Emirates Journal for Engineering Research, 17 (2), 43-52 (2012

)

(Regular Paper)

RISK ANALYSIS OF CRYOGENIC AMMONIA STORAGE TANK IN
IRAN BY FAULT TREE METHOD

H. Nemati, R. Heidary

Department of Mechanics, Marvdasht Branch
Islamic Azad University - Marvdasht, Iran

(Received November 2011 and Accepted October 2012)

‫ ﻓﻲ‬.‫ﻣﻦ أهﻢ اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺘﻨﻜﺎت ﺗﺨﺰﻳﻦ اﻷﻣﻮﻧﻴﺎ هﻮ ﺗﺴﺮب آﻤﻴﺎت آﺒﻴﺮة ﻣﻦ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺎدة ﺑﺴﺒﺐ أﻋﻄﺎل اﻟﺨﺰاﻧﺎت‬
‫ ﺗﻢ ﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺰاﻧﺎت اﻷﻣﻮﻧﻴﺎ ﻓﻲ إﻳﺮان وهﻮ اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺐ دراﺳﺔ ﻋﻤﻴﻘﺔ ﺣﻮل ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮ‬،‫اﻵوﻧﺔ اﻷﺧﻴﺮة‬
‫ آﺄﺳﻠﻮب ﻟﻠﺘﻘﻴﻴﻢ اﻟﻜﻤﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ وذﻟﻚ ﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ‬fault tree ‫ ﺗﻢ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام أﺳﻠﻮب‬،‫ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ‬.‫اﻟﻔﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﺑﻬﺎ‬
‫ وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ أﺳﺒﺎب رﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ ﻟﻺﻧﺒﻌﺎﺛﺎت‬.‫ ﻃﻦ‬20000 ‫وﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ ذات اﻟﺼﻠﺔ ﺑﺄﺣﺪ ﺧﺰاﻧﺎت اﻷﻣﻮﻧﻴﺎ ﺳﻌﺔ‬
‫ ﺗﻢ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻷﺣﺪاث اﻟﻔﺮﻋﻴﺔ واﺟﺮاء اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻞ‬،‫ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ هﺬﻩ اﻷﺣﺪاث اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ‬.‫اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮة ﻣﻦ اﻷﻣﻮﻧﻴﺎ آﺄﺣﺪاث ﻋﻠﻴﺎ‬
.‫( ﻟﺘﻘﻴﻴﻢ اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﺑﺨﺰان اﻷﻣﻮﻧﻴﺎ ﻗﻴﺪ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ‬MECHREL) ‫ ﺗﻢ اﻋﺪاد ﻧﻤﻮذج‬.fault tree ‫ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام‬
‫ وﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﺳﺮﻳﻊ ﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات اﻷآﺜﺮ‬.‫ﺑﺎﻻﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﻢ دراﺳﺔ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﻴﺔ آﻞ ﺣﺪث‬
.‫أهﻤﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ اﺗﺨﺎذ ﻗﺮارات ﻋﻠﻰ أﺳﺎس اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ‬

The most important concern about an atmospheric ammonia storage tank is the release of the
large amount of ammonia due to the loss of tank integrity. Recently, several ammonia storage
tanks have been built in Iran which necessitates a deep study about the failure risk associated with
them. In this paper, fault tree analysis as a quantitative risk assessment has been applied to specify
and evaluate the related risks of ammonia storage tank with the capacity of 20,000 tons. Five
major causes for the ammonia large release are specified as the top events. Based on these top
events, all possible sub-events therefore are recognized and the fault tree analysis is performed.
In-house software, MECHREL, is prepared to evaluate the risks related to the specified storage
ammonia tank. Moreover, the sensitivity of each event is investigated in the following. These
results can be used to identify the most critical paths quickly to have reasonable risk-based
decisions.

and make it possible to identify critical paths. This
1. INTRODUCTION assessment is focused only to the internally-induced
events which lead to catastrophic failure. These
The cold storage tank is the equipment that can be events are highly dependent upon human error or
found mostly in all industries. The necessity of the equipment failure. So, the external events (e.g.,
storing a large amount of liquefied gas at atmospheric earthquakes, sabotage etc.) are not considered.
pressure beside the inverse proportionality of the
Generally, there are four common types of ammonia
construction cost with the tank dimension[1],
storage tanks, namely, ‘single’, ‘double’, ‘full’ and
instigate the construction and design of storage tanks
‘membrane’ containments that the economical,
with capacity of 10,000 to 120,000 m3. Apparently,
environmental considerations, acceptable safety level
an increase in tank dimensions would be
and system reliability are the effective parameters in
accompanied by an increase in tank failure
type selection. Single containment double wall type is
probability. Therefore, the risk assessment and
a common type in ammonia industries in Iran.
elucidating the causal relations to optimize the design
Recently, several high capacity tanks of this type
as well as prediction of failure modes seems
have been built or are under construction to store the
inevitable.
liquid ammonia at -40 oC. In the single containment
In this paper, the fault tree method, which is a system, a carbon steel main wall, primary container,
systematic risk assessment tool, is employed for an is used to contain the liquid ammonia and the outer
ammonia storage tank with the capacity of 20,000 wall retains the thermal insulation. This wall, which is
tons in Lordegan petrochemical plant (Iran) to covered by a dome roof, plays also the role of a vapor
identify and evaluate the potential hazards leading to barrier. A concrete dike wall must be foreseen around
release of a large amount of ammonia liquid or vapor it to support the ammonia leakage in the case of tank
from the body or inlet/outlet lines to the environment failure. A schematic configuration of single
as a final undemanding top event and based on this containment double wall tank is depicted in
analysis, the critical failure modes are discovered. Figure1[2].
The results are a good guide in condition monitoring

43

098 barg PSV 50020 50006 I HH barg PSV B 5001 50002A SET 0. The minimum and maximum tank 2. Vol. TANK SET 44 PSV LT barg 50006 50002 B PSV SET 44 50006 barg XV A 50002 DIKE WALL Figure 2. PACK.L. a detailed description of safety cut sets.H. The minimum and maximum design discover all top events. SET 44 PV SET 0. The abbreviation of each single containment. Finally. 17. A systems of a specific ammonia storage tank is sensitivity analysis is then performed to investigate expressed and then. PT LT 50002 50001 TO/FROM B. Nemati and R. No. the fault tree is modeled based on the importance of each event and cut set. by identifying the a height of 21m.L. critical paths will be discovered. Figure 2 shows a schematic view The ammonia storage tank which is under study is a of tank safety systems. respectively. PACK. A schematic configuration of single containment double wall tank [3] 1) Primary liquid container 2) Secondary liquid container (dike) 3) Warm vapor container (roof) (low temperature steel) 4) Concrete foundation 5) Suspended deck with insulation 6) Insulation (Annular space) 7) Warm vapor container (outer shell) 8) Bottom insulation 9) Warm vapor container (outer bottom) In the following. It is component has been brought in nomenclatures. the first step is to 33 oC. respectively.000 tons of liquid ammonia at .5 50002B mbarg PSV PSV SET -6. To designed to store 20. PT XV 50001 50001 ACTUATE PV-50001 PSLL 50005 ACTUATE XV-50002 PV 50001 TO FL.5 50001A 50001B mbarg TO REFR.4m with ACTUATE XV-5001 PSV 50006 A START / STOP REFR. A schematic sketch of tank safety diagram 44 Emirates Journal for Engineering Research. release of ammonia to the environment. 2012 . the specified storage tank.2. setup the fault tree analysis. AMMONIA TANK SPECIFICATIONS design pressure is set equal to -9. double wall type tank. which lead to catastrophic temperature is equal to -40 oC and +48 oC.098 PT LL barg PSV 50020 SET -6.8 mbarg and 98 mbarg. Heidary Figure 1. INPUT LINE TO B. The inner wall of the tank diameter is 44m and the diameter of the outer wall is 45.

classifying of cut sets based may be under control. the logic function OR shows To perform the fault tree analysis. though it has been the smallest combination of components failure successfully started. the occurrence probability of undesired top event will Figure 3. quantitatively that events are related in series and happening of one method. of faults and failures. other documents such as Process Equipment These five events are asserted to be the major reasons Reliability Data published by the Center for Chemical of tank failure. most of the time. MECHREL[8]. the top event In-house software. detail. the risk interpret the relationship between the malfunction of analysis method. To set up a fault tree. Moreover. by specifying the that software. if available. Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)[5]. The AND logic function is used whenever 4. the cut sets for probability of the over pressurization is explained in present fault tree are found out and sorted in Table 2. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS However. called cut sets. which. inherently. a sensitivity analysis helps in deciding Boolean algebra. Classification of all cut sets will result in by the authors. two types of failure probability values for input will lead to top event occurrence[4]. the fault tree of each major accident used to calculate failure probabilities are brought in is described and the method of estimating the Table 1. The failure rates or occurrence probabilities Emirates Journal for Engineering Research. components. "AND" and "OR" are collected. hierarchy of the events which lead to the an accident resulting from sequences or combinations undesirable event.2. top event may occur by • Unavailability: the probability of a component various combinations of events. But loading line. Five major hazards that may lead to the failure rate or occurrence probability of basic events. has some uncertainties. the • Unreliability: probability that a component fails resulting sets are called minimal cut sets which show during mission time. In this method. omitting all repetitive events from cut sets. which is prepared will happen. historical data from the identical components of • Ammonia release due to rupture of the inlet equipments in the same application. 3. 2012 45 . which be found out. all are performed by After setting up the fault tree. is the major advantage[6]. Risk Analysis of Cryogenic Ammonia Storage Tank in Iran By Fault Tree Method For the specified tank. finding out the minimal cut sets. No. the valuable information to specify investment plan to Modeling the fault tree. Fault tree diagram for major accidents that may lead to major release of ammonia In the following. unfortunately. while. the two gates which are used mostly in Boolean algebra. Vol. probability is the consequence of the analysis. final undesired accident are shown in Figure 3. are discovered: on the number of components and their occurrence • Ammonia release due to overfilling. 17. It is used to evaluate the probability of furthermore. it is not necessary to be concerned Fault tree is a logical and diagrammatic tool to about the uncertainty of generic data because. one needs to know the valid • Ammonia release due to under pressurization. By failure to response when it is on demand. all the events resulting to accident about the components for which more data should be of hazards will be discovered. CALCULATION METHOD the simultaneous happening of input events triggers the output event. cut sets classification and improve the reliability and safety of system. Based on these values. if they happen simultaneously. • Ammonia release due to over pressurization. five internal events. equipments must be taken into consideration [7]: In analyzing a fault tree. is used to simulate the fault tree. or the information of other similar projects. these data are • Ammonia release due to rupture of the outlet unavailable and there is no choice but to rely on the loading line. by means of Moreover.

51x10 1. 8.RUN Fails in refrigeration package operation (Compressor) 4x10 .42x10 1. Critical paths or cut sets which results in the release of ammonia. rate LT-50001 I Fails to indicate liquid level correctly 8.89x10 5.62x10 D2-D4-D5 loading line (D1) Ammonia release due to rupture of the outlet 3 2.2.76x10-3 Per year [12] -3 LT-50002 I Fails to indicate liquid level correctly 8.8x10-4 Per year [5] -1 REF.L.62x10 .5x10 Per year [12] XV-50002 CL Fails to get closed automatically 6. [5] PT-50002 AC Fails to run refrigerating package ate 70mbarg 3. Heidary Table 1.62x10 . [6] -2 HUMAN ERROR Operator fails to response to alarm 5x10 .13x10 3. [6] Table 2. 2012 . The failure rates used for the calculation of failure probabilities Failure Name Description Unit Ref.27 6.85x10-8 8.H.L 8. Nemati and R.00x10 C17-C3-C8 -7 -12 Ammonia release due to under 11 1. Vol.14x10 2.76x10 Per year [12] LT-50001 AC Fails to actuate inlet valve in H.76x10 Per year [12] -3 LT-50002 AL Fails to alarm in H.62x10-3 . sorted based on the event frequency per year Major accidents Rank Sensitivity analysis Frequency / year Cut sets 1 -3 1 9.55x10 -8 2. No.26x10 C16-C3-C14-C15 -9 -14 16 3.27 6.85x10 8. [5] PT-50001 AC Fails to load refrigerating package at 80mbarg 3.27x10 1.25x10 9. 17.76x10-3 Per year [12] -3 XV-50001 C Fails to get closed 6. [5] PSV-50002A/B OP Fails to open at 98mbarg 18.17x10 B10-B18-B8-B15 -6 -10 7 4.8x10-4 Per year [5] -1 REFRIG. [5] -4 PSLL-50005 AC Fails to actuated at 10 mbarg 2.2x10-3 .5mbarg 8x10 Per year [5] Fails to get opened completely when the pressure is going under Per year PSV-50006A/B OP 18.58x10 A8-A14-A11-A13 Ammonia release due to overfilling (A1) -1 -5 5 4.45x10 2. [12] PT-50020 AC Fails to actuate PV-5002 in the pressure more than mbarg 3. [5] -4 PSV-50001A/B OP Fails to get opened completely at -6.08x10 3.76x10 A8-A14-A15 -1 -5 4 5.L.2x10-3 [5] 3. [5] PV-50001 OP Fails to open at 80mbarg 6.2x10-3 [5] 44mbarg Fails to get opened completely when the pressure is going under Per year PSV-50005A/B OP 18.5mbarg HUMAN ERROR Operator fails to observe correctly 1x10-3 .52x10 B11-B18-B8-B15 (B1) 13 2.8x10-4 Per year [5] -3 PV-50020 OP Fails to open in pressure more than 50mbarg 6.39x10 1.33x10 B6-B18-B8-B15 -7 -12 Ammonia release due to over pressurization 10 1.07x10 1.30x10 C11-C3-C14-C15 pressurization (C1) 12 8.LOAD Fails to condense ammonia in refrigeration package (Compressor) 4x10 .32x10 C17-C3-C14-C15 -6 -10 8 3.33x10-13 B5-B18-B8-B15 -8 -13 14 1.50x10 C16-C3-C8 Ammonia release due to rupture of the inlet -05 2 2.50x10 -12 C11-C3-C8 -9 -13 15 4.62x10-3 .62x10-05 E2-E4-E5 loading line (E1) 46 Emirates Journal for Engineering Research.19x10 A8-A7-A11-A13 -2 -6 6 7.09x10 A8-A7-A15-A13 -7 -12 9 2.

Such of same cause (for example LT-50001 may not as these two cut sets. Risk Analysis of Cryogenic Ammonia Storage Tank in Iran By Fault Tree Method 4. two of liquid level and closing the inlet valve. automatically.) and and level transmitters LT- environment.L. which is described here. In this equal to 2. Vol. for example without assuming CCF. the above described events which lead to or the operator does not observe the indicated level overfilling.2. stage. The fault tree shown in Figure 4 depicts 50001/LT-50002 do not show the correct liquid level graphically.1 Ammonia release due to overfilling In this case. If LT-50001 does not perform its duty The first event. With the cut sets will be A6-A8-A10-A14-A15 and A6-A10- assumption of Common Cause Failure. LT-50001 should close the inlet valve. Fault tree diagram for tank overfilling It is worthwhile to mention that two duties are cut sets because some repeated event will be in some considered for LT-50001 and LT-50002.8x10-3/year. liquid level exceeds the H. table 3. Figure 4. then event will diminished from 8 to 4. which A8-A13 and by considering CCF (A14=A6 .L. the liquid level exceeds the H. which is the event A14 will be same as A6 and A15 will be very helpful in recognition of critical points and same as A10. No. Indicating cut sets. Overfilling frequency is evaluated to be correctly.H. means each valve does not perform its duties because A10=A15) then the first one will be eliminated. This assumption reduces the number of sensitivity analysis. total number of cut sets for this perform its duties because of electrical shock) . liquid ammonia will be vastly released to the high level (H. correctly or if the inlet valve XV-50001 does not Referring to Figure 2. 2012 47 . 17.L. is overfilling. CCF [9]. Emirates Journal for Engineering Research. if the operator does not respond correctly to high level alarm or if LT-50002 fails to indicate liquid level correctly. when the tank is being filled to respond.

there are four cut sets in over pressurization increase in the working pressure beyond 50mbarg events which may be named CSi. 3. Nemati and R. If none of those methods can stop increasing of blockage of vapor outlet line.2.2 Ammonia release due to over pressurization lets the vapor to be condensed in the package. this controller Probability of over pressurization = P = P(CS1 ∪ CS 2 ∪ CS3 ∪ CS 4 ) = P(CS1 ) + P(CS 2 ) + P(CS3 ) + P(CS 4 ) − P(CS1 ) P(CS 2 ) − P(CS1 ) P(CS3 ) − P(CS1 ) P(CS 4 ) − P(CS 2 ) P(CS3 ) − P(CS 2 ) P(CS 4 ) + P(CS1 ) P(CS 2 ) P(CS3 ) + P(CS1 ) P(CS 2 ) P(CS 4 ) + P(CS 2 ) P(CS3 ) P(CS 4 ) − P(CS1 ) P(CS 2 ) P(CS3 ) P(CS 4 ) Figure 5. No. to run the this major accident. Heidary Table 3. This over pressurization can be as a result the flare. An Table 2. Referring to +98mbarg while it works normally at 50mbarg. 2012 .H. The allowable ammonia vapor to the safe zone. The fault tree for working pressure is between -6. However. Diminishing cut sets of event A1 because of CCF Original cut sets CCF Minimal Cut sets A8-A14-A15-A10-A6 A8-A13-A10-A6 A8-A13-A10-A6 A8-A14-A15-A11-A6 A8-A13-A11-A6 A8-A13-A11-A6 A14 = A6 A8-A14-A15-A10-A7 A10 = A15 A8-A13-A10-A7 A8-A13-A10-A7 A8-A14-A15-A11-A7 A8-A13-A11-A7 A8-A13-A11-A7 4. sudden drop in the pressure. PT-50001. PV-50001. the probability of over refrigerating package. up to 70mbarg. and conducts the ammonia vapor to tank body. Vol. When the inside pressure reaches 80mbarg. the controller opens the Over pressurization in tank may lead to the rapture of valve. Fault tree diagram for over pressurization 48 Emirates Journal for Engineering Research. P. the pressurization. 4]. If the pressure increases more. 17. may be evaluated as follows [7]: ammonia vapor does not direct to the package. For triggers a controller.5mbarg up to over pressurization is shown in Figure 5. PSV-50002A/B will vent the extra barometric pressure or rollover. i = [1. 2.

two pressure switch valves. fails to get closed. If the pressure decreases frequency to be 2. will open and let the tank breath to very catastrophic for thin wall shell structures. If this valve. 17. and the inside pressure barometric pressure gets increases abruptly. it is possible that operators located in site close it manually. Frequency of this event is Figure 6.5mbarg. to 10mbarg. In the prevent buckling of the tank wall. MECHREL software.4x10-10/year. 2012 49 . PSLL-50005 will actuate the valve XV-50002 to be closed. In this case.5x10-11/year. PAL-50002 will turn Figure 7. The evaluated result shows this event off the refrigerating package. Risk Analysis of Cryogenic Ammonia Storage Tank in Iran By Fault Tree Method Figure 6 shows evaluation of over pressurization in 1. No. PSV- ammonia tank may be subjected to vacuum which is 50001A/B. Set up the fault tree diagram for over pressurization in MECHREL 4. for any When the tank outflow is more than inflow. The fault tree present ammonia tank.2. Vol. Fault tree diagram for under pressurization Emirates Journal for Engineering Research. If this valve is not Figure 7.3 Ammonia release due to under pressurization closed automatically. whenever the working diagram for under pressurization can be observed in pressure drops below 30mbarg. the reaches -6. or reason.

it may lead to line rupture. Heidary 4. The fault tree for rupture of inlet and 5. determine the importance of each cut set. PSV-50006A/B do not open at line pressure of 44barg (44 barg is design criteria for inlet line and 3. 2012 . The other index in the fault tree analysis. The over pressurization in that part of pipe which is connected to the tank may be damped. The final step in the analysis of a fault tree is to respectively.5 barg is design criteria for outlet line). which must be taken into consideration. All minimal cut sets are ranked in Table 2 based on their evaluated importance. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS outlet lines is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. it has a potential to make damages to the pipe lines. Fault tree diagram for rupture of inlet line immediate attention.4 Ammonia release due to rupture of the inlet/outlet loading line The final assessed scenario is the release of ammonia due to rupture of the inlet or outlet loading lines. Vol. for any reason. ammonia gets confined in pipes.62x10-5/year for both inlet and outlet line. then. Fault tree diagram for rupture of outlet line events frequency of 6. Nemati and R. This index aids in deciding which events are most likely to cause an accident and would therefore require Figure 8. if the on-off valve XV-50001 be closed and the two pressure switches (relief valves). Qoj is top event frequency in the absence of jth basic event and Qo is the top event frequency. I Ei = Qo − Qoj . The evaluated result shows these Figure 9. 17. In this condition. The improvement index for each basic event is calculated and presented in Figure 10. No. Qo Ci Qj where I is the cut set importance. but in other parts. 50 Emirates Journal for Engineering Research. The cut set importance is calculated as [10]: Qj I Ci = × 100. get blocked. is the cut set Q frequency and o is the top event frequency. is the improvement index which shows the criticality of a basic event and is determined by eliminating each basic event from the tree and evaluating its weight on the tree [11].2. the pressure of line will rise. and will evaporate as the result of heat transfer with surroundings.H. These lines work continually and if. so. Ei where I is the basic event improvement.

E5. the ammonia storage tank. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. indictors with SIL 2 (Safety Integrity Level 2) by the 2. Wiley.8x10-3/year and after that. the results of this paper may be very vital 7. 2004. D5. to 4. Guide to Storage failure rate. USA. Therefore. the quantitative fault tree analysis was Chemical Engineers. Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability Data with Data Tables.62x10-5/year to 6. Center for Chemical 7. the most probable accident is overfilling with specially Mr. Plenum calculations are based on the operation in first year Press. Korean J. and due to continual work of equipments.N. Lygerou V. and Koh J.. Kim H. Mechanical rates will be increased.62x10-7/year. Dynamic safety analysis of process improvement. Emirates Journal for Engineering Research.2. Chem. which lead to the release of ammonia. performed for an ammonia tank with the capacity of 6. MECHREL. Tank Systems for Refrigerated Liquefied Gas decreases from 6. J Loss Prevent Proc 13: frequency of overfilling decreases from 2. New York. In the case of loading line 2000. et al. a basic step to improve the tank safety is to select level indictors with lower 1. same one with SIL3. Eng. A8. The based on Fault Tree Analysis. 2012 51 .A. Reliability to make the correct decisions in risky conditions. is the rupture of the inlet or outlet loading line with frequency of REFERENCES 6.. API STANDARD 625. Aneziris O. 2010.. Billinton R. are A15.1x10-5/year and the frequency of overfilling 3. sensitivity analysis showed also all potential hazards. Fatemi and Mr. Heidary R. 5. 2005. 2002. 2ed. Amirkabir University of Technology. Iran. 2.A. USA. By those simple modifications. Risk Assessment of 20. it is recommended to replace the level tanks & Equipment. No. It can be depicted from Figure 10. Vol. which shows a significant improvement in tank 4..8x10-3/year 153-165. Stamatelatos M. and Garner B. 2. the failure 8. So. D4. Storage. At Evaluation of Engineering Systems: Concepts the end. 17. M. immediate response in accidents.62x10-5/year.S. Improvement index for each basic event 6. the events Handbook with Aerospace Applications. which are most likely to cause an accident. 22:1-8. Risk Analysis of Cryogenic Ammonia Storage Tank in Iran By Fault Tree Method Figure10. 2005. Fault Tree safety. Therefore. which require USA. Long B. system reliability software. As it can be deduced from Table Authors would like to thank HEDCO Company. and Allan N. 1992. it is also recommended to use safety systems with an application to a cryogenic valves with SIL 3. Rezaeian. and A14.. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The fault tree analysis is performed to estimate the ACKNOLEDGMWNT probability of five major causes. 1989...000 tons and the ability of this method in Membrane Type LNG Storage Tanks in Korea- discovering the critical paths was proved. Saraei for providing the frequency of required information and documents. Papazoglou I. (Thesis). CONCLUSION Process Safety of the American Institute of In this paper. it is worthwhile to mention that the current and Techniques. E4.

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