Labor Market Regulation via Trade Union Combinations and Multi-Employer

Bargaining: Context, Processes and Outcomes in the Philippines

Dr. Jonathan P. Sale
University of the Philippines

1. Introduction

The Philippine Constitution directs the State to promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and expresses a preference for voluntary
modes in settling labor disputes. It declares that all workers have the right to self-
organization and collective bargaining. (1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XIII,
Section 3)

On March 15, 2003, the rules implementing the Philippine law on labor relations,
otherwise known as Department of Labor and Employment (DoLE) Department Order
(DO) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, became effective, supplanting DO No. 9, Series of
1997. According to the Philippine Bureau of Labor Relations, DO No. 40-03 has four
aims: (1) to uphold the right to self-organization, (2) to advocate for responsible and
accountable unionism, (3) to promote the doctrine of shared responsibility, and (4) to
provide for speedy labor justice. There are two interesting innovations under DO No. 40-
03 – trade union mergers and consolidations and multi-employer bargaining. Merger
refers to a process where a labor organization absorbs another resulting in the
cessation of the absorbed labor organization’s existence, and the continued existence
of the absorbing labor organization. Consolidation refers to the creation or formation of
a new union arising from the unification of two or more unions. The other significant
change in the rules is multi-employer bargaining. Legitimate labor unions and employers
may agree in writing to come together for the purpose of collective bargaining. But only
legitimate labor unions that are incumbent exclusive bargaining agents and their
counterpart employers may participate and negotiate in multi-employer bargaining. Also,
only legitimate labor unions belonging to employer units consenting to multi-employer
bargaining may participate therein. (Sale 2003)

This study takes a closer look at the context, processes and outcomes of trade union
combinations and multi-employer bargaining in the Philippines. What institutions helped
shape these rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining? What
are the processes involved? What are the outcomes? To what extent have the aims of
the rules been achieved, if at all? Have more centralized bargaining structures
emerged? Do conceptualizations of work matter (Budd 2011)? These are basic
questions this research tries to answer by analyzing, among others, aggregate,
quantitative empirical evidence over time and across regions in the country.

2

2. Context: Nexus of bargaining structure, coverage and trade union density in
general1

According to Kochan (1980),2 bargaining structure refers to the scope of employees and
employers who are covered by or are in some ways affected by the terms of a labor
agreement. Thus, the bargaining structure is more centralized if the scope of
employees and employers covered by a CBA is larger.

Thomson (1981)3 noted that the North American systems of collective bargaining are
the most decentralized in the world compared to Western Europe where employer
cooperation has a history. This is illustrated in Figure 1.4 Based on Figure 1 the
degree of centralization is low if bargaining happens at the enterprise or workplace
level. The degree of centralization is medium when bargaining takes place at the
industry or regional level, and high if at the national level.

Thomson (1981)

In Figure 1, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland represent highly
centralized systems. United States and Canada typify decentralized systems.

As depicted, the differences in bargaining structure reflected two distinctive models: (A)
the system generally in the United States manufacturing sector; and (B) the model
found in much of Europe, which Thomson described thus:

some pay questions are also negotiated at the plant level with local unions. Pay is determined by formal industry-wide bargaining and again. the greater the coverage of collective bargaining.7 On the other hand. the higher the level of voice regulation. which signifies that they are low on both collective bargaining coverage and trade union density (Figure 2. The upper – right quadrant reflects systems which are high on both collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. and some working conditions between the company and one or more national unions. to perform vital and highly visible services for local officers and members alike in processing their grievances and policing the contract. less formally at plant level by management activity either unilaterally or under pressure from shop stewards or local shop committees. fringes. The lower – right quadrant represents systems with low collective bargaining coverage but high trade union density. Systems in Asia and the Pacific are grouped in the lower – left quadrant.4 are from the Global Report under the Follow-up to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work for year 2000. In voice regulation.”5 Figures 2. Model (B) on other hand is characterized by wider separation of the centers of decision- making and more overlap in the determination of pay. for its part.1). In the lower – left quadrant are systems with low collective bargaining coverage and low trade union density. the company-wide level tends to drop out as a visible locus of wage determination. the latter connecting the company-wide wage settlements in the industry via pattern bargaining. 3 “Model (A) involves the negotiating of wages. The upper – left quadrant shows industrial relations systems that are high on collective bargaining coverage. . . and local and national unions are sequentially involved in grievance handling .1 to 2. representational security at work is based on the freedom of workers and employers to form and join organizations of their own choosing without fear of reprisal or intimidation. . systems of consultation and negotiation supplement minimum legal frameworks. The role of the national union in the determination of non-pecuniary conditions and in the disposition of grievances is minimal. Each figure has four quadrants. these functions tend to be discharged by management and/or local work groups. giving management an arrangement designed to connect the wage setting and productivity determining activities as closely as possible and as permitting the national union. and also by legislative enactment and labour courts. to a lesser degree. Working conditions and. . and the higher the level of trade union density.8 Thus. but low on trade union density.6 The figures depict the relationship between voice regulation and representational security. the greater the extent of representational security. as in the determination of local wage supplements.

ILO (2000) .2. African systems are also generally low on both collective bargaining coverage and trade union density (Figure 2. 4 ILO (2000) With the exception of South Africa.).

. 5 In the Americas. Only the United Kingdom shows a seeming resemblance to Asia and the Pacific. except for Argentina (Figure 2. Europe conveys a different picture (Figure 2. while Hungary appears to resemble South Africa. Africa and the Americas reflect some degree of homogeneity in that the systems therein appear to converge in the lower – left quadrant. ILO (2000) While collective bargaining coverage and trade union density in Asia and the Pacific.3).4). industrial relations systems are typically low on collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. The rest of Europe is found in the upper quadrants. Africa and the Americas. with a few exceptions.

countries with decentralized bargaining structures have low levels of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. trade union density does not appear to be very significant to collective bargaining. these (Figures 1 to 2. In this regard. Ireland. like Austria. recognition of unions as a prerequisite for collective bargaining appears to be of little significance considering that collective bargaining coverage is almost 100%.) Although in others. This is typified by the industry-wide bargaining system of Sweden where ILO reported collective bargaining coverage and trade union density at above 70 percent.9 Therefore. 6 ILO (2000) Significantly. Conversely. albeit trade union density is below 40%. Norway and Denmark are representative of industrial relations systems that have high levels of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. This is exemplified by the enterprise or workplace bargaining system of the United States where collective bargaining coverage and trade union density fell below 20% as reported by the ILO. In Austria. The evidence seems to validate the hypothesis of Thomson that under centralized bargaining. (Previously. Sweden had an economy-wide bargaining system. Belgium and the Netherlands. Finland.4) suggest that countries with centralized bargaining structures have higher levels of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. The situation is similar in France. countries in Asia and the Pacific tend to be homogenous as collective bargaining coverage and trade union density in the region failed to surpass the 30% threshold based on the ILO report. . Germany. Greece. recognition of unions as a prerequisite for collective bargaining is only of limited significance once a certain threshold density has been achieved. This indicates that the extent of voice regulation and representational security in these countries is greater than in others. Sweden.

promote full employment. as may be ascertained from the basic policy declared in Article 3 of the Philippine Labor Code: “The State shall afford protection to labor.403 in 2002 while the number of . BLES reported that as of June 30. over time. collective bargaining.) Recognized and protected by public policy. security of tenure. Work is temporary if time-bound and peripheral if indirectly related to the employer’s main business.8% and 25%. Context: Institutions that helped shape the rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining in the Philippines10 As already noted.13 Non-regular. respectively.12 The growth in underemployment in recent years came from the services sector and the extent of underemployment is a measure or gauge of the severity of the lack of jobs. temporary and peripheral workers have been increasing in number. Why did these rules emerge? These rules emerged chiefly because of failure of institutions. 2003.” (Emphasis supplied. and just and humane conditions of work. and thus failing.14 The number of establishments that resorted to permanent closure/retrenchment due to economic reasons rose from 2. 7 3. which makes workers accept shorter work hours or low-paying jobs instead of open unemployment. low-paying jobs in the services sector creates doubts about the quality of employment generated.859 in 2001 to 3. 40-03 – trade union mergers and consolidations and multi-employer bargaining. there are two interesting innovations in DO No. incompleteness of statute and administrative action via regulation. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. The Philippine Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics (BLES) reported that in January 2004 the services sector accounted for about 48% of employed persons in the Philippines. race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. a. an increase of more than 7% from the 2002 figure. contractor/agency-hired workers and non-regular staff comprised 10. Failure of institutions Labor organizations and collective bargaining are key institutions in Philippine industrial relations. yet they have been declining. of total employment in establishments with 20 or more workers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization.11 But the preponderance of low-productivity.

824 in 2003.2% and 19. The Philippine Labor Code does not have provisions on trade union combinations (mergers/consolidations) and multi-employer bargaining. Changes and developments in social conditions. or enumerating only few actions”.23 And labor organizations have argued that the State has failed to assure the rights of workers to self-organization and collective bargaining.e.19 The extent of unionism as of June 2003 was also reported by BLES. Employers downsize.7%.17 Membership in newly registered unions also declined from 89.8% were unionized and 14. markets and technologies may give rise to circumstances not contemplated when a particular law was enacted. b. another reason why the rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining emerged is the incompleteness of statute – the 1974 Philippine Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. i. institutions exist to handle residual law-making and enforcement.187 in 2002 to 44. which is explained by the fact that unions usually organize regular employees.22 Atypical forms of employment have been replacing typical employer-employee relationships.21 The downward trend in trade union density and CBA coverage coincided with the growth of employment in the services sector.. The usual source of union members has been shrinking. and therefore law may be incomplete because it “broadly circumscribes outcomes without identifying particular actions. an indication that more regular jobs had been lost.15 Significantly.091. as amended). Incompleteness of statute As already pointed out.16 Therefore.794 in 2003. the falling level of trade union density has been influenced by increases in company closures over the years. rightsize. hotel and restaurant. i. 14. the number of unions registered went down from 910 in 2002 to 647 in 2003..24 According to Pistor and Xu (2003).864 to 80.20 Survey results also showed that union membership and CBA coverage reached 20. in terms of labor turnover.582.2% had CBAs. Also. outsource and adopt other measures to increase efficiency and streamline operations in the face of competition. courts . The figures were not encouraging. respectively. because law is incomplete and cannot cover every situation.412 in 2002 to 66. separation rate was higher than accession rate in the first and second quarters of 2002 for the construction.18 The number of CBAs registered decreased from 588 in 2002 to 415 in 2003 while the number of workers covered by new CBAs fell from 114. of the total 2. various types of work and employment contracts co-existing simultaneously. and financial intermediation industries. The result has been fragmentation of the workforce.000 paid employees. There appeared an inverse relationship between the two. 8 displaced workers went up from 71.e. 442. Of the total number of establishments surveyed.

Notice of merger or consolidation of federations or national unions shall be filed with and recorded by the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). The notice of merger or consolidation shall be accompanied by the minutes of merger or consolidation convention or general membership meetings of all the merging or consolidating labor organizations. legal origins (whether a country is of common law origin or of civil law origin). 40-0330 Trade union merger refers to a process where a labor organization absorbs another resulting in the cessation of the absorbed labor organization’s existence.g. e. to exercise residual law-making and enforcement through the issuance of DO No. The legal system of the Philippines is characterized as a hybrid. Administrative action via regulation In the Philippines. economic context. Moreover. 40-03 by DoLE is characteristic of the civil law tradition’s focus on rules and regulations setting. having elements of both Spanish civil law and American common law due to the country’s colonial experience. Procedurally. Consolidation refers to the creation or formation of a new union arising from the unification of two or more unions. Series of 2003 which introduced the novel processes of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining. the hybridity of the legal system. Context: Nexus of bargaining structure. 9 and regulations.25 Courts tend to be reactive. while regulators may be proactive. The amended constitution and by-laws and minutes of its ratification shall also accompany the notice. The certificate of . Processes of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining under DO No. it cannot be gainsaid that the experience of other countries (as discussed in Section 2. existing institutions for residual law- making and enforcement. chartered locals and workers’ associations shall be filed with and recorded by the DoLE Regional Office that issued the certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered local of either the merging or consolidating labor organization. 4. among others. coverage and trade union density in general) and the economic context as described above (in this Section) influenced in some way the introduction of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining in 2003 through DO No. existing institutions for residual law-making and enforcement. specifically the Department of Labor and Employment (DoLE). 40-03. and the continued existence of the absorbing labor organization.28 Civil law systems are based on fixed codes or rules while common law systems rely on judicial decisions and precedents..27 c.29 (Sale 2011) The issuance of DO No. 40-03.26 And different factors may affect how governments rely on courts or regulators for residual law-making and enforcement. with the list of their respective members who approved the same. and the economic context combined to enable regulators. experience of other countries. notice of merger or consolidation of independent labor unions. experience of other countries.

scope and coverage of negotiations and agreements as well as the effect of the negotiations on existing agreements or employment conditions. Such effects or consequences should be embodied in the rules to avoid confusion. Also. Only legitimate labor unions that are incumbent exclusive bargaining agents and their counterpart employers may participate and negotiate in multi-employer bargaining. The surviving or consolidated union automatically assumes the rights. The legitimate labor unions who desire to bargain with multi-employers shall send a written notice to each employer concerned which shall be accompanied by the agreement mentioned above and their certificates of registration. its new name and its business address. During the negotiations. . the effects and consequences are clear insofar as the surviving or consolidated entity is concerned – by operation of law it automatically assumes all rights and obligations. There are conditions. This relatively new procedure is especially useful when employers merge or consolidate. assets and liabilities of the combining corporations. the rules are silent on the consequences or effects of trade union mergers or consolidations. 10 registration issued to the merged or consolidated labor organizations shall bear the registration number of one of the merging or consolidating entities as agreed upon by the parties to the merger or consolidation. only legitimate labor unions belonging to employer units consenting to multi-employer bargaining may participate therein. national or industry unions are exempt from execution of such an agreement. franchises and privileges as well as the obligations. Employers who agree to group themselves or use their existing associations to engage in multi-employer bargaining shall send a written notice to each of their counterpart legitimate labor unions indicating their desire to engage in multi-employer bargaining. employers and legitimate labor unions shall discuss and agree on the manner. Negotiations may commence only with respect to employers and labor unions that consent to participate in multi-employer bargaining. Legitimate labor unions desiring to negotiate with their employers collectively shall execute a written agreement among themselves. Curiously. Legitimate labor unions and employers may agree in writing to come together for the purpose of collective bargaining. among others. In corporate mergers or consolidations. Legitimate labor unions who are members of the same registered federation. The other significant change in the rules has to do with multi-employer bargaining.31 It is submitted that union mergers and consolidations have the same effects or consequences. Labor unions or employers may initiate multi-employer bargaining. assets and liabilities of the combining unions.

or economy-wide bargaining structure correlates with higher trade union density and lower strike activity.32 Multi-employer bargaining could actually pave the way for more centralized bargaining structures. DoLE has no authority to require the same through a mere administrative action. like industry. Studies tend to show that an industry. that strike activity is higher in countries where the bargaining structure is decentralized (company and plant bargaining) and lower in countries that have centralized or highly centralized bargaining systems (industry-wide or economy-wide bargaining). Notably. aggregate data sets of BLES in the Current Labor Statistics. however. a multi-employer CBA may cover two or more certified or recognized bargaining units in two or more enterprises. The consensual character of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining. only the National Capital Region has shown somewhat moderate numbers in terms of union and CBA registration and CBA coverage. The quantitative. a more centralized bargaining structure would be consistent with the constitutional principle of shared responsibility between employer and labor34 under which rights and interests are balanced and/or coordinated by the State. in a study involving some advanced societies. For instance. 5. These are ascertainable from the Tables that follow:35 . what exists in the Philippines is a decentralized structure where collective bargaining occurs at the plant or company level.33 Also. Douglas Hibbs (1976) suggests. which is a quarterly DoLE publication. Across regions in the country. Outcomes: Less unions and bargaining and fewer workers covered by bargaining Thus far. is a limiting factor. there are no reported cases of trade union merger or consolidation and multi- employer bargaining in the Philippines. In the absence of a statute that requires trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining in defined situations. do not even mention trade union merger or consolidation and multi-employer bargaining. the numbers for union and CBA registration as well as workers covered by CBAs have continued to decrease over time.or economy-wide collective bargaining. 11 Thus. At present.

12 BLES (2015) .

13 BLES (2015) .

14 BLES (2015) .

36 it was reported that there was no registered multi-employer CBA in the country. could foster multi-employer bargaining.R. 15 BLES (2015) In a 2012 research.37 it was observed that parent and subsidiary corporate relations. Among the hindering factors identified were the voluntariness of the process (as to the employer) and limited coverage (as it excludes the public sector). April 12. DLSU Employees Association (G. The College of St. 2000). Benilde should be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of De La Salle University. requiring multi-employer bargaining. among others. formation of industry unions. the Philippine Supreme Court held that the employees of the College of St. Benilde is a subsidiary of De La Salle University. benchmarking and disseminating/publishing successful models of multi- employer bargaining. because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. presence of industry-wide bargaining. (Alcantara 2012) In an earlier research. . 109002. No. Certain facilitating factors were also identified – strengthening tripartism. In De La Salle University v.

39 Multi-employer bargaining is possible in parent and subsidiary corporations because employer cooperation is easier to coordinate among interrelated companies. effectively placing within the scope of the negotiated CBA employees of the subsidiary corporations of BDO as well. in the Philippines. 874 and House Bill No. perpetrate fraud. The Explanatory Notes (first page) of the Senate and House Bills are reproduced in the pages that follow:40 . 40-03. compensation. Based on the MoA. 2826. working conditions. duties. a step in this direction has been taken by Banco De Oro (BDO). a bank. In fact. parent and subsidiary corporations are not treated as one and the same employer in Philippine law. commit crime or defeat public convenience. unless it is shown that their legal personalities are being used to justify wrong. a bargaining unit is defined as that group of employees sharing mutual interests within a given employer unit. 16 Thus. comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees in the employer unit or any specific occupational or geographical grouping within such employer unit. too. This means that parent and subsidiary corporations have distinct bargaining units as well. These are Senate Bill No. Under DoLE DO No. the recognized bargaining unit shall cover all rank and file employees of BDO and its subsidiaries. More recently.38 Mutual interests could refer to substantial similarity of work. and the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE). The parties signed a memorandum of agreement (MoA) that resulted in one (1) CBA for the rank and file employees of the parent and subsidiary corporations. a labor federation. proposed legislation requiring multi-employer bargaining in defined situations had been submitted to the Fifteenth Congress of the Philippines.

17 .

18 .

874 are illustrative of the defined situations that require multi-employer bargaining: xxx . 19 The following proposed provisions in Senate Bill No.

2826 has similar proposed provisions: xxx . 20 House Bill No.

more centralized bargaining structures have not emerged notwithstanding that conceptualizations of work do matter. their consensual nature under DO No. 40-03 are indicative of how work is seen by Philippine regulators. in that sense. The processes of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining as expressed in DO No. 40-03 is a constraining factor. Notably.e. is incomplete. 21 These proposed Senate and House Bills show that the existing Philippine Labor Code fails to lay down guiding rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining and.. as articulated by Budd (2011). . i. as an activity done by human members of a community entitled to certain rights or occupational citizenship.41 But as already pointed out.

Scout Path. The consensual character of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining under DO No.P. Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations from Theory to Policy and Practice. Multi-employer bargaining could pave the way for more centralized bargaining structures. Paper presented at the Regional Conference on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).: Industrial Relations Research Association. Philippine Journal of Labor and Industrial Relations. Industrial Relations 1950 – 1980: A Critical Assessment. . Labor Dispute Settlement and Decision Making. in the absence of a statute authorizing it to do so. incompleteness of statute and administrative action via regulation. Also. Austin Road. A. See also Sale. such as economic groups and trade unions. through public policy. for example. There are fewer unions and CBAs. 3 Thomson. 1980.S. 2005. Such would broaden the base of union organizing and widen the scope of collective bargaining. 2005.A. Inc. 13-43. Irwin. the duty to bargain collectively should be extended.P.42 Such disparities could be removed by specific legislation requiring trade union combinations and multi- employer bargaining in defined situations. Hong Kong held on 11th to 12th April 2005. 1981. Endnotes and References 1 See Sale. The rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining came about in 2003 because of failure of institutions. XXV (1 & 2). are part of the “power structure”. A View from Abroad in U. casual. and other temporary or non-regular staff.S. And the DoLE could not have mandated trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining via administrative rule-making alone. 40-03 is a limiting factor. J. to multi- employer situations where direct hires (regular and non-regular staff) work side by side with indirect hires (contractor/agency-hired workers).A. New York: Richard D. it is the “power structure” of a society that is critical in determining the transferability or transplantability of laws and legal institutions to other societies. contractual. 2 Kochan. there are no reported trade union mergers or consolidations and/or multi- employer CBAs in the Philippines. University of Wisconsin. and the disparities in the power and influence of organized interests. J. the Senate and House Bills are a step in the right direction. Conclusion Public policy should enable trade unions to organize contractor/agency-hired. Therefore. T. As noted by Kahn-Freund (1974). and fewer workers covered by CBAs. Trade union mergers and consolidations could strengthen the right to self-organization especially in times of employer (corporate) mergers. pp. U. However. 22 6. GATS and Multi-Employer Bargaining: An Analysis in TUs and NGOs Challenge GATS.

supra. 2011. 27 Ibid. at 32-35. note 11.2139/ssrn. 931-1013. See Center on Law and Globalization. The governance of decision making and labor dispute settlement in the Philippines: Shifting methods from command to collaboration or vice-versa? Doctoral Dissertation. 20 Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment. 23 4 Ibid. p. p. 28 Sale. 56. 6 International Labour Office (ILO). P. 8 Id.com/abstract=310588 or http://dx. Statistics on Non-Regular Workers.org/10. 12 Congressional Commission on Labor Report and Recommendations.12. 08 March 2011. 29 Ibid. https://clg. Vol. 2004. 2004.. 8 (13) (October). Switzerland: ILO. 24 Pistor. 5 Ibid. J. at 76.cfm?keytext_id=26.310588 . at 2. op. Journal of International Law and Politics. note 1.A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation. Quezon City: UP School of Labor and Industrial Relations and Philippine Industrial Relations Society. Human Capital in the Emerging Economy. Trade Union Combinations and Multi-Employer Bargaining in Business Focus. 2004.com/library/keytext.P. No. cit.. 15 Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics. at 19.. 13 Id. J. 9 Thomson. 19 Ibid. R. cit. J.. pp. 2. 2001. 14 Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment. 25 Ibid. note 3. Geneva. 27. Globalization. Your Voice at Work. supra. Manila Bulletin. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn. 11 Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment. 30 See Sale.19. op. 8 (21) (December). Katharina and Xu. 2000. op. 17 Id. 22 Szal.P. 2003. 26 Ibid. Chenggang. 2015. 7 Id. University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance. June 27. Current Labor Statistics. 10 See Sale.doi. How Countries Deal with Incomplete Law. 2003. Challenges and Strategies. 4. Incomplete Law . 23 Ibid.portalxm. p. p. supra. 2000. Available at . 20. p. Employment and Industrial Relations: The Case of the Philippines in Philippine Industrial Relations for the 21st Century: Emerging Issues. at 18. LABSTAT Updates. 1.. Extent of Unionism. LABSTAT Updates. 21 Id. Philippines: Congress of the Philippines. A. 16 Id. p.. 18 Ibid. cit. 35. at 13. p..

html 36 Alcantara. cit.dlsu. 35 Taken from Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment.A. Tokyo. Article XIII. The Labor Code With Comments and Cases (5th ed.dlsu.edu..senate.gov. 32 Sale. Industrial Conflict in Business Focus. Department of Labor and Employment. 39 2 C. 2004).gov. supra. 34 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. See Sale. 38 See DoLE DO No. J. Vol. 41 Budd. Section 3.ph/download/basic_15/HB02826.pdf.congress. Available at http://www.: Cornell University Press. Current Labor Statistics. 1033-1058. J. cit. 2011.bles.ph/lisdata/83376891!. Japan/US/EU Joint Research. note 1.pdf.gov. 2012. Series of 2003. 70. Labour Relations and the Law in Three East Asian NICs: Some Problems and Issues for Comparative Labour Law Inquiry in Labor Law Reform for the 21st Century: Responding to Globalization and Social Challenges. 40 Taken from http://www. 40-03. D.W..S.ph/PUBLICATIONS/Current%20Labor%20Statistics/index. op. 42 Cooney. J. R. Institute for Labor Studies.douglas-hibbs.dole. L. See also DoLE DO No. respectively. . Series of 2003.ph/research/centers/cberd/pdf/bus_focus/Industrial_conflict.pdf and http://www.A. 2015. Manila Bulletin. S. November 28.com/HibbsArticles/APSR%201976. June 31. op. 2003. 37 Sale.. note 1. 24 http://www. 4 (Dec. No. and Mitchell.edu. 40-03. Azucena. Japan. http://www. The Thought of Work. Shall we call it off? A Study on Multi-Employer Bargaining in the Philippines: Knowledge. The American Political Science Review. 33 Hibbs.P.P. citing Kahn-Freund (1974).pdf. sec. Attitude and Practices among Social Partners. 31 CORPORATION CODE. 80.P. J. 1st DoLE Cluster Research Conference on Decent Work. U. 1976. pp. 1976).ph/research/centers/cberd/pdf/bus_focus/Trade_Union.. Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies. Available at http://www. supra. Jr. 2000.pdf.C.