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First Nation

N nal Da
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afety Confe
C erence
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2425March2
2015,IC&
&SRAuditorium,IITM,Ch
hennai

Com
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Organiizedaspartoff
DamR
Rehabillitation
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Project
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FirstNationalDamSafetyConference
24&25March2015 Chennai

Select papers submitted for the First National Dam Safety Conference organized by Central Water
Commission (CWC) in collaboration with Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department (TNWRD) and
IndianInstituteofTechnology,Madras(IITM)during24&25March2015inChennaiarepublishedin
thisCompendiumafterincorporatingeditorialcorrectionsasnecessary.

Disclaimer

Theviewsandopinionsexpressedorassumptionsmadeinthesepapersarethoseoftheauthorsand
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of CWC, TNWRD or IITM. Appropriate
discretion may be exercised while utilizing the information, examples, analysis or case histories
presented within these papers in realworld situations; concerned authors of the papers may be
contactedasnecessary.

Foranyinformation,pleasecontact
TheProjectDirector,
CentralProjectManagementUnit,DRIP
CentralWaterCommission,
3rdFloor,NewLibraryBuilding(NearSewaBhawan),
R.K.Puram,NewDelhi110066.
Email:cpmucwc@nic.in
Website:www.damsafety.in
FOREWORD

First National Dam Safety Conference was jointly organized by


Central Water Commission. Tamil Nadu Water Resources
Department (TNWRD) and Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
(llTM) in Chennai during 24 & 25 March 2015. The conference
spread over six technical sessions focused upon (i) Design Flood
Estimation, (ii) Risk Assessment, (iii) Institutional Arrangements for
Sustainable Dam Safety, (iv) New Materials and Methods for Dam
Rehabilitation, (v) Innovations and Methods for Dam Health Monitoring and (vi)
lssues & Strategies for Compliance with Design Standards. The conference received
immense response with over 280 delegates registering for participation and receipt of
50 technical papers, of which 30 papers were selected for oral presentation.

National Dam Safety Conferences are henceforth planned to be organized every year
in different parts of the country to deliberate on varied dam safety aspects; e.g.
hydrological studies, design, construction, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation,
environmental impact, state of the art technology, emergency action plans, financing,
contract management, quality management systems, etc. Technical papers
deliberated in these conferences are expected to go a long way in sensitizing dam
safety concerns and evolving standardized dam safety practices.

To provide permanent record and for wider dissemination, select papers received for
the First National Dam Safety Conference are published in this compendium. I hope
that this compendium will provide an important reference material for decision-
makers, researchers, engineers and all those associated with dam safety in line with
the spirit of the Conference. Lot of efforts have gone in organizing the Conference
and in bringing out this Compendium; and I take this opportunity to compliment the
Organizing and Technical Committees of the First National Dam Safety Conference
for their valuable contribution. Meticulous planning and untiring efforts of several
individuals from the collaborating organizations have played an important role in this
achievement, and I appreciate the hard work of each such individual.

,V
(A.B Pandya)
New Delhi Chairman
25 August 201 5 Central Water Commission

i
PREFACE

India has over 4900 large dams: three-fourths of these dams are more than 25
years old and require rehabilitation to restore their operational performance and safety.
Central Water Commission (CWC) with financial assistance from the World Bank,
embarked upon the six year Dam Rehabilitation and lmprovement Project (DRIP) at an
estimated cost of Rs. 2100 crore, The objectives of DRIP includes rehabilitation of about
250 dams and also promoting new technologies and improving institutional capacities
for dam safety evaluation and project implementation at the Central and State levels
and in some identified premier academic and research institutes of the country,

As part of institutional strengthening for dam safety, First National Dam Safety
Conference was organized in Chennai during 24 - 25 March 2015 by CWC jointly with
Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department (TNWRD) and Indian Institute of Technology,
Madras (llTM). The Conference provided a forum for sharing knowledge and experience
of experts in the field, belonging to distinguished organizations, dam owners, academic
and research institutes and the industry. The focus of the Conference was on effective
application of knowledge and technologies to real-life problems faced by the dam safety
professionals and help them in determining the strategies for effectively managing the
uncertainties associated with dam ooeration and maintenance.

The topics for technical sessions in the First National Dam Safety Conference
were chosen to reflect key concerns highlighted during the first three years of DRIP
implementation. There was good response for the conference both in terms of technical
papers received for presentation and the registered delegates Fifty technical papers
were contributed by experts from government agencies, utilities, academia, consulting
firms and private industry within and outside the country; due to paucity of time all the
papers could not be presented during the Technical Sessions.

To create a repository of the knowledge and experience reflected in the technical


papers and making them available for permanent reference, select papers received for
the Conference are published in the form of a Compendium under the aegis of the
Technical Committee of the Conference. This Compendium is an un-priced publication
for distribution to DRIP lmplementing Agencies and others concerned. I am sure this
Compendium will act as an important reference material for dam professionals for
implementing their dam safety initiatives.

I take this opportunity to thank all the esteemed members of the Technical
Committee for their untiring support in conduct of the Conference and in compiling this
valuable Compendium.

C.K. Agrawal, Member (D&R)


New Delhi Central Water Commission
12 August 2015 Chairman, Technical Committee

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CONFERENCE INTRODUCTION

The notion of scarcity of water on planet earth is day-by-day gaining strength. But this
view is somewhat erroneous because earth is the only known planet with abundant water; or
may be the only planet where fresh water is available in renewable liquid form. However the
renewable fresh water on earth is not distributed uniformly in space and time. This single natural
factor, along with the dilemma of ever increasing human population, forms the premises of our
great water problem. The remedy for the geographic non-uniformity in availability of water lies in
construction of diversion dams; while time related non-uniformity in availability of water is
essentially addressed by construction of storage dams. Dams as solution for water problem
were apparently known to very early civilizations; and even today, dams provide the only
meaningful solution for meeting water demands of the current and future world population.

With a geographic land proportion of only 2.2%, India musters a share of about 4.6% in
renewable water. Yet it faces water stress because of over 16.6% share in world population.
Moreover, India suffers due to erratic rainfall pattern both over space and time. About 65% of
Indias land area accounts for less than 30% renewable water resource. More than 80% of
annual rainfall occurs during four monsoon months. Even during monsoon, distribution of rainfall
remains uneven with 50% of rainfall happening in less than 15 days, and in less than 100
hours. It has been realized very early that vulnerable dependence of Indian agriculture on the
vagaries of the monsoons must be reduced through storage dams. Accordingly, over the last
fifty years, India has invested substantially in infrastructure necessary to store surface runoff
water in reservoirs formed by large as well as small dams. India now ranks third in the world
after USA and China in terms of number of large dams. The country has over 4900 large dams
and another 350 dams are under various stages of construction.

The health and safety of these dams are of paramount importance for three primary
reasons: (i) for the sustainable utilization of the valuable water resources; (ii) for the protection
of heavy investment made in primary dam assets; the secondary assets such as canal network,
powerhouse etc; and the tertiary assets like agro industries, transmission lines etc; and (iii) for
the protection of life and property of people downstream of dams. A safe dam is one, which
performs its intended functions without imposing unacceptable risks to the public and society in
normal as well extreme conditions that may occur. The safe design of a dam calls for hydraulic
safety, seismic safety, foundation safety, structural safety, and hydro-mechanical safety
throughout the life of dam. The safety of a dam can be threatened by natural phenomena such
as floods, earthquakes, landslides and deterioration of construction materials with ageing
process. Safety of a dam can also be threatened by manmade causes arising from faulty
planning, inadequate design, poor quality of construction, insufficient maintenance, or improper
operation; or a combination of these factors.

Dam safety is thus considered an inherent function in the planning, design, construction,
maintenance and operation of dams. Over the time, these aspects have improved significantly
with the development of new investigation techniques, design tools, construction technologies
and materials. Many of the existing dams, which were built using the then available knowhow
and technologies, are not meeting the stringent provisions of the current times. Moreover, with
the current approach of greater risk aversion, some of these ageing dams may not be meeting
the safety standards and criteria of today. It has been generally recognized that a successful
dam safety assurance programme with a dedicated institutional structure is essential for
ensuring safety of all dams. In recognition of this need for a nation-wide initiative, Dam Safety
Organization was established in the Central Water Commission in 1979. Subsequently, CWC
has helped in setting up independent Dam Safety Organisations in most of the States. The

iii
National Committee on Dam Safety was also set up in 1987 to guide and oversee the activities
of the State Dam Safety Organizations.

With CWC initiative and World Bank funding, the Dam Safety Assurance & Rehabilitation
Project was implemented during 1991-1999, wherein in about 33 distressed dams of the country
were restored to good health. This project was the first of its kind in the whole World. As a
follow-up of this dam safety project, another project namely Dam Rehabilitation and
Improvement Project has now been taken up, again with World Bank assistance. This Six
year project has commenced from April, 2012, and is presently under implementation in Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka, and few more States are likely to join
shortly. Project targets rehabilitation of about 250 dams in DRIP States, besides strengthening
of the dam safety institutional capacities of State dam owning organizations and Central Water
Commission. DRIP will also improve upon the dam safety expertise of some of the identified
premier academic and research Institutions, including IIT Madras.

As part of institutional strengthening for dam safety, this First National Dam Safety
Conference is being organized by CWC jointly with Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department
and IIT- Madras. It is our intention to make the National Dam Safety Conference an annual
feature with subsequent events planned jointly with other DRIP States and Academic
Institutions. Focus of the Conference will be on effective application of knowledge and
technology to real-life problems faced by the dam safety professionals. The Conference is also
intended to bridge the knowledge gap between expert organizations, dam owners, research
institutes, and the industry. Topics for technical sessions of the Conference have been chosen
to reflect key concerns flagged during first three years of DRIP implementation. For the six
identified themes, very good responses have been received in terms of about 50 technical
papers contributed by professionals cutting across Expert organizations; Dam owning agencies;
Academia, Consulting firms and Industry. The industry response is also demonstrated by the
active involvement of about 15 firms in the Conference Exposition. The participation for the
Conference has also exceeded the originally set target with the registration of about 280
delegates from within India as well as from abroad.

I am confident that the deliberations during the Conference will not only be enlightening
to the professionals attending the Conference but also result in valuable recommendations for
strengthening the dam safety initiatives in the country. Success of this Conference will also help
in setting the bench-mark for future National Dam Safety Conferences.

Chennai Dr. B.R.K. Pillai


24 March 2015 Project Director (DRIP)
Central Water Commission

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First National Dam Safety Conference
24 - 25 March, 2015 IC&SR Auditorium, IITM, CHENNAI

Recommendations based on the deliberations during the Conference

TS-I: Design Flood Estimation and Dam safety Measures for Flood Mitigations

For dams with small catchment areas, storms having less than 24 hours duration
may be critical and should be adopted while assessing their design flood. It would be
worthwhile to adopt multiple storm durations to produce multiple inflow design flood
hydrographs to arrive at the most severe inflow design flood hydrograph.
Frequency of extreme events has been seen to be increasing in the South Indian
peninsula. More extensive data needs to be analyzed for establishing the reasons for
significant increasing trends in rainfall in this region. The impact of the likely increase
in extreme hydro-meteorological events on river valley projects should be addressed.
The Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) atlases form a comprehensive
knowledge bank which provide not only readily useable SPS/PMP estimates at sub
basin level/ grid points but also detailed data of around 700 storms for carrying out
project/ catchment specific SPS/PMP studies. Use of revised PMS atlas for design
flood reviews are recommended.
In case of blockage of rivers due to a major landslide, the information pertaining to
possible additional rise in river water level and warning time in the event of possible
dam breach is very important input for disaster management planning. The river
cross sections and other data along with breach modelling framework may be kept
ready so as to provide requisite information to concerned authorities at the shortest
possible time.
While carrying breach analysis of blockage of river due to land slide or any other
reason, the assessment of sediment volume likely to be generated during the event
should also be taken care of.
As hydrology is a dynamic process, the hydrological parameters such as design
flood, should be reviewed periodically, particularly when a significant hydro-
meteorological event occurs in the catchment of the project.
Impact on design flood due to cloud burst and GLOF needs to be analyzed and
incorporated in the practice.

TS-II: Risk assessment and emergency preparedness

The conference recommends that the efforts to ensure fail safe dam structures shall
be made with a timely release of the funds required for the purpose.
Institutional capacities of dam owning organizations as well as premier academic
institutes shall be improved to develop emergency action plans for every large dam in
the country and keep them updated.
The soundness and stability of dam abutments needs to be thoroughly investigated
and suitably featured in the dam design for mitigation of risks associated with
abutment failures.

TS-III: Institutional arrangements and good management practices for sustainable


dam safety

Dam safety organizations in every state and other dam owning authorities shall be
strengthened with adequate and qualified manpower.
Development of information system for monitoring the status of dam health and long
term data backup shall be taken up as priority.
Quality control set up for monitoring the quality of works during construction of new
dams or during dam rehabilitation shall be strengthened in each state.

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First National Dam Safety Conference
24 - 25 March, 2015 IC&SR Auditorium, IITM, CHENNAI

Recommendations based on the deliberations during the Conference

DRIP can provide the necessary initiative for a three-way collaboration involving
experts in technical organizations, dam owners and academic and research
institutions for effective implementation of new technologies in dam safety.
A suitable workflow process for dam rehabilitation works, similar to DRIP mechanism,
needs to be replicated by non DRIP states.

TS-IV: Latest Innovations and Methods for Monitoring Dam Health

State-of-art tools have become available at affordable costs for real time, automated
monitoring of dam behaviour. The dam owners are advised to make maximum use of
these technologies for ensuring the health and safety of their dams.
Pollution of dam reservoirs can have significant impact on the health of dams and
hence preventive measures are needed to check the entering of pollutants in dam
reservoirs.
Dam instrumentation is also vital for establishing the prevalent design philosophies
so as to improve upon them. All new dam constructions shall be encouraged to
incorporate such instrumentation preferably in collaboration with premier academic
and research institutes.

TS-V: New Materials and Methods for Dam Rehabilitation

Existing techniques of dam rehabilitation based on grouts, guniting, etc. may not be
effective in all cases. New techniques based on geomembranes, micro-fine cements,
fibre reinforced concrete and other chemical based grouts shall be adopted based on
sound engineering judgement.
Wherever appropriate, new materials and technologies shall be encouraged in a
select few dams so as to derive confidence on their performance, and also to scale
up their usage for financial viability of such new techniques.

TS-VI: Compliance with the Provisions of Design Standards Issues & Strategies for
Existing Dams

Periodic maintenance and adherence to codal requirements in dam construction is


important.
The relaxation of codal stipulations for rehabilitation of dams needs to be examined
case-to-case based on the site conditions, hazard potential and techno-economics.
The effect of alkali-silica slow reaction (ASSR) for dam rehabilitation works needs to
be validated through more field data. The phenomenon of Delayed Entringite
Formation (DEF) and its impact on dam concrete swelling needs to be investigated
on ageing concrete dams.

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First National Dam Safety Conference
24 - 25 March, 2015 IC&SR Auditorium, IITM, CHENNAI

Technical Session Plan

Technical Session 1: Design Flood Estimation and Dam Safety Measures for Flood Mitigation
Date & Time: 24 March 2015; 1130 1300 h
Chairman: Prof. K. Srinivasan, IITM
Co-Chairman: Shri. Rajan Nair, Former Chairman, Brahmaputra Board, Guwahati
Rapporteur: Shri. Bhopal Singh, Director, CWC

Technical Session 2: Risk Assessment and Emergency Preparedness


Date & Time: 24 March 2015; 1400 1530 h
Chairman: Shri. M.K. Gopalakrishnan, Former Member, CWC
Co-Chairman: Shri A.K. Ganju, Former Member, CWC
Rapporteur: Dr. Balaji Narasimhan, IITM

Technical Session 3: Institutional Arrangements and Good Management Practices for


Sustainable Dam Safety
Date & Time: 24 March 2015; 1600 1730 h
Chairman: Shri. A.K. Bajaj, Former Chairman, CWC
Co-Chairman: Shri S.R.Toley, Former Chief Engineer, CWC & Member DSRP. MP
Rapporteur: Shri Atul Jain, Chief Engineer, (HRM), CWC

Technical Session 4: Latest Innovations and Methods for Monitoring Dam Health
Date & Time: 25 March 2015; 0900 1030 h
Chairman: Shri. Ashwin B. Pandya, Chairman, CWC
Co-Chairman: Shri Suresh Chandra, Former Chairman, CWC
Rapporteur: Dr. Arun Menon, IITM; Email: arunmenon@iitm.ac.in

Technical Session 5: New Materials and Methods for Dam Rehabilitation


Date & Time: 25 March 2015; 1100 1230 h
Chairman: Mr. Jun Matsumoto, Task Team Leader, DRIP, World Bank
Co-Chairman: Shri Murari Ratnam, Director, CSMRS
Rapporteur: Dr. Manu Santhanam, IITM; Email: manus@iitm.ac.in

Technical Session 6: Compliance with the Provisions of Design Standards Issues &
Strategies for Existing Dams
Date & Time: 25 March 2015; 1330 1500 h
Chairman: Shri. R. Subramanian, Chairman, TN Cauvery Technical Cell
Co-Chairman: Shri R. Jeyaseelan, Former Chairman, CWC
Rapporteur: Shri Saibal Ghosh, Director, CWC

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CompendiumofTechnicalPapers

INDEX

S.N. Titleofpaper Page#


Foreword i
Preface ii
ConferenceIntroduction iii
ConferenceRecommendations v
TechnicalSessionPlan vii
1. FrequencyAnalysisforNonstationaryFloodSeries 1
NarendraKumarGoel,SunilPoudel,andRBJigajinni
2. PlanningofFloodStorageCapacitiesofUpstreamReservoirsforFloodMitigationatAkola 8
City
CABirajdar,RWNikum,ArunRNaikandSunandaNJagtap
3. FloodEstimateforPossibleDamBreakScenarioofSunKosiLandslideDam 16
N.N.RaiandO.P.Gupta
4. RoleofPMPAtlasinDesignFloodEstimation 23
M.RaghuramandRaviRanjan
5. TrendofAnnualOneDayMaximumRainfallSeriesoverSouthIndia 31
AshokeBasistha,PriyaNarayanan,RaviRanjanandAntonioPorcheddu
6. FailureofAnkamnhalMinorIrrigationDam Investigation 42
Y.K.Handa
7. DamBreakAnalysisABasicApproach 49
AntonioPorcheddu
8. AKnowledgeBasedSystemTechnologyforDamSafetyAnalysis 57
S.Mohan
9. DegreeofRiskofDamFailure 63
RameshNikum
10. RiskInformedDecisionMakingforDamMaintenanceandRehabilitationinIndia 71
BDasgupta,GScottandGWittmeyer
11. EmergencyActionPlanImplementationforDRIPDams 77
AntonioPorcheddu,PhilippeCleyetMerletandEdwardE.Flint
12. Atwodimensionaldambreakflowsimulationmodelforpreparingemergencyactionplans 82
SoumendraNathKuiry
13. DamSafetyStatusofDRIPDams TrendsandImprovementInitiatives 93
VinodKVerma,YokiVijayandGaranceBlaut
14. TemghardamAcasestudyofHandling of Seepages in Gravity Dams 102
IshwarChaudhari
15. ManagingOurWaterConservationAssetsRoleofDamSafety 110
A.B.Pandya,B.R.K.PillaiandManojKumar
16. OrganisationalSetupandMonitoringSystemsforSustainable DamSafetyinMaharashtra 126
State
K.S.VemulkondaandRameshNikum
17. IntegratedGeophysicalApproachforDamHealthChecks&DamConditionMonitoring 133
SanjayRana
18. DamSafetyChallengeanInstitutionalDiagnosis 139
AkshayaKumarDasandGopalPrasadRoy
19. DamSafetyandDripActivitiesinTamilNadu 149
V.D.Suresh,P.GunasekaranandV.Veeralakshmi
20. QualityManagementSystemsinCentralDamSafetyOrganisation 156
M.BhaskaraReddyandYokiVijay
21. LeveragingWebBasedApplicationsforMonitoringRehabilitationofDams 162
AmitKDasgupta,AjjayAroraandAnkitKumar
FirstNationalDamSafetyConference
2425March,2015IC&SRAuditorium,IITM,Chennai
CompendiumofTechnicalPapers

S.N. Titleofpaper Page#

22. DamSafetyInstrumentationwithCaseStudy 172


RajbalSingh
23. Assessment,InstrumentationandManagementofDams 178
MatthewA.Pavelchak,GabrielA.Jimenez,AndyYoung,andAbhijitShah
24. RealTimeInfrastructureMonitoringforDams(RTIM):UsingArtificialIntelligence(AI) 184
fordataanalysis
A.ToppleandG.Kilbride
25. MonitoringandAssessingReservoirsthrougheDAMs:AWirelessFieldMonitoring 191
ServerandRemoteRealitySensors(RRS)network
HiromichiFUKUI,B.BabuMadhavanandS.Nishadh
26. CaseStudyonWaterQualityandLimeLeachinginDams 196
N.Pandian,A.KalimuthuandE.Raju
27. ReservoirSedimentationasaChunkofDamHealth:AGlimpseofRealWorldPractices 203
andtheStateoftheArtApproaches
SanjayGiri
28. SediconDredgingasEffectiveMethodofSedimentRemovalfromReservoirs 211
TomJacobsenandSudhirGupta
29. UseofPozzollanicMaterialsforMinimisingtheRiskofAlkaliAggregateReactionin 218
Concrete
MurariRatnam,N.V.MahureandPankajSharma
30. PreventiveMeasuresofAlkaliAggregateReactioninHardenedConcrete 227
RajeevKumar,RajeevGuptaandN.K.Khoth
31. BasaltFiberandRebar:AConstructionMaterialofFuture 234
SudhirGuptaandN.Nalini
32. MicrofineCementgroutsanditsapplications 239
A.V.Shroff
33. RepairofDamagesinDistressedMasonryDamsACaseStudy 251
A.V.Patil,S.J.Pillai,R.Vigneswaran,K.Balachandran,S.D.PingaleandRizwanAli
34. StateoftheArtontheApplicationsofGeosyntheticsforDamRepairandRehabilitation 257
K.RajagopalandD.N.Arnepalli
35. AnOverviewofKonarDamonNeedofRehabilitation 269
DipankarChaudhuri,A.K.Dubey,andS.B.Pandey
36. GeosyntheticswaterbarriersinKadamparaidam:observedbehaviourofits 277
exposedgeomembraneafter10yearsofinstallation
V.Subramanian
37. ABriefStudyofArchDamsBehaviour 283
B.R.K.Pillai,ZikaSmiljkovicandA.K.Dhawan
38. FailureofspillwayradialgateofNarayanapurDaminKarnataka acasestudy 292
N.Srinivas
39. FailureofBarrageGates:CaseStudyofFarrakaBarrageProject 298
GulshanRajandAmitRanjan
40. BasicApproachforAnalysisofEarthquakeResponseofDams 305
ZikaSmiljkovicandA.K.Dhawan
41. ManagingGeotechnicalInstabilitiesofAbutmentsforDamSafety 312
R.K.Gupta
42. BasicDesignProvisionsforExistingDams 318
C.S.Mathur,ManojKumarandAnkitKumar
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Frequency Analysis for Non-stationary Flood Series


Narendra Kumar Goel Sunil Poudel
Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee
goelhy@gmail.com

R.B. Jigajinni
Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee

ABSTRACT
There are many physical processes or factors that could lead to non-stationarity in a flood series. Changes in the
land use within the catchment area, such as urbanization, could be expected to increase the mean of the flood
series. A standard assumption in flood frequency analysis is that the available data represent a stationary series
i.e. past data series are representative of future data series. This requirement of stationarity is not always satisfied
in practical applications. The objective of this paper is to investigate the presence of non stationarity in annual
maximum daily rainfall and annual flood series and quantify its impact on the frequency estimates. The focus in
the present work is on Zone 3, which is one of the seven hydro meteorologically homogeneous zones of the
country. This zone covers the river basins of central India. This zone has been further divided into the 9 sub-
zones. Sub-zones 3 (g) and 3 (i) have not been considered in the present study because of the lack of
hydrometric data for these sub-zones. Furthermore, some of the hydrometric gauging locations have been
excluded from analysis either because of very short data records or because screening of the extreme flow data
revealed data that were suspect. The summary of test results for short-term and long-term dependence indicates
that 9.21% annual flood series show short-term dependence and 17.10% show long-term dependence. 9.76%
annual daily maximum rainfall series show short-term dependence and 11.22% show long-term dependence. The
conditional probabilities of existence of long-term dependence when the series has passed short-term
dependence tests are 18.84% and 12.64% for annual flood series and annual daily maximum rainfall series
respectively. The probabilities are fairly high and there is no reason to disregard them. Hence, if a series shows
short-term independence, one should still investigate for long-term dependence. From the frequency analysis, it is
quite evident that on the independence assumption, when the series is in fact non-stationary leads to
underestimation of quantiles. This underestimation increases with the increase in return period. This has also
been found to be directly related with the Hurst coefficient. The under estimation due to independence
assumption were obtained as per the procedure explained in the previous section. The results indicate that the
assumption of independence, when the series is in fact non-stationary leads to under estimation of flood
quantiles. This underestimation has been found to be increasing with increase in return period and Hurst
coefficient (K). Long-term dependence, if present in a data series, increases degree of uncertainty
associated with extreme flow quantiles.

1. INTRODUCTION

There are many physical processes or factors that could lead to non-stationarity in a flood series.
Changes in the land use within the catchment area, such as urbanization, could be expected to lead to
changes (increases) in the mean of the flood series. Changes to the climatic conditions (e.g., as a
results of global warming) could result in changes to both the mean of the flood series and also to the
variability of the flood series (Burn, 1998). In addition, the physical characteristics of the catchment
area could contribute to non- stationarity in the flood series. An example of this is a river that is
downstream of a large lake that exerts a natural storage effect resulting in persistence (short-term or
long-term) in the flow series.

Standard approaches to flood frequency analysis invariably include, as an initial step, an examination
of the flood series for trends and other indications of non-stationarity (see, for example, Pilon and
Harvey, 1994). If a series does not pass the prescribed tests for stationarity, little guidance is given as
to how to proceed. However, often an estimate for a design flood quantile is still required for a river
that demonstrates non-stationarity. This paper attempts to address the issue of non-stationarity in
peak flood and rainfall data. A particular focus of this work is on zone 3 of central India.

Previous work includes that of Wall and Englot (1985) who investigated the dependence between
annual peak flows from Pennsylvania streams to determine if basin carryover effects were related to
the degree of dependence. They concluded that the assumption of independence of annual peak
flows is valid in flood frequency analysis for Pennsylvania streams. Knox (1984) estimated flood

1
Compendium of Technical Papers

quantiles for the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minnesota for four climatic periods and observed large
differences in extreme flood quantiles. Webb and Betancourt (1992) observed an increase in flood
magnitudes on the Santa Cruz River, in Arizona, in recent decades due in large part to an increase in
floods from dissipating tropical storms during El Nino years.

Booy and Morgan (1985) analyzed the annual flood record of the Red River at Winnipeg, Manitoba
and found that the record demonstrates clustering of high flood events. This clustering increases the
uncertainty in the parameters of the probability distribution of peak flows estimated from the record.
Booy and Morgan used a fractional Gaussian noise model to generate a time series having an
appropriate degree of clustering and Bayes theorem to update the distribution parameters. Their
results show the flood risk to the City of Winnipeg and the Red River Valley to be substantially higher
than was estimated by a conventional approach.

Booy and Lye (1989) analyzed 49 annual peak flow series for Canadian rivers and found that many
exhibit long-term persistence. Lye and Lin (1994) analyzed the serial correlation structure of 90
Canadian rivers for both short-term and long-term dependence. It was found that significant long-term
dependence, as measured by the Hurst coefficient, is present in a large number of rivers and that
when a peak flow series shows short-term independence, there is still a fairly high probability of long-
term dependence.
Villarini et al. (2009) prepared new model to dynamically capture the evolution of probability density
function over time. He studied Charlotte of North Carolina which witnessed extensive urban and sub
urban development over past 40 years. GAMLSS package is used to model annual peak discharge.
GAMLSS package is used to model the nonstationary series and to determine the flood frequency
using two parameters distribution over future decades.

The next sections of this paper provide the details of the study area and data used. This is followed by
the results of the tests used for investigating the non-stationarity. The assessment of impact of non-
stationarity on frequency estimates is presented next.

2. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA

The focus in the present work is on Zone 3, which is one of the seven hydro meteorologically
homogeneous zones of the country. This zone covers the river basins of central India. This zone has
been further divided into the 9 sub-zones. Sub-zones 3 (g) and 3 (i) have not been considered in the
present study because of the lack of hydrometric data for these sub-zones. Furthermore, some of the
hydrometric gauging locations have been excluded from analysis either because of very short data
records or because screening of the extreme flow data revealed data that were suspect. The
summary information presented in Table 1 is for the 76 gauge and discharge sites that are analyzed in
this work. These data sets have been compiled from various reports of Central Water Commission.
The criterion for selection is that each series should have 20 or more observations.

Table 1: Summary of annual flood data used

Sub- Number of Catchment Record Length


Zone River Basin Sites Area (km2) (years)

3 (a) Mahi and Sabarmati 4 30.1- 1094 20 25

3 (b) Lower Narmada and Tapi 9 17.2- 284.9 21-28

3 (c) Upper Narmada and Tapi 12 41.8- 2110.8 20 30


3 (d) Mahanadi 17 30-1150 20 31
3 (e) Upper Godavari 8 31.3 2227.4 21 32
3 (f) Lower Godavari 15 35 824 21-29
3 (g) Indravati 0
3 (h) Krishna and Penner 11 31.72 1690 22 32
3 (i) Kaveri 0

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

The annual daily maximum rainfall series from 205 raingauge stations are selected for the analysis.
The raingauge stations are located in and around zone 3 and are spread over Kerala, Tamilnadu ,
Karnataka , Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra , Gujarat , Orissa , Bihar and West Bengal. These states
cover an area of approximately 1.6 million Km2. These data sets have been obtained from India
Meteorological Department (IMD). The summary of raingauge stations is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Summary of rainfall data used in the study

State Number of rain gauge stations Record length (years)

Andhra Pradesh 24 20-96


Bihar 6 55-96

Gujarat 25 22-95
Karnataka 27 22-96
Kerala 10 20-97
Maharashtra 46 21-97
Orissa 15 23-96
Tamilnadu 31 23-95
West Bengal 21 27-96

3. INVESTIGATION OF NON-STATIONARITY

In this work, non-stationarity due to short term dependence and long term dependence (Hurst
phenomenon) only has been examined. The short-term dependence was examined using: (i) the
median crossing test (Fisz, 1963); (ii) the turning point test (Kendall and Stuart, 1976); (iii) the rank
difference test (Meacham, 1968); (iv) Kendalls rank correlation test (Kendall, 1970); (v) the run test
(Guttman et al.,1971); (vi) the linear regression test ( Kottegoda, 1980); (vii) the Wald-Wolfowitz test
(Wald and Wolfowitz, 1943); (viii) the runs above and below the median test (Shiau and Condie, 1980);
(ix) the rank Von Neumann ratio test (Madansky, 1988); (x) the Von Neumann ratio test (Madansky,
1988); and (xi) the auto correlation test (Yevjevich, 1971). A wide range of tests was selected as
different statistical tests for dependence have been designed under different assumptions and
conditions, and these do not have equal power in discriminating between time series, which are not
truly random. The power of tests depends upon the nature of the dependence present and on the
length of the record. Hence, sometimes, various tests employed give different conclusions for the
same series. This means that a flood series can fail one test of independence but pass the other tests.
This can clearly be seen in the results. Due to this, it is difficult to say whether a flood series is
independent or not based only on the result of one test. Therefore several tests have been applied
before arriving at any conclusion. It has been assumed in this analysis that, for short-term
dependence, at least four out of eleven short-term dependence tests applied to each data sequence
should indicate dependence. Lye and Lin (1994) and Jigajinni (2001) provide the description of each
of the tests used herein for short-term dependence.

Long-term dependence was measured by the Hurst coefficient, K (Hurst, 1951). The nonparametric
bootstrap approach (Efron, 1979; Lye and Lin, 1994 and Jigajinni, 2001) was used to test whether or
not the computed Hurst coefficient was greater, at the 5% significance level, than the values from
other generated samples, as follows:

(i) Suppose that the annual flow series X1, X2,........,Xn are independent observations. Each Xi
has the same probability of occurrence, which equals 1/n.
(ii) Generate a uniform random data i between one and n, then choose Xi as one point in the boot
strap sample. Repeat this step n-time to generate a boot strap sample of the same size n as
the original sample.
(iii) Calculate Hursts K for the boot strap sample.
(iv) Repeat steps (ii) and (iii) a large number of times (10,000 times in this study).

3
Compendium of Technical Papers

(v) Count the number of times the observed K value of the sample is exceeded by the
10,000 boot strapped K values.
(vi) Calculate P value given by No. of K K obs.
P value
10,000
Hence, if the P value is less than the specified significance level, it is concluded that the sample being
tested is long-term dependent at the specified level; otherwise it has no long-term dependence.

4. ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL FLOOD SERIES AND ANNUAL DAILY MAXIMUM RAINFALL SERIES

Information of annual flood and rainfall series analyzed including length of record, mean, standard
deviation, coefficient of skewness, coefficient of kurtosis, lag-one serial correlation. Annual flood series
data are in cumecs and annual daily maximum rainfall series are in mm. For annual flood series the
record length ranges from 20 to 32 years. Lag-one serial correlation varies from 0.476 to 0.715. Many
rivers have fairly high Hursts K. Hursts K varies from 0.4507 to 0.9381 with an average of 0.6993. For
annual daily maximum rainfall series, r1 varies from 0.4350 to 0.650 with an average of 0.0119 and
Hursts coefficient K from 0.4655 to 0.9521 with an average of 0.6427.

In annual flood series, 90.79% series show short-term independence and 82.90% series show long-
term independence. In annual daily maximum rainfall series, 90.24% series indicate short-term
independence and 88.78% series exhibit long-term independence. For short-term tests, maximum
number of annual flood series i.e. 15.79% fail in Wald-Wolfowitz test and next, 13.16% in Von
Neumann ratio test. None fails in run above and below the median test. In annual daily maximum
rainfall series, maximum number of data series i.e. 14.63% fail in Kendalls rank correlation test and
next, 13.66% of data series fail in linear regression test.

The summary of test results for short-term and long-term dependence indicates that 9.21% annual
flood series show short-term dependence and 17.10% show long-term dependence. 9.76% annual
daily maximum rainfall series show short-term dependence and 11.22% show long-term dependence.

The conditional probabilities of existence of long-term dependence when the series has passed short-
term dependence tests are 18.84% and 12.64% for annual flood series and annual daily maximum
rainfall series respectively. The probabilities are fairly high and there is no reason to disregard them.
Hence, if a series shows short-term independence, one should still investigate for long-term
dependence.

5. IMPACT OF NON-STATIONARITY ON FREQUENCY ESTIMATES

In order to examine the impact of any dependencies in the data on the extreme flow and rainfall
estimates, synthetic sequences that preserve the important characteristics of the available data set
including any non-stationarity present in the data set, are generated. The intent with the data
generation process is to examine other possible sequences that are plausible given the information
available for the site. Information from the generated sequences can then be used to estimate impact
of non- stationarity on various flood and rainfall quantiles. Data sequences were generated using a
mixed noise model (Booy and Lye, 1989). This model is given by

X t w a a X (a)
t1 t
(a)
w b b X (b)
t1 t
(b)
w c c X (c)
t1 t
(c)

w d d X (d)
t1 t
(d)

where, wa , wb , wc and wd are weights , and a ,b , c and d are serial correlation coefficients, t(a) ,
t , t , t are independent processes , having zero mean and variances (1-a ) , (1-b ) , (1-c ) ,
(b) (c) (d) 2 2 2

2
(1-d ) respectively.

Sequences are generated by a FORTRAN-program for mixed-noise model. First, for given lag-one
serial correlation and Hurst K of original series, parameters of mixed-noise model i.e. wa, wb, wc , wd ,
a, b, c and d are computed as per procedure given by (Booy and Lye, 1989). Normal distributed
random numbers are first generated. These are then transformed into Gamma distributed random

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

numbers, in order to account for coefficient of skewness. In this study, two types of data sets are
generated.

(i) 1000 samples of 100 years length having r1 and K of original series.
(ii) 1000 samples of 100 years length having r1 =0.0 and K=0.5 i.e. independent case.

The intent with the mixed noise model is to preserve in the generated data sequences both the short-
term and long-term dependence observed in the available data record. In particular, this modelling
approach is designed to reproduce, on average, the lag one serial correlation coefficient and the Hurst
coefficient, K.

In order to quantify the impact of non-stationarity, quantiles for 50 years, 100 years, 200 years return
period were computed using General Extreme Value distribution and probability weighted moments
(PWM) method for each of the generated samples. For 1000 long-term generated samples (with r1 and
Hurst K of original series) and for 1000 independent samples (with r1 = 0.0, Hursts K = 0.5) the
expected values of flood quantiles for return periods for 50, 100, 200 years i.e. E (Q50), E (Q100), E
(Q200) were computed.

In annual flood series, 13 series have long-term dependence and remaining series show no long-term
dependence. Average Hursts K for series, having long-term dependence is 0.8324 and for those not
having long-term dependence are 0.6754 i.e. Hursts K is significant at 0.8324. Expected values of
flood quantiles for 50 years, 100 years and 200 years return periods for the two cases are computed.
For annual flood series with long-term dependence, maximum underestimation for 50 years return
period is 44.28% and it increases to 54.20% for 100 years return period and 64.26% for 200 years
return period.

Similarly, for annual daily maximum rainfall series only 23 series have long-term dependence with
average Hursts K as 0.7630.The maximum underestimation for 50 years return period is 30.88% and
it goes up to 42.28% for 100 years return period and 54.83% for 200 years return period.

From the analysis, it is quite evident that on the independence assumption, when the series is in fact
non-stationary leads to underestimation of quantiles. This underestimation increases with the increase
in return period. This has also been found to be directly related with the Hurst coefficient. For obtaining
this variation 1000 samples of 100 years length were generated for each of the series for the two
cases viz. (i) samples having r1 and K of original series, and (ii) samples having r1 =0.0 and K=0.5 i.e.
independent case. The under estimation due to independence assumption were obtained as per the
procedure explained in the previous section. For a return period of 100 years the underestimation has
been found to be linearly varying with Hurst coefficient (K) as follows:
Y= 53.495 X- 27.89; r=0.69, Where, Y is % underestimation in 100 years return period quantile, X is
Hursts coefficient (K) and r is coefficient of correlation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

For estimating the flood quantile, the assumption that the data series is random, stationary and
representative of population, sometimes may not hold good. Based on the analysis of 76 annual flood
series and 205 annual daily maximum rainfall series, pertaining to Zone 3 of India, the following
conclusions may be drawn.

(i) Before estimation of flood quantiles, the data series should be investigated not only for short
term dependence, but also for long-term dependence. Both short-term dependence and long-
term dependence have far reaching effects on estimation of flood quantiles for different return
periods.
(ii) In this study, conditional probability of existence of long-term dependence when the series have
passed short-term dependence tests are high i.e., 18.84% for annual flood series, and 12.64%
for annual daily maximum series. These probabilities are fairly high and therefore, if a series
shows short-term independence, one must further investigate for long-term dependence. The
long-term dependence should not be disregarded unlike in traditional flood frequency analysis, it
should be taken into account as it may significantly increase the risk associated with future peak
flows.

5
Compendium of Technical Papers

(iii) Data sequences can be generated using mixed noise model (Booy and Lye, 1989). The intent
with mixed noise model is to preserve in the generated data sequences both short-term and
long-term dependence observed in the original series i.e. this model can produce, on average,
the lag one serial correlation coefficient and Hursts coefficient K of original series.
(iv) Long-term dependence, if present in a data series, increases degree of uncertainty associated
with extreme flow quantiles.

The results obtained by this study are based on annual flood and annual daily maximum rainfall series
of zone-3. Similar study should be taken up for other series also such as, annual maximum
temperature series, annual maximum wind velocity series, and annual daily maximum evaporation
series, etc. in order to evaluate any long term non-stationarity in these parameters.

AKCNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors are thankful to Prof. D.H. Burn for providing guidance to carry out this study and improving several
sections of this study.

REFERENCES

Booy, C. and Lye, L.M. (1989). A new look at flood risk determination, Water Resources Bulletin, 25(5), 933-943.
Booy, C. and Morgan, D.R. (1985). The effect of clustering of flood peaks on a flood risk analysis for the Red
River, Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 12, 150-165.
Bradley, A.A. (1998). Regional frequency analysis methods for evaluating changes in hydrologic extremes, Water
Resources Research, 34(4), 741-750.
Burn, D.H. (1998). Climatic change impacts on hydrologic extremes and the implications for reservoirs,
Proceeding of The Second International Conference on Climate and Water, Espoo, Finland, Volume 1, 273-281.
Efron, B. (1979). Bootstrap methods: another look at the jackknife, Annals of Statistics, 7, 1-26.
Fisz, M. (1963). Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics, Wiley, New York.
Guttman, I., Wilks, S.S. and Hunter, J.S. (1971). Introductory Engineering Statistics, Wiley, New York.
Hurst, H.E. (1951). Long term storage capacity of reservoirs, Transactions American Society of Civil Engineering,
116, 770-808.
Jigajinni, R.B. ( 2001). Estimation of flood quantiles from non-stationary flood series. Unpublished M.E. Thesis,
Department of Hydrology, University of Roorkee, 78p.
Kendall, M. and Stuart, A. (1976). The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 3, Charles Griffin, London.
rd
Kendall, M. (1970). Rank Correlation Methods, 3 Edition, Charles Griffin, London.
Knox, J.C. (1984). Fluvial response to small scale climate changes, in Developments and Applications of
Geomorphology, edited by J.E. Costa andP.J. Fisher, Springer-Verlag, New York, 318-342.
Kottegoda, N.T. (1980). Stochastic Water Resources Technology, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Kubik, H.E. (1992). Annual extreme lake elevations by tot al probability theorem, Journal of Great Lakes
Research, 18(1), 202-206.
Lye, L.M. and Lin, Y. (1994). Long-term dependence in annual peak flows ofCanadian rivers, Journal of
Hydrology, 160, 89-103.
Madansky, A. (1988). Prescriptions for Working Statisticians,Springer, New York.
Meacham, I. (1968). Correlation in sequential data three sampleindicators, Civil Engineering Transactions of
the Institute of Engineers ofAustralia, CE10(2), 225-228.
Pilon, P.J. and Harvey, K.D. (1994). Consolidated Frequency Analysis(CFA), Version 3.1 Reference Manual,
Environment Canada, Ottawa.
Potter, K.W. (1992). Estimating the probability distribution of annual maximum levels on the Great Lakes, Journal
of Great Lakes Research,18(1), 229-235.
Shiau, S.Y. and Condie, R. (1980). Statistical test for independence,trend, homogeneity and randomness,
Hydrologic Applications Division, WaterResources Branch, Inland Waters Directorate, Environment Canada,
Ottawa.

6
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Strelchuk, D.L. (1976). Multivariable flood level frequency distributions,Journal of Hydraulic Division, ASCE,
102(12), 1737-1744.
Villarini, G., Smith, J. A., Serinaldi, F., Bales, J., Bates, P. D., & Krajewski, W. F. (2009). Flood frequency analysis
for nonstationary annual peak records in an urban drainage basin. Advances in Water Resources, 32(8), 1255-
1266.
Wald, A. and Wolfowitz, J. (1943). An exact test for randomness in the non-parametric case based on serial
correlation, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 14, 378-388.
Wall, D.J. and Englot, M. (1985). Correlation of annual peak flows for Pennsylvania streams, Water Resources
Bulletin, 21(3), 459-464.
Webb, R.H. and Betancourt, J.L. (1992). Climatic variability and flood frequency of the Santa Cruz River, Pima
County, Arizona, U.S. GeologicalSurvey Water Supply Paper 2379.
Yevjevich, V. (1971). Stochastic Processes in Hydrology, WaterResources Publications, Fort Collins, CO.

7
Compendium of Technical Papers

Planning of Flood Storage Capacities of Upstream Reservoirs for


Flood Mitigation at Akola City
C. A. Birajdar R. W. Nikum
Director General Chief Engineer
Maharashtra Engineering Research Institute, Nashik Maharashtra Engineering Training Academy
patodgmeri@gmail.com Nashik

Arun R. Naik Sunanda N. Jagtap


Superintending Engineer Executive Engineer
Command Area Development Authority Designs Division (Power House 1)
Aurangabad Central Designs Organization
Nashik

ABSTRACT
The function of a flood-mitigation / storage reservoir is to retain a portion of the flood inflow so as to minimize the
flood peak at the point to be protected. In an ideal case, the reservoir is situated immediately upstream from the
protected area and is operated to cut off the flood peak. This is accomplished by discharging all reservoir inflow
until the outflow reaches the safe capacity of the channel downstream. All flow above this rate is stored until inflow
drops below the safe channel capacity, and the stored water is released to recover storage capacity for the next
flood. Since the reservoir is situated immediately upstream from the point to be protected, the hydrograph at that
point is the same as that released at the dam, and the peak has been reduced.

While doing various trials , to facilitate planning of Upstream reservoirs namely the following guiding principles
are generally considered to restrict the flood peak at, to be protected area.

(i) In order to restrict the flood peak at, to be protected area, flood storage capacity would be exclusively
necessary and not flood absorption capacity. It means the flood storage capacity would be provided below
FRL.
(ii) The spillway capacity of all these reservoirs will have to be designed as per criteria laid down by BIS 11223-
1985.
(iii) In case irrigation, domestic water supply, Industrial water supply etc. is planned from these dams, the flood
storage capacity would be over and above the live storage capacity required for the above purposes.
(iv) All flood volume which is required to be retained in any reservoir should be in the capacity available above
crest of spillway.

Keywords: Flood Storage, Flood Mitigation, Inflow Hydrograph, Restricted Inflow

1. CASE STUDY: FLOOD MITIGATION AT AKOLA CITY, MAHARASHTRA

Akola city is situated on the banks of the Morna river. Heavy floods were experienced during the year
August 83 & August 1994 because of which lot of damages occurred in the city.

Protection work of Akola city included a scheme as under :

(1) Part I : To widen and remove the obstructions in the river channel.
(2) Part II: To construct protection Bunds on both the banks of Morna river.

Government further directed to work out, what should be the flood magnitude to protect the Akola City
from flood hazards. Also to take into account the flood moderation which is likely to take place in all the
upstream reservoirs, existing projects, under construction and future projects.
The study had been undertaken in Water Planning Division of Central Designs Organization, (Earth
Dam), Nasik.

2. APPROACH TO STUDY

In the light of above, two approaches have been studied in Central Designs Organization,
(i) To estimate the flood for design of Flood Protection Works at Akola.

8
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

estrict the flo


(ii) To re ood at Akola a within the safe
s channel carrying cap
pacity of Morna river by providing
upstream reservo oirs for flood
d moderation.

2.1 Triall Studies to Restrict the


e Flood at Akola
A City

Compute er program in
i EXCEL iss used for ca
arrying out various
v trials
s. In doing th
hese trial stu
udies the
following
g concept has been used.

2.2 Conc
cept

While m moderating thet flood hyydrographs through 4 reservoirs, restricted re eleases are planned
througho out the flood event, and the flood oveer and above these releases are sim multaneouslyy retained
in the flo
ood storage capacities
c off the reservo
oirs. Graphica ation of conccept used is shown in
al representa
Fig. 1

Figure 1: In
nflow Outflow Hydrograph

SCRIPTION OF
3. DES O THE CAT
TCHMENT

The tota al catchment of upto Ako ola city is 652 2.92 sq km. Akola city is s situated onn the banks of Morna
river. Moorna river is a tributary off Purna riverr. Purna riverr is left bank
k of tributary of Tapi riverr. Vidrupa
river, a right
r hand tributary of Mo orna river me eets upstream of Akola city.
c The catcchment area a of Akola
city is sh
hown in Platee 1.

The interrcepted catchment area upto Akola city


c are as be
elow :

Table 1: Catchment
C Arrea Details

Sr. N
No. Catchmentt Are
ea sq km
a) Upper Morn
na 80.94
b) Middle
e Morna Uninttercepted 103.50
c) Lowerr Morna Unintercepted 129.00
d) Dhapedwad da 82.60
e) Unintercepte
ed 256.88
TOTAL 652.92

9
Compendium of Technical Papers

4. DESIGN FLOOD CONSIDERED

For flood of 100 years frequency for works pertaining to protection of town, important industrial and
other vital installations. Accordingly 1 in 100 year return flood is considered in the study.
( IS:12094 )

5. ESTIMATION OF 1 IN 100 YEAR FLOOD AT AKOLA CITY

Normally 1 in 100 year flood can be estimated by carrying out frequency analysis, by fitting a
frequency distribution in a particular set of data. The annual peak data of minimum 20 years length of
record is essential to carryout flood frequency analysis. Normally flood frequency analysis gives peak
figure only. Whereas for integrated planning of reservoirs, full flood hydrograph would be essential,
since we are interested in retaining part of flood hydrograph in upstream dams and releasing part of
it.(IS:5477-1971 Part-4)

Clarks method is used for developing unit hydrograph. (Kolher)

Using storm depths & time distribution respectively, the inflow flood hydrographs corresponding to 1 in
100 year frequency flood hydrograph at Upper Morna, Middle Morna, Lower Morna, Dagadparva and
Akola (unintercepted catchment) site are worked out.

5.1 Time of Travel

In order to combine these flood hydrographs, to get combined flood hydrograph at Akola City, suitable
time lag, i.e. time of travel is assumed based on the experience.
Time of travel assumed is shown below.

Table 2: Travel Time

Sr.No. Time of Travel Time of Travel


In terms of Time in
From Upto
Tcal hours
1 Upper Morna Dam site Middle Morna dam site 1.0 Tcal 6
2 Middle Morna dam site Lower Morna dam site 1.0 Tcal 4
3 Lower Morna dam site Confluence of Morna and Vidrupa rivers 0.6 Tcal 5
4 Dagadparva dam site Confluence of Morna and Vidrupa rivers 0.6 Tcal 4
5 Confluence Akola City 0.6 Tcal 2

The flood at various nodes are channel routed so as to take into effect valley storage and time of travel
for finding out the effect of all these sub catchments floods at Akola City.

5.2 Base Flow

The base flow observed during 31st August 1994 at Middle Morna dam site is of the order of 39.5
cumecs to 72.9 cumecs from the catchment area of 184.43 sq.km. From this, rate of base flow is
worked out as 0.3 cumecs /sq.km. With this rate the base flow for other sub catchments is worked out
as follows :
Table 3: Catchment wise Base flow

Sr.N C.A. Base flow


Sub catchment name Type of catchment
o in sq.km. in cumecs.
1 Upper Morna Total 80.94 24.28
2 Middle Morna Unintercepted 103.50 30.92
3 Lower Morna Unintercepted 129.00 38.85
4 Dagadparva Total 82.60 24.78
Akola below Dagadparva and
5 Unintercepted 256.88 77.07
Lower Morna Dam site.

All these sub catchments inflow flood hydrographs are lagged by suitable time lag and combined to
get 1 in 100 year frequency flood hydrograph at Akola City. This is shown in Plate 2. This 1 in 100

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

year frequency flood hydrograph at Akola City has a peak of 1822.36 cumecs and is considered for
further analysis.

Peaks of individual flood hydrographs from various sub-basins are shown below:

Table 4: Catchment wise Flood Peak

Sr.No. Sub Catchment Peak Corresponding To 1 In 100 Year


Flood in Cumecs
1 Upper Morna 897.57
2 Middle Morna 764.99
3 Lower Morna 1199.42
4 Dagadparva 841.05
5 Unintercepted catchment below Lower Morna and 457.89
Dagadparva
6 Entire Virgin Catchment 2335

These sub catchments inflow flood hydrographs are to be used for planning of respective upstream
reservoirs.

6. FLOOD STORAGE CAPACITIES PLANNED

Flood storage capacities are computed on the basis of basic data furnished by the field officers as
follows :
a) Upper Morna Project
(i) Gross Storage Capacity @ 104 M = 13.59 MCM
(ii) Dead Storage = 0.75 MCM
(iii) Irrigation requirement = 5.68 MCM
Flood storage capacity available = 7.16 MCM

b) Middle Morna Project This is a completed ungated dam, hence no storage capacity
available.

c) Lower Morna Project


(i) Gross Storage @ FRL 321.3 M = 17.34 MCM
(ii) Dead Storage = 2.38 MCM
Flood storage capacity available = 14.96 MCM

d) Dagadparva Project
(i) Gross Storage @ FRL 319.45 M = 23.48 MCM
(ii) Drinking Water Supply = 10.19 MCM
(iii) Dead Storage = 1.88 MCM
Flood Storage Capacity available = 11.41 MCM

7. RESULTS OF STUDIES

While moderating the respective flood hydrographs corresponding to the 1 in 100 years flood
hydrograph through various upstream reservoirs namely Upper Morna, Middle Morna, Lower Morna
and Dagadparva. Part of respective flood hydrograph is retained within the flood storage capacities
assumed and a restricted outflow is released through respective upstream flood control reservoirs.
Then the net effect at Akola City, of all the outflow releases from various upstream reservoirs, together
with the unintercepted catchment flow downstream of Lower Morna and Dagadparva dams are worked
out allowing suitable time lag. These studies carried out will be useful to formulate tentative guide
lines. These tentative guide lines will facilitate planning of these three reservoirs namely Upper Morna,
Lower Morna, and Dagadparva reservoirs with an objective to restrict the flood at Akola City.

Inglis flood at Akola city works out to 3194 cumecs for virgin condition. 1 in 100 year return period
flood at Akola city works out to 1822.36.cumecs without moderation of flood in upstream. If upstream

11
Compendium of Technical Papers

reservoirrs are operatted well, utilizing their flood storage capacity, th


he flood at Akola city worrks out to
umecs.. The inflow, outflo
931.4 cu ow, flood hyddrographs is shown in Plaate 3.

Thereforre it can be seen that thhrough a pro oper planninng and opera ation of upstream reservvoirs, the
flood dowwnstream ca an be moderrated to a larrge extent. Itt is more judicious to mo
oderate the fllood than
to provid
de flood prote
ection work as
a it rules out the drainag
ge problem / dewatering of o interceptin
ng nallas.

REFRENCES:

1. IIS : 5477 - 197


71 Method forr Fixing Capaccities of Reserrvoir (Part1 to Part 4)
2. IIS: 11223 - 19
985 Guideliness for Fixing Sp
pillway Capaciity
3. IIS: 12094- 19887 - Guideline
es for Planning
g and Design ofo River Emba ankments (Lev
vees)
4. CChapter 19 PW WD Handbookk for Hydrolog gy
5. EEngineering Hydrology:
H Linssley Kohler

Figure 1. Plate
e1

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Figure 2. Graph
h1

Figure 3. Graph
h2

Figure 4. Graph
h3

13
Compendium of Technical Papers

Figure 5. Graph
h4

Figure 6. Graph
h5

Figure 7. Graph
h6

14
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Figure 8. Graph
h7

Figure 9. Graph
h8

15
Compendium of Technical Papers

Flood Estimate for possible Dam Break Scenario


of Sun Kosi Landslide Dam
N.N.Rai
Director, Central Water Commission, New Delhi, India
Email: nnraicwc@gmail.com

O.P.Gupta
Director, Central Water Commission, New Delhi, India

ABSTRACT
Blockage of rivers due to landslides in Himalayas and consequent formation of lakes behind landslide dams
poses a major threat of flash flood to downstream areas due to possible breaching of such dams. Because
landslide dams are natural phenomena, they are vulnerable to failure by overtopping and breaching. In past a
number of flash flood events due to breaching of landslide dams on river Parechu, Kurichhu etc occurred. For an
effective disaster management planning, it is essential to have an estimate of lake volume behind landslide dam,
dam break flood due to possible breaching of such dam, attenuation and translation pattern of dam break flood. In
majority of cases getting the input data for having the above estimate is not possible. In the present paper an
attempt has been made to discuss the methodology for estimating the flood scenario due to possible breaching of
landslide dams, using the input data, which can be easily obtained from open sources. The methodology has
been presented through a case study of Sun Kosi landslide dam, which was formed due to a major landslide that
took place on 02.08.2014 in the upper reaches of Sun Kosi river in Sindhupalchowk district of Nepal. For effective
disaster management planning in the downstream reaches of Nepal and Bihar (India), it was essential to estimate
the possible rise in river water level in the event of landslide dam breach and travel time of flood peak. At the time
of landslide dam formation, the available input data was latitude, longitudes of landslide dam site and fetch of the
lake thus formed. To have a realistic estimate of possible rise in river water level and travel time of flood peak at
different downstream locations, in event of possible dam breach, better estimate of lake volume, catchment
details at landslide dam site and river cross sections from landslide dam location upto Kosi barrage were
essential. Based on the latitude and longitude information, the lake volume and river cross sections were obtained
using open source ASTER DEM and HEC-RAS mathematical model. The dam break flood and propagation of
flood wave in downstream was simulated using MIKE11 mathematical model to estimate the possible rise in river
water level and its time of arrival at salient locations. The study results were shared with relevant authorities
responsible for disaster management planning.

Keywords: Landslide dam, Dam break flood, Flood attenuation, Warning time, Disaster management

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Landslide dams are natural phenomena that pose hazards for the downstream territory due to failure
by overtopping and breaching. A few of these blockages attain heights and volumes that exceed the
man-made large dams. Some of the worlds largest and most catastrophic floods have occurred
because of failure of these natural dams. In past a number of flash flood events due to breaching of
landslide dams on river Parechu, Kurichhu etc occurred. The recent landslide dam formation on Sun
Kosi river in Nepal was a major concern for Nepal and India due to possible flash flood in downstream
in the event of sudden breaching of the dam. This landslide took place on 02.08.2014 in the upper
reaches of Sun Kosi river in Sindhupalchowk district of Nepal at a location having latitude: 2704540 N,
0
longitude: 85 52 08 E, which blocked the Sun Kosi river about 1.2 km u/s of existing Sun Kosi Hydro
Power Dam. The consequent impounding of water behind landslide dam submerged the area upto 4 to
5 km u/s of the landslide dam location. A site photograph of landslide dam is shown in Figure 1. In the
event of dam break, the flash flood was likely to enter in Kosi river, which might have caused heavy
devastation for Kosi barrage and thickly populated areas of Bihar near the Kosi river. Accordingly, for
effective disaster management planning by concerned agencies, necessary study was carried out by
Central Water Commission to estimate the possible flood peak, differential rise in river water level and
travel time of flood peak at different locations downstream of the landslide dam, in event of a dam
break. Kosi barrage is about 280 km downstream of the landslide dam. There were some information
from the different sources that the rise in river water level behind the dam was about 80 m. Based on
the limited information available from different sources and using open source data, necessary study
was carried out in Central Water Commission and outcome of the study was shared with relevant
authorities responsible for disaster management planning.

16
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Figure 1. Photograph
h of landslide dam
d on Sun Kosi
K river

2.0 D
DATA CONS
STRAINTS

At the time of landsslide dam fo ormation on Sun Kosi river, the da ata available
e were, Latittude and
Longitudde of landslide dam, its photograph h and approoximate height, prevailing discharge of 3540
cumec ata Kosi barragge located about 280 km m downstreamm of landslide e dam locatio
on. In order tto have a
proper e estimate of flood peak, its travel timme and diffferential rise in river waater level at different
downstre eam location
ns in event off a possible dam break, the
t proper estimate of sttorage volum me behind
landslide
e dam, crosss sections off river from dam location n up to Kosi barrage, ca atchment are ea of the
river at landslide da
am location & at Kosi ba arrage and ppossible rainnfall scenario
o in drainagee area of
e dam were essential.
landslide e

3.0 M
METHODOL
LOGY ADOP
PTED TO TA
ACKLE THE PROBLEM

Locationn of landslide
e dam was marked on Go oogle Earth. ASTER
A DEMM of 30m x 30 m resolutio on having
grid size
e 1 degree x 1 degree wa as download ded and a mo osaic to get the coverage of entire catchment
of Kosi rriver up to Kosi
K barrage prepared. Catchment
C arrea and hypssometry of th he river catcchment at
landslide
e dam and att Kosi barrag ge were estimmated by GIS S processingg of the DEM M. Catchmentt areas of
major sttreams betw ween landslid de dam and d Kosi barra age were also
a estimateed for distribution of
prevailing initial conddition flow in
n Kosi river. Cross sections of river upstream off landslide dam d were
extractedd from ASTE ER DEM ussing open so ource HEC-G GeoRAS exttension of ARC-GIS.
A Froom these
cross seections the sttorage volum me behind da am was estim mated using open source e software HEC-RAS.
Cross seections of riv
ver from landslide dam up pto Kosi barrrage were exxtracted for hydrodynam
h ic routing
of dam b break flood to
t get flood peak,
p its travvel time and possible add ditional rise in river wateer level at
different downstream m locations.

3.1 C
Catchment area of riverr at landslid
de dam locattion

The catcchment area a of the Sun Kosi river ata landslide dam location was abou ut 2494 sq.km m, out of
which abbout 1004 sqq.km was abo ove the elevaation band 5000
5 m. A ca
atchment are ea map of the e location
is shownn in Figure 2.
2 The inform mation abouut next 24 hour rainfall estimate
e was obtained from
f IMD
sources and this estiimate was ab bout 60 mm.. For the rive
er catchmentt at the landsslide dam loccation the
possible runoff volum
me in 24 hou urs for aboutt 60 mm rainnfall was esttimated as 54
5 million cub bic meter
which waas equivalennt to a discha
arge of aboutt 620 cumec..

17
Compendium of Technical Papers

Figure 2. Catchment area of Sun Ko


osi river at land
dslide dam

3.2 V
Volume estiimate of lake behind lan
ndslide dam
m

There w were a lot off uncertaintie es about the e lake volum me behind the landslide e dam. However, the
estimatee about fetch of lake form med behind dam was appropriate. This fetch was about a 5 km. Hence to
get this a
amount of feetch behind la andslide dam m a number of o water proffile simulations were run on HEC-
RAS usiing the riverr cross sectio ons extracte ed from AST TER DEM. ThisT fetch wa
as obtained for 80 m
depth ne ear landslide
e dam. Base ed on the wa ater profile simulation
s th
he volume off lake formeed behind
landslidee dam was estimated abo out 31 million
n cubic mete er. The volumme estimate is presented d in Table
1. The bbed profile off the river upstream of the landslide damd along with
w water surface profile is shown
in Figure
e 3.

Table 1.
1 Estimated volume
v behind
d landslide dam
m for 80m dep
pth of water ne
ear LSD

River Chainaage River bed


b Wateer Flow Area
A Top
p flow Volume
Reach (m) u/ss of elevation Surfacce W
Width
landslide Elevv
damm
(m)) (m) (m22) (m)
( (1000 m3)
LSDUS 6000
0 836.3
36 840 75.4
49 43
3.27 31195.52
2
LSDUS 5000
0 825.3
37 840 1600..46 157.22 30357.55
5
LSDUS 4000
0 813.7
73 840 3294..37 195.52 27910.13
3
LSDUS 3000
0 785.4
49 840 163800.13 474.23 18072.88
8
LSDUS 2000
0 760.4
48 840 197655.64 354.11

18
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Volum
me Plan: Plan
n 01
R iver LSD
DUS
Leg
gend
900
WS PF 1
880 Gro
ound

860

840
Elevation (m)

820

800

780

760

740

720
-1000 0 1000
0 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Main Cha
annel Dis tance (m)
(

Figure 3. Possible fetch of


o lake behind
d landslide dam
m for 80 m depth of water near dam site

3.3 D
Dam break simulation
s a results
and

For the estimated volume


v of 31
1 million cubbic meter, thhe possible critical dam break scen nario was
generateed to estimaate the flood peak, its tra
avel time annd possible rise
r in river water level. For dam
break sccenario the initial
i condition flood in the river at Kosi barragge was adop pted as 3540 0 cumec,
which waas distributed
d along the e
entire 280 kmm study reach of the riverr from landslide dam loca ation upto
Kosi barrrage in catcchment area proportion. The catchm ment area of the Kosi rivver at Kosi barrage
b is
about 577971 sq.km.. Taking the e river crosss section fro
om ASTER DEM, D the daam break sttudy was
carried out
o using 1 dimensional mathematica
m l model MIKE11. The mo odel set up iss shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Mike11 model set up for dam break


b study off landslide dam
m

For the breach width of 80m, breach


b depth
h of 40 m and breach development
d t time of 2 hours
h the
maximum m discharge through the
e breach wass estimated as 5884 cum mec. The saame was found to get
attenuate
ed to 940 cu
umec at upsstream of Ko
osi barrage. The travel time of flood peak from Landslide
L

19
Compendium of Technical Papers

dam location and upp to the Kossi barrage lo


ocated abou ut 280 km do ownstream was
w estimate ed as 20
hours. T
The drainagee area map of Kosi rive er at Kosi baarrage site is
i shown in Figure 5, where
w the
numberss shown in different polyg
gons represe
ent the draina k 2 at the ou
age area in km utlet of the re
espective
polygon.

LSD Location
L

Figure 5. Drain
nage area of Kosi
K river at Ko
osi Barrage

The estimated flood peak due to o landslide dam


d breach and possible
e additional rise in wate
er level at
ocations is given
salient lo g in Tabble 2. The atttenuation and translatio
on pattern off flood hydro
ograph is
shown in n Figure 6, where
w lake 3000
3 denotess flood hydro
ograph near landslide daam and Kosi 279000
denotes flood hydrog graph near Kosi
K barrage.

Table 2. Estimated floo od peak due tto landslide da


am breach and possible additional rise in
n water level at
a different
locations of the Kosi rivver

Note: Kossi 10500.00 deenotes the loccation 10500 m downstream


m of landslide dam location. Same way alll the other
locations may please be read. Furrther the date es and time given in the table are the e same as aadopted in
mathema atical model sim
mulation. The same should not be treated
d in absolute terms.
t

Locatiomm (m) Initial flood Initial floo


od + ood peak
Flo Possible Floodd peak
downstreeam of in river landslide damd d to
due additional rise
a e in occurrrence
landslide
e dam (cumec) breach flo ood landslide dam water level du
ue time (date-
(
(cumecc) (ccumec) t landslide da
to am hr:m
min
breach (m)
Landslid
de dam 0 5885 5885 8.50 3/8/201
14 2:15
KOSI 10 0500.00 152 5827 5675 6.09 3/8/201
14 2:40
KOSI 25 5500.00 182 5698 5516 7.19 3/8/201
14 3:00
KOSI 40 0500.00 182 5231 5049 9.18 3/8/201
14 3:40
KOSI 55 5500.00 182 4673 4491 8.62 3/8/201
14 4:20
KOSI 61500.00 182 4547 4365 5.54 3/8/201
14 4:35
KOSI 112500.00 620 3564 2944 5.31 3/8/201
14 6:54

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Locatiom (m) Initial flood Initial flood + Flood peak Possible Flood peak
downstream of in river landslide dam due to additional rise in occurrence
landslide dam (cumec) breach flood landslide dam water level due time (date-
(cumec) (cumec) to landslide dam hr:min
breach (m)
KOSI 121500.00 620 3531 2911 4.52 3/8/2014 7:15
KOSI 151500.00 620 3097 2477 3.42 3/8/2014 8:49
KOSI 181500.00 997 3136 2139 3.78 3/8/2014 10:30
KOSI 220500.00 997 2991 1994 5.87 3/8/2014 11:55
KOSI 237714.28 997 2618 1621 1.88 3/8/2014 13:34
KOSI 254000.00 3540 4604 1064 0.68 3/8/2014 16:54
KOSI 279000.00 3540 4482 942 0.44 3/8/2014 22:20
(Near Kosi barrage)

[m^3/s] Discharge
Time Series Discharge
6000.0 KOSI 61500.00
KOSI 121500.00
5500.0 KOSI 181500.00
KOSI 220500.00
5000.0 KOSI 279000.00
LAKE 3000.00
4500.0

4000.0

3500.0

3000.0

2500.0

2000.0

1500.0

1000.0

500.0

0.0
00:00:00 04:00:00 08:00:00 12:00:00 16:00:00 20:00:00 00:00:00 04:00:00
3-8-2014 4-8-2014

Figure 6: Attenuation and translation pattern of landslide dam break flood hydrograph

(Note: The horizontal line before rising limb of each hydrograph shows the initial discharge in river at that location
before arrival of dam break flood)

3.4 Limitations

The above estimate was obtained using the river cross sections from ASTER DEM, which may differ in
comparison to surveyed river cross sections. A very high rainfall in the drainage area of the rivers
might have influenced the attenuation pattern of the flood peak, resulting some higher discharge in
comparison to estimated one. It is not possible to exactly predict the dam breach parameters, hence a
major variation in dam breach parameter might have resulted in variation of estimated flood peak

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

In case of blockage of rivers due to a major landslide dam, the information pertaining to possible
additional rise in river water level and warning time in the event of possible dam breach is very
important input for disaster management planning, which should be made available to concerned
authorities at the shortest possible time. In majority of the cases it may not be possible to get the data

21
Compendium of Technical Papers

of lake volume and river cross sections, which are essential for hydrodynamic simulation. However,
from the available open source DEM and modeling tools some of the important data can be extracted
and used for hydrodynamic simulation to provide the desired input for disaster management planning.
While providing the inputs regarding additional rise in river water level and warning time etc limitations
of the data should be clearly mentioned in order to take some reasonable additional factor of safety in
the estimate and consequent disaster management planning.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the paper are purely personal and not necessarily the views of the
organisation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This technical paper could be possible due to availability of SRTM and ASTER DEM of NASA and HEC-RAS
software of HEC. Further we acknowledge the inputs received from the officers of Govt. of Nepal and Central
Water Commission to carry out this study.

REFERENCES

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, HEC ( 2011): HEC-GeoRAS Users Manual

Rai, N. N. (2009): Glacial Lake Outburst Flood Study Journal of Hydrological Research and Development, Vol
24, 2009 published by Indian National Committee on Hydrology (INCOH), p.159-184

Froehlich, David C. (1987): Embankment-Dam Breach Parameters, Hydraulic Engineering, Proceedings of the
1987 ASCE National Conference on Hydraulic Engineering, Williamsburg, Virginia, August 3-7, 1987, p. 570-575.

Froehlich, David C. (1995a): Peak Outflow from Breached Embankment Dam, Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management, vol. 121, no. 1, p. 90-97.

Froehlich, David C. (1995b): Embankment Dam Breach Parameters Revisited, Water Resources Engineering,
Proceedings of the 1995 ASCE Conference on Water Resources Engineering, San Antonio, Texas, August 14-18,
1995, p. 887-891.

22
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Role of PMP Atlas in Design Flood Estimation


Er M.Raghuram Er Ravi Ranjan,
Director, Central Water Commission Deputy Director, Central Water Commission
raghuram32@rediffmail.com

ABSTRACT
In India, important hydraulic structures are designed based on the size of the structure and the risk involved in an
event of failure. Accordingly, BIS prescribes the Standard Project Flood (SPF) and Probable Maximum Flood
(PMF) as design flood for intermediate and large dams respectively. The Standard Project Storm (SPS) and
Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) are the main inputs in computations of SPF/ PMF. Estimation of PMP is a
time consuming process and requires large amount of data such as daily rainfall data, critical storms information,
synoptic situation of such critical storms, persistent dew point temperature, near by SRRG data, topography,
transposabilty of the storms etc as well as indepth knowledge and experience in the field of hydro-meteorology.
Recognizing the importance of PMP studies in the design of hydraulic structures, in recent years CWC, IMD, and
IITM brought out PMP atlases for different river basins of India. CWC in association with IMD has recently taken
up a project which includes the updating of existing PMP atlases prepared in nineties and development of new
PMP atlases for Ganga and Brahmaputra basins. The present PMP atlases provide SPS/ PMP estiamtion at sub
basin level and at uniformly placed grid points in the basins as well. In addition, the PMP atalses include isohyetal
patterns in GIS form, synoptic situation, DAD curves, persisting dew point temperature data, moisture
maximization factors and other relevant details of about 700 key storms across different river basins of India. The
maximum one/ two/ three day annual rainfall series have also been analysed for all rain-gauge stations of river
basins for assessing various return period rainfall as well as point PMP estimates by statistical method. The PMP
atlases are comprehensive knowledge bank which provide not only readily useable SPS/ PMP estimates at sub
basin level/ grid points but also detailed data of around 700 storms for carrying out project/ catchmnet specific
SPS/PMP studies. It is usually advocated to limit the usage of grid wise PMP/SPS given in atlases for small and
medium cathments and detailed storm analysis using the storm data incorporated in the atlases must be
employed for large catchments. Few case studies are presented to demonstrate usage of PMP atlases in
different ways and the results are also compared. Through case studies efforts have been made to formulate
guidelines for usage of PMP atlases in computing the project specific SPS/ PMP estimates.

1 INTRODUCTION

In India, hydraulic structures are designed depending on the size of the structure and the risk involved
in an event of failure. Accordingly, BIS: 11223, 1985 prescribes the Standard Project Flood (SPF) and
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) as design flood for intermediate and large dams respectively. In the
design of small structures, some calculated risk is taken and for that reason, estimates of maximum
point or areal rainfalls of different return periods are used. The basic step in computation of SPF/ PMF
is the estimation of Standard Project storm (SPS) /Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). Though
the hydrologists and practicing engineers are well equipped with algorithms to convert SPS/ PMP into
SPF/ PMF, evaluation of SPS/ PMP itself poses a challenge. WMO (2009) defined PMP as the depth
of precipitation for a given duration that is meteorologically possible for a design watershed or a given
size storm area at a particular location at a certain time of year. Estimation of PMP is a time
consuming process and requires large amount of data such as daily rainfall data, critical storms
information, synoptic situation of such critical storms, persistent dew point temperature, near by SRRG
data, topography, transposabilty of the storms etc as well as indepth knowledge and experience in the
field of hydro-meteorology. Recognizing the importance of PMP studies in design of hydraulic
structures, there have been major efforts in recent years by CWC, IMD and IITM in analysis of critical
storms and preparation of the PMP atlases for different river basins of India. Recently, CWC and IMD
have taken up a project to update existing PMP atlases prepared by CWC under DSARP-1 in
nineties and develope new atlases for Ganga and Brahmaputra basins.
The study area in the present project includes river basins of Ganga, Brahmaputra , Cauvery and
other east flowing rivers, Godavari, Mahanadi, Brahmani, Baitarani and other east flowing rivers
between Mahanadi and Godavari, Narmada, Tapi, Sabarmati, Banas and Luni and rivers of
Saurashtra and Kutch regions including Mahi and West flowing rivers of the Western Ghats

The present study covers all the river basins in the country except the Indus and Krishna basins. The
PMP atlases for Indus and Krishna basins were prepared in year 2007. Thus PMP atlases have been
prepared for all river basins in the country.

23
Compendium of Technical Papers

2 S
SALIENT FE
EATURES OF
O PMP ATL
LAS

The follo ults are iincluded in the PMP Atlase


owing vital data and resu es which can n be used ass a quick
reference for SPS/ PMP
P compuutaions at grrid points as well as for carrying out project / catchment
specific d
detailed SPS
S/ PMP comp putations alsso:

i. CClimatology of the basins - mean monthly, seasonal and annual rain nfall maps fo or all the
bbasins.
ii. DDetails of 7000 identified storms
s and synoptic
s situa
ation of key storms
s
iii. IIsohyetal pa atterns, DAD (Depth- Are ea- Duration) analysis of 1- day, 2-d day & 3-dayy duration
sstorms
iv. TThe Moisture e Maximization Factor (M MMF) computtations
v. MMatrix showiing sub basin n/ grid point wise
w affectin
ng storms of 1- day, 2-dayy & 3-day du uration
vi. SSub Basin wise
w SPS and d PMP estima ates in tabulaar and graphhical form
vii. PPMP estimates at 10 X 10 grid poin nts for each of the basinss and presenting in the maps for
ddifferent areaas
viii. SSub basin wise
w Time Disstribution (TDD-Analysis) factors
f for 12
2- hour, 24-hhour, 48-hour and 72-
hhour duration n storms
ix. SSub basin wise Area Red duction Facto ors (ARF)
x. PPoint PMP estimation
e for the duratioons of 1-day, 2-day and 3-day
3 stormss based on maximum
m
aannual rainfa all series off stations in and around d the basin by using He ershfield method and
rresults in maaps and table es
xi. 2 2 50; 100; 500; 1,000; 5,000 and 10,000 year return
2.33; 5; 10; 25; r period
d rainfall estim
mates for
aall stations
xii. MMaps showin ng the snow fed areas an nd rain fed arreas.
xiii. AAll the maps prepared on n GIS plotforrm
xiv. WWorked out examples
e for highlighting
g use of atlasses

Methodo
ology followed in preparin
ng the above
e products is described in
n brief in the following
f pra
agraphs.

3 S
STORM ANA
ALYSIS

The daily rainfall datta for the peeriod 1901-22006 were su urveyed to determine
d th
he rainstormss over all
river bassins /rivers sy
ystems unde er study. Thee criteria of rain
r spells ha
aving recordeed rainfall off 200 mm
or more in 1-day, 250 mm or more in 2-day and a 300 mm or more in 3-day 3 duratio
on at the cenntre of the
storm wa as applied too select the ra
ainstorms. A list of all raiinstorms seleected using the
t above crriteria has
been pre epared. In this study, aboout 700 stormms have bee en selected across
a river basins/
b river systems.
Isohyetaal maps of alll the stormss were prepa ared by using g geospatial techniques.. Rainfall datta for the
duration of storms within
w the bassin and adjoining areas was w considerred in the pre eparation of isohyetal
maps. The DAD ana alysis was caarried out using the deve eloped isohye etal pattern for
f all the sto orms and
included in the reporrt in graphica al and tabula
ar form. Figu ure 1 showss a typical isohyetal patte ern for 1-
day rainsstorm, while Figure 2 sho al DAD curve for 1-day, 2-day and 3-d
ows a typica day durationss.

24
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Figure 1: Isohyetal Pattern


P for 18 July, 2000 rainstorm

pth Area Durattion curves of 17-19 July, 2000


Figure 2: Dep 2 rainstorm
m

4 P
PMP ESTIMATION AT SUB
S BASIN LEVEL

Considering the topo ography of thhe catchmen nts, PMP esttimation hass been carrie ed out by DA AD or DD
(Depth Duration)
D meethod. Out of
o storms listted, a sub basin
b wise matrix
m has be een prepare ed for the
identifica
ation of affec
cting rainstorms for 1-daay, 2-day an nd 3-day durrations at ea ach sub bassin. DAD
envelope e curve for each
e sub bassin was prepa ared for 1-da
ay, 2-day andd 3-day dura ations. Whilee deciding
the stormms that can contribute to o the DAD envelope
e curve of each sub basin, limits
l of tran
nsposition
were followed. Sub basin
b wise co
ontributing storms to the DAD envelo oping curvess for 1-day, 2-day
2 and
3-day du urations havee been tabulated for quicck reference.. Figure 3 shhows typical DAD envelo ope curve
for sub bbasin 311 of Godavari ba asin. The inssitu Standardd Project Sto
orm (SPS) for different arreas were
read fromm corresponding DAD en nvelope curvves of the suub basin for 1-day, 2-dayy and 3-day durations
and tabu ulated. Thesee insitu SPS values were e multiplied with
w the MMF F to obtain inssitu PMP vallues.

Figure 3:
3 Envelope DA
AD Curve (1-d
day) for Sub Basin-311
B

5 P
PMP ESTIMATION AT GRID
G POINT
T LEVEL

Grid points were constructed in the basins at the interssection pointts of 10 latitu ude X10 long gitude for
computa ations of PMPP at these grrid points. De
epending on the topography, the grid d points were e taken at
finer inte O of the storms listed, a grid point wise matrix was prepare
ervals also. Out ed for identiffication of
affectingg rainstorms for 1-day, 2--day and 3-d day durationss at each loccation. The storms
s that fell
f within
the limitss of transpos
sition were marked
m as afffecting storm
ms at each lo
ocation. DA AD envelope curve for

25
Compendium of Technical Papers

each grid point was s prepared fo or 1-day, 2-day and 3-d day durations separatelyy. While decciding the
storms that can conttribute to thee DAD envellope curve ofo each grid point, limits of transposittion were
followed. From the DAD
D enveloppe curves off each grid point
p and duuration (1-daay, 2-day and 3-day),
Grid Rain Depth valu ues were rea ad at standard areas. Grrid point Rainn Depth valuues for differe
ent areas
were mu ultiplied by the correspo onding valuees of Transsposition Adjjustment Fa actor (TAF) to t obtain
1-day, 2--day and 3-dday areal SPPS values at various
v grid points corresponding to specified are eas. The
SPS vallues were fu plied by the MMF to ob
urther multip btain the PM MP values at each grid point for
standard
d areas and durations. Grid
G wise PM MP map of Godavari
G rive
er basin for the 1-day duration for
500 sq. kkm. areas is given in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Grid
d PMP Estima
ate for 500 sq. km area for Godavari
G basin
n

6 P
PMP BY STA
ATISTICAL APPROACH
H

Statistica
al approach of PMP estimmation is gennerally used to estimate the PMP values at rainfa all station
locationss. Globally accepted Herrshfield meth
hod has been n used in thiis study to estimate
e the statistical
point PMMP values. The
T station w
wise point PMP estimate es have bee en computed for 1Day, 2Day
2 and
3Day durations and have
h been given in tabula
ar and map format.
f

7 U
USAGE OF PMP ATLAS
S

The PM MP atlases arre comprehensive data banks which will w be useful not only forr quick assesssment of
design storm
s ( PMP, SPS or retu urn period sto
orm) for a smmall or mediu
um catchmen nt but also in
n detailed
project specific
s studiies. The diffe
erent ways which
w can be e employed in
i SPS/ PMP P computatio ons using
the PMPP atlas are exxplained in brief in the following lines::

7.1 G
Grid Point PMP
P Values

The read dymade Grid Point PMP P values preesented in the


t atlas are
e ideally suited for projects with
medium size drainag ge areas and d matching with
w one of the standard d areas adop pted in the atlas
a with
estriction tha
further re at the projecct basin shou
uld have one e of the grid points closee to its centrre. In this
case, we e need to picck up a suitaable areal PM
MP value from one of the e relevant tables presentted in the
atlas. Hoowever, such an ideal ccondition can n rarely exisst. In such cases the intterpolated arreal PMP
values corresponding g to the drain
nage area off the project for
f surroundiing grid points are compu uted. The
average value of succh computed PMP valuess of surround ding grid poinnts can be ussed as PMP value for
ect.
the proje

omputation of
In the co o Grid Point PMP valuess, influencing g points, transposabiltyy of such
g storms at grid
storms, barrier elevaation and maaximum persisting dew point
p tempera atures vary from
f one gridd point to
the other resulting in
n discrete PM
MP values at different Griid Points. Avveraging out such valuess for large

26
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

catchment areas may yield erroneous results. In view of these limitations, the grid point PMP values
cannot be used for large catchments say catchments with more than 500 sq km drainage area.

7.2 Sub Basin wise Envelope DAD Curve

Based on the location of the project and its catchment area, the relevant sub basin can be identified
from the Atlas. The SPS value corresponding to drainage area of the project can be read from relevant
sub basin envelope DAD curve. Further, the Moisture Adjustment Factor (MAF) pertaining to the storm
for the project location can be computed using the dew point temperature data incorporated in the
Atlas. Using the computed SPS and MAF values, the project PMP value can be estimated. Usage of
envelope DAD curve usually yields higher SPS values because of which this method can be employed
for small and medium drainage areas only.

7.3 Identifying the Critical Storms and Using DAD Curve

The atlas provides the list of storms affecting the basin as well as different sub basins also. Using such
data and taking the transposabilty limitations into account, the critical storms for the specific catchment
area can be identified. Using relevant DAD curve, the SPS value for the appropriate area can be
computed. Further MAF for the identified storm at the project location can be computed and
subsequently the PMP can be evaluated. Usually usage of DAD curves result in higher areal rainfall
values compared to areal rainfall depths computed by superimposing isohyetal pattern over the
catchment. Because of this restriction, the method results in slightly higher values but can be
considered as better method when compared with earlier described methods.

7.4 Catchment Specific Storm Studies

This is the most preferred method which can be employed for any catchment area as the method
takes care of all aspects of study. The method involves following steps:

a. Identification of the critical storms for the catchment from the matrix of the influencing storms
given in atlas for the sub basin or nearby grid points
b. Computation of transposed areal rainfall depth on the catchment from all the critical storms
using readily available isohyetal patterns
c. Computation of SPS value from the transposed areal rainfall depths from all the critical storms
d. Computation of MAF for the relevant critical storms using the persisting dew point temperature
data, topography of the storm centre and location of the project
e. Calculation of PMP from the estimated SPS and relevant MAF

In conducting the detailed storm studies, all the necessary data such as the list of influencing storms,
storm centers and isohyetal patterns of such storms, synoptic situation, barrier elevation of storms and
persisting dew point temperature of the storms, maximum persisting temperature maps are readily
available in the atlas. So, the atlas will be very handy for carrying out such detailed storm studies
otherwise procuring such data itself will be a herculean task. Further the availability of data in GIS
compatible form makes the analysis much easier and less time consuming also.

7.5 Statistical Point PMP Values

The physical method is preferred over the statistical method in computation of project specific PMP
values. However, as cross check, the statistical point PMP maps/ values along with Aral Reduction
Factors (ARF) can be employed to compute areal PMP value for the project. As the statistical point
PMP values are estimated using the specific rain-gauge data, these values are not preferred in project
PMP computations.

8 EXAMPLE AND CASE STUDIES

A worked out example is presented in the following section to appreciate the role of PMP atlas in
estimation of SPS/ PMP values.

27
Compendium of Technical Papers

8.1 E
Example Problem

Estimatioon of one da ay areal PMP


P for a Uppe
er Wardha project
p (havin
ng an area of
o 4,205 sq. km) on a
tributary of river Wardha. The Fig 5 shows the catchme ent area map p of the projject and rele
evant grid
point dettails also. Th
he PMP value
es are computed using different meth
hods as explaained above.

Fig
gure 5: Location map of pro
oblem catchme
ent

8.1.1 Grid Point PMP


P Values

None of the standarrd grid pointts lie near th


he centre of the project basin. The drainage are ea of the
project b
basin is 4,205
5 sq. km, wh
hich also doees not matchh the standarrd area proje
ected in the atlas.
a The
PMP vallues at the 4 surrounding g grid points WRD-4, WR RD-5, WNG--3 and NT10 04M-4 corresponding
to 4,000 sq. km., 5,000 sq. km. and
a the interp polated value
es for 4,205 sq.
s km. are as
a given belo ow:

Neigh
hboring Grids
s WRD--4 (mm) W
WRD-5 (mm) WNG-3 (m
mm) NT104
4M-4
PMP ffor 4,000 sq.kkm 469 489 439 454
PMP ffor 5,000 sq.kkm 456 476 428 444
Interp
polated PMP fo
or 4,205 sq.km
m 466 486 437 452

Average of the areal one day PM


MP for 4,205 sq.
s km. = (466+486+
+437+452)/4 = 460 mm

8.1.2 S
Sub Basin Envelope
E DAD
D Curve

From th
he one day envelope DAD
D curve of
o Wardha SubS basin, the
t SPS value correspo onding to
4205 sq km area is s read as 37
72 mm. Thee MAF for th nding storm of 12th Julyy 1994 is
he correspon
computeed as 1.18. The
T estimatedd PMP value
e works out to
o 438.8 mm.

8.1.3 C
Catchment Specific
S Storm
m Study

From thee list of the storms


s influencing the Wardha sub ba asin, three most
m severe storms that lay
l within
the transsposable limmits of the prroject were id d the same are transpossed to the catchment
dentified and
area. Thhe areal rain nfall depth over
o a the three storms are computed u
the catcchment for all using the
isohyetal patterns givven in the report and the same are taabulated beloow:

Transpo osed areal


Storm
m Storm Centrre Storm
m Peak (mm))
rainfall depth
d (mm)
27 June, 19914 Parbhani 401 2
274
12 July, 1994 Chandur Railwayy 468 3
322
18 July, 2000 Paoni 407 3
338

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

From the table it can be seen that the SPS value for the project is 338 mm and relevant MAF works
out to be 1.24. Computed SPS and MAF yields estimated PMP value as 419 mm.

8.1.4 Statistical point PMP values

The point static PMP value at the project location is read from the map as 470 mm and the Area
Reduction Factor for the project catchment works out to be 0.85. The areal PMP value for the project
works out to 400 mm.

8.2 Case Studies

The data and outputs of the PMP atlas have been used to estimate the PMP values for various
projects with different catchment areas and at different locations. The results of few projects are
tabulated below:
S.N Project Name and State River Catchment One day PMP by One day PMP by
Basin Area (sqkm) Grid Point values detailed storm
(mm) analysis (mm)
1 Sukta Project, Madhya Narmada 450 554 480
Pradesh

2 Willingdon Dam Project, Cauvery 130 712 658


Tamilnadu

3 Mohanpura Project, Madhya Chambal 3825 413 425


Pradesh

4 Raghava Rosara Basania Narmada 3164/ 4255/ Cannot be Different scenarios


Project, MP 4796 estimated as were generated to find
project consists of out critical situation for
cascading dams each project

From the case studies and limitations involved in estimation of Grid Point and Sub Basin SPS/ PMP
values as explained in the above sections, following few guidelines can be drawn for better usage of
PMP Atlas:

Grid Point SPS/ PMP is preferred for the catchment areas up to 200 sq km

If elongation ratio is less than 1.5 and one of the grid points close to the centre of the
catchment, Grid Point SPS/ PMP values can be used for the catchments up to 500 sqkm

Envelope DAD values can be used for the catchments up to 500 sqkm

For catchments of more than 500 sq.km., detailed storm study is recommended

When an existing dam intercepts the project catchment, detailed storm study is preferred.

9 CONCLUSIONS

The PMP atlas utilizes long term data mostly available till the recent period. Each atlas has been
prepared focusing on basin specific geography, topography and meteorological aspects. The study
has been conducted by extensive use of GIS, Relational Database and Statistical techniques. As a
result, each atlas provides a comprehensive knowledge bank including various aspects of climatology
including maps and tables, extreme rainfall statistics and synoptic situations. About 700 medium and
severe storms have been analyzed for their isohyetal patterns, DADs, dew point temperatures,
moisture maximization factors and moisture adjustment factors. A comprehensive data and information
have been generated through this study which will be useful not only for quick assessment of design
storm ( PMP, SPS or return period storm) for a small or medium catchment but also in detailed project
specific studies. The atlases provide detailing for every important aspect such as worked out
examples, area reduction factors and time distribution coefficients. The atlases shall be very useful in
the assessment of design storm as required in the assessment of design flood for any water resources
development project.

29
Compendium of Technical Papers

10 REFERENCE

1. PMP Atlases for different river basins brought out by CWC, IMD and RMSI

2. Dr. Kishor Dhore, RMSI, Bhopal Singh, Director, Hydrology(S), CWC, Vinay Kumar, Chief Engineer,
HSO, CWC, Deshraj Singh, RMSI 2015: Preparation of Probable Maximum Precipitation Atlases for
Major River Basins of India
3. Manual on Estimation of PMP (2009): WMO-1045, World Meteorological Organisation

30
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Trend of Annual One-Day Maximum Rainfall Series over South India


Ashoke Basistha Priya Narayanan,
EGIS India Consulting Engineers Pvt. Ltd., National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management
ashoke.b@egis-india.com (MoEF), Chennai

Ravi Ranjan Antonio Porcheddu


Deputy Director Hydrology (South), CWC, Delhi EGIS France, CPMU, DRIP, Delhi

ABSTRACT
There are many important dams spread over the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka, supplying
water for habitations, irrigation or hydropower. Design flood estimation for many of the dams under the DRIP
project, some of which are more than a century old, have been carried out using empirical approach / considering
lower design storm rainfall depths compared to those considered reasonable as per the recent practice. The
possibility of increase in storm rainfall depth receivable in a day potentially increases the danger of having greater
flood magnitudes. This poses direct threat to the safety of the dams and the life and property of the inhabitants
downstream, as most of the areas are thickly populated.

The paper explores the long-term trend of annual maximum rainfall series over South India from the gridded (one
degree by one degree) Indian rainfall data set over the period of 1951 2008. Pre-whitened Mann-Kendall test
has been chosen for the purpose. This trend detection test performs best with presence of auto correlation in
data, which is often the case with natural data series. The most popular test for trend detection, viz., the Mann-
Kendall test, is known to detect trend even in its absence for series which are auto correlated. This study also
investigates the spatial pattern of trends of 1-day annual maximum rainfall over the region, with particular
reference to the south Indian states of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, currently covered under the DRIP
project.

The results of the study reaffirm the findings of earlier researchers that extreme rainfall is increasing over south
India. Over the long period of 1951 to 2008, the gridded annual maximum 1-day maximum rainfall series over the
south Indian land region has shown statistically significant increasing trend (at 10% level of significance) at 20
points out of a total of 69 (which is about 29%). The results of this study is supposed to be an improvement over
that of the earlier researchers as PMK test, best suitable for detecting trend in auto correlated series has been
used, and 17 series (25% of total) have been found to be auto correlated.

At 5% level of significance, increasing trend has been detected at 14 points (about 20% of the total). However,
only one grid point at Karnataka and one other at Tamil Nadu shows statistically significant rising trend which are
significant at 5% level.

Increasing trend has been shown at only 4 points (about 6% of the total), at a significance level of 1%. However,
within the boundary of the three southern DRIP states of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, none of the grid
points depict any rising or falling trend, which are significant at 1% level. Over the maximum at the corresponding
location, at 23 grid points (33% of total grid points considered) the increases over the data period of 58 years
exceed 10%, the chosen limit for practical implications. Over the whole region, the maximum increase in one-day
rainfall is 19.55%. However, only at two grid points (about 7%, out of a total of 29) within the boundary of the
southern DRIP states of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the maximum increase exceeds the chosen limit of
10%, being 16.94% at 10 north and 78 east and 12.90% at 10 north and 79 east. Considering all the 69 data
points, the average change over 58 years is 6.69%, increasing. Over the 29 grid points covering the DRIP states,
the average change is 3.04%, also increasing. Perhaps, this may be considered as an indication that the increase
of extreme rainfall over the DRIP states is less alarming. Further studies based on more extensive data,
preferably using modelling techniques are required for attribution.

Keywords: Extreme rainfall; trend, Pre-whitened Mann Kendall Test, spatial pattern, South India

1. INTRODUCTION

Climate change has been attracting global attention at an ever-increasing rate over the last two and
half decades, starting with the appearance of First Assessment Report of Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990. The large volume of literature related to climate change is an
indicator of the increased awareness in the subject.

South India had been the cradle of civilization since times historical. Along with agriculture, the art and
science of dam construction was also not unknown to the people of the past. For example, Kallanai

31
Compendium of Technical Papers

Dam, (Grand Anicut) of Tamilnadu is the fourth oldest dam in the world. This dam on the River Kaveri,
constructed by King Karikala Chola of the Chola Dynasty in the 2nd century AD and is still serving the
people.

The assessment of design flood, a prerequisite for the estimation of design spillway discharge for
ensuring structural safety of dams, has been evolving throughout the time. The current practice of
estimation using deterministic and stochastic approaches, based on collection of observed rainfall data
helps to impart better confidence in the results. However, with the threat of a changing climate with
increase in extreme rainfall looming large, this poses a question to the degree of reliance. In order to
assess the seriousness of threat of increase in design flood due to increase in extreme rainfall over
south India, the present study attempts to explore the presence of trend in annual maximum one-day
rainfall, based on daily rainfall over the region as a one degree by one degree grid data. This also tries
to look into the practical implications of the rate of change, if any.

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Based on their analysis of 104 years of gridded daily rainfall data, Rajeevan et al. (2008) reveal
statistically significant long term trendin frequency of extreme rainfall events over central India. A vast
majority of the studies indicate increase in extreme precipitation over parts of the Indian subcontinent,
e.g., the Himalayas (Caesar et al. 2010); as also over the central India (Pattanaik and Rajeevan 2009),
particularly over urban regions (Kishtawal et al. 2009), the north-western Himalaya and the foothills of
the Himalaya extending south into the Indo-Gangetic basin (Sen Roy and Balling 2009), parts of West
Bengal near Bangladesh border (Ghosh et al. 2009). Based on their analysis of daily rainfall data from
2599 selected rain gauge stations over India for the period 1901-2005, Guhathakurta et al. (2010)
report significant increasing trend in one-day extreme rainfall over the south peninsular region.
Analysis of Guhathakurta et al. (2011) bring out that the frequency of heavy rainfall events are
decreasing in major parts of central and north India while they are increasing in peninsular, east and
north east India. Ghosh et al. (2011) indicate increasing spatial variability of rainfall extremes over
India. It has been projected by that the end of this century, extreme precipitation events over wet
tropical regions will very likely be more intense and more frequent (IPCC, 2013).

3. METHODOLOGY

In climatic and hydrologic literature, only one nonparametric method, i.e. Mann-Kendall, has been
used in trend studies (Kahya and Kalayci 2004). Being based on ranks of observations, this does not
require any assumption regarding the normality of data, which, often, the hydrological records do not
follow. Yue and Pilon (2003) have shown that the rank-based tests exhibit higher power than their
slope-based counterparts for non-normally distributed data. However, in presence of positive
autocorrelations, this may indicate presence of trend where actually it is absent (Hamed and Rao
1998; Yue et al. 2002; Cunderlik and Burn 2004; Bayazit and Onoz 2007). Autocorrelation in
hydrological or climatic records are common (Haan 1995). Therefore, the present study attempts to
detect trend in rainfall time series using Prewhitened Mann Kendall test (Bayazit and Onoz 2007;
Cunderlik and Burn 2004).
Mann Kendall (MK) test
It is based on the test statistic S defined as:

n 1 n
S sgn( x j xi ) (1)
i 1 j i 1

where, x j are the sequential data values, n is the length of the data set and

1if ( y 0)

sgn( y ) 0if ( y 0) (2)
1if ( y 0)

32
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Mann and Kendall have documented that when n 8, the statistic S is approximately normally
distributed with the mean E(S) = 0 (3)

m
n(n 1)(2n 5) t i (ti 1)(2t i 5)
and variance as V (S ) i 1
(4)
18

where, m is the number of tied groups and ti is the size of the ith tied group. The standardised test
statistic Z is computed by

S 1
whenS 0
Var ( S )

Z MK 0 whenS 0 (5)
S 1
whenS 0
Var ( S )

The standardised MK statistic Z follows the standard normal distribution with mean of zero and
variance one.

Pre-Whitened Mann Kendall (PMK) Test

In PMK, removal of the serial correlation is accomplished by

xt xt 1 1 xt (6)

where, 1 is the lag-1 autocorrelation coefficient. Serial independence is tested using

n2
t 1 (7)
1 12

where, the test statistic t has a Students t -distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom. If t t 2 , the
null hypothesis about serial independence is rejected at significance level . MK test is applied on
the series generated after removing the serial correlation.

A change that is statistically significant may not have practical significance and vice-versa (Yue and
Hashino 2003). To explore the practical significance of a change, percentage changes over the data
period were calculated. It has been obtained by computing the Theil and Sens median slope from the
series (described later), multiplying with 58, and calculating percentage over respective highest annual
one-day rainfall for the grid point under consideration.

Theil and Sens median slope

The procedure is not greatly affected by gross data errors or outliers (Helsel and Hirsch 2002). In this
approach, the slope estimates of N pairs of data are first computed by

Qi ( x j x k ) /( j k ) for i 1, N (8)

33
Compendium of Technical Papers

where, x j and x k are data values at times j and k , ( j k ) respectively. The median of these N
values of Qi is Sens estimator of slope. If there is only one data in each time period, then
N n ( n 1) / 2 (9)

where n is the number of time periods. The median of the N estimated slopes is obtained in the
usual way, i.e., the N values of Qi are ranked by Q1 Q2 Q N 1 Q N and

Q ( N 1 ) / 2 if N is odd

Sens estimator 1
Q N / 2 Q ( N 2 ) / 2 if N is even
2

It has been assumed that a change of 10% will have practical implications. This study considers a
significance level of 10%, to match with practical significance.

4. DATA

The study was carried out on gridded Indian daily rainfall data set over 1051-2008 prepared by the
Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Pune. Annual one-day maximum rainfall series for the South
Indian land region (considered from the southernmost tip to 19 north) was derived from the data. The
grid points considered for the study has been shown in Figure 1. It also shows the south Indian states
under the Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement (DRIP) project.

Analysis for shorter sub periods was not attempted, following Chen and Grasby (2009). They caution
that the critical length of data period for undertaking trend analysis using Mann-Kendall or Theil and
Sens approach is 60 years, as otherwise the results may not represent climate change truly, owing to
the long-term periodicity associated with natural phenomena. The data period considered for present
study is 58 years, which approximately satisfy their criteria.

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

5.1 Results of Statistical Trend Analysis

The results of PMK test show that at 10% level of significance, out of 69 grid points over the south
Indian land region, there are statistically significant rising trends at 20 grid points, the remaining
depicting random behaviour. At none of the grid point statistically significant falling trend was noticed.
The number of grid points with significant rising trend is about 29% of the total number of grid points
considered for the study. The results of statistical analysis for trend in annual 1-day maximum rainfall
series has been presented in Table 1. To assess the effect of chosen level of significance on the
results, the results at 5% and 1 % level of significance were also explored, and have been shown in
Table 1. The spatial distribution of the results of trend analysis with PMK at 10% level of significance
has been shown in Figure 2. It brings out that the many of the grid points showing statistically
significant rising trend lay within the newly formed state of Telangana, and the state of Andhra
Pradesh. Statistically significant increasing trend has also been portrayed at a few other grid points in
Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. This also shows that out of the 29 grid points under the DRIP states of
south India, only 5 points have statistically significant rising trend (at 10% level of significance) over
the period, which is about 17% of the total.

Increasing trend has been detected at 14 points (about 20% of the total), at 5% level of significance.
The spatial distribution of the results of trend analysis with PMK at 5% level of significance has been
shown in Figure 3. This brings out that out of the 29 grid points within the boundary of the DRIP states,
only one grid point at Karnataka and one other at Tamil Nadu has statistically significant rising trend
which are significant at 5% level.

34
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

At 1% le evel of signifficance only 4 points (about 6% of the total) sh how increasing trend. Th he spatial
distribution of the re
esults of tren
nd analysis with
w PMK at 5% level off significance e has been shown in
Figure 4. There are no grid points within the e boundary of o the three DRIP
D states of south Ind
dia, which
shows a rising trend in annual ma aximum 1-da ay rainfall at 1% level of significance.
s

Fig
gure 1: Grid Points Conside
ered for the Stu
udy

These rresults reaffirm the findings of earllier research hers that the e south Ind dian land region has
experien nced increasiing trend in extreme
e rain
nfall. Howeve er, it was found that 17 raainfall series (out of a
total of 6
69) are auto correlated
c att 10% level of
o significancce. So, the reesults of this study are co onsidered
to be be etter than sim
milar study byy earlier reseearchers using Mann-Ke endall test known to be e affected
by auto correlation. For example e, using origginal Mann K Kendall test at 10% leve el of significa
ance, the
number of grid pointss which show ws statisticallly significant increasing trend is 29.

5.2 R
Results of Practical
P Sig
gnificance Analysis
A

For asse essment of the


t practicall implicationss of the tren nd, it has be een considerred that a change
c of
rainfall of
o 10% or more over the e maximum one-day rain nfall at the correspondin
c ng grid point over the
data perriod is practiccally significant. There are
a 23 (or 33 3% of the total of 69) grid points in the t study
area whe ere the increease over 58 8 year period d has excee eded 10%, as s shown in Figure
F 3. Wh hile at 33
points thhere has bee en an increa ase of the magnitude
m lesss than 10% %, there hass been a deccrease of
magnitud de less than n -10% at 12 2 grid pointss as well. At A a single grid
g point (9 north 77 east) the
decrease e was estimmated as -10.24%, which h is marginally less than n -10%. The maximum e estimated
increase e was 19.55% %, for the gridd point locateed at 18 norrth and 80 east.
e At 14 grid points (20 0% of the
total num mber of grid d points considered forr the study)), rising tren nd is significcant statisticcally and
practically, as portrayyed in Figure e 5. It also brings
b out thaat barring a single
s point in
i Tamil Nad du, all the
other grid points whe ere the risingg trend is sta
atistically sig
gnificant at 10% level, as s well as the increase
over the e data period d is greater than 10% are a concentrated over Telangana
T a
and Andhra Pradesh.
Interestinngly, the sing
gle grid poinnt with a pracctically signifficant (less th
han -10%) decreasing tre end does
not show w up in Fig gure 6, as there are no n decreasin ng trends which
w are sttatistically siignificant.
Considering all the 69 data pointss, the averag ge change is 6.69%, incre easing.

he boundaryy of the three DRIP stattes of Karna


Within th ataka, Keralaa and Tamil Nadu, the m maximum
estimateed increase at
a a grid poinnt was found d to be 16.94 4%, at 10 noorth and 78 east, in Tam mil Nadu.
The risin
ng trend at th
his location iss also statisttically significcant at 10% level of sign
nificance. Ovver the 29
grid poin
nts covering the
t DRIP sta ates, the average change e is 3.04%, in
ncrease. The e results of an
nalysis of
practical significance
e of trend havve also been n presented in Table 1.

35
Compendium of Technical Papers

6. CON
NCLUSIONS
S

The resu ults of the study reaffirm the findingss of earlier re


esearchers extreme
e rainffall is increassing over
south India. Over th he long perio od of 1951 to 2008, the e gridded an nnual maxim mum 1-day m maximum
rainfall sseries over thhe south Indian land region has show wn statisticaally significan
nt increasing trend (at
10% level of signific cance) at 20 points out ofo a total of 69 (which iss about 29% %). The resullts of this
study are e supposed to be an imp provement ov ver that of th
he earlier ressearchers ass the PMK te est is best
suitable for detecting g trend in au
uto correlated
d series and d 17 series (2 25% of total) are auto co orrelated.
Mann-Ke endall test, th
he most popular test for trend
t detection is well knnown to detecct trend even n where it
is actually absent, if the
t series is auto correlaated.

At 5% le evel of significance, increeasing trend has been de


etected at 14
4 points (abo
out 20% of the
t total).
Howeverr, only one gridg point att Karnataka and one othher at Tamil Nadu has statistically
s s
significant
rising tre
end which are e significant at 5% level.

Increasinng trend has been shown n at only 4 points (about 6% of the to otal), at a significance levvel of 1%.
Howeverr, the grid po oints within the
t boundaryy of the three southern DRIP D states of Karnatakka, Kerala
and Tam mil Nadu, do o not depict any trend, rising or fallin ng. Over thee maximum at the corresponding
location, at 23 grid po
oints (33% of
o total grid points conside creases over the data perriod of 58
ered) the inc
years exxceed 10%, the chosen limit for practical implica ations. Overr the whole region,
r the maximum
m
increasee in one-day rainfall is 19.55%. However, only at two t grid poin
nts (about 7% %, out of a to
otal of 29)
within the boundary of the southern DRIP sta ates of Karnnataka, Keralla and Tamil Nadu, the m maximum
increasee exceeds the e chosen limmit of 10%, be eing 16.94%% at 10 northh and 78 ea ast and 12.90 0% at 10
north and 79 east. Considering
C all the 69 da
ata points, th
he average change is 6.6 69%, increasing. Over
the 29 ggrid points coovering the DRIP
D states, the averagee change is 3.04%, also increasing. Perhaps,
this mayy be considered as an in ndication thatt the increasse of extreme rainfall ove er the DRIP states is
less alarrming. Furtheer studies baased on more extensive e data, preferably using modelling te echniques
are required for attrib
bution.

Figure 2: Results of PM
MK test of Ann
nual Maximum
m 1-Day Rainfa
all Series at 10
0% level of Sig
gnificance

36
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Fiigure 3: Results of PMK test of Annual Ma


aximum 1-Dayy Rainfall Seriies at 5% leve
el of Significan
nce

Fiigure 4: Results of PMK test of Annual Ma


aximum 1-Dayy Rainfall Seriies at 1% leve
el of Significan
nce

37
Compendium of Technical Papers

Figure
e 5: Results off Analysis of Annual
A Maximu
um 1-Day Rainfall Series for Practical Sig
gnificance of Change
C

Figure 6: Locations where Trend of Annual


A Maxim
mum 1-Day Ra ainfall Series iss Significant both Statistically (at 10%
evel) and Pracctically (>10% of the maximu
le um obtained at a the grid poin nt)

Tablle 1: Results of
o Trend Analy
ysis of Annual Maximum 1-D
Day Rainfall Series
S
Resultts of PMK Results of PMK
P Resu
ults of PMK
Latitud
de Longitu
ude Rainfaall
test at 10% test at 5%
% tes
st at 1%
Degreees Degre
ees % Chan nge
Significance Significanc ce Significance
9 77 Raandom Random R
Random -10.244
9 78 Raandom Random R
Random 6.53
10 77 Raandom Random R
Random 4.03
10 78 R
Rise Rise R
Random 16.944
10 79 Raandom Random R
Random 12.900
11 76 Raandom Random R
Random -0.96
11 77 Raandom Random R
Random -1.08
11 78 R
Rise Random R
Random 7.73
11 79 Raandom Random R
Random 2.73
12 76 Raandom Random R
Random -2.53
12 77 Raandom Random R
Random -4.73

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Results of PMK Results of PMK Results of PMK


Latitude Longitude Rainfall
test at 10% test at 5% test at 1%
Degrees Degrees % Change
Significance Significance Significance
12 78 Random Random Random 1.91
12 79 Random Random Random 1.89
13 75 Random Random Random 2.54
13 76 Random Random Random -2.11
13 77 Random Random Random 2.67
13 78 Rise Random Random 6.34
13 79 Random Random Random -0.46
13 80 Random Random Random 2.05
14 75 Rise Rise Random 5.36
14 76 Random Random Random -1.02
14 77 Random Random Random 4.01
14 78 Rise Rise Random 9.86
14 79 Random Random Random -1.86
14 80 Random Random Random -2.02
15 75 Random Random Random 0.06
15 76 Random Random Random 3.14
15 77 Random Random Random 3.43
15 78 Random Random Random 7.03
15 79 Rise Random Random 12.71
15 80 Rise Rise Random 15.98
16 74 Random Random Random 12.15
16 75 Random Random Random 1.57
16 76 Rise Random Random 8.91
16 77 Random Random Random 9.04
16 78 Rise Rise Random 11.93
16 79 Rise Rise Rise 11.79
16 80 Random Random Random 17.43
16 81 Random Random Random 11.74
17 74 Random Random Random -2.56
17 75 Random Random Random 12.12
17 76 Random Random Random 9.91
17 77 Random Random Random -1.42
17 78 Random Random Random 8.85
17 79 Rise Rise Random 12.33
17 80 Rise Rise Rise 18.78
17 81 Rise Random Random 10.95
17 82 Random Random Random 12.08
18 74 Random Random Random 2.85
18 75 Random Random Random 9.28
18 76 Random Random Random 6.15
18 77 Random Random Random 6.37
18 78 Rise Random Random 12.28
18 79 Rise Rise Random 9.43
18 80 Rise Rise Rise 19.55
18 81 Rise Rise Random 13.24
18 82 Random Random Random 7.10
18 83 Random Random Random 12.50
19 74 Rise Rise Random 15.74
19 75 Random Random Random 8.22
19 76 Random Random Random 10.13

39
Compendium of Technical Papers

Results of PMK Results of PMK Results of PMK


Latitude Longitude Rainfall
test at 10% test at 5% test at 1%
Degrees Degrees % Change
Significance Significance Significance
19 77 Random Random Random 5.14
19 78 Random Random Random 12.10
19 79 Rise Rise Rise 16.70
19 80 Rise Rise Random 17.40
19 81 Random Random Random 4.12
19 82 Random Random Random 5.97
19 83 Random Random Random 0.39
19 84 Random Random Random -1.39
Rise 20 14 4 23
Random 49 55 65 45

REFERENCES

Bayazit , M. and Onoz, B., 2007, To prewhiten or not to prewhiten in trend analysis?, Hydrological Sciences
Journal,, 52 (4), 611-624.
Caesar, J., Alexander, L.V., Trewin, B., Tse-ring, K., Sorany, L., Vuniyayawa, V., Keosavang, N., Shimana, A.,
Htay, M.M., Karmacharya, J., Jayasinghearachchi, D.A., Sakkamart, J., Soares, E., Hung, L.T., Thuong, L.T.,
Hue, C.T., Dung, N.T.T., Hung, P.V., Cuong, H.D., Cuongo, N.M., Sirabaha, S., 2010, Changes in temperature
and precipitation extremes over the Indo-Pacific region from 1971 to 2005, Int J Clim, DOI: 10.1002/joc.2118.
Chen, Z. and Grasby, S.E., 2009, Impact of decadal and century-scale oscillations on Hydroclimate Trend
Analyses, J Hyd, 365 (1-2), 122-133.
Cunderlik, J.M. and Burn, D.H., 2004, Linkages between Regional Trends in Monthly Maximum Flows and
Selected Climatic Variables, ASCE J Hyd Eng, 9(4), 246-256.
Ghosh, S., Das, D., Kao, S-C and Ganguly, A.R., 2011, Lack of Uniform Trends but Increasing Spatial Variability
in Observed Indian Rainfall Extremes, Letters to Nature Climate Change, DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE132.
Ghosh, S., Luniya, V., Gupta, A., 2009, Trend analysis of Indian summer monsoon rainfall at different spatial
scales, Atm Sc Lett, 10, 285290.
Guhathakurta, P., Menon, P., Mazumdar, A.B., and. Sreejith, O. P, 2010. Changes in Extreme Rainfall Events and
Flood Risk in India During the Last Century, National Climate Centre Research Report No: 3/2010.
Guhathakurta, P., Sreejith, O.P. and Menon, P.A., 2011, Impact of Climate Change on Extreme Rainfall Events
and Flood Risk in India, J. Earth Syst. Sci.120, No. 3, pp. 359373.
Haan, C.T., 1995, Statistical Methods in Hydrology, Iowa State University Press, pp 378.
Hamed, K.H. and Rao, A.R., 1998, A Modified Mann-Kendall Trend Test for Auto correlated Data, J Hyd, 204,
182-196.
Helsel, D.R. and Hirsch, R.M., 2002, Statistical Methods in Water Resources Hydrologic Analysis and
Interpretation: Techniques of Water Resources Investigations of the U.S. Geological Survey, Chapter A3, Book 4,
510pp.
IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K.,
Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex V., and Midgley P.M. (eds.)], Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Kahya, E. and Kalayci, S., 2004, Trend Analysis of Stream Flow in Turkey, Journal of Hydrology, 289, 128-144.
Kishtawal, C.M., Niyogi, D., Tewari, M., Pielke R.A.Sr. and Shepherd, J.M., 2009, Urbanization signature in the
observed heavy rainfall climatology over India, Int J Clim, DOI: 10.1002/joc.2044.
Pattanaik, D.R. and Rajeevan, M, 2009, Variability of extreme rainfall events over India during southwest
monsoon season, Met Appl, 17(1), 88-104.
Rajeevan, M., Bhate, J.and Jaswal A.K., 2008, Analysis of Variability and Trends of Extreme Rainfall Events over
India using 104 years of Gridded Daily Rainfall Data, Geophys. Res. Lett., 35, L18707, DOI:
10.1029/2008GL035143.
Sen Roy, S. and Balling R.C., 2009, A spatial analysis of extreme hourly precipitation patterns in India, Int J Clim,
29, 345-355.

40
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Yue, S. and Hashino, M., 2003, Long Term Trends of Annual and Monthly Precipitation in Japan, Journal of the
American Water Resources Association, 587-596.
Yue, S., Pilon, P., Phinney, B. and Cavadias, G., 2002, The influence of Autocorrelation on the Ability to Detect
Trend in Hydrological Series, Hyd Proc, 16, 1807-1829.
Yue,S. and Pilon, P., 2003, Interaction between deterministic trend and autoregressive process, Wat Res Res, 39
(4), 1077 Doi: 10.1029/2001WR001210.

41
Compendium of Technical Papers

Failure of Ankamnhal Minor Irrigation Dam- Investigation


Y.K. Handa
Chief Engineer,
Designs (N&W), Central Water Commission
cedesnws@nic.in

ABSTRACT
The Ankamanhal Minor Irrigation Dam, 16.83 m high and 278 m long embankment dam was designed and
constructed by the State Government in Krishna Basin across a nala near Ankamanhal village in 1988
downstream of a old bund which had breached earlier also. No records were found available of the old earthen
th st
dam breached earlier and the present dam, which breached on the night of 20 and 21 August, 2010. Both the
dams breached in the deep nala portion. The spillway width of the old dam was very less compared to the
th st
present dam. The dam had breached for a length of 71 m during the night of 20 and 21 August, 2010 after the
catchment experienced an unprecedented rainfall of 102 mm for about 9 hours. The breach of the dam was
investigated by the several panels/authorities and committees. The state Dam Safety review panel, headed by
Dr. Y.K. Murthy, Ex Chairman Central Water Commission, was of the opinion that a lineament of a major joint
which existed all along the mother valley in the foundation of the earth dam as a major cause of concern.
Member DSRP observed that discharge over the spillway was much above the designed capacity which might
have caused overtopping the dam. He also anticipated foundation failure along the same shear lineament or
because of differential settlement in the right bank. The team of CWC and GSI inspected the breached dam
along with Geologist from GSI. Since no one saw the dam when it was breaching and no records were available,
all the aspects were studied on the basis of site observations and accordingly analysis was carried out on the
basis of data generated through observations and using codal provisions to arrive at the probable failure cause.

1.0 BACKGROUND
The Ankamanhal Minor Irrigation Dam in Krishna Basin was constructed across a nala near
Ankamanhal village in 1988 downstream of the old bund which had breached earlier. No records were
available for the construction as well as breaching of the dam before 1988. The 16.83 m high & 278 m
long embankment dam was designed and constructed by the State Government. The 53.35 m long
ogee crested spillway (waste weir) was ungated and designed to pass a design discharge of 102
cumec with 0.9 m head. The dam was having two sluices Right and Left bank for irrigation. Due to
mining activities in the upstream the dam reservoir had been silted up to the extent of 0.5 m above sill
elevation of irrigation sluices and the irrigation sluices were not functioning. The farmers were pumping
ground water from the downstream of the dam. No water level records of the reservoir and spillage
from the waste weir were being maintained by the department.

The state Dam Safety review panel, headed by Dr. Y.K. Murthy, Ex Chairman Central Water
Commission, had inspected the dam on 08-12-2009 and following were the main observations.

a. Left Bank consists of schistose formation on which spillway waste weir is constructed. Team had
observed extensive damage to the bed pitching constructed of dry slabs provided in between four
drop walls along the tail channel.

b. In the foundation of the earth dam, there is lineament of a major joint which exists all along the
mother valley, which was considered by the team during the inspection as a major cause of
concern. During the inspection it was reported that no treatment was given to the foundation in this
reach of the main dam.

c. The waste weir structure was designed with an Ogee crest. Team had recommended that the
spillway design discharge should be 1 in 100 years flood as per IS Codes and the adequacy of the
existing spillway capacity should be checked for SPF. The free board shall also be provided as per
IS codal provisions.

d. The top width of the dam i.e. 2.44 m was considerably reduced at many places. The original dam
section shall be restored by providing additional earth work duly compacted. Also the stability of
the dam shall be checked for all conditions including seismic condition since the dam is in Zone II.
If needed strengthening measures should be carried out.

42
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

e. No seepage was observed on the downstream slope and no trace of seepage collected in the toe
drain below rock toe. Team observed leakage of 5 liters/s in the nala immediately downstream of
the dam. But one of the drawings shows a 5.07 m deep cut off trench. This needs to be
investigated.

f. Few piezometers shall be provided in the downstream zone of embankment dam to observe water
levels with reference to reservoir levels.

g. Outlet gates, seals and other maintenance works shall be undertaken if irrigation is to be revived.

2.0 SITE INSPECTION BY MEMBER DSRP

The dam was inspected by a Member 0f Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP0 on 30-09-2010 after the
breach. The following were his main findings.
1. The depth of water that passed over the spillway was about 1.5 m as ascertained from the
flood mark.
2. The discharge over the spillway with 1.5 m head of water, appears to have reached a peak of
219 cumec and outflow of 180 cumec against a designed capacity of 102 cumec.
3. The flood was arrested between the old bund and new bund and might have caused a
heading up of 0.6 to 0.7 m of water and consequently overtopped the earth dam resulting in
the breach of the new bund.
4. The breached portion needs to be rectified and all the components of the dam be rehabilitated
to make it serviceable.

3.0 OBSERVATIONS OF DR Y .K. MURTHY, CHAIRMAN, DSRP

The report of Member DSRP of State along with flood hydrograph and photographs, after the breach,
were sent to Dr. Y.K. Murthy for his observations. His main observations were.

1. The difference between the top of waste weir and top of dam is 2.14 m. With 2.14 m head,
discharge will be 366.79 cumec and 334.91 cumec for Cd value of 2.19 & 2.0 respectively.
Therefore, the dam cannot overtop with a flood of 219 or 180 cumec.

2. It is anticipated that a shear lineament extends from the upstream in the reservoir to the
downstream all along the mother valley. It is also anticipated that no foundation treatment was
given at the time of construction. The seepage of 5 liters/sec in the nala portion at the time of
inspection in Dec. 2009 justifies the above. Therefore the failure could have caused due to
foundation failure along this shear lineament. The failure could also be due to cracks as a result of
differential settlement in the right bank,

3. The Photographs do not suggest any overtopping, at anticipated location i.e. from CH 180 to 193.

4. The Chairman DSRP desired that there was a need to investigate each issue and the project
organization should take up detailed inspection with the help of an earth dam design engineer and
an expert engineering geologist to know the actual cause of failure before rehabilitation is taken
up.

4.0 VISIT OF CWC AND GSI FROM 24-02-2011 TO 25-02-2011

The following data was supplied during the visit:

1. Copy of the DPR stage drawings and estimate of the dam constructed in 1988.
2. Cross section of the dam at 30 m interval taken after the breach of 21st August 2010, showing
the profile of the embankment dam.
3. Longitudinal section of the embankment dam after the breach.
4. Submergence plan of the dam up to 1 m above the top of dam.

43
Compendium of Technical Papers

4.1 Observations of the site visit

Hard Schishtose formation with interbanded quartzite and thin quartz veins were exposed both in
the upstream and downstream of the ogee waste weir. The waste weir (spillway) drop walls were
heavily damaged. This was mainly due to two reasons firstly the discharge on the 20th August night
was nearly double the designed discharge (102 cumec) and secondly the design of the weir was not
as per state of the art.

No records were found available of the old earthen dam breached earlier and the present dam, which
breached on 21st August was inspected. Both the dams breached in the deep nala portion. The
spillway width of the old dam was very less compared to the present dam.

The entire reach of the dam from upstream and downstream was inspected. There was no sign of
distress at any place on the slope except the three failures stretches i.e. CH 180 to 193, CH 199 to
270 and the failure around the right bank sluice. The top width of the dam in the entire reach as
provided at the time of construction was found to be less than 2.44 m (8 feet). No signs of overtopping
of the earthen dam were also apparent in the visible reach.

The embankment material exposed in the steep right breach face between CH 199 to 270 does not
show any visible signs of distress such as cracking and loosening. The cross section of the dam at
CH.240, which is the deepest valley portion shows the existing breached embankment level to be 2 to
3 m above the stripped foundation level. The soil material of side slopes of the breached reach from
CH 199 to 270 showed only little difference in colour of the shell and core material. The core soil, when
dry was very hard and was easily rolled into balls in wet condition indicating that the soil was having
high clay content. The horizontal and inclined filter material was visible only at few locations on the
side slopes. At other locations probably it would have been mixed up with the surrounding soil due to
side slope slips.

The failure at CH 180 to 193 looked to be slip failure and no sign of overtopping could be seen. The
slip appeared to be a surface failure. In the right bank sluice portion around CH 307 the failure was
nearly up to the ground level at that point. The sluice is close to nala portion and downstream of the
breached portion of the old dam. (see Googles map enclosed).

44
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

OLD SPILLWAY

OLD DA
AM

Figure 1 : Satellitte View of the Dam & Reserrvoir

There waas a thick co over of 3 to 5 m impervioous clayey sediment exte ending for ab
bout 300 m upstream
of the da
am. Due to drying, the clayey mate erial in the rreservoir bed
d was highlyy cracked an
nd gulley
formation
n was observed along g the right flank hill. This
T sedimeent should have acted d as an
impervio
ous blanket and safegu uard againsst seepage through th he foundation
n of the dam.
d The
permeab bility of the se
ediment in th
he reservoir may
m be determined by la aboratory testts.

The brea ach in the oldd dam was also


a inspecte
ed as it was dry on the day of inspecction. Highly contorted
c
schistosee rocks were a along the entire length
e exposed all h of the brea ach. No majo
or discontinu
uity in the
form of sshear of fractture zone could be obserrved during this field insp
pection.

ht flank hill forming the right


The righ r rim of the reservoir presents stable
s s. No major landslide
slopes
scars weere observed d. Therefore the possibility of a large
e landslide into the reservoir therebyy causing
over topp
ping of the dam appears to be remote e.

epth of 2 to 3 mts along the toe of th


A few triial pits were dug to a de he dam. Stifff clayey matterial was
encounte ered in them below top.

ssible Cause of Failure


4.2 Pos

After insspection and d discussion and going through the data suppliied by proje ect authoritie
es, it was
conclude ed that failurre could havve taken placce by any off the followin
ng four causses or combiination of
more tha an one.

a. O
Overtopping due to high flood.

45
Compendium of Technical Papers

b. Failure of foundation due to shear lineament.


c. Overtopping due to wave action.
d. Slip failure of earth dam slope leading to breaching of the dam.
Each of the above cause has been analyzed as discussed below:-

4.2.1 Overtopping due to high flood.

Since the 1.5 m water level mark was at the spillway crest, the water level in the reservoir would have
been more than 1.5 m may be nearly equal to 1.7 m This was conformed with the help of water profile
table given in Central water Commission Manual on Hydraulic design of Spillways for Ogee shapes.

Considering He = Hd =1.7 m (i.e. actual head equal to design head) the factors X/He and Y/He from
Chart 7 of the Manual are:-

X/He Y/He
0.2 0.821
1.0 0.933
Putting a value of He =1.7
For X = 0.34 m (1.7 X 0.2), Y will be 1.51 (1.7 X 0.821) and
For X =1.70 m (1.7 X 1.0), Y will be 1.72 (1.7 X 0.933)

Therefore the water level in the reservoir would have been close to 1.7 m at the time of breach. Since
the upstream floor of waste weir was nearly at the same level as crest of spillway the coefficient of
discharge Cd will be 1.84 and discharge over the waste weir will be :-

Q = Cd L He3/2 = 1.84 x 53.35 x 1.7 3/2 = 218 cumec.


Where 53.35 m is length of waste weir

4.2.2 Failure of foundation due to shear lineament.

The cross section of the dam at CH 240 shows the existing breached embankment level to be 2 to 3
m above the stripped foundation level. If seepage through foundations were to be a primary cause for
failure, one would normally expect the failure to be initiated at the base of the dam and extend
upwards progressively, which does not seem to be the present case.

In the ground water prospects map of part of Bellary and Chitra Durga districts of Karnataka, on
1:50,000 scale, a lineament is shown along the course of the nala in the mother valley. During
discussions with geologist it was confirmed that this was the same lineament referred to in the DSRP
team report. The trend of this lineament is in NW-SE direction which is also the regional foliation
direction of Dharwar Schistose rocks. This lineament when extended to the present breached dam
alignment would intercept it near its waste weir location and would therefore be far away from the deep
valley section. The trend of the line joining the deep valley points of the breached dams in N 70o E-70o
W or E-W which is quite different from the trend of the inferred lineament.

There is a nala which joins the mother valley nala some distance upstream of the dam and the trend
of its course is nearer to the direction of the line joining the mid points of the two breaches. However,
no lineament is shown along this nala course in the Ground water prospects map referred to earlier.

A doubt had been expressed about the actual execution of a cut of trench as per the design drawings.
This fact could not be verified during field inspection as the breach at CH.240.00m (the deepest valley
portion) was quite above the base of the dam. However, the drawings and estimate of the DPR stage
provided during the visit shows cut of trench

The right sluice is located at CH.307 m. The breach has exposed the foundations of the sluice and its
abutting surface with the right flank hill. It was observed that the sluice was founded on loose talus
material and the failure can be attributed to its foundations.

4.2.3 Overtopping due to wave action

46
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

As per the cross sections (taken after the breach) at every 30 m and the longitudinal sections supplied
during the visit it was observed that the dam top had a settlement of nearly 30 cm at CH 90, 120, 150
& 165 and from 30 to 45 cm from CH 180 onwards. The higher settlement from CH 180 could be due
to the slip failure from CH 180 to 193 and breach at or around CH 199 to 307. Therefore it can be
considered that there was an overall settlement of nearly 30 cm. in the entire length of the dam which
could be slightly higher in the nala portion due to height of dam.

The old earth dam upstream of the present earth dam could be seen just upstream in the reservoir and
top nearly at same level as that of the waste weir crest. A wave originating from the farthest left end of
reservoir will break due to the obstruction from the old earth dam. Therefore the straight reach along
the nala on the right side of the reservoir was the only path along which the wave could have
generated and hit the dam. The free board was calculated considering this as the main path.

Considering the MWL condition the free board calculations were carried out with water level 1.7 m
above waste weir crest level using IS 10635 code i.e. free board Requirement for Embankment dams -
Guidelines. Calculations were also carried out for normal condition i.e. water at FRL (waste weir level).
The free board required for MWL condition was 0.64 m and the significant wave height 0.41m.
Significant wave height is the average height of one third of the highest waves. Though the permissible
free board required is 1.5 m in MWL condition but in this case even the significant wave could over top
the dam since there was a free board of only 0.14 m available with water level as 55.95 m. (crest level
54.25 +1.70) and top of dam reduced from 56.39 m to 56.09 m due to settlement of dam top.

4.2.4 Slip failure of earth dam slope leading to breaching of the dam.

The soil properties of the dam were not available and the dam section for slope failure could not be
checked with actual properties. Due to heavy rains on that night the dam was in fully saturated
condition. When the dam was almost full of water up to top and in saturated condition a slope of
1.5(H):1(V) & 2(H):1(V) in the downstream and 2(H):1(V) & 2.5 (H):1(V) in the upstream was probably
not enough.

5.0 CONCLUSION

No records/data were collected after the breach and after the breach there was a soil cover of 2 to 3 m
left above nala bed from CH 199 to 270. There was no signs of washing off the foundation material at
the site. The geologist also did not support the existence of shear lineament. Therefore, the theory of
shear lineament failure was ruled out.

The possibility of a failure only due to flood with a water level at EL 55.95 m against top of dam EL
56.09 m at the time of breach was also not likely possibility. Though the permissible free board
required is 1.5 m in MWL condition but, in this case there was a free board of only 0.14 m available
with water level at 55.95 m. (crest level 54.25 +1.70) and top of dam reduced from 56.39 m to 56.09 m
due to settlement of dam top, where even the significant wave could over top the dam. Hence, the
most likely reason for failure of the dam was overtopping due to wave action. This explanation is also
supported by the fact that the dam had breached at two places CH 199 to 270 and around CH 307
both of them are in line with the nala and the upstream old bund breach portion and where wave
height calculations for free board were carried out. As already explained above since the water level
was high and the soil material was fully saturated some slip failure might have also.

Since the failure occurred during the night and no one saw the failure, with the data available and the
analyses carried out as explained above, the most possible cause of failure was due to overtopping by
wave action and slip failure.

6.0 BASIC CODAL PROVISIONS AND STATE OF THE ART NOT FALLOWED RESULTED IN
LESS UTILITY AND FAILURE OF DAM.

1. The spillway design discharge should have been checked for SPF.
2. The free board not provided as per IS codal provisions & no parapet wall provided.
3. Waste weir design - No water cushion was provide at each drop of waste weir.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

4. The stability of the dam not checked for all conditions including seismic condition since the dam is
in Zone II.
5. Heavy siltation due to mining waste in the reservoir resulting in non operational of outlets.
6. No record of discharge from the spillway was maintained and also no instruments were installed.
7. Lack of maintenance
I. The top width of the dam (2.44 m) considerably reduced at many places.
II. The original dam section needed to be restored by providing additional earth work
duly compacted where ever it was required.
III. Outlet gates, seals etc.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Dam Break Analysis A basic approach


Antonio Porcheddu Ashoke Basistha
Dam Break Analysis, Egis, New Delhi Hydrologist
antonio.porcheddu-int@egis.fr Egis-India, New Delhi

ABSTRACT
One of the scopes of Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) is to prepare the Emergency Action
Plan (EAP) for the dams included in the project. The results of the Dam Break (DB) study, jointly with the results
of the routing of the discharge from the outlets, are the major information to be included in the EAPs. In this paper
it is illustrated the approach used to develop this study, the basic mathematical equations that describe the
phenomena and the possible approximations, the numerical schemes that could be used to solve the equations.
Also some information and hints regarding the software used to implement the mathematical model are given.
Considering the important number of dams within the DRIP project we have adopted a basic approach that may
be used for the majority of analysis. The study is generally based on the open channel flow theory, but for some
particular circumstances, a mixed approach, given by open channel equations and mathematical solver tools,
normally used in aeronautics, is suggested. These latter numerical models have the benefit to be more stable and
therefore to represent the discontinuities that frequently can happen in rapidly varied flow in a more satisfactory
way.

1 INTRODUCTION

The safety of dam has always been a matter of concern for designers who make a lot of efforts in
order to guarantee an absence of risk in terms of failure and deterioration. However, a certain risk is
always present even if the structure is safe and the actual tendency is to assess it trough an economic
analysis.

Risk assessment is the first step toward a correct landscape management and it is of fundamental
importance considering that threat to human life is involved. In different countries there are laws which
mandate a dam-break wave study for dams to be built and for existing dams. This study is usually
performed by means of mathematical models which, actually, in case of a flood propagation involving
an area of hundreds square kilometers, are less expensive and give more reliable results than
physical model.

In this paper a simple mathematical approach is illustrated and a short description of the software that
is recommended for DRIP Project is articulated.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PHENOMENA

When a dam breaks the dynamic situation is characterized by a perturbation which acts on the system
lake-dam-river; the perturbation propagates as a steep negative wave upstream and a steep positive
wave downstream. Waves characteristics depend upon the velocity with which the dam collapses, the
reservoir morphology, the channel shape and roughness. To summarize the dam-break event
following the breach formation can be characterized through three basic steps:

formation of a steep negative wave that trigs an acceleration in the body of water that can
significantly influence the outflow;
outflow through the breach;
formation and propagation of a positive wave downstream.

Generally speaking the three steps are strictly dependent because the outflow is influenced by the
negative wave and the positive wave can influence the outflow as well. The situation is complex and
the use of a model that simulate the movement evolution without separating it into different steps
might seem better. However there are some situations, in which the outflow is free, i.e. uninfluenced
by the positive wave, and the problem can be split into two parts: outflow hydrograph (OH)
determination and flood routing downstream. In these cases can be easier to implement the study.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

3 OUTFLOW HYDROGRAPH (OH)

3.1 Breach formation mechanism

The way a breach forms is peculiar to the type of dam considered, it means that different techniques
should be used to determine the OH. A short classification on the possible type of breach and the time
for it to develop is given below:

Concrete Dam: the structure is built with blocks statically independent from each other, the
most likely situation is a partial breach caused by blocks failure. The time for the breach to
develop can be considered short.
Arch Dam : the structure is monolithic therefore a almost complete and instantaneous
structure failure should be assumed.
Earth Dam : partial breach which forms relatively slowly (half an hour, two hours); formation
mechanisms are: flood overtopping and landslide of a zone due to infiltration in the
embankment body.

3.2 Dam breach type,

The outflow hydrograph is the result of the "reservoir's behavior" both with respect to the breach
formation and to the downstream river or valley features.

The variables that control the outflow are many, among them the most important are:
Breach size, Time for the breach to develop, Breach shape,
Head H=H(t), Storage S =S(H(t)), Reservoir's morphology and roughness;
Morphology and roughness of the channel downstream.

Therefore in order to compute the OH, in accordance with Yevjevich, we can identify three situations
based on the effect of the breach and of the channel on the outflow hydrograph.

Small Breach: the effect of the negative wave generated by the sudden water release can be
neglected. The maximum outflow occurs at the initial time because an instantaneous acceleration of
the water body is assumed. The reservoir empties in conditions of quasi steady flow (i.e. reservoir
surface remain nearly horizontal), the critical depth occurs in the breach section.

Hunt gives an "a priori" criterion to verify if we can consider a quasi steady flow in case of partially
breached dam:

b/B < 0.37 (b=breach width, B=dam width)


which is a situation likely to be met in many practical condition.

Yevjevich instead gives an "a posteriori" criterion:


Q = Qm-Q0 < Qm
Qm =max discharge without considering the negative wave, Q0 = max discharge considering
the negative wave, ( =0.05-0.10).

If these criterion are met, the outflow hydrograph can be determined using the continuity equation
(conservation of mass):

(1)

in order to perform the integration, S=S(H(t)), Q=Q(H(t)) and I=I(t) must be known. In the literature
there are several examples and in case of special forms of S=S(t) and Q=Q(t) analytical solutions are
given, otherwise it is necessary to integrate it numerically.

Medium Breach: the effect of the negative wave cannot be neglected nor the reservoir shape and
roughness. The maximum discharge occurs when the negative wave is fully developed and the critical
depth still occurs in the breach section. There are several procedures to determine the outflow
hydrograph, the procedure proposed by Yevjevich take into account the negative wave effects through

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

a fictitious hydrograph, to be introduced into the continuity equation (1), and evaluated from the
negative wave travelling upstream.

Large Breach: the effects of negative wave, of reservoirs roughness and shape and of tailwater
cannot be neglected. Critical depth does not occur in the breach section and thus the outflow is not
free. The tailwater effect decreases the outflow at the beginning and increases it at the end, increasing
also the time for the reservoir to empty. The best technique seems to analyze the outflow and the
routing downstream together and with the complete equations, the outflow through the breach should
be considered as an internal boundary condition [Schamber & Katopodes]

4 FLOOD ROUTING

4.1 Flow conditions

The condition of the fluid flowing downstream through the breach can be schemed as follows (Also in
accordance with Schamber & Katopodes):

Free outflow / supercritical flow (Fr > 1)


Free outflow / subcritical flow (Fr< 1)
Outflow influenced by tailwater (submerged) and hence subcritical.

In the first two situations the Outflow Hydrograph can be used as an input function to perform the flood
routing downstream, in the third case it is advisable, as already stated, not to split the computation.

4.2 Theory

The treatment of gradually varied unsteady flow can be performed with the St. Venant equations which
are a system of hyperbolic partial differential equations. Their derivation is based on mass and
momentum conservation principles: they are reported here for one dimensional case with u(x,t) and
h(x,t) as unknowns (for basic hypothesis see Cunge) :
A u A
u A = 0 (2)
x x x

u u h
u g g ( So S f ) ( 3)
t x x
where:
A: cross section area,
u(x,t) : flow velocity
h(x,t) : flow height
S0 : river slope
Sf : energy grade line slope,
g: gravitational acceleration,
x,t : space and time variables.

This system of equation has to be coupled with suitable initial and boundary conditions (the unknowns
being u(x,t) and h(x,t)) :

initial conditions : u=u(x,0),h=h(x,0);


boundaries conditions: upstream u=u(0,t) = (1/A(h)) ( Q(0,t)) ;

one more boundary condition has to be specified depending on the flow conditions: if the flow is
supercritical the boundary must be specified upstream ( ex. h=h(0,t)), if subcritical, it must be specified
downstream.

It can be proved that, if equations and initial and boundary conditions meet the hypothesis, a solution
exists and it is unique. Yet there are some situations when these hypothesis (continuity,

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Compendium of Technical Papers

differentiability, etc) are violated and thus the equations are not longer applicable; it is the case, for
example, of an undular moving jump. Nevertheless, the discontinuity can be considered infinitesimal
and the moving hydraulic jump relation can be used as an internal boundary condition to link the flow
immediately upstream and downstream [Cunge]. In conclusion the St.Venant equations are a powerful
tool to perform flood routing, they can simulate perturbations which either propagate upstream and
downstream. The existing discontinuities, that do not comply with the basic hypothesis of the
equations, may be treated as internal boundary, overcoming in this way an important limitation.

4.3 Simplified equations

There are same particular situations, to be evaluated carefully, where it is possible to use a simplified
form of the full equations. A brief discussion on it follows.

Terms in the momentum equation (3) can be considered as slopes [Yevjevich]: the first term
represents the slope of the energy line (total head) with respect to the acceleration, the second term is
the slope which corresponds to the variation of kinetic energy in space and in condition of steady flow,
the third represents the water surface slope, Sf is the slope due to friction forces which oppose the
flow and S0 is the channel slope. From the channel characteristics and the possible type of flow we
can roughly estimate the order of magnitude of each term and predict its role in the fluid flow : for
example, if one is interested in the global evolution of a flood, which is a typical engineering interest,
the local acceleration terms may be dropped (diffusive approximation), and also dh/dt may be dropped
if small compared with S (kinematic approximation). In case of steady flow, the time dependent terms,
either from (2) and (3) could be dropped.

Diffusive equation:

The acceleration terms are small compared with the others and so they can be dropped from (3) which
reduces to
h
So S f ( 4)
t
(4) coupled with the (2) becomes [Cunge] :

Q Q dK Q K 2 2Q
0 (5)
t b1 K1 dh x 2b Q x 2

(6) is a parabolic partial differential convective-diffusive equation in the dependent variable Q(x,t). This
equation is adequate to simulate also backwater effects and requires two boundary conditions.

Kinematic equation :
If no backwater effects propagate upstream the diffusive term can be dropped and (3) reduces to :

0 So S f (6)
coupling (6) with (2) it becomes [Cunge] :

Q dQ Q
0 (7)
t dA x x

which is a first order differential equation in the unknown Q(x,t) and it is widely used in hydrologic
studies. Wooliser and Ligget proposed a criterion to verify the applicability of (7) to describe flood
propagation, based on the Kinematic Number,

S 0L
K (8)
Y (Fr ) 2

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

The two authors found out that if K>20 the approximation is good and if K>10 the approximation is
acceptable.

US Agencies, like FEMA, suggest to select the type of model depending on the hazard of the dam, i.e.
depending on the damages that can occur downstream. Therefore the suggestion is for the use of a
simplified model (essentially with hydrologic routing) for low and intermediate hazard potential and
unsteady (1D or 2D with unsteady flow) model in case of high hazard potential.

4.4 Numerical Solution

The equation proposed are too complex to be solved analytically so it is necessary to use a numerical
technique to get approximate solutions which satisfy the original differential equations as well as
possible.

Methods of solution found in the literature are : FEM (Finite Element Method), FDM (Finite Difference
Method) and Method of Characteristics. FEM is not commonly used; the Characteristics Method is
used in special problems where accuracy is mainly important; FDM is the most widespread technique
in mathematical modeling of flood propagation. The basic idea of the FDM method is to replace
continuous functions by functions defined on a discrete number of points within field of existence. A
FDM can employ an explicit scheme or an implicit scheme or both: in the explicit scheme the solution
is computed, for a given time line, from one point to the next; in the implicit scheme the solution is
computed simultaneously for all the points that lie on the same time line. The first scheme is
computationally easiest to use but unstable if Courant Friedrichs and Lewis condition (CFL) is not
satisfied, the second is mathematically more complicated but always stable and more accurate. Also a
semi implicit scheme can be used, this scheme has the advantage to be mathematically complicated
only when necessary, i.e. only the terms that cause instability are treated implicitly, while the other
terms are treated explicitly; this technique is usually powerful and computationally convenient.

Over the last few years more powerful numerical schemes were implemented thanks to improved
computers, these schemes are usually in use in fluid dynamic and have high grade of stability also
when they simulate discontinuities like hydraulic jumps. It is worth to mention about the TVD model
(Total Variation Diminishing), the Godunov scheme, the approximate Riemann solver, the Flux vector
and the Petrov-Galerkin scheme.

5 SOFTWARE

Different software has been implemented in the last 30 years by Institutions, Universities and
Research Centers to take advantage of the increased computational power of the new computers.

Among the commercial software the most used are Mike and FLO-2D, among the free software we
should remind the ones developed by the National Weather Service as Breach, Dambreak, SMPBBK
and HEC-1 and HEC-RAS developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Dambreak and Breach
have been used for many years as an efficient tool, though nowadays HEC-RAS, that is more recent,
efficient and user friendly is more used.

HEC-RAS (Hydrologic Engineering Center - River Analysis System), developed by the US Army Corps
of Engineers, is multi purposes hydrologic and hydraulic software to perform one dimensional river
analysis in condition of steady and unsteady flow. It is mainly used in the United States for dam break
analysis but is also used in Europe and other Countries with satisfactory results. Recent comparison
between Mike and HEC-RAS by Fleenor and Jensen (2013), in modeling of unsteady flow, have led to
the conclusion that both get to a reliable representation of the benchmark test and both were able to
model transient effect in California Aqueduct. It is now a quite stable (numerically speaking) code and
can deal with different situations, as quite complicated shape of channel or channels and different
structures that interfere with the flow. In addition it is user friendly because of its graphic infer face and
the detailed manuals. All these assets easy to use by engineers who have got vast specific
experience.

Within the DRIP project we have started to work on HEC-RAS that we recognize to be one of the most
flexible software and probably the most suitable to our necessities. In the figure n 1 an inundation
map in scale 1:2000 was prepared as final result of dam break study.

53
Compendium of Technical Papers

Figure n 1 Example
e of inundation
n map prepare
ed as final outp
put of Dam Brreak Study

6 CONCLUSION

The dam m break analysis is a com mplex pheno omenon but, in particularr situations, can
c be treate ed with a
basic appproach. Ab bove all, in case of free e outflow fro
om the brea ach it is convenient to split the
computa ation in two steps,
s i.e. ca
alculation of the
t outflow hydrograph
h f
from the breaach and floood routing
of the ou
utflow downsstream, and focus
f on themm separatelyy. A first evaluation of the
e outflow cann be done
using the continuity equation. The T routing of
o the hydroograph down nstream of th he breach should be
carried o
out with the complete dyynamic equa ation, unless particular coonditions aree met. As a matter of
fact the kinematic flo
ood routing iss acceptable e of large sccale study, in areas with adequate
e only in case a
slopes and
a at a certa ain distance from the bre each. But in some situation it may be e useful to ca
arry out a
preliminaary study witth the Kinematic model in n order speedd up the who ole study proocess.

One of tthe softwaree used to ca arry out the Dam Break Analysis and the flood routing is HEC-RAS,
which usses the complete motion h got a user friendly in
n equation, has nterface and has got its own GIS
software
e application.. Within DRIPP project moost of the stud e under development, and
dies that are d that will
lead to tthe preparatiion of inunda
ation maps, are carried out
o with HEC C-RAS or with software of similar
characteeristics.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

LIST OF SYMBOLS AND VARIABLES


x Space coordinate (along the river), propagation direction
t Time
A = A (H(t)) Reservoir area
A(x,t): Average cross sectional area;
CFL Courant Friedrichs and Lewis (Criterion)
Fr Froude number
g : Acceleration due to gravity
H = H (x,t) Height of water ( in channels or reservoir)
Q = Q (x,t) Discharge
q Unit discharge
S 0L
K Kinematic number
Y (Fr ) 2
S = S(H(t)) Storage of reservoir
So : Channels slope;
Sf : Rate of energy loss (energy grade line slope);
y (x,t) : Height of flow respect a datum (z+h)
v = v (x,t) Fluid velocity (water)
V = V (H(t)) Volume of water in the reservoir

REFERENCES

BALLOFET, SCHEFFLER : Teton dam failure flood. JHE 04/82.


BELLOS, SAKKAS : Dam-break flood propagation on dry bed. JHE vol.113, 12/87
BRAKENSIEK, COMER : A re-examination of a flood routing method comparison. JHE 03/65.
CHOW, MAIDMENT, MAYS: Applied Hydrology . Mc Graw Hill 1988 (N.Y.)
CUNGE, HOLLY, VERWEY: Practical aspects of computational river hydraulics . Pitman 1980 (London).
DRESSLER : Comparison of theories and experiment for the hydraulics dam-break wave. National Bureau of
Standards, Washington, U.S.A.
FENNEMA, CHAUDRY : Simulation of one dimensional dam-break flows. JHE vol.25, 01/87.
FRENCH : Open Channel Hydraulics. Mc Graw Hill 1986 (N.Y.).
GABOS, ZIFFERERO : Calcolo generalizzato di profili idrici. Idrotecnica 05/90.
HROMADKA, DE VRIES: Kinematic wave routing and computational error.JHE02/88.
HENDERSON : Open channel flow . The McMillan Company 1964 (N.Y.).
IAHR : XX IAHR Congress Proceedings . Moscow 1983
ICOLD : 17 International congress on large dam. Idrotecnica Special Issue March-April 1991
U.S. Army Corps of Engineer : HEC-RAS Users Manual January 2010
HUNT : Dam break solution . JHE 06/84.
HUNT : Perturbation solution for dam break flood . JHE 08/84.
LINSLEY, FRANZINI: Water resources engineering . Mc Graw Hill 1987 (N.Y.)
KATOPODES, SCHAMBER: Applicability of dam break flood wave models. JHE 05/83.
KATOPODES, STRELKOFF :Computing two dimensional dam-break flood wave. JHD 09/84.
MACDONALD et Al : Breaching characteristics of dam failures. JHE 8/84.
MAHMOOD, YEVJEVICH: Unsteady flow in open channels. Vol I, II 1975 WRP (Fort Collins, Colorado).
PORCHEDDU A.: Studio della formazione e della propagazione dell'onda di piena conseguente alla rottura di uno
sbarramento. Msc. Thesis, College of Engineering, University of Cagliari (Italy) 07/1989
PORCHEDDU A. : Considerations on Dam-Break problem. University of Sassari (Italy) Studi Sassaresi 1991
SCHAMBER, KATOPODES : One dimensional model for partially breached dams. JHE 09/84.
STEPHENSON : Kinematic Hydrology and modeling . Development in WS.
STOKER: Water waves. Interscience Publishers (N.Y.).

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Compendium of Technical Papers

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1: HEC-1 Users Manual 1986,


WURBS : Dam breach flood wave models. JHE 01/87
XANTHOPOULOS, KOUTITAS : Numerical solution of two dimensional flood wave propagation due to dam
failure. JHE 04/82.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

A Knowledge Based System Technology for Dam Safety Analysis


Dr. S. Mohan
Professor
Environmental and Water Resources Engineering
Department of Civil Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
smohan@iitm.ac.in

ABSTRACT
Dam Engineering emerged as a structured branch of engineering in the earlier parts of this century. Because
many dams are now over 50 years old, special attention has been devoted to the issue of their effective
management. The art of managing dams is very complex and requires the efforts of multi-disciplinary teams
involving highly specialized knowledge. In case of dams, such knowledge is accumulated through a process of
learning and understanding how each structure responds to the current and exceptional actions. As old
structures tend to deteriorate and warrant special attention from managers and as more dams need to be
monitored for safety, managers are faced with large amounts of information which need to be evaluated in order
to highlight any anomalous situation which may endanger the structure serviceability or its safety and trigger
possible remedial actions. Also, the safety and serviceability requirements of existing dams must endorse all
relevant aspects of its history, namely design, construction, operation, and maintenance. Such task is also very
comprehensive, demanding and often very much puzzling. To ensure that a dam remains in good health,
surveillance must be continuous and performed at a professional level. To ensure timely perceptive analysis,
those who process surveillance data must be selective and be able to sort out what may be important.
Otherwise, there may be a tendency to bog down with the voluminous detail that can be generated by a
comprehensive system of observations. Artificial Intelligence and data mining concepts and techniques, referred
as knowledge based systems are tools with a recognizable potential to assist the engineering activities related
to monitoring, interpretation and diagnosis, in terms of simple rules of decision making. Also, engineers
responsible for a new dam have opportunities to know its foundation and materials, and to determine and
execute their treatment, processing and placement. They know where the site and the structure are strong and
where they are weak. For the sake of later analysis, their knowledge and its limits must be thoroughly
preserved. Otherwise, as those engineers responsible for the dam age with the structure, crucial knowledge
about the dam will be lost. Indeed, an old dam that has outlived its creators may be a puzzle to those who see it
for the first time.. This paper deals with how knowledge based system technology could help managers in the
everyday management of dams, especially the dam safety control activity. Including the knowledge acquisition
process. Secondly, it not only analyzed knowledge representation about dam safety monitoring expert system,
that is, factual knowledge, rule knowledge and procedure knowledge, but also established a simple knowledge
base based on relational database for dam safety monitoring expert system including fact base, rule base and
knowledge inference strategies. Finally, knowledge base has been embedded in an DKBASE system developed
indigenously at IIT Madras and applied to dam safety monitoring expert system for providing the dam safety
monitoring works.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of Safety of Dams has generated a lot of interest in recent years. This is mainly on
account of the potential for extensive loss of life and property in case a failure occurs. Though other
factors like natural calamities, wars, etc have resulted in greater deaths, dam failure on account of
being a failure of a man made structure, attract a lot of concern. A dam may fail due to several causes.
Some of the likely causes are foundation inadequacy, inadequate spillway capacity, defective material,
poor workmanship in construction, unexpected settlement, high pore pressure, embankment slips,
incorrect operations of spillway gates, earthquakes, etc.

According to statistics, out of nearly 15000 dams built, only 150 dams have failed. Two thirds of them
are of low height upto 30m. The large number of these (80 %) are earth embankments mostly built
without applications of modern technology in soil mechanics and control of quality. However, with
recent advances in quality control and monitoring methodologies, the percentage of Dams failed to
those constructed have reduced considerably. To solve a particular problem, engineers make use of
scientific knowledge which uses general models that have a great degree of abstraction and can be
used in too wide an application. On the other hand, engineers often make use of their experience and
common sense by using rules of thumb or heuristics. For the engineer, experience and judgement
must take over when scientific knowledge lacks or fails.

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Up to now dam safety assessment has relied heavily on the skills and experience of dam engineers.
The expertise accumulated by those engineers throughout the years is not always easily transferred to
new staff or might even not be transferable through written reports. Expert system technology has an
important and growing role here as one of the tools available to dam engineers for the management of
safety control (Comerford et al 1992).

Knowledge based systems technology differs from other, more traditional, computer programs
because their reasoning is not straightforward. Their tasks have no practical algorithmic solutions and
they must often make conclusions based on incomplete, judgmental, speculative, uncertain, or fuzzy
information. To reason like a human being expert systems rely not only on factual knowledge, as
conventional programs do, but also on uncertain knowledge and observations based on experience
and intuition (collectively called heuristics). The facts and heuristics are extracted from experts in a
specialised subject area. They are then coupled with methods of analysing, manipulating and applying
the encoded knowledge so that the program can make inferences and explain its actions. The purpose
of this paper is to develop an Expert System for the analysis of the safety of embankment dams. This
is done by asking for distress symptoms and other background data. These data are put through a set
of rules and the causes of the distress are identified along with suggestions for remedial measures.

EMBANKMENT DAMS

Embankment dams are the most common dams built since time immemorial. These are still the
common type of dams constructed for irrigational purposes. The failures of embankment dams in the
past have given invaluable lessons and enhanced our understanding of such immense structures.
With the development of heavy machinery for transportation and compaction of different types of soils
and rocks it has now been possible to build embankment dams of heights exceeding 300m.

The failure of embankment dams could be broadly classified into the following three categories.
Hydraulic failures
Seepage failures
Structural failure

They are briefly explained below

Hydraulic failures

Hydraulic failures involve the erosion of surfaces of the embankment and account for nearly third of all
disasters. No soil is erosion resistant and even a small but steady flow of water can wash out large
quantities of materials. Obviously a larger flow will wash out more material and do it faster. The
common forms of hydraulic failures are described below

Overtopping: (flow over embankment):This can be caused by inadequate spillway capacity,


clogging of spillways, obstruction in the spillway channel, malfunctioning of gates, provision of
insufficient freeboard or settlement of embankment after construction.

Wave Erosion(upstream)::The attack of waves on the upstream face and the action of currents in
the vicinity of the spillways and outlets can notch the dam and weaken it structurally. This is
caused by the absence or improper rip rap design or inadequate protection measures near the
structures

Toe Erosion (downstream): Erosion of toe of the dam due to outlet or spillway discharges is
caused by locating the spillway or outlet toe close to the dam, inadequate divide / training wall,
improper design or absence of rock toe and pitching upto the required elevation.

Gullying(downstream slope ): Erosion of downstream slope due to rainfall is caused by lack of


proper turfing or pitching and poor surface drainage arrangements.

Seepage Failure

Seepage of water through the embankment or foundation is responsible for a large number of failures
of embankment dams. Some seepage is inevitable in such dams and when it is controlled it does not

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

cause any damage. Uncontrolled seepage can lead to excessive loss of water from the reservoir or to
seepage erosion and piping through the dam. Excess seepage loss frequently comes from pervious
strata, seams or cavities in the foundation.

Excessive leakage through the embankment is caused by highly pervious soil, debris, and poor
compaction. Usually this leads to internal erosion and piping. Leaks could develop in conduits through
the embankment due to deterioration or settlement. Occasionally excessive seepage loss has been
caused by cracks in the dam produced by settlement . Drying of clay dams exposed by prolonged low
water level in the reservoir also produce cracks and excessive seepage.

Fine sands, silts and poorly compacted soils are particularly sensitive to seepage erosion. the same
leakage that causes excess water loss often leads to erosion, even though the amount of seepage
may be too small to notice.

Piping : piping begins at a point of concentrated seepage where velocity gradient is high. If point of
erosion is on the face of dam, where soils can be washed away, a small cavity is formed. This brings
in elongation of the cavity on the upstream side .The further the cavity ,the greater the seepage and
higher are the velocity gradients. The pipe which initially might have been few inches develops
suddenly into a tunnel which can cause a structural collapse of the dam.

A pervious dam foundation or a leaky reservoir bottom is a frequent cause of excessive loss and
occasionally of piping. The most common cause is the strata and the lenses of sand or gravel so
frequently encountered in the alluvial deposits on which earth dams are built.

Structural Failure

Structural failure or sliding of embankment and the foundation due to slope instability or liquefaction
are responsible for about one third of all failures. They take place when the stress in the soil produced
by the weight of the dam or the load of water on it exceeds the strength of the soil. Any combination of
circumstances that causes an increase in the loads or a decrease in the soil strength can lead to
failure . Sometimes surface erosion and uncontrolled seepage , though may not produce a failure on
their own account , can cause weakening of the soil and a structural failure.

The seams of sands and silt in the foundation which are connected to the reservoir, can build up water
pressure and create a plane of weakness in the foundation. Horizontal sliding may take place on this
surface which Slides can take place in either the upstream or the downstream face of the dam above
or including the foundation. Upstream slides usually occur during or immediately after a sudden
drawdown of the reservoir level.

Downstream slides usually occur during the first filling of the reservoir or following unusually heavy
rains or abnormally high reservoir. Though most slides are caused by sudden draining in the upstream
face and saturation of the downstream face, they can occur in either face during construction if the soil
is weak, the design is skimpy, or the soil is not properly and adequately compacted.

In flow slides the soil within the failure zone suffers a structural collapse. It suddenly flows like a
viscous liquid , completely destroying its original form and coming to rest far from its original position.
Sudden saturation and shock and vibration have been known to induce flow slides.

DAM DETAILS TO BE INSPECTED

The external surface provides a clue to the behaviour of the interior of the structure. hence a thorough
check of all exposed surfaces should be made. The earthen dam should be carefully examined for any
evidence of displacement, cracks, sinkholes, springs, wet spots, surface erosion, animal burrows,
vegetation, etc. Surface displacement on the earth dam can often be detected by visual examination.
The alignment, any depressions, upstream and downstream slopes should be checked. Any bulges in
previously smooth surfaces also indicate problems, including checking up for any cracks on the
surface

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The downstream face and the toe of the dam should be inspected for wet spots, boils, depressions,
sinkholes or springs. The upstream side should be carefully examined during period of low reservoir
stage when conditions permit.

NEED FOR AN KNOWLEDGE BASED TECHNOLOGY

With age dams may pose problems due to deterioration of materials used, sedimentation of the
reservoir, etc. With a sound design and quality construction, the problems of dam safety cannot be
said to be resolved to entirety. It is necessary to keep the Dam under observation continuously, even
during the maintenance phase. This pre-supposes that adequate instrumentation in the Dam is
provided so that it would give timely information about the happenings on the Dam and alert the
maintenance engineers for possible action to be taken to keep the Dam under safe conditions.

The engineer-in-charge of maintenance should have adequate knowledge of the various forces that
can cause failures, causes of failure and /or deterioration which generally occur or can occur so that
he can detect distress in time and take possible remedial measures and where they require specialist
advice obtain it without any loss of time. In the present system of administration when persons often
change charge it is necessary to devise a system by which every maintenance engineer is initiated to
the dam safety problems.

The above indicate an urgent need for an expert system that can perform the function of an expert
and also provide the means for transmitting knowledge in a methodical manner.

Knowledge Based Systems

The term Expert Systems does not describe a product but rather a whole set of concepts, procedures,
and techniques that enable people to use computers in a variety of valuable new ways. In essence,
Expert Systems techniques enable computers to assist people in analysing and solving complex
problems that can often be stated only in verbal terms. By encoding the knowledge and reasoning
skills of human experts within expert systems programs, we can create programs to diagnose
problems and make recommendations that would previously have required a human experts attention.

A broad definition of an Expert Systems is that Expert Systems is a program that manifests some
combination of concepts, procedure, and techniques derived from recent AI research, to allow people
to design and develop computer systems that use knowledge and inference techniques to analyse and
solve problems.

The six components of an expert system are briefly explained below:

Knowledge Base:

The knowledge base is where the domain specific knowledge acquired from the expert is stored. The
behaviour and action of the expert system entirely depend on the nature of the knowledge put in the
knowledge base. It is essential that the knowledge representation scheme adopted should be capable
of handling complexities, inexactness, and uncertainties of engineering knowledge.

Inference Engine:

Inference Engine which is nothing but the implementation of one or more inference mechanisms,
carries out the search through the knowledge base either to prove hypothesis or to arrive at a
conclusion. This is very important as Expert Systems do inferential computing and not algorithmic
computing.

Working Memory:

Working memory ,also called context , is a workspace for the problem, generated by the inference
engine, from the information provided by the user. Many hypotheses and facts are established during
the reasoning process. These are stored in the working memory. The information available in the
working memory are used for continuing with the inference process using the knowledge contained in

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the knowledge base. The explanation facility also uses the information in the working memory, to
answer the queries of the user.

Knowledge Acquisition Facility:

This is an optional component of an expert system depending on the expert system development tool
used to implement the system. Any text editor can be viewed as a knowledge acquisition facility, since
it provides an environment for the knowledge expert or the expert to input the coded knowledge into
the system. A good knowledge acquisition facility should have the capability to incrementally acquire
the knowledge at various levels of knowledge abstraction and update the knowledge base.

Explanation Facility:

This is one of the most important components of an expert system providing the user of the expert
system to get more information on the inference process. The possible pieces of information required
by the user during and after the inference process are

* Description of the variable whose value the user is asked to input


* Reason for the requirement of the variable
* How the system arrived at a particular conclusion after reference

User Interface:

This component is an interface module for a user to interact with the expert system.

DEVELOPMENT OF DEKBASE: KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM

DEKBASE is an acronym for DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR KNOWLEDGE BASED


SYSTEMS FOR ENGINEERING DESIGN. It was developed by a team of IIT Madras professors lead
by Dr. C. S. Krishnamoorthy in collaboration with Prof. S. J. Fenves of Carnegie Mellon University,
USA. It is a general purpose environment for developing Knowledge -Based Expert Systems (KBES).
DEKBASE is much more than a traditional knowledge based shell. It provides features required for
developing prototypes in Engineering domains.

DEKBASE provides an elegant language for expressing the experts knowledge. The language is
English like and is highly readable. The main form of knowledge representation is production rules. It
is possible to use multiple knowledge bases (as has been done in this assignment) for building a
prototype. Such a division of knowledge is usually dependant on the problem domain and on how
knowledge pertaining to the domain can be further sub classified. Using multiple knowledge bases
promotes efficiency and encourages structured development of prototypes.

The formal structure of a knowledge base in DEKBASE is shown below:

* Title Block
* # Directives
* Declarations
* # Variable flags
* # Initializations
* Goal statement
* Rules
* # Info Definitions

The portions of the knowledge base that are optional are indicated with a hash ( #) . A rule base must
always end with the keyword END. The rule bases are ascii files with an .rl extension and any text
editor can be used to build them. The rule bases are compiled by the Rule Base Compiler to object
form. The object file has the same name as the source file but has an .rbs extension. The rule base
compiler is invoked as :
c:\> rbc <filename>

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The filename is given without the .rl extension. Only on file name can be specified at each invocation
of RBC. The various object files need to be linked together using the rule base linker. The output file of
RLINK is named runfile. The linker is invoked as :
c:\> rlink < file1> <file2>

No extensions should be specified in the file names. The order of naming the object files is important.
The first file or knowledge base is the one loaded by the inference engine when it is invoked. The
order of naming the remaining files is not significant. The linker checks for dependencies amongst the
various knowledge bases. It reports an error if a knowledge base referred to by another is not linked. It
is however possible to link knowledge bases that are not dependent on each other. In such cases,
some of the knowledge bases are never loaded by the inference engine in the normal course of
inferencing, but it is possible to switch to any of the knowledge bases through the environment.

The main file that is to be loaded first is the damsaf.rl The other files are damseep.rl dampipe.rl
damhyd.rl damstru.rl

damsaf.rl is a general introduction file setting the linkages into action

damseep.rl considers the problem of seepage in earth embankment dams

dampipe.rl considers the problem of piping in the embankment dams

damhyd.rl considers the problem of hydraulic failure and erosion in earth


embankment dams

damstru.rl considers the problem of structural failure in the embankment dams

When the DEKBASE shell is opened . Press F10 to obtain the menu . Click at GO to execute the
program and one can follow the instructions given regarding the nature of input data required and get
the rules of operation and maintenance. The developed expert system was validated for the the
analysis of Dam Safety and Improvement of this expert system using Data Mining is under progress.

REFERENCES

1. C.Srinivas Rao, S. Suresh, H. Shiva Kumar, C. S. Krishnamoorthy, S. Rajeev Development Environment for
Knowledge-Based Systems in Engineering (DEKBASE) Research Report R-94-1 (July 1994) Indo-US
Project on Knowledge-Based Expert Systems for Civil Engineering Design-

2. Workshop Dam Safety 5-6 July 1994 Madras Proceedings - Organised by Central Board of Irrigation and
Power , New Delhi

3. Seepage and Leakage from Dams and Impoundments- Proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the
Geotechnical Engineering Division in conjunction with the ASCE National Convention, Denver, Colorado May
5 1985

4. Ronald C. Hirschfeld ,Steve J. Poulos (2002) Embankment-Dam Engineering Casagrande Volume - editors
, John Wiley & Sons

5. Engineering for Dams, William P. Creager, Joel D. Justin, Julian Hinds (2011) Vols 2 and 3, Wiley Eastern
private limited

6. Proceedings Symposium on Earth and Rockfill Dams December 18-19, 1999, Department of Civil
Engineering, University of Roorkee,Roorkee

7. Dr C. S. Krishnamoorthy, Dr S. Rajeev Computer aided design Software and Analytical Tools( Revised
Edition), 1998.

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Degree of Risk of Dam Failure


Ramesh Nikum
Chief Engineer
Design, Training, Research & Safety, Maharashtra
metanashik@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Reservoirs are formed by dams while reservoirs are designed and operated to reduce the risk such as water
shortage, downstream flooding. They inevitably create a new risk of dam failure. This risk is characteristically of
low probability, but can be of high consequence, with a potential for life loss in addition to economic and
environmental damages and societal disruption. Many dams that were constructed decades ago do not meet the
current state-of-the-art in dam design practice. The growth of civilization is inextricably woven around the
availability of water the world over. Dams are human device for exploitation of water for irrigation, flood control
and hydro-power development etc, and thus occupy a pivotal role in the development activities of the human
race. Dams, however, are not unmixed blessings they do pose a major hazard in the unlikely event of a failure.
There have been about 200 notable reservoir failures in 20th century in the world so far. It is estimated that more
than 8000 people lost their lives in these failures have not only occurred in dams were built without
application of engineering principles; but also in dams built to accepted state of art of dam engineering.

In situations of this kind it is at the outset impossible to divorce the technical aspects of the event from the
human tragedies involved. Yet every fair-minded Engineer will remember that failures of this kind are,
unfortunately, essential and inevitable links in the chain of progress in the realm of engineering, because there
are no other means for detecting the limit to the validity of our concepts and procedures. The failure was not a
consequence of an error in design but in the past has not received the attention which it requires. Several dam
incidents with severe consequences during recent years had given rise to general concern about the safety of
dams, and indicate the necessity for the introduction of a formal safety approach to predicting the failure in
feature with its magnitude in easiest way i.e. degree of risk. Degree of risk can be calculated on the arithmetical
basis by considering Numerical value of vulnerability & Potential consequences of dam failure .This Vulnerability
calculated on basis of Physical parameters like Dam height, type of dam , impounding capacity of dam & type of
foundation Also Variable parameter like Dam age , Spillway waste weir age , Seismicity , reliability of discharge
facility & Dam condition. Thus Degree of risk may help to forecast dam failure consequences for managing prior
repairs, maintenance & operation of dam.

INTRODUCTION

Reservoirs are formed by dams while reservoirs are designed and operated to reduce the risk such as
water shortage, downstream flooding and insufficient draft for navigation; they inevitably create a new
risk of dam failure. This risk is characteristically of low probability, but can be of high consequence,
with a potential for life loss in addition to economic and environmental damages and social disruption.
Thus reservoirs present societal tradeoffs of the everyday benefits of more reliable project outputs,
against the remote potential for dam failure. However, the distributions of project benefits and dam
failure consequences are seldom congruent. This can result in conflicts between the beneficiaries of a
reservoir / project and those whose lives and livelihoods are placed at risk, albeit a low probability risk,
by the existence of the project.

Today, many dams that were constructed decades ago do not meet the current state-of-the-art in dam
design practice. In many cases downstream development has increased the hazard associated with
dam failure. Our understanding of the seismic threat to dams has grown in recent decades. Also
todays engineering practice yields more severe safety evaluation floods and earthquake than most
existing dams were designed to withstand engineering assessments of dam safety are characterized
by various uncertainties like dam classifications, physical parameters type of foundation, age of dam,
seismic zone, condition of dam, discharge reliability, design floods etc. Based on the above
parameters, we can work out the vulnerability of dam.

1.0 DAM CLASSIFICATION

Classification of Dams based on degree of risk, it poses to persons and property, say it as P.
P=VxC where P - Degree of Risk.

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V - Numerical value of Vulnerability


C - Numerical value of potential consequences of dam failure.

According to equation, Dams can be classified into 4 classes of degree of risk. i.e. A to D

Table No. 1 : Dam Classification


Sr. No. P value Dam Classification on degree of risk.
1 P >= 120 A
2 70 =< P < 120 B
3 25 <= P < 70 C
4 P < 25 D

2.0 DAM VULNERABILITY (V)

The vulnerability (V) of the dam is measured by multiplying the arithmetic mean value of the constant
physical parameters ' ' by the arithmetic mean value of the variable parameters ' '

DAM VULNERABILITY V = ' X '

- ' means average value of constant physical parameters i.e - 1,2,3,4


- ' means average value of variable parameters i.e - 1 ,2,3,4,5

2.1 Constant Physical Parameters -

Constant physical parameters to be considered from Dam Height,Dam Type, Impounding capacity
of Dam, Foundation types of Dam.

2.1.1 Dam Height - 1

Constant physical parameters 1 to be considered from Height of Dam

Table No. 2: Dam Height Classification


Dam Height (m) Points
<= 5 1
10 2
20 3.5
30 4.5
40 5.0
50 5.8
75 8.0
100 10.0

The points for intermediate heights shall be determined by linear variation, except a dam 5 m or lower,
which is always assigned 1 point.

2.1.2 Dam types - 2

Constant physical parameters 2 to be considered from Type of Dam

Table No. 3: Dam Type Classification


Dam Type Points
Concrete arch 1
Concrete gravity 2
Concrete buttresses 3
Masonry Gravity 5
Earth 10
Rock fill dam with
- Concrete facing -
- Upstream earth filled core 3

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2.1.3 Impounding capacity 3

Constant physical parameters 3 to be considered from impounding capacity of Dam,

Table No. 4: Dam impounding capacity classification


Capacity in ( m3) Points
<=1 1
50 3
1000 5
2000 6.5
2500 8
3000 10

The point for intermediate capacities shall be determined by considering linear variation.

2.1.4 Foundation types 4

Constant physical parameters 4 to be considered from types of foundation of Dam.

Table No. 5: Dam Foundation Classification


Foundation types Points
Treated Basalt rock 1
Basalt Rock 2
Treated rock other than basalt 3
Rock other than basalt 4
Treated clay 6
Clay 7
Treated alluvial deposits 8
Alluvial or unknown deposits 10

Note: The treatment includes all the geotechnical methods meant to reduce the permeability of the
foundation and increase its resistance to internal erosion or to increase the bearing capacity of the
foundation or the stability of the dam.

If there is more than one foundation type in a section of dam, the points to be assigned to the
foundation type parameter for that section of dams must be the highest of the points assigned to the
different foundation types in that section.

2.2 Variable Parameter -

The variable Parameters to be considered from Age of Dam , Age of spillway / Waste weir ,
Seismicity zone, Reliability of discharge facilities ,& Condition of Dam.

2.2.1 Dam Age - 1

The dam age, which is number of years since its construction or as the case may be, as determined by
the engineer in charge of the safety and review on the basis of the useful life of the dam.

Table No. 6: Dam Age Classification


Concrete dam Embankment Dam
Age (years) Points Age (years) Points
<1 1 <1 25
5 3 5 20
10 5 10 15
20 8 15 10
40 15 20 8
50 18 25 6
>=55 20 30 5
40 4
50 3

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>=60 2

The points for intermediate dam ages shall be determined by considering linear variation.

2.2.2 Spillway / Waste Weir : - 2

Table No. 7: Dam Spillway Age Classification


Sr. No. Spillway / Waste Weir Age in Year Points
1 <=5 5
2 10 6
3 15 7
4 20 8
5 25 9
6 > = 30 10

2.2.3 Seismicity : - 3

The seismic zone in which dam is located according to the seismic zone map.

Table No. 8: Seismicity zone Classification


Sr. No. Seismicity Zones Points
1 I 1
2 II 1
3 III 2
4 IV 6
5 V 8

2.2.4 Reliability of discharge facilities: - 4

The reliability of the discharge facilities of the dam, which must be capable of passing the inflow design
flood. The reliability is assessed on the basis of the design of the discharge facilities and the
procedures established by the owner to ensure that they operate effectively during floods. At the
completion of the assessment, the reliability of the discharge facilities is rated satisfactory,
acceptable or unsatisfactory or unknown.

Table No. 9: Reliability of discharge Classification


Sr. No. Reliability Points
1 Satisfactory 1
2 Acceptable 5
3 Unsatisfactory Or unknown 10

2.2.5 Dam condition : - 5

The dam condition, which is assessed by considering the physical state and structural condition of the
dam, the quality and effectiveness of maintenance, aging, possible effects of external factors such as
frost or earthquakes and any dam design or structural defects. At the completion of the assessment,
the dam condition is rated very good, good, acceptable or poor or unknown.

Table No. 10: Dam condition Classification


Sr. No. Condition Points
1 Very Good 1
2 Good 3
3 Acceptable 5
4 Poor or unknown 10

Very Good: The dam does not show evidence of any deficiency or has minimal confined
deterioration considered normal or of no consequence.

Good: The dam shows evidence of only minor deterioration or deficiencies that do not affect
the proper operation of its components.

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Acceptable: The dam shows evidence of deterioration requiring repairs without immediately
endangering the structure; a dam in this state requires maintenance and repair work in the
immediate or near future without which the dam would become increasingly vulnerable. The
dam may also show evidence of deficiencies which do not affect its immediate safety but
which require close monitoring.

Poor or unknown : The dam shows evidence of single or multiple severe deterioration that
could affect its stability or make certain parts in operable, or the dam shows evidence of
serious deficiencies likely to endanger its safety or the condition of the dam cannot be
ascertained.

3.0 DAM FAILURE CONSEQUENCES (C)

The numerical value of the consequences of dam failure (C) is based on the failure consequence
category of the dam determined as below

Table No. 11: Dam Failure consequences Classification


Sr. No. Dam Failure Consequences Points
1 Very low 2
2 Low 5
3 Moderate 10
4 High 15
5 Very high 20
6 Severe 25

The dam failure consequence category is determined on the basis of the characteristics of the
downstream area, barring exceptions that would be affected by the dam failure and takes into account,
from among a number of dam failure scenarios, the one that would result in the highest consequence
category. Those characteristics are assessed in terms of population density and the extent of
downstream infrastructure and services that would be destroyed or severely damaged in the event of
dam failure.

The delineation of the area that would be affected by a dam failure and identification of the
characteristics of the area are based on a dam failure analysis that includes inundation maps. Dam
failure analysis consists of a detailed evaluation of the consequences of a dam failure by means of an
accurate delineation of the affected area and identification of the characteristics of the area. The
analysis involves an examination of various dam failure scenarios under normal conditions and in flood
conditions, to determine the dam break flood wave, flood wave arrival times and the extent of the
affected area.

3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFFECTED AREA

Consequence Category: Population density and extent of destroyed or severely damaged


infrastructures and services.

3.1.1 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Very Low

Uninhabited area
OR
Area containing minimal infrastructures or services such as

a second dam in the Very Low Consequence category


a resources access road
farmland
a commercial facility without accommodations

3.1.2 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Low

Occasionally inhabited area containing less than 10 cottages or seasonal residence.

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OR
Area containing a commercial facility that provides accommodation for less than 25 persons
or that has less than 10 accommodation units (i.e., 10 cottages, 10 campsites, 10 motel
rooms)
OR
Area containing limited infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Low Consequence category
a local road

3.1.3 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Moderate

Permanently inhabited area containing less than 10 Residences or occasionally inhabited


and containing 10 or more cottages or seasonal residences
OR
Area containing a seasonal commercial facility that provides accommodation for 25 or more
persons or that contains 10 or more accommodation units or that operates year-round and
provides accommodation for less than 25 persons or has less than 10 accommodation unit
OR
Area containing moderate infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Moderate Consequence category ;
a feeder road
a railway line (local or regional)
an enterprise with less than 50 employees
a main water intake upstream or downstream of the dam
that supplies a municipality

3.1.4 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - High

Permanently inhabited area containing 10 or more residences and less than 1,000 residents
OR
Area containing a commercial facility that operates year-round and provides accommodation
for 25 or more persons or has 10 or more accommodation units.
OR
Area containing significant infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the High Consequence category
a regional road
a railway line (transcontinental or transborder)
a school
an enterprise that has 50 to 499 employees

3.1.5 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition Very High

Permanently inhabited area with a population of more than 1,000 and less than 10,000
OR
Area containing major infrastructures or services such as

a second dam in the Very High Consequence category


an auto route or national highway
an enterprise that has 500 or more employees
an industrial park
a dangerous substances storage site

3.1.6 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Severe

Permanently inhabited area with a population of 10,000 or more


OR
Area containing substantial infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Severe Consequence category
a hospital
a major industrial complex

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a large dangerous substances storage site

For the purposes of the above table, commercial facility means a golf Course, bicycle trail, cross-
country ski trail, snowmobile trail, campground, outfitting operation, outdoor recreation centre, holiday
camp, tourist complex or any other similar sports or recreational facility.

4.0 REFERENCES

1) 109th session of American congress,2nd Session 2735AN ACTTo amend the United States and President
of Senate

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CALCULATIONS SHOWING DEGREE OF RISK FOR SOME MAJOR DAMS IN MAHARASHTRA STATE

Sr.No. Name Of Constant physical parameter Mean Mean V= Dam Degree


Dam Height in Dam Type Capacity in Founda a Dam Age Wier Type Sesmicity Reliability Dam b a*b Failure of risk
M Thousand tion ( Free/Rock Zone Of Condition Conseq 'P'
Mm3 type fill) Spillway uences
Discharge 'C'
a1 a2 a3 a4 Age b1 b2 Zone b3 b4 b5
1 Gangapur 36.6 5.28 TE 10 216 3.4 1 4.91 44 3.5 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.9 19.14 25 479
2 Ujjani 56.4 5.28 TE 10 3320 6.7 1 5.74 29 5.2 Gate 9.8 II 2 GS 1 Good 3 4.2 22.94 15 361
3 kyona 103 8.01 Conc 2 2797 6.9 1 4.48 35 13.3 Gate 10.0 IV 6 G.S 1 Good 3 6.65 29.77 10 298
4 Jaykwadi 31.4 5.10 TE 10 2909 7.0 1 5.76 35 4.3 Gate 10.0 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 3.86 22.25 15 334
5 Isapur 57 5.31 TE 10 12354 5.4 1 5.42 27 5.6 Gate 9.6 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 4.04 21.91 15 329
6 Girna 54.6 5.99 TE 10 609 4.2 1 5.29 40 4.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 4 21.17 15 318
7 Mula 48.2 5.70 TE 10 736 4.4 1 5.29 37 2.4 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.67 19.40 15 291
8 Bhandardara 82.4 7.23 Conc 2 312 3.6 1 3.45 83 20.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 5 7.6 26.18 10 262
9 Panzara 33.5 4.65 TE 10 44 1.6 1 4.31 36 2.3 FF 10.0 III 2 UG 1 Good 3 3.66 15.78 15 237
10 Darana 28 4.20 PG 2 227 3.4 1 2.64 93 10.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 5.2 13.74 10 137
11 Totaladhoh 74.5 6.08 Conc 2 1241 5.4 1 3.61 20 10.0 Gate 8.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 4.8 17.33 10 173
12 Hatnur 25.5 4.00 TE/PG 2 388 3.7 1 2.67 27 6.4 Gate 9.4 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 4.36 11.65 15 175
13 Burai 30.6 4.50 TE 10 21 1.5 1 4.24 26 3.0 FF 9.2 III 2 UG 1 Good 3 3.63 15.38 10 154
14 Bori 20 3.50 TE 10 41 1.6 1 4.03 32 5.2 Gated 10.0 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 4.04 16.26 5 81
15 Chankapur 41 5.10 TE 10 80 3.0 1 4.78 98 1.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.4 16.26 5 81
16 Sonwad 18.6 4.78 TE 10 13 1.1 1 4.22 11 6.2 Gated 6.2 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.68 15.53 5 78
17 Gosi Kd 22.6 3.76 TE 10 770 4.5 1 4.82 U/c 1.0 Gate 1.0 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 1.4 6.74 5 34

Note
1. Foundation for all dams taken as Treated basalt rock
2. T.E :- Earthen Dam
3. Conc :- Concrete Dam
4. P.G. :- Gravity Dam
5. TE/PG Composite Dam
6. FF :- Free fall wier
7. UG :- Ungated Spillway
8. G.S. :- Gated Spillway
9. Bold case dams are National Importance dams

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Risk Informed Decision Making for Dam Maintenance and


Rehabilitation in India
B. Dasgupta G. Scott
Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas, USA Scott Consulting, LLC, Denver, Colorado
bdasgupta@swri.org

G. Wittmeyer
Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas, USA

ABSTRACT
India has the third largest inventory of large dams, a significant number of which need rehabilitation.
Unmaintained or non-rehabilitated dams are at increased risk of failure and threaten downstream areas with
flooding, resulting in loss of life, economic loss, and environmental damage. Although dams need periodic
evaluation, maintenance, and potential rehabilitation, dam upkeep is expensive and available resources are
limited. Around the world dam risk assessment is increasingly used to allocate resources used to ensure dam
safety. Dam risk analysis helps owners and regulators identify problems and vulnerabilities, prioritize and plan
dam risk reduction actions, develop and propose better risk reduction alternatives, and ensure the dam safety
decision making process is transparent. In the United States, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have embraced risk assessment as an essential element of their dam
safety management process. In this paper, we discuss a practical dam safety risk analysis process and how the
results are used to make decisions whose implementation will reduce the risk of dam failure.

1. INTRODUCTION

With more than 4,800 in operation and approximately 350 under construction, India has the third
largest large dam inventory in the world (Pandya et. al., 2014). This major infrastructure investment
provides India a wide range of important economic, environmental, and social benefits. According to
data in the National Register of Large Dams, about 23 percent of these dams were built before the
1970s and are now more than 45 years old (http://www.cwc.nic.in/main/downloads/new%20nrld.pdf).
There was significant growth in dam construction in India in the 1970s and 1980s, during which nearly
27 percent of the total dam inventory was completed, while another 26 percent of the dam inventory
was constructed between 1980 and 1990. Aging dams are at increased risk of failure as a result of
degradation of structural capacity because of deterioration of dam or foundation material properties,
operational problems, and to potential increase in the magnitude and frequency of natural hazards.
Because more than 75 percent of the large dams in India are 25 years or older, there is need for a
systematic method to prioritize the inspections, maintenance programs, and rehabilitation efforts
needed to both preserve this important national asset and to protect the communities and industries
that could be endangered by failure of one or more large dams.

Around the world, agencies managing similar inventories of dams are finding it more difficult to keep
up with the standard-based upgrades for dam safety, and must judiciously prioritize dam safety
activities because of resource limitations. In addition, the standards-based dam safety criteria do not
account for all the ways dams can and have failed. Therefore, many agencies have turned to
risk-informed decision making for dam safety management using risk assessment. This includes the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Australian
National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD), the New South Wales Dam Safety Committee (NSW
DSC), and the Canadian Dam Association (CDA). In addition, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) are in the process of implementing
risk-informed decision-making practices. These agencies are pursuing this approach because risk-
informed decision-making offers several advantages, which include the following (Scott, 2011).

1. Improved understanding of the problems and vulnerabilities of a facility is achieved through failure
mode identification and systematic evaluation of entire dam systems, leading dam safety teams to
develop and propose better risk reduction alternatives or recommend more appropriate courses of
action to address issues that have been raised relative to dam safety.

2. Improved capability to prioritize and plan dam safety risk reduction actions is achieved through the

71
Compendium of Technical Papers

use of semi-quaantitative and


d quantitative e risk evalua
ations relativ
ve to risk as
ssessment guidelines
g
and consideratio
on of site-spe
ecific factors.

etter balance
3. A be e of risk red
duction for th
he funds spe
ent is achievved, allowing
g for more rapid
r and
econ
nomical risk reduction.
r

4. Moree transparen
ncy in dam safety
s decisiion-making is achieved allowing for better justification of
imple
ementing actions and invvolvement off all stake-ho
olders.

5. By d
definition, riskk includes booth the likelih
hood of failurre and the co
onsequencess should failuure occur.
Thuss, there is more
m resoluttion on the downstream m hazard in the decision n making pro ocess as
oppo
osed to the traditional high,h significa
ant, and low w hazard claassifications. Furthermo ore, a full
rang
ge of loading scenarios are examined d, not just sin
ngle determin
nistic events, giving a pe
erspective
on w
which types of o loads and load ranges produce the greatest risk k.

paper, an ovverview of a practical risk analysis process is presented based


In this p b on the
e current
approach hes used byy the USBR and USACE E. The pape er discusses nformed decisions for
s how risk-in
dam saffety prioritizzation are made
m based
d on a riskk assessmen nt. A simiilar process can be
impleme ented in India
a to make risk-informed decision
d for dam
d safety management.
m .

2. RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS

Risk Assessment is s the process of decid ding whetherr the risks are accepta able at currrent level
e) or risk red
(tolerable duction actio
ons are needed, while a Risk R Analysis is the proc
cess of estimmating the
risk. A Risk Analys sis explores three questions known as the risk triplet: (i) What W can go
o wrong?
(ii) How likely is it? and (iii) Wh hat are the consequencces? In the e context of the dam sa afety risk
analysis, it involves a systematicc examination n of the site conditions, the
t hazards, and the dam m design,
construcction performmance, and operations
o to
o address (i) potential wa ays the damm including fooundation
and abuttments, gate es, spillway, and appurtenant systems, can fail in n response too a specific natural
n or
human-in nduced event that mayy lead to po otential release of rese ervoir storag
ge; (ii) the likelihood
l
(including associated d uncertaintiees) of all posssible outcom mes caused byb failures off the dam annd system
interactio
ons; and (iii) consequencces from pote ential reservoir breach suuch as loss of
o life, econo
omic loss,
and enviironmental damage, amo ong others. As A shown in Figure 1, the e major elemments of a quuantitative
dam riskk analysis pro ocess consisst of evaluatio on of Load, System
S Respponse, and Consequence
C es. Each
of the co
omponents of risk analysiis is describe ed next.

Figure 1: Overvview of Risk Analysis


A Proce
ess

2.1 L
Load

Dam riskk analysis re


equires inforrmation abou
ut loadings tthat, if they occur,
o can cause
c damagge to the
dam andd related stru
uctures. The e two most common loa adings for da ams are hydrologic events (under
normal ooperations or
o large floood events), and
a earthquakes. The hazards fro om these evvents are

72
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

represennted by hazard curves showing pro obability of the loading parameters expected at a a site.
Specializzed technicaal analyses and
a experience-based inssights of floo od hydrologissts and seism mologists
are required to devellop hazard curves.
c For hydrologic hazard curves,, the pertinen nt loading paarameters
could bee reservoir elevation, pea ak flood inflow
ws or flood volumes.
v Figure 2(a) sh
hows an exam mple of a
hydrologgic hazard curve expressed as annu ual probability of exceed dance of resservoir water surface
elevation
ns that coulld occur under normal operations. Hydrostattic and hydrrodynamic lo oads are
ed from the water elevattions. The se
calculate eismic hazard curve rep presents the annual prob bability of
exceeda ance of the peak
p ground acceleration n or the speectral acceleration. An example
e of a seismic
hazard curve
c is showwn in Figure e 2(b). One of the appro oaches used in dam safe ety risk analysis is to
estimatee the annual probability or frequencyy of occurrence per yea ar that a loadd will be in a certain
range. T
The hazard cu urve is divide
ed into desireed intervals as
a shown in Figure 1 and d from the diffferences
in the prrobability of exceedance e for upper and lower lo oads defining the range ( ). The load range
annual pprobability, /year is esttimated for eache interval and then used
u as an initiating eve ent in the
system rresponse analysis to calcculate an ev vent sequencce frequencyy. Although the t results frrom each
load rannge are aggrregated, the contribution ns to the totaal risk from each load range
r are re
etained to
provide aadded risk in
nsights.

(a) (b)
Figure 2: Example Annual Exceeda ance Curves: (a) Reservoirr Level (hydro
ologic hazard)) and (b) Seissmic Peak
Ground Acceleration
A (s
seismic hazard
d)

2.2 Systtem Respon


nse

System Response analysis


a conssists of, iden
ntification of potential failure modes analysis, an
nd failure
progresssion event se
equence moddeling as sho own in Figure e 1.

Potentiall Failure Mo ode Analysiis: The first step in a risk analysis is to iden ntify the sitee-specific
potentiall failure modes. An adeq quate job of identifying potential
p failu
ure modes ca an be performed only
after releevant background informmation for a dam is colle ected and thoroughly revviewed. This includes
informatiion related to
t geology, design,
d analyysis, constru uction, flood and seismicc loading, op perations,
and perfformance monitoring. Photographs, particularly those taken n during con nstruction orr unusual
events, are often vital to identiffying vulneraabilities. It iss essential that
t the reco
ords be reviewed by
more tha an one perso on, as someething mightt have been overlooked, or one perrson may pick up on
critical in
nformation that
t another person mig ght miss. Th his process will typicallyy involve a site visit
aimed att uncovering clues to da am safety vulnerabilities and identifyiing the poten ntial failure modes
m of
the dam, as well as making
m obse
ervations of th
he downstrea am conditionns if the flood
ding from dam m breach
occurred d.

Experiennce shows th hat identifying potential failure


f modess is best don ne in a team m setting, with a small
but technically diverrse group of qualified pe eople. Input from operatting personn nel is essential to the
process.. In a typical case, a facilitator guidess team memb bers in developing the po otential failuree modes,
based on the teams s understand ding of the project
p vulne sulting from the data review and
erabilities res
current ffield conditio
ons. The pote ential failure modes musst be describ bed fully, from initiation to
t breach
(or unco
ontrolled rese ervoir releasse). It is important to scrreen the identified poten ntial failure modes
m so
that morre expensive e detailed qu uantitative riisk analysis is performed for only th hose potentiial failure
modes tthat contribu ute significanntly to risk. Some pote ential failure modes can be screene ed out as
obviouslyy too remote driver potenttial failure modes can
e to contributte significanttly to the riskk. The risk-d
often be identified thhrough a sem mi-quantitativve process th hat uses broa ad order-of-m magnitude categories

73
Compendium of Technical Papers

for likelihood and consequences on a risk matrix. These risk-driver potential failure modes could then
be carried forward for quantitative analysis. Risk reduction measures or additional data collection may
be identified and implemented at this stage as well.

As shown in Figure 1, one or several failure modes ( to ) could be identified for a specific
hazard. For example, some of the potential failure modes for hydrologic load on concrete dam are (i)
overstressing of concrete; (ii) block sliding and overturning along a plane of weakness at the dam and
foundation interface; (iii) block sliding along weak joint lifts; (iv) foundation erosion by piping; (v) dam
overtopping and abutment or foundation erosion; (vi) gate failure; or (vii) human error, such as
improper operation of spillway gates. Sliding on a lift joint in a concrete gravity structure (Scott and
Fiedler, 2010) is shown in Figure 1, as failure mode, , for illustration purpose.

Event Sequence Modeling: The identified potential failure modes that are likely risk drivers are
analyzed quantitatively. For those potential failure modes, a complete and thorough description is
developed as a basis for breaking the failure mode into a series of steps, events, or states of nature
that are necessary to lead to failure. These can be represented on an event tree comprised of a series
of logically linked nodes and branches as shown in Figure 1. This technique is used in risk analysis to
model an initiating event and subsequent failure progression of systems and components, or
operational issues resulting in sequences of events that could lead to potential dam breach. Event
trees are used to quantitatively estimate the frequency of each sequence using probabilities or ranges
of probabilities of events or states of nature obtained by various procedures from subjective expert
estimates and statistical evaluation to rigorous probabilistic analyses including propagation of
uncertainties. Sometimes fault tree techniques are used to model failure probabilities of complex
components and systems. Estimation of uncertainties or variabilities of parameters as input to these
models are considerations in risk analysis.

In the example of the lift joint sliding failure mode shown in Figure 1, the initiating event for the
load range is /year and subsequent nodes examine the probability that (i) the tensile strength of
the concrete at the joint is exceeded due to the load and (ii) a crack propagates and uplift increases
causing sliding instability given that the tensile strength is exceeded (Scott and Fiedler, 2010). If the
tensile strength is not exceeded or there is insufficient cracking to initiate sliding, there is no failure of
the dam as seen in end-states of two branches. Analysis results are used to estimate the conditional
branch probabilities, , that the tensile strength will exceed and that crack growth will take place.
The probability of failure could be input as a point estimate or probability density function. For each
branch that ends with failure, the annual probability of failure can be estimated by multiplying the
branch probabilities through the tree from left to right. Simulation techniques such as Monte-Carlo or
Latin Hypercube Sampling can be used to examine uncertainty when branch probability distributions
are used. This analysis is conducted for all load ranges ( to .

All risk-driver potential failure modes ( to ) can be evaluated in this manner. The potential
failure modes that contribute most to the risk should be identified, and the reasons underlying the
judgment should be enumerated. Sometimes, the largest contributions come from a particular loading
branch of the event tree, and it is useful to know whether this is due to lower conditional failure
probabilities associated with frequent loadings, or higher conditional failure probabilities associated
with infrequent loadings. Event trees also can be used to evaluate the effects of various risk-reduction
measures.

2.3 Consequence Evaluation

Consequences of dam failure primarily focus on loss of life, although there could be other
considerations, including economic, environmental, and sociological factors. As shown in Figure 1, the
consequence analysis is conducted for the branch of the event tree that results in a postulated dam
breach under the specific water elevation associated with the load range. Consequence analysis
consists of dam breach modeling and flood routing from the breach through the downstream river
channel and flood plain. Dam break flood inundation maps are used to identify the population or
properties that will be flooded in different reaches. Estimating the potential loss of life can be based on
case studies of historical dam failures and flash floods or models that have been developed to
simulate population movement and safety relative to flood wave travel.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

3. RISK--INFORMED
D DECISION PROCESS

Several organization ns have deve eloped risk guidelines


g fo
or evaluating dam safety risks, such as those
shown in n Figure 3 fro om the USBR R (Scott, 201 11). They typically consist of two commponents: an n annual
failure prrobability orr individual risk
r guideline that provid
des a certain level safety for a dam even if the
consequ uences are not large (1.0 0E-04 in Figu ure 3), and an
a annualizeed risk or societal risk guideline
that proovides increa ased safety as the con nsequences become la arger (slopinng line in F Figure 3).
Estimate ed risks obta ained from System Ana alysis and CConsequence e can be plotted relativve to the
guidelinees for risk asssessment.

Figure 3: U.S
S. Bureau of Reclamation
R D
Dam Safety Ris
sk Guidelines

Howeverr, it must be e recognized d that risk annalysis proce edures, altho ough quantittative, do no ot provide
precise numerical re esults. Thus, the nature of the risk a analysis should be advissory, not pre escriptive,
such tha at site-speciffic consideraations, good logic, and alla relevant external
e facto ors can be applied
a in
decision--making, rath her than relia
ance on a ccookbook, nu umerical criteria approacch. The risk estimates
e
for dam safety relate ed potential failure
f modees, regardlesss of the metthods used to t arrive at them,
t are
only app proximate. Iff performed diligently
d in a relatively consistent
c ma a useful in program
anner, they are
managem ment. Howe ever, risk asssessment guidelines arre not intend ded as rigid d decision crriteria for
declaring g a dam sa afe solely on n the basis of
o a risk esttimate. There efore, additioonal reasoniing, often
referred to as the da am safety ca ase, is needded to convin nce decisionn makers tha at (i) the interrpretation
of the co ondition of the structures and their ab bility to withsttand future lo he risk estimates, and
oading, (ii) th
(iii) the re
ecommended actions are e all coheren
nt and make sense.

Going th hrough the process


p of developing
d th
he risk estimmates, if don ne thoroughly y and rigoroously, will
result in n the learning needed to build the case. As part of the e case, three e elements must be
addresse ed: (i) whetther the estim
mated risk ju ustifies action; (ii) if so, the
t urgency of taking acction; and
(iii) the cconfidence in
n the estimatees and whether additiona al information is likely to change percception of
the need d and urgenccy to take acttion. All three
e componentts of the riskk estimates mustm be addressed: (i)
the loadings, (ii) the response off the structures to the lo oadings, and (iii) the consequences. The risk
estimate es and the da am safety caase do not in themselve es ensure the e safety of a facility. Ra
ather, the
dam safe ety case beccomes the basis
b for risk managemen nt: it enabless the dam ow wner/operatoor to take
appropriate actions, including the possib ble need fo or increased monitorin ng, further analysis,
remediattion, and ma aintenance, all
a of which are a integral activities
a rela
ated to propeer long-term operation
o
and care e of the faciility. The unnderstanding g given to all
a those asssociated with h a facility by
b a well-
construccted dam sa afety case iss intended to focus atte ention on te echnical aspe ects essentiial to the
facility's integrity.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

4. PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIONS BASED ON RISK ASSESSMENT

As a general rule, as the risk increases, the justification and urgency to take action also increase.
Similarly, as the risk decreases, the justification and urgency to take action also decrease. It is
important to strive to develop consistent risk estimates through an established methodology and
review process. However, it must be recognized that risk estimates are likely to come from a variety of
sources, each with its own degree of accuracy and completeness. Consequently, complete
consistency in the estimates cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is important to consider other factors,
such as those listed below, when prioritizing activities. All else being equal, the risk assessment
numbers can then be used as a prioritization tool.

Direct evidence that failure is in progress and the dam is almost certain to fail if action is not
taken quickly would be considered the highest priority.
A case where both the probability of failure and the annualized risk are high (exceeding risk
assessment guidelines) would generally be more critical than a case where only one or the
other is high. Equal weight would be given to cases where one or the other (risk or failure
probability) is in this category.
A case where the high annualized risk or failure probability (above guidelines) is driven by a
single potential failure mode would generally be more critical than a case where several
potential failure modes must be accumulated to arrive at values above guidelines.
A case where the risk is driven by potential failure modes manifesting during normal operating
conditions would typically take priority over cases where the risks stem primarily from low or
very-low probability flood or earthquake loadings.
A case where the uncertainty band is relatively tight and the mean and median estimates are
close to each other would take priority over a case where there is significant scatter in the data
and the mean and median are far apart.
A case where confidence in the risk estimates is high would typically take priority over a case
where the confidence is low. Furthermore, the recommended actions also would be affected
by the confidence in the estimates. For example, additional information would typically be
gathered for high risks with low confidence, whereas risk reduction actions would be
appropriate for a similar case with high confidence.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aging dam infrastructure, increase in population growth downstream, and limited resources make
development of consistent, thorough, transparent risk assessments an important element of effective
dam safety risk management. Key to making the process effective is beginning with a detailed analysis
of potential failure modes. If shortcuts are taken during this process, the results of the risk analysis
could be unreliable and misleading. Once the potential failure modes are understood, a screening
process can be used to identify those for which quantitative risk estimates are appropriate. A variety
of tools are available for making the quantitative risk estimates. The process of making the estimates
affords the opportunity to learn about the dam and its vulnerabilities in more detail. It is recognized
that risk estimates and risk assessment guidelines are only approximate, and that it is essential to
build the case for why the condition of the structures and their ability to withstand future loadings, the
risk estimates, and the recommended actions are consistent and technically sound and well
supported. If done diligently by a team of qualified experts whose minds are open to a diversity of
failure modes and effects, risk assessment can be a very effective tool for managing the risks
associated with storing large amounts of water upstream of populated areas.

6. REFERENCES

B. Pandya, N.K. Goel, and B.R.K. Pillai. (2014): Management of Design Flood Issues in Existing Dams under
Climate Change, International Symposium on Dams In A Global Environment Challenges, Bali, Indonesia, June
16, 2014.
G.A. Scott and W. Fiedler. (2010), Shedding Some Light On This Thing Called Risk Assessment, Part II, Risk
Analysis, Journal of Dam Safety, Vol. 8, Issue 3, pp 819.
G.A. Scott. (2011), The Practical Application of Risk Assessment to Dam Safety, GeoRisk, ASCE.

76
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Emergency Action Plan Implementation for DRIP Dams


Antonio Porcheddu Philippe CLEYET-MERLET
Dam Break Analysis, Egis, New Delhi Hydrologist, Egis, New Delhi
antonio.porcheddu-int@egis.fr
Edward Eugene Flint
Dam Safety Specialist, Egis, New Delhi

ABSTRACT
We describe an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for a dam and underline its importance when we deal with
catastrophic events such as significant release of water from spillways, dam breaks or even large magnitude
earthquakes. India is a high hazard region because many dams are built close to highly populated urbanized
areas and the dams spillways are frequently designed for events with a return period which is now considered
low for this type of construction, it means that in many cases the discharge capacity of the dams may be
inadequate.. In this paper the general structure of an EAP used within our Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement
Project (DRIP) is described. The EAP contains the basic information regarding the dam and the definition of roles
and responsibility, then a simple and straightforward procedure, articulated in five basic steps, to really manage
the emergency phase is considered. The basic steps are 1) Emergency detection; 2) Emergency Level
determination (or evaluation); 3) Notification and communication (procedures) 4) Expected Action to be
implemented ; 5) Termination step. In the paper it is also described our involvement in Capacity Building (issuing
of new guidelines) and in Institutional Strengthening (training on EAP preparation) that is going on.

Finally paper describes the process of implementation of EAPs within the DRIP project. This activity is a duty of
the Dams Owner (DO), who has to take care of all the necessary study, the State Project Management Unit
(SPMU ) will coordinate the DO and Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) will actively assist and support
both SPMU and DO with dedicated personnel.

1. WHAT IS AN EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

An Emergency Action Plan, or EAP, is a formal plan that identifies potential emergency conditions at a
dam and prescribes the procedures to be followed to minimize loss of life and property damage. An
emergency in terms of dam operation is defined as a condition which develops unexpectedly,
endangers the structural integrity of the dam and / or safety of lives and properties, at the dam site as
well as in the areas downstream of the dam, and requires immediate responsive action.

The EAP is the document that has to be used in case of emergencies generated by either a dam break
or to a significantly high release of water from gated or ungated spillways. It identifies the roles and
responsibility of the Dams Owner and of the Institution in charge to manage emergency situations and
evacuate people from low-lying areas downstream. Furthermore, it specifies the actions to be taken in
different types of emergency conditions.

2. RISK LIMITATION MEASURES

The risk associated with the presence of a dam on the territory can be reduced by adopting structural
and or non-structural measures. The structural measure include safe design and construction,
rehabilitation of the discharge system, reduction of internal seepage and leakage, rehabilitation of
drainage system, grouting etc.. Also after the implementation of structural measures there are still
some risks, these remaining risks can be further reduced ( but not cancelled) by adopting other
measures, not strictly connected with construction or operation of the dam, these measures are called
non- structural measures and are really effective when planned in conjunction, or in addition to
structural measures. The EAP is a non-structural measure because it is intended to reduce the risk of
loss of peoples life and property damages in case of failure or near-failure of the dam or extremely
high discharges from the spillways.

3. PRESENT SITUATION OF RISK OF DAM FAILURE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EAPS

At the moment there are potential high risk situations regarding safety of dams in India due to the high
number of existing large dams, (4900) and new dams (350) under construction. Many of these dams

77
Compendium of Technical Papers

are a key source for irrigation and the production of hydropower and many of them provide industrial
and civil water supply. The two main elements of risk are:

The location of a dam is an element of risk itself, when it is located nearby a highly populated
urbanized area where there are civil and industrial dwellings, the risks that affect general
population and property are clear.

The spillways inadequacy is another important concern; in fact, during the review of PST
(Project Screen Template) of the DRIP dams we have realized that many of them are designed
for a 100 years flood, this return period is usually considered non-congruent with the damages
that can be produced downstream, it means that the discharge systems of many of the existing
dams are possibly not in a safe condition and the dams have a potential risk of breaching.

Some other problems are related to seepage (through earth dams), leakage (through concrete and
masonry dams), inadequacy of drainage system and hydro mechanical equipment malfunctioning.
Other elements of risk should also be evaluated and scored in order to be able to categorize the dams
under study and rehabilitation according to a Risk analysis method that is also under preparation
within our project. Element of risk are connected with problems regarding the dam itself and with
external problems like type and density of urbanization, distance of dwellings from the dam and
possible damages caused by failure. These are all elements to be investigated and we are proceeding
in this direction within our DRIP project.

At the moment only a few EAPs have been prepared by the States. Within DRIP we have reviewed
an EAP prepared by the Disaster Management Institute (DMI) of Bhopal and this is the first step
forward by the States in addressing the challenges that face them. Therefore, the preparation of EAPs
to manage and potential emergency is a priority of our project.

4. STRUCTURE OF THE EAP

For the scope of our work the structure of the EAP is articulated through basic components that are
illustrated in this paragraph:

Identification, location and dams info.


Basic information regarding the classification, location and the physical characteristics of the
dam.
Identification of Roles and responsibilities - The EAP should contain the specification of the
roles and responsibilities of the people involved with the management of the dam with a
notification flowchart clearly summarizing the following information:
Who is to be notified in case of emergency?
Who is responsible for notifying Owners staff and public officials?
Prioritized order in which individuals have to be notified.

It is possible to identify two main roles in the management of emergencies:


1. Dam owner : Has to take care of all the procedures regarding the dam
2. Public Authorities: they have to take care of evacuation and to save lives. (the
Collector/District Magistrate and the Civil Protection Service).

After the basic information regarding the dam and the definition of roles and responsibility there is a
simple and straightforward procedure, articulated in 5 steps, to really manage the emergency phase,
that is:
1. Emergency detection
2. Emergency Level determination (or evaluation)
3. Notification and communication (procedures)
4. Expected Action to be implemented
5. Termination step
The general 5 steps can be better depicted in the following chart.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

F
Figure 1 - Flow
wchart for the Basic steps of
o an Emergen
ncy Action Pla
an

ergency dete
4.1 Eme ection

During th his phase whatever evennt that is unusual and de echnical perrsonnel or either by a
etected by te
visitor to
o the dam siite should be
e investigate ams Owner.. These events may also
ed by the da o include
unusual dam monito oring results (typically fro ntation readings), earthq
om instrumen quakes and or
o severe
weather conditions.

4.2 Eme
ergency Lev
vel determin
nation (evalu
uation)

As the emergency
e i detected it is necessary to careffully assess the situation and deterrmine the
is
Emergenncy level in accordance.
a In our procedure we havve identified three
t emerge
ency levels:

Emergency level 1 - Non emerrgency situattion unusu


ual event und
der control situation de
eveloping
slowly

The situa
ation has not yet become e a serious threat
t for the
e structural in
ntegrity of the
e dam but it may give
problemss if it continu
ues to devellop. The dam ms owner Engineer and the State Government
G Engineer
should be
b contacted d to carefullyy evaluate the
t circumsttances and identify nece essary actio
ons to be
taken. Th
he dam has to be carefully monitored d to detect a potential failure situationn

Emergency level 2 - Potential da


am failure sittuation rapidly developing
g

The even nt may lead to eventual dam


d failure and
a consequent release of o water dow
wnstream, buut, a dam-
break is not imminent. Civil eme ergency authhorities shou
uld be alerte osed and in sensitive
ed, roads clo
locationss, evacuation
n started.

The dam ms Owner Engineer


E andd the State Engineer sh hould be contacted to carefully
c eva
aluate the
situation and monitor the progresss of the pottential dam failure
f and of
o any eventuual remedial works to
minimizee risk. This emergency
e le
evel should also
a be applied to spillwaay releases that,
t in the estimation
e
of the Daam Owner, maym affect areas
a outsidee the rivers channel. If possible
p and if safe, any remedial
actions have
h to be ta
aken to avoid
d, repair, dela
ay, and mode erate the bre
eak.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Emergency level 3 - Dam failure is imminent or in progress

This is an extremely dangerous situation and dam failure cannot be avoided. A flood is to be
considered imminent and certain. Civil protection should be alerted, roads closed and evacuation
initiated immediately for all at-risk dwellings, roads and infrastructures. The inundation maps should be
used as a proper tool to conduct evacuation. Emergency level 3 can also be applicable to high
releases from spillways.

4.3 Notification and communication (procedures)

After the emergency level has been evaluated, responsible people, identified in the flowchart (roles
and responsibilities), will be notified and messages should be sent accordingly, indicating the
emergency level. The higher the emergency the more responsible people should be contacted. A
specific notification scheme for every emergency level has been developed within the new Guidelines.

4.4 Expected Action to be implemented

For each emergency condition that is estimated, the plan should describe actions to be taken,
therefore:

Emergency Level 1 - Non-emergency incident; unusual event; slowly developing situation

The Dam Owner should inspect the dam and the reservoir area. If increased seepage, erosion,
cracking, or settlement is observed, should immediately report the observed conditions to the State
Dam Safety Engineer (EE). The Dam Owner should contact the State Dam Safety Engineer and its
own Engineer and request technical staff to investigate the situation and recommend corrective
actions.

Emergency Level 2 - Potential dam failure situation; rapidly developing

The Dam Owner should contact the District Magistrate to inform him/her that the EAP has been
activated on emergency level 2 and, if current conditions get worst, the emergency level may
increase and the emergency situation may require evacuation. Preparations should be made for
road closures and evacuations. The Dam Owner should report the situation to the State Dam
Safety Engineer and to its own Engineer and request investigations and recommended corrective
actions.

If time permits, the Dam Owner should inspect the dam and the reservoir. If increased seepage,
erosion, cracking, or settlement is observed, immediately report the observed conditions to the
District Magistrate and State Dam Safety Engineer.

Emergency Level 3 Urgent - dam failure is imminent or in progress

The Dam Owner shall immediately contact the District Magistrate, and others shown on the
notification flow chart, to inform that the EAP has been activated on emergency level 3.

The District Magistrate will to carry out warnings, close roads, and evacuate people at risk
downstream from the dam.

The Dam Owner will take care of the people in the dams area and surroundings and shall
maintain continuous communication and provide the District Magistrate with updates of the
situation to assist in making timely decisions concerning warnings and evacuation.

4.5 Termination step

Whenever the EAP has been activated, an emergency level has been declared, all EAP actions have
been completed, and the emergency is over, the EAP operations must eventually be terminated and
follow-up procedures completed.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Additionally we should insert in the EAP the inundation maps, the basic maps regarding the dam and
access roads, some additional information depending on the particular study (Classification of flooded
areas of example) and some templates for emergency detection report.

Being a dynamic document the EAP should be exercised at least once per year and drills have to be
programmed. It should be regularly updated as personnel in the chain leave or new personnel are
brought on board and conditions of the dam may change.

5. CAPACITY BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

Within the DRIP project we are working on capacity building and institutional strengthening aiming to
provide to State units (namely SPMU State Project Management Unit) the necessary tools to
prepare or manage the preparation of the EAPs for all the dams they are in charge. In the framework
of capacity building the main tasks identified are:

Updating of existing guidelines for the preparation of the EAP originally prepared by the CWC.
Preparation of a practical case study that can be used as a reference by the SPMU.

Moreover particular attention has been devoted to the dam break analysis and the release of large
amounts of water from spillways. These two events have to be carefully considered because of the
design flow used (usually 100 year return period) that can be exceeded and the large quantity of water
that can be released in standard operating conditions. Therefore a guideline specially dedicated to a
dam break has been issued. A dedicated paper will describe technique of dam break study that is
essentially the hydraulic study of a flow in an open channel, underlining the features and the
importance of expertise to carry it out.

Regarding the Institutional Strengthening the main activities are related to the training of States
Officials in the preparation of Emergency Action Plans and on Dam Break (DB) Analysis. Within this
framework three training sessions of two days on EAP and DB have been given in Kerala, Tamil Nadu
and Odisha, by Egis and CWC faculty during August and September 2014. A practical training, lasting
one week, on mathematical modelling of dam break with a case study implementation has been given
in New Delhi in September 2014 and officials coming from four States joined the training and actively
participated. Other training in the coming months will be given to other States which have joined
recently the DRIP program.

All the trainings are aimed to give the necessary information and tools regarding the EAP preparation
and to detail the theory and practice of dam break and flood routing.

The expected result of this Institutional Strengthening (IS) activity is to furnish to the SPMUs staff the
necessary basic knowledge to manage the preparation of the EAP themselves or using any external
qualified entity as Academic Institution or private Consultant.

6. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND EXPECTATIONS

Considering the high level of potential risk the current program is aimed at the preparation of EAPs for
each dam in the DRIP program. Therefore, after the training sessions and the issuing of Guidelines,
the different States in DRIP will be assisted in the preparation of EAPs, according to a specific
program that has been prepared and is under implementation at the moment.

All activities will be coordinated centrally from CPMU by experienced engineers; in every State the
SPMU will appoint a dedicated team for local coordination. Dams Owners (DO) will have the
responsibility to prepare EAP with their workforce or outsourcing it to external Consultants.

A General Coordinator will guide and assist all the local teams and DOs during the first pilot phase
(consisting in the implementation of EAP for two pilot dams for each CPMU) and during the follow on
standardization phase. Our main expectation is to accomplish the preparation of simple and effective
EAPs for all the dams under study within the schedule of the DRIP project.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

A two-dimensional dam-break flow simulation model for preparing


Emergency Action Plans
Soumendra Nath Kuiry
Hydraulics and Water Resources Engineering Division
Department of Civil Engineering, IIT Madras, Chennai
Email: snkuiry@iitm.ac.in

ABSTRACT
Approximately 5,125 large dams and several thousand smaller dams in India provide vital socioeconomic and
environmental services such as flood protection, water storage for public, industrial and agricultural use,
hydroelectric power generation, river navigation, mining, industrial waste management and recreation.
However, due to lack of fund dams have started getting lower priority for maintenance. Therefore, dams
constitute serious risk to life, property and environment due to their potential to fail and to cause catastrophic
flooding. Development of Emergency Action Plan (EAP) to mitigate these risks and to plan for emergency
response requires identification of all potential failure modes and the prediction of corresponding inundation
areas at different times, flood arrival times, maximum inundation depths and flood flow velocities. The EAP can
be defined as a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions at a dam and specifies
preplanned actions to be followed to minimize property damage and loss of life. The precision modeling of dam
break floods can lead to formulation of proper emergency action plan to minimize flood impacts within the
economic lifetime of a dam. To remedy this situation and to forecast flood inundation in real time, mathematical
models are used. Though one-, two- and three-dimensional models for dam-break flow simulation are
available, it is clear from different literature that a two-dimensional model is required as minimum to represent
the associated hydraulics accurately. This paper therefore presents the development of a two-dimensional
dam-break flow model and how this model can be used to prepare EAPs for dam-failure. The model is based
on the solution of the depth-averaged non-linear shallow water equations on uneven bathymetry. The solver is
implemented on unstructured quadrilateral grids so that irregular dam geometry and bathymetry details can be
represented. The solution methodology is based upon a finite volume based Godunov-type second-order
upwind formulation, whereby the inviscid fluxes of the system of equations are obtained using the HLLC
Riemann solver. The HLLC Riemann solver performs better than other available Riemann solvers as far as
two-dimensional aspects of flow and dry-wet conditions are concerned. A number of boundary conditions are
implemented to take care of field requirements. A variety of test cases are presented to study accuracy and
applicability of the model. It is also discussed that the model can be used for preparing inundation maps by
simulating different dam-break scenarios. The model can also be used to prepare EAPs for dam-break failure
by integrating with a GIS platform. Application of GIS techniques in conjunction with the dam-break flow
modelling for mapping of the flood inundated areas can play a tremendous role in further minimizing the risk
and likely damages.

1. INTRODUCTION

Approximately 5,125 large dams (4,728 completed and 397 under construction) and several thousand
smaller dams in India play important roles in providing vital socioeconomic and environmental services
for the nation (Ganju et al. 2012), such as flood protection, water storage for public, industrial and
agricultural use, hydroelectric power generation, river navigation, mining, industrial waste management
and recreation.

However, funds for maintenance have reduced over the time though there is significant increase in
water resources activities (Ganju et al. 2012). Thus, many dam owners are unable to undertake dam
repairs and rehabilitation due to lack of funding. As a consequence, dams constitute serious risk to life,
property and environment due to their potential to fail and to cause catastrophic flooding. The
disruption of the vital services they are providing as critical infrastructures could stress the economy,
public health and national security, which may be amplified by cascading failures triggered in other
critical infrastructures and key resource sectors. Development of Emergency Action Plan (EAP) to
mitigate these risks and to plan for emergency response requires identification of all potential failure
modes and the prediction of corresponding inundation areas at different times, flood arrival times,
maximum inundation depths and flow velocities. In principle, all dams categorized in terms of probable
loss of life in the event of a failure of the structure as significant hazard or as high hazard should have
an EAP. The EAP can be defined as a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions
at a dam and specifies pre-planned actions to be followed to minimize property damage and loss of
life. The EAP should also contain dynamic inundation maps as well as the procedures and information

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

to assist the dam owner/operator in issuing early warning and notification messages to responsible
downstream emergency management authorities.

To remedy this situation and to forecast flood inundation in real time, mathematical models are used.
The expensive commercial softwares such as MIKE 11, MIKE 21 (www.mikebydhi.com), TUFLOW
(www.tuflow.com) or freely available packages such as HEC-RAS (http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/
software/HEC-RAS/), CLAWPACK (http://depts.washington.edu/clawpack/) can be used for dam-break
flow simulations. The simulations can be done using either one-dimensional (1D) models (MIKE 11,
HEC-RAS) or two-dimensional (2D) models (MIKE-21, TUFLOW, CLAWPACK). The 1D hydrodynamic
modelling is based on the assumption that the water levels are horizontal across the section with a
single dominant flow direction. This may be good enough for a typical channel flow or valley flooding
but is less suitable for complex flows such as flows over a floodplain due to levee break (Hesselink et
al. 2003), or over a flat floodplain (Aronica et al. 1999) or due to dam-break (Kuiry et al. 2008). The
dam-break flow is also discontinuous and trans-critical in nature. Nevertheless, the flow directions
change significantly both spatially and temporally. Therefore, 1D dam-break models can be used if the
flow is restricted to the downstream channel but this is very unlikely situation since most of the dams in
India are large dams. Under these conditions, a 2D model is required as a minimum.

Though the available softwares such as MIKE-21, TUFLOW, CLAWPACK etc. serve some purposes
but may not be suitable for preparing EAP and real time flood forecasting due to large computation
time, restricted input formats and continuous monetary investment for upgradation. The development
of a dam-break flow model, therefore originates from the fact that an indigenous mathematical model
which can be easily modified and upgraded based on the field requirements has not been developed
so far.

The Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) has been taken up by the Government of
India with the assistance from World Bank (Ganju et al. 2012). The DRIP project mainly focuses on
improving the structural and non-structural safety measures of the existing dams. However, the project
in its present form does not have scope to develop dam-break tools though flood markings is one of
the primary objectives. The developed dam-break model may be enhanced and integrated with
Geographical Information System (GIS) in order to effectively pre- and post-process data for preparing
EPA.

This paper, therefore, focuses on development of a 2D dam-break flow model and its validation with
experimental observations. The efforts have been made to describe how EPA can be prepared for a
particular dam site using the present model.

2. DAM-BREAK FLOW MODEL

The 2D dam-break model is developed by solving the 2D shallow water equations which are derived
by integrating the Navier-Stokes equations over the flow depth. The assumptions made in the process
are: incompressible fluid, uniform velocity distribution in the vertical direction, hydrostatic pressure
distribution and small bottom slope.

2.1. Governing Equations

Consider the overland flow over a complex topography as depicted in Fig. 1. The horizontal plane is
defined by x- and y-coordinates, and the z-coordinate points in the vertical direction. The bottom
elevation, zb, and the water surface elevation, Z, are measured with respect to an arbitrary common
reference datum. The water depth (h) at any point at any time is defined as

h( x, y, t ) Z ( x, y, t ) zb ( x, y) (1)

The water surface elevation and the flow depth are functions of space and time whereas the bottom
topography is only the function of space and it does not change with time.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Fig
gure 1. Definition sketch for model variables.

The 2D depth-averaaged shalloww water equa


ations which
h describe th
he unsteady non-uniform
m flow on
complexx topography can be writte
en as:

h q x q y
0 (2a)
t x y

qx qx2 qx q y Z n 2u u 2 v 2
gh g (2b)
t x h y h x h4 3

q y qx q y qy Z n 2v u 2 v 2
2

gh
h gh (2c)
t x h y h y h4 3
Referring
g to the defiinition sketch
h in Fig. 1, the conservative form of
o the shallow
w water equ
uations in
vector fo
ormat can be written as:

U F(U
U) G(U)
S(U) (3)
t x y

In which,
T
q y2
T
qx2 qx q y qx q y
U ( h , q x , q y ) ; F qx ,
T
, ; G q y , , ;
h h h h
T
n 2u u 2 v 2 n2v u 2 v2
g Z / x
S 0, gh , gh Z / y
h4 3 h4 3

where U represents the vector of conserved d variables, F and G arre the fluxess associated with the
conserveed variables in the x- and y-direction
ns. In additioon, qx = uh and
a qy = vh are the unita ary water
discharg
ges, u and v are depth-avveraged velo ocities in the
e x- and y-dirrections, respectively, whhile Z/x
and Z/y are the water
w surface slopes along
g these direcctions. The frriction slopess are estimated using
the Mann ning relation with n as the
e Mannings roughness coefficient.
c

In the ab
bove form of the governin ng equations s, the driving forces are represented
r by only one term with
the wateer surface grradient, whicch makes it very
v useful for
f treating the
t source te erm because e: (a) the
variation
n of water surface is ge enerally smooother than water depth h and bed toopography and
a (b) it
eliminate
es numericall imbalance that arises dued to using g different methods to evvaluate drivin
ng forces
that are split between the hydrosstatic flux andd bed slope source terms (Nujic 1995; Kuiry et al.
a 2008 &
2010).

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

2.2. Numerical Solution

The governing equations are discretized according to the cell-centered finite volume method on a
quadrilateral grid which form the control volumes. The Eq. (1) is then integrated over an elementary
control volume and discretized by finite volume method. The dependent variables of the system are
assumed to be stored at the center of the cell and represented as piecewise constants and the fluxes
are calculated at the interfaces between the neighbouring cells. It is useful to rewrite Eq. (1) as

U
E(U) S( x, y, U) (4)
t
where E = (F, G)T is the flux tensor. Integrating Eq. (4) over the ith cell, one obtains

U
i t
d ( E)d Sd
i i
(5)

where i the area of the ith cell. The Gauss divergence theorem is applied to the second term of
Eq. (6) and is given by

U
i t
i E nd i Sd
d (6)

where i boundary of the ith cell and n = the unit outward vector normal to the boundary. The
contour integral is approached via a mid-point rule, that is, a numerical flux is defined at the mid-point
of each edge giving

Fn Gn y d
3

i
x E
j 1

ij n ij ij (7)

where j is the cell edge index and E* is the numerical flux vector, the length of an edge of a
quadrilateral cell, nx and ny are the components of unit normal in the x- and y-directions, respectively.

Therefore Eq. (6) can be written as

n
t 3 *
Uin1 Uin
i j 1

Eij nij ij tSi
n
(8)

According to Godunov (1959), the variables are approximated as constant states within each cell and
then the fluxes at interfaces are calculated by solving the Riemann problems that exists at the
interfaces. The explicit expression of E* depends upon the selected Riemann solver (Roe 1981; Valiani
et al. 2002, Kuiry et al. 2008, 2010). In the proposed work, the HLLC Riemann solver (Fraccarollo and
Toro 1995) is used to compute the numerical flux. The HLLC scheme is a modification of the HLL
scheme by defining that the solution to the Riemann problem consists of three waves separating four
states instead of three states. If the cell-centered values of the variables are used to calculate the flux
at an interface a first-order accurate scheme is obtained, which suffers from excessive numerical
dissipation, and accuracy is undermined. A higher-order accuracy in space will be obtained by
reconstructing the variables for the left and right states (Kuiry et al. 2008).

Water surface gradients in the source term are evaluated by using the Greens theorem

Z 1 Z 1

x i i
Zdy and
y i
i
Zdx (9)

It is evident that the proposed solution method does not suffer from numerical instability under no flow
condition which is a common problem in most of the finite volume based flow models. Since the
proposed solution method uses an explicit scheme to solve the shallow water equations, it is subjected

85
Compendium of Technical Papers

to Coura
ant-Friedrichss-Lewy (CFL
L) condition fo
or stability an
nd convergence.

2.3. Bou
undary Conditions

When a face of a cell coincides with


w the boundary of the flow domain n or some ph hysical boundary, it is
necessary to solve a boundary Riemann
R prob
blem (Sleigh et al. 1998; Kuiry et al. 2008;
2 Yoon and
a Kang
T theory of characteristtics provides sufficient infformation to establish a relation
2004). The r to fin
nd out the
unknown n variables at
a the bounda ary. The opeen boundaryy conditions for
f subcritica al or supercritical flow
is implem
mented depe ending upon the local floow regime. The
T no flow through a bo oundary is maintained
by specifying wall bo
oundary cond dition. However, any spe ecific boundaary condition can be implemented
dependinng upon the field requirem
ments.

3. MOD
DEL RESULT
TS

3.1. Parrtial Dam-bre


eak in a labo
oratory flum
me

An experimental parrtial dam-break test cond ducted by Fraaccarolo and d Toro (1995 5) is considered here.
The two--dimensional aspects of the flow and the ability of the mode el to correctlly reproduce
e the flow
behaviou ur can be vaalidated by th
his test. The flume is recctangular in shape
s and coonnected to a tank at
the upstream which can be treated as a res servoir. The flume which is considere ed as a floo
odplain, is
open on all the threee sides. The reservoir
r is 1 m long and 2 m wide while the flood dplain is 3 m long and
2 m wide e. The width of the gate which is sym mmetrically centered,
c is 0.4 m. The gate
g is opera
ated by a
pneumattic cylinder and
a guarante ees a very sh hort opening
g time of lesss than 0.1 s. A number of o gauges
are located at differrent locationss to record the depth evvolution usin ng wave heiight meters and their
locationss are describ
bed in Table 1. Details of o the experimmental set-u up and its opperation can be found
from the cited reference. Fraccao orolo and To oro (1995) coonducted sevveral tests out
o of which a specific
case is selected in which the water
w level inn the reservvoir was kep pt at 0.6 m and the dow wnstream
floodplain was initially dry.
Sttations -5A
A C 4 0 8A
8
x (m) 0.18
8 0.48 1.00
0 1.00 1.7
722
y (m) 1.00
0 0.40 1.16
6 1.00 1.00

Table 1. Lo
ocations of sta
age Gauges

Figure
e 2. Computational mesh for the partial da
am-break test and gauge lo
ocations

hows the computational mesh and th


Fig. 2 sh he locations of the differrent gauges.. The total number of
quadrilatterals used is
i 6141 and finer cells are
a used in the vicinity off the gate where
w the flow
w pattern
changess drastically. The time series of waterr depths at different gaug
ges are comp pared in Fig.. 3. In the
graphs, the
t simulated results of Ying
Y and Waang (2006) are
a also presented to exa amine the accuracy of

86
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

the pressent model. The time dependent curves are never mon notonically decreasing
d b show
but
oscillatio
ons. This means that though the water w volumme in the re eservoir is strictly
s mono otonically
decreasiing, the free e surface is moving alte ernatively up and down. As soon as s the gate iss opened
suddenlyy, a strong rarefaction
r w
wave is gene erated and moves
m backw ward into the reservoir while
w the
front wavve spreads laterally and flows onto th he floodplain
n. The free surface variattions at statio ons "-5A"
and "C" compare we ell with the exxperimental observationss as well as the simulate ed results of Ying and
Wang (2 2006) and th he RMSE att these stations are 0.01757 and 0.01738. The e gauges "0"" and "4"
shows some initial oscillations
o w
which are alsso confirmedd by the exp perimental ob bservations. At these
stations, the water depth
d reducees drasticallyy to a minim
mum soon affter the gate is opened. After the
minimum m, the plots show
s a rising
g stage whic t contribution of the latteral propaga
ch is due to the ation and
represen nt, therefore, a two-dimen nsional effec
ct. This aspect is well repproduced by the numericcal model.
The sligh ht delay of th
he measured d data can bee attributed to
o the fact tha
at actually th
he gate opening is not
instantanneous as pointed out by Fraccarolo and Toro (19 995). The RMSE
R valuess at these gaauges are
calculateed as 0.0638 86 and 0.054 422 respectivvely. Neverth heless, the discrepancy
d at these stations can
be attribbuted to the three-dimen nsionality of the flow wh hich cannot be exactly captured
c by a depth-
averaged d 2D model.. The depth prediction at station "8A A" is close too the observved depth hyydrograph
and the wave arrival time to this station is qu uite accurate
e. The RMSE E value at thhis station is 0.06571.
The RMS SE values are slightly large but the computed
c re
esults are we ell compared with Ying and Wang
(2006). In spite of the e limitations of the shallo
ow water rep presentation, the overall predictive
p acccuracy is
quite sattisfactory.

(-5A) (C)

(
(0)
(4)

(8A)

87
Compendium of Technical Papers

Fiigure 3. Comp
puted and mea
asured depth evolutions at different gaug
ges

3.2. Dam
m-break flow
w in a slope
ed convergin
ng-diverging
g channel

Bellos ett al. (1992) conducted


c a series of da
am-break test cases unde er various flo
ow conditionss. One of
the expeerimental testt cases is co onsidered heere. This test case can exxamine the accuracy
a of the model
becausee it includes some difficu ulties such as
a an irregular flow dom main and an initially dry bed. The
width of the rectang gular sloped channel varries like a converging-diiverging cha annel. The channel is
20.7 m long with uniform bottom m slope 0.006 6. The Mann ning's roughn ness co-efficcient was rep ported as
-1/3
0.012 m s. A gate is located at a x = 8.5 m from the up pstream and initial water level in the reservoir
section, i.e. upstreamm of the gate e, was set att 0.3 m. Depth evolutionss were meassured by eigh ht probes
located a
along the cen ntre-line of thhe channel. All
A the three sides of the channel are e defined as solid wall
and the downstream m is defined d as free-ouutfall. The simulation
s iss performed d on a grid of 5047
quadrilatteral cells an
nd the converging-divergiing section iss shown in Fig.
F 4. Fig. 5 shows the m measured
and commputed flow depths
d at the three locatio
ons at x = 0.0
0 m, x = 4.5 m and x = 18 8.5 m, respeectively.

Figure
e 4. Convergin
ng-diverging se
ection of the computational
c grid for the da
am-break test case by Bello
os et. al.
(1992)

The com
mputed RMSE at the thre ee probes arre within reasonable limits and are 0.00473,
0 0.00
0203 and
0.00766 respectively
y. In the dowwnstream, th he arrival tim
me of the waater front is accurately predicted.
p
Howeverr, the presen
nt model sligh
htly overestim
mates the floow depth at x = 18.5 m, shown in Fig. 5(c).

(a) (b)

(c)

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Figure
e 5. Computed
d and measure
ed flow depth comparisons at: (a) x = 0.0 m (b) x = 4.5 m and (c) x = 18.5 m

3.3. Lab
boratory Dam
m-break ove
er a triangullar hump

The num merical mode el is applied tot reproduce e the comple ex laboratory dam-break flow over a triangular t
hump. T The experim ment was re ecommended d by the EU E CADAM project and conducted d at the
Rechercches Hydrauliques Laborratory, Chte elet together with the University
U of Bruxelles (B Belgium).
The experimental se etup is illustra
ated in Fig. 6.
6 A dam is located 15.5 5 m away fro om upstream m end in a
38 m long rectangular channel. The dam has h a reservvoir in the upstream side with the still s water
surface eelevation at 0.75
0 m and the
t downstre eam floodplain is initially dry.
d A triangular hump on n the bed
is located at 13 m aw way from the dam at the downstream
d . The symme etric triangulaar hump is 0.4 m high
and the projected len ngths of the normal and adverse slopes of the hump are botth 3 m. The upstream u
end is soolid wall and the downstre eam end is assumed
a to be
b open. A Manning
M coeffficient 0.012 25 m-1/3s-1
is used throughout
t th
he domain. TheT simulatio on is run for 90 s on a grid with a ressolution of 0.1 m size
square ccells. At t 0 , the dam suddenly
s bre
eaks and the e initial still water
w in the reservoir russhes onto
the downstream floo odplain. As soon
s as the wave front reaches to the hump, due d to the innteraction
between n the incomiing flow and d the bed to opography a shock wav ve gets form med that propagates
upstreamm. During thiis time, a rarefaction wa ave is develo oped, moving g downstrea am, which ca auses the
water de epth above th he hump to decrease. The T shock wa ave which was w develope ed by the bed d hits the
solid wall at the upsttream end at around t 24 s and ge ets reflected d. The reflecttion causes a second
shock too form and propagate
p do
ownstream. AtA the same time, the wa ater on the hump
h starts receding
and the drying-out process
p conttinues at the
e upstream sside before the t second shock
s hits th
he hump.
Then the e shock attaccks the hump and the hu uge momenttum carried by b the shockk pushes the e water to
climb up p the hump so that the e entire hum mp is again submerged d. Another shock
s is immmediately
develope ed and startss to move up pstream. The ese complexx processes associated
a w wave intteractions
with
and wettting and drying continue until the mo omentum of flowf is damped by friction n effects and d the loss
of mass from the dom main through h the downsttream boundary. Time hisstories of wa ater depth reccorded at
five gaugges located ata 4 m (G4), 10 m (G10), 11 m (G11)), 13 m (G13 3) and 20 m (G20) downsstream of
the dam m (Fig. 7). Th he RMSE att different ga auges (G4: 0.02874,
0 G10: 0.05266, G11: 0.046 682, G13:
0.01702 and G20: 0.026488) are a calculate ed for up to o 65 s beca ause after that
t results are very
oscillatorry. The maximum errorss are contribu uted due to under predicction at the peaks. p At all gauges,
the wave e arrival timee is preciselyy predicted. However, co omputed res sults show th hat the time series at
G20 is under
u predictted at all timees and this is
s also prediccted by otherr researchers Brufau et al. a (2004)
using diffferent numerical scheme es. Thereforee, a possible explanation for the disag greement at G20 may
be that tthe flow is highly
h complex and unsttable beyond d the hump and the sha allow water e equations
based on n hydrostaticc assumption n may not be quite suitab ble for this sittuation. Howe ever, the wave arrival
time is accurately mo odelled, whicch is a more important facctor for dam--break simula ations.

Figure
e 6. Definition sketch of the experimental set up for dam
m break over a triangular hu
ump (distorted
d scale)

89
Compendium of Technical Papers

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

(e)

Figure 7
7. Dam break over
o a triangular hump: time
e histories of w
water depth att different gauges: (a) G4 (b
b) G10 (c)
G11 (d)
( G13 and (e e) G20

3.4. Pre
eparation of Emergency
y action plan
ns for a dam
m-break incid
dent

A dam ssite may be flooded due e to sudden uncontrolled d release orr excessive controlled re elease of
water. The release may
m be caussed by dama age to or failure of the dam. When people
p live in
n an area
that could be affecteed by the opperation or failure
f of a dam,
d there iss the potential for an em mergency
related tto dam safeety incident. The plannin ng should beb carried out based on n the severity of the
situation. Therefore, the dams in India shouldd be classifie
ed at least in
nto two categ
gories: (a) low w-hazard
dams an nd (b) high-hhazard damss. A dam with low or no o potential im
mpact may notn require extensive
e
emergen ncy planning process. Hoowever, a higgh-hazard da am should ha ave extensive
e EAPs.

Residentts of areas th hat could be affected by a dam failurre or operatio


onal incident have a risk of loss of
life, injurries, and dam
mage to prooperty. Theree should be guidelines forf the prepa aration of the
e EAP to
facilitate the develo opment of plans that arre comprehe ensive and consistent during
d a dam safety
incident. An EAP is a formal docu ument that id
dentifies pote
ential emerge ency conditio
ons at a dam
m site and
specifiess actions to be
b followed to
t minimize loss of life annd property damage.
d Thee EAP should include
the followwing six elem
ments (CWC, 2006):

N
Notification flowcharts
f

90
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Responsibilities
Emergency identification, evaluation and classification
Notification procedure
Preventive action
Inundation map
Appendices for supporting materials

It is obvious from the elements outlined above that the dam-failure EAP guidelines require the
performance of a dam-break analysis as the basis for delineation of possible flood inundation areas,
i.e. inundation maps. The various dam-break parameters, such as breach size and time to failure, are
normally obtained either from published guidelines by the Central Water Commission, India or need to
be formulated for each high-hazard dam. The dam breach information is required in predicting the
failure mode of a dam. The failure of a dam is seldom instantaneous, but occurs over a finite length of
time, and is usually preceded by noticeable indicators. A detailed discussions on this topic was
presented for variety of dams in USA in Jansen (1980, 1988) and Beard (1984). The breach
development time of a dam mainly depends on type of materials and volume of materials. The studies
on dam-failure incidents have resulted in the development of a series of curves relating breach
material volume to breach development time and quantifying breach outflow characteristics
(MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis 1984). The water resource engineer should also carefully study
a dam, including any past inspection reports, before selecting dam-breach parameters. For concrete
dams, failure of a single monolith will most likely result in partial failure of adjacent monoliths. Past
areas of dam repair should always be suspected as possible areas of future dam failure. Once the
failure mode and breach information are available for a dam, a dam-break flow simulation model cab
employed to generate various scenarios and corresponding inundation maps.

The proposed dam-break flow simulation model can be upgraded to include breach profiles so that
dam-break flow simulation can be done for different failure modes. The model then can be used to
generate information on (a) the extent of the flooded area, (b) spatial distribution of flood depth at
various times, (c) spatial distribution of flood velocities (in two horizontal directions) at different times,
(d) flood arrival time at each point of the computational domain, and (e) duration of the flood at each
point of the computational domain. In addition, the envelope maps of maximum flood depth and
maximum velocity can also be created for the entire simulation domain. These results can readily be
imported into a GIS software for generating inundation maps. Thus, dam-break flow model is
indispensable for generating inundation maps which are used for preparing EAP. In addition, the dam-
break model can also be used to prepare inundation maps while a flood is in progress and the failure
mode is quite different than that was considered for preparing the EAP for a particular dam.

4. CONCLUSIONS

A 2D dam-break model is presented. The depth-averaged shallow water equations are discretized by
the finite volume method and the HLLC approximate Riemann solver. The model uses unstructured
quadrilateral grids to describe the flow domain and hence real geometry can be considered for
simulation. The model is validated against a number of experimental observations that include dam-
break phenomena with different regimes of flow. It is also discussed that the model can be used for
preparing inundation maps for different dam-break scenarios. The model can also be used to prepare
EAPs for dam-break failure by integrating with a GIS platform. A small upgrade is required to take care
of breach failure mode.

REFERENCES

Aronica, G., Tucciarelli, T., and Nasello, C. (1999): 2D multilevel model for flood wave propagation in flood-
affected areas. J. Water Res. Plann. Manag., 124: 210-217.
Beard, J. (1984): Anatomy of a dam failure. Constr., Associated General Contractors of America, Washington,
D.C., May, 30-34.
Bellos, C. V., Soulis, J. V., and Sakkas, J. G. (1992): Experimental investigation of two-dimensional dam-break
induced flows. J. Hydraul. Res., 30: 4763.
Brufau, P., Garca-Navarro, P., and Vazquez-Cendon, M. E. (2004): Zero mass error using unsteady wetting
drying conditions in shallow flows over dry irregular topography. Int. J. Numer. Methods Fluids, 45: 104782.

91
Compendium of Technical Papers

CWC (2006): Guidelines for development and implementation of emergency action plan (EAP) for dams.
Fraccarollo, L., and Toro, E. F. (1995): Experimental and numerical assessment of the shallow water model for
two-dimensional dam break type problems. J. Hydraul. Res., 33: 843864.
Hesselink, A., Stelling, G., Kwadijk, J., and Middelkoop, H. (2003): Inundation of a Dutch river Polder, sensitivity
analysis of a physically based inundation model using historic data. Water Resou. Res., 39: 9, 1-17.
Jansen, R. B. (1980): Dams and public safetyA water resources technical publication. U.S. Department of the
Interior, Washington, D.C.
Jansen, R. B. (1988): Dam safety in America. Hydro Rev., VII (3), HCI Publications, Kansas City, Mo., May, 10-
20.
Kuiry, S. N., Ding, Y., and Wang, S. S. Y. (2010): Modelling coastal barrier breaching flows with well-balanced
shock-capturing technique. Comput. Fluids, 39: 10, 2051-2068.
Kuiry, S. N., Pramanik, K., and Sen, D. J. (2008): Finite volume model for shallow water equations with improved
treatment of source terms, J. Hydraul. Eng., 134: 2, 231-242.
MacDonald, T. C., and Langridge-Monopolis, J. (1984): Breaching characteristics of dam failures. J. Hydraul.
Eng., 110: 5, 567-586.
Nujic, M. (1995): Efficient implementation of non-oscillatory schemes for the computation of free surface flow. J.
Hydraul. Res., 33: 101111.
Roe, P. L. (1981): Approximate Riemann solvers, parameter vectors and difference schemes. J. Comput. Phys.,
43: 357-372.
Sleigh, P. A., Berzins, M., Gaskell, P. H., and Wright, N. G. (1997): An unstructured finite-volume algorithm for
predicting flow in rivers and estuaries. Comput. Fluids, 27: 4, 479-508.
Valiani, A., Caleffi, V., and Zanni, A. (2002): Case study: Malpasset Dam-break simulation using two-dimensional
finite volume method. J. Hydr. Eng., 128: 5, 460-472.
Ying, X., and Wang, S. S. Y. (2006): Modeling flood inundation due to dam and levee breach. In: Proceedings of
the USChina workshop on advanced computational modelling in hydroscience & engineering, Oxford,
Mississippi, USA; 1921 September, 2006.
Yoon, T. H., and Kang, S. K. (2004): Finite volume model for two-dimensional shallow water flows on unstructured
grids. J. Hydraul. Eng., 130: 7, 678-688.

92
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

D ety Status of DRIP Dams - Trends and Imp


Dam Safe provemen
nt
Initiatives
Vino
od K Verma
a Yoki Vija
ay
Dam Safety Sp
D pecialist, Egis, New Delhi De
eputy Director (DSR), Centra
al Water Commission
Vinodkumaar.v@egis-ind dia.com
Garance Bla
aut
Engine
eer, Egis, New
w Delhi

ABSTRACT
This pape er deals with overall scena ario of variouss activities invvolved for reh habilitation and improvement of dam
projects in different staates of India under
u DRIP (Dam Rehabiliitation & Imprrovement Project), being co oordinated
and supe ervised by Central
C Water Commission n as a Centrral Project Management
M U
Unit (CPMU). General
deficiencies found in various typess of dam pro ojects includin ng their appurtenant workss along with proposed
improvem ments and rem medial measu ures suggeste ed for executtion involving the latest te echnologies have been
deliberateed in detail. Coommon deficie encies observ ved in Embankkment dams re elate to settlemments found at a different
locations of the dam section
s requiring re-sectioniing as per original design sections includding resetting of rip-rap,
seepage conditions dow wnstream of the
t dam, cond dition of chute drains and to oe drain and suitability of da am section
and reservoir le
to withsta evel of increassed MWL posst revised design flood. As re egards Mason nry/ Concrete dams, the
major issues are with respect to se eepage throug gh dam body, clogging of porous p drainss, concrete da amages in
spillway/eenergy dissipa ation arrangem ment, contracction joint wate er stop failure es and operational issues related to
service/em mergency gattes & hoists. Remedial me easures to brring back the embankmentt dams to the eir original
status inccludes carryingg out the detailed survey of the dams with h reference to a permanent Bench Mark to t pinpoint
settlemen nt areas and tot carry out ap ppropriate filling and compa action repairss; removal of woody vegeta ation from
u/s &d/s slopes
s of the bund
b and reseetting of the sttones of the rip-rap, toe dra ains and rock toe;
t repairs off the chute
drains, thheir cleaning and
a making th hem effective enough
e to faccilitate flow of rain
r water from m dam top to down and
monitoring of the seep page water being
b collectin
ng in the toe drain with re eference to th he reservoir le evels. For
masonry// concrete dam ms, the measu ures include treatment of u/s u face of the e dams with appropriate cem mentitious
and UV rresistant morta ars like Poly Ironite Ceram mic Cemmentittious formulattions to minim mise seepage from dam
body to thhe foundation gallery; treatm ment of contra action joints oof the dam bod dy for leaking water stops by b sealing
the joint w
with water toleerable, hydrop philic polyureth hanes or Acryylamide grout system; groutting of the dam body at
required llow density da am locations using
u grout forrmulations witth appropriate admixtures to o reduce seep pages and
treatmentt of the draina age holes in thhe foundation gallery to rele ease uplift wa ater pressuress. The status of o seeking
approval of Project Sccreening Tem mplate (PST) for execution n of rehabilita ation works fo or different da ams, after
incorporaating the recom mmendations of the state level Dam Safety Review Panels P (DSRP P), from CPMU U and the
World Ba ank has been elaborated. StatusS of Ten ndering Proce ess, after the dam project is granted ap pproval for
undertaking the rehabilitation works by World Ban nk and up to th he award of re ehabilitation works
w to the Contracting
C
Agencies has also bee en covered. Status of rehab bilitation workss under execu ution for differrent dam proje ects along
with workk completion time schedule e and the sta atus of expen nditure incurre ed on each dam d project have
h been
brought oout in this papeer.

1. DRIP DAMS IN VA
ARIOUS STA
ATES

1.1 Ov
verview

Dam Reehabilitation and


a Improvement Projecct (DRIP) hass been taken n up by Government of India with
World Baank assistan
nce and is beeing manage ed and coord dinated by Ce
entral Waterr Commission n (CWC).
The Projject has beco e on 18th Aprril, 2012 for implementation period of six years.
ome effective

DRIP ha ad been ado opted within four states namely Kerrala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa (Odisha) and
Tamil Naadu. Five moore States/ Organisation
O were also id oin DRIP at a later stage
dentified to jo e: namely
Karnatakka, Punjab, Uttarakhand d Jal Vidyutt Nigam Limmited (UJVNL), Damoda ar Valley Co orporation
(DVC) and Farakka Board (FB) for which a provision of unallocated resources had h been prrovided in
ect estimate.
the proje

Karnatakka became officially


o n 7th Octoberr, 2014. DVC
partt of DRIP on C and UJVNL will join th
he project
during 20
015 and Fara
akka Board & Punjab hav ve finally deccided not to join
j DRIP.

40 dams havve been identified for rehabilitation un


In all, 24 NL and DVC also join,
nder the projject. If UJVN
the total would be 248
2 dams. These
T 240 id
dentified dam ms are unde er the controol of Water Resource
R

93
Compendium of Technical Papers

ments of Mad
Departm dhya Pradessh (29 dams s), Orissa (266 dams), Keerala (16 dams), Tamil Nadu
N (38
dams) an
nd Karnataka
a (27 dams); and State Electricity
E Bo
oards of Tamil Nadu (67 dams)
d and Kerala
K (37
dams un
nder 12 Hydro Electric Prrojects).

These 2 240 dams (c current list) have


h been identified to have substa antial need for rehabilitaation and
improvem ment and will be subject to rehabilitaation and imp provement works
w under DRIP.
D In adddition, the
also aims for the dam saffety institution
project a nal strengtheening in the participating
p States and in Central
Water Commission.
C The implem menting agen ncies (IAs) of
o DRIP are the ownerss of the dam ms, which
comprise e Water Ressource Depa artments (W WRDs) and StateS Electriccity Boards (SEBs)
( of re
espective
states. The
T Implementing Agenciies are respo onsible for th
he implementtation of the works underr DRIP.

Dams arre critical co


omponents of
o the infrasttructure in India. Approxximately 518 87 large damms (4839
completeed and 348 under consstruction) an nd several tthousand sm maller dams provide a range of
economiic, environmental, and social benefitts, including hydroelectric power, irrigation, wate
er supply,
flood control, and tourism.
t Howwever dams age and de eteriorate, posing a poteential threat to life &
property.

Given th
he number an nd widesprea on of dams in India, it is clear that th
ad distributio he potentiallyy affected
populatio
ons and secttors are many, and that th
he effects off dam-relatedd hazards can be seriouss.

ment objectivves of DRIP are to:


The project developm
Imp prove the saffety and perfformance of selected exiisting dams and associated appurten nances in
a su
ustainable manner, and
Streengthen the dam
d safety in
nstitutional setup
s in particcipating Stattes as well ass at Central level.
l

1.2 Sttate-wise de
etails of DRIP dams

There arre currently 240


2 dams in n the scope of DRIP. Inittially 223 da
ams were invvolved in DRRIP within
four stattes. Some dams were deleted
d and others addeed, then Karn nataka joined last Octob
ber 2014,
bringing to 240 the number of DR
RIP dams.

The seleection of dam


ms for DRIP has
h been ma ade by the fo
our states con ncerned. The
e states havve done a
review o of the statuss of their dams
d and ha ave determiined those damsd a most in need of
that are
rehabilita
ation and imp
provement inn order to gu
uarantee theiir future safe
ety and opera
ational capaccity.

Kerala has pro


oposed 28 dams
d projectts, out of which
w 16 dam ms are mannaged by the Water
Ressources Dep
partment (WRD) and 12 2 HEP mana aged by thee Kerala Staate Electricitty Board
(KS
SEB). Some of
o these dam
ms are in rea
ality dam commplexes, with more than one dam (ssee table
belo
ow).

Tammil Nadu has


s proposed 105 dams to be included in DRIP, of which 67 da
ams are man
naged by
the WRD and 388 by the Tam
mil Nadu Elec
ctricity Board
d (TNEB).

Thee number of dams from m Madhya Pradesh, Orissa


O and Karnataka
K are 29, 26 and 27
resp
pectively and
d are managed by Waterr Resources Department of the Statess.

Tamil
T Tam
mil TOTAL
Madhya Kerala Kerala
State/ Organization Orissa N
Nadu Nad
du K
Karnataka HEP
Pradesh WRD SEB
WRD
W SEBB (dams)
Total N
No of DRIP
223
Dam P Projects 50 38 60 44 19 12 (37) -
(248)
Original (April 2012)
Total N
No of DRIP
215
Dam p projects 29 26 67 38 16 12 (37) 27
(240)
Revised (Dec. 2014)

94
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

State-wisse break-up of DRIP dam


ms is given in
n Figure-1 be
elow:

NoofDRIPdams Stateewise
Madhya
K
Karnataka,27 Pradesh,29
Madhya
Pradesh
Orissa,26 Orissa

Kerala,5
53 TamilNadu

Kerala

TamilNadu,
105

Most DRRIP dams are


e single purp
pose, either providing
p irrigation or hydro-power benefits, but some
s are
multipurp
pose. Some also are useed for potablle water supply or flood control. The majority of the
t dams
(around 59%) are 25
5 to 50 years old, while on
nly 4 dams (a around 2%) are over 100
0 years old.

2. TYPIC
CAL DEFICIIENCIES OF
F DRIP DAMS

2.1 Gen
neral

As per th
he understan nding, SPMUUs are required to work oout revised deesign flood based
b on hyddrological
data avaailable/ obseerved by them or obtaine ed from IMD gn flood for 100 year
D for estimattion of desig
return period or Sta andard Probbable Flood (SPF) or Prrobable Maxximum Flood d (PMF) for different
projects.. It has been
n observed inn general tha
at flood estim
mation is fau
ulty and the routing
r of the
e flood is
also erro
oneous. The e revised Maaximum wate er Level (MWWL) so worke ed out based d on the abo ove flood
routing studies
s often needs to be
e reworked ou ut.

Other da am features which


w attract recurrent comments
c n account of deficiencies observed during site
on
visits of tthe Consulta
ants to variou n the following paras.
us dams are described in

2.2 Emb
bankment Dams
D

Upstreamm & downstrream slopess of the embankments an nd even the road at top of dam are found to
have und dulating surffaces which indicate setttlement. Rip--rap on the u/s
u slopes off the embankkments is
disturbedd and found covered witth thick woody vegetatio on. Chute dra ains and horrizontal drainns on the
downstreeam slopes are seen fillled with deb bris and coveered with veegetation andd also found d cracked
and dammaged. The d/s slopes of o most of thet embankm ment dams are covered d with thick & woody
on. Toe draiins at most of the damss are found ignored and
vegetatio d are seen filled
f with de ebris and
having trees growing g in the drain. Stone pittching of the
e toe drain and
a also tha
at of rock toe e is seen
disturbedd. Deep gullyy cuts on the
e surface of d/s
d slopes on n account of rain water arre quite promminent. V-
notches are found damaged.
d Paarapets on top
t of dam are
a seen in broken state e or are tiltin
ng. Road
surface iis not mainta
ained. The old system of illumination of
o dam areass is non-funcctional.

At some of the damss with longerr length of re


eservoir, the rip-rap stone
es are found
d dislodged from
f their
location on account of
o impact of waves
w due to
o high wind velocities.
v

Concenttrated/ excesssive seepagge/ leakage of


o water throuugh the earth
h dam body into the toe d
drain has
been obsserved at so
ome of the dams and we et spots on th
he down- strream slope of
o the bund hhave also
been fou
und.
Leakagees from the Earth
E d.
dam in to the outlet works are also observed

95
Compendium of Technical Papers

2.3 Masonry / Concrete Dams

The mortar filling and pointing of masonry joints on the upstream face of dams at many projects is
found cracked or missing. This leads to excessive seepage or leakage through the dam body.
Leakage from the transverse contraction joints due to failure of water stops has been noticed. Porous
drains provided in the dam body are found choked on account of calcination. These porous drains are
also found open at the dam top and provided with steel grating. At most of the locations, the drainage
holes provided in the foundation gallery for releasing the uplift pressure are found non-functional. V-
notches provided for measuring the seepage water coming into the foundation gallery are seen
damaged or not provided at appropriate locations. Standby dewatering pumps are not provided in the
gallery sump wells. Concrete surfaces of the Spillway crest and glacis are seen eroded/damaged on
account of abrasion and also detachment of concrete layer is noticed in small patches. Damages to
the concrete surfaces of buckets and to the dented blocks and end sill of the stilling basin arrangement
have been noticed. Slope protection of the water channel d/s of the spillway is inadequate. Instruments
installed at most of the dams are non-functional except manual water level scales and rain gauges.

2.4 Hydro-Mechanical Gates & Hoists

Structural condition of the gates and hoists for spillway and canal/river sluices at various dam projects
has generally been found satisfactory. At most of the projects, rubber seals of the spillway gates and
stop logs, service gates and emergency gates of the canal/ river sluices require replacement.
Periodical maintenance of the gates and hoists is lacking. Electric motors of many gate hoisting
arrangements were found requiring major repairs or replacement. Standby power Generators available
at project sites are very old and require major repairs or replacements.

3 IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES TAKEN / PROPOSED

Depending upon the condition of the dam and the extent of damages noticed, following measures are
proposed to be taken up ;

3.1 General

The design teams of the SPMU for various states are required to work out design flood as per relevant
I S codes and undertake flood routing studies strictly as per IS:11223 & IS:5477 Part-iv. Training
programs/ workshops had been organized by CPMU for design teams of different states to provide
necessary guide lines for estimation of design flood and for carrying out the flood routing studies in
line with BIS stipulations.

3.2 Embankment dams

It is suggested that the levels of the embankment dam surfaces on u/s, d/s and top should be checked
at about 25m c/c with reference to a permanent Bench Mark. The depressions in dam surfaces must
be filled with the type of soil having similar properties as that of the originally used soil with appropriate
compaction. The dam section should be brought to the original dam design section. Chute drains,
horizontal drains and toe drain are to be cleared of all the muck and vegetation and necessary repairs
of the drains be carried out. Resetting of the stone pitching of toe drain, rock toe and rip-rap must be
undertaken. Necessary repairs of the parapets need to be done. V-notches are to be replaced. Where
ever required the d/s slopes should be provided with turfing to save the slopes from rain water cuts.
Illumination system around dams should be made functional.

Where ever required, the thickness of the rip-rap and the size of stones used in the rip-rap, whether
hand packed or dumped must be checked as per IS: 8237 for wave height being encountered at
particular dam and necessary modification be undertaken.

The quantity of seepage/ leakage being collected in the toe drains needs to be monitored with
reference to the increase or decrease of reservoir levels. Colour of the seepage/ leakage water also
must be observed and should be checked for movement of fine soil particles along with water.

96
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Conduits down-stream of the sluice service gates must be inspected thoroughly and repairs required
to arrest leakage from the dam into the conduits be carried out. Also these are vulnerable locations in
the dam and the condition of the dam at these locations need to be specially checked.

3.3 Masonry / Concrete dams

Treatment of stone masonry joints on u/s face of the dams should be carried out using latest cement
based material/ mortars like Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious formulations or with suitable
admixtures. Reaming of the porous drains should be done to make them functional. Open end of the
porous drains at the top of dam need to be provided with a removable cap and the lower end in the
foundation gallery with a water seal as per BIS code to minimize calcination process. Treatment of
transverse contraction joints having leaking water stops should be undertaken by sealing with water
tolerable, hydrophilic polyurethanes or Acrylamide grout system, as per the site requirement and
should be undertaken through a recognized agency. Grouting of the masonry dam to minimize the
seepage through the dam body should be undertaken only after identifying the low density pockets
established by carrying out Tomography. The drainage holes provided in the foundation gallery must
be made functional by re-drilling the existing holes. Repairs of the damaged concrete surfaces need to
be undertaken using high strength concrete tested to withstand abrasion on account of high velocities
as per requirement of the site conditions. The seepage coming in to the foundation gallery must be
monitored with reference to the reservoir levels. Necessary protection works to save guard the bank
slopes of the water channel d/s of the spillway are required. Old instruments, installed at approachable
locations of the dam should be replaced with latest instruments and regular observation of data be
ensured.

3.4 Hydro- Mechanical Gates & Hoists

Damage to any structural part of the spillway or canal/ river sluice gates and that of the gate hoisting
arrangement must be attended to on urgent basis. Periodical overhauling / maintenance of all gates
and their hoisting systems including painting works must be undertaken. Efficiency of the old electric
motors of the gate hoisting systems should be checked and necessary repairs or replacement of the
same be carried out. Efficiency of the old standby power generators available at dam sites for supply
of power to the gates should be checked well before on-set of rainy season and necessary repairs or
replacement with latest model be undertaken.

4 STATUS OF STATE DAM SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REPORTS

Dam safety review panels (DSRP) constituted by the respective SPMUs have been visiting various
dams and had been giving recommendation reports on deficiencies observed. Status of DSRP
recommendation reports for dams of different SPMUs is given as under;

198 dams have been inspected by the Dam Safety review panel out of 240 dams up to the end of
February 2015.

The status of DSRP visits and revised targets proposed by Implementing Agencies is brought out
below:

DSRP Visit till


IA No. of Dams Target for Mar 2015
Feb, 14
MP WRD 29 28 29 (100 %)
Orissa WRD 26 26 26 (100%)
T. Nadu - WRD 67 48 67 (100 %)
Tangedco 38 35 38 (100%)
Kerala - WRD 16 16 Done
Kerala EB 37 37 Done
Karnataka - WRD 27 8 14 (50%)
Total 240 198 227

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5. STAT
TE-WISE ST
TATUS OF D
DAMS

5.1 Key
y activities under
u DRIP

The key activities forr rehabilitatio


on of dams un
nder DRIP are
a summarizzed in the gra
aph below:

For each h dam, Statee Project Maanagement Units


U (SPMUU) send to Central
C Proje
ect Managem ment Unit
(CPMU-C CWC and Eg gis) the design flood for review. Once
e approved, they submit to CPMU th he Project
Screenin ng Template (one for eacch dam). This s document is
i reviewed by
b CPMU an nd sent to Woorld Bank
for approoval.After ap
pproval from WB, the SP PMU prepare es and issue
e bid documments. Bid doocuments
having vvalue of workks exceedin ng Rs.5.0 Crrores (INR) are
a reviewed d by CPMU anda then ten nders are
floated.

The revieew of the Pro


oject Screening Templatees (PST) by CPMU is the e main activitty and all im
mportance
is given to the proce
essing of thiss document. As such, the
e status of review
r of PS
ST is discusssed in the
g paras.
following

5.2 Stattus of Projec


cts Screenin
ng Template
es

After revview by CPMMU and comp


pliance with SPMUs, Pro
ojects Screen
ning Templates are sent to World
Bank forr approval.

5.2.1 PS
STs approve
ed by World Bank
B (state-w
wise)

Progresss achieved up to date is as


a follows
Impllementing Age
ency No. off dams Agreed
d by WB
MP - WRD 2
29 2
24
Orissa - WR
RD 2
26 1
15
T. Nadu - WRD
W 6
67 2
28
Tangedco 3
38 4
Kerala - WRD 16 1
13
Kerala - EB 37 (12
2 HEP) 1
18
Karnataka 2
27 0
Total 2440 102

5.2.2 Da
ams with PSTs under revview with SP
PMUs

No
o. of Dams sta
ate-wise with
Implem
menting Agenccy Total Dams
PSTs underr review
MP - WRD 29 3
Orissa - WR
RD 26 3
T. Nadu - WRD 67 1
Tangedco 38 2
Kerala - WRRD 16 2
Kerala - EB 37 4
Karnataka 27 3
TOTAL 240 18

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

5.2.3 Dams with PST under process with CPMU & WB

No. of Dams state-wise with PST


States Total Dams
under process with CPMU
MP - WRD 29 0
Orissa - WRD 26 1
T. Nadu - WRD 67 2
Tangedco 38 1
Kerala - WRD 16 1
Kerala - EB 37 1
Karnataka 27 0
TOTAL 240 6

5.2.4 PSTs not submitted

So far 120 Projects Screening Templates have been submitted by Implementing Agencies for review
and 120 are yet to be submitted. There are exactly 50% of PSTs which remain to be reviewed.

Implementing Agency No. of dams PSTs not submitted


MP - WRD 29 2
Orissa - WRD 26 7
T. Nadu - WRD 67 36
Tangedco 38 31
Kerala - WRD 16 0
Kerala - EB 37 (12 HEP) 20
Karnataka 27 24
Total 240 120

5.3 Projects Under Tendering Process

Once the World Bank has approved Project Screening Template, SPMUs prepare tender documents
and submit them to CPMU for review.

42 contracts have been awarded so far and 33 more bid documents are under process.

Tender documents under Contracts already awarded


Implementing Agency No. of dams
process (packages) (packages)
MP - WRD 29 5 26
Orissa - WRD 26 11 2
T. Nadu - WRD 67 0 9
Tangedco 38 0 4
Kerala - WRD 16 8 1
Kerala - EB 37 (12 HEP) 9 0
Karnataka 27 0 0
Total 240 33 42

5.4 Projects Undergoing Rehabilitation Works


Once tender documents are awarded, SPMU undertake the rehabilitation and improvement works.
The day-to-day construction supervision is conducted by the field units of concerned State
implementing agency and quality assurance of the works is ensured through quality control unit of the
implementing agency. The Central Project Management Unit is required to provide the third-party
supervision of the construction and quality control.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

There are currently 23 dams for which works are on-going.

No of dams under Contracts awarded


Implementing Agency No. of dams
rehabilitations works (packages)
MP - WRD 29 12 26
Orissa - WRD 26 2 2
T. Nadu - WRD 67 9 9
Tangedco 38 0 4
Kerala - WRD 16 0 1
Kerala - EB 37 (12 HEP) 0 0
Karnataka 27 0 0
Total 240 23 42

5.5 Project-Wise Status of Expenditure

Details of month wise and cumulative expenditure incurred by each SPMU, based on actual
disbursement till February 2015 are brought out as under in tabular form;

SPMUwiseActualDisbursementtillFebruary15 INRinMillion
Year Jun12 Sep12 Dec12 Mar13 Jun13 Sep13 Dec13 Mar14 Jun14 Sep14 Dec14 Feb15
MPWRD 0.93 2.03 3.61 14.21 24.56 4.74 39.13 55.41 41.09 49.03 55.48 33.447
OdishaWRD 0.11 1.33 1.07 0.71 0.83 0.25 3.02 2.50 3.35 6.29 6.17 16.323
TNWRD 0.00 0.00 0.68 4.91 4.46 5.64 8.62 40.93 0.72 33.90 76.85 30.86
TNSEB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.56 4.60
KeralaWRD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.66 0.38 0.17 23.72 0.00 16.10 0.85 10.33
KeralaSEB 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 21.00 1.07 2.21 3.56 5.53 6.04 9.47 5.81
CWC 0.01 0.35 0.84 3.04 1.67 1.32 7.27 36.07 55.41 1.53 13.65 46.97
Total 1.05 3.71 6.68 22.95 53.17 13.38 60.42 162.18 106.11 112.88 181.03 148.34

CumulativeActualExpendituretillFebruary15
Jun12 Sep12 Dec12 Mar13 Jun13 Sep13 Dec13 Mar14 Jun14 Sep14 Dec14 Feb15
MPWRD 0.93 2.96 6.58 20.78 45.34 50.08 89.21 144.62 185.71 234.74 290.21 323.66
OdishaWRD 0.11 1.44 2.50 3.21 4.04 4.29 7.30 9.80 13.16 19.45 25.62 41.95
TNWRD 0.00 0.00 0.68 5.59 10.05 15.69 24.32 65.25 65.97 99.87 176.72 207.57
TNSEB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.56 23.16
KeralaWRD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.75 1.12 1.29 25.01 25.01 41.11 41.96 52.28
KeralaSEB 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.48 21.48 22.55 24.75 28.31 33.84 39.88 49.35 55.16
CWC 0.01 0.36 1.20 4.24 5.91 7.23 14.50 50.57 105.98 107.51 121.16 168.14
Total 1.05 4.76 11.44 34.40 87.57 100.96 161.37 323.56 429.67 542.56 723.59 871.92

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

ActualExpendituretillFebruary15
INR inMillion
1000.00

900.00

800.00
Total
700.00
MPWRD
600.00
TNWRD
500.00
CWC
400.00 KeralaSEB
300.00 KeralaWRD

200.00 OdishaWRD

100.00 TNSEB

0.00

Projected expenditure likely to be incurred during the Financial year 2015-16 is given as under;

Projected Disbursement for the Financial Year 2015 - 16 (INR in Crore)

Sl Implementing Fund for Fund for Bids Fund for Awarded Total
No. Agency Approved PST's Issued Contracts
1 MP WRD - 14.92 21.13 36.05
2 Odisha WRD * 14.00 18.56 4.99 37.54
3 Tamilnadu WRD 21.05 - 9.51 30.56
4 Tamilnadu SEB 3.75 - 3.75
5 Kerala WRD 26.05 2.77 10.14 38.97
6 Kerala SEB 4.73 4.80 0.89 10.42
7 CWC - - 15.00 15.00
8 Karnataka 62.47 62.47
9 UJVNL 7.16 7.16
10 DVC 11.97 11.97
Total 151.17 41.06 61.64 253.87
(Rs. 2538.70
million)
* In case of Odisha although only 12 PSTs; are approved but it is assumed that in the coming Financial Year,
work on 15 Dams will start, therefore fund flow of all the 15 Dams have been accounted for.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Temghar dam - A case study of Handling of Seepages in Gravity


Dams
Ishwar Chaudhari
Superintending Engineer, Pune Irrigation Projects Circle, Pune
Ishwarch59@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Many dams have been constructed in Maharashtra in last century for irrigation and hydro power generation. Most
of these dams constructed are of stone masonry being cheaper than concrete one.

Leakages are universal phenomena in masonry dams. However, proper maintenance through regular monitoring
could restrict the same.

It has been experienced that dams built earlier are having less leakage problems than those built in recent 30
years, which are facing severe leakage problems. Main cause for this is dearth of skilled workmanship required
for laying stone masonry which is disappearing day by day.

In some of the cases leakages from masonry dams have assumed enormous proportion involving loss of precious
water stored and creating fear amongst the people residing on the downstream. Profuse leakages from masonry
induce leaching of free lime in cement rendering loss of strength of masonry. Hence it is essential to address
leakages issue properly and timely.

This paper explains issues related to developments of leakages in Temghar dam recently constructed (2010).

Temghar dam is constructed across the river Mutha about 13 Km from the origin of the river Mutha located near
village Temghar.

Leakages in dam are observed from the time of construction in increasing trend with increase in reservoir storage
level.

Detailed Technical study for Leakage controlling measures to be done was referred to Central Water and Power
research Station, Khadakwasla, Pune, Central Designs Organisation, Nasik and Central Water Commission, New
Delhi were also referred for solution to the problem.

Short term measures were carried out on u/s and d/s of dam to certain extent before Monsoon 2014 .It is
observed that the earlier prominent leakages has been stopped or lessened at the location of treatment. However
water is finding way out above or below treated area. Only leakage spot are shifted from one location to another.
It clearly underlines that small portion or patch treatment will not give any significant results as mentioned by
Cwprs in their report. Hence complete u/s face treatment and dam body grouting is necessary to provide solution
in long run. Curtain grouting has been carried out from the foundation gallery from the bore holes drilled at 6 m
interval. However considerable leakages from foundation drainage holes are observed. Hence Secondary curtain
grouting to prevent leakage from foundation drainage holes is to be undertaken from foundation gallery after
making necessary arrangements to dewater the foundation gallery.

Long term measures comprise of complete upstream face treatment to prevent leakages by adopting suitable
methods as discussed above along with dam body grouting from top of dam in order to compensate amount of
cement leached due to excessive leakage and impart density as well as strength to the dam body.

1.0 TEMGHAR DAM

Temghar dam is constructed across the river Mutha about 13 Km from the origin of the river Mutha
located near village Temghar. Mutha River is a right bank tributary of river Bhima in main Krishna
Basin. Temghar project mainly caters irrigation demand of water supply to Pune city and irrigation of
1000 ha through K.T. weirs. Hydro power is also contemplated at the foot of the dam. The total
utilisation of 3.708 T.M.C. planned for this project is accommodated within 599 T.M.C. Krishna water
use permitted to Maharashtra.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

2.0 CONSTRUCTION

The construction of Temghar Dam was started in 1997 and completed in May 2010. Temghar dam is a
Stone masonry dam with a cover of 5 m thick colgrout masonry on U/S face. It comprises 72 m long
spillway portion in the centre from RD 528 to 600 m and non-overflow portion on either flank. The
salient features of dam are attached herewith (Annexure A).

The Construction of dam was going in full swing from March 1997 to December 2001.However work
was totally stopped by the Forest Department in Jan.2002 due to the 4.5 Ha of forest land coming
under submergence.

Then after receiving the permission from forest Department, construction was started in Apr 2009 and
completed in May 2010 and storage was done against the full reservoir level of 706.50M.

3.0 LEAKAGE PROBLEM

Leakages in dam are observed from the time of construction in increasing trend with increase in
reservoir storage level. Maximum leakages to the tune of 602 LPS were observed in 2011-12 at RWL
of 707 m. After Curtain grouting in 2012 leakages reduced to the extent of 306.90 LPS at RWL of
704.30m. However leakages increased next year again to the extent of 390 LPS at RWL of 706.50m in
2013 monsoon.

4.0 OBSERVATIONS

4.1 Upstream face of dam

There are large holes and cavities observed on the upstream face of dam from ch 45 to 528.
Undulations/uneven surface observed on upstream face of dam from monolith 5 to 13.
The slurry used in grouting of masonry has disintegrated and is accumulated on the entire
u1wxpstream surface of dam

4.2 Downstream face of dam

Heavy leakages are observed from downstream face of dam from ch.350 to 528m and from 600 to
640 m, from spray wall at ch.600 m
White patches of leaching are observed on downstream face of dam.
Removal of pointing in major portion due to leakages.
Leakages from downstream face of dam are mostly from the junction of masonry and colgrout.
At ch.415 to 420 m diagonal cracks and bulging is observed on D/S face of dam, some stones
from masonry are found in dislocated condition.
Boils are observed at ch.38.50,450,456 m on D/S face of dam in the drain on the fillup ground.
However later on it is confirmed that leakages were from the body of the dam and not from
foundation.

4.3 Foundation gallery

Foundation gallery is flooded in portion from ch.415 to 705m


Some drain holes are jetting which shows excessive uplift pressure.
Porous pipes at many places are observed in chocked condition.
Contraction joint pipes at ch.430 m and 600 m flows heavily.

4.4 Inspection gallery

There are heavy leakages from inspection gallery porous blocks at ch 388,528,671,693 m etc.
There are heavy leakages in lift well and staircase at ch 472 to 475 @Rl 664 m and below.
Inspection gallery top slab, side wall at ch.375 to 380,545,550m, mo.jt top slab at ch.545, 574 m

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Compendium of Technical Papers

4.5 Drainage arrangement

1) Vertical Porous drains at every 3 m c/c are provided from dam top to Inspection Gallery
2) Vertical porous drains at every 3 m C/c are provided from inspection gallery to foundation gallery
3) Drain holes at every 3 m C/C provided from foundation gallery
4) Side gutters of size 30 x30 cm are provided in inspection as well as foundation gallery to collect
the seepage water.
5) Three sumps at ch. 400m, 535m and 705 m are provided as collection pits in foundation gallery.
Sump at ch 400m is opened outside the dam foot the leakage water drawn by gravity from this
sump.The sump at ch.705 m chocked so collected water from right side goes to foundation
gallery whereas sump at ch. 535 is central sump. Three pumps of capacity 2x35 hp and 1X100
hp are provided to draw water.

4.6 Measurement of Leakages

Leakages from gallery are measured in gutter by veleocity area method. Individual leakages from
porous pipes are measured in bucket by stop wach.

There is no arrangement for measurement of leakages provided on the downstream toe of dam as
excavated stuff is deposited at the downstream toe by 8-10 m at the time of construction. 900 mm dia
pipe is provided on downstream in guide wall to measure leakages from D/S face of dam whereas
Reservior level wise leakages at every meter intervals are maintained.

5.0. CAUSES OF LEAKAGES

5.1 Poor construction quality and bad workman ship

The upstream septum of 5m width is provided of col grout masonry to prevent leakages. Also on
downstream col grout masonry zone is provided up to RL 669 m. From the leakages and visual
inspection it is evident that particularly right flank portion and half of the central gorge portion For
which tenders were awarded to the firm, Srinivas Constructions, work has been executed very badly.
Upstream surface undulations and uneven slopes speaks of bad workmanship and cement slurry
accumulated on the upstream surface, percolated from the shuttering for col grout masonry reveals
that cement grout is not able to occupy the space between the stones due to improper packing
between the stages of masonry. Large cavities show the improper laying of stones. From
correspondence made by the supervisory staff to contractor, it reveals that proper mixing equipment
was not used for preparing cement grout.Single drum mixer was used in stead of double drum mixer
which is not able to create colloidal state of the mix. Also use of improper grading of artificial sand
used seems to be responsible for forming a homogenous masonry. The leakages on downstream are
prominent below RL 669 where col grout masonry is provided. All these lacunae in execution of col
grout masonry have defeated the purpose for providing it for imparting impermeability to the dam body.

5.2 Imperfect Stage grouting

There is provision of stage wise grouting to be carried out before laying next season work. The stage
grouting carried out may not have been done effectively to achieve the required impermeability. The
field test results recorded at the time of construction shows the required impermeability results
however the extent of leakages defies it totally. In situ masonry cores were not sent to MERI Nashik
for permeability and strength test, which will reveal real status of strength and permeability parameters
of the dam masonry.

5.3 The Special Investigation Team (SIT) Finding

SIT members visited dam site twice and it has passed hard strictures on the quality of execution,
supervision and quality control aspects of Temghar dam construction and proposed enquiry by a
special squad and also recommended that remedial measures shall be carried out at the risk and cost
of the contractor and due payments shall not be released to him.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

6.0 STUDIES FOR REMEDIAL MEASURES

Detailed Technical study for Leakage controlling measures to be done was referred to Central Water
and Power research Station, Khadakwasla, Pune, Central Designs Organisation, Nasik and Central
Water Commission, New Delhi were also referred for solution to the problem.
Remedial measures suggested by CWPRS, Pune:

6.1 Upstream surface treatment:

AS there are holes and cracks on upstream surface of dam, to arrest the entry of water, the upstream
surface needs to be made watertight by any one of the suitable methods below-

Method-1:
Clean U/s surface and masonry joints.
Apply Primer coat and pointing with 1:2 cement mortar.
20-25 mm diameter nozzle grouting with spacing of 4-6 m c/c, fixing the nozzle with BECKBOND
or M-seal.
Grouting with varying proportion of cement water from 1:20 to 1:1, the grout pressure should not
exceed 3-4 kg/cm2.
If consumption is more reduce the grouting spacing to 2 m c/c.
After grouting drill hole of 12 mm diameter to a depth of 75 mm at 1000 mm c/c.
Fixing 8 mm dia shear connector.
Cavities if any on the surface shall be filled using repair mortar.
Weld mesh of 50mmx50mmx3mm shall be fixed on shear connector.
Apply 25 mm thick shotcrete mixed with silica fumes and suggested polypropylene fibers followed
by 10 mm thick gunite coat.
Alternative to shotcreting the u/s can be coated with 15 mm thick coat of high strength, non shrink
and impermeable cementitious mortar with seal coat of water repellent material.

Method-2:
Removing the loose material on the u/s face of the dam in order to open up the hidden cavities.
Cleaning the surface with sand blasting or suitable method.
The cavities and the masonry joints shall be packed with cement mortar.
After curing of pointing apply suitable epoxy based primer coat.
Finally a suitable polymer modified high strength non shrink repair mortar of 12 -15 mm thickness
shall be applied on entire u/s face.
A water repellent seal coat should be applied on the entire treated surface.

Method-3:
Existing surface should be sand blasted/roughened by chipping.
Apply cement slurry coat to u/s face.
Provide 25 mm dia, 1.0m long anchors at 1.5 m c/c both ways.
Provide surface reinforcement of 16 mm dia. bars 250mm c/c both ways.
M-20 grade concrete wall having thickness at top 250 mm and at bottom 1.15 m shall be provided.
The wall shall be keyed into hard rock.
Apply suitable bond coat.

6.2 Dam body grouting

After treatment to u/s face, the body of the dam shall be grouted as follows:
50 to 38 mm dia. grout holes with spacing of 6 m c/c and further needed at 3 m c/c and 1.5 m c/c.
Grouting in two rows at 1.5m and at 3 m from u/s face.
Stage grouting method shall be adopted.
Grout pressure shall be between 1.5 to 3.0 kg / cm2.
Grout mix of 1:20 to 1:1 proportion with suitable admixture.

6.3 Foundation curtain grouting

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Compendium of Technical Papers

As there are leakages in the form of jets from foundation drain holes, foundation curtain grouting has
to be carried out as follows.
Curtain grouting from drainage gallery at 6.0m or lower spacing.
38 mm dia holes with 10o inclination.
Depth of hole shall be (2/3) h + 8m,where h is ht. of reservoir water in meters.

6.4 Cleaning of porous blocks

Porous blocks provided in the dam body are chocked due to leaching material. To release the water
pressure porous pipes has to be cleaned.

6.5 Central Design Organisation comments

Temghar dam leakage issue was also referred to Central Design Organisation, Nashik. CDO 's
comments on remedial measures suggested by CWPRS, Pune are as follows-

Upstream face Treatment:

Method 1:
Shotcreting and guniting shall be carried out as per the required IS.
Care shall be taken while applying grout pressure.
Proper sealing treatment at joints of shotcrete panels may be given.
However previous experience of this method shall be considered.

Method 2:
This method might be faster. However the previous experience of this method where it has
executed shall be considered.

Method 3:
For completed dam this method will be difficult for execution.
The joints of each lift shall be properly treated.
The anchor length in masonry shall be upto 60 D(i.e. 1.5 m)

CDO also suggested that while selecting method of remedial measures on upstream ,deflections of
dam body during filling and depletion shall be considered.

7.0 CENTRAL WATER COMMISSION TEAM INSPECTION

CWC team comprising of-Sh. L A V Nathan, Chief Engineer, Dam safety Dr. B R K Pillai, Director,
Dam Safety Rehabilitation Directorate ,Sh. S K Sibal, Director, Concrete and Masonry Dam
Design(NW&S) Sh. Manoj Kumar, Deputy Director, Dam Safety Rehabilitation Directorate inspected
rd
Temghar dam on 3 July 2014.

During their visit CWC officials suggested one more alternative of upstream face treatment of providing
geomembrane on upstream face.To consider this alternative CARPI India has been contacted to
provide technical and financial proposal for the same in July 2014, which is awaited.

CWC officials also expressed about usefulness of Geophysical studies in implementing leakage
remedial measures. Accordingly proposal of geophysical investigations has been obtained from
Parson Overseas Limited, New Delhi.

8.0 GEOPHYSICAL INVESTIGATIONS

8.1 There are many holes and cavities on the U/S face of the dam. During the site visit of officers
from Central Water Commission New Delhi, they had the opinion that the U/S surface of dam
should be treated first to stop the direct entry of water in the dam body. For that to know the
priority of treatment in various monoliths of dam, non destructive tests should be conducted on
the dam. It is desired to carry out an investigation program to understand the subsurface

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

conditions in the dam body in non-destructive speedy manner, before taking up remedial
measures. Such investigations will help target specific zones for effective treatment and will also
prioritize the remedial works.So it is under consideration to carry out such tests like
TOMOGRAPHY which will locate the exact location of seepage paths and cavities in dam body
before going to take any remedial measures.

8.2 Proposal for carrying out non-destructive geophysical investigations at Temghar dam

It is desired to carry out an investigations program to understand the subsurface conditions in the
dam body in non-destructive speedy manner, before taking up remedial measures. Such
investigations will help target specific zones for effective treatment and will also prioritize the
remedial works. Ideally the investigation should be carried out in following phases:

Phase-1
Immediate and before filling of reservoir: At this time the reservoir is almost empty, and internal weak
zones will show excellent contract in terms of conductive properties and shear wave parameters. This
is the best time to undertake electrical resistivity tomography all along the dam length, and 2D MASW/
ReMi study to determine shear wave velocity in dam structure, throughout the dam length. A study at
this time will also provide excellent information on leakage through the foundation.

Phase-2
The study under phase-2 should be taken up once reservoir is full and various zones are contributing
to leakages. This would be a good time to undertake electrical resistivity tomography along with SP
(streaming potential) all along the dam length, and 2D MASW/ ReMi study to determine shear wave
velocity in dam structure, throughout the dam length. The saturated zones will reflect themselves as
low resistivity zones (as compared to high resistivity zones expected in phase-1 study) and SP will
help quantify amount of leakage attributed by different zones.

Phase-3
Last phase of study should be undertaken after remedial measures have been undertaken. This study
will show effectiveness of remedial measures in terms if strengthening of various zones. The methods
at this stage would be electrical resistivity tomography along with SP (streaming potential) all along the
treated dam length, and 2D MASW/ ReMi study to determine shear wave velocity in dam structure

Geophysical investigations were carried out for reservoir full condition in December 2014. Electrical
Resistivity Imaging Line, U/S, 0-525 meters:The zone between 260-300 seem to be anomalous in
comparison with other blocks. Anomalous zone is observed between Ch 370-420 which well correlates
with the similar zone observed in line conducted in D/S side.

Electrical Resistivity Imaging Line, U/S, 600-1090 meters: The zone between 680-760 seem to be
anomalous in comparison with other blocks. Clear anomalous zone is observed between Ch 680-750
starting at almost top level and extending all the way down till investigated depth of around 50m, and
needs to be attended to.

Electrical Resistivity Imaging Line, D/S, 600-1090 meters: The zone between 620-720 seem to be
anomalous in comparison with other blocks and needs to be attended to.

Electrical Resistivity Imaging Line, Gallery, 400-700 meters: Highly saturated zone is observed
between Ch 440-460 and 480-540m which correspond well with the seepage observed in this zone.

Steaming Potential Data, U/S, 0-525 meters: The SP development from 320m to 410m shows water
flow point at these chainage. This also correlated well with ERI data which shows saturation at these
levels.

Steaming Potential Data, D/S, 0-525 meters: The negative SP development is observed from 265 to
370m, which also correlated with ERI observations.

Steaming Potential Data, Gallery, 400-700 meters: No interpretable SP data is observed in Gallery due
to excessive surface water flow conditions.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Steaming Potential Data, U/S, and D/S 600-1090 meters: Multiple minor SP anomalies are observed
between Ch 600 and 840, which might be developing due to multiple flow lines. No SP development is
observed beyond 850 meters.

Refraction Microtremor (ReMi)- 0-525 meters:High shear wave velocities (Red Colour) correlate well
with rock formation in the area. Very low shear wave velocities are observed between Ch 255 to Ch
335m, which indicates low strength of material in this zone.

Refraction Microtremor (ReMi)- 600-1090 meters: Low shear wave velocities are observed between
Ch 675 to Ch 755m, which indicates low strength of material in this zone and correlates well with
results obtained in ERI as well.

The geophysical study of dam ruled out possibilities of large pockets or cavities in dam body and
indicated priority area of treatment However it is not very clear in establishing other parameters like
strength and density of dam body required for evaluating stability of dam.

9.0 ACTION PLAN FOR REMEDIAL MEASURES

Considering severity of the problem and hazard potential of the dam, as it is located just on the
upstream of Khadakwasla dam adjoining City Pune ,it is planned to adopt immediate short term
measures before coming Monsoon to plug excessive leakages which may lead to potential danger of
piping. Long term measures are planned to provide complete solution for leakages as well as
strengthening of the dam if required considering actual in situ strength of the dam body masonry.

9.1 Short term immediate measures

Immediate remedial works to be carried out to control the damages on emergency. These measures
are to be executed by dam construction contractor at his cost as per tender conditions

9.1.1 U/S face treatment to colegrout septum:

Work of removal of loose slurry material from u/s face of the dam was done by deploying three
concrete breakers. The exposed surface gives an impression that possible paths of seepage is from
layer joints as well as monolith joints. After further removal of the dirt and loose mortar, upstream face
of dam to be treated with Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious (PICC) mortar as suggested earlier by
Cwprs, since it is cheaper than epoxy mortar and already adopted successfully in Anjumen dam (Goa).
The details of procedure to be adopted shall be as below-

The loose material on the u/s face of the dam is removed in order to open up the hidden cavities.
The surface is cleaned with wire brush, rotary grinding and by water jetting etc.
The cavities and the masonry joints to be packed with cement concrete if there are large cavities.
Application of Nitobod EP two pack system, bond coat on prepared concrete surface for bonding
the old surface to new surface.
Applying Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious (PICC) repair mortar Nicomix (100+53 grade cement)
upto 10 mm thickness and filling the honey combing area, cavities.
Applying sealer coat of Poly cementatious material (Niccoat PC+ Kelmer A 80) on PICC repair
mortar.
Then after curing for 8 days, for Nipple grouting holes 20-25 mm m drilled 1m deep in masonry
with spacing of 4-6 m c/c and fixing the nozzle with BECKBOND or M-seal.
Grouting with varying proportion of cement water from 1:20 to 1:1, the grout pressure should not
exceed 2 kg/cm2.
If consumption is more reduce the grouting spacing to 2 m c/c.

9.1.2 D/s face treatment:

It is observed that the masonry is disturbed on the d/s face of dam from ch 375 to 528 m at various
levels is observed at ch 415 to 420 mat Rl 667 to 670.There are large holes on the downstream face
due to excessive seepage and the cavities are increasing day by day. Pointing is also disturbed.

So the d/s face is decided to be treated as follows:

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The loose material on the d/s face of the dam is to be removed in order to clear it from the weeds
and open up the hidden cavities.
The surface is cleaned with wire brush.
Pointing with CM 1:2 and with mortar in the portion where pointing is disturbed.
Nipple grouting from the downstream Surface by proving the nozzles in drilled holes in similar
manner at upstream face at 2-4 m c/c spacing and 1m deep in masonry.

9.1.3 Dam Body grouting:

The dam body grouting is to be done for both halves. However extent of grouting for right half is
considerably on less scale compared to left half. Dam body grouting is planned from dam top and from
inspection gallery in complete left half portion and in selected monoliths for right half portion.
Directional grouting is to be carried out targeting maximum penetration under low pressure with
reservoir empty condition. Complete body grouting of one half portion (Left half being taken first) to be
completed within one season.

Detailed specification for body grouting in terms of direction, spacing and length of holes, grout mix,
grout pressure and methodology of grouting to be followed as per relevant Indian Standards.

After treatment to u/s face, the body of the dam shall be grouted as follows-
50 to 38 mm dia. grout holes with spacing of 6 m c/c and if further needed at 3 m c/c and 1.5 m c/c.
Grouting in two rows at 1.5m and at 3 m from u/s face.
Stage grouting method shall be adopted.
Grout pressure shall be between 1.5 to 3.0 kg/ cm2.
Grout mix of 1:20 to 1:1 proportion with suitable admixture.

9.1.4 Reaming of Vertical Porous drains and foundation drainage holes

Reaming of all formed drains to be carried out from inspection as well as foundation gallery. This is to
be carried out only after the completion of body grouting as fresh drilling of formed drains where
formed drains are absent seems very difficult as it may further disturb the existing poor quality
masonry.

9.2 Implementation of short term measures

Short term measures were carried out on u/s and d/s of dam to certain extent before Mansoon 2014 .It
is observed that the earlier prominent leakages has been stopped or lessened at the location of
treatment.However water is finding way out above or below treated area.Only leakage spot are shifted
from one location to another. It clearly underlines that small portion or patch treatment will not give any
significant results as mentioned by Cwprs in their report. Hence complete u/s face treatment and dam
body grouting is necessary to provide solution in long run.

9.3 Mid Term measures

Curtain Grouting: Curtain grouting has been carried out from the foundation gallery from the bore holes
drilled at 6 m interval. However considerable leakages from foundation drainage holes are observed.
Hence Secondary curtain grouting to prevent leakage from foundation drainage holes is to be
undertaken from foundation gallery after making necessary arrangements to dewater the foundation
gallery.

9.4 Long Term Measures

Long term measures comprise of complete upstream face treatment to prevent leakages by adopting
suitable methods as discussed above along with dam body grouting from top of dam in order to
compensate amount of cement leached due to excessive leakage and impart density as well as
strength to the dam body.

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Managing Our Water Conservation Assets-Role of Dam Safety


A B Pandya Dr. B R K Pillai
Chairman, Central Water Commission Director (DSR), Project Director (DRIP)
chairman-cwc@nic.in Central Water Commission
dir-drip-cwc@nic.in
Manoj Kumar
Deputy Director (DSR), Central Water Commission
manojkumar1-cwc@nic.in

ABSTRACT
Dams have played a key role in fostering rapid and sustained agricultural and rural growth and development,
which have been key priorities for the Government of India since independence. Over the last fifty years, India
has invested substantially in infrastructure necessary to store surface runoff in reservoirs formed by large as well
as small dams with associated appurtenances. In terms of large dams, India ranks third in the world after USA
and China (ICOLD, 2011). In India, there are 4846 large dams completed and another 347 dams that are under
construction; while full information on smaller dams numbering several thousand is yet to be catalogued.
More than 76 per cent of Indias 5100-odd dams are over 20 years old and suffer from structural, hydrological
and other deficiencies. They are in urgent need of repair and maintenance. The country has already gone
through at least 36 instances of dam collapse in the past with the recent collapse of Grarda Dam in Rajasthan in
2010. Such disasters can be averted only if dams are well looked after, water stocks are properly monitored and
regulated to keep them at safe levels, and the institutional set-ups to monitor the safety issues are suitably
strengthened and updated. Realizing the importance of dam safety, Govt. of India has taken a number of steps to
reinforce its concerns.

This paper examines the dam safety practices followed in India, institutional arrangement, Governments
initiatives for dam rehabilitation and improvement program, experiences learnt, Dam Safety Legislation and the
Challenges ahead.

1. INTRODUCTION

Dams have played a key role in fostering rapid and sustained agricultural and rural growth and
development, which have been key priorities for the Government of India since independence. Over
the last fifty years, India has invested substantially in infrastructure necessary to store surface runoff in
reservoirs formed by large as well as small dams with associated appurtenances. In terms of large
dams, India ranks third in the world after USA and China (ICOLD, 2011). In India, there are 4846 large
dams completed and another 347 dams that are under construction; while full information on smaller
dams numbering several thousand is yet to be catalogued. Although almost every state of India
has large dams, the major chunk is situated in Maharashtra (1845), Madhya Pradesh (905) and
Gujarat (666) (NRLD, 2014).

A substantial proportion of Indian dams have now become old. Many of these ageing dams have
various structural deficiencies and shortcomings in operation and monitoring facilities, while few of
them do not meet the present design standards both structurally and hydrologically. Thus, an
increasing number of dams fall in the category where they need rehabilitation. Safety of these dams is
very important for safeguarding the national investments and the benefits derived. An unsafe dam also
constitutes a hazard to human life and property in the downstream reaches. The safety of the dam and
allied structures therefore is very necessary for ensuring continued accrual of benefits and for ensuring
protection of the downstream areas from any potential hazards.

2. NEED FOR STORAGE DAMS IN INDIA

Agriculture is the main occupation of the people of rural India contributing nearly one-sixth of the gross
domestic product (GDP). However the irrigated agriculture in India suffers due to erratic rainfall pattern
both over time and space resulting in vagaries of monsoon. More than 80% of annual rainfall occurs
during four monsoon months. Even during the monsoon months distribution of rainfall over time &
space remains uneven and all the precipitation occurs over a couple of hundred hours. It has always
been an accepted proposition that the vulnerable dependence of Indian agriculture on the vagaries of

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the monsoons must be reduced through the storage of water for irrigation. On an average, annual
rainfall of 1170 mm is received over a total geographical area of 3.29 million Sq. km of India and is
transformed into surface runoff of 1869 km3. It is estimated that about 1122 km3 can be beneficially
utilised.

Therefore, for meeting round the year needs of irrigation, hydropower, drinking water and industries in
the country with such a vast population, creation of storages across rivers and streams is vital. It has
been estimated that it is feasible to ultimately create a total storage capacity of about 690 km3 in the
country. However, the projects constructed so far in the country have been able to build up a live
storage capacity of only 253 BCM. Thus, India has a long way to go in order to harness the utilisable
surface water and many more projects need to be constructed. Some of these new projects will come
up in the peninsular region but most of the developments, particularly in hydropower sector, are now
taking place in the Himalayas.

During the last six decades the number, height of dams and capacities of reservoirs behind them have
been increasing steadily as also the technical problems associated with them. The problems have
been compounded particularly because it is increasingly necessary now to locate the new dams at
less favourable sites after having exhausted most of the favourable ones.

Therefore, not only to sustain the growth achieved so far but also to meet the future demand, safety of
the existing dams and reservoirs as well as construction of new storage dams are very much essential.

3. AGEING OF DAMS AND NEED FOR PRIORITIZATION

Although dam failures have been so far infrequent, the factors of age, construction deficiencies,
inadequate maintenance, extreme weather, or seismic events can contribute to its likelihood. However,
extreme seismic events (exceeding the assumed seismic magnitudes for design of structures) and weather
events (leading to larger floods than the assumed ones) are difficult to predict, and hence may not be of
much help in assessing the odds of dam failure. On the other hand, age of dam is a leading indicator of
odds for its potential failure. In particular, the structural integrity and operational effectiveness of dams
may deteriorate with age; and in most case, older dams do not comply with the updated dam safety
standards.

Sometimes certain factors of failures unrelated with ageing process may also get linked with the age of
dam. We know that the reasons for dam failure can be several, and they may get ingrained at any point
of time over the prolonged life cycle of dam. Thus, cause of failure may get implanted at investigation
stage, design stage, construction stage or the post-construction (operational) stage of the dam. However,
the cause may fructify only after a prolonged period; and thus it may get attributed to the ageing of dam.

Even though portrayed as modern-temples of India by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, the dams in India
have been in existence since age old times. The 24 m high earthen dam of Thonnur Tank in Karnataka
is over 1000 years old, and it is still in use. Besides, there are 126 large-dams which are over 100
years old. Post independence, a substantial number of dams were added up in the early five-year plan
periods to meet the needs of irrigation, drinking water, hydro-power and supplies to municipalities and
industries. Over 76% of these dams are more than 20 years old a period sufficient to dim the initial
spotlight and political mileage attached with water resource projects. Evidently, most of these projects
are in dire needs of maintenance, for want of adequate budgetary support from the State
Governments.

The large number of Indias ageing dams since not maintained adequately present a grave threat to
the lives and economies of the downstream populations. With increasing number of dams becoming
older and older, the likelihood of dam failures in India is understandably on an ascending path. The
likelihood of dam failures has been further aggravated by the fact that many of the ageing dams lack
qualified (and experienced) supervisory and maintenance staff needed for guaranteeing the structural
safety and the operational integrity to prevent possible failures.

To reduce the risk of dam failures, regular health inspections are necessary to identify the deficiencies;
and, wherever severe deficiencies are observed, comprehensive rehabilitation measures are required
to be taken. However, owing to the large proportion of ageing dams in India, this exercise is skewed

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with the possibility of spreading the limited financial resources too thinly with no meaningful results,
and perhaps, with detrimental effects. To overcome this situation, there is an urgent need for
prioritization of ageing dams for rehabilitation purpose.

4. DAM FAILURES

Any public civil works facility such as dams, buildings or bridges present a degree of risk to loss of life
or damage to property should it fail. However, possible failure of a dam and sudden release of the
stored water poses a larger threat to human life and property, and is a matter of great concern to the
general public. The effect of huge bodies of water suddenly released from restraint causing havoc in
the downstream valley is widespread compared to the effects of other calamities. During the last
century, there has been substantial increase in construction of dam world over, and thereby the risk of
failure of a dam has become one of the inevitable burdens of civilization. By the end of 20th century,
there were over 45000 large dams in over 140 countries (Wrachien and Mambretti, 2009), and it is
evident that many of these structures have not performed as designed or planned. As per an ICOLD
publication Lessons from Dam Incidents (1973) there have been about 200 notable failures of
large dams in the world up to 1965 (see Table 1 below), in which more than 8000 people have died.

Table 1: Year-wise figures for failures of Large Dams worldwide

Year Approximate number of significant failures


Prior to 1900 38
1900 to 1909 15
1910 to 1919 25
1920 to 1929 33
1930 to 1939 15
1940 to 1949 11
1950 to 1959 30
1960 to 1965 25
Date unknown 10
Total 202

A more detailed statistical analysis of 179 dam failures by ICOLD (1995) indicates that the percentage
of failure of large dams has been falling over the last four decades about 2.2% of dams build before
1950 have failed while the failure rate of dams built since 1951 has been less than 0.5%. It was also
noted that most failure involved newly-built dams over 70% failures occurred chiefly in the first ten
years, and more especially in the first year after commissioning. Problems in foundation (internal
erosion and shear strength) have been found to be the most common cause accounting for 42%
failure in case of concrete dams. In case of earth and rock fill dams, the most common cause of
failure is overtopping (31% as primary cause), followed by internal erosion in body of the dam (15%)
and foundation problem (12%) respectively. Overtopping (43%) followed by internal erosion in
foundation (29%) have been the most common causes of masonry dam failures.

India too has had its share of dam failures. The first such failure was recorded in Madhya Pradesh
during 1917 when the Tigra Dam failed due to overtopping. As per dam failure records maintained in
Central Water Commission (CWC), in all there have been 36 reported failures since then, details of
which have been listed in the Appendix-I. Maximum number of dam failures has been reported over
two decades corresponding to the period 1951 to 1970, as illustrated in Figure 1. An analysis of this
data shows that most of the failures have been in respect of earth dams (30 failures) plus a few
composite dams (3failures). Only three failures have been reported for masonry dams in the last 90
years, while none of the concrete dam has failed. Since over 90% of reported failures are of earth or
composite dams, one may argue that the earth dams are more susceptible to failure in India. However,
such a deduction may not be proper because over 90% of Indias large dams are of earth or composite
type. If we look at State-wise records of dam failures (Figure 2), Rajasthan has the dubious distinction
of having maximum failures followed closely by Madhya Pradesh with both the states accounting for
almost 60 percent of the failures that have occurred so far. However, this information needs to be

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grasped with the rea alisation tha


at there is no o established system off recording and
a reporting
g of dam
n India, and thus, not all the failures get recorded by CWC.
failure in

F
Figure1:Y
Yearwisenumbero
ofdamfailureinIndia
12

10
10
9

8
7

4
3 3 3

2
1

0
Upto1950 19511960
1 1
19611970 19711980 19811990 19912000 20012010

The mosst common causec of dam


m failures in India has be een breachin ng accountting for abouut 44% of
cases followed by y overtoppin
ng that acco ounted for a about 25% failures.
f Prooblems of fooundation
(including piping in foundation), piping throu ugh dam bo ody, and slope failure each accou unting for
about 9% % cases ha ave contributed equally to t the cause e of dam failu ure. Majority of Indian da
ams have
failed im
mmediately affter construcction or at the e time of firsst full-load (se
ee Table 2), which can beb clearly
attributed
d to factors of
o either inaddequate design or poor quality
q of con
nstruction. Knowing the causes
c of
failure an
nd analysing g the available statistics gives
g an imp portant indica ator of how to
t structure the
t future
dam saffety program mme of the country.
c Invvestigations of such failures have also a confirme
ed that a
majority of failures co
ould have beeen avoided by proper de esign, constrruction and regulation. It therefore

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becomes a national responsibility to see that manmade reasons for the possibility of dam failures are
minimized, and their consequence on the unsuspecting people is avoided.

Table 2: Age of Indian dams at the time of failures

Age of Dam at failure Number of failure % Failure


0 - 5 years 16 44.44%
5 - 10 years 7 19.44%
10 - 15 years 1 2.77%
15 - 20 years 1 2.77%
50 - 100 years 6 16.67%
> 100 years 2 5.56%
Age not defined 3 8.33%
Total 36

5 DEVELOPMENT OF DAM SAFETY ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

It has now been recognised world over that dam safety aspects, particularly of the existing dams, are
not receiving adequate attention. It is so because a large number of existing dams are ageing, and
these dams were constructed using the standards and criteria prevalent at an earlier time and may
either not be safe under todays technology and know-how or may not be acceptable to the present
society which demands absolute safety in terms of life and property. Worldwide, dam safety is
considered an inherent function in the planning, design, construction, maintenance and operation of
dams. It has been also generally recognised within the international dam safety community that a
successful dam safety assurance programme requires a dedicated institutional structure with access
to top management attention. Without the top managements commitment in providing the necessary
resources, the programme will be lost amidst other demands and more dams may become a risk to
the public and society. With the ever-increasing number of dams, Government of India realised the
importance of dam safety and took a number of steps to reinforce its concern.

In India, by and large, dams are owned, constructed and maintained by the State Governments. The
State Governments operate their dams primarily through their Irrigation Department. Other State
Organisations like State Electricity Boards, State Power Corporations, and Municipal Corporations also
own and operate some dams. There are also few Central PSU organizations like Bhakra Beas
Management Board (BBMB), Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation (NHPC) Ltd., Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVNL) Ltd, Tehri Hydro Development Corporation
(THDC) Ltd., NTPC Ltd. etc., who also own dams and operate them. Presently there are very few
dams under private ownership, though their numbers are gradually on the rise with the increasing
private-sector participation in Indias hydropower development.

The safety of the dams in India is the principal concern of the State agencies and other organisations
that own the dams and are involved in various aspects of their investigations, planning, design,
construction operation and maintenance. However the overall responsibility of Dam Safety is that of
the State in which these dams are located. As the practices of dam safety can vary from State to State
and from organization to organization, the centre has been working towards evolving unified practices
of dam safety and has recommended its implementation by all States and dam owning organisations.

5.1 Formation of Dam Safety Organizations

State Ministers of Irrigation in their First Conference held in July 1975 at New Delhi discussed the
question of dam safety and recommended that, in view of the increasing number of large dams in
India, the Government of India may constitute an advisory Dam Safety Service to be operated by the
Central Water Commission (CWC, 1986). Pursuant to the directives of the State Ministers Conference
and realizing the importance of dam safety, a Dam Safety Organization (DSO) was established in
CWC, in May 1979. The Dam Safety Organization in CWC has made great efforts in creating

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awareness in the country and has succeeded to a large extent in convincing the States towards the
concept of dam safety which has now been accepted by a large number of States.

The DSO of CWC has compiled guidelines for the safety inspection of dams; check lists and formats
for data book for the periodical inspection of dams; guidelines for emergency action plan; and a
number of other dam safety literatures. This organization has also been assisting the State
Governments in locating the causes of distress in dams, and to suggest remedial measures for the
same. However, such assistance is rendered only on specific request from State Governments.
Apparently, it is not practical for such a dam safety service at the Centre to cater to the needs of all the
dams in the country. Also, it is important to note that in the present legal framework, DSO of CWC has
substantial authority to issue guidelines and review standards relating to dam safety, but have virtually
no powers for actual enforcement.

Due to a few dam disasters like Machhu II dam (in Gujarat), the attention of the country was drawn on
the systematic management of the dams for safe operations. Consequently, a large number of states
established their own Dam Safety Organisations and have taken up measures for ensuring dam safety
in their respective jurisdictions exercising responsibilities for maintaining an inventory of dams,
compiling a history to reveal areas requiring special attention and monitoring administrative and
technical procedures regarding dam safety. So far, 19 States namely, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh,
Meghalaya, Odisha, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand
and West Bengal having significant number of dams, have created State level DSOs. Besides, four of
the dam owing organizations namely, NHPC, BBMB, DVC and Kerala State Electricity Board have
also created their own DSOs.

Despite such large number of DSOs in the country, the state-of-affairs of dam safety in the country is not
up to the mark. To begin with, the staffing pattern, capabilities and activities, differs widely in these
States (and in dam owning organizations) due to various limitations. There is no uniformity in the
administrative set-up or functions of these DSOs. Even the size of dams that come under the purview of
DSOs differs from state to state, owing to non-standardization of dam classification. The worst scenario is
with regard to the instrumentation of dam, owing to large communication gap between agencies (and
personnel) involved with design, construction, operation & maintenance, and inspection. Although some
states have gone in a systematic way to evolve appropriate machinery to safe guard their dams, but in
most cases, the DSOs have skeletal staff and somewhat undefined roles. In majority cases, the role of
DSO is restricted to advisory capacity, with little scope for proactive intervention in dam safety and
rehabilitation measures.

5.2 Dam Safety Procedures

Erstwhile Ministry of Irrigation, Government of India constituted a Standing Committee in 1982 to


review the existing practices and to evolve unified procedures on dam safety for all dams in India,
under the Chairmanship of Chairman, CWC. The Committees report titled Report on Dam Safety
Procedure, brought out in July 1986, outlines the existing procedures, their evaluation and
suggestions for administrative set-ups for dam safety cells in the States, their functions and also the
role of dam safety organization in the Centre. The Report also gives guidelines for hydrological and
structural reviews and also for inspection and maintenance of dams (CWC, 1986). Action points
recommended by the Standing Committee, and as ratified by the Ministry of Water Resources,
Government of India constitutes the unified dam safety procedures to be followed for all dams in
India.

5.3 National Committee on Dam Safety

Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, in 1987 constituted the National Committee on
Dam Safety (NCDS) under the Chairmanship of Chairman, CWC by broad-basing the then existing
Standing Committee to include all the States, having significant number of dams. This Committee has
been reconstituted from time to time to include additional States, organizations and dam owning
agencies. This Committee is represented by the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal. The Organizations, namely, Geological Survey of India (GSI), India Meteorological
Department (IMD), BBMB, NHPC, and DVC are also represented in this Committee. The Committee

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oversees dam safety activities in various States and organizations and suggests improvement to bring
dam safety practices in line with latest state-of-the-art technology consistent with Indian conditions. It
acts as forum for exchange of views on techniques adopted for remedial measures to relieve distress,
and also monitors follow-up actions. The National Committee has also set up three sub-committees to
monitor the safety aspects of select inter-state dams.

Thirty three meetings of NCDS have so far taken place, and major issues discussed therein include:
(i) review of national scenario concerning safety of dams; (ii) implementation of recommendations of
Report on Dam Safety Procedures; (iii) strengthening of dam safety cells in the States; (iv) setting up
of hydrological units in the States for review of hydrology of all large dams in the States; (v)
preparation of operation and maintenance manuals; (vi) preparation of completion report of all the
large dams; (vii) compilation of data books for dams of National Importance; (viii) activities of sub-
committees to monitor safety aspects of inter-State dams; (ix) safety review of dams by an
independent panel of experts, once in ten years; (x) instrumentation of dams; (xi) setting up of
Management Information System (MIS) for dam safety.

5.4 National Committee on Seismic Design Parameters

Considering the importance of seismicity in the design of hydraulic structures as well as during their
operation and maintenance stage, the Government of India constituted a National Committee on
Seismic Design Parameters (NCSDP) in October 1991 with Member (Design and Research), CWC, as
its Chairman by broad-basing a previously constituted Standing Committee. The Committee is
represented by experts from IMD, Engineering Geology Division of GSI, Department of Earthquake
Engineering (IIT, Roorkee), National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI), Indian Institute of
Remote Sensing (IIRS) and Survey of India. The Committee considers various river valley projects put
up by the State Governments and other Organizations and gives suitable recommendations for design
seismic coefficients, seismic risk mapping, attenuation relationships, Maximum Credible Earthquake
(MCE), Design Base Earthquake (DBE), probability of Reservoir Induced Seismicity (RIS), besides
seismic network and specifications for seismic instruments etc. The seismic coefficients recommended
by the NCSDP are to be used in the design of various components of the river valley project. So far,
twenty seven meetings of NCSDP have been held.

6 DAM SAFETY INITIATIVES

6.1 Dam Safety Assurance and Rehabilitation Project

Dam Safety Assurance & Rehabilitation Project (DSARP) assisted by the World Bank was
implemented in four States of the Indian Union, namely Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Tamil
Nadu, under overall guidance of CWC during the period 1991 to 1999.The Project was completed in
September 1999 at a cost of Rupees 422.95 Crore. The objectives of the project were to: (i) improve
the safety of selected dams in the project states through remedial works; (ii) install basic dam safety-
related facilities; and (iii) strengthen the institutions of the DSO, CWC and project states responsible
for assuring dam safety.

Institutional set-up at the Centre in CWC as well as in the four participating States was strengthened
through training of officers, purchase & installation of modern equipments etc. Formulation and use
of a number of guidelines on dam safety, and preparation of Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP)
Atlases by CWC with assistance from the implementing agencies and dam owners, have been the
most significant and unique achievements of the project. With the use of PMP Atlases, the uniformity
in methodology/ approach for the estimates of appropriate precipitation values in the various regions
was achieved. Basic dam safety facilities like providing access roads, backup power, instrumentation,
installation of communication system, stockpiling of emergency material, etc., was provided at 182
dam locations in the 4 States.

In 33 dams (out of 55 dams that were proposed at the start of the project) remedial measures were
completed under this project and they have come up to the desired safety level, reducing the risk and
adverse environmental impact on the property and people living downstream. Thus, probable loss of
reservoir capacities was restored to provide for assured irrigation/ water supply/ power generation
which in turn have contributed to the economic development of the respective regions in the country.

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Remaining rehabilitation works of the balance 22 dams were also completed subsequently by the four
State Governments through their own funds.

The project has helped in streamlining data collection at the dam level through standardizing pre- and
post-monsoon reports. The capacity of the CWC (the main implementing agency) and the State DSOs
was enhanced through training and involvement in project activities. The project increased the
awareness of dam safety issues, and improved capacity of implementing agencies to diagnose and
prioritize problems. More importantly, implementation of the DSARP provided an impetus for further
work in the area by creating awareness about dam safety concepts and benefits of their adoption. The
key lessons from the project (World Bank, 2009) are summarized as under:
Institution-building can be a long process when it involves organizations at multiple levels,
establishing new work methods, and upgrading technical expert.
Institutions that carry out regulatory functions require technical expertise and adequate resources
to be able to function in a capable and independent manner. In this project, shortage of
experienced/ qualified staff and inadequate operating budgets contributed to the under-
performance of the state dam safety organizations.
When new monitoring and reporting procedures are instituted, their purpose should be made clear
to all those involved, and appropriate and regular feedback should be given to those originating
the data.
New techniques and equipment should be tailored to the existing level of capacity, facilities and
funds for ongoing maintenance. A significant portion of the relatively sophisticated instrumentation
installed at dams under this project has deteriorated for lack of maintenance or use.

6.2 Central Dam Safety Legislation

In many advanced countries, particularly America, UK, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, etc., dam
safety legislations have been enacted for the purpose of regulating and ensuring the dam safety. In
several other countries, it is still in the proposed stage. Owing to Indias sizeable number of dams of
which substantial proportions are ageing legislation on the dam safety has been desired by various
forums to ensure the safety of the dams in the country. The need of legislation was first underlined by
the Standing Committee constituted in 1982 to review the then existing practices and to evolve unified
procedures on dam safety in India (CWC, 1986). The need has also been repeatedly emphasised by
the National Committee on Dam Safety. The first draft of the Dam Safety Act was prepared by CWC in
1987, and was discussed many times by NCDS. Comments on the same were also received from
twelve states (i.e. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) which were incorporated in the Draft
Bill (2002) circulated to all states. Initial efforts for dam safety legislation were directed towards
enactments of appropriate legislation by respective State Governments, and accordingly State of Bihar
enacted the Dam Safety Act, 2006. However, some of the States favored the idea of a uniform Central
Dam Safety Act. The States of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal have adopted resolutions in their
respective Assemblies for enactment of dam safety legislation for regulation in their States by an Act of
Parliament. In pursuance of the above, the Union Government decided to enact the central dam safety
legislation.

Accordingly, Ministry of Water Resources formulated a (Draft) Dam Safety Bill 2010, which was
introduced in the Parliament on 30th August 2010. The Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Water Resources for the examination of the Bill, which had submitted its
recommendations in June 2011. The observation and recommendations of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Water Resources were examined by Ministry of Water Resources for necessary
compliance. Dam Safety Bill (2010), has now come to lapse. Hence the Bill needed to be prepared
afresh. Moreover, the (draft) Dam Safety Bill (2010) had the limitation of its initial applicability to the
two States of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, and the Union Territories only; and it might have
taken many more years to convince the other States to adopt that Bill. Hence a new draft of the Dam
Safety Bill (2014) seeking national level applicability of the Bill was prepared afresh by the CWC
and sent to the Ministry of Water Resources for its consideration.

The proposed legislation on dam safety is intended to provide for proper surveillance, inspection,
operation and maintenance of all large dams to ensure their safe functioning, and thereby protect

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Compendium of Technical Papers

persons and property against risks associated with dam failures. The legislation seeks to enjoin
responsibility on Central Government, State Governments and owners of specified dams to set up an
institutional mechanism for ensuring safety of such dams and reporting the action taken. It defines the
duties and functions of these institutions in relation to perpetual surveillance, routine inspections,
operation and maintenance, maintenance of log books, instructions, funds for maintenance and
repairs, technical documentation, reporting, qualifications and trainings of concerned manpower etc.
Provisions have been made concerning the necessities of periodical inspections, instrumentations and
establishment of hydrological and seismological stations. The Bill addresses the issues of emergency
action plan and disaster management, and also enlists the requirements of comprehensive dam safety
evaluation.

6.3 Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project

The DSARP Project, assisted by the World Bank, was a unique project and first of its kind anywhere in
the world. After seeing the performance and benefits accrued from the project, an imperative need has
been felt that another project covering some more States having significant number of large dams
be implemented through the World Bank assistance on similar terms and conditions.

As part of continuous strengthening of the dam safety activities in India, Dam Rehabilitation and
Improvement Project (DRIP) has been taken up with World Bank assistance. About 223 large dams in
four states i.e. Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala and Tamil Nadu would be rehabilitated under this
project. List of originally targeted DRIP dams with photographs of some of the important dams
identified for rehabilitation under DRIP are given at Appendix-II and Appendix-III respectively. Some
more States/Organisation have also been identified to join DRIP at a later stage, for which a provision
of unallocated resources had been provided in the project estimate. The list of DRIP dams can also
change with addition/deletion of some dams in course of project implementation-latest position can be
seen in DRIP website: http://damsafety.in/ . DRIP is a six-year project. Apart from structural and non-
structural measures for rehabilitation and improvement of identified dams, the scope of project
includes the development of appropriate institutional mechanisms for the safe operation and
maintenance of all large dams in participating states. In addition, strengthening of the institutional
setup for national level dam safety surveillance and guidance would be taken up in Central Water
Commission (CWC) under Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR).

The project implementation agencies for DRIP are the Water Resources Departments (WRD) of the
four participating States and State Electricity Boards of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The overall
implementation of the project is being coordinated by Central Water Commission with assistance of a
management and engineering consulting firm.

The total project cost is estimated at Rs 2100 Crore, out of which 80% cost will be financed by World
Bank while balance 20% will be financed by respective state government and Ministry of Water
Resources. The break-up of the overall DRIP expenditure is as under

State No of large No of DRIP Total Project Cost


dams in state dams (Rs. Crore)
Kerala 54 31 280
Madhya Pradesh 906 50 314.5
Orissa 163 38 147.76
Tamil Nadu 108 104 745.46
CWC 132
Unallocated* 480
Total 2100
(* for inclusion of some more dams in existing states and for inclusion of new states in DRIP)

The project has become effective from 18th April, 2012 and will be implemented over a period of six-
years. Implementation activity is gearing up, and the achievements till date are highlighted as below:

Central Water Commission has hired the services of an Engineering and Management
Consultant. The contract has been signed with M/s EGIS EAU, France and expert consultants
have been mobilized.

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So far, design flood reviews of 189 DRIP dams have been completed.
Dam Safety Review Panels have inspected 182 DRIP dams.
Project Screening Template in respect of 84 DRIP dams have been approved by the World
Bank.
Works have been awarded for 30 tenders, while 14 more tenders have been invited and
expected to be awarded shortly.
Thirty two trainings have been conducted by the CPMU, wherein about 1000 officials have
been trained on different aspects of DRIP implementation.
World Bank has given their approval for Karnatakas joining the DRIP project as new State for
rehabilitation of their 27 dams.
So far ten meetings of Technical Committee for DRIP have been held for guiding and
expediting the pace of project implementation.
World Bank has also completed five of its Review Missions, wherein road blocks as well as
way forward in project implementation have been discussed. The Mid-term review mission of
the World Bank was held from 7th to 17th October, 2014.

7.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

For the disaster risk reduction, United Nations has identified 5 priority actions (known as Hyogo
Framework for Action), and these are: (i) Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local
priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; (ii) Identify, assess and monitor disaster
risks and enhance early warning; (iii) Sharing of Knowledge, innovation and education to build a
culture of safety and resilience at all levels; (iv) Reduce the underlying risk factors; and (v) Strengthen
disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels, so that consolidated efforts gets projected
coherently in a synchronized manner at the global platforms (UN, 2005). Understandably, the above
actions are also applicable in case of dam safety activities in India; and, these are being embedded in
Government of Indias recent initiatives for dam safety initiatives.

For countries like India with large stocks of dams, the issue of dam safety is critical. There is an urgent
need for proper organisational arrangement at the national and state levels for ensuring the safety of
such dams. The proposed dam safety bill is expected to ensure proper inspection, maintenance and
surveillance of existing dams and also to ensure proper planning, investigation, design and
construction for safety of new dams. However, there is a need for expediting its approval by the
Parliament; and, also the need for its earliest adoption by different States by passing of resolutions in
this regard by respective Assemblies.

The fundamental dam safety objective is to protect people, property and the environment from harmful
effects of miss-operation or failure of dams and reservoirs (ICOLD, 2010). India has significant
numbers of large dams, many of which are old and some are distressed; and the safe operation of
such dams has social, economic, and environmental relevance. In such a scenario, the importance of
stakeholder involvement in dam safety projects hardly needs any overemphasis. The projects
relationship with its stakeholders is a two-way process: it enables the project to fathom the concerns
and reactions of stakeholders and also allows the stakeholders to comprehend project actions
correctly thus eliminating chances of misinformation (Maheshwari and Pillai, 2004). The earlier
completed Dam Safety Assurance and Rehabilitation project (DSARP) was a novel step in right
direction, which also gave realization of the limitations of our institutional capacities. The now
proposed Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) is expected to give new and
stakeholder-inclusive impetus to the dam safety activities of India by helping in the capacity building of
the Dam Safety Organisation of CWC and that of participating states, for fulfilment of important roles
envisaged as per dam safety legislation under formulation.

REFERENCES

1. CWC (Central Water Commission) (1986). Report on Dam Safety Procedures. New Delhi
2. CWC (Central Water Commission) (2009). National Register of Large Dams. New Delhi.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

3. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (1973). Lessons from Dam Incidents, Paris.
4. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (1995). Dam failure statistical analysis, Bulletin 99, Paris.
5. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (2010). Dam Safety Management: Operational Phase of
the Dam Life Cycle, Paris.
6. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (2011). Number of Dams by Country Members,
downloaded from http://www.icold-cigb.net/GB/World_register/general_synthesis.asp.
7. Lok Sabha (2010). Draft Dam Safety Bill, 2010, downloaded from http://164.100.47.4/
newlsbios_search/Bill_texts_pre.aspx.
8. Maheshwari, G C and Pillai, B Ravi Kumar (2004). The Stakeholder Model for Water Resource Projects,
Vikalpa, Vol.29, No.1. January March 2004, Ahemedabad: Indian Institute of Management.
9. United Nations (2005), Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015), downloaded from http://www.
Unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa.
10. Wrachien, D.de and Mambretti, S (2009). Dam-break Problems, Solutions and Case Studies, WIT Press:
Boston.
11. World Bank (2009), Project Performance Assessment Report on Dam Safety Assurance and Rehabilitation
Programme (DSARP). Report No. 48651.
12. World Bank (2010). Project Appraisal Document on Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP).
Report No. 51061-IN.

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Appendix-I

Reported failure of dams in India (Year wise)

SL. State Name of Type Maximum Year of Year of Cause of failure


No Project Height Completion Failure
(M)
Up to 1950
1 Madhya Tigra Masonry 24.03 1914-17 1917 # Overtopping followed
Pradesh by slice.
2 Maharashtra Ashti Earth 17.7 1883 1933 Slope failure.
3 Madhya Pagara Composite 27.03 1911-27 1943 # Overtopping followed
Pradesh by breach.
1951-1960
4 Madhya Palakmati Earth 14.6 1942 1953
# Sliding failure.
Pradesh
5 Rajasthan Dakhya Earth N.A 1953 1953 Breaching.
6 Uttar Pradesh Ahrura Earth 22.8 1953 1953 # Breaching.
7 Rajasthan Girinanda Earth 12.20 1954 1955 # Overtopping followed
by breaching.
8 Rajasthan Anwar Earth 12.5 1956 1957 Breaching.
9 Rajasthan Gudah Earth 28.3 1956 1957 # Breached due to bad
workmanship.
10 Rajasthan Sukri Earth N.A N.A 1958 # Breached by leakage
through foundation.
11 Madhya Nawagaon Earth 16 1958 1959 # Overtopping leading to
Pradesh breach.
12 Rajasthan Dervakheda Earth N.A N.A 1959 Breaching.
13 Gujarat Kaila Earth 23.08 1955 1959 Embankment collapsed
due to weak foundation.
1961-1970
14 Maharashtra Panshet Earth 53.8 1961 1961 # Piping failure leading
to breach.
15 Maharashtra Khadakwasla Masonry 60 1875 1961 # Overtopping.
16 Rajasthan Galwania Earth N.A 1960 1961 Breaching.
17 Rajasthan Nawagaza Earth N.A 1955 1961 Breaching.
18 Madhya Sampna Earth 21.3 1956 1964 # Slope failure on
Pradesh account of inappropriate
materials.
19 Madhya Kedarnala Earth 20 1964 1964
# Breaching.
Pradesh
20 UttaraKhand Nanaksagar Earth 16 1962 1967 # Breached due to
foundation piping.
1971-1980
21 Gujarat Dantiwada Earth 60.96 1965 1973 Breach on account of
floods.
22 Tamil Nadu Kodaganar Earth 12.75 1977 1977 Breached on account of
floods.
23 Gujarat Machhu-II Composite 20.00 1972 1979 Overtopping due to
floods.
1981-1990
24 Gujarat Mitti Earth 16.02 1982 1988 Overtopping leading to
breach.
1991 2000
25 Madhya Chandora Earth 27.3 1986 1991
# Breach.
Pradesh

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Compendium of Technical Papers

SL. State Name of Type Maximum Year of Year of Cause of failure


No Project Height Completion Failure
(M)
26 Andhra Pradesh Kadam Composite 22.5 1958 1995 *Over topping leading to
breach.
27 Rajasthan Bhimlot Masonry 17 1958 - # Breached due to
inadequate spillway
capacity.
2001-2010
28 Gujarat Pratappur Earth 10.67 1891 2001 Breached on account of
floods.
29 Madhya Jamunia Earth 15.40 1921 2002 # Piping leading to
Pradesh breaching.
30 Orissa Gurilijoremip Earth 12.19 1954-55 2004 The abutment structure
along with wing and
return walls got
undermined with
foundation scouring.
31 Rajasthan Jaswant Sagar Earth 43.38 1889 2007 # Piping leading to
breaching.
32 Rajasthan Gararda Earth 31.76 2010 2010 Examination for cause of
failure by state authorities
in progress.
33 Andhra Pradesh Palemvagu Earth 13.0 U/C 2008 Flash flood resulting in
dam overtopping of the earth
dam.
34 Maharashtra Nandgavan Earth 22.51 1998 2005 Excessive rain causing
water flow over the waste
weir to a depth beyond
the design flood lift.
35 Madhya Chandiya Earth 22.50 1926 2008 Breach.
Pradesh
36 Madhya Piplai Earth 16.73 1998 2005 Breach
Pradesh

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Appendix-II

LIST OF DAMS UNDER DAM REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

TAMIL NADU 51. Perumpallam 98. Bungihalla Earthen Bund


1. Krishnagiri` 52. Amaravathy 99. Vandal
2. Thambalahalli 53. Uppar ( Erode) 100. Vennirar
3. Pambar 54. Palar Porandalar 101. West Varahapallam
4. Vaniar 55. Vattamalalai Karai Odai Western Catchment weir-
5. Shoolagirichinnar 102.
56. Parappalar I
6. Kelavarapalli 57. Kuthiraiyar Western Catchment weir-
103.
7. Chinnar 58. Noyyal Athupalayam II
8. Kesarigulihalla Western Catchment weir-
59. Kodaganar 104.
9. Nagavathi III
60. Upper Nirar Weir
10. Thoppiar KERALA
61. Lower Nirar Weir
11. Sathanur 105. Idukki
62. Parambikulam
12. Vidur 106. sengulam
13. Rajathopekanar 63. Thunakadavu
107. poringalkuthu
14. Mordhana 64. Sholayar
108. sholayar
15. Manimukthanadhi 65. Aliyar
109. SABARIGIRI HEP
16. Gomukinadhi 66. Thirumurthy
110. Idamalayar
17. Veeranam 67. Avalanche
111. Pallivasal
18. Vaigai 68. Chinnakuttiyar
112. Panniaar
19. Manjalar 69. East Varahapallam
113. Neriamangalam
20. Marudhanadhi 70. Emerald
114. Kuttiyadi
21. Sothuparai 71. Eravangalar
115. Lower Periyar
22. Pilavukkal Periyar 72. Glenmorgan( Kariappa)
116. Kakkad
23. Pilavukkal Kovilar 73. Highwavys
117. Siruvani Dam
24. Vembakottai 74. Kadamparai
Kanhirapuzha Irrigation
25. Kullursandai 75. Kodayar -I 118.
Project
26. Anaikuttam 76. Kodayar -II 119. Chimni Project
27. Golwarpatti 77. Kundahapalam 120. Kuttiyadi Irrigation Project
28. Manimuthar 78. Kuttiyar Malapumzha Irrigation
29. Gatana 79. Manalar 121.
Project
30. Ramanadhi
80. Maravakandy Muvattupuzha Irrigation
31. Karuppanadi 122.
81. Moyar Forebay Project
32. Gundar Pothundy Irrigation
82. Mukurthy 123.
33. Adavinainarkoil Project
83. Nirallapallam
34. Vadakkupachayar 124. Neyyar Irrigation Project
Papanasam Diversion
35. Kodumudiyar 84. Vazhani Irrigation Project
weir 125.
36. Nambiar
85. Parson's Valley
37. Pechiparai 126. Peechi Irrigation Project
86. Pegumbahalla Forebay
38. Perunchani Periyar Valley Irrigation
39. Chittar - I 87. Periyar Forebay 127.
Project
40. Chittar - II 88. Pillur
128. Pamba Irrigation Project
41. Poigaiyar 89. Porthimund
Gayathry Project Stage II
42. Anaimadavu 90. Pykara 129.
Chulliyar
43. Kariakoil 91. Pykara New Forebay Gayathry Project Stage I -
92. Sandynallah 130.
44. Mettur Meenkara
45. Ponnaniar 93. Servalar 131. Walayar Irrigation Project
46. Siddhamalli 94. Thambraparani 132. Mangalam Dam
47. Uppar 95. Upper Aliyar Pazhassi Irrigation
133.
48. Bhavanisagar 96. Upper Bhavani Project
49. Gunderipallam Upper Bhavani Pumping 134. Kallada Irrigation Project
97.
50. Varattupallam Weir 135. Moolathara

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Regulator(Chitturpuzha 165. Kharadi 195. Dhanei


Irrign.Project) 166. Sarathi 196. Kalo
MADHYA PRADESH 167. Moorum nalla 197. Nesa
136. Sanjay Sagar 168. Chawarpani 198. Pilasalki
137. Gopi Krishna sagar 169. Gangulpara 199. Pitamahal
138. Makroda 170. Dhutiweir 200. Salia
139. Kunwar Chain Sagar 171. Nahlesara 201. Sarafgarh
140. Bisoniya Tank 172. Badera 202. Satiguda (UKP)
141. Nallaziri Tank 173. Bamhodi 203. Satiguda (Malkangiri)
142. Lasudiya Kanger 174. Harrai 204. Talsara
143. Kankarkheda 175. Mandwajhiri 205. Ardei
144. Bhagwanpura 176. Dongarbodi 206. Ashokanalla
145. Dhablamata Tank 177. Karhi 207. Bagjharan Dam
146. Manjhi Khedi 178. Surkhi Pondi 208. Balaskumpa
147. Guradia Surdas 179. Sher 209. Banksal
148. Laxmi Kheda 180. Birnai 210. Deojharan
149. Chandrakeshar 181. Marhi 211. Jagadala
150. Jirbhar 182. Umrar 212. Jhumuka
151. Sundrel 183. Chandpatha 213. Kalakala
152. Sampna 184. Kamera 214. Kanheinalla
153. Bundala Birpur 215. Khasbahal
154. Tawa 185.
216. Laigam
155. Kolar ORISSA 217. Liard
156. Barna 186. Balimela 218. Mathanpal
157. Deogaon 187. Hirakud 219. Padampurnallah
158. Sanjay Sarovar 188. Rengali 220. Pipalnallah
159. Thanwar project 189. Salandi 221. Ramaguda
160. Mehgaon tank 190. Upper Kolab 222. Runugaon
161. Barnoo 191. Budhabudhiani 223. Sanamachhakandana
162. Mandai 192. Dadaraghati
163. Sagarnadi 193. Daha
164. Ari 194. Derjang

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Appendix-III

Photogra
aphs of few select
s dams
s covered un
nder DRIP

Hirakud Da
am of Odisha
a Mettur Dam of Tamil Nadu

Idukkki Dam of Kerrala dra Dam of Karnataka


Tungabhad K

m of Madhya Pradesh
Tigra Dam Maithon Dam of
o Jharkhand

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Organisational Set up and monitoring Systems for Sustainable


Dam Safety in Maharashtra State
Er. K.S.Vemulkonda Er. Ramesh Nikum
Superintending Engineer Chief Engineer
Dam Safety Organisation, Maharashtra Design, Training, Research & Safety, Maharashtra
se.damsafety@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Maharashtra State has the distinction of constructing highest number of large dams in the Country. About 35 %
of total populations of large dams are situated in Maharashtra. As on February 2015, the total number of large
dams in Maharashtra is 2132. About 60% of the dams in Maharashtra are older than 25 years. Considering the
history of Dam building in Maharashtra and the number of large dams; it becomes highly imperative to have in
place an elaborate mechanism for Inspection and Monitoring Dam Safety. Maharashtra has been the Pioneer
State to implement comprehensive and sustainable Dam safety assurance program. It is utmost necessary to
inspect, evaluate & determine the safety of dams & allied structures. A systematic approach & working
methodology is very essential to monitor the safety aspects of the dams. Maharashtra state has established an
elaborate set up for effective monitoring by establishing Dam Safety Organisation (DSO) way back in 1980.This
paper discusses the organisational set up, its functions, Mandatory and Test Inspections, Annual Consolidated
Health Status Reports, inspection of mechanical components of dam and review of Health Status Reports. Skill
development training and other best practices being followed by Dam Safety Organisation, Maharashtra. The
elaborate mechanism of Inspection and Monitoring Dam Safety of all the Dams twice a year has helped Water
Resources Department in identifying and rectifying problems timely by effective prioritization of funds, averting
failure and disasters and thereby instilling public confidence in the continued accrual of benefits on the national
investment made. Due to lack of sufficiently trained and expert staff with private dam owner organisations for
carrying out dam safety inspection, DSO carries out these inspections on consultancy basis. DSO is also
entrusted the work of Inspection of Canals & Structures there on of all major and medium Irrigation projects in
Maharashtra in view of safety and uninterrupted service for Irrigation/water supply. To keep a check on the
inspections carried out at field level, test inspections are carried out by DSO as a third party inspection. During
the DSO inspection, several deficiencies pointed out by field officers in their Pre/Post Monsoon Reports are cross
checked. HSR is also prepared for the state & submitted to CWC & Govt. of Maharashtra. This Health
Status Report gives a summary of dams according to deficiency category. The mechanical organisation wing of
Water resources Department which is a specialised agency carries out the inspection of mechanical components
of Large Dams. Status Report of Gates of various gated dams (Including Private Dams) in Maharashtra State is
prepared by Mechanical Organisation. The review of DSO activity is taken by different higher level authorities &
funding prioritisation is done depending upon deficiency & dam category during discussions with field Engineers.
Awareness and expertise dam safety technology is best attained and maintained through effective training given
by Dam Safety Organisation, Maharashtra.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Maharashtra State has the distinction of constructing highest number of large dams in the country. As
per National Register of large dams (2009), India has 5202 large dams. There are about 1845 large
dams in Maharashtra. These constitute about 35% of the total population of large dams in India. As on
February 2015, the total number of large dams in Maharashtra is 2132. About 60% of the dams in
Maharashtra are older than 25 years (see Table-1).Considering the history of Dam building in
Maharashtra and the number of large dams; it becomes highly imperative to have in place an
elaborate mechanism for inspection and monitoring dam safety.

Table -1: Dams in Maharashtra (Year wise)

Sr.No. Year of completion Age of Dam (years) No. of Dams


1 up to 1914 >100 35
2 1914 to 1939 75 21
3 1940 to 1964 50 48
4 1965 to 1989 25 1163
5 1990 to 2014 <25 865

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2.0 NEEDFOR MONITORING OF DAM SAFETY

The monitoring of the dams from Dam Safety aspect is utmost necessary,
1) To ensure the Structural, Hydraulic& seismic adequacy of structure to serve the purpose
for which they were designed.
2) To verify the physical state of structure & monitor its behaviour.
3) To investigate the condition that might cause distress and address it.
4) To study the extent of deterioration based on which maintenance & repairs schedule can
be planned.
5) To ascertain the potential hazards to human life &property in downstream reaches.
6) To ensure public confidence in the continued accrual of benefits on the national
investment made.

Hence it is utmost necessary to inspect, evaluate& determine the safety of dams & allied structures. A
systematic approach & working methodology is very essential to monitor the safety aspects of the
dams. Maharashtra which is one of the pioneer states has established an elaborate set up for effective
monitoring by establishing Dam Safety Organisation way back in 1980.

2.1 Dam Safety Organisation (DSO)

The Dam Safety Organisation, Nashik (DSO) Maharashtra state is under control of Director General,
Design, Training, Hydrology, Research & Safety, MERI Nashik and Chief Engineer, Design, Training,
Research & Safety. It is headed by Superintending Engineer and has four divisions. The dams in six
regions of Maharashtra were distributed among three dam safety divisions. Each division is headed by
Executive Engineer with four Deputy Engineers to assist him for monitoring the safety aspect of dams.
The fourth division is dedicated for monitoring safety of canals of all projects in Maharashtra. Apart
from these, there is a cell for Instrumentation data analysis which collects data from dams where
instrumentation is done. Secondly, the Instrumentation Research Division carries out inspection for
checking& calibration of instruments installed in dams and also carries out necessary repairs. The
Seismic Data Analysis Division acts as nodal agency for seismicity in Maharashtra. It analyses data of
various seismographs from 35 observatories spread across Maharashtra. The Mechanical
Organisation carries out safety inspections of Mechanical component (i.e. Gates & allied parts) &
report is furnished to DSO to be incorporated in Health Status Report (HSR).

2.2 Functions of Dam Safety Organisation

The Dam owner i.e. the field Engineers are responsible for the safety of dams under their control and
therefore the prime responsibility of inspection of dams on regular basis lies with field Engineers. Dam
Safety Organisation monitors periodical inspections of dams carried out by field Engineers .The
functions of Dam Safety Organisation are as under:

To overview the process of periodical inspections of specified large dams.


To carryout scrutiny of the Inspection reports received from field officers. Significant &
Important Deficiencies to be intimated to concern authorities to carryout remedial measures.
To prepare the Annual Health Status reports.
To monitor the safety aspects & remedial actions taken by field officers.
To carry out test inspections of dams.
To carryout analysis of Instrumentation data& prepare Instrumentation Analysis Report.
To compile the documents specified by the National Committee on Dam Safety such as
Gate operation schedule ( GOS) / Reservoir operation Schedule ( ROS ) , Data Book ,O
& M Manual , EAP, Record drawing & Completion Report.
To prepare inventory of National Register of Large Dams & compile register of Small Dams
To prepare & update dam safety manuals.
To keep liaison with Central Water Commission & Central Board of Irrigation & Power
New Delhi through : National Committee on Dam Safety & Indian National Committee On
Large Dams Which is sub- Committee of ICOLD
To compile information on dam incidents in the state.
To arrange training courses on Dam safety & Instrumentation with assistance of Maharashtra
Engineering Training Academy, Nashik.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

To carry out periodical inspection of Private Dams in Maharashtra State & other to monitor
their safety.
Inspection of canals of Irrigation Projects and structures thereon.

2.3 Mandatory Pre & Post Inspection by Field Authorities

The Govt. of Maharashtra has designed systematic approach for monitoring each & every Dam &
allied structure periodically. The Dam Safety Organisation of Maharashtra state has categorised the
large dams in into three sub categories i.e. Category-I, Category-II & Category-III large Dams (see
Table-2). The field authorities are responsible to carry out the inspection of these large dams twice in a
year i.e. pre monsoon & post monsoon. The categorisation & Inspection authorities is as under,

Table -2: Categorisation of Dams & Inspecting Authorities

Height
Impounded
from
gross
general
SR storage Spillway Type of Inspection Inspection Reports be
Type of Dam level of
No capacity Up capacity spillway authority sent to
deepest
to FRL in
foundation
M Cum
in m.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1) Chief Engineer
Above Superintending
Large Dam Above 30 Above 60 Gated 2) Superintending
1 3,000 Engineer/
(Category-I) m MCum Spillway Engineer Dam Safety
Cumecs Administrator
Organisation.
1) Superintending
Engineer/
15 MCum 2,000 to Un-
Large Dam 15 m to 30 Executive Administrator
2 upto 3,000 gated
(Category-II) m Engineer 2) Superintending
60MCum Cumecs Spillway
Engineer, Dam safety
Organisation
Sub-Divisional 1)Superintending
1.0 MCum 2,000 to Un-
Large Dam 10 Eng./Sub Engineer/
3 upto15 3,000 gated
(Category-III) m.to15m Divisional Administrator 2)
MCum Cumecs Spillway
Officer Executive Engineer

The Pre-Monsoon Inspection is expected to be complete before 15th of May of the year and
report sent to concerned authorities before 30th June of same year. The Post Monsoon
Inspection is expected to complete before 30th November of the year &report sent to
concerned authorities before 31st December of same year.
Special Inspection before first filling should be done before 30th April & report should be send
to concerned authorities before 31st May of same year.(Reports need not be sent to DSO).
Special inspection after a severe distressing event or accident or incident should be carryout
immediately after the event is noted and report should be sent to concern authorities within
one week from the date of inspection.

2.4 Scrutiny of Mandatory Pre/Post Monsoon Inspection Reports

Dam Safety Organisation takes overview of the periodical inspections i.e. pre monsoon & post
Monsoon of 1231 large dams (Category I &II) on receipt of inspection reports from field officers.

DSO carries out scrutiny of the Inspection reports received from field officers for Category I &
II dams. Category III dams inspection reports are scrutinised by respective superintending
Engineer.
Significant &Serious Deficiencies are intimated to concerned authorities to carryout remedial
measures.
The deficiencies are categorized as under:
Deficiency Category-1: Dams with major deficiencies which may lead to dam failure
Deficiency Category-2: Dams with major rectifiable deficiencies needing immediate attention

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Deficiency Category-3: Dams having minor / Nil deficiencies.


DSO monitors the remedial actions taken by field officers through their compliance reports.
DSO prepares the region wise Annual Health Status Reports & sends it to all field CEs, SEs &
EEs. The scrutiny of inspection reports are done meticulously so as to categorise the
deficiency and prepare a synopsis of inspection report in the form of a Health Status Report. A
consolidated HSR is also prepared for the state & submitted to CWC & Govt. of
Maharashtra. This Health Status Report gives a summary of dams according to deficiency
category. This helps Government to prioritise the allocation of funds to dam requiring
immediate attention. The annual health status report of class III dams is prepared /compiled by
regional Chief Engineer and sent to Government & DSO annually.

2.5 Test inspection by DSO

The periodical inspections of the dam under their control become a routine and mundane affair for the
field engineers. To keep a check on the inspections carried out at field level, test inspections are
carried out by DSO as a third party inspection. During the DSO inspection, several deficiencies pointed
out by field officers in their Pre/Post Monsoon Reports are cross checked. The DSO also advices field
officers on the remedial actions to be taken for rectifying deficiencies. Apart from the mandatory pre &
post monsoon inspections carried out by field officers for 1231 large dams, DSO carries out Test
inspections of selected large dams every year. The annual dam inspection programme is prepared
which is sanctioned by D.G., DTHRS, Nashik during annual meeting with all field CEs.

The Annual Dam Inspection program of DSO is prepared by taking into consideration the following
criteria,

Dams suggested by Regional Chief Engineers.


100 Years old Dams (once in three Years)
Dams which are not inspected in last 10 year by DSO
Private Dams on consultancy Basis : (Twice in a year, Pre/Post monsoon)
National Importance (NI) Dams: Once every year. (Koyna, Isapur, Pench, Ujjani, Jaikwadi,
Goshikhurd, Middle Vaitarna.) (NI Dams: having height >100 meters or storage capacity >
10,000 million cubic meters)

2.6 Pre-Post Monsoon Inspection of Mechanical Components

In Maharashtra there are 1231 large dams out of which 129 are gated dams. The smooth operation of
the gates during monsoon to route the floods is of critical importance. To keep all spillway gate/outlet
gates and their ancillary parts in fit condition, periodic inspection of the same is utmost necessary. The
mechanical organisation wing of Water resources Department which is a specialised agency carries
out the inspection of mechanical components of Large Dams. Status Report of gates of Various Gated
Dams (Including Private Dams) in Maharashtra State is prepared by Mechanical Organisation. This
status report is sent to Dam Safety Organisation for further inclusion in Annual Consolidated HSR of
large dams in Maharashtra State. This Report consists of following:

Abstract of Deficiencies noticed in Previous year


Statement showing Dams with Deficiency Category-1: Dams having with major deficiencies
which may lead to dam failure
Statement showing Dams with Deficiency Category-2: Dams having major rectifiable
deficiencies needing immediate attention
Statement showing Dams with Deficiency Category-3: Dams having minor / nil deficiencies
noticed.
Remedial Action Suggested on Deficiencies Noticed/ Action taken report.

2.7 Inspection of Private Dams

In Maharashtra apart from government owned dams, many dams are owned by private owners like
TATA Power, Sahara etc. and by urban local bodies like Municipal corporations of Mumbai, Nagpur etc.
& Power generation companies like Mahagenco etc. There are about 45 private dams in Maharashtra
which are operated and maintained by them. Due to lack of sufficiently trained and expert staff with
owner organisation for carrying out dam safety inspection, DSO carries out these inspections on

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consultancy basis. In addition, DSO also carries out Inspection of Nathpa Jhakri Dam (Himachal
Pradesh) every year on consultancy basis.

2.8 Inspection of Century Old Dams

There are 35 Century old large dams. As per guidelines received from Dam Safety Monitoring unit of
Central Water Commission, New Delhi, Health Status Report of century old dams is prepared
separately once in three years on the same lines as that of Annual Health Status Report of Identified
large dams.

2.9 Annual Consolidated Health Status Report

Annual Consolidated Health Status Report of Identified Large Dams consists of following:
Part-I - Action Taken Report: This part covers the remedial action taken for the deficiencies
pointed out in previous year's HSR.
Part-II - Annual Health Status Report Of Identified Large Dams : Deficiencies reported &
noticed during the course of inspections for the current year & remedial actions suggested
for Cat-I & Cat-II Dams are covered in this part. The deficiencies are categorized according
to their seriousness as mentioned earlier.
Part-III -Annual Report of performance of dam instruments installed on identified large dams.
Part IV- Annual Report of performance of Metrological instruments installed on identified large
dams.
Part-V- Annual Report of inspection done by Mechanical Organisation. Deficiencies Category -
1 & 2 from received Health Status Report of Mechanical Organisation are incorporated in this
part.

2.10 Inspection of Canals & Structures

Canals serve as important carrier of benefits and facilities to the region downstream. However such
canals also form a potential source of hazard in the event of any mishap or failure of the canals.

Due to rapid urbanization, canals of many project run through heavily populated areas. Seepage
through these canals causes unhygienic conditions in these areas; whereas breaches to canals may
cause loss of property and life even. Breaches in canal in rural areas, causes inundation of fields
leading to loss of agricultural produce eventually loss to nation. Considering the hazard potential and
loss of facility in event of failure of canals or structures there as, DSO is entrusted the work of
Inspection of Canals & Structures there on of all major and medium Irrigation projects in Maharashtra
in view of safety and uninterrupted service for Irrigation/water supply. DSO prepares & publishes
Annual Consolidated Health Status Report based on inspections carried out by field officers as well as
test inspections carried out by Dam Safety Organisation, Nashik. DSO has also prepared Canal
Safety manual which is under process of approval.

3.0 REVIEW BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES

In Maharashtra the issue of dam safety is taken on priority. The HSR prepared by DSO is approved by
Director General which then sent to higher authorities i.e. Secretary (CAD) of Govt. of Maharashtra
and CWC for information, suggestions & necessary action.

Periodic meetings/VCs are called by Secretary (CAD). Director General, DTHRS, and Chief Engineer
DTRS with all field Chief Engineers and Superintending Engineers to discuss safety related issues,
compliance of NCDS documents (EAP,GOS,ROS,O&M manual),compliance of deficiencies pointed
out in HSR. Also funding prioritisation is done depending upon deficiency & dam category during
discussions with field Chief Engineers.

4.0 TRAINING

The inspection of dam is an elaborate process which requires high level of technical knowledge of all
aspects of dam & its allied structures. The safety and proper custodial care of dams can be achieved

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

only through an awareness and acceptance of responsibilities and through availability of competent
well trained Engineers, technicians and operators. Such awareness and expertise is best attained and
maintained through effective training in dam safety technology as well as operation & maintenance of
dams.

DSO has carried out trainings in assistance with Maharashtra Engineering Training Academy, Nashik
through Regional Training Centres, at Pune /Nagpur/Aurangabad & Field Chief Engineer of respective
region.

Training & Workshops were carried out on Dam Safety & Procedures for 162 MPSC Direct
recruits AEE/AE-1/AE-2 & 620 in service Engineers EE/SDE / SDO / AE-2/ Sect. Engineer
/Junior Engineer of Water Resources Dept. through DSO.
Non technical personnel working on dams are also being imparted Hands On trainings at dam
site on O & M procedures.

Due to comprehensive training, the field engineers are now more aware about the importance of
procedures / working / Pre-post Monsoon Inspection for the dam safety. This has helped DSO in its
working as it receives good and detailed inspection reports which help in proper categorisation of
deficiencies.

5.0 OTHER ACTIVITIES BY DSO

5.1 National Register of Large Dams In Maharashtra

The Dam Safety Organisation compiles the information required for National Register of large Dams
(NRLD) from field authorities for 2132 large dams in Maharashtra.

5.2 Preparation of Dam Safety Manuals

The Dam Safety Organisation, Nashik is entrusted with the preparation of draft of Dam Safety Manual
for guidance of field officers who are in charge of operation and maintenance of large dams in state. It
is proposed to bring out this Manual in 9 Chapters. Out of these, Chapter No. 7 entitled Flood
Forecasting, Reservoir Operation and gate Operation, chapter No. 8 entitled Preparedness for
dealing with Emergency situations of Dams prepares, and Chapter No. 2 entitled Identification of
Causes of Failure are published by Dam Safety Organisation and circulated to all concerned
departments. Drafts of remaining 6 Chapters are submitted to the government for approval.

5.3 Compilation Of NCDS Documents

Dam Safety Organisation also compiles NCDS documents i.e. EAP, ROS, GOS and Data book and
records drawings. Emergency action plan (EAP) is important to avoid the hazards potential to human
life and property on downstream of dams.

At DSO, compilation of EAPs of 233 Class I dams is taken on priority. So far EAP of 112 dams has
been compiled.. The GOS and ROS of all gated dams have been compiled. ROS is revised after every
five years.

5.4 Preparation of Dam Safety Bill & Flood Zoning Bill

The draft of Dam Safety Bill and Flood Plain Zoning Bill of Maharashtra State was prepared by Dam
Safety Organisation and submitted to all Chief Engineers for confirmation and comments. After
receiving comments the same will be submitted to the Government of Maharashtra for further
necessary action before legislation.

5.5 Safety Review of Large Dams

Government of Maharashtra has formed six region wise dam safety review committees to review
safety aspects of major dams every ten years. SE DSO is member in all committees.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

6.0 FUTURE ROAD MAP

The Water Resources Department, Government of Maharashtra has embarked on an e-governance


program for Integrated Computerised Information System (ICIS) called as E-Jalseva. This is the first
attempt of Government Process Reengineering (GPR) in Water Resources sector (Portal website,
http://wrd.maharashtra.gov.in). In this portal there are 34 modules covering various aspects of Water
Resources Department. Out of which module M-12 is related to Dam Safety. DSO has started working
on preparation of module wherein inspection reports can be submitted by authorities online as soon as
physical inspection is over. This online submission of inspection reports would also have facility of
uploading pictures and videos of any deficiency noted during inspections. Timely online submission
would help DSO in preparing scrutiny report and send back the deficiencies noted online to field
authorities. Online submission of reports will help in timely publication of better Health Status Reports.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Integrated Geophysical Approach for Dam Health Checks & Dam


Condition Monitoring
Dr. Sanjay Rana
PARSAN Overseas Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi
sanjay@parsan.biz

ABSTRACT
Dams in the country represent a major investment and huge benefits to population in terms of irrigation, power
and flood control. Most of the big dams are very old and regular monitoring and maintenance of these dams is of
utmost importance for continuing benefits. Unlike soil investigations, critical nature of dams, does not permit
traditional invasive inspections by means of drilling, and such inspections are best avoided unless extremely
important, and are done only when problem is too grave.

Although long recognized that dams need periodic inspection and monitoring, it has only been recently
recognized that geophysical surveys can supplement the results of standard inspection and monitoring
techniques. Geophysical surveys have been performed on a number of dams around the world, including India,
and have yielded extremely useful insight into dam conditions. Seismic refraction surveys have been performed to
provide a cross-section of the dam embankment and foundation materials in terms of strength characteristics. Self
Potential (SP) surveys have been performed to investigate seepage conditions within dam embankment and
foundation materials, and abutment materials. Electrical Resistivity Tomography is also routinely performed on
dams to determine internal saturation conditions in dams. ReMi is effectively used to determine shear wave
velocities (Vs) in dams.

Present paper discusses various geophysical techniques with emphasis on their integration to provide unique
solutions to subsurface challenges. The paper also presents few case studies where integration of two or more
geophysical techniques helped resolve complex problems. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate as to how
these geophysical techniques are applicable to solve various issues related to health check of existing dams.
These geophysical surveys may find future use as monitoring tools applied to various dams.

INTRODUCTION

In the event of a dam failure, the economic loss as well as the potential hazard to life and property
could be enormous. Typical dam safety surveillance consists of visual inspections supported by limited
instrumentation. However, the problems in dams can become quite advanced before the problem is
detected via these means. Recently, interest has grown regarding the use of non-intrusive geophysical
techniques to facilitate early detection of anomalous seepage, piping, internal erosion and other
degradation issues.

Geophysical methods are sensitive to contrast in the physical properties in the subsurface. Different
methods respond to different physical properties, like material strength, material conductivity (linked to
water saturation), fluid movement (seepage), change in density etc. The application of geophysical
methods to dams enables detection of problems in early stages and hence can become part of dam
safety surveillance program.

Geophysical techniques, by virtue of their non-invasive and non-destructive nature, offer an excellent
solution for investigation or regular monitoring of dams, and detection of anomalous conditions which
might snowball into major problems if left untreated.

Various geophysical methods are available to investigate the problems of earthen, masonry, concrete
or composite dams:

Leak path detection


Internal Erosion
Identification of zone of water accumulation
Cavity/ sinkhole
Concrete degradation

No single geophysical technique can uniquely solve the problem due to a large overlapping of physical

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Compendium of Technical Papers

propertie
es in variouss subsurfacee materials. To date, the e use of geo ophysical me ethods to investigate
dams ha as produced d mixed results, partly because the e application
n of these methods
m is not well-
understoood and partly because false
f positivees cannot be tolerated. That
T is the reason why it becomes
importannt to use a combination
c of geophysical methodss to uniquelyy resolve the e problem. Following
F
table pre
esents a rangge of choicess available to
o address to various issues and conc cerns:

ISSUES AND CONCERRNS


GEOP
PHYSICAL CONCRE
ETE DAM EARTH EMBANKMENT
E T DAMS MASONRY DAMS
D
ME
ETHODS Water Land Sink Water
Cracks Degradation S
Strength
Leaks Slide Holes Leaks
Ele
ectrical
Resistivity
Streamiing Potential
Geeoradar
Radar TTomography
Seismic
mography
Tom
Seismicc Refraction
ReMi

Table 1. Geophysical Methods


M for C
Common Dam Problems

ELECTR
RICAL RESIS
STIVITY IMA
AGING

The dire ect current resistivity method hass well-estab blished data a acquisition n and interrpretation
techniquues for stand dard survey configuration
c ns. The meth hod uses paairs of electro odes to injecct current
into the ground and d measure the t resulting
g electrical potential disstribution. Its
s applicationn to dam
seepage e investigatioons is two-fold. The me ethod may be b used to monitor spa atial and/or temporal
variation
ns in electrica t changing soil condition
al resistivity in response to ns caused by y internal ero
osion and
anomalo ous seepage e. The metho od also may y be used to o characterizze the electrrical resistivity of the
subsurfaace for the puurposes of in nterpreting SP data.

The metthod can alsso be used to detect cha anges in resistivity with time,
t which may be linke
ed to the
developm
ment of interrnal erosion in the core off the embankkment.

The resuults of electrrical surveys carried out on the crestt of a dam are
a presented d as vertical sections
showing the electric cal properties of the dam m materials. Electrical currents
c travvel along preeferential
pathwayys in the most conductivve materials such as dam m core composed on fin ne grained materials.
m
The metthod provid des picture ofo internal reesistivity dis
stribution of
o the dam structure,
s ide
entifying
areas oof water sa aturation inn the dam m body, an nd thus ide entifying thhe zones o of water
accumuulation and wetting.
w

2D Resiistivity Imagiing uses an array of ele ectrodes (typpically 64) connected


c byy multi-core cable to
provide a linear deppth profile, orr pseudo-sec ction, of the variation in resistivity both
b along thhe survey
line and with depth. Switching
S a potential electrode pairs
of the current and p is done automatically using a
relay boxx. The compputer initially keeps the spacing between the elec ctrodes fixed and moves the pairs
he line until the last electrode is reached. The spacing is then increassed and the
along th e process
repeatedd in order to
o provide an n increased depth of invvestigation. In this way a profile of resistivity
against depth
d do-section') is built up alo
('pseud ong the survey line.

The mod deled results s are displayyed as scale ed resistivity--depth pseud a illustrated below in
do-section as
Fig. 1. B
Blues represe ent areas off low resistiv
vity whilst red vely higher. The wedge shape of
ds are relativ
the plot illustrates th
he gradual reeduction in the
t amount of o data acquuired as the current and potential
electrode
e spacing are increased.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Fig
gure 1. Electrical Resistivityy Section Show
wing Zone of Saturation
S (Blue)

The method can be applied


a in tw
wo ways.

nvestigations as a onetim
1. Resistivity in me survey ma ay detect spa
atially anoma alous zones along
a the
d
dam, and ca an be used too investigate suspected structural
s weaaknesses.
2. Long-term re esistivity mo
onitoring makke use of thee seepage-innduced seassonal variatioon inside
t
the embankment to dettect anomalies not only in space, but b more im mportantly in time, by
s
studying devviations from the time-variation patterrn. The seco
ond approach h is more powerful as
repetition of measureme ents providess additional evaluation possibilities
p f seepage analysis.
for
However, the monitoring g approach iss also more demanding as installatio ons are neceessary as
w as long--term instrum
well mentation.

MING POTENTIAL SURV


STREAM VEY

The streaming poten ntial method consists of measuring


m th
he electrical potential
p by flowing
f water within a
e or subsurfa
structure ace. Self-pottential (SP) is
i a passive technique that measure es naturally occurring
o
electrica
al potentials in the ground
d. This is thee only one off these geopphysical techniques that responds
directly to
t fluid flow.. Water flow
wing through the pore sp pace of soil generates electrical currrent flow.
This elecctro-kinetic phenomenon
p n is called strreaming poteential and gives rise to SP
S signals thhat are of
primary interest in daam seepage studies.

SP is measured by determining the voltage across a pa air of non-po


olarizing elecctrodes usingg a high-
impedan nce voltmete er. This inexpensive and d deceptivelyy simple datta acquisition n procedure requires
special ccare and atte ention in ord
der to reliablyy interpret and correct fo
or sources ofo electrical noise
n that
can massk the signal of interest. All noise sou urces inclu
uding time-vaarying telluric
c currents asssociated
with solaar and atmo ospheric acttivity, stray currents,
c and the corros sion of burieed metal must be
recognizzed and mea asured. These noise sourrces can massk the relativvely small sig gnals associated with
seepage e anomalies. For this rea ason, telluric
c measureme ents and ma agnetic surveeys should beb carried
out to asssist in interp
preting the SP
S data. Typ pically, SP annomalies on the order off tens of millivolts are
associatted with seep page anoma alies of intere
est, althoughh anomaly am mplitudes larrgely dependd on site-
specific conditions.
c

Interprettation of SP measuremen nts to infer seepage


s pattterns and concentrated seepage
s flow
ws ranges
from sim
mple qualitativve to more advanced qua antitative nummerical modeeling approaches.

Most com mmon appliccation of SP study is to id


dentify the zo
ones in the dam
d body thrrough which seepage
is taking
g place. The results are correlated with
w resistivityy sections. An
A example of such corrrelation is
shown b below in Fig. 2 wherein zo
one of saturaation in dam body, as notted in electrical resistivityy imaging
section, shows a proofound negative SP development.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

300

200

100

0
0
200 400 600 800 1000 12
200 1400
0 1600 1800 2000
-100

-200
Chainage
-300
Figure 2. SP Resu
ults along with Resistivity Se
ection

C REFRACT
SEISMIC TION TOMOG
GRAPHY

The seissmic refraction method detects changes in late eral- seismicc velocity an
nd/or layer th
hickness.
Seismic techniques are
a extremelly useful sincce seismic ve
elocity is gen
nerally the most
m sensitive
e to slight
changess in density and
a saturation
n in the types of materials commonly y used in dam
ms.

The com mmon seismiic technique used for da am investigattion is seism n method. A standard
mic refraction
seismic refraction lin eophones at 5m intervalss. Energy is input into the ground
ne is laid outt using 24 ge
us points loca
at variou ated along thhe seismic lin
ne, resulting in a 2D velocity model off the subsurfface.

A minimum of seven n shot points are used for each sprea ad. These incclude two far shots on either side
of the sspread, to provide the true
t seismicc velocity of the sound rock, two end shots to t obtain
reciprocaal times, and
d three mid shots withinn the profile to obtain la
ateral velocityy variation in
n the top
layer(s) (overburden).

The lenggth of geophone spread depends


d upo on the requirred depth of investigationn and the dimmensions
of any suubsurface fe
eatures that area to be ma apped. A leng gth of approxx. three to fo
our times the
e depth of
investiga
ation is usedd. A geophon ne spacing of o 5 m with 24 channelss spread is adequate
a forr detailed
mapping g of subsurfaace condition ns to a depth h of approx. 30m. The geophone
g sp
pacing can beb further
increaseed for greaterr depth of invvestigation, iff required.

The com mpressional wave veloccity is affec cted by ma any conditions. Howeve er, in sedim ments (or
compactted soil) the primary facctors affecting the compressional wa ave velocity are density,, porosity
and satu erials (rock), factors succh as cemen
uration. In liithified mate ntation, fractturing, altera
ation and
stress ge enerally havve a greater effect on thee velocity. Fiig. 3 hereund
der show typ pical results obtained
from Seismic Refracction Tomogrraphy, with blue b to red representing
r increasing seismic velo ocity, and
red line rrepresentingg the bedrockk topographyy.

Figure 3. Geophysical Methods for Common


C Dam Problems

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

REFRACTION MICRO TREMOR (ReMi)

Innovative technique of ReMi (Refraction Micro-tremor) has distinct edge over MASW and SASW in
terms of logistics, execution and results. ReMi can be performed under the same layout as used for
seismic refraction, to obtain excellent shear wave velocity profiles of subsurface.

ReMi is a new, proven seismic method for measuring in-situ shear-wave (S-wave) velocity profiles. It
is economic both in terms of cost and time. Testing is performed at the surface using the same
conventional seismograph and vertical P-wave geophones used for refraction studies. The seismic
source consists of ambient seismic "noise", or micro-tremors, which are constantly being generated by
cultural and natural noise. Because conventional seismic equipment is used to record data, and
ambient noise is used as a seismic source, the ReMi method is less costly, faster and more
convenient than borehole methods and other surface seismic methods, such as SASW and MASW
used to determine shear-wave profiles. Depending on the material properties of the subsurface, ReMi
can determine shear wave velocities down to a minimum of 40 meters (130 feet) and a maximum of
100 meters (300 feet) depth.

The ReMi method offers significant advantages. In contrast to borehole measurements. ReMi tests a
much larger volume of the subsurface. The results represent the average shear wave velocity over
distances as far as 200 meters (600 feet). Because ReMi is non-invasive and nondestructive, and
uses only ambient noise as a seismic source, no permits are required for its use. ReMi seismic lines
can be deployed within road medians, at active construction sites, or along highways, without having
to disturb work or traffic flow. Unlike other seismic methods for determining shear wave velocity, ReMi
will use these ongoing activities as seismic sources. There is no need to close a street or shut down
work for the purpose of data acquisition. And a ReMi survey usually takes less than two hours, from
setup through breakdown. These advantages sum to substantial savings in time and cost. Moreover
the method provides more accurate results compared to conventional effort of picking up shear waves
from records which more often than not lead to errors.

GROUND PENETRATING RADAR- BRIEF

GPR survey is conducted to identify shallow cracks, cavities and voids in the dam body. The survey
also might reveal the stratigraphy in the dam body based on contrast in dielectric constant.
The method can be used to obtain high resolution subsurface images showing buried objects, cables,
pipes and cavities. Following example shows a cavity detected by GPR.

SESIMIC TOMOGRAPHY- BRIEF

Unlike other methods discussed till here, used from the surface of Dam or Ground, Seismic
Tomography is conducted between a pair of boreholes or between upstream and downstream face of
the Dam, to provide high resolution details of internal structure. The resulting tomogram shown
physical property of each unit cell of dam body. In a concrete dam the information can be interpreted
in terms of fractures, weathered concrete etc., as shown in Fig.4 hereunder:

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Compendium of Technical Papers

eismic Tomography Across Faces of a Co


Figure 4. Se oncrete Dam

USIONS
CONCLU

Geophyssical method ds can be used in order to


t obtain data on internal conditions of dams veryy quickly.
Currentlyy these methhods have be een used to investigate a number of large dams. Indian expe erience of
using theese methods s in various dams
d has alsso been veryy encouragin
ng, resulting in effective treatment
t
of assocciated problem
ms. The key benefits cann be summarrized as undeer:

Geophysical Techniques- Quick as


G ssessment of o subsurfacce conditionns of Dams in non-
d
destructive m
manner
G
Geophysical Techniquess- Detailed an
nd continuouus information as againstt drilling
G
Geophysical Techniquess- Important tool for healtth check of dams,
d regula
ar monitoring
g and pre
& post rehabbilitation insp
pections.

These methods
m mayy also find usse in the futu
ure as monito
oring tools byy establishin
ng a baseline e data file
immedia ately after da
am constructtion. Subseq quent surveyys can be ru un after initia
al filling and
d after an
event su uch as rapid drawdown
d or an earthquake to determmine if any significant
s chhanges have occurred
in the intternal conditiions of damss.

REFERENCES
1. CEATI
C publica
ation- A Guidee to Resistivityy Investigation and Monitorin
ng of Embankkment Dams
2. CEATI
C publica
ation- Investig
gation of Geop physical Metho ods for Assess
sing Seepagee and Internal Erosion in
Embankment Dams: Self-Potential Field Data Acquisitiion Manual
3. Robbilard Claude, Seismic Tomography of o a Concrete Dam in Cana ada (Project Report)

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Dam Safety Challenge: An Institutional Diagnosis


Akshaya Kumar Das Gopal Prasad Roy
State Dam Safety Organisation, Bhubaneswar, Odisha State Dam Safety Organisation, Bhubaneswar, Odisha
akdas61@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
A safe dam is one which performs its intended functions without imposing unacceptable risks to the public and
society by its presence. Dam safety is now considered as an inherent feature in the planning, design,
construction, maintenance and operation of dams. The operation and maintenance of dams is a very essential
component of sound and sustainable water resources management. Dams potentially provide social and
economic benefits but at the same time pose a threat to lives and livelihoods and environment. Dam owners have
a legal obligation, to ensure that the dams are operated in a way that optimizes economic and social outputs
while not compromising safety. The Dam Safety Programme in the country advocates a comprehensive review of
all existing large dams to ensure that they are optimally delivering benefits in an effective, efficient and equitable
manner. Dam safety has enjoyed varying degree of attention by the international dam safety community and it
has been recognized that a successful dam safety assurance programme requires a dedicated institutional
structure with access to top management attention. Without the top management commitment in providing the
necessary resources, the programme is likely to be lost amidst other demands and more dams may become risky
to the public. Institutions evolve with changing conditions and social needs. The importance of understanding the
institutional context of dam safety management is that whether the existing structure is sufficient to deliver the
intended mandate or the institutional reform is necessary to foster the adoption and diffusion of technical
innovations in dam safety management. Social institutions are determinant to environmental changes and critical
forces in shaping the real world environmental governance. An efficient dam safety management needs
development of effective co-ordination mechanism between users to ensure that their policies, instruments and
objectives are mutually consistent and do not undermine each other. In this paper the author has tried to identify
the institutions relating to dam safety, their linkages, efficiency and further needs for a successful dam safety
programme in the country. An effort has been made to identify the stake holders their need and role in the dam
safety programme. Special mention have been made on the existing dam safety activity in the country,
institutions involved in planning, design, quality control and execution ,their linkages ,the short comings for a
successful dam safety programme. This paper also explores the institutional condition i.e. organizations, related
roles and responsibilities for sustainable dam safety management.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Water is a scarce resource, which makes its management one of the greatest challenges in the globe.
Water is the basic human right which applies to basic human needs and environmental sustainability.
Indias development vision will only be realized if water resources are managed in a way that is
sensitive and supportive of the many demands on this resource. The operation and maintenance of
dams is a very essential component of sound and sustainable water resources management. Dams
potentially provide social and economic benefits but at the same time pose a threat to lives and
livelihoods and environment. Dam owners have a legal obligation, to ensure that the dams are
operated in a way that optimizes economic and social outputs while not compromising safety. The
Dam Safety Programme in the country advocates a comprehensive review of all existing large dams to
ensure that they are optimally delivering benefits in an effective, efficient and equitable manner.

The importance of understanding the institutional context of dam safety management is that whether
the existing structure is sufficient to deliver the intended mandate or the institutional reform is
necessary to foster the adoption and diffusion of technical innovations in dam safety management.
Social institutions are determinant to environmental changes and critical forces in shaping the real
world environmental governance. This paper explores the institutional condition i.e. organizations,
related roles and responsibilities for sustainable dam safety management.

2.0 EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR LINKAGES

International and national organizations of advanced countries have been pioneers in dam safety
management. To name a few who have been followed for various national dam safety programmes
are as follows.

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ICOLD: The International Commission on Large Dams founded in 1929 has universal support and is
instrumental in collecting and sharing knowledge gained by professionals on dam design and
construction from all countries of the world. The various publications by ICOLD have been guiding
documents in dam engineering including dam safety.

FEMA: The Federal Emergency Management Agency of United States of America provides leadership
and support for a comprehensive, all hazards emergency management programme. Its role is unique
although it neither owns dams nor has regulatory responsibility for dams. FEMA is responsible for
coordinating all the activities of the US National dam safety Programme. FEMA leads the Interagency
Committee on Dam Safety (ICODS), which consists of representatives from Federal departments and
agencies who meet regularly and exclusively to examine dam safety at national level and recommend
mitigation policies that promulgate Dam safety. FEMA is also responsible in preparation of the dam
safety guidelines to be adopted and implemented by federal agencies responsible for operation and
maintenance of Dams in USA.

BOR (USBR): The Bureau of Reclamation of the US Department of the Interior (DOI) is responsible for
the development and conservation of the water resources in 17 Western States of USA. It controls 475
dams and dikes. BOR also provides an overview of dam safety programme in USA and provides
technical assistance to other DOI bureaus.

India has adopted the definition of large dams as per the International Commission on Large Dams
(ICOLD) standards. There are 4858 numbers of completed and 345 numbers of under construction
large dams in the country .These dams are mostly owned by State Irrigation/Water Resources
Departments and public sector power companies or state electricity boards. There are few dams
owned by municipal corporations, other public sector companies and some private companies (source:
National Register of Large Dams).

The Government of India realized the importance of dam safety way back in mid-70s and took a
number of steps to highlight its concern for creating general awareness among the engineering
community and the public at large. The state governments have the autonomy in their list of subjects
which includes the management of their own water resources within the state. As a follow up action to
the recommendations of state irrigation ministers conference held in 1975 the Dam Safety
Organization (DSO) in Central Water Commission (CWC) was created in 1979. The DSO in CWC
performs the coordinating and advisory role for the state governments and lays down guidelines,
compiles technical literature, organizes training and takes necessary steps to create dam safety
awareness in the states. With the initiative of CWC, 12 states in the country with signification number
of large dams have set up the Dam Safety Organisation in the respective states.

National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS): A standing committee on dam safety was constituted in
early 1980s comprising members from the centre and state governments to meet periodically and
discuss dam safety related issues. In October, 1987, the Government of India constituted the National
Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS) by broad basing the existing standing committee on dam safety to
include all states having significant number of large dams including some of the agencies /
organizations owning sufficient number of large dams. The national committee has been reconstituted
four times since its formation in December 1989, July 1993, November,1997 and in June,2002 so as to
include the new members. This committee meets regularly to discuss issues arising in the field of dam
safety with a view to oversee the dam safety activities in various states and organizations and
suggests improvement to bring these in line with the latest state of the art consistent with the Indian
condition. It also acts as a forum for exchange of views or techniques adopted for remedial measures
besides the committee also monitors follow up action on the recommendations of the Report on Dam
Safety Procedure published in July, 1986. To address the inter-state dam safety issues, the NCDS
has formed sub-committees for inter-state rivers.

The onus of operation and maintenance of these dams lies with the dam owner represented by the
Engineer in charge of the dam.

The State DSOs are headed by a Chief Engineer (for states having relatively large number of dams) or
a Superintending Engineer (Director) with adequate technical and non technical staff to carry out the
following jobs.

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3.0 INSPECTION OF DAMS

Phase-I Investigation

The State Dam Safety Organisation/Dam Safety Cells conduct Phase-I investigation of all large dams
once in 5 years to identify expeditiously the dams which may pose hazard to human life and property.
The investigation include an assessment of general condition with respect to safety of the project
based on available data and a visual inspection and determines the need for emergency measures
and conclude if additional study, investigation and analysis are necessary and warranted.

The work includes:


(a) review of data book (b) review of available engineering data related to design assumptions and
design of structures, construction records, post construction changes, hydrological and hydraulic
assumptions and features (c) review existing record of operation of dam and appurtenant structure
including mechanical and electrically operated equipments (d) review existing maintenance procedure
(e) review of structural behavior based on reading of instruments mounted or embedded in Dam (f)
review periodical inspection reports (g) conduct detailed field inspection as per proforma (h) record at
the end of investigation, the assessment of safety of dam, need for additional study, investigation,
analysis considered essential to assess the safety of dam, urgency of such additional investigation &
advice for Phase-II investigation, if needed.

Phase-II Investigation

The Phase-II investigation will be supplementary to Phase-I investigation and is conducted when the
results of Phase-I investigation indicates the need for additional in-depth study, investigation and
analysis.

The work includes: (a) additional visual inspection and surveillance (b) measurements through
instrument mounted or embedded in dams (c) foundation exploration (d) material testing (e) hydraulic
and hydrologic analysis & (f) structural stability analysis.

Review of Pre & Post-monsoon inspection reports

Pre-monsoon and Post-monsoon inspections are periodical inspections done every year by the field
engineers as per the guidelines prescribed by the Central Water Commission. The reports are
received by end of June and November, respectively by SDSO or Dam Safety Cell. Each year these
reports of inspections are reviewed at SDSO & the Annual Health status of the dams is published and
sent to Government in Department of Water Resources and Central Water Commission for their
appraisal.

Hydrological Review of Large Dam

Hydrological review of all the large dams are essential with respect to the safety of dam as in case of
most of the dams the design flood has been calculated with the help of some empirical formula based
on regional experience. With the advent of new methodology and development of Hydrological
Sciences, the hydrological review of dams has become essential based on hydro-metrological
approach following the guidelines fixed by the CWC. The adequacies of existing spillways are
reviewed for the enhanced inflow design flood. The method of computation needs specialization of the
subject as many assumption, probability, justification are connected with the subject.

Structural Review

After the hydrological review of a dam, if the spillway is found to be inadequate, alternatives like
putting an auxiliary spillway/fuse plug, adding parapet walls, strengthening the existing spillway ,raising
of dam height etc. are studied and design of such structure are made by appropriate organizations for
execution. The instrumentation data also analyzed to assess the structural safety of the dam.

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Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

In spite of all precautions and proper maintenance of the dam, sometimes due to unprecedented
natural phenomenon, or due to faulty operation of the reservoir, the dam may face emergency
situation such as dam over topping, dam break etc. which may lead to disaster. To cope up with such
exigency, Emergency Action Plan (EAP) each dam needs to be prepared.

An EAP is a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions at a dam and specifies
actions to be followed to minimize loss of life and property damage. The EAP includes:

1. Actions the dam owner will take to moderate or alleviate a problem at the dam.
2. Actions the dam owner will take, and in coordination with emergency management authorities, to
respond to incidents or emergencies related to the dam.
3. Procedures dam owners will follow to issue early warning and notification messages to responsible
downstream emergency management authorities.
4. Inundation maps to help dam owners and emergency management authorities identify critical
infrastructure and population-at-risk sites that may require protective measures, warning, and
evacuation planning.
5. Delineation of the responsibilities of all those involved in managing an incident or emergency and
how the responsibilities should be coordinated.

Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP)

As a part of the Dam Safety procedure, DSRP for each dam owning organization have been
constituted keeping water resources experts, civil engineers, mechanical engineers, hydrologists,
geologists with National and International reputation as its members. The main objective of the panel
is to provide independent expert review of the reports of distress observed in the investigation,
analysis performed and remedial action proposed prior to initiation of rehabilitation activities. The
SDSO organize the meetings, site visits of DSRP, gives the feed back to its member and transmits the
suggestion of the panel to Government for approval.

Inspection of dams once in 10 years

As per the report on dam safety procedures published by CWC, the States arrange the safety review
of dams which are more than 15m in height or which stores 15000ac.ft. or more of water by an
independent panel of experts once in 10 years. The State DSOs also prepare their own guidelines for
safety inspection keeping in view of their requirements but such guidelines draw their basic contents
from the guidelines prepared by the CWC.

State Dam Safety Committee (SDSC)

To carry out the Dam Safety Assurance Programme, high level committee comprising senior
Administrators & Engineers of Water Resources Department, representative of CWC have been
formed in each state. The Secretary of DOWR is the Chairman of the Committee. This committee
reviews the progress of the dam safety works. The head of the State DSO is usually the Member-
Secretary, organizes the committee meeting at regular intervals.

Workshops, Seminars & Trainings

The SDSO is the nodal agency for conducting workshops, trainings and seminars pertaining to Dam
Safety in the State.

Monitoring of rehabilitation work

The SDSO monitors the rehabilitation works of large dams. Regular progress report, expenditure
statements are being sent to Government, Central Water Commission and Funding Agencies at
regular intervals.

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4.0 THE STAKEHOLDERS OF DAM SAFETY PROGRAMME

There are various types of stakeholders in the dam safety programme, depending on their need and
role. Some of them are primary stakeholders (e.g., local people who consume water for domestic and
agricultural needs) while other may be secondary (like, NGOs) or tertiary(like, the World Bank which
intervenes through the government) in nature so far their direct and active relationship with the river
basin dynamics is concerned. Further, some are single-role stakeholders (like, the boatman) whereas
others are multi-role stakeholders (like, state governments).

The simple categorization of stakeholders that has been adopted in this paper is based on their role
either as a user, or contributor, or decision maker. This, in fact corresponds more or less to their
identity as primary or secondary stakeholders because users are generally primary stakeholders
whereas contributors can be secondary or tertiary, and so also the decision makers. Upshot is an
exception implying the negative side of dam safety management.

Various important stakeholders who are involved in the sector and their roles are as follows :

Stakeholder Stakeholder type Role


Govt. of India (MOWR) Decision maker Governs water resources
IMD (Indian Meteorological Dept) Contributor Provides data and analyses storms
CSMRS Contributor Provides technology for construction quality,
laboratory tests and analyses results
CWPRS Contributor Model testing and provide technology
INCOLD/CBIP/National Water Academy Contributor Capacity building of technical staff through
training
IITs, NITs Contributor Provides technology
State Research Institutes Contributor Model testing and provide technology
State Water Resources Dept Decision maker Governs water resources and owns maximum
no of dams
Water Supply Organizations (Urban Decision maker Ensures water for domestic use
Local Bodies / Panchayats)

State Forest & Environment Dept Decision maker Manages the catchment
Disaster Management Authorities Decision maker Coordinates agencies and people during
and contributor emergency
Agriculture Dept Decision maker Governs agriculture
Tourism Dept Decision maker & Governs on tourism development
User
Fishery Dept Decision maker & Policy maker for reservoir fishery
User
World Bank / Funding Agencies Contributors Provides aid/loan for dam rehabilitation works.
Drinking Water Users User Consume water for drinking, cooking and other
household need
Irrigation Water Users User Consume water for agricultural purposes
Fishermen User Use water bodies for fishery
Displaced people Upshot They are the negatively affected people of
water resource development (dams)
Industry User Consume water for industrial production as well
as for non-industrial use by the employees
Navigation Companies / Boatmen User Use rivers for navigational purposes
Contractors User cum Does the remedial works
Contributor
Polluting Agencies Upshot Pollutes the water with activities(mining)
Consultants User cum Provides expert advises ,prepares reports at a
Contributor cost
NGOs/Activists Contributor Raise issues related to peoples safety,
environmental degradation
News Papers / Electronic Media Contributor Information to public

5.0 PRIORITY AND PERFORMANCE

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The water regulated by and stored in dams is considered to be an absolute requirement to meet the
water challenges and the development objectives of other sectors in industry, agriculture, energy and
risk management. Indeed, it is said that in many parts of the world such challenges cannot be
achieved without increased storage, and demand cannot be met by exploitation of natural flow
patterns alone. Dams continue to be seen as a solution across all of the use and demand
challenges. Unfortunately, many of our most powerful and extensive alterations of flow of water have
long run consequences that are unintended, unanticipated and undesirable. Institutions develop over
decades and centuries to fulfill specific social needs. While our institutions have served us well, they
are pressed to cope with a future in which water quality and availability for rapidly changing demands,
ecological health for fresh and coastal waters, integrative use of surface and ground water and land
use patterns must be considered simultaneously in geographical settings of watersheds. At a larger
scale, maintaining sustainable practices in land and water management by building synergies between
social and natural capital can serve security needs effectively. Building social networks of trust and
mutually beneficial interdependence is therefore the social infrastructure of water resources
sustainability.

6.0 STRENGTHENING THE DAM SAFETY INSTITUTIONS

Many large dams are ageing and have various structural deficiencies and shortcomings in operation
and maintenance. In most states, budgets for dam O & M are part of the larger budget for irrigation
system maintenance, which is decided on the basis of irrigated area than the actual need. In practice,
irrigation canal maintenance gets priority over dam maintenance, which has allowed deterioration of
many dams. The dam safety assurance is necessary to reduce risks and assure sustainability and full
operational capacity of existing storage through early identification and rectification of the problem.

During April 1989, the World Bank proposed to establish a centrally funded scheme for a possible
assistance by the Bank as a project with objective (a) to strengthen the institutional frame work for
Dam Safety Assurance b) to upgrade the physical features in and around the selected dams to
enhance the safety status as required through basic safety facilities and remedial works.

Accordingly an agreement was signed in 1991 for an assistance of US $130 Million for Dam Safety
Assurance and Rehabilitation Project (DSARP) in Central Water Commission and 4 participating
States i.e., Orissa, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. The project completed in September
1999. The key achievement as per the Implementation Completion Report of World Bank is that the
dam safety programme has become generally accepted in India as necessity. In central and state
levels, awareness has grown appreciably. Institutional strengthening in terms of creation and operation
of permanent DSO equipped with requisite staff carrying out periodic inspection of health status of
large dams have been achieved. The CWC has also been strengthened with permanent staff
increased and equipment, training provided. In other words, Indias dam safety assurance programme
has made an important start towards being institutionalized. The hydrological review capability of
CWCs DSO has been strengthened but effective and sustainable. Regional probable maximum
precipitation (PMP) atlases have been prepared for two regions. The CWC reviewed the flood
forecasting facilities in Chambal and Mahanadi basins and improvements have been implemented.

Lessons learnt from DSARP

The project was the first stand alone dam safety project financed by the World Bank and the lessons
learned from the project include the substantial up gradation of institutions at the central level and
within the states. The project brought out many technical and institutional issues as follows:

Hydrological review of dams take a long time to collate data for rainstorms ,decide the PMP and
derive the unit hydrograph of the project catchment. Highly technical components, such as flood
forecasting using telemetry, risk analysis, and some other specialized areas needs to be
thoroughly prepared before appraisal, using international consultants where necessary. The use of
new instrumentation requires training of the personnel concerned. Where practical, the supply and
installation contract should include a component for on-the-job training. The project design should
incorporate development of computer data bases incorporating historical major flood hydrographs
and corresponding storm data, software for analysis, and graphical user friendly interfaces.

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Training in dam safety should be institutionalized so that all engineers in charge of dams
routinely receive dam safety training. The frequent rotation of experienced staff away from dam
related work should be minimized.

It is important to prioritize investments according to appropriate risk analysis and not on limited
parameters such as dam height and reservoir volume but taking account of the extent of potential
loss of life and physical damage downstream.

Dam safety review panels should be advisory only and should not be required to approve studies
or designs. The selection of members of dam safety review panels should be made very carefully
to ensure that those selected are capable of reaching sensible conclusions quickly.

States generally do not have adequate hydrological capability to estimate design floods and
review flood operating strategies. There is a need for more specialization and the development of
experience in specific fields. Flood analysis, flood forecasting and reservoir operation and the
other aspects of the hydrology of reservoirs is one such field where specialization is desirable.
Frequent transfer of engineers who have received specific training is counter-productive. There is
a need for much more review and analysis of historical events to understand why floods in excess
of previous designs were passed without undue damage or difficulty and as an aid to formation of
future operational strategies.

Systemic problems in project implementation need to be avoided: Uncertainty in the flow of funds
deters good contractors from bidding for the works. Procurement is slow. Contract management
by DOI / DOWR needs improvement. The stakeholders' Workshop drew attention to the need for
more training in Bank procedures and contract management.

O&M manuals should take account of dam safety plans (including O&M, instrumentation, and
emergency preparedness), which should be drafted early in the rehabilitation process and
progressively updated during implementation. Problems identified with the remedial works
should be reflected in revision to O&M manuals. Operating instructions should incorporate
design assumptions, such as expected erosion downstream of spillway energy dissipaters, pore
pressure readings, expected displacement, etc. The results of periodical readings of monitoring
instruments installed in the dams should be analyzed and the findings should be incorporated in
the annual O&M program, if necessary. Although implementation of the project has been
generally satisfactory, assurance against dam safety related disasters is a continuous and
ongoing process and further strengthening of institutions, procedures and technical capacity in
the project states are required.

The staff position of CWC and participating states strengthened and have been very effective in
implementing the dam safety programme, but the staff position in other non participating states were
not satisfactory to carry out the dam safety activity. The capacity to carryout effective dam safety
assurance programs varies from state to state due to staffing levels, training and degree of
experience. Several SDSOs face shortage of staff, capacity, office space, equipment and operating
budgets which limits their ability to adequately carry out their roles and put forth before the higher
management the dam safety needs and the resources.

7.0 NEED OF POLICY FRAME WORK

The competition for water by different sectors, urban and rural pressures, the need for sustainability
and environmental protection, the influence of climate change and climate variability, pressures from
various advocacy groups and partisan approaches, all make water management decisions highly
political. India ,like many nations is beginning to position water management decision making in the
framework of Integrated Water Resources Management(IWRM).The National Water Policy,2012
indicates the step in that direction. It also contains safety issues of hydraulic structures.

National Water Policy, 2012

The National Water Policy has spelt out regarding the water resources infrastructure maintenance and
the suitable percentage of costs of infrastructure development needs to be set aside along with

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collected water charges for repair and maintenance. Legally empowered dam safety services need to
be ensured in the states as well as at the centre. Appropriate safety measures including downstream
flood management for each dam should be taken on top priority.

Flood forecasting is very important for flood preparedness and should be expanded extensively across
the country and modernized using real time data acquisition system and linked to forecasting models.
Efforts should be towards developing physical models for various basin sections which should be
linked to each other and to medium range weather forecast to enhance lead time.

The operating procedure for reservoirs should be evolved and implemented in such a manner to have
flood cushion and to reduce trapping of sediment during flood season. These procedures should be
based on sound decision support system. Protecting all areas prone to floods and droughts may not
be practicable. Hence, methods for coping with floods and droughts have to be encouraged.
Communities need to be involved in preparing an action plan for dealing with flood / drought situations.
To increase the preparedness for sudden and unexpected flood related disasters, dam break studies
and preparation and updating the emergency action plan should be evolved involving affected
communities.

Regarding the institutional arrangements, the national water policy says there should be a forum at the
national level to deliberate upon issues relating to water and evolve consciousness, cooperation and
reconciliation among party states. A similar mechanism should be established within each state to
amicably resolve differences in competing demands for water amongst different users of water and
also between different parts of the state.

A permanent water dispute tribunal at the centre should be established to resolve the issues
expeditiously in an equitable manner. Apart from using the good offices of the union or the state
governments, as the case may be, the path of the arbitration and mediation may also be tried in
dispute resolution. Water resources projects and services should be managed with community
participation. For improved service delivery on sustainable basis, the stage government / urban local
bodies may associate private sector in public private sector mode with penalties for failure under
regulatory control on prices charged and service standards with full accountability to democratically
elected local bodies.

Integrated water resources management (IWRM) taking river basin / sub-basin as a unit should be the
main principle for planning, development and management of water resources. The departments /
organizations at centre and stage government levels should be restructured and made multi-
disciplinary accordingly.

Appropriate institutional arrangement for each river basin should be developed to collect and collate all
data on regular basis with regard to rain fall, river flows, area irrigated by crop and by source,
utilization for various uses by both surface and ground water and to publish water accounts on ten
daily basis every year for each river basin with appropriate water budgets and water accounts based
on hydrologic balances. In addition, water budgeting and water accounting should be carried out for
each aquifers.

Most of the State water policies also indicate about the proper organizational arrangements for
ensuring the safety of the dams.

8.0 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

Dam Safety Bill

Government of India is considering bringing out a central legislation on dam safety. The proposed dam
safety legislation will provide for proper surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of all large
th
dams in India to ensure their safe functioning. The Dam Safety Bill, 2010 which was introduced in 15
th
Lok Sabha in 30 August, 2010 has now come to lapse. Hence the bill needed to be prepared afresh.
The Dam Safety Bill, 2014 has been prepared by CWC and sent to Ministry of Water Resources for its
consideration. The Dam Safety Bill, 2010 encompasses 1) constitution of national committee on dam
safety; 2) the central dam safety organization in CWC to provide the technical and managerial

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assistance to the state dam safety organizations or non-state dam safety organizations, all dam safety
cells; 3) constitution of state dam safety committee by state govt. having more than 20 specified dams;
4) establishment of state dam safety organizations in states having 20 or more large dams; 5)
establishment of dam safety cell in states having less than 20 specified dams; 6) establishment of non-
state dam safety organization by dam owners having more than 10 specified dams; 7) establishment
of non-state dam safety cell by dam owners having less than 10 specified dams. The bill elaborates
the duties and functions of these institutions.

9.0 SUSTAINABLE DAM SAFETY AND INTER-GENERATIONAL CHALLENGE

Challenge Fund Mechanism & private sector participation

Inadequate budget allocation, lack of smooth flow of funds has resulted deferred dam maintenance
causing distress to dams and increased risk of failure. Dams with potential to generate hydro power,
aquaculture, and water related recreation and tourism can attract private sector to participate in dam
operation & maintenance. A replenishable challenge fund by responsible financial institution can be
created. A dam qualifying to repay can avail fund for its proper O & M.

Till the Dams are made self sustaining, adequate fund provision for O & M needs to be made by the
dam owners.

Preserving and digitizing the documents and drawings

A most important aspect of dam safety sustainability is upkeepment of the records and drawings. A
well maintained history record guides the decision maker before going for any intervention. The well
preserved documents and drawings not only help the present user generation but also to generations
to come. The State DSOs need to have library containing all digitized documents and drawings.

Link with premier Technical and Management Institutions and Universities

There is a necessity to bridge the gap between the advanced theoretical knowledge gathered in the
technical education institutes and its applications in the field. The country may not withstand the
Business as Usual scenario. To prepare the younger generation to face the challenges of demand for
water for growing population, uncertainties due to climate change and aging of existing structures , the
technical education institutes and Government Departments should plan out suitable programmes to
move shoulder to shoulder not limiting the role as consultants . Likewise the premier management
institutes and universities should evolve suitable conflict management and negotiation skill
development techniques to make dam safety programme sustainable.

Sustainable Catchment Management

Although the construction of more no of storage reservoirs is necessary to meet the ever increasing
water needs, but the best possible sites have already been used. To make the existing reservoirs
sustainable, the sediment flow in to the reservoir needs to be controlled by suitable interventions such
as forestation and appropriate catchment treatment. Existing laws also need to scrupulously enforce to
stop the industries releasing untreated affluent to rivers.

10.0 CONCLUSION

Dams must be designed, built, operated and maintained safe. The responsibility for protecting lives
and property never ends. New approaches and policies must be developed, implemented and
evaluated. New programmes must be promoted and weak programmes need to be revitalized.
Institutions are to be strengthened and interlinked. An efficient dam safety management needs
development of effective co-ordination mechanism between users to ensure that their policies,
instruments and objectives are mutually consistent and do not undermine each other. An important
prerequisite is better availability & access to accurate, consistent data as well as facilitating dialogue
among stakeholders on relevant issue. Given the large capital investment in the large dams, the
substantive evaluations of completed projects are few in number, narrow in scope, poorly integrated

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across impact categories and inadequately linked to decision on operation. Figuere et al (2005) rightly
advocate for investment in three inter-generational segments of society: the present senior generation,
the present young professional and future professionals. They argue, in this complex jungle of
uncertainties, there is one thing that we know for sure. If we wait for the next generation of water
mangers to do something, it will be too late for too many people. The difference of opinion between the
social activist, the policy maker and the engineers is not insurmountable. Instead of arguing endlessly
on the advantages of one form of water resources development over the other, emphasis should be
given on finding the right balance between the two so that the societal, agricultural and industrial
needs are satisfied in an optimum and efficient way. Hence all concerned with the water resources
sector should relentlessly pursue the objective of overall development with a participatory approach to
maximize the benefits and reduce the negative impacts to the bare minimum possible.

REFERENCES

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Government of India, Central Water Commission; (1986) Report on Dam Safety Procedures, CWC publication;
(1989) Guidelines for safety inspection of dams, CWC publication.

Government of Orissa, Department of Water Resources, State DSO (2007): Dam safety activities and large dams
of Orissa.

ICOLD, 1998, ICOLD World Register of Dams, Computer Database, Paris, International Commission on
Large Dams.

The World Bank,(2000), Implementation completion report. Report no 20399, Rural Development Sector
Management Unit, South Asia Region.

United Nations (2003), World Water Development Report, Water for People Water for Life, UNESCO and
Berghahn Books.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (1995), Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams, Water
Resources Technical Publication, Denver, Colorado

World Commission on Dams, (2000) Dams and Development - A new frame work for decision making; Earthscan
publication Ltd, London.

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Dam Safety and DRIP Activities in Tamil Nadu


V.D.SURESH
Project Director
SPMU, Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department
tnspmu@gmail.com

P. Gunasekaran V. Veeralakshmi
Executive Engineer Assistant Executive Engineer
SPMU, Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department SPMU, Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department

ABSTRACT
Tamil Nadu, the southernmost state of the Indian peninsula is, spread over 130,058 sq. km. It lies between 800 5"
to 130 35" N and 760 15" to 800 20" E and accounts for about 4 percent of the total area of the country. About 40
per cent of the state population is dependent on agriculture for livelihood. Hence growth in agriculture is important
not only to ensure food security but also for higher living standards as well. The state is heavily dependent on
monsoon rains. It has 17 major river basins. Presently there are about 85 reservoirs under major, medium and
small category which are being used for either irrigation or drinking or both and are maintained by Water
Resources Department (WRD). The existing storage structures were created years before and need improvement
to meet the growing demands and to preserve rainwater for using it efficiently. The state Water Resources
Department through various modernization programmes are attempting to revive them. Also, it is important to
monitor the safety and operational performance of the dams for safe and efficient use. The Dam Safety
Directorate (DSD) was established in the year 1991 in Tamil Nadu with the object of giving assurance to the
safety of large dams in Tamil Nadu. At Present the Dam Safety Directorate is monitoring the health status of 89
WRD dams and 38 Nos. of Tamil Nadu Generation and Corporation (TANGEDCO) large dams and provides
suggestion to improve the safety and operational performance of the dams. Also, being a member in State Dam
Safety and National Dam Safety Committees it reports the government about the health status of dams in the
state and recommends for the various dam safety activities that are to be carried out in the state.

Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) have been taken up in India with World Bank Assistance to
ensure the strength, safety and to improve the operational performance of the existing Dams in a sustainable
manner. The project implementation period is six years from 2012 to 2018. Presently, 75 WRD dams and 38
TANGEDCO dams in Tamil Nadu are proposed to be rehabilitated under this project and in few dams the works
are in progress. This paper deals about the dam safety and DRIP activities that are carried out in Tamil Nadu. The
implementation procedure and the activities involved in the Project pertaining to Tamil Nadu are detailed in this
paper in clear manner. The rehabilitation works that are required to be carried out in the DRIP dams are also
outlined.

1. INTRODUCTION

Tamil Nadu, the southernmost state of the Indian peninsula is, spread over 1,30,058 sq.km. It lies
between 800 5" to 130 35" N and 760 15" to 800 20" E. Tamil Nadu constitutes 4 percent of Indias land
area and is inhabited by 6 percent of Indias population, but has only 2.5 percent of Indias Water
resources. About 40 per cent of the state population is dependent on agriculture for livelihood.
Agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the State, using 75 per cent of the States water
resources. Demands from other sectors such as domestic and industries have been growing
significantly.

The State is heavily dependent on monsoon rains. The annual average rainfall is around 930 mm. (47
percent during the north-east monsoon, 35 percent during the south-west monsoon, 14 percent in the
summer and 4 percent in the winter). Hence, it is essential to store the rain water through the existing
storage structures like Dams and tanks. Many dams in Tamil Nadu are constructed years before and
there is an urgent need to revive them to accommodate to the present climatic scenario for safe and
efficient operation of the same.

Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) has been taken up in India with World Bank
Assistance in order to ensure the strength, safety and to improve the safety and operational
performance of the existing Dams in a sustainable manner. The project is being supervised and
coordinated by Central Water Commission (CWC) at the National level and the State Project

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Managem ment Unit (SSPMU) at the e State leve


el. This pape
er aims to hig
ghlight the dam
d safety a
and DRIP
activitiess that are carrried out in Tamil Nadu.

2. DAMS
S IN TAMIL NADU
N

Prior to independen nce only thrree reservoirs, viz., Perriyar, Pechip


parai and Mettur
M reservvoir were
construccted. Presenttly there are about 85 resservoirs majo
or, medium and
a small puut together with a total
storage ccapacity of about
a 6,500 MCM.
M

ution of dams in Tamil Na


The age--wise distribu adu is diagra
ammatically represented
r in Figure 1. 65% of
the damss in Tamil Naadu are moree than 25 yea
ars old and are
a in a needd of rehabilita
ation and
improvem
ment. Hence e, more numb ber of dams is included u
under DRIP in Tamil Nadu.

%
3% 2%
35% 12%
Above100
A Years
75
7 - 100 Yearrs
50
5 - 74 Years
48%
25
2 - 49 Years
Less than 25 Years
Y

Figure
e 1 Age-wise distribution
d of dams in Tamiil Nadu

3. DAM SAFETY IN TAMIL NA


ADU

To give assurance to the safe ety of damss in Tamil Nadu, Dam Safety Dirrectorate (DSD) was
hed in the year
establish y 1991 in Tamil Nadu u headed byy a Director in the rank of a Superrintending
e detailed below.
Engineer. The activitties of the Directorate are

eparation of Health Stattus Reports of dams


3.1 Pre
The periodical monsoon inspection reports prepared
p by the
t field offic
cers of the fo
our regions (Chennai,
(
Madurai,, Trichy and Pollachi) arre reviewed byb the DSD as detailed in the Table e 1 and Health Status
Reports are prepareed prioritizing
g the deficie
encies and submitted to the Governm ment, Regional Chief
Engineers and Chieff Engineer (C Civil Designss), TANGEDDCO. The co onsolidated health
h status report is
nually submiitted to the Central Watter Commisssion as Ann
also ann nual Consolidation Repo ort (ACR)
based on
n Pre-Monso oon and Postt - Monsoon inspection re eports.

Table 1 Inspe
ection by Dam Safety Directtorate

Sl.No. Period Tarrget Date for Inspection


th th
1 Pre Monsoon 10 Apr 14 Jun
n
th th
2 Monsoon I 15 Jun 15 Aug
g
3 Monsoon II 16th Aug 14th No
ov
th th
4 Post Monsoon
n 15 Nov 9 Aprr

chnical inve
3.2 Tec estigation off large dams
s by Multi-Disciplinary Committee
C (
(Phase-I)

Technica al Investigation of all the Dams in the


e state (both WRD and TANGEDCO)
T ) are carried out once
in five yyears by a five member multidisciplinary committee as Pha ase-I Investig
gation of Da ams. The
Director, Dam Safetyy Directorate is the Chairman for Phase I investiga
ation.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

3.3 Detailed Technical Investigation of dams by National Level Experts (Phase II)

These inspections of dams are being carried out by experts from National level. These experts
recommend their views and comments on specific problems related to dam structures.

3.4 State Dam Safety Committee (SDSC)

The State Dam Safety Committee (SDSC) was reconstituted by the State Government to monitor the
safety aspects of all the dams in the State. The main functions of the Committee are to review the
work done by the Dam Safety Directorate and to keep the State Government informed of its activities
and recommendations. The committee meets twice in a year. The Chairman of the Committee is
Principal Secretary to Government, Public Works Department.

3.5 National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS)

The Chief Engineer (O & M) and the Director, Dam Safety Directorate are the members of the National
Committee on Dam safety under the Chairmanship of the Chairman Central Water Commission which
reviews the activities of the State Dam Safety Organisations in the states. The National Committee on
Dam safety meets once in a year.

3.6 Preparation of Geological Mapping documents of Dams

The Geological Mapping documents of dams are being prepared through Geological Survey of India.
So far, Geological mapping documents were prepared for 65 PWD dams and 36 large dams of
TANGEDCO. The structural deficiencies observed at the dam site with respect to Geological aspects
are reported in the document with recommendations for remedial works.

3.7 Preparation of History Books of dams

So far, History books of 9 dams namely (1) Vaniar (2) Gomukhi (3) Mettur (4) Uppar (Thiruppur) (5)
Periyar (6) Pechiparai (7) Manjalar (8) Manimuthar and (9) Sholayar have been prepared and printed.

4. DAM REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (DRIP)

The Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project with implementation period of six years has become
effective on 18th April 2012 and is under implementation initially in four States, namely: Tamil Nadu,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha, targeting rehabilitation and improvement of 223 identified dams.
These identified dams are of Water Resources Department of the States and in case of Tamil Nadu
and Kerala, also of the State Electricity Boards. The total estimated cost of DRIP is Rs.2100 Crore
which includes share of about Rs.1488 Crore for the initially identified four States, Rs.480 Crore for the
new States/Organizations, and Rs.132 Crore for CWC. World Bank will be funding 80% of the project
cost by way of loan/credit, while remaining 20% will be borne by the respective State Governments
and the Central Government.

The main components of the DRIP Project are; (a) Rehabilitation and Improvement of Dams and
associated appurtenances, (b) Dam Safety Institutional Strengthening and (c) Project Management.

5. DRIP ACTIVITIES IN TAMIL NADU

In Tamil Nadu, the participating Departments in DRIP are Water Resources Department (WRD), Tamil
Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. (TANGEDCO) and Agricultural Engineering
Department (AED). The total number of dams taken under DRIP in Tamil Nadu is 113 of which 75 (i.e.
70 dams + 4 drinking water reservoirs+ 1 Anicut) are WRD dams and 38 are TANGEDCO dams. In
addition, Catchment Area Treatment works are taken up by the AED in two reservoirs, namely
Krishnagiri and Kundah reservoirs to reduce the siltation in dams. State Project Management Unit
(SPMU) in Tamil Nadu is the co-ordinating office for Tamil Nadu State headed by a Project Director.
The implementing agencies are (IA) are WRD, TANGEDCO & AED in Tamil Nadu.

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6. DRIP IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE IN TAMILNADU

Certain procedures are followed in Tamil Nadu to rehabilitate the DRIP dams and the implementation
procedure has been detailed as a flow chart in Figure 2.

HYDROLOGICAL REVIEW STUDY


(To be vetted by CWC for Large Dams & by Design Circle for
Small and Intermediate Dams)

FLOOD ROUTING by Design Circle, WRD


(Additional surplus arrangements design stability checks are
to be done if required)

INSPECTION BY DAM SAFETY REVIEW PANEL

PREPARATION OF DETAILED ESTIMATE

PREPARATION OF PROJECT SCREENING TEMPLATE


First level Screening of PST - SPMU
Second level Screening of PST - CPMU
Approval of PST by WB

EMPOWERED COMMITTEE CLEARANCE FOR THE PROPOSAL

ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION FROM GOVERNMENT

TECHNICAL SANCTION OF THE ESTIMATE

BID APPROVAL
Prior Review works - > Rs.25 Crores- by WB &
Rs.5- 25 Crores by CPMU
Post Review Works < Rs.5 Crores by SPMU

TENDERING PROCESS
(Inviting Tenders, Tender Award Committee approval & Bid
Evaluation report approval by WB for prior review works)

AWARD OF CONTRACT

IMPLEMENTATION

Figure 2. Implementation Procedure of DRIP in Tamil Nadu

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6.1 Hydrology Review Study and Flood Routing

The design flood computed in many dams, especially in older ones are inadequate according to the
new standards since the design floods were arrived based on the limited rainfall details available
during construction period. Now, many rainfall stations were established during the recent past and
hence the design flood can be computed more precisely. Under DRIP, before any rehabilitation and
improvement works are undertaken on a dam, the design flood for the reservoir are being calculated in
accordance with IS: 11223 - 1985. Based on IS: 11223 - 1985, dams are classified as Small,
Intermediate and Large (Table 2). Depending on the type of dam, hydrology review study report is
prepared. If a dam is classified as Large, the hydrology of the dam is prepared taking into the
consideration of Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) and the report is sent to Central Water Commission,
New Delhi for vetting. If a dam is small, 100 year storm is taken as inflow design storm and if the dam
is intermediate, Standard Project Storm is taken as the inflow design storm. The hydrology review
study reports of Small and Intermediate dams are vetted by Designs Circle, the Design Wing of Tamil
Nadu Water Resources Department (TNWRD).

Table 2 Classification of dams as per IS11223-1985

Gross Hydraulic Total No. of


Sl. Classification Total No. of
Storage Head Inflow Design Storm TANGEDCO
No. of Dam WRD dams
(Mcm) (m) dams
1 Small 0.5-10 7.5 -12 100 year Storm 19 2

2 Intermediate 10-60 12 -30 Standard Project Storm 41 17

3 Large >60 >30 Probable Maximum Storm 15 19


Total 75 38

After the approval of hydrology review study, if the revised design flood is greater than the original
design flood, Flood Routing study has to be carried on the vetted inflow hydrograph to access the flood
handling capacity of the existing surplus arrangements to cater the revised inflow peak. Decisions
have to be made on what type of surplus arrangements have to be provided if it needed. Necessary
designs have to be formulated for the additional surplus arrangements and the stability of the existing
structure has to be checked for the revised M.W.L conditions and the availability of free board also be
checked for the rise in water level.

6.2 Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP) Inspection

DSRP will be advisory in function and provide expert opinion on studies and designs. The objective of
DSRP is to review and advise on complicated design and construction matters related to dam safety
and other critical aspects of project dams, its appurtenant structures, catchment area, area
surrounding the reservoir and downstream areas. There are two DSRP teams constituted in Tamil
Nadu under DRIP consisting of technical experts. The DSRP team inspect in and out of the DRIP
dams and recommend the rehabilitation works needed for the dam and other appurtenant structures.

6.3 Detailed Estimate

Based on the recommendations of the DSRP, detailed estimate for each dam is prepared by the field
Engineers and the estimates are scrutinized by Tamil Nadu SPMU. The following rehabilitation works
have been proposed / taken under DRIP:

Strengthening of Earthen bund


Reaming the Vertical Drainage Shaft
Repairs to revetment/ rip -rap in u/s face
Repairs to Chutes, Parapet walls/kerb walls
Repairs to Toe drain, Rock Toe
Providing additional Surplus Weir
Providing Fuse plug Arrangements
Repair/Improvements to Energy dissipation arrangement
Providing Turfing on D/S
Filter Arrangements

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Repairs to Road on top of dam, approach road, service road.


Construction of protective walls along the sides of the roads, surplus course etc.
Repairs/ replacement of shutter
Construction of Retaining wall at upstream side
Repairs to d/s rubble apron.
Repair works to gallery
Grouting if necessary
Reaming of choked drain holes
Providing Culverts in d/s of the dam
Improvements to existing drain and Retaining Wall
Repairs or providing Instrumentation
Repairing, renewing and providing electrical arrangements
Providing Lightning Conductors
Providing Generator if necessary.
Providing Communication Facilities
Automatic weather stations, Digital water level indicators, Flood warning System (Siren) are
proposed to be installed.

6.4 Project Screening Template (PST)

An important feature of project management is the standard template form which is to be filled by the
concerned Executive Engineer. The template provides the basic parameters of each dam and detailed
information on technical, environmental, social and all implementation related aspects. The PST
consists of six forms namely (1) Form 1-Project Details, (2) Form 2-Dam Specific details, (3) Form 3-
Health Status of dams, (4) Form 4-Rehabilitation Proposals, (5) Form 5-Environmental and Social
Management Framework and (6) Form 6-Implementation arrangement. The preliminary screening of
the PST is done by TNSPMU and after incorporating SPMU comments the same has been sent to
Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) for obtaining World Bank approval.

6.5 Administrative and Technical Sanction

After obtaining the World Bank approval for the PST, the rehabilitation proposal is placed before the
Empowered Committee for DRIP which is headed by the Chief Secretary to Government for getting
approval after which Administrative Sanction is obtained from the Government. After obtaining the
Administrative sanction, Technical sanction is accorded by the concerned regional Chief Engineers.

6.6 Tender Process

Bid document is prepared by the Dam Engineers based on World Bank approval norms and guidelines
and the same is scrutinized and approved by the competent authority. (i.e. Prior Review Works (Rs.5
Crore to Rs. 25 crore) - CPMU approval & above 25 Crores- World Bank approval, Post Review
Works (<Rs.5 Crore) SPMU approval. After the approval of the bid document, tenders are floated.
Tender is awarded after the approval of Bid Evaluation Report by the Tender Award Committee.

6.7 Award of Contract

Once the tender is awarded, the agreement is signed with the approved bidder. The dam site is
handed over for carrying out the rehabilitation works at the dam site as per the specification outlined in
the Bid. Hydromechanical works are being carried out through Public Works Workshops and Stores
which is specialized institution in Water Resources Department having more than 150 years of
experience in this field. Similarly Electrical works are being carried out through Electrical wing of Public
Works Department. The quality of the rehabilitation works are also being checked by the respective
Quality Control divisions functioning in the fours regions of the state.

7. AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT (AED)

Reservoir sedimentation or Reservoir Silting is a major issue in many reservoirs. Sedimentation results
in loss of storage and also reduces the life span of the reservoir. To address these issue necessary
catchment area treatment works are to be carried out. Catchment Area Treatment works in Kundah

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

and Krishnagiri reservoirs are proposed to be carried out through AED under DRIP. The Catchment
area treatment works proposed are construction of Terrace Support Wall/Gabion Terrace Support
Wall, Facial Revetment/Gabion Facial Revetment, Drainage Line Treatment and landslide treatment
works etc.

8. OTHER ACTIVITIES OF DRIP IN TAMIL NADU


In addition to the implementation procedure mentioned above, TNSPMU involves in the following
activities;

(1) Sedimentation studies in DRIP dams in Tamil Nadu through Watershed Management Board
Division, Pollachi.
(2) Organizing training programmes on various topics such as Procurement Procedures, Design
Flood Review, Geo-technical investigations, grouting techniques, Preparation of Templates,
Emergency Action Plan, etc. at various cities of Tamil Nadu.
(3) Organizing Technical Committee meetings and World Bank Review Mission meeting meetings
for DRIP on behalf of Tamil Nadu.

9. PROGRESS OF DRIP IN TAMILNADU

Following the implementation procedure, 9 WRD and 3 TANGEDCO works are in progress in Tamil
Nadu. 95% of Hydrology review study, 65% of flood routing study, 87% of DSRP has been completed.
Template approval for 31 dams (26WRD+ 5 TANGEDCO) dams have been obtained from the World
Bank. Action is being taken to implement the Rehabilitation works after adhering the World Bank
procedures for 15 WRD dams, 5 TANGEDCO dams and catchment area works in 2 dams by AED
during the year 2014-2015 and the balance in subsequent years.

10. CONCLUSION

The Progress of DRIP activities in Tamil Nadu are being monitored by the Officials of World Bank,
Central Project Management Unit (CPMU)/ CWC, SPMU, WRD, Dam Safety, Consultants then and
there to check the progress and quality of the work done at the dam site. World Bank Review Mission
review the progress of DRIP works twice in a year. The technical Committee for DRIP review the
progress once in four months and discuss about the bottlenecks in implementation and provide
necessary guidance.

It is expected that after the dams are rehabilitated and brought to its original standards by this project,
the efficiency of the project will be improved and the life of the dam will be extended and thus serve to
the nation through bringing the maximum benefits.

REFERENCES

Project Appraisal Document for Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project, World Bank, Report No. 51061- TN,
2010

IS11223-1985 Guidelines for fixing spillway capacity, Indian Standards Institution, New Delhi, 1985.

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Quality Management Systems in Central Dam Safety Organisation


Yoki Vijay M. Bhaskara Reddy
Deputy Director (DSR), Central Water Commission Institutional Strengthening Specialist (DRIP)
EGIS India Consulting Engineers Pvt. Ltd.
cynosureconsultancyservices@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Quality Management System (QMS) is a set of interrelated or interacting elements of an organization to establish
policies and objectives and processes to achieve those objectives. QMS manages the interacting processes,
sub-systems, procedures, and resources required to provide value to all relevant interested parties and realize
the outputs, outcomes or results of the whole organization.

Central Dam Safety Organisation (CDSO) decided to establish the Quality Management Systems conforming to
ISO 9001: 2008 and obtain certification from a reputed certification body.

QMS in CDSO was developed by the following process:


1) Investigatory Study/Gap Analysis to assess the existing operational procedures and the methods and
identifying the key processes for defining the procedures;
2) Organizing a two-day training programme on quality management systems and documentation for the
senior and middle level executives;
3) Defining the quality policy and vision, mission and values of CDSO;
4) Developing quality manual, procedures and formats with the active involvement of the personnel directly
implementing or supervising corresponding processes; and
5) Releasing them for implementation with the approval of the Chief Engineer.

A one-day appreciation programme was organized to cover all executives involved in the implementation of QMS
processes to explain the basic concepts and requirements of QMS and to bring awareness about the need to
implement the processes in accordance with the documented quality management system. Appropriate records
maintained as defined in the corresponding procedures to demonstrate the implementation. CDSO monitors
customer views and opinions about the organisation and its services and obtains feedback relating to their
perception of the degree to which their requirements have been met.

Implementation and effectiveness of the QMS were monitored through internal reviews and internal quality
audits. The results were evaluated during the management review process to determine the adequacy, suitability,
implementation and effectiveness of the QMS and appropriate actions taken.

CDSO maintains an ongoing focus on improvement to maintain current levels of performance, to react to
changes in its internal and external conditions and to create new opportunities. CDSO establishes performance
and improvement goals in terms of quality objectives for different functions and levels in CDSO and monitors the
status of their achievement.

The process for certification of CDSO Quality Management System is under way for the identification of a
certification body and submission of application. Implementation of quality management system is a continuing
process which is based on the methodology, known as PDCA; which illustrates the planning (P), executing
according to the plan (D), monitoring the results (C) and implementing improvement activities as necessary (A)

1. INTRODUCTION

Quality Management System (QMS) is a set of interrelated or interacting elements of an organization


to establish policies and objectives and processes to achieve those objectives. QMS manages the
interacting processes, sub-systems, procedures, and resources required to provide value to all
relevant interested parties and realize the outputs, outcomes or results of the whole organization.

Process approach envisaged in the Quality Management Systems defined in ISO 9001: 2008 is the
result of consolidated efforts of worlds practising professionals managing organizations both in public
and private sectors. Sound Quality Management Systems provided the framework for effective
management and is the key to success of any organization. Today, more and more organizations are
establishing sound Quality Management Systems conforming to ISO 9001 in their effort to achieve
excellence in their operations.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Consistent and predictable results are achieved more effectively and efficiently when activities are
understood and managed as interrelated processes that function as a coherent system. The quality
management system is composed of interrelated processes. Understanding how results are produced
by this system, including all its processes, resources, controls and interactions, allows the organization
to optimize its performance. All processes, including outsourced processes are proactively managed to
ensure that they are effective and efficient.

The Quality Management System is a dynamic living system that evolves over time through periods of
improvement and innovation. Every organization has quality management activities, whether they have
been formally planned or not; ISO 9001 provides a structure that helps the organization to develop a
cohesive quality management system and a framework for planning, executing, monitoring and
improving the performance of various processes.

Central Dam Safety Organisation (CDSO) decided to establish the Quality Management Systems
conforming to ISO 9001: 2008 and obtain certification from a reputed certification body. The
Consultant engaged under the Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) was given the
task of facilitating the establishment of QMS.

2. MODUS OPERANDI ADOPTED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF QMS

2.1 Stage 1: Investigatory Study/Gap Analysis

All the processes of CDSO were studied and extensive discussions held with key personnel of each
Directorate to assess the existing operational procedures and the methods. The need for any
improvement in the effectiveness of the processes in achieving desired quality and compliance with
the requirements of ISO 9001: 2008 were identified.

The key processes of CDSO and their extent were determined, interrelationship between the
processes were understood before defining the procedures to specify the way to perform these
processes. The processes were classified as management processes and dam safety related
processes; list of key processes identified for developing procedures is given at Annex 1.

Based on the analyses of existing processes and systems a roadmap for the development of QMS and
an appropriate structure for the implementation of the documented quality management system were
agreed upon with the top management.

2.2 Stage 2: Initiation Phase

To provide for greater awareness, appreciation and understanding of the quality management
systems, documentation requirements and method of their development, a two-day training
programme was organized. Senior and middle level executives of CDSO attended the programme who
together determined the requirements and the structure for the documentation.

Initially the procedures and formats to be developed for the key processes and the personnel
responsible for the same were agreed upon. To monitor and guide in the development and
implementation of the QMS documentation, a Management Review Committee (MRC) was constituted
with the Chief Engineer, CDSO as its Chairman and all the Directors as the Members. A Management
Representative (MR) and an Associate Management Representative (AMR) were designated to
coordinate the establishment of the QMS.

2.3 Stage 3: System Development

Roles and Responsibilities of Chief Engineer, Directors, MR and AMR in relation to QMS were
determined. Quality policy and vision, mission and values of CDSO were defined with the active
involvement of top management. Quality policy and vision, mission and values statements are given at
Annex 2. Fundamental concepts and principles of QMS as well as the Quality policy and vision,
mission and values were used in the development of CDSO Quality Management System. A
numbering system for unique identification of the documents and their revision status and the format,
structure and style of presentation for different types of documents were agreed upon. Draft

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procedures and formats were developed with the active involvement of the personnel directly
implementing or supervising corresponding processes. The procedures took cognizance of the way
the processes were currently being performed and introduced improvements wherever necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of the processes and conformance with the requirements of ISO 9001: 2008.
The formats were developed as convenience tools to record the evidence for performing the
processes or the results obtained. The procedures and formats were reviewed by concerned Directors,
approved by the Chief Engineer and released for implementation. Quality Manual describing the
quality management system of CDSO was developed, approved by the Chief Engineer and released.
Now the initial documentation of QMS is complete and the next phase would be to implement the QMS
by following the procedures in the performance of various processes and maintaining records as
defined in the procedures to demonstrate compliance with the system.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DOCUMENTED QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

A one-day appreciation programmes was organized to cover all executives involved in the
implementation of QMS processes to acquaint them with the basic concepts and requirements of the
QMS, quality policy and vision, mission and values of CDSO, their role in achieving the quality
objectives and their contribution to the effectiveness of the quality management system. They were
also exposed to the documentation to be followed in performing various processes and the
implications of not conforming to the quality management system requirements.

All concerned started implementing the processes in accordance with the documented procedures and
maintaining records as prescribed in the procedures. The effectiveness of the processes is
systematically measured and acted upon. The efficiency and effectiveness of the management system
for the processes is being reviewed on a continuing basis.

Internal external customers were identified by different Directorates and their current and future needs
as well their perception about the extent to which CDSO is meeting their needs and expectations is
being obtained through an invited feedback system.

All process outputs and services that do not conform to requirements are identified and controlled to
prevent their unintended use or delivery. Appropriate controls are exercised to correct the
nonconforming process outputs and services and investigate their causes and eliminate them to
prevent the recurrence of such nonconformities.

4. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT


SYSTEM

It is important that the Organisation regularly monitors and evaluate both the implementation and
effectiveness of the QMS. It is important to determine carefully considered indicators facilitate these
monitoring and evaluation activities. CDSO ensures that monitoring activities are implemented in
accordance with the determined requirements and retains appropriate records as evidence of the
results.

CDSO monitors customer views and opinions of the organisation and its services. CDSO obtains
information relating to customer perception of the degree to which their requirements have been met;
the methods for obtaining and using this information defined in the procedure for Customer
Satisfaction Feedback.

Internal quality audits are an essential feature of the quality management systems and are aimed at
maintaining the health of the system and providing an opportunity for timely corrective actions. Internal
quality audits are organized by trained internal auditors to determine the adequacy, implementation,
and effectiveness of the quality management system. A two day structured Internal Quality Auditor
Training Programme was conducted to train a group of middle level Executives for conducting the
internal quality audits. During the internal quality audits, evidences relating to the implementation of
various processes are collected and the gathered evidences are systematically evaluated to determine
any non-compliance with the documented quality management system and reported as Nonconformity
Reports (NCR). NCRs will need to be addressed by the concerned management by taking appropriate

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

corrections and corrective actions to remove the detected nonconformities and their causes. Wherever
required, changes to the process documentation are made to ensure compliance with the
requirements.

Management reviews were conducted at regular intervals initially to monitor the development of the
QMS and later to evaluate the adequacy, suitability, implementation and effectiveness of the QMS.
Results of internal and external audits, customer feedback and customer complaints, process
performance and conformance of services provided by CDSO, formed the inputs to the management
review process. CDSO maintains an ongoing focus on improvement. Improvement is essential even to
maintain current levels of performance, to react to changes in its internal and external conditions and
to create new opportunities. CDSO establishes performance and improvement goals in terms of quality
objectives for different functions and levels in CDSO and status of their achievement will also be
monitored during the management review process. CDSO evaluates the performance and the
effectiveness of the quality management system and determines appropriate actions for correction and
improvement based on analysis of the evidence gathered during the monitoring process thus taking
QMS performance to higher levels.

5. WAY FORWARD

The process for certification of CDSO Quality Management System is under way for the identification
of a certification body and submission of application. Implementation of quality management system is
a continuing process which is based on the methodology, known as PDCA; which illustrates the
planning (P), executing according to the plan (D), monitoring the results (C) and implementing
improvement activities as necessary (A). PDCA is used during the following three levels of
performance:

1) Maintenance: Take action to maintain performance at current levels, meeting objectives.


2) Improvement: Take action to raise performance to a higher level, meeting or exceeding
objectives.
3) Innovation: Take action to fundamentally transform performance, by generating and utilizing
new knowledge.

It is important to address the three levels with proper balance to effectively and efficiently achieve an
organizations purpose and objectives. Addressing only maintenance may not realize the potential
ability of the organizations processes. Likewise, attention to improvement and innovation without
steady maintenance may not retain the desired results.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Annex 1
Central Dam Safety Organisation - List of Key Processes Identified for Developing Procedures
Management Processes
1. Management Review
2. Control of QMS Documents
3. Control of Documents Generated for External Use
4. Control of Records
5. Internal Quality Auditing
6. Control of Nonconforming Services
7. Corrective & Preventive Actions
8. Customer Satisfaction Feedback
9. Customer Complaint Resolution
10. Evaluation and Engagement of Individual Consultants
11. Purchasing of goods & services
12. IT Services & Support
13. Training
14. Providing Information for Parliament Questions / VIP References.
15. DRIP Website Management

Dam Safety Related Processes


1. Updating National Register of Large Dams (NRLD)
2. Providing Technical and Managerial Assistance to Dam Owners and State Governments
3. Organizing Training Seminars, Conferences and Publications for Promoting Dam Safety
4. Secretarial Assistance to National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS)
5. Secretarial Assistance to National Committee on Seismic Design Parameters for River Valley
Projects (NCSDP)
6. Comprehensive Dam Safety Evaluation
7. Investigation of dam failures
8. Technical Appraisal of Detailed Project Reports (DPR)

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Annex 2
Central Dam Safety Organisation
Quality Policy
We provide technical and managerial assistance to dam owners and State Dam Safety Organisations
for proper surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of all dams and appurtenant works in
India to ensure safe functioning of dams and protecting human life, property and the environment.
We develop and nurture competent manpower and equip ourselves with state of the art technical
infrastructure to provide expert services to all stakeholders.
We continually improve our systems, processes and services to ensure satisfaction of our customers.

01 September 2014 Chief Engineer


Central Dam Safety Organisation
Central Water Commission

Central Dam Safety Organisation


Vision, Mission and Values
Vision
To remain as a premier organisation with best technical and managerial expertise for providing
advisory services on matters relating to dam safety.
Mission
To provide expert services to State Dam Safety Organisations, dam owners, dam operating
agencies and others concerned for ensuring safe functioning of dams with a view to protect human
life, property and the environment.
Values
Integrity: Act with integrity and honesty in all our actions and practices.
Commitment: Ensure good working conditions for employees and encourage professional
excellence.
Transparency: Ensure clear, accurate and complete information in communications
with stakeholders and take all decisions openly based on reliable information.
Quality of service: Provide state-of-the-art technical and managerial services within agreed time
frame.
Striving towards excellence: Promote continual improvement as an integral part of our working and
strive towards excellence in all our endeavours.

01 December 2014 Chief Engineer


Central Dam Safety Organisation
Central Water Commission

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Leveraging Web Based Applications for Monitoring &


Rehabilitation
Amit K Dasgupta Ajjay Arora
MIS / Software Development Specialist Web Developer, Egis-India
Egis-India
Amitkumar.d@egis-india.com

Ankit Kumar
Design Engineer, Egis-India

ABSTRACT
The management of dam safety and its health is a primary focus area for CWC who are mainly interested in
not only leveraging and harnessing vast information related to dams and their rehabilitation, but are keen on
developing and providing IT applications and IT knowledge management tools (KMT). The intent is to foster a
knowledge-sharing culture amongst its various stakeholders and ensure efficient information dissemination,
storage, retrieval and analyses.

This paper provides an overview of the management of information that is needed to ensure efficient
dissemination of dam related information. It further suggests the need for leveraging web based applications
and suggests efficient workflows that allow users to optimally manage all the activities that fall within DRIP. It
provides a document management workflow that integrates robust document management tools such as
Sioux, Comanche & SharePoint. The paper also evaluates the various factors that go into the development of
MIS related websites and applications that are under development. These applications provide a way to
evaluate future directions in integrating the dam related health and rehabilitation information with geospatial
technologies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Coordinated and supervised by Central Water Commission (CWC) and assisted by World Bank, the
Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) mainly deal with the development, improvement
and rehabilitation of dams. The objective of the project is to improve the safety and performance of
selected dams and to strengthen dam safety. It involves not only the collection, storage and
dissemination of dam health information, but focuses on providing such information with the help of
analytical tools and functions that allow stakeholders to optimally manage dam safety and operational
capability.

IT plays a significant role in managing existing and future information related to dam rehabilitation
projects and in leveraging web based technologies through the development of applications and KMT.
The objectives of web based applications are manifold and relate mainly to the following:

Integrating and evolving an optimal workflow in the dissemination of dam related information.
Capture and analysis of dam health and rehabilitation data for long-term planning and guiding
of dam operations.
Developing applications that will allow a systematic presentation and interpretation of data for
effective monitoring of dam health and rehabilitation.

This paper provides an overview of the information content of DRIP and discusses how web based
applications can be used to provide technical, environmental, project based information to participating
states.

2 THE NEED FOR LEVERAGING WEB BASED APPLICATIONS

IT has become an inherent part of the DRIP, especially related to the management of information
(MIS). As a turnkey project, the role of MIS within DRIP is to identify information requirements and
provide solutions and applications that will optimise information gathering, sharing and dissemination.
MIS involves optimal management of information not only in data collection and capture but also in

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

providingg an organissed represen ntation of da


ata. It is witth this intentt that variou
us factors ha
ave been
identified
d so as to le everage webb based appllications for smooth funcctioning of da am health monitoring
m
and reha abilitation. Th
hese are as follows:
f

Exhaaustive dam performancce informatio on related to


o dam health h and rehab bilitation nee
eds to be
colla
ated and orga anised from various
v state
e Dam Safetyy Organisatioons (DSO).
Provvide a comm mon coordina ation and commmunication interface that allow all participating
p states to
havee common op perating pictu
ure (COP).
Provvide an orga anised workfflow for docu ument mana agement, financial plannning, project planning
and facilitate the generation and
a storage of data.
Prommote appropriate technollogical skills and use of modern toolss and functio onalities thatt facilitate
smooth functioning of dam he ealth monitoring and reha
abilitation.

With the ever increassing advance ements in IT and the critical role it pla eb based
ays in organising data, we
applications offers significant opp
portunities fo
or exchange of informatio des essential tools for
on and provid
developing effective internal and external com mmunicationss.

Figuree 1: Positives off leveraging Web


We Based Applications

It is enviisaged that the


t positives of leveragin ng web based technologiies within DR RIP would leead to the
developm ment of IT enabled
e servvices; develo
opment of remote and en nterprise applications; in
ntegration
and orga anisation of data;
d and devvelopment ofo mobile andd web based services. Th he intent of CWC
C is to
transformm the functio oning and data dissemin nation of dam health annd rehabilitattion amongsst various
stakeholders. While datad capture e and data shharing form the
t backbone e of the proje
ect, workflow
ws related
to activitties within th
he project annd documentt manageme ent solutions need to be integrated asa part of
the projeect. The nextt sections detail the desig
gn and logic for
f the devellopment of thhe following:

1. D
Developmentt of DHARMA A application
n.
2. MIS
M websitess & financial websites.
w

3 A
APPLICATIO
ONS AND WEBSITES
W DEVELOPME
D ENT PROCE
ESS

The application deve elopment of DHARMA


D an
nd MIS webssites is basedd on an agile
e SDLC mod del where
the focu us is mainly on small in ncremental builds
b in con
nsultation with the CPMMU/ CWC. This is an
iterative process witth functional teams from
m CWC and EGIS workin ng simultaneeously on de eveloping
various tools and fu unctionalities. Once thes
se tools and functionalities have beeen develope ed, these
productss are releaseed and continnuously upgrraded based on user feeddback. Typiccally the development
process follows the following
f seqquence:

ning, gathering and analyysis of requirrements.


Defin
Desiign the conceeptual and physical mode els.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Deveelopment based on user requirementts.


Integ
gration and te
esting of pro
ototype and modification
m t meet userr requirements.
to
Deployment and acceptance of solutions.
Mainntenance and d sustenance e of solutionss.

Figure 2: Multiple
M stages of software andd application development.
de

It must be
b reiterated that the weeb based app plications deevelopment uses
u an agile
e based metthodology
since it p
provides opportunities to assess the direction
d of th
he applicatio
ons under development. It I focuses
on repetitive review of
o work done e and the req
quirements are
a continually revisited. It utilises insp
pect-and-
adapt ap pproach to de
evelopment and
a is curren nt and in line with the use
er requirements.

3.1 S
Software De
evelopment Platform

The softtware develoopment platfform has bee en designed d on open so ource since it allows low
w cost of
software
e developmen nt platform. The
T emphassis is towardss collaboratio on with stakeeholders to define
d the
moduless or types of information that
t will be re
equired as pa
art of the varrious solution
ns.

Figure 3: System Archittecture for Development of MIIS website

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

The devvelopment platform


p ado
opted for Dam
D Health and Reha
abilitation Monitoring Ap
pplication
(DHARM
MA) and otheer web sites are
a as follow
ws:

Deveelopment Language PH HP, Ajax, JSON and Java a Script


Data
abase - MySQ QL
Brow
wser Supportt: Internet bro owser Chroome, Firefoxx.
Webbhosting Facility
T The CWC wiill facilitate th
he web hosting facilities for
f the websiite.
E EGIS (for the
e period of Consultancy
C assignment)) - upkeep, periodic
p main
ntenance and
d controls
rregularly.

3.2 E
Enterprise data
d model developmen
d nt

Enterprisse data-mod del developm ment is an im mportant asp pect of web based solutiion developm ment and
has bee en used to develop
d the various web based applications an nd functiona
alities. It invo
olves the
identifica
ation of data attributes, id
dentification of
o entities, domains and classes and the associations that
exist between classses relatio onships, inhe eritance, com mposition, and
a aggregation. Enterprise data
models provide support to ne etwork / ha ardware infra astructure, organization structure, software
infrastruccture, and bu
usiness proccesses.

The deve
elopment of data model involve
i ollowing taskks as shown in the figure below:
the fo

Figure 4: Enterrprise data moddel developmennt

These ta
asks are as fo
ollows:

Iden
ntify entity Types
T It is a collectiion of tabless that are used
u for the development of the
data
abase.
Iden
ntify Attributtes The infformation or structured daata availablee within the entity
e types.
Appplying namin ng conventtions The e naming co onventions based
b on sta andard agile e naming
convventions.
Iden
ntifying Relaationships The real wo orld relationships that exisst within eacch of the entitty types.
Appplying data model
m patterrns The paatterns developed on the types of ana alysis to be pprovided.
Assign keys Identifies
I thee foreign or relationship
r k necessary for identify
key fying the relaationships
and data model patterns.
p
Normmalise to reeduce data redundancy
r y It is the process
p in which
w data atttributes withhin a data
model are organized to increase the cohe esion of entitty types.
Denormalise to o improve performance
p e - Modificattion of normalised data to enhance the data
acce
ess performa ance.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

3.2 Developing User Interface

One of the most significant elements of a good user interface is visibility of the systems status. Within
the DRIP, UI is designed based on an iterative process that includes the following:

Developing a skeleton UI based on user requirements


Show case the skeleton UI to client
Client provides feedback and modifications
Modification of the skeleton UI based on client feedback.
Final approval of UI design.

Providing a successful user experience requires a balanced approach throughout the development life
cycle and it involves close interaction with CWC so as to ensure that the functionalities provided are in
line with the required tasks. Once the UIs have been developed a prototype application will be
delivered to CWC and with subsequent discussions and modifications a final application will be
approved for use.

4 ABOUT DHARMA AND MIS WEBSITES

Within DRIP, there are two focus areas: one the data capture and storage of information related to
dam and its rehabilitation; second the integration of various workflows that help in the management of
information. Below are brief on DHARMA and MIS based websites that are under construction.

4.1 DHARMA - Dam Health and Rehabilitation Monitoring Application

DHARMA is an application that was under development by CWC to capture dam related information
from various states and represent the information in an organised and standardised manner. A need
was felt to improve upon this application and make it expandable to all participating stakeholders by
developing it into a web based solution.

The basic objectives of developing DHARMA are as follows:

o Develop a web based solution that will help in collecting, storing, analysing, and presenting crucial
Dam Safety related data (historical, inspection, and rehabilitation data) in an organized and
standard manner.
o Development of seven modules with appropriate precautions for data compatibility.
o Allow addition of dams through the use of a unique Project Identification Code (PIC) as per details
provided within National Register for Large Dams (NRLD).
o Allow multiple-level data processing (data entry, data editing, and data deletion) with adequate
password protections.
o Allow DSOs to capture the missing basic/ engineering/ stakeholder data in case of large dams.
o Allow the systematic presentation and interpretation of data for effective monitoring of the health of
dams.

DHARMA will be a multi-tier web based application based on a clientserver architecture in which the
user interface (presentation), functional process logic ("business rules"), computer data storage and
data access are developed and maintained as independent modules. The application will be divided
primarily into seven modules with each module designed for the following purpose(s):

1. Module 1: Project Portfolio - This module will capture a macro view of all components of the
project;
2. Module 2: Basic Feature - This module will contain such fundamental data as appearing in
NRLD;
3. Module 3: Engineering Feature - This module will allow entering of such information as: salient
features, design, hydrology, geology, construction history, operation plan, instrumentation,
maintenance schedule, earlier studies, safety related events, and known deficiencies etc.;

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

4. Moddule 4: Stak keholders - This module will recorrd pertinent information about organ nizations/
agenncies respon nsible as/for owners,
o opeerations, bene eficiaries, co
ontractors, em
mergency acction etc.,
besid
des enlistingg the impactt of possible dam failure, parties affe ected, and the emergency action
plan;
5. Moddule 5: Dam Health Th his module will
w record the e periodical observationss of health in
nspection
team
ms in a standard format.
6. Moddule 6: Dam Rehabilitation This module
m will ca
atalogue succh informatioon on periodiccal repair
type of work, tecchnique involvved, cost of work,
w agencies involved,, extent of mitigation etc.
7. Moddule 7: Analy ysis and Re eport This module will provide variied tools for capturing tim me-series
a of pertinent parameters for the purpo
data ose of analyssis and report preparation.

4.2 IIntegration of Workflow


ws to manag
ge dam relatted informattion

It is enviisioned that the MIS refle ect the vario


ous activities within the DRIP
D need to
o be coordin
nated and
integrateed in a way thhat will allow
w the following:

D
Document co ontrol by asssigning a uniqque document ID for eacch dam.
A centralised
d database fo or storage an
nd backup off all documen nts created within
w the DRRIP.
A user interfa
ace that for the
t managem ment of all doocuments ge enerated duriing the DRIPP.
A
Adequate traaining all stakkeholders in the operatioon of user inte
erface.
E
Evaluate thee status of va
arious activitie
es that are being
b undertaaken by the various
v stake
eholders.
T
The web based facility will
w be based d on user acccess and will
w be integrrated with th he DRIPS
P
Project webssite.
T
The MIS ne eed to be flexible eno ough to be integrated with other MIS and geospatialg
a
applications.

he DRIP folllow two basic workflowss: Activities as


All activiities within th a provided within the D
DRIP, and
Document Managem ment and disssemination workflow.
w A brief
b on each are given be
elow:

ow of DRIP Activities
Workflo A

A custom mised workflow has been designed to t reflect the


e various acttivities that are
a being unndertaken
within the DRIP. A brrief descriptio
on of these workflows
w aree given below
w for better understandin
u ng of how
data is being
b organis
sed and utilissed by the vaarious stakehholders.

There arre approxima ately six actiivities that are presently being undertaken within n the DRIP and
a each
are mon nitored through a web based
b MIS application
a th
hat is being developed. These activvities are
controlle
ed by a doccument conttrol manage er who is re esponsible forf providing
g unique ID
Ds for all
documen nts generated. Metadata is also captu ured so as to
o facilitate ea
asy retrieval of
o documentts.

Fiigure 5: Workfllow of Activitiess for Evaluatingg Dam Health and


a Rehabilitatiion

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Controlleed by CPMUU and variou us SPMUs, these activitties are conducted for all
a participatiing dams
within the DRIP and include the following:
f

Design Flood Review


R (DFRR) This acctivity involve
es the evaluation of dam ms with resp pect to its
hydrrology analysses and advvising on the various options to caterr for the incrreased desig gn floods,
where applicable e.
Visitts by Dam Safety
S Revie ew Panel (DS SRP) This activity involves the evaluation of the e detailed
desiggn of the dam
m with identified rehabilittation works.
Project Screeniing Templatte (PST) The T PST is based
b on thee findings of DFR and DSPR and
involves various sub activitie es that inclu
ude project details,
d dam specific dettails, health status of
dams, and reha abilitation prooposal. Reviiewed by va arious stakeh holders it neeeds to be approved
a
befo
ore a tender document
d is generated.
Tend der Docume ents This activity
a is rela
ated to the dam
d rehabilitaation propos
sal and is revviewed by
vario
ous stakehold ders before a competitive e bid processs is initiated.
Awa ard of Work k This acttivity relatess to competitive bidding process that is initiate ed by the
conccerned Dam Owners so o as to com mplete the dam
d rehabilitation. Monitored by the project
management units, this inclu udes monitorring physical and financia al progress, and
a preparin ng annual
workk plans and regular
r progrress reports.
Project Comple etion Reportt The progress of the projects
p w the help of a web
are monitored with
baseed tool.

F
Figure 6: Statuss Review of Actiivities within MIS
M

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

For exam mple the above figure provides


p a sa
ample workfflow that is under
u review
w by CWC and
a is as
follows:

1. Userr Logs in usin


ng user / passsword autheentication.
2. Seleects the moduule Workflow w Tracking to find out th
he status of th
he activities.
3. A forrm opens upp that allows the user to select
s the sta
atus of the activity,
a for exxample, all P
PSTs that
havee been approoved.
4. On selecting
s the number of approved
a PS
STs, a new window
w opens up that sho ow the dam name, its
PIC, the impleme enting agenccy and the coompletion sta
atus.
5. Clickking on View
w Details will open a ne ew page tha at will show the status of o the activitty. In this
exammple, the sttatus of the dam in que estion has undergone
u all
a the first fourf activitie
es and is
pressently under rehabilitation
r n contract.

All the above activitie


es have been designed to t facilitate easy
e and effic
cient organis
sational respo
onse and
meet the e project objectives of acctive rehabiliitation and im
mprovement works. It must be reiterrated that
the workkflow is preseently applicable for damss within the DRIP
D and is presently
p under review by
b various
SPMUs.

A. cument Man
Doc nagement System Work
kflow

The document mana agement is mainly


m used for
f managing g various doccuments thatt are being generated
g
he project. Itss uniquenesss lie in providing a uniqu
within th ue id and a defined worrkflow as enu umerated
below:

1. D
Drop document in the dro op zone / cd// email. Alertt by email.
2. C
Codification of documentt (with Sioux) & generatio on of Review w Sheet.
3. T
Transfer of codified
c docuument.
4. C
Collaborativee experts on
nline job.
5. D
Delivery of re
eview letter to
t CPMU (inccluding Revie ew Sheet & Draft Letter to
t SPMU)
6. P
Potential Woorld Bank Re eview
7. T
Transfer to SPMU
S by a le
etter from CP
PMU regarding reviewed documents.

Figure 7: Docu
ument Managem
ment Workflowss

It include
es the integrration of custtomised softwware solution
ns like Siouxx and Comannche that enables the
users to store, make e available and protect th
he informatioon. It uses a scalable we
eb based plattform like
SharePo w collaboratiion amongstt various stakeholders to
oint that allow uments, assign tasks,
o share docu
track teaam events on o a shared web calend dar. Based ono a user login and passsword authe entication

169
Compendium of Technical Papers

system, SharePoint follow


f the sa
ame documen
nt managem
ment process as shown in the above fiigure.

5 U
USER AUTH
HENTICATIO
ON AND ACC
CESS

User autthentication is a critical process thatt allows users to commu unicate with external nettworks. It
has the ability to resstrict users without
w proper user loginn / passwordd credentials
s. Apart from
m security
reasons,, there are many otherr reasons why w adminisstrators must implementt user authe entication
process in the firewaalls before thhe users are allowed to communicate
c e with the ex
xternal netwoork. User
authenticcation withinn CWC will be based on the following prottocols and the system security
architectture would re
eflect the samme.

1. A hierarchy of user authentication willl be provided access to the web


bsites and DHARMA
D
application. The hierarchy will be as follow
ws:

Figuree 8: Hierarchy of
o Users

2. Withhin the hierarrchy the Web b Administrattor (1) will bee mainly resp ponsible for ensuring
e that the web
applications funcction efficienttly and mana age all user accounts.
a
3. The Central Adm ministrator DS SO (2), will be
b located ce entrally at CWWC and mainly responsible for all
dams data.
4. The Central Use er (3) will be able to view w all data rellated to the dams, but will
w not be ab ble to edit
any data.
5. The State Administrator for Dam Safetyy (4) will be e responsible e for the geeneration of PIC and
authenticating all data entere ed.
6. The Dam Inspecction Team (5) ( will be re esponsible fo or entering all
a dam safetty related infformation
like tthe engineerring data, damm health and d rehabilitatio
on.
7. The Data Manag ger (6) will b
be available for
f each of thet participatting state an nd will be ressponsible
for m
management of all data fo or their respeective state.
8. The State Generral User (7) will
w be respon nsible for enttering of all data
d related to
t the dams.

While the above prootocols need to be firmedd up at a latter stage the


e access righ
hts and protoocols are
scalable and are baased on the functions pe erformed by the various users. The access rightts will be
based oon a distributted web arcchitecture wh
here data integrity and confidentialitty will be maintained
using secure commu unication prottocols.

6 ON WITH GEOSPATIAL
IINTEGRATIO L TECHNOLOGIES

Geospattial technologgies provide enhanced management


m t of dam infoormation. It provides nott only the
benefits of MIS but adds
a spatial content to th
he various ap
pplications th
hat are beingg designed. Mapping,
remote ssensing, sateellite imagerry, GPS, and unmanned aerial vehiclles are few of the tools that can
provide dam managers the tech hnology to evvaluate dam m health and monitor its rehabilitatioon. It can
provide additional support
s inforrmation in the
t form of warning systems, locattion of posssible dam

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

breachess, water storage capacityy, and other critical


c meassurements.

Figure 9: Creeating hill shadde for calculatinng catchment arrea for a dam.

7 B
BENEFITS

Web bassed applicatiions as deve eloped for DRIP is geare


ed not only to
t provide th
he participating states
the beneefit of managging the volu
uminous damm related data but will be
e an example
e for other sttates and
agenciess that can leeverage the importance of migrating to a web based application. Som me of the
benefits are as follow
ws:

Crosss platform compatibility


c y - These applications
a will be compatible accross platforrms than
traditiional installed software and
a require only
o a web browser to fun nction efficie
ently. There will
w be no
restricctions on thee OS since th
he applicationn will run on multitude of operating syystems.
Centrrally manage ed and deployable - The managemen
m nt of these we eb sites will be
b centrally managed
m
and nneed not be installed on end user wo orkstations. All
A system and database e manageme ent will be
centra ally managed d and updateed and inform
mation can beb deployed seamlessly
s v the web sserver.
via
Secure live data - While data will be store ed centrally, access
a to the database will
w be monittored and
mana aged at the centrally loccated server. User based authenticcation protocols will enssure that
restriccted data is only
o accessible to authorrised personnel.
Reduced costs - These web b based applications willw dramatica ally lower co osts due to reduced
suppo ort and maintenance, low wer requirements on the ende user sys stem and sim mplified archittecture.

8 C
CONCLUSIO
ON

Leveragiing and deveeloping the correct


c tools, functionalities and web based appliccations allow
w multiple
users to nd connect simultaneously. It provides users the
o interact an t facility to access annd share
informatiion from anywhere whe ere internet is available,, provide oppportunities for
f collaboraation and
ensure in
nstantaneous updates.

DRIP is a pioneering g project wheere web base ed tools and applications will allow ussers to betterr manage
dam relaated informattion to betterr understand dam health and rehabiliitation. It pro
ovides a new direction
for otherr users to em
mulate and co onstruct similar web baseed managem ment solution ns for manag ging large
data.

171
Compendium of Technical Papers

Dam Safety Instrumentation with Case Study


Rajbal Singh
Central Soil and Materials Research Station, New Delhi 110016
rajbal.singh@nic.in

ABSTRACT
Tala Hydroelectric Project is a run of the river scheme on river Wangchu Bhutan. The project consisted of a 92m
high concrete gravity dam; three desilting chambers each of 250m x 13.90m x 18.5m size for removal of
suspended sediments of 0.2mm and above size coming with the river water diverted through the intake structure;
a modified horse shoe head race tunnel (HRT) of 6.8m diameter and 23km in length; a 12m/15m diameter and
184m high surge shaft; 2 inclined steel lined pressure shafts of 4m diameter and 1.1 km length each to carry the
water to underground powerhouse (206m x 20.4m x 44.5m) for utilizing a gross fall of 861.5m for generation of
1020 MW of power (6 x 170 MW); a tail race tunnel of 3.1 km length and 7.75m diameter that discharges the
water back into river Wangchu. The project taken up for execution from the zero level of infrastructure
development on 1st October 1997 and first and last generating units were commissioned on 31st July 2006 and
30th March 2007, respectively. The project was executed by the Tala Hydroelectric Project Authority (THPA),
which was a joint venture of the Govt. of India and the Royal Govt. of Bhutan.

Instrumentation is a tool for evaluating performance of the structure during construction as well as during the
operation stage. A 92m high concrete gravity dam was constructed on river Wangchu at Tala Hydroelectric
Project in Bhutan. This paper deals with planning, procurement, installation, monitoring and analysis of data for
various instruments installed in the body of 92m high concrete gravity dam at Tala Hydroelectric Project in
Bhutan. Vibrating wire instruments consisting of temperature meters, pore pressure meters, concrete pressure
cells or stress meters, strain meters, joint meters, MPBX, normal and inverted plumb lines, automatic water level
recorder and strong motion accelerographs have been installed in the dam during its construction. Behaviour of
these instruments as indicated by observed data was found to be in order and output of instruments was useful in
taking up appropriate remedial measures during construction. Out of 282 instruments installed in dam body, only
5 instruments have gone out of order and 277 instruments were in working order at the time of completion of
construction for dam. This is an excellent rate of survival of instruments for concrete gravity dam. This was
possible only due to proper planning and awarding a separate contact package for supply, installation,
maintenance and monitoring of instruments. All the instruments have been connected with data acquisition
system for further monitoring of the behaviour of dam in control room building at the top of the dam during
operation and maintenance. It is recommended to take care of the instruments at the time of installation and
damage prevention measures during construction. The safe design parameters must be made available and may
be attached with data acquisition system as alarm for further monitoring the safety of dam.

1. INTRODUCTION

Evaluating monitored data is important for dam safety management. The appropriate decisions and
actions must be taken timely, similar to reacting to the traffic signals green, yellow and red lights
(ASCE 2000). Dam instrumentation has also undergone many changes in recent years because of
progress in micro computer technology. International Committee on Large Dams (ICOLD) has always
given utmost importance to collecting dam related data from actual experience. The large number of
reports on this subject as well as the special ICOLD publications on dam instrumentation (ICOLD,
1988; ICOLD, 1989; ICOLD, 1992) clearly show the interest generated by instrumentation and
measuring techniques.

A 92m high concrete gravity dam was constructed on river Wangchu at Tala Hydroelectric Project,
Bhutan. The dam was constructed in 7 construction blocks. Vibrating wire instruments consisting of
temperature meter, pore pressure meter, concrete pressure cell or stress meter, strain meter, joint
meter, multipoint borehole extensometer (MPBX), Strong motion accelerographs and water level
indicators were installed in the dam body. The pipes for inverted and normal plumb lines were installed
during the construction. Tables for measuring deviations were installed in December 2005.

The installation and monitoring works of dam instrumentation were awarded to M/s Encardio-Rite
Electronics Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow (UP), India before commencement of dam construction and was
responsible for the supply, installation, maintenance and monitoring of instruments.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Dam co onstruction was


w completted up to a height of 92m with maximumm ele
evation of 1366m
1 in
construcction block 2, while lowesst foundation level of the dam wais 12 275m. The main
m instrume
ents were
embedde ed in blocks 2 and block 5 except some joint metters at construction jointss between blocks 2-3,
3-4, 4-5, and 5-6 andd MPBX in th he left and rig
ght abutmentts in blocks 2 and 7.

per presents briefly insta


This pap allation and monitoring
m off instrumentss taken up during
d constrruction of
dam at Tala
T Hydroele
ectric Projecct in Bhutan Himalayas.
H

TALLATION OF INSTRU
2. INST UMENTS IN DAM
D

Number of instrumen nts proposed


d by WAPCO OS/CWC and d installed in the dam body are given n in Table
1. Out oof 282 instrum
ments installed in dam body,
b only 5 instruments have gone out of orderr and 277
instrumeents were in working
w ordeer at the time
e of completion of construction for daam. This wass possible
only due e to proper planning and
a awarding a separate contact package
p forr supply, insstallation,
maintena ance and monitoring of instruments. This is an excellent ra ate of surviv
val of instrum
ments for
concrete m. Locations of various in
e gravity dam nstruments proposed/insttalled in damm blocks 2 is shown in
Fig. 1.

Table
e 1: Instruments Proposed and
a Installed in
n Dam

Sl. Nam
me of Instrume
ent Total No. of Instrum
ments
No. Propose
ed Installed Woorking R
Remarks
1. Temperature Meter
T M 51 51 51 Monitoring
2. P
Pore Pressure Meter 37 28
8 28 Monitoring
3. Joint Meter/ Crrack Meter 23 19
9 18 Monitoring
4. M
Multi Point Borrehole Extenso
ometer (MPBX
X) 9 9 6 Monitoring
5. N
Normal Plumb Line 2 2 2 Monitoring
6. In
nverted Plumb b Line 1 1 1 Monitoring
7. C
Concrete Presssure Cell 21 21 21 Monitoring
8. V
Vibrating Wire Strain Meter 126 (21 se
ets) 126 (21sets) 125 (21sets) Monitoring
9. U Lift Pressurre Pipe
Up 20 18
8 18 Monitoring
10. S
Strong Motion Accelerograph (SMA) 4 4 4 Monitoring
A
Automatic Watter Level Recoorder
11. 2 2 2 Monitoring
Total Instruments 296 2822 277 *
* O
Only 5 instru
uments were not working

Figu
ure 1. Location
ns of Instrume
ents in Dam Block 2

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Compendium of Technical Papers

3.0 MONITORING OF INSTRUMENTS

3.1 Temperature

The practice of pre-cooling of concrete materials prior to mixing was started in the early 1940s for
keeping the temperature of mass concrete as low as possible during the heat of hydration period and
has been extensively employed in construction of large dams (ACI, 1987). It has become almost
standard practice to employ pre-cooling of concrete for large dams in regions where the summer
temperatures are high to assure that temperature of concrete as it is placed in the work does not
exceed 100C.

Fifty one temperature meters were installed at Tala dam in blocks 2 and 5. The monitoring data has
been plotted and presented in Fig. 2 for temperature meters in blocks 2. The temperature variations in
mass concrete have been given in Table 2 along with cement content in mass concrete as discussed
in details by Singh et al. (2006a, b).

B2T1 B2T2 B2T3 B2T4


31 30.9 B2T5 B2T6 B2T7 B2T8
B2T9 B2T10 B2T11 B2T12
B2T13 B2T14 B2T15 B2T16
26
Temprature (degree c)

22.6
21
19.0
16 16.8

11 10.3
9.0
6
03/01/2001
06/04/2001
23/05/2001
25/12/2001
02/01/2002
16/03/2002
16/04/2002
01/01/2003
09/02/2003
16/03/2003
24/04/2003
26/01/2004
27/02/2004
06/04/2004
12/05/2004
11/09/2004
21/10/2004
04/12/2004
11/01/2005
23/02/2005
06/04/2005
09/05/2005
28/06/2005
22/08/2005
28/09/2005
02/11/2005
05/12/2005
11/01/2006
Monitoring Time (Date)

Figure 2. Observation of Temperature Meters in Block 2 of 92m High Wangkha Dam

Table 2. Comparison of Variations in Mass Concrete Temperature with Cement Content

0
Block Group of Elevation Temperature Variation C Cement
No. Temperature. m Placement Minimum Maximum Final Content
Meters kg/m3
2 B2T1 to B2T5 1279/1281 10 16 30.9 20.6 - 22.6 210
2 B2T6 to B2T13 1293 10 22 28.4 21.5 - 24.6 200
2 B2T14 to B2T18 1304 10 8.6 14.9 13.6 - 14.5 180
2 B2T19 to B2T24 1319 9.8 9.4 14.6 13.4 - 14.6 160
2 B2T25 to B2 T27 1334.5 9.0 5.2 15.1 12.0 15.1 140
2 B2T28 to B2 T29 1355.5 9.6 9.4 13.1 9.4 - 9.6 140

5 B5T1 to B5T8 1276 10 14.1 30.6 17.0 - 22.1 210


5 B5T9 to B5T15 1292 10 22.4 27.8 19.5 - 23.8 200
5 B5T16 to B5T22 1307 9.9 9.0 16.1 13.7 - 15.5 180

3.2 Pore Pressure

Twenty six pore pressure meters have been installed out of 37 proposed in the design. The pore
pressure meters were installed in blocks 2 and 5. These instruments are being monitored since 1st
March, 2001 onwards. The variations in pore pressure have been shown in Fig. 3. The pore pressure
varied from 0.3 to 3.2 kg/cm2 in Block 2 while it varied from 0.1 to 2.0 kg/cm2 in Block 5 except in B5P3
and B5P9 where it was recorded as 3.8 kg/cm2 and 4.0 kg/cm2, respectively as on 28.01.2006. Both

174
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

these instruments have shown high pore pressure equal to 5.5 kg/cm2 and 3.6 kg/cm2 up to 9th June
2003, respectively.

6.0
5.6 B5P1 B5P2 B5P3 B5P4
Pore Pressure (kg/cm2) 5.0 B5P5 B5P6 B5P7 B5P8
4.0 B5P9 B5P10 B5P11 B5P12 4.0
3.6 3.8
3.0 2.8
2.52.3
2.0 1.8 2
1.0 1.3
0.0
15/03/2001
26/04/2001
17/11/2001
01/09/2002
17/02/2002
30/03/2002
29/11/2002
16/01/2003
27/02/2003
04/04/2003
05/09/2003
26/10/2003
26/01/2004
27/02/2004
04/06/2004
05/12/2004
09/11/2004
21/10/2004
12/04/2004
01/11/2005
19/02/2005
28/03/2005
06/05/2005
16/06/2005
10/08/2005
22/09/2005
26/10/2005
03/12/2005
05/01/2006
Monitoring Time (Date)

Figure 3. Observation of Pore Pressure Meters in Block 5

3.3 Stresses in Mass Concrete

Twenty one stress meters have been installed as proposed in blocks 2 and 5. The variations of stress
in mass concrete have been shown in Fig. 5 in block 2. The stress varied from 3.8 kg/cm2 to 5.5
kg/cm2 in Block 2 while it varied from 3.1 kg/cm2 to 4.4 kg/cm2 in Block 5 up to 28th January 2006. Five
stress meters installed in block 5 at EL 1305 on 2nd February 2003 have shown the stresses in the
range of 0.5 kg/cm2 to 1.8 kg/cm2 as on 28.01.06. Another set of 5 stress meters installed in block 2 at
EL 1318.25 on 25.01.05 have shown the stresses in the range of 0.8 kg/cm2 to 1.0 kg/cm2 as on
28.01.06.

The density of mass concrete is approximately 2400 kg/m3 and consequently for every additional ten
meter of concrete above the concrete pressure cell the reading should theoretically increase by
approximately 2.4 kg/cm2. The present height of mass concrete above the stress meters installed in
blocks 2 at EL 1281.5m and block 5 at EL 1278m are 84m (EL 1366m) and 87.30m (EL 1365.40m),
respectively. With density of 2400 kg/m3, stresses above the stress meters installed in blocks 2 and 5
theoretically should be 20.16 kg/cm2 and 20.95 kg/cm2, respectively. The maximum stress records by
concrete pressure cells are of the order of 5.5 kg/cm2 and 4.4 kg/cm2, which are up to 3.8 and 4.76
times lower than, expected for blocks 2 and 5, respectively. However, all recent records of pressure
cells have shown increasing trend in stress level. Thermal changes in mass concrete may be one of
the main reasons of showing records on lower side than expected. However, there is increasing trend
in observations and further records may give the true picture of state of stress in mass concrete.
6
B2S1 B2S2 B2S3 B2S4
5.5
Stress (kg/cm2)

5 B2S5 B2S6 B2S7 B2S8


B2S9 B2S10 4.7
4 4.2

3
2
1 1.0
0
03/01/2001
26/04/2001
14/12/2001
09/02/2002
02/04/2002
01/01/2003
27/02/2003
16/04/2003
24/06/2003
17/07/2003
31/08/2003
21/10/2003
11/12/2003
26/01/2004
10/03/2004
05/05/2004
23/09/2004
17/11/2004
11/01/2005
03/05/2005
25/04/2005
28/6/2005
05/09/2005
26/10/2005
12/12/2005

Monitoring Time (Date)


Figure 5. Observation of Stress Meters in Block 2

3.4 Strains in Mass Concrete

Twenty one sets of (126 nos.) strain meters have been installed as proposed. Locations of five sets of
strain meter rosettes mounted from the upstream side to the downstream side of the dam are just
below the gallery in blocks 2 and 5, respectively. It should be noticed that strain meter and stress

175
Compendium of Technical Papers

meter have also been installed in each of these five locations such that the stress and strain readings
can be correlated with each other. At the time of installation, the instruments were fixed on spider with
the help of 200mm rods at correct angular position (00, 450, 900, 1350 and parallel to dam axis).

The plots of monitoring data of vertical strain meters have been shown in Fig. 6 for strain meters
B2SN9A to B2SN9F for blocks 2. The strain meters have been embedded near the instrumentation
gallery of dam body at an elevation of 1281.5m to 1282.05m in block 2 and at elevation of 1278.10m in
block 5. Five strain meters were installed at an elevation of 1305m in block 5.

The vertical strain from first eleven strain meters showed the variation from 13.8 to 356.2 micro-
strains. However, some strain meters have shown tensile strains, which have not been considered for
calculation of modulus of elasticity. Theoretically, the modulus of elasticity of mass concrete is around
2 x 105 kg/cm2 and may vary up to 3 x 105 kg/cm2 (Encardio-Rite, 1996).

40.0
B2SN9A B2SN9B B2SN9C
30.0 B2SN9D B2SN9E B2SN9F
20.0
Strain (micro meter)

10.0
0.0
-10.0
-20.0
-30.0
11/02/2004

10/03/2004

19/04/2004

24/05/2004

01/10/2004

14/11/2004

18/12/2004

25/01/2005

23/02/2005

04/06/2005

05/09/2005

28/06/2005

22/08/2005

28/09/2005

02/11/2005

05/12/2005

11/01/2006
Monitoring Time (Date)

Figure 6. Observation of Strain Meters in Dam Block 2

4.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR DAM INSTRUMENTATION

On the basis of the instruments installed in the dam body, the following conclusions are drawn:

The mass concrete temperature, which was about 100C at the time of placement, has risen up to
30.90C and finally settled down between 21.60C to 22.50C. Due to low ambient temperature (40C)
in the month of January, temperature of mass concrete dropped during 3 days from 9.90C to 5.20C
and started increasing again up to 12.60C after placement of next lift of mass concrete.
The cement content in mass concrete should be optimized to achieve the required strength. High
cement content leads to cracking in mass concrete.
It is recommended that the temperature readings should be monitored from the time of placement
of concrete. Instrument should be calibrated with placement temperature of mass concrete.
The pore pressure meters installed in Blocks 2 and 5 had shown pore pressures in the range of
3.2 kg/cm2 to 4.0 kg/cm2, respectively.
The concrete pressure cells installed in Blocks 2 and 5 had shown pressures in the mass concrete
varying from 5.5 kg/cm2 to 4.4 kg/cm2 which was 3 to 5 time lower than theoretically expected
stresses of 20.16 kg/cm2 and 20.95 kg/cm2 based on mass concrete density of 2400 kg/cm2 and
height of blocks 84m and 87.30m above the pressure cells, respectively.
All the instruments have been connected with data acquisition system for further monitoring of the
behaviour of dam in control room building at the top of the dam during operation and maintenance.
It is recommended to take care of the instruments at the time of installation and damage
prevention measures during construction.
The safe design parameters must be made available and may be attached with data acquisition
system as alarm for further monitoring the safety of dam.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

The Tala Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan is one of the best instrumented dams. Out of 282
instruments installed in dam body, 277 instruments were in working order during construction. This
was possible by awarding a contract for supply, installation, maintenance and monitoring of
instruments before commencement of dam construction.

REFERENCES

ACI (1987), Mass Concrete and Cracking of Mass Concrete, American Concrete Institute Report No. ACI 207
IR-87, Report by ACI Committee 207, 70p.
ASCE (2002), Guidelines for Instrumentation and Measurements for Monitoring Dam Performance, prepared by
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)-Task Committee on Instrumentation and Monitoring Dam
Performance.
Encardio-Rite (1996), Instrumentation of Concrete, Earthfill and Rockfill Dams by Vibrating Wire Technology,
Application Note AN 9603, Lucknow.
ICOLD (1972), Dam Monitoring General Consideration, Bulletin No.60 (1988), revised and edited version of
Bulletins No.21 (1969) and No. 23.
ICOLD (1989), Monitoring of Dam and their Foundations-State of the Art, Bulletin No. 68.
ICOLD (1992),Dam Monitoring Improvement, Bulletin No. 87.
IS456 (2000), Indian Standard Plain and Reinforced Concrete- Code of Practice (Fourth Revision), Bureau of
Indian Standard, l00p.
Singh Rajbal, Sthapak A.K., Dhiman S.M. and Khazanchi R.N. (2006a), Report on Quality Control and
Instrumentation for Concrete Gravity Dam of 1020 MW Tala Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan, Volume I: Quality
Control, Tala Hydroelectric Project Authority, Gedu, Bhutan.
Singh Rajbal, Sthapak A.K., Dhiman S.M. and Khazanchi R.N. (2006b), Report on Quality Control and
Instrumentation for Concrete Gravity Dam of 1020 MW Tala Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan, Volume II:
Instrumentation, Tala Hydroelectric Project Authority, Gedu, Bhutan.
THPA (1997), Technical Specifications Contract Document No. C1/98, Document No. 5, Contract Package C-1:
Construction of Dam, Intake, Desilting Arrangement and Head Race Tunnel from Thiyomachu, Tala Hydroelectric
Project (1020 MW).1.1. Title, author and affiliation

177
Compendium of Technical Papers

Assessment, Instrumentation and Management of Dams


Matthew A. Pavelchak, P.E.
Gabriel A. Jimenez, Ph.D., P.E., S.E.
Andy Young, P.E., CFM
Abhijit Shah, P.E.
Walter P Moore
mpavelchak@walterpmoore.com

ABSTRACT
Dams represent significant infrastructure investments which require assessment, maintenance and periodic
rehabilitation to ensure safe and efficient performance. As highlighted by the Dam Rehabilitation and
Improvement Project (DRIP), many dams throughout India and the world have been in service for 50 years or
more. These structures were constructed for a variety of reasons over many decades with varying structural
configurations and design standards. Over long periods of time, slow acting deterioration mechanisms can take
hold in both earthen and reinforced concrete dams. Successful long term stewardship of dams requires an
emphasis on periodic assessment and monitoring to identify existing and ongoing distress conditions as well as a
long term Capital Asset Management Plans (CAMP) to provide a coordinated management strategy within the
financial constraints of the managing agency. This lecture will highlight best practices for dam assessment
including the use of Non Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques, and long term instrumentation to identify
deterioration mechanisms. The use of CAMP for management of dams will also be explored as it relates to
prioritization of rehabilitation efforts, effective budgeting for maintenance tasks, and monitoring of known issues.

A variety of NDE techniques are available to assist in the assessment of dams and apertures and when used
effectively, can help delineate and quantify the extents of known or suspected deficiencies. Common NDE
techniques for the assessment of dams include Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR), impulse response, and
acoustic tomography. When employed strategically, NDE testing can further define the existing condition of the
dam and can also help determine the magnitude of required repairs. Instrumentation of dams offers a great tool
for understanding current structural behavior as well as an effective way to monitor long term performance.
Instrumentation of dams often includes the use of inclinometers, piezometers, extensometers, and, strain gages.

Most assessments identify a number of distress conditions, deterioration mechanisms, and deficiencies with
varying levels of immediate concern. Managing agencies often lack the immediate funding to implement all
recommended repairs immediately. CAMP plans are effective tools in prioritizing repairs to address life safety
issues immediately, and to phase durability repairs and required maintenance over a preset timeframe. This
allows agencies to project required cash flows and move into a proactive management role to minimize future
deterioration and budgetary uncertainty.

1. INTRODUCTION

Dams represent significant infrastructure investments that require assessment, maintenance, and
periodic rehabilitation to ensure safe and efficient performance. With proper maintenance and targeted
improvements the useful and economical lifespan of these structures can be extended far beyond the
initial design life. The risks and costs associated with these assets increases considerably when
maintenance is deferred and deterioration mechanisms are allowed to progress without intervention.
This paper outlines best practices for dam stewardship which provide a road map for extended service
life with reduced financial and safety risks for the facility operators and the general public. Periodic
assessments of the dam and associated apertures are essential to understand the nature of the
existing structure and the existing and ongoing deterioration mechanisms.

Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques are powerful tools to extend the breadth and depth of
the available assessment information. When applied in a targeted way NDE enhances the
understanding of deterioration that can be visually observed and/or detects deterioration which is not
plainly visible.

Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) programs are another powerful tool to provide continuous
feedback and warnings if a change in a critical condition, identified during and assessment, occurs.
SHM can provide a critical bridge between periodic in-person assessments and can provide warning of
slow acting or abrupt changes in key parameters.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Assessments of complex infrastructure often generate many recommendations for targeted


interventions that address existing deficiencies, enhance durability, or improve functionality. In the
case of large dams, it is likely that many items of concern will be noted and that the operating agency
will not have the resources (time and money) to implement all suggested interventions immediately.
Capital Asset Management Plans (CAMP) aim to set forth an actionable plan for the facility operator
and engineering consultant to execute over a set period, generally 5-10 years. The goals of a CAMP
approach are to prioritize and plan needed repairs and routine maintenance activities in a way that
balances the financial constraints of the operating agency with the needs of the structure. CAMP
plans set forth annual budgets for repair and maintenance tasks that are recommended based on the
results of the assessment. These plans make routine maintenance easier to track and execute and
provide a more reliable mechanism to budget for capital improvements. These plans are living
documents which are routinely updated based on new information obtained by periodic inspections
and long term SHM.

2. ASSESSMENT OF DAMS

Routine assessments are the bedrock of infrastructure stewardship. Dams are subjected to many
environmental deterioration mechanisms and continual changes in water (loading) levels. Periodic
inspections provide the best opportunity to spot both localized and global condition issues. Visual
observations of key portions of the dam, spillways, and related facilities provide a wealth of knowledge
regarding the current condition of the asset. There are however, many drawbacks to relying on visual
assessment alone. Visual observations cannot typically quantify the extents or depths of distress
conditions other than what is apparent on the surface and they fail to detect potential deterioration
mechanisms which have not yet progressed to the member surface. Therefore we recommend the
targeted used of NDE testing to supplement the visual assessment findings. Often a series of different
testing procedures will be used on the same project to assess different material parameters. The NDE
results typically help further characterise the extents of the distress and the severity. This data can
then be used in prioritization of repairs and estimation of potential repair costs.

2.1. Visual Assessment

Visual assessments must be as thorough as possible and should include the dam, spillways and outlet
works, mechanical equipment, abutments and rim, and the downstream area. In reinforced concrete
dams the observation team should focus on noted cracking, spalling, scaling, corrosion, excessive
movement at joints, and water seepage. Typical near-surface spalling and cracking common in mass
concrete installation are shown in Figure 1. Along the spillways and outlet works observations should
focus on signs of erosion, cavitation, undermining of reinforced concrete aprons, concrete
deterioration, or excessive movement of concrete joints. When weep holes are present in concrete
aprons they should be clear and operational. Routine review of mechanical systems, valves, and
controls is essential to ensure that full functionality is maintained even if current operating conditions
do not require full range of use. Along abutments and the rim signs of seepage, sliding, cracking,
bulging, etc. should be noted. Once the results of the visual observations have been compiled, NDE
testing can be developed to provide additional information about the noted distress.

179
Compendium of Technical Papers

Figure 1. Typical near-ssurface concre


ete spalling an
nd cracking

2.2. Gro
ound Penetra
ating Radarr

GPR is a non-destrructive techn nique that emits a shorrt pulse of electromagne


e etic energy, which is
radiated into the sub bsurface. When
W this pullse strikes an
a interface between layyers of materials with
different electrical pro
operties, parrt of the wave e reflects bacck, and the remaining
r ennergy continuues to the
erface. GPR evaluates the reflection
next inte n of electrommagnetic wavves at the in nterface betwween two
different dielectric maaterials as shown in Figu ure 2. The pe enetration off the waves into
i the subssurface is
on of the med
a functio dia relative dielectric consstants (). If a material is dielectrically
y homogeneous, then
the wavee reflections will indicate a single thick layer.

GPR can be used to t detect ste eel reinforcemment in concrete due to o the large difference
d in dialectic
constantts between steel
s and cooncrete as shown
s gure 2. GPR can also be used to estimate
in Fig
member thicknesses s if the signa
al reaches thhe back side of a membe er, or to dete
ect voids bellow slabs
supporteed on grade. GPR can be used to find subsurfface delamin nations, hone ey combing, or other
anomalie es. The primmary limitattion for the use of GP PR is signa al attenuatioon through concrete.
Depending on the sig gnal frequency used, GP PR will generrally only produce useful results at deepths less
than 0.55 meters. Deespite this lim
mitation, GPPR is a wide ely used testt method to assess nea ar-surface
concretee conditions on
o mass con ncrete structures like damms and on th hinner assocciated structu
ures such
as spillw
ways.

Figure 2. Typical
T GPR radargram
r and
d sample 3-D GPR scan showing reinforccing pattern

pulse Response
2.3. Imp

Impulse response is a non-destructive test used to evalu


uate the integ
grity of concrete elementts. A low-

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

strain impact is applied to excite the structure and the response of the structure is measured. The
concrete element is struck using a small hammer which has a built-in load cell that measures the
impulse imparted. The response (vibration) of the concrete element is monitored by a velocity
transducer (geophone) placed adjacent to the impact location. The hammer and the geophone are
connected to a data acquisition and processing system which calculates the dynamic mobility as a
function of the frequency of the excitation. The dynamic mobility is analyzed to characterize the
condition of the concrete and support conditions, and the probability of internal delaminations and/or
voids in the concrete which may not be visible at the surface.

Based on the analysis of the mobility plot, the following characteristics are obtained: average mobility,
dynamic stiffness, mobility slope, and voids index. The average mobility is a function of the density
and thickness of the element. Cracking in concrete might affect the stability of the mobility plot. The
dynamic stiffness is a function of the concrete quality, the element thickness and the element support
conditions. The mobility slope is a function of concrete consolidation and structural shape changes.
The voids index is the ratio between the peak mobility and the average mobility. A high voids index
indicates a higher probability of delaminations within a concrete member. The testing is performed on
a grid pattern and contour plots are developed for the respective characteristics factors. Based on the
analysis of these contour plots, probable locations of delaminations and/or voids are determined.
Impulse response is also limited in effective depth and is generally confined to assessment of near-
surface concrete in mass concrete structures such as dams.

2.4. Acoustic Tomography

Acoustic tomography (AT) is a non-destructive test method that is used to analyse the properties of
mass concrete. The principals of the AT test method are very similar to those of impulse response,
however, direct access to at least two sides of the mass concrete structure are required for this test to
be effective. A matrix of evenly-spaced receiver locations is established on one side of the element of
interest, and a similar evenly-spaced matrix of source locations is established on the opposite side of
the element. Impulse waves are induced at each of the source locations and the resulting signal is
intercepted at the receiver array on the other side of the element. The test is run repetitively with
impacts at each of the source locations. The source signal is typically generated by electrical
actuators or modal hammers. The simultaneous receiver signals measure the arrival time of the
compressive waves at different points along the structure.

Specialized software is utilized to analyse the data sets produced by successive impact tests. The
result is velocity tomographs which indicate the average wave propagation velocity through each
portion of the concrete mass. Review of these tomographs can identify regions where the wave
propagation varies significantly. Areas with high travel velocities are generally considered to indicate
sound concrete while areas with lower velocities can be indicative of low quality concrete,
delamination, cracking, and/or general deterioration. The primary benefit of AT testing is that it
provides a global picture of a mass concrete structure to allow for focusing of efforts to specific regions
of interest. Once anomalies are detected, visual observations or test openings can be performed to
further quantify the type of distress which is contributing to the low velocity values detected. The
biggest challenge with implementation of AT testing is obtaining sufficient access to multiple sides of
the structure.

2.5. Drones

Un-manned aerial drones are an emerging technology with significant potential for dam assessment.
Drones can be used to reduce the access costs associated with dam assessments or supplement up-
close assessment in areas which are too inaccessible or too hazardous for direct observation. Modern
drones pack high definition video cameras and technology in this area is rapidly developing.

3. STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING OF DAMS

SHM techniques are widely used in dams and embankments throughout the world. The principle
benefit of a targeted SHM program is that it provides a measure of continuity between periodic
assessments (visual observation and NDE). A variety of sensor types can be used to monitor key
aspects of the dam performance as well as the loads and environmental conditions to which it is

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Compendium of Technical Papers

exposed. Review of SHM data can identify slowly occurring trends as well as abrupt changes. Many
SHM systems are configured with alarm systems which alert engineers and owners to data anomalies
or unexpected changes in the data stream. One key to a successful SHM system is to attempt to
measure key inputs such as level of the impounded water and ambient temperature which are likely to
impact the measured parameters. When known forces such as loading and temperature are actively
monitored the data trends observed in the other sensors can be benchmarked. When selecting a
sensor network redundancy is always important especially when access to install new sensors will be
difficult or costly. Unexpected SHM results should trigger a new round of assessments to determine
the underlying deterioration mechanisms. Once the issues are understood immediate repairs and/or
updates to the CAMP can be implemented to address the new conditions.

3.1. Inclinometers

Inclinometers are one of the most commonly used sensors for dam instrumentation. Inclinometers
report changes in inclinations with units of degrees and are helpful in determining movement, rotation,
or bulging of materials. Inclinometers can be mounted on ridged surfaces such as a concrete dam or
wall to measure changes in inclination overtime. The use of down-borehole inclinometers is also
prevalent. These can be used to measure geotechnical movements in the underlying soil or in earthen
embankments. One important consideration for the installation of inclinometers is the length over
which you want to measure. Many models come in different lengths or can be installed on rigid bars.
Longer inclinometer lengths make it more likely that movement will be detected but may also average
localized effects and reduce the certainty of the movement location.

3.2. Piezometers

Piezometers measure pore water pressure or uplift pressure in soils. Pore water pressures in the soils
supporting a dam are critical indicators of performance, as increased pore pressure generally
decreases the overall stability of the dam and can cause severe deterioration. Piezometer readings
are typically closely correlated to reservoir fill heights with pressures increasing as the height of
impounded water increases. Some changes may also be observed with changes in seasonal
temperature. Significant changes in pore water pressure not associated with a change in loading must
be investigated promptly.

3.3. Strain Gages

Strain gages are perhaps one of the most economical sensors and provide essential data to structural
engineers, related to material stress levels. Strain gages are most often used when overloading of an
element or large cyclical changes are suspected. As long as the modulus of elasticity and geometry of
the base material are known, approximations of the loading in a member can be made. A main
consideration in the selection of strain gages is that the state of stress prior to gage application cannot
be determined. Therefore, any dead or live load present at the time of installation will not be included
in the resulting measurements. Strain gage readings on exposed portions of dams will be expected to
see significant strain variations due to thermal cycling and sun exposure of the underlying materials.

4. CAPITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT PLANS

CAMP creates a higher level of predictability of expenses over the useful life of an asset and ensures
that operating agencies have adequate projections of future expenses. There are two distinct portions
of the CAMP process; the expense model and the funding model. The goal of the CAMP process is to
break the cycle of reactive maintenance and create a framework and implementation plan to
proactively maintain infrastructure assets. This philosophy reduces risk of failure while harnessing the
economic benefits of addressing deterioration before it get worse in degree and scope. The results of
an initial assessment are the basic inputs for development of a CAMP. The plan is then periodically
amended based on the results of future assessments or the results of SHM data.

4.1. Expense Model

The expense model is fundamentally based on the assessment, design, and repair cycle that every
asset undergoes as shown in Figure 3. Once an initial assessment is conducted a series of repairs,

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

enhance ements and rehabilitation


r n needs are identified. S Some of thesse needs are e immediate in nature
and otheers can be sccheduled dowwn the road;; many will reequire contin
nuous stewardship everyy 5, 10, or
15 yearss. Since conncrete deterio
oration as weell as coating
g and waterp proofing systtem deterioration can
be predicted based ono case histories and pa ast experiencce it is possible to estima
ate the obsoolescence
date of specific
s comp
ponents. This is where thhe expense model
m begins.

Once req quired rehabbilitation item


ms and mainte enance activvities are identified and planned
p theirr cost can
be budge eted at the appropriate
a future date. In this way required
r cash h flows for co
ontinual maintenance
can be predicted. Taken a ste ep further, th
he principless of life cyccle cost analysis (LCCA A) can be
employeed to compare and conttrast the life cycle costss of various alternative repairs r and durability
enhanceements. The e goal of LCC CA is to empower ownerss to understa and the life cycle
c cost imp plications
of choossing more rob bust and mo ore costly inte
erventions which
w may ha ave a greate er impact on asset life
cycle thaan less costtly repairs. Once the preferred
p reppair alternativves are sele ected based d on their
LCCA m merits, the cassh flow in eaach year can be projected d forward ma any years or decades.

Figure 3. Overvie
ew of Asset Management
M C
Cycle

4.2. Fun
nding Model

The fund ding model picks


p up wherre the expen
nse model en
nds. Once a clear projec
ction of requirred funds
is available the manaaging agencyy can work with
w a clear purpose
p to devise a plan
n to meet the e required
cash flow ws. The objjective of a clearly defined expensee model is to provide clarity
c to the
e funding
obligations of operating the given
n asset.

4.3. CAM
MP Updates

CAMP p plans often provide


p projections 30 yeears or moree in the futurre. As time passes it is essential
that the results of fu
uture periodicc assessmennts and ongo oing SHM arre relayed too the CAMP team for
n in the plan. CAMP updates
inclusion u shou
uld be made every 3-5 5 years in consultation
c with the
consultin
ng engineer and the ope erating agency to include e new informmation, changes in opera ations, or
changess in funding. Continual management
m of the plan provides
p morre accurate projections
p and keeps
the plan relevant to current
c consttraints.

5. CONC
CLUSION

The mosst effective plan of actiion for asse et managem ment is one which holisttically addreesses the
challenges implicit inn continually assessing, monitoring,
m a funding each
and e asset. In-depth asseessments
g state-of-the
including e-art NDE testing
t technniques proviide a clear snapshot in n time of an n assets
strength and liabilitie
es. Howeverr, the certainty with which h the assesssment can bee regarded faades with
time as additional deterioration
d e. SHM provvides an im
takes route mportant bridge between periodic
assessm ment cycles tot provide ea arly warning to changes in system behaviour.
b Once
O all the liabilities
associated with an asset are known, k a caarefully managed CAMP P plan provides a road map for
continuaal maintenanc ucture with predicable cash flows.
ce of the stru

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Compendium of Technical Papers

Real Time Infrastructure Monitoring for Dams (RTIM): Using


Artificial Intelligence (AI) for data analysis
A Topple G Kilbride
HR Wallingford, UK Siemens, UK
a.topple@hrwallingford.com

ABSTRACT
The EU funded UrbanFlood project has developed a framework for linking smart sensors to real time monitoring
systems using Artificial Intelligence (AI) software. The monitoring software can be used to inform an early warning
system (EWS). This helps to inform asset managers and is a valuable tool for reservoir engineers in their
assessment of the condition and performance of a dam.

Additionally, incident managers alerted by the EWS can then use the vast processing power within the cloud to
run computer models to assess the probability of embankment failure, the likely dam breach scenario, resulting
flood inundation and behaviour of people within the floodplain. The sensors can detect changes below ground
such as temperature, moisture, and movement, which could be the first signs of a potential failure.

This paper provides an overview of the system, highlighting aspects of research considered most relevant to
monitoring of reservoir systems, and the benefits to reservoir owners.

1. BACKGROUND

It has become common practice to install instruments in new dams to monitor performance during
construction and impounding. Many older dams, particularly those showing signs of deterioration,
have had instruments installed subsequent to construction as part of an investigation. It is quite
common to install instruments in dams where no problems have been identified previously, since
regular monitoring of a dams behaviour is a useful element of routine surveillance. Over the years
new technologies have enabled vast amounts of data to be generated from new monitoring
techniques, the Real Time Infrastructure Monitoring (RTIM) system is a tool that can be used to handle
these large volumes of data with the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

The RTIM system was developed from the work undertaken in the UrbanFlood project as part of the
EU 7th Framework Programme which started in 2009 and ran for 3 years. The UrbanFlood project
created an Early Warning System framework that could be used to link sensors via the internet to
predictive model and emergency warning systems. The system was developed to predict a failure of
an urban flood embankment. Three pilot sites were selected in Amsterdam (Netherlands), Boston (UK)
and the River Rhine (Germany). On completion of the project HR Wallingford and Siemens identified
how this technology could be taken forward and used in dam engineering. This paper describes the
RTIM technology and the benefits of dams being even smarter in the future.

2. THE RTIM CONCEPT

Real Time Infrastructure Monitoring (RTIM) involves detailed assessment of the issues affecting your
dam and design and holistic specification of a bespoke system of 3rd party sensors for the site to
monitor key properties.

The data feeds from the system of sensors are all directed to a single RTIM secure server where
Artificial Intelligence (AI) software constantly monitors the data streams, compares different sources of
information and looks for anomalies that it cannot explain. Anomalies are then flagged up in the MS
Windows based user interface software for the attention of the dam owner and for anomaly
investigation. Anomalies may for example necessitate IT hardware investigation, geotechnical
engineering like slope stability analyses, or reservoir engineer involvement. See Fig. 1

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Fiigure 1. Block
k diagram of th
he RTIM syste
em

All data is handled securely


s in accordance
a with currentt regulations, and is sea
amlessly inco
orporated
within the dam owneers particularr security pro
otocols and ssystems.

The holistic nature of


o the system
m design means that yo
ou can use the best sensors for the
e job, no
matter who
w manufactturers them.

The mod dular nature of the systeem means that you can n choose to add additionnal levels of anomaly
investiga
ation supportt, or enhancce your syste
em to includde incident planning
p or incident mannagement
tools succh as dam brreach flood in
nundation modelling to th
he interface.

The flexiible nature of


o the system m means thatt after the inittial set up, itt becomes re
elatively costt-effective
to add a
additional dams on to the RTIM-d syystem. This means that you can mo onitor simultaaneously,
continuo
ously, and ea e same user interface.
asily from the

2. SENSOR NETW
WORK SYSTE
EM

sor Selectio
2.1 Sens on

The senssor network design will vary


v from one dam to an nother. The RTIM system m allows the flexibility
of using
g different sensors, from m multiple manufactures
m s yet all the
e data will be captured d by one
operating
g system. Sensors could d include:
P Piezometerss,
F Flow meters on drainage e flows;
T Tilt meters th
hat if conneccted by a semmi rigid casing, can meassure moveme ent ;
T Temperature e sensors to indicate seepage;
P Pore water pressure
p sensors to meassure seepage;
F Fibre optic fa
abric to mon nitor settleme
ent (See Fig.. 2) althoug
gh at presen
nt this is not real time
m
monitoring;
S Shape acceleration arrayys to measurre horizontal movement;
R Reservoir wa ater level sennsors;
R Rainfall gaugges;
C Crack gauge es;
C CCTV video feed; and
A w a digital output signa
Any sensor with al.

Most existing sensorr installationss which proviide an outputt can be routted through the
t RTIM sysstem.

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Compendium of Technical Papers

All the ddata from the e sensors is electronically sent to th


he Reservoir Manager annd operatorss and the
Artificial Intelligence software provides a co ontinuously monitored and
a analysedd assessment of the
data. E Emergency triggers can be set up on all the monitoring
m seensors to hiighlight any potential
changess in the reservvoir behaviour.

Figurre 2. Embedde
ed optical cab
bles for measu
urement of stra
ain and tempe
erature

3. DAT
TA CAPTURE
E, STORAGE AND ANA
ALYSIS

a capture
3.1 Data

Data willl be collected once per hour.


h The da
ata being collected is sim
mple analogu
ue data whicch is then
digitised and transmiitted using th
he HART com
mmunicationss protocol.

3.1.1 Wiireless Hart Communicati


C ions

By utilising an indusstry proven standard su uch as Wireless Hart co ommunication ns, a robustt wireless
mesh ne etwork can be established for the transmitting g of the pro ocess meassurements. Outlying
measure ements which are beyon nd normal lin ne of sight communicatio
c ons to the data
d gatherin
ng control
station ccan also be transmitted
t r
reliably via th
he wireless mesh
m back too the desired
d control poiint. Table
3.1 proviides details of
o the two maain elementss for the wireless hart nettwork.

Table 3.1

Wirelesss Hart Adaptors Wireless Hart Gateway


G
The SITRANS AW20 00 WirelessH Hart adapter is a The Siemens
S IE/W
WSN-PA LINK K WirelessHartt Gateway
battery ppowered com mmunication ccomponent, which will enable
e comm munication be etween the distributed
d
integratess HART and the 4 to 20 mA m field connnected sensoors and a Sie emens S7 120 00 PLC which h will then
sensors into the WirelessHart
W network for data handle the require ed communica ations, scalingg and data
transmisssion to the Pro
ogrammable Logic Control (PLC). transfer to the Siem
mens data con ntrol centre via
a. GPRS.

Life expe ectancy of th he internal replaceable


r liithium
battery is up to five yea
ars dependantt on the appliccation

The netw work uses IEEEE 802.15.44 compatible e radios operrating in the 2.4GHz Indu
ustrial, Scien
ntific, and
Medical radio band. The radioss employ dirrect-sequencce spread sp pectrum tech
hnology and d channel
hopping for commun nication secu
urity and relia
ability, as weell as TDMA
A synchronize
ed, latency-ccontrolled
commun nications bettween device
es on the network.
n Thiss technology
y has been proven in real
r plant
installatio
ons across a broad rangee of process control indu ustries.

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First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015

Each device in the mesh network can serve as a router for messages from other devices. This extends
the range of the network and provides a redundancy for the communication routes to increase
reliability of the system.
The network manager within the gateway unit determines the redundant routes based on latency,
efficiency and reliability. To ensure the redundant routes remain open and unobstructed, messages
continuously alternate between the redundant paths with no loss of data. The mesh design also makes
adding or moving devices easy. As long as a device is within range of others in the network, it can
communicate.

For flexibility to meet the application requirements, wireless hart supports multiple messaging modes
including one-way publishing of process and control values, spontaneous notification by exception, ad-
hoc request/response, and auto-segmented block transfers of data sets. These capabilities allow
communications to be tailored to the application requirements thereby reducing power usage and
overhead.

3.1.2 GPRS Communication

Communications for data transfer from the PLC would be provided via GPRS over mobile phone
network to the Siemens data control centre.

3.1.3 Power Supply

Where there is no mains power supply, the RTIM system can operate either a hybrid solar and wind
power system or a micro hydro power scheme.

Hybrid solar and wind power systems are becoming more and more popular as technology becomes
more affordable and efficient. Whereas in the past, wind turbines were costly, a number of companies
now produce quiet, cost-effective turbines which are able to produce a reasonable amount of power
with only a light average wind.

The main benefit of a hybrid system is that it can take advantage of all climatic conditions. This
approach has particularly successful on off grid monitoring and data acquisition. In both of these
cases, power drawn from the batteries is quite cyclic and seasonal, i.e. most battery power is drawn at
night and, if we consider a roadside speed sign, they are activated more often during rush hours (at
the beginning and end of the day). Incorporating a wind turbine into their power production systems
allows batteries to be at least partially charged overnight, whereas this is impossible with just solar.

Micro-hydro schemes extract energy from flowing water; a range of turbines can be used, depending
on the rate of flow and the head available.

3.2 Data Storage

The data once transmitted from site will be stored on a secure remote server platform. Rules will be
applied for security and safety which are in place for remote monitoring and diagnostics services for
confidential data from clients. The system separates the role of the data serv