not
on the basis of the law of value alone. He argues that
"the objective laws that determine prices are laws
that are uisibly dependent on both economic and
political levels". and furthermore "prices are also
determined by objective social laws. "\6 (emphasis in
original). Unfortunately. what this is supposed to
mean is never explained. nor is it ever demonstrated.
 mote the growth of productivity and efficiency. And it is
the failure of these internal measures which has forced the
system to look for external solutions.

IMPERIALISM AND EAST- WEST TRADE

While Russian imperialism is partly a response to
western imperialism, the need for buffer states and spheres
of influence, its fundamental drive stems from the failure of
its domestic economy. Initially it involved the looting of
eastern Europe and the establishment of exploitive trade
relations.
But such methods cannot provide the sophisticated
equipment and technology needed to further develop its
economy. For this it r,lust tum to the west. The result is
detente, and the increase in trade with the west, and bor-
rowing from western banks to finance the trade.
It is doubtful this strategy will work, for it includes a
range of new problems. For along with the machinery they
also import the west's problems, such as inflation. The in-
creasing debt which results from purchases (amounting to
around 48 billion dollars for the Soviet Union and Eastern The import of technology from the west, needed .s the Soviet
Europe, the Comecon countries) must be paid for by in- Union turned from extensive to IntenSive industrial growth, is a
creasing exports. Furthermore, the increasing reliance on cornerstone of ·'detente. II

western goods can have a devastating effect on the entir~

economy, reducing the bureaucracy's control. Hence
more recently there has been a tendency for the rate of
growth of east-west trade to decline, from 49% in 1973 to
only 2.3% in 1976."
THE DEVELOPING CLASS STRUGGLE
W hile labor power is not a commodity in the
Bureaucratic Collectivist system, the workers re-
main proletarians, alienated from the process of produc-
tion, with dead labor dominating living labor. They have
no control over the means of production and are therefore
forced to labor for the state in order to survive.
The class struggle does not end with Bureaucratic Col-
lectivism, in fact just the opposite is true. The fusion of
economics and politics that exists in a totally nationalized
economy gives any workers' struggles a particularly ex-
plosive character. Every economic struggle is at the same
time a political struggle, every strike over economic condi-
tions is at the same time a strike against the ·state.
It is not surprising that demands for more democracy
have been an element in every workers' uprising,
regardless of the different circumstances that led to the im-
mediate struggle.
The events in Poland in 1970-71 are fairly typical in
showing who the enemy was perceived to be, and in the
type of demands raised. They were vividly described by
Edmund Baluka, a leader of {he struggle.
"The first wave of strikes started on December 14th in
Gdansk and Gdynia, two major ports on the Baltic. The
Issue was the 'experimental' introduction of a new
piecework system foUowed a week later by price rises in
food. The effect of these two changes was to reduce
workers' real wages by about 45%. Many workers died
and the strikes were quickly crushed. On the 17th,
when activity at these two ports was effectively at an
end, workers walked out of the shipyards at Szczecin,
the third major Polish port 200 miles away. A day of
rioting and fights with the police took place, culminating
in attacks on the police headquarters and prison and the
burning of th~ party headquarters, the Union head-
quarters and many other important buildings in town."
After Gomulka fen on December 19th the struggle con-
tinued.
"The workers occupied, locked gates of the shipyards
and were themselves blockaded by the police . . . The
main demand of the strikes for a cancellation of price
rises introduced in December was not immediately won,
although it was conceded only a few weeks later. The
workers did however assert their right to strike and
wrung from the regime important concessions relating
to workers democracy in the plant. The strike commit-
tee became the workers' commission and for a period of
six weeks supervised the execution of those demands
which had been won. CruCially they supervised new
elections at the plant. From these elections a trade
union branch was created which for a period become a
democratic force which extended the gains of thp
strike. "22
That brief description is typical of the struggles that have
broken out in Eastern Europe. A strike around an
economic issue is quickly extended into a struggle against
the state. Democratic workers organizations are formed
and demands are made to make them official and legal.
The enemy is perceived to be not only the government,
but also the party and the union.
Nowhere are demands raised for a return to capitalism,
for reintroduction of the market, profits, etc. Rather, the
main thrust, not always explicitly expressed, is for more
democracy, and for workers' control over production.
The struggles in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia,
are a clear refutation of the "socialist" character of the
regimes, and Russian justifications for their invasion. It is
the duty of socialists everywhere to support those workers'
struggles. It is those struggles which are the embodiment of
the proletarian movement in t!ios,h:Otii1&ies; and which .
hold out the promise of a new socialist revolution.

31
 CONCLUSION
-z-f/-
believe that socialism could be built by "substitutes" for the
The working class has suffered tremendous defeats dur-
ing the last 50 years, the greatest of which has been the
loss of power in the Soviet Union. The bureaucracy, under
the leadership of Stalin, usurped all power and carried out
its own revolution, from above. Since the thirties it has
been this model, of socialism from above, which has been
the main influence in the socialist movement around the
world.
This model, of revolution made by an elite, in the name
of the working class, and ostenSibly for the working class,
but not by the working class, has led to successful revolu-
tions against. capitalism in several other countries. These
successful revolutions led many good revolutionaries to
FOOTNOTES
'Sweezy, On The Transition to Socialism, (Monthly Review
Modern~Reader) p. 52.
2ibid., p.49
libid., p. 57.
·China Since Mao. Monthly Review, July-August 1978, p. 37.
~Capital. Vol. I, (Kerr edition), p. 241.
'Gandy in Monthly Review, July~August 1977.
7Anti-Duhring. (International Publishers), p. 328.
8ibid., p. 346.
~Capital Vol. III (International Publishers) p. 820.
!OHoward Sherman, Radical Political Economy. (Basic Books) p.
221.
"Tony Cliff, Russia. A Marxist Analysis, p. 21.
121\ Revolutionary Socialist Manifesto, New Politics Vol. 5, nos. 2
& 3. Pages cited from pamphlet reprint from 1.5. London, p. 15.
I "'.
, , r>-
•
32
-'
proletariat.
As attractive as that perspective is to intellectuals
throughout the world, fifty years' experimentation with
"socialism from above" can lead to only one inescapable
conclusion: socialism from above leads. not to socialism,
but only to Bureaucratic Collectivism.
In spite of any advances mady by Bureaucratic Collec-
tivism in terms of developing the economy of the countries
where it exists, the fact remains that the working class re-
mains exploited by a bureaucratic ruling class. The class
struggle therefore continues, and must continue, until such
time as· the working class, there as elsewhere, raises itseif
to the position of the ruling class, and takes control over jts
own destiny. C
'3Maurice Dobb, Soviet Econmic Development Since 1917, p.
348.
uibid., p. 356.
,sAlec Nove, The Soviet Economy. p. 81.
"ibid., p. 16.
"Kuron and Modzelewski, p. 17.
uBukharin,lmperialism and the Accumulation of Capital, (MRl
p.226.
19Antonio Carlo, The SOCia-Economic Nature of the USSR, Telos
Fall 1974, p. 53.
ZQChris Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution (Pluto Press), p.
255.
Z'Ernest Mandel, The Second Slump, (NLS), p. 155.
uEdmund Saluka and Ewa Barker in International Socialism 94.
p. 19.
 -~ff-
Some Problems of "Permanent Revolution" from CHATTGES, 1.984 .
(JulY-~ttgust) 1.

Is Workers Power a Perspective'

BY David Finkel
IS SOCIALIST REVOLUTION possible in the so<all-
ed underdeveloped world1 No question is of greater im-
portance to an understanding of today's national libera-
tion movements, Third World revolutions and the
regimes arising from them.
Attempting to answer this extremely broad question
inevitably leads to a complex discussion of the nature of
class forces in the Third World, their relation to the im-
perialist system and its crisis, and what the term socialist
actually means.
The boldest hypothesis in twentieth century revolu-
tionary Mandsm, known as theory of Permanent Revolu-
tion, argued that socialist revolution-the taking of
power by the working class and the beginning of the con-
struction of socialism-is possible in so<alled backward
countries with relatively small working classes, as well as
in the powerful industrial nations. Did this theory, first
advanced by Leon Trotsky in the years before the 1917
Russian Revolution, accurately predict the unfolding of a
world-revolutionary process in this century7 Is the theory
useful for the study of today's Third World revolutions?
I will argue here that the theory of Permanent Revolu-
tion does offer key insights for understanding revolu-
tionary struggles today, but only with some crucial reser-
vations, and only if it is applied very critically and
carefully.
Opposing a Mechanistic Orthodoxy
At the tum of the twentieth century, the coming Rus-
sian Revolution was already the hope of the international
labor movement. The Tsarist empire was visibly in crisis,
a new socialist workers' movement was stirring, impor-
tant strike movements had begun to shake its periphery
(e.g. Poland), and the rising new power of Japan threat-
ened it in the East.
No social democrat of the day doubted that Russia was
the lynchpin of every reactionary power in Europe. For
decades, the threat of Tsarist military intervention had
weighed down attempted social and political revolutions
far beyond Russia's own borders. The most backward
major power in economic and social terms, its industry
dominated by western European capital, its agriculture
resting on a miserable, semi-i!nserfed peasantry, Russia
nonetheless possessed a military state machine which
dominated the political consciousness of Europe.
What kind of revolution was on the agenda in Tsarist
Russia?
Russia had never had its democratic, bourgeois revolu-
tion. Its capitalist development had barely begun, its
working class was a tiny minority of the population. For
"orthodox" European Marxists, the strategic objective of
the Russian revolution was therefore to put the bour-
geoisie in power, to replace Tsarist rule with a bourgeois
SO CHANGES
 -~6-
For Third World Revolutions?
democratic republic, to clear the way for the full develop-
ment of capitalism.
This. in turn, would create a working class struggle for
socialism-but until then, the idea of socialist revolution
in Russia was a utopian dream. Certain speculative letters
of Marx which half-suggested that Russia might not have
to follow the same stages of development as other Euro-
pean countries had been buried.
As for colonial revolutions, most of the Marxist move-
ment had only the dimmest idea that such a thing was
possible, let alone what its class content would be.'
H owever, the revolutionary left wing of the e-
merging sociaJist workers' movement in
Russia-Lenin and the Bolsheviks-were developing a
politically more radical perspective. In an earlier work,
The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin had
shown that Russia was already irreversibly on the
capitalist road, shattering what remained of the
revolutionary-populist illusion that the Russian peas-
antry might leap straight over capitalism to a communist
cooperative society.
Now Lenin was seeking a perspective and strategy that
fused the scientific Marxist theory of classes and social
development with the populists' revolutionary will and
energy, organizational dedication and, above all, their
deep hatred of Tsarism and capitalist exploitation. In a
chain of articles and polemics from What Is to Be Done?
to Two Tactics of Social Democracy In the Democratic
Rlroolution. leading up to and incorporating the ex-
perience of the failed 1905 revolution, Lenin developed
his perspective.
To be sure, Russia's revolution must be a
democratic one to remove the obstacles to
capitalist development. To deny this, he in-
sisted in Two Tactics. would lead to "ab-
surd and reactionary conclusions." But
this process could be carried out in
more than one way, and the
• The great revolutionary socialist Rosa
Luxemburg wrote eloquently of the bru·
tality with which the colonies were pulled
into the process of capital accumulation.
However. rather than advancing a strate·
gic political view of the importance of
colonial revolutions, Luxemburg mistak·
enly believed that the extension of cap-
italist relations to the entire globe would
mean the automatic collapse of the whole
system. On the other hand. the promin-
ent German reform socialist leader Ed-
ward Bernstein had already written in his
Et!olutionary Socialism that Gennan col-
onialism was a positive force for progress
and civilization in Africa, The main-
stream socialist leadership in Germany
had repudiated Bernstein's reformist
perspective as a departure from Marxism.
but no one yet suspected that the support
of the "advanced" and "civilizing" im-
perialism of one's own ruling class was
the time bomb that would blow the inter-
national socialist movement to bits,
working class had an enormous stake in how it took
place.
A process led by the bourgeoisie through its political
party, the liberal Constitutional Democrats (Cadets),
would be a half-strangled reform that would leave intact
many of Tsarism's most repulsive features. To sweep
away the system, to open the way for the fullest and most
sweeping and most democratk development of capital-
ism (including the "bourgeois program" of nationalizing
the land and leasing it to the most productive farmers!), a
full-scale revolution was necessary.
The revolution must be carried out against the Tsarist
autocracy by the workers and the peasants, not the big
capitalists who would compromise with Tsarism at every
point. Against his main opponents, the Mensheviks, he
argued throughout this period that the working class
must not simply put the bourgeoisie in power and restrict
itself to forming a revolutionary Parliamentary opposi-
tion. Rather, the working class and its party-the Rus-
sian Social Democratic Labor Party-must lead the anti-
Tsarist revolution, never holding back for fear of
alienating the bourgeoisie, and must go on to form a
revolutionary government.
Such a revolutionary government in Russia would not
be a proletarian dictatorship committed to socialism-
which, Lenin agreed, was nonsense. It would be a coali-
tion of the working class and the revolutionary petit-
bourgeoisie, the peasantry-a "revolutionary-<lemocratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," as
Lenin was to insist all the way up to 1917; a kind of
workers' and peasants' republic whose exact configura-
tion, social potentialities and limitations Lenin refused to
spell out.
While the above summary of Lenin's views is com-
pressed, the basic idea Lenin argued was that the workers
and peasants could carry out the "bourgeois-<lemocratic"
revolution in their own way.
L enin, in essence, adopted the "orthodox" Marxist
framework of his day and pushed it toward its
revolutionary limits. A third perspective pointing toward
even more extreme and startling conclusions was put for-
ward by a Russian revolutionary outside the mainstream
Bolshevik and Menshevik tendencies, Leon Trotsky.
The new Russian working class, Trotsky observed,
was relatively small (in relation to the huge peasantry).
but it had come into existence as a modem industrial
working class. The most backward country had imported
the most modern technique, the largest factories. and was
thus creating an advanced, not backward, proletariat.
(Think of the comparable development in today's Brazil.
and you begin to see why this insight is still of great
relevance. )
This phenomenon of "uneven and combined develop-
ment," as Trotsky called it, carried some profound im-
CHANGES C 9
 plications that he was-the first to begin thinking through
systematically. For one thing, with a modem proletariat
coming rapidly into existence, there was no need for a
prolonged period of bourgeois rule before this proletariat
could develop socialist politics and consciousness. For
another, as this proletariat entered the struggle for
democracy, the bourgeoisie would take fright and aban-
don its "own" bourgeois-democratic revolution, even at
the cost of leaving Tsarism in power.
The Mensheviks had sensed this danger and argued for
political moderation to prevent it; Trotsky believed it
was inevitable. The bourgeois revolution in Russia was
so long delayed that its coming now threatened the
capitalists' own class survival. The working class would
have to lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and
that dynamic would create a deep contradiction: the
revolution would be bourgeois-democratic and pro-
letarian, at the same time.
What, exactly, did this mean7 To win, the proletariat
must ally with the struggles of the peasantry for land.
With the revolution in power, however, the working
class would be self-impelled toward a socialist program:
expropriation of the industrialists, nationalization and
state management of industry. The working class would,
on the one hand, form a revolutionary government coali-
tion with its peasant allies; on the other hand, because the
peasantry as a class was not capable of an independent or
leading revolutionary role, this coalition would be a pro-
letarian dictatorship supported by the peasantry, rather
than Lenin's "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship" in
MAJOR SOURCES IN THIS ARTICLE
There is still no substitute for the classics: Trotsky's
writings such as 1905, Results and Prospects, Permanent
Revolution and the History of the Russian Revolution,
especially the first chapter on the unique features of
Russia's development, are indispensable not only for a con-
crete understanding of the context of the theory of Penna-
nent Revolution, but also as examples of Marxist method.
For a current restatement and defense of the theory, I
have relied heavily on Michael Lowy, The Politics of
Uneven and Combined Development (Verso Editions, Lon-
don, 1981). This stimulating and original work is of great
interest as an attempt to incorporate the Third World ex-
perience into the theory. A critique of Lowy's work by Alex
Callinicos, in the British journal International Socialism
(Spring 1982), presents a viewpoint similar to the one I
develop here.
Of course, while not discussed.it length in this article, the
view that Lenin's "democratic dictatorship" formula, as op-
posed to Trotsky's perspective, correctly guided the
Bolsheviks throughout 1917 is widespread in the left. For a
presentation of this viewpoint see Doug Jenness, "Our
Political Continuity with Bolshevism," in the supplement to
the Mililant, June 25, 1982.
Permanent Revolution In Nicaragua, by Paul Le Blanc.
forms the basis for the discussion of Nicaragua in this arti-
cle. Le Blanc. a member of Socialist Action, has produced
one of the most interesting theoretical essays to appear on
the Nicaraguan revolution. It can be ordered from the
author for $6.90 plus $1.15 postage from PO Box 10769,
Pittsburgh, PA 15203_
Samuel Farber has raised with me the problems of apply-
ing a Permanent Revolution perspective in small. very poor
countries where no prospect exists of a socialist revolution
in a powerful neighboring country coming to the rescue.
Although this problem remains unresolved, it is a crucial
one. -D.F.
100 CHANGES
which the two classes shared power equally. Trotsky
believed (accurately, as events showed) that equal shar-
ing of power between a concentrated, modem urban class
and a scattered, backward rural one was impossible.
To put this in a slightly different way, Trotsky's
perspective as developed in 1905 and Results and Pros-
pects foresaw a twofold but simultaneous revolutionary
process. The mass force of the "bourgeois-democratic"
revolution would be a revolutionary peasant upheaval to
seize the land and destroy the landlords. But the victory
of this agrarian struggle wouid only be secured through
the leadership of a proletarian revolutionary movement
in industry, which would embody the socialist aspira-
tions of the working class.
Jointly, these two revolutions would smash Tsarism.
But the more the working class tended toward a socialist
perspective, the greater would grow the gulf between its
goals and those of the peasantry, for whom the revolu-
tion would be completed as soon as they had their own
piece of land. This contradiction, Trotsky argued, would
only be resolved if the proletarian power in Russia was
just the beginning of a series of successful socialist revolu-
tions in Europe.
I n pre-World War I Marxism, this perspective of a
socialist, proletarian revolution in the Tsarist empire
seemed like a bizarre, idealist aberration. But the events
of 1917, the Russian Revolution, brilliantly confirmed it.
In February the Tsar was overthrown, the peasants on
the land began seizing the estates while those in uniform
walked away from the slaughter at the front-and the
working class organized itself into soviets, workers'
councils. In October, the soviets took state power in an
insurrection organized under the leadership of the
Bolshevik Party.
Shor~ly after February, Trotsky had joined the Bolshe-
viks when he and Lenin found themselves in complete
agreement on the perspective of organizing the working
class to take power. To carry out that perspective, the
Bolsheviks first had to win decisive majority working
class support within the soviets, against the "moderate"
Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary parties which sup-
ported the pro-<:apitalist and pro-war Provisional
Governments. But besides this, Lenin also had to wage a
short but very sharp struggle with his own "Old
Bolshevik" cadres, who were initially opposed to the
perspective of struggling for power-because according
to the pre-1917 Leninist "democratic dictatorship" for-
mula which they knew by heart, a socialist revolution in
Russia was anti-Marxist nonsense.
The cadres of the very revolutionary party which made
the workers' victory possible could have become a fatal
conservative barrier to that victory! Lenin won them
over, but only by combining all his powers of persuasion
with repeated threats to go over his comrades' heads and
appeal directly to the revolutionary workers and sailors_
October 1917 was the first successful proletarian rev-
olution, in the country where pre-World War I Marxism
had regarded it as hopelessly utopian and premature_ The
workers' state created by the October Revolution had to
attempt, simultaneously. to end Russia's war with Ger-
many and defend the revolution from a vast imperialist-
backed counterrevolution; to prevent industry from col-
 -<B8-
lapsing, which required sweeping nationalizations and
forced requisitions of grain harvests, while maintaining
the worker-peasant alliance to the extent possible; and to
assist the revolutionary movements in Europe on whose
victory the Russian Revolution's own survival depended.
In their struggle to accomplish these tasks, the RUSSIan
revolutionaries between 1917 and 1923 carried out the
dlfssic application of the Permanent Revolution theory in
the field of political strategy. They acted on the assump-
tioas both that the Soviet Union's survival depended
upon world revolution, and that the struggles for pro-
letarian rule and colonial liberation were themselves in-
separable.
To assess the applicability of such a strategy to today's
liberation movements, it is important to grasp some of
the very specific elements of the reality of that time. The
revolutionary workers movement had taken power in a
major European country. Workers' revolutionary strug-
gles with the potential to take power in other strategic
countries (Germany, Italy, perhaps France not far down
the road) were a live reality, not a distant dream.
The capitalist system as a whole, shaken to the core by
the war and the class struggles it had unleashed, was only
beginning to restabilize its institutions. We will see later
how the absence of such favorable conditions gravely
complicates today's problems of applying a Permanent
Revolution strategy.
Tragically, the post-war revolutionary wave of
1919-23 in Europe was defeated; a new bureaucracy
achIeved a growing stranglehold within the Soviet state
apparatus; under Stalin, a theory of "socialism in one
country" and a revived "theory of stages" displaced the
perspective of world revolution, to fit into the social in-
terests and diplomatic maneuvers of the bureaucracy.
Ultimately, the Stalin-led bureaucratic counterrevolution
destroyed all remnants of workers' power in the Soviet
Union.
How that counterrevolutionary process unfolded is not
our topic here, Rather, we must now briefly summarize
Trotsky's own post-1917 generalizations of the Perma-
nent Revolution theory and then discuss whether it re-
mains applicable for today.
Peru: neighborhood org~nizes self-defense during 1976 general
strike. Community-labor lmks are key In Latin struggles. NACLA
. V iewing the dynamics of struggle in what we now
call "underdeveloped" societies, Trotsky identified
three basic democratic imperatives: agrarian revolution
to free the peasantry from landlord domination; national
liberation and independence; and democracy, meaning
both I'oliticai freedoms and crucial social reforms such as
the eight-hour day, universal literacy and the like. (For a
useful summary see Michael Lowy, p. 89.)
In the Chinese revolution of 1925-7, he perceived the
struggle for these basic necessities taking place under the
same conditions of uneven and combined development
that had occurred in Russia-the formation of new, ex-
plosive and essentially modem industrial (though not as
much so as in Russia) working class. The outcome was
catastrophically different, because Stalin's policies forced
the Chinese Communist Party to disarm the workers for
the sake of a supposed alliance with Chiang Kai-shek's
"national democratic" Kuomintang, which savagely
slaughtered the workers at its first opportunity!
Based on this devastating experience, Trotsky sought
to systematize and sharpen his conception of the Perma-
nent Revolution. The success of 1917 had proven once
and for all that socialist revolution was a possibility in a
country without a fully developed system of bourgeois
rule.
China now proved that such a revolution was a
nec:ssity. Trying to split. the revolution into stages, the
achIevement of democratic capitalism first and socialism
in the future, was catastrophic for democracy and
socialism alike.
The 19305 led Trotsky tei expand the ahatysi,fevenfutc
ther. In a world of growing crisis, fascism and bitter
inter-imperialist conflict, bourgeois democracy itself
seemed to be disappearing in a general process of
capitalist decay.
the historic conquests of democracy in the "advanced"
countries would be lost unless proletarian socialist
revolution succeeded. In the so-called backward colonial
and semi-colonial ones, democracy would never be
achieved unless the proletariat, organized independently
through its unions, its revolutionary party, ultimately its
soviets, took the lead in the anti-imperialist struggle of its
entire oppressed nation. By a dynamic similar to the Rus-
sian Revolution, in its broadest features (not details, of
course), Trotsky foresaw small but powerful, modem
and conscious workers' movements linking the colonial
and metropolitan revolutions.
The French socialist revolution might well begin in In-
dochina, or North Africa, the English revolution in Egypt
or India ... there was no way to predict how or where the
process would begin, nor its exact speed and duration,
but it would be a single world-revolutionary process
leading to triumphant socialism, or a defeat in which the
proletariat, culture and civilization itself would be
thrown back generations or centuries.
Permanent Revolution After Trotsky
!The Pennanent Revolution] strategy prevailed only dur-
mg the revolutionary high tide of 1917-23 ... After Lenin's
death, however, a new variety of stagism became' official
doctrin~. becau~ of its congruence with the shortsighted
reaipoiztzk that Increasingly dominated the thinking of the
Soviet bureaucracy. In its consistent and, th?rough ap-
CHANGES ell
 plication, Stalin's variety of stagism invariably producea
tragic defeats for the labor movement; and only those
communist parties who in practice went beyond the of-
ficial limits and pursued an implidtly permanentist line
weTe able to triumph.
-Michael Lowy, The Politics of Uneven and
Combined Development, p. 189 (emphasis added)
For the past 35 years or so, theoretical discussions of
Pennanent Revolution have centered around the question
of how supposedly socialist revolutions could be led by
bureaucratic Communist parties with Stalinist politics.
That fact alone should be enough to alert us to the ex-
istence of deep problems with the theory.
In fact, the main predictions of the general theory of
Pennanent Revolution did not materialize. To be.some-
what more precise, a set of developments occurred which
were not predicted by the theory, and which need to be
understood before we can seriously assess what parts of
the theory may be relevant today.
First, bourgeois democracy did not collapse in the face
I
the workers," reported i I A year later, after taking
people. Chinese workers are I to applaud. but not receive accurate information about Cambodia, or their own
of expanding fascism. It was European fascism that fell,
and bourgeois democracy that expanded, even into some
of the fonner colonies. The leading example was, of
course, India, which achieved national independence
under national bourgeois Parliamentary democracy-a
distorted half-democracy which has failed to solve basic
agrarian and de""'lopmental problems, but clearly a
bourgeois democracy as opposed to anything like fas-
cism, let alone socialism.
Second, the post-1945 decolonization process strength-
ened the institutions of world capitalism, rather than
destroying them.
Britain and France declined precipitously as imperialist
powers, but the United States government proved more
than capable of replacing them as the organizer of the in-
terests of capitalist imperialism as a whole.
Third, the phenomenon that caused the greatest the-
oretical crisis and confusion was that the system created
by Stalin's counterrevolution in the Soviet Union also ex-
panded. This fact threw up a new and wholly unan-
ticipated set of problems-beginning with the question of
whether it represented a progressive or reactionary
120 CHANGES
development from a socialist standpoint!
A fourth phenomenon which added multiple layers of
complexity is what Michael Lowy calls "unfinished
bourgeois revolutions" -Mexico, Algeria, Egypt and
Turkey being examples of various kinds-in which some
of Trotsky's prognoses were strikingly confirmed while
others collapsed. In these societies' class struggles, the
socio-economic analytical side of Trotsky's theories
stood up best. The path of development of western Euro-
pean and North American capitalism could not be repro-
duced in what was now called the Third World; the
working class struggle already assumed great prominence
well before the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" was
completed; the bourgeoisie accordingly became less and
less democratic; and political strategy that seriously plac-
ed the "democratic" stage on a pedestal to be completed
before the "socialist" one always ended in disaster.
Unfortunately, none of this meant the bourgeoisie
could no longer rule, or that the working class could take
over. Rather. a bewildering variety of bouregois Third
i I the
World regimes emerged: sometimes governed by military
castes (typically though not always rightist). or by mod-
ernizing elites with a state-capitalist perspective,
sometimes taking the form of revolutionary Bonapartist
formations (the Ethiopian Dergue comes to mind) pro-
claiming their anti-imperialism while crushing their own
working classes with more bloody ferocity than the aver-
age Stalinist bureaucracy. The mere fact that such
regimes could emerge didn't seriously damage Trotsky'S
theory; but their ability to survive, to successfully
modernize and often incorporate workers' institutions
clearly did.
Now, the validity of Trotsky's Permanent Revolution
theory did not depend on whether this or that particular
prediction materialized. (Marxism is not astrology.) It
did, critically, depend on whether the theory could be
shown to explain a general dynamic toward world rev-
olution. Thus, much of Trotskyist theory since the 1940s
has attempted to demonstrate such a dynamic.
Even after the generalized capitalist crisis of the 1930s
had given way to decades of post-war expansion (roughly
1945-68), and then with the reappearance of instability
leading to systemic crisis from 1968 on, it was argued that
the theory of Permanent Revolution still described an
uneven but worldwide movement toward proletarian
revolution.
T he results of this attempt have been, on the
whole, dismal. Rather than enabling the Trotskyis!
movement better to analyze the world and struggle to
cliange it, Permanent Revolution devolved into a fetish
that helped transform the movement's own politics. The
greatest damage was done by the effort to locate a general
world proletarian-revolutionary dynamic for a historic
period when, in tragic truth, none existed. This created a
politics of substitutionism· which ultimately permeated
the Trotskyist (or Fourth International. as it's also
known) movement all the way to its core.
Most prominently, Stalinist-led revolutions were seen
as vindications of the Permanent Revolution theory,
whether workers supported these takeovers-from-above
actively (Yugoslavia), approved them more or less
passively (China and Cl1ba), or experienced them as
social catastrophies and foreign occupations (most of
Eastern Europe). But this was only one problem among
many. The tendency to regard every social-<lemocratic
electoral victory as heralding a pre-revolutionary crisis
analogous to France in 1936, if not Russia in 1917, led· "stagism" takes on an almost mystical character.
Fourth Internationalists to issue calls for "governments of
the left" (meaning SP-CP coalitions) as if those sterile
slogans would expose the reformism of the misleaders of
labor.
However, the best way to understand the problems of
the Permanent Revolution theory is to examine the most
thoughtful attempts within the Trotskyist tradition to
systematically defend and update the theory. For this
purpose, The Politics of Uneven and Combined Develop-
ment, by Michael Lowy, is the best source.
Lowy's book is important for many reasons. The first
three chapters trace the Permanent Revolution from early
suggestions by Marx and Engels, through Trotsky's con-
ception of the Russian Revolution and the further
development of his conception after 1917. They are in-
dispensible reading for anyone seriously interested in the
theory.
Lowy also, more than any other author I know within
the Fourth Internationalist framework, deals seriously
with the difficulties created by divorcing a concept of
proletarian revolution from actual class activity and
power. In his concluding chapter, he actually abandons
the standard Trotskyist designation "deformed workers'
states" for the bureaucratic dictatorships of Eastern
Europe, and proposes to call them bureaucratic states of
proletarian origin. While he does not quite call the
bureaucracy a ruling class, resorting instead to the term
"estates" (p. 218-9), he has virtually dropped the notion
that these states represent working class power of any
kiitd.
T he theoretical substitutionism, however remains.
In the passage I italicized at the beginning of this
section, Lowy expresses one of his key contentions, that
certain Communist parties "in practice" could adopt an
"implicitly permanentist" strategy; and it is assumed by
definition that they thus became the leadership of
socialist revolutions. In real life, however, all it proved is
that certain Communist parties were capable of taking
power for themselves.
Put another way, it showed that "stagism" was not
necessarily fatal to a Stalinist party in the same way it
was to a socialist workers' movement. Stalinist parties
that sunk for years, even decades, in the muck of the
theory of stages, the bloc of classes, the necessity of con-
solidating the bourgeOis national democratic revolution
and all the rest, could be flexible enough to slough it all
away when the historic opportunity of bureaucratic state
power presented itself. It was exactly this possibility of
revolution-above-classes that attracted certain kinds of .
intellectuals to these parties, a fact Lowy misses in his
discussion of revolutionary intellectuals.
In some instances (China), the long years of the
"stagist" ideology may have even helped the Stalinist
leadership avoid infecting the workers with dangerous
ideas of socialist revolution and workers' power. It was
exactly to prevent that same infection that the Viet Minh
(Vietnamese Communists) murdered the Vietnamese
Trotskyists in 1945, not because the Viet Minh leadership
itself was loyal to capitalism. Against this backdrop,
Lowy's claim that the "historic loyalty to the proletariat"
of these Communist parties transcended their official
Lowy's chapter on ''The Socialist Revolutions in
Backward Capitalism" applies this concept, less convinc-
ingly as it goes along, to Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam and'
Cuba. In the case of Yugoslavia, one can at least give the
Communists credit for unifying a nation that would
otherwise have dissolved in ethnic warfare and been
carved up between Moscow and Washington, and for
brazenly lying to Stalin the whole time about their radical
aims. In China and Vietnam, to an even greater extent
than Yugoslavia, the Communist parties were intel-
lectual-led, peasant-based organizations; the only
evidence Lowy can give that they represented "'the his-
toric interests of the proletariat" is that they said they
did. (See especially the quotes from Le Duan of the Viet-
namese CP, pp. 140-1.) The fact that the Chinese Com-
munists under Mao developed the theory of stages and
blocs of classes to almost Talmudic complexity, while the
Vietnamese regularly stressed "'the uninterrupted
character of the revolution,"' mysteriously turned out not
to make the slightest difference in the end.
Underlying Lowy's unsatisfying theorization of the
Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions is a deeper historic
dilemma. Within the Trotskyist movement, because of
the Stalinist parties' long-standing verbal stagism, it was
customary to regard them as being almost permanently
counterrevolutionary. When, contrary to theoretical ex-
pectation, such parties took power, destroyed the
bourgeoisie and announced their loyalty to the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, they suddenly had to be recogniz-
ed as revolutionary parties in practice.
Despite the great value of Lowy's work, his discussion
of the Stalinist-led revolutions does not escape this dilem-
ma. He would have done better, despite the problems it
would have caused for the Permanent Revolution theory,
to explore the ways in which these Communist leader-
ships succeeded in simultaneously mobilizing nationalist
and anti-capitalist sentiments among intellectuals,
CHANGES 013

peasants and workers, while deflecting and when
necessary suppressing the self-emancipating socialist class
potential of those very same workers. Recognizing that
reality would have gravely damaged the search for a uni-
fying world proletarian-revolutionary process, but it
would have cut through the tendency toward substitu-
tionism.
Nicaragua: A Test of the Theory?
In addition to historical assessment, even more can be
learned from the application of theory to'a living revolu-
tion. Does the experience of the Nicaraguan revolution
confirm the dynamic predicted by the theory of Perma-
nent Revolution? Is it, in fact, an important test of that
theory? A recently written analysis of Nicaragua, from
an explicitly Permanent Revolution perspective, is ex-
tremely useful for a study of both those questions.
Permanent Revolution in Nicaragua, by Paul I.e Blanc
(Pittsburgh, 1983) develops an argument which applies
the Permanent Revolution to the Nicaraguan revolu-
tionary process. The first four chapters present a concise
summary of Nicaragua's social formation and revolu-
tionary movement, showing how strongly the phenom-
enon of uneven and combined development applies. The
fifth chapter, "Dynamics of Permanent Revolution," ex-
plains Trotsky's view of the class dynamic of the Russian
revolution.
The author also suggests a comparison of the two
situations:
The development and concentration of heavy industry
which characterized Russia was absent in Nicaragua, and
this resulted in an industrial proletariat with different
characteristics. On the other hand, Nicaragua experienced
a general proletarianization of its labor force (including
majority sectors of the peasantry) which had been
unknown in Russia. In fact, Nicaragua in the 19705 was
considerably more urban and more proletarian than was
Russia in the early 19005. (p. 49. My emphasis.)
The observations are accurate, and it is important that
the Nicaraguan workers are not surrounded by an enor-
mous "peasant sea" of the pre-1917 Russian type.
However, it seems to me that Le Blanc understates the
relative weakness of the Nicaraguan working class, large-
ly working in small. dependent enterprises rather than
modem industrial factories.
The final four chapters, where I want to focus closer
critical attention, present a view of the Nicaraguan
140 CHANGES
If this democratic revolution 5UC;C;eeOs. we But only the proletariat in power. as the
can begin to pass to the socialist revolu- leading class. can finally emancipate the
,..
tion. We stand for unintll!lTUptil!d revolu- peasants through socialism.
revolution since 1979 which, Le Blanc argues, "will clear-
ly reveal the dynamic of permanent revolution."
O bviously, no time need be wasted asking whether
the Nicaraguan revolution represents a "revolu-
tion by stages." That theory looks even more absurd than
usual in the Nicaraguan context. On July 19, 1979, the
day of "the victory," it was not only the government but
the capitalist state apparatus in Nicaragua which disinte-
grated. Since that point, a new state has been in the pro-
cess of formation. To what extent does the theory of Per-
manent Revolution explain its direction?
Le Blanc quotes another author, Henri Weber, to the
effect that the Sandin;sta government with its mass base
of support in the popular organizations "is what revolu-
tionary Marxists term a 'workers' and farmers' govern-
ment.'" Now, exactly what a "workers' and farmers'
government" is has been the subject of an obscure and
not very enlightening debate, but Le Blanc goes on to
quote Trotsky's remark that after October 1917 the for-
mula "represented nothing more than the popular desig-
nation for the already established dictatorship of the pro-
letariat." (p. 61)
Here and in several other places, Le Blanc seems to be
telling us that Nicaragua is, perhaps without even know-
ing it, a proletarian state. Yet it should be clear that
Nicaragua is no such thing, from any point of view. Mass
proletarian institutions of the workers' council type (such
as the Russian soviets of 1917) do not even exist, let alone
hold state power. From the Sandinistas' own point of
view, the possibility of socialism is limited by the fact
that "we haven't enough capital to run that which we
have already taken over. We need the private sector to
help keep the economy going." (A government economist
quoted by Le Blanc, p. 67)
I.e Blanc's own view is more guarded than might be im-
plied by the appearance of the term "dictatorship of the
proletariat" in a few places. His analysis suggests that
Nicaragua is not yet such a state, but is in rapid transition
toward it under the pressures of imperialist aggression,
internal capitalist sabotage and mass sentiment. Further,
he maintained, the transition to workers' rule is strongly
facilitated by the Sandinistas' ideology. FSLN leader
Sergio Ramirez is quoted as saying, "The mixed economy
must start from the harmonious and limited insertion of
the private economy into the overall strategic framework
of the People's Property Sector," i.e. that the nationalized
sector must play increasingly the leading role. (p. 67)
One can agree there are tendencies in this direction. For
example, as this is written, news reports indicate the
Nitaraguan government may take over private grain
distribution facilities to stop hoarding and speculation.
(When I visited Nicaragua in March, farmworkers' leader
Edgardo Garcia also suggested to me that some kind of
intervention along these lines was contemplated by the
unions.)
Nonetheless, there are both significant counter-
tendencies and other problems to be taken into account.
Even after state intervention, laws of private capital may
still dominate. As I understand it, some state farms must
pay their workers more than double the official wages to
compete with the wealthier private landowners (and
where do the state farms get the extra cordobas for this?).
Pro!etarian revolution in Ii badward
country like Russia cannot sucaed on its l
own without the support of international
revolutions in more adva:n~ countries.
••• 01 ~s revolution, baded by a
reofuu- proletariat/peasant alliance, might
in~ nationalization of the land as a
ba5is for industrial progress. But na-
tionaUzaI:ion doesn't mean socialism or
even equal land tmure.
For anotner thing, the state sector may expand-
ed without abolishing capitalism (e.g. Mexico). And still
another consideration, as shown by Eastern Europe, is
that capitalism can be abolished without empowering the
working class at all. Exactly how the Sandinistas' own
politics relate to all this is also more ambiguous than Le
Blanc admits.
For example, he quotes Victor Tirado: '1t is necessary
to take into account that sacialism is going to be can-
structed in a backward country ... socialism will not be
canstructed from great abundance, as wauld be ideal, but
rather fram the little that we have." (p. 68-9)
Does this express the "permanentist" perspective .of em-
powering the masses to break through the chains .of ex-
ploitation, defying the threats of imperialism and inspir-
ing the masses .of the region ta their awn revalutians? Or
does it express the straightforward Stalinist conception of
socialism in one country? It could, in fact, be either one.
R egarding grassroots democracy, the revolution-
ary-pluralist dimensian .of Sandinista politics i.
well expressed in Tomas Borge's statement: 'The San-
dinista government does not want an official or govern-
mental union movement. What we need is a trade union
organization respansive ta the interests of the workers.
ThE' W<lrking class in Nicaragua must have the right to
say 'no' where appropriate, and must even have the right
to confront the government when it is necessary." (p. 75)
Yet there is also a paternalist dimension of Sandinism,
which Le Blanc does nat always recognize even when he
quates it at length. It is a paternalism which bath reflects
and perpetuates the political weaknesses of the Nicaraguan
working class itself, and shaws itself rather clearly in a
statement of the FSLN Natianal Directarate pertaining to
the rale .of electians in the revalutionary pracess:
For the Frente Sandinista democracy is not measured sole-
ly in the palitical sphere, and cannot be reduced only ta
the participation of the people in elections. Democracy is
nat simply electians ... it means participation by the peo-
ple in the political, economic, social and cultural affairs.
The more the people participate in such matters, the more
democratic they will be ... Democracy begins in the
economic order, when social inequalities begin to
diminish, when the workers and peasants improve their
standard of living. That is when true democracy begins,
not before ... in a more advanced phase democracy
7
means the participation of the workers in the running of
factories, fanns, cooperatives and cultural centers.. (p-, 83)
"...
While solidarizing with this statement's absolutely car-
rect critique of the limitatians of bourgeais elections, Le
Blanc overlaaks its own equally seriaus limitations. The
FSLN statement "reduces democracy," if y,?u like, ta the
"participatian by the peaple in palitical. economic, social
and cultural affairs," and even compaunds the errar by
making this participatian "a mare advanced phase" of
democracy!
There is no doubt in my mind that;the Sandinistasgen-
uinely favar papular and warking class participatian. But
participation is nat pawer. The Sandinistas clearly favor
the revalutianary leadership having to explain, defend,
madify, sometimes change their decisians in the face of
the criticism .of the peaple. However, in five years in
pawer, they have not shawn a commitment ta having the
masses actually make the decisians.
This wauld require a network of palitical .organs of
papular power and, abave all, .open political debate
within the revolutianary camp far beyond anything the
FSLN has ever suggested. Nat even in their farthest-
laaking vision .of the future "socialist" Nicaragua have
the Sandinistas spelled aut a cammitment ta genuine
revalutianary demacracy in that sense.
Later in his analysis, Le Blanc offers his awn insightful
critique .of the Sandinista's idealogical contradictians. In
1980 and early '81, the FSLN paper Barricada commented
quite favarably on Polish Salidamasc. But follawing the
martial law crackdawn in Poland, Barricada essentially
endorsed the suppressian of the Polish workers in crude,
and, ta put it bluntly, dishanest language clearly follow-
ing the line of the Cuban Granma.
Le Blanc recognizes that this tragic change cannot
simply be explained .only by diplomatic consideratians:
... but rather [reflects) a tension' within the [Sandinistas)
perspectives themselves-a tension arising from the in-
tense contradictions facing the revolution at this
time ... there has been a tendency to denounce unions and
workers not follOwing the line of the FSLN-led CST as
'counter·revolutionary' and 'imperialist-inspired,' even
when this is obviously not the case, and sometimes there
has even been resort to repressive tactives against
them ... if pluralism is eliminated within the working
class, then the workers will be weakened in their struggle
for self~ancipation." (p. 87-9)
L eBlanc, and here I agree with him, puts these de-
viatians fram revolutianary-pluralist principles
within the context of the Nicaraguan revolutian's gigantic
CHANGES 0 15
 --Y3.-
accomplishments and even more profound potential. His
critique would be more effective, however, if he pointed
out the difficulties caused by the tightly closed character
of whatever debates occur within the revolutionary van-
guard itself.
Le Blanc cites a 1980 Barricada article by Herberto In-
cer which virtually dismisses elections altogether as a
"formal, non-e.sential element" of democracy. Accor-
ding to Le Blanc, Incer's position is an aberration:
In fact, as the statement on democracy by the FSLN's Na-
tional Directorate indicates. elections are an assumed, not
a nonwessential, aspect of democracy. Incer's distortion,
far from being a definition of genuine democracy is a re-
I
flection of pressures on the Nicaraguan Revolution which
threaten its revolutionary-<lemocratic course. (p.89)
But does Le Blanc have any way of knowing which is
the "real" thinking of the FSLN on elections in the future
Nicaragua? I don't think he does: I know I don't, and
what is more important by far, I don't think the Nicar-
aguan workers and peasants have any way of knowing
their revolutionary leaders' views on these questions,
apart from formal public pronouncements in which the
reality of sharp differences may be blurred over.
If I had to make a guess, it would be that the FSLN
itself does not yet know what form the "institutionaliza-
tion" of the revolution should take. That is quite
understandable: the revolution must, above all, survive,
and its greatest tests in facing imperialist invasion and
sabotage probably lie ahead rather than behind it. But if a
revolutionary-ciemocratic pluralism is to prevail, the Nic-
araguan masses cannot be simply left to ratify or even
"participate" in amending a decision reached beforehand
by the vanguard.
T here is another question which Le Blanc does not
really address, but which cries out for analysis. In-
sofar as Permanent Revolution implies the destruction of
capitalist relations of production even in a non-
industrialized country, does carrying through that basic
"socialist task" as rapidly as possible really best ensure
the survival and health of Nicaragua's revolution?
Here, we are on rather tricky and uncharted ground.
There are, after all, levels and degrees of underdevelop-
ment, industrial backwardness and absolute physical
small size. To be sure, the generalization that working
class power could not survive in isolation applies equally
in Nicaragua, Mexico, or Argentina. But there is the
crucial factor of time-it makes all the difference in the
world whether a single workers' revolution could hold
out for several years, during which time its very example
could inspire other revolutions to come to its aid, or
whether invasion and internal contradictions would
make its destruction likely in a very short time. Nicar-
agua seems to me to belong in the second category.
A Mexican workers' state, by contrast, could exert a
certain leverage on imperialism by threatening to
repudiate its roughly $30 billion debt, an action which
could destroy the international banking system. But
Nicaragua, ironically, is too small and too poor to have
accumulated enough debt to destroy the banks. Its debt,
at something between $2-3 billion, is enough to destroy
Nicaragua, but not the lenders.
Certainly, one may agree that regional and interna-
tional events will ultimately determine Nicaragua's fate.
160 CHANGES
But this is true whether Nicaragua attempts to "imple-
ment socialist measures" or concentrates on economic
reconstruction within the contradictory present "mixed
economy framework" -neither can succeed in isolation!
This generalization, then, still leaves open the question
of which strategy is likely to give Nicaragua the greatest
breathing space and permit the process of self-empower-
ment of its workers and peasants.
Actually, I'm inclined to believe that the Sandinistas'
pragmatic economic policy has been a better strategy
than the theorists of Permanent Revolution might be will-
ing to admit. In fact, I would go so far as to argue that the
attempted implementation of a "permanentist" revolu-
tionary perspective within Nicaragua might prove to be
the fastest route to the grotesque bureaucratism and
brutalities of "socialism in one country."
It might be argued that for the revolution to be suc-
cessfully carried through, the Sandinistas must rapidly
"decisively break with imperialism," "expropriate the
capitalist exploiters," and other nice-sounding revolu-
tionary phrases. Yet in the present Nicaraguan context,
these measures would probably be most destructive-
today-of the chances for a revolutionary socialist
development. Rather than increasing the power of
workers at the workplace and political levels. the im-
plementation of such so-called "socialist tasks" would
most rapidly promote bureaucratization.
Faced with the task of administering a statified
economy far beyond its administrative capacity, the
FSLN leadership would be forced to impose a degree of
austerity that could only be enforced by coercion. The
strain of pseudo-Marxist authoritarianism that exists in
Sandinista ideology, in uneasy balance with its
revolutionary-ciemocratic thrust, would not only come to
the fore, but would rapidly harden into Stalinism of the
Castroist variety. The suppression of existing bourgeois-
opposition political organs, newspapers and so on would
not lead in today's Nicaragua to a worker-controlled
media and political process, but more likely to the
elimination of all possible and suspected independent
popular and working class organizations as well.
Under such a disastrous course, Nicaragua might
become "another Cuba;" but in reality, given the extreme
popular disaffection and international isolation likely to
be generated by a forced march toward bureaucratic
pseudo-socialism, the revolution would be lucky to avoid
the fate of Grenada.
Based on my own observations in Nicaragua (Changes,
May-June 1984), I believe the Sandinistas are (fortunate-
ly) unlikely to adopt such a course, at least in the short
run. It also seems clear to me that those defenders of the
theory of Permanent Revolution (in particular, Le Blanc
and Lowy) whose works I am discussing here recognize
. that workers' democracy is as central a necessity to
revolution as is anti-capitalism-as did Trotsky. They
also recognize, at least implicitly, that the most rapid
elimination of capitalist relations of production might not
advance working class organization and power.
The problem, then, is that trying to force an analysis of
Nicaragua into the classic Permanent Revolution for-
mulas tends to create a certain theoretical schizophrenia.
According to the theory, one should assign a positive
value to certain short-term anti-capitalist measures
which, as a matter of concrete analysis, one knows may
be destructive of a longer-term socialist goals. In Paul Le
Blanc's work in particular, where the theoretical presen-
tation of Permanent Revolution and the concrete discus-
sio~ of Nicaragua are both excellent, one can hear the
gears grinding as the two fail to quite mesh together.
Toward a Critical Reaffirmation
Despite these serious problems, I would suggest a way
to dtically reaffirm the basic framework of the theory of
Permanent Revolution for analyzing the dynamics of to-
day's Third World revolutions. It is not a perfect theory
and certainly not a guide to tactics for revolution in the
underdeveloped countries, but it can certainly be a useful
general framework for analysis. I will start from the
specific case of Nicaragua, then take up some of the ques-
tions raised by my earlier critique.
Nicaragua, for the reasons I have cited, is not a decis-
ive confirmation of the theory of Permanent Revolution.
But it is also not a decisive test of the theory, one way or
the other.
In fact, Nicaragua is one of the poorest and smallest of
the underdeveloped countries, with weak classes and thin
traditions of either bourgeois or proletarian politics.
Contrary to both imperialist propaganda and the roman-
tic conceptions of some revolutionaries, Nicaragua is too
weak to be either a trigger or a secure fear base for
revolutions in neighboring countries.
Until and unless revolutionary movements succeed
in-at the very least-EI Salvador and Guatemala, vic-
tories which the Nicaraguans can hope for and morally
support but unfortunately cannot do very much to direct-
ly hasten, the Nicaraguan revolution must find a way to
survive on its own.
Seen by itself, in isolation, the dynamics of the
Nicaraguan' revolution can be characterized by Lenin's
pre-1917 theory of a "democratic dictatorship" (a revolu-
tionary government remaining within the bounds of
capitalism and living with the contradictions this causes)
at least as well as by Trotsky's theory of the necessity of a
proletarian dictatorship which would smash through the
chains of capitalist relations and begin the construction of
socialism.
But would the same be true of successful revolutions
In, say, Argentina, or Brazil, or Venezuela or Mexico? Or
even Chile, Bolivia or Peru? Almost certainly, the answer
.s no: in the more developed and larger Third World na-
:ion5, there is every reason to imagine that the dynamic
:heorized by Trotsky would be much more to the point.
There are several major grounds for this likelihood.
First, in such a country (Le. underdeveloped but not as
lesperately so, or as small, as Nicaragua) it is much less
,ossible for the entire bourgeois state apparatus to
:fisin~egrate with the overthrow of one rotten govem-
nef", as the capitalist state in Nicaragua collapsed with
he flight of Somoza in July 1979. The bourgeoisie would
'" much more formidable in the defense of its class
roliticai power. (Already this has proven to be so in EI
iah'ador.)
Secondly, the revolutionary process in such a country
unless carried through in a bureaucratic Stalinist
ashion)' would tend to require greater working class and
>easant inroads on capitalist social power (workers' con-
trol, expropriations, etc.), before and during the insurrec-
tionary taking of power, than we have yet seen in
Nicaragua.
For this reason, and because of the greater investment
and strategic stakes, the threat of direct imperialist
military intervention, not to mention choking off of loans
and other forms of aggression, would be enonnous from
the beginlning-greater than even Nicaragua faced for the
first three years of its revolution.
Finally, the imperialist threat would create a more
urgent need for the expropriation of both foreign-owned
and domestic capitalist industry, and for its nationaliza-
tion. The feeling of class power of workers in such a
country, in contrast to Nicaragua, would also tend to fuel
the radicalization of the process.
Although highly schematic (surely these factors would
not all apply with equal force in every situation), these
considerations suggest that the tendency (not inevitabli-
ty) of the revolutionary process breaking through
capitalist boundaries, both through its in~er logic and
through responding to external threat, is valid in the most
crucial and strategic of the "underdeveloped" countries.
In fact, one can reasonably argue that this tendency
would operate today in more countries than it did when
Trotsky generalized his theory in the .19205 and '30s (con-
sider, for example, the "boom" countries of South Asia,
Nigeria, Portugal with its aborted revolution of 1974-5,
the above-<:ited Latin American countries, the Philip-
pines ... )
In this broader context, the Nicaraguan revolutionary
process would be seen as a partial confirmation of some
of the key aspects of Trotsky's theory-for example, the
revolutionary social and political implications of uneven
and combined development-but only within the limits
dictated by Nicaragua's extreme poverty and objective
difficulties.
While this argument could (and hopefully will) be
developed and challenged at length, I will leave it as
sketched and move to some more general considerations.
The uniqueness of the Permanent Revolution theory
lay in showing that proletarian revolution, working class
self-<!mancipation, was possible in the "underdeveloped"
or colonial world as well as the "advanced" countries. For
the task of reconstructing an authentic Marxist theory
and practice for our own time, the theory of Permanent
Revolution offers the crucial insight that class organiza-
tion, politics, leadership of the struggles of all the op-
pressed, is as vital to the ultimate success of revolution in
Peru as it is in North America. It is an insight which needs
to be critically integrated into our own Marxism, our
solidarity work, our theory. The centrality of class
politics is the best possible antidote to all the elitist and
fuzzy illusions of our own left, which vacillates from
• The possibility of the destruction of capitalist relations from above is not to be
easily discounted. It happened in Cuba in 1960-1, precisely in one of the "more
developed of the underdeveloped" nations. Samuel Farber's analysis of the weak
political traditions of the Cuban working class and middle class (Revolution and
Reaction in Cuba. 1933-1960) is highly relevant to an understanding of this pro-
cess. However. while similar internal dynamics could create favorable conditions
for a bureaucratic collectivist development elsewhere. I am inclined to believe that
the Cuban experience would be harder to reproduce than might appear on the sur-
face. For one thing, the geopoiiticallandscape of the early 1960s (the Sino-Soviet
competition for relations with Third World revolutions. the greater Soviet will-
ingness to invest in subsidizing an ally in the western hemisphere. the relative
slowness of U.S. imperialism in reacting aggressively to this development, etc.) are
not likely to reappear in the short run.
CHANGES C 17
 -tCf.6 -
romanticizing the whole Third World as one homogen-
ous classless revolutionary bloc to hopeless despair in the
face of an apparently invincible U.S. imperialism.
H owever, if the revolutionary Marxist left is to
make effective use of these very insights, it has to
get some of its own conceptions and definitions clear. It is
necessary, first to reclaim the meaning of socialist revolu-
tion as the taking of power by a conscious, organized
working class.
A re-formulation of the theory of Permanent Revolu-
tion which puts working class self..,mancipation back at
the center needs to place the emphasis in a somewhat dif-
ferent place than most recent interpretations have done.
One set of interpretations places enormous stress on
the objective factors of the crisis of imperialism which
lead to anti-capitalist revolution. Any democratic revolu-
tionary struggle in the colonial or underdeveloped world,
it is argued, faced with the deep hositility of imperialism
and the betrayals of the cowardly local bourgeoisie, will
be forced to take an "uninterrupted" revolutionary road
to liberation.
This analysis has some strengths. However, it has led
to the conclusion that objective pressures for socialism
are so great that socialist revolution can be made by
almost anyone in place of the working class: Stalinist par-
ties in Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam; revolutionary
guerilla or intellectual leaderships in Cuba (and perhaps
Nicaragua) .
A second set of interpretations of the Permanent
Revolution theory is associated with the most sectarian
and ideologically unstable sectors of the Trotskyist
movement. (1 have not dicussed them in this article
because they are of practically no analytical interest.)' In
these interpretations, extreme sectarian subjectivity
prevails: the one and only necessary condition for a suc-
cessful proletarian revolution in Chile, South Africa,
Nicaragua, Zimbabwe or anyplace else is seen to be the
construction of the ideologically correct section of a
hypothetical reconstructed Fourth International. While
virtually devoid of theoretical importance, political
groups engaging in such posturing have done a significant
amount of damage in some countries to the reputation of
Trotskyism and revolutionary working class socialist
politics in general.
I
would propose, instead, a critical re-affirmation of
the theory of Permanent Revolution that places the
greatest emphasis on the formation of working class
political consciousness and independent organization.
Very concrete historical and theoretical analysis must be
done to show how workers in Third World countries can
become conscious both of their immediate economic in-
terests, and the political importance of championing and
leading the struggles for national independence, the
liberation of the peasantry, of oppressed minorities, of
women. Such consciousness and organization of the
working class are possible, but not inevitable, and nec-
essary-along with, of course, a revolutionary socialist
working class party-for socialist revolution and work-
~For those who willre<:ognize the tenninology, I am referring here to ''M:orenite,· ...
"Healyite" and "Spartacist" politics.
180 CHANGES
ing class power as Trotsky envisioned it to come on the
agenda.
There are several important reasons for rebuilding a
theory that insists on the central importance of workers'
consciousness and organization in the "underdeveloped"
world.
First, there is the straightforward depressing body of
experience proving that if workers are not organized to
defend their own rights, those rights will be subordinated
to the needs of the state. This has been true whether the
state is ruled by an anti-capitalist bureaucracy in Cuba,
Yugoslavia or China; whether it represents a Third
World state capitalism of the "left" (Boumeddienne's
Algeria, Sekou Toure's Guinea) or "right" (Sadat's Egypt)
variety; or whether it carries out a relatively successful
bourgeois stabilization (India, Venezuela). In all these
places, strikes, and rights of trade union and working
class political organization have been suppressed or
sharply restricted. Defense of such rights is central to any
socialist program whether or not there are short-term
revolutionary possiblities.
Second, history has shown Trotsky's theses On the
dynamics of struggle in the underdeveloped world to be
important insights into a set of possibilities that provided
to be more complex than he (or other Marxists) realized.
The alternatives of triumphant socialist revolution versus
bourgeois counterrevolution have proven not to exhaust
all possibilities. A theory that focusses on the develop-
ment of class struggle and consciousness under conditions
of "dependent" or "underdeveloped" or "neo-colonial"
capitalism will help us to understand how conditions for
successful proletarian-led revolution can come about, as
well as understanding (and defining a political attitude
toward) other outcomes of the class struggle.
Third, such a theory will enable Marxists to incor-
porate the concrete and unique experiences of each strug-
gle, rather than imposing pre-set formulas on them. Only
relatively recently have Marxists of all stripes begun to
realize that so-called Third World societies have their
specific complex structures, traditions and unique
memories of struggle.
Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of uneven and combin-
ed development within an ever-more-international
economy creates dynamics which, given class struggles in
these SOCieties, contain certain common features (con-
sider, for example, the importance of grassroots
movements which link the marginal shantytown dwellers
to the stable employed working classes in Latin America).
But such common features need to be theorized, and
discovered in practice, not assumed a priori-as if pure
objective necessity or the implantation of a party with the
right line would produce socialist revolution by instant
formula.
M ost important, a theory that looks carefully at
the processes of class formation and class con-
sciousness in all phases of their development, will best
help us to understand the politics of the movements and
leaderships crystallized from those processes. What, for
example, has made possible the recent exciting emergence
of the Workers Party in Brazil? What pressures from the
base helped bring about the steps toward unification of
the Salvadoran revolutionary movement? Why have the
successful national liberation struggles in Angola,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe so far not produced in-
dependent workers' movements-while, on the other
hand, Black workers in South Africa have forged a new
trade union movement of such fantastic potentia!. the
inost important union upheaval in recent world history
with the sole exception of Solidamosc in Poland? Why
did the working class in Iran fail to stop clerical fascism
from destroying the great promise of the anti-Shah
revolution?
Revolutionary political leadership certainly is crucial,
sometimes decisive, in the underdeveloped world. A
fruitful theory must not impute a mythical "proletarian"
character to non-proletarian and indeed anti-working
class leadership, nor on the other hand contemptuously
dismiss revolutionaries who don't adhere to a pre-
determined correct ideology. Rather, we need to be able
to analyze concretely where a given leadership comes
from, where its class loyalities lie (not always easy to
detennine!), how it advances or retards the consciousness
and organization of the classes it leads or speaks for.
Even more difficul t, when we seek to analyze the
politics of a given tendency within, say, the Salvadoran
or Philippine or any other liberation struggle, the ques-
tion we need to know how to ask is not "Does this group
have the exact same theory and politics as my own?"
Rather, the critical question is: "Does this tendency have
a basic commitment to revolution; to the struggles of the
working class; and to non-sectarian revolutionary
organization; which give it the potential to become a
vanguard party of the working class if the class itseif
proves capable of creating that party?"
The possibility of socialist revolution will depend on
(in'addition to all the objective factors) at least two sub-
jective ones: the working class developing the level of
struggle and consciousness that can produce a revolu-
tiopary socialist leadership, and a core of revolutionary
militants with politics capable of organizing that leader-
ship given the historic opening to do so.
Within the context of this kind of emphasis. Trotsky'S
method of analysis can again be seen as a decisive con-
tribution to the development of revolutionary theory.
There is not only no necessity for a "bourgeois-
democratic stage" of the revolutionary process in the
underdeveloped world; in most cases, the very terms
"bourgeois" and "democratic" are mutually contradic-
tory. Not only is there no historic necessity for the work-
ing class to subordinate its goals and organization to a
cross-class bloc or national unity; in every case it is
detrimental for it to do so, whether the short-term "tasks"'
(i.e. possibilities) facing labor be reformist or revolu-
tionary.
T here is one other essential attribute-besides class
loyalty, theoretical openness and a concrete
political priority of opposing the imperialist crimes of our
own ruling class-that Marxists in the so-called advanced
countries must bring to the study of Third World revolu-
tions. That attribute is humility: not an uncritical wor-
ship of every manifestation of Third World struggle, but
an understanding of the limits of our own movement and
politics.
The North American left knows nothing of what it
means to build clandestine trade unions, popular
movements whose cadres and their families face death
squads every day and night, armed organizations linked
to legal and semi-legal mass movements of struggle.
Those links which we sometimes discuss in mechanical,
abstract language are composed, in fact, of the in-
conceivable heroism of ordinary people who have been
transfonned into organized revolutionaries. True, objec-
tive conditions and politics, not heroism alone, will
determine whether their revolutions succeed or fail. But
win or lose, their heroism must never be forgotten.
Finally, if Permanent Revolution is seen as a complex
international chain, then that chain must also include our
own struggle, American workers' struggles against the
corporate ruling class of North America-the real
controlling power of the misnamed multinational cor-
porations, banking institutions and other exploiters. It is
that struggle, our struggle, which is today the weakest
link of all. 0
CHANGES C 19
 -9.1 -
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