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A Report by the Commission on the Black Sea
An initiative of:
The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation
A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region
A Report by the Commission on the Black Sea
Why read this Report? What is the Commission on the Black Sea? 4 7
Executive Summary Резюме выводов Yönetici Özeti The Report Introduction: The State of Play Peace and Security Economic Development and Welfare Democratic Institutions and Good Governance Regional Cooperation Conclusions Policy Recommendations The Black Sea in Figures Abbreviations Initiators The Rapporteurs, Editor and Acknowledgements Imprint
12 15 19
22 28 31 34 36 38 40 45 65 67 69 70
the enlargement of NATO and the EU along its shores and repeated Russian-Ukrainian crises over gas. Geography. By the same token. impact global politics. the Black Sea links north to south and east to west. developments regarding the conflict in Transnistria. It has undergone countless political transformations over time. economies and societies. From 2000 until the onset of the world economic crisis. Straddling Europe and Asia. 4 . discussions over the fate of the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol. transport and trade routes are all crucial in explaining its increasing relevance. the evolving global economic and political landscape as a result of the current world financial crisis. Trade between countries of the region was also on the rise. gas. the interests of others and the region’s relations with the rest of the world in large part explain its resurgence. competition to control pipelines. the changing nature of Russo-Turkish relations and finally. between the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin and energyhungry Europe. But. result in redundancy owing to too much capacity for not enough gas and oil. In the last two decades the Black Sea has changed beyond recognition. We have seen a heightened US interest since 9/11. Since the end of the Cold War it has undergone a fundamental change in terms of economic development and has now secured a place on the global economic agenda. places the Black Sea in a unique position. Its strategic location. We have also witnessed the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia followed by its fallout. not only throughout the region. raises the risks of confrontation. Oil. This reflects the changing dynamics of the Black Sea countries and the complex realities of their politics and conflicts. the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. shipping lanes and transport routes to secure increased political and economic influence. the region had one of the fastest rates of growth in the world. but on a global scale.Why read this Report? Why read this Report? … because the Black Sea matters The Black Sea region is coming into its own . while the opportunity to transfer Caspian oil and gas to European markets raises hopes for regional economic development and prosperity. And now.but it is a contested and sometimes dangerous neighbourhood. once again. it is becoming the subject of an intense debate. We have witnessed the transformation of the former communist societies and the impact of globalisation. at the same time. the proliferation of routes while potentially increasing bilateral cooperation at the expense of the regional may. All of these are deeply affecting the region’s stability and in turn.
enabling policy makers to enhance the area’s security. The emergence of a peaceful and cooperative Black Sea region would be of benefit to all. priorities and interests of all stakeholders. It will allow us to develop innovative approaches to problems. New thinking will provide us with a better understanding of what. finally. democratic institutions and good governance and. that unresolved issues can ignite into open warfare. economic development and welfare. For this. stability and welfare.Why read this Report? … because of the lack of real knowledge The region’s real priorities and needs are still being largely ignored by insiders and outsiders alike. With this in mind. They impact regional stability and security and. Moscow and Berlin and Commission members also researched and wrote four policy reports to gain as wide a perspective as possible regarding the future. strengthened political stability. Despite heightened interest in the area by everyone from oilmen to foreign ministries the Black Sea still does not attract enough attention from those who should be thinking about how the countries of the region can solve their common problems together rather than vying amongst themselves for power and influence. Its festering conflicts retard economic development and have the potential to flare up into wider conflagrations. the Commission has come to an understanding that the region’s future lies in further democratisation and economic integration with the wider world. For these reasons. is urgently needed. the Commission has sought to promote an inclusive strategy taking into account the needs. It then presents policy recommendations for all stakeholders. in the real world. sustained efforts to solve its protracted conflicts and the renunciation of the use of force for their settlement. It held meetings in Istanbul. It also needs an enhanced sense of security. … because immediate action is needed With its overarching approach. These are peace and security. the Commission first presents an up to date picture which focuses on four areas. the Commission on the Black Sea believes that a reassessment of the region and its problems and priorities. the Commission made a conscious effort to listen to all interested parties including civil society.eu. The rationale behind the preparation of this report has been the increased geopolitical volatility of the region which has proven.blackseacom. As a result. These can be accessed at our website: www. unless 5 . Part of the blame for this can be attributed to the failure of regional actors to produce an agreed vision for the future. can actually be done. The emergence of the Black Sea as a region-between-regions and the conflicting agendas of powerful local and external players distort the necessary regional focus and thus blur outcomes. regional cooperation. time and again.
integrated and stable region so long as we take action now. … because only a regional approach will work Black Sea politics work best if the approach is regional. NGOs and civil society to play a real role in shaping solutions. we believe that: • The regional actors must renounce the use of force in their political relations and respect each other’s territorial integrity. May 2010 6 . in which one party’s gain is automatically perceived as another’s absolute or relative loss. developed. the inviolability of their borders. Mustafa Aydın and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou The Rapporteurs Istanbul and Athens. In other words. But it need not be like this. In this report the assumption of a “positive sum” approach underlies our vision for the Black Sea. international treaties and the rule of law in their dealings. threaten far greater international ramifications. It is the Commission’s conviction that it is realistic to envisage a cohesive. To do so. • Interested outsiders must support efforts to secure good governance. However stakeholders must face up to the need to tackle tasks together and allow for non-state actors such as the business sector. the creation of interdependencies and the regionalisation of the Black Sea’s politics and economy. • The international community must encourage cooperative efforts and confidencebuilding measures as well as action in favour of the peaceful resolution of disputes. we assume that concerned actors are willing to explore “win-win” options that permit the realisation of mutual gains and are not locked into “zero sum” or relativist ways of thinking.Why read this Report? tackled. The states in question should be encouraged to seek regional solutions for regional problems and the Black Sea already possesses the institutional wherewithal to address its challenges directly.
Gütersloh. Members: Former and Current Policy Makers Erhard Busek Former Vice Chancellor of Austria. EU-Russia Centre. Athens 7 . Brussels. President of the Southeast Europe Association (Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft). Chairman. The names of those members who are willing to associate themselves publicly with this report are listed below. National School of Political Studies and Public Administration.What is the Commission on the Black Sea? What is the Commission on the Black Sea? The Commission on the Black Sea is a civil society initiative developed and launched jointly in January 2009 by The Bertelsmann Stiftung. governments. who wish to remain anonymous due to their current official affiliations or for personal reasons. Vienna Sergiu Celac Former Foreign Minister of Romania. Although individual members may not necessarily agree with all the analysis and recommendations contained in the report. Ankara. the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (BST-GMFUS). the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). organisations or institutions with which they are associated. they support the overall thrust of the project and its conclusions. President. Bucharest Gernot Erler Former Minister of State of the German Federal Foreign Office. Hellenic Petroleum. Berlin. Athens. Member of the German Bundestag. They all serve on the Commission in a personal capacity and this report should in no way be construed as reflecting the views of the states. Professor of Economics. Bucharest. The Commission’s work has been supported and complemented by several individuals from different countries. Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). former Member of the European Parliament. Senior Adviser. Bucharest Daniel Daianu Former Minister of Finance of Romania. National Centre for Sustainable Development. and the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). Munich Tassos Giannitsis Former Foreign Minister of Greece. Coordinator.
Istanbul Hannes Swoboda Member of the European Parliament. Brussels Borys Tarasyuk Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. AK Party Deputy Chairman of External Affairs. Alternate Director General. Hamburg Özdem Sanberk Former Ambassador and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Chairman of the Board. University of Athens 8 . Tbilisi Volker Rühe Former Minister of Defence of Germany. Professor of International Relations. International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on European Integration. Vice-President. Centre for Economic and Political Research (FAR-Centre). Baku Vartan Oskanian Former Foreign Minister of Armenia. Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. Yerevan Vladimer Papava Former Minister of Economy of Georgia. the Civilitas Foundation. Ankara Irakli Menagarishvili Former Foreign Minister of Georgia. Vice-Chairman.What is the Commission on the Black Sea? Tedo Japaridze Former Foreign Minister of Georgia. Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS). Athens Suat Kınıklıoglu ˘ Member of Parliament. Kiev Yannis Valinakis Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece. Senior Fellow. Spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Parliament. Tbilisi Rasim Musabayov Former Adviser on Interethnic Relations to the President of Azerbaijan. Member of Parliament.
Amicus Europae Foundation of Aleksander Kwasniewski. Policy & Strategy. Bucharest State University. Thessaloniki Peter Havlik Deputy Director. Bucharest Ireneusz Bil Director. Munich Ovidiu Dranga Ambassador of Romania to Belgium. Southeast Europe Association (Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft). Brussels Panayotis Gavras Head. and Berlin Alexander Iskandaryan Director. Warsaw ´ Mitat Çelikpala Deputy Dean. Washington. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB). The German Marshall Fund of the United States. London Georgi Kamov Project Coordinator. Correspondent of The Economist. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. Graduate School of Social Sciences. Ankara Johanna Deimel Deputy Director. Sofia 9 . Economics and International Relations Institute (EIRI). Member of the Executive Board. University of Economics and Technology. Yerevan Tim Judah Journalist and author. Vienna Jörg Himmelreich Senior Transatlantic Fellow. Caucasus Institute. DC.What is the Commission on the Black Sea? Members: Scholars and Practitioners Franz-Lothar Altmann Associate Professor for Intercultural Relations. Bulgarian School of Politics.
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Moscow Bruce Lawlor Director. Athens Andrei Zagorski Leading Researcher and Professor. Harvard Black Sea Security Program and US-Russia Security Program. Athens. Washington. Harvard University. Rhodes Ognyan Minchev Executive Director.What is the Commission on the Black Sea? Alan Kasaev Head of the CIS & Baltic Department. The New Eurasia Foundation. Cambridge Andrei Kortunov President. University of the Aegean. Moscow 10 . Association of the Russian Society of Researchers. Kiev Panagiota Manoli Senior Research Fellow. Russian State News Agency RIA Novosti. International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Andrei Lobatch Senior Project Manager. Moscow Sergei Konoplyov Director. John F. International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). Copenhagen Yannis Tsantoulis Research Fellow. Center for Technology. Blacksburg Ian Lesser Senior Transatlantic Fellow. and Policy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Kennedy School of Government. Lecturer. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Co-chairman. Sofia Fabrizio Tassinari Senior Fellow. DC. Security. The Foundation for Effective Governance. Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS).
Kadir Has University. University of the Aegean. Director. International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). International Policy Research Institute (IPRI) of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). Bucharest Dimitrios Triantaphyllou Director General. Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. Ankara Armando García Schmidt Project Manager. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Rhodes 11 . Gütersloh Alina Inayeh Director.What is the Commission on the Black Sea? Steering Committee Mustafa Aydın Rector. Istanbul. Assistant Professor of International Relations. Athens.
linking north to south and east to west. But it is the Commission’s conviction that it is realistic to envisage a cohesive. The area’s unresolved conflicts retard economic development and have the potential to flare up into wider conflagrations. threaten far greater international ramifications. finally. developed. peace and security. democratic institutions and good governance and. Thus. In part this can be attributed to the failure of the regional actors to produce an agreed vision for the future. To do so: • The regional actors must renounce the use of force in their political relations and respect each other’s territorial integrity. the region’s real priorities and needs are still being largely ignored. transport and trade routes are all important reasons for its increasing relevance. regional cooperation. the inviolability of their borders. They impact regional stability and security and. The rationale behind the preparation of this report has been the increased geopolitical volatility of the region which. stability and welfare. economic development and welfare. the interests of outsiders and the region’s relations with the rest of the world.Executive Summary Executive Summary The Black Sea region is a contested neighbourhood and the subject of intense debate. its complex realities. a reassessment of the region. can ignite at any given moment into open warfare. as well as allowing them to develop innovative approaches to problems. integrated and stable region. The emergence of the Black Sea as a region-between-regions and the conflicting agendas of powerful local and external players distort the necessary regional focus and blur outcomes. This reflects the changing dynamics of the region. in certain places. thus enhancing the region’s security. With this in mind and with its overarching approach. the Commission has sought to promote an inclusive strategy taking into account the needs. This will provide all actors involved with a better understanding of what can be done. The emergence of a peaceful and cooperative Black Sea region would be of benefit to all. • The international community must encourage cooperative efforts and confidence-building measures as well as actions in favour of the peaceful resolution of disputes. the creation of interdependencies and the regionalisation of the Black Sea’s politics and economy. • Interested outsiders must support efforts to secure good governance. as well as its oil. Its strategic position. is urgently needed. unless tackled. gas. international treaties and the rule of law in their dealings. with all of its problems and priorities. The Commission has come to an understanding that the region’s future lies in further democratisation and economic integration with the wider world. priorities and interests of all stakeholders in four essential areas. 12 . Despite heightened interest in the area however.
should be the end point for the work of the high level group. involving the regional states and international stakeholders. human and societal resources are essential components of such a development model. Its aim would be to promote regional cooperation while anticipating changes in the neighbourhood. expanded role and enhanced regional relevance could be symbolised by giving it a new name. The 2020 Vision needs to be developed into a clear strategy which should mark the culmination of several linked initiatives. Enhance the profile of Black Sea regionalism The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is in need of rejuvenation. need to be implemented. which should be translated into coherent policies at national and regional levels. NGOs and civil society to play a real role in shaping solutions. Thus the Commission recommends: 2020 Vision – A Black Sea Dimension Creating a new overarching concept and policy. by the actors and countries in the region. Focus on economic issues that meet common challenges and real needs The principles of sustainable development should be the guiding philosophy of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area. preferably at summit level. Deal with the conflicts Establish a high level consultative group in order to tackle the protracted conflicts and other outstanding issues of the region. A region-wide awareness raising competition could be opened for everyone in the region to suggest a new name for it and to design a new flag and logo. 13 . Rational responses to the consequences of climate change and the responsible use of natural. Policies to improve the business environment and facilitate greater economic activity across borders. The feasibility of an international gathering on the Black Sea. The states in question should be encouraged to seek regional solutions for regional problems. BSEC’s rebirth.Executive Summary Black Sea politics work best if the approach is regional. Its 20th anniversary summit in 2012 should be an opportunity to renew the commitment of its members to regional cooperation and to inaugurate an overhauled BSEC in order to make it a more relevant organisation with greater clout. focusing on the year 2020. as well as establishing regular policy dialogues between relevant officials. A number of confidence-building measures and a structured security dialogue on relevant issues should be established. The stakeholders must face up to the need to tackle tasks together and allow for non-state actors such as the business sector. a Black Sea Dimension.
diplomats. young leaders. Promote the targeted training of professional groups There is a need for the targeted training of public servants. Lessons should be drawn from the experiences of other areas which have faced or are dealing with similar issues. 14 . parliamentarians and business leaders throughout the region. civil society and social dialogue The involvement of civil society in policy making and their linkages in relation to good governance should be encouraged.Executive Summary Promote and coordinate regional cooperation schemes at all levels The coordination of numerous existing cooperation schemes. should be encouraged. the Danube region and so on. There is also a need to move beyond the common top-down approach to assure that civil society plays a role in the development of the region. is a priority. for the region. Efforts should also be made to facilitate cooperation between civil society organisations in Black Sea countries including the conflict regions. The creation of a Black Sea Training Academy would help streamline such a process. the Balkans. rather than nationally. Business organisations such as chambers of commerce. Cooperation between universities should be enhanced and more coverage of the countries by journalists from the region. employers’ organisations and trade unions should also be encouraged to talk to one another in order to find and propose regional solutions for common problems. Identifying issues which could be better addressed regionally. programmes and initiatives for the Black Sea needs to be taken in hand in order to unleash the full potential of the region. Promote intercultural dialogue A clear encouragement and sponsorship of intercultural and interfaith dialogue among the peoples of the Black Sea is needed. such as the Baltic. Promote good governance.
более широкими столкновениями. Для этого: 15 . соединяющих Север и Юг. что будущее региона теснейшим образом связано с дальнейшей демократизацией и интеграцией в мировое хозяйство. развитого. интегрированного и стабильного региона Черго моря. которая позволила бы включить в него всех заинтересованных участников и учитывала бы их приоритеты и интересы в четырех ключевых областях сотрудничества: укрепление мира и безопасности. ее комплексный характер. Стратегическое значение Черного моря определяется его расположением на пересечении путей. а также роста благосостояния в регионе. Тем не менее Комиссия убеждена в реалистичности перспективы формирования целостного. Все это повышает его значение. Их анализ поможет всем участникам лучше увидеть возможности для взаимодействия и нестандартно подойти к решению существующих проблем в интересах укрепления безопасности и стабильности. Комиссия обсуждала стратегию регионального сотрудничества. экономическое развитие и рост благосостояния.Резюме выводов Резюме выводов В регионе Черного моря переплетется множество интересов. Несмотря на возрастание интереса к региону. Эти споры отражают меняющуюся ситуацию в регионе. Восток и Запад. Данное обстоятельство заставляет вновь вернуться к оценке существующих здесь проблем и определению приоритетов регионального сотрудничества. Исходя из этих общих соображений. Это – одна из причин. развитие демократических институтов и надлежащего управления. В регионе проходят маршруты транспортировки нефти и газа. Эти конфликты чреваты новыми. От развития черноморского региона как региона мира и сотрудничества выиграют все участники данного процесса. которая в любой момент может обернуться вспышкой открытого противостояния. другие транспортные и торговые коммуникации. его собственные приоритеты и потребности во многом остаются вне поля зрения. Неурегулированность конфликтов тормозит здесь экономическое развитие. порождая немало споров. Они наносят ущерб региональной стабильности и безопасности. Комиссия пришла к выводу о том. Их неурегулированность имеет более широкие международные последствия. разнонаправленность политики влиятельных региональных и внерегиональных сил – все это способствует смещению акцентов в сотрудничестве и неопределенности его результатов. Его расположение на стыке других региональных объединений. по которой участники регионального сотрудничества так и не выработали общее видение перспектив развития региона. интересы внерегиональных участников и отношения региона с остальным миром. Подготовка настоящего доклада во многом мотивировалась пониманием нарастающей геополитической волатильности в регионе. развитие регионального сотрудничества.
• Международное сообщество должно поощрять укрепление сотрудничества и доверия в регионе. Оптимальным подходом к решению вопросов черноморской политики является региональный подход. способствующие мирному урегулированию споров. организациям гражданского общества – возможность принимать участие в поиске решений существующих проблем. соблюдать международные договоры и принцип верховенства закона в отношениях друг с другом. Необходимо поощрять поиск региональных решений региональных проблем. укрепление взаимозависимости и регионализацию черноморского политического и экономического сотрудничества. согласование которой стало бы кульминацией обсуждения ряда взаимосвязанных инициатив. целесообразно не только подтвердить приверженность региональному сотрудничеству. В этой связи Комиссия рекомендует: Черноморское измерение: горизонт 2020 г. Поиск урегулирования конфликтов В интересах содействия урегулированию затяжных конфликтов и иных нерешенных региональных проблем целесообразно создать консультативную группу высокого уровня.Резюме выводов • Участники сотрудничества в регионе должны отказаться от применения силы в своих политических отношениях. приуроченном к 20-летию Организации. а также шаги. но и принять решение о реформе ОЧЭС. На саммите 2012 г. Общее понимание того. В ее основу должно быть положено развитие регионального сотрудничества с учетом ожидаемых здесь дальнейших перемен. которая позволила бы повысить ее роль. Это способствовало бы укреплению доверия и налаживанию структурированного 16 . Проведение открытого регионального конкурса на ее новое название и логотип способствовало бы популяризации Организации. повышение ее роли в регионе можно было бы символически подчеркнуть переименованием Организации. Обновление ОЧЭС. следует преобразовать в ясную стратегию действий. • Заинтересованные внерегиональные силы должны поддерживать утверждение норм надлежащего управления. как регион должен выглядеть к 2020 г.. Участникам регионального сотрудничества необходимо разработать более широкую концепцию его развития до 2020 года – концепцию и политику «черноморского измерения». Ключевые участники этого процесса должны доказать свою способность совместными усилиями добиваться необходимых результатов и предоставить негосударственным участникам сотрудничества – бизнесу. Повышение уровня черноморского регионального сотрудничества Организация Черноморского экономического сотрудничества (ОЧЭС) нуждается в обновлении.. взаимно уважать территориальную целостность государств и нерушимость их границ.
в частности. Межкультурный диалог Необходимо всемерно поощрять и поддерживать межкультурный и межрелигиозный диалог народов черноморского региона. государств Балтийского моря. программ и инициатив. которые проще решить на региональном. Для этого необходимо согласовать меры по улучшению условий деятельности бизнеса. Конечной целью работы группы могла бы стать проработка вопроса о созыве международного совещания по черноморскому региону – желательно на высшем уровне – с участием как стран региона. а не национальном уровне. молодых лидеров. Следует отказаться от практики решения всех вопросов регионального сотрудничества «сверху». Гражданское общество должно играть в их решении бóльшую роль. придунайских стран и другими. Эти принципы должны последовательно претворяться в жизнь на национальном и региональном уровне. дипломатов. вытекающих из общих вызовов и потребностей В основу регионального сотрудничества должны быть положены принципы устойчивого развития: рациональное реагирование на изменение климата и ответственное использование природных. Расширять сотрудничество между университетами и содействовать более широкому освещению в СМИ жизни и событий стран региона. Балкан.Резюме выводов диалога по вопросам укрепления безопасности. расширению трансграничной экономической деятельности и наладить регулярный диалог представителей соответствующих государственных органов. человеческих и общественных ресурсов. Решение экономических вопросов. реализуемых в черноморском регионе. Целевая подготовка кадров Существует потребность в целенаправленном повышении кфалификации государственных служащих. Целесообразно учесть опыт решения таких проблем региональными организацияими. Создание Черноморской Академии позволило бы оптимизировать эту деятельность. 17 . парламентариев и лидеров бизнеса стран региона. так и ключевых внерегиональных держав и организаций. Согласование механизмов регионального сотрудничества на разных уровнях Для более полного раскрытия потенциала регионального сотрудничества необходимо обеспечить бóльшую согласованность многочисленных механизмов. Приоритет должен быть отдан выявлению проблем.
Резюме выводов Надлежащее управление. такими как торгово-промышленные палаты. союзы предпринимателей и профессиональные союзы. тем самым способствуя утверждению практики надлежащего управления. с тем чтобы они могли предлагать региональные решения их общих проблем. гражданское общество и общественный диалог Целесообразно шире привлекать организации гражданского общества к обсуждению и подготовке политических решений. 18 . Важно поощрять диалог между организациями бизнеса. включая регионы конфликтов. Следует способствовать расширению сотрудничества между организацями гражданского общества стран региона.
Yönetici Özeti Yönetici Özeti Karadeniz Bölgesi yoğun çekişmelerin odağında olan tartışmalı bir alandır. büyük krizlere neden olma potansiyelini de bünyelerinde barındırmaktadır. bölge dışı güçlerin çıkarları ve bölgenin dünyanın geri kalanıyla ilişkilerinin bir yansımasıdır. karmaşık gerçekleri. taşımacılık ve ticaret rotalarının üzerinde yer alması önemini giderek artırmaktadır. Barışçıl ve işbirliği içinde bir Karadeniz Bölgesi ise herkesin yararına olacaktır. bölgesel istikrara ve güvenliğe etki etmekte ve çözümlenmedikleri takdirde uluslararası ortamda dallanıp budaklanma tehlikesi içermektedir. bölge için gereken odaklanmayı engelleyerek. önemli petrol. ilgili tüm aktörlerin ne yapılması gerektiğini daha iyi anlamalarını ve sorunlara yaratıcı şekilde yaklaşabilmelerini sağlayacak. Bu. Komisyon. entegre ve istikrarlı bir bölgenin ortaya çıkartılabileceğine samimi şekilde inanmaktadır. ‘demokratik kurumlar ve iyi yönetişim’ ve son olarak ‘bölgesel işbirliği’ olmak üzere dört önemli alanda tüm paydaşların ihtiyaç. bölgenin hızla değişen dinamikleri. Söz konusu çatışmalar. ‘ekonomik gelişme ve refah’. 19 . Bu nedenle. işbirliğinin olası olumlu sonuçlarını zayıflatmaktadır. • Bölge dışından olmasına rağmen bölgede çıkarları olan ülkeler iyi yönetişimin sağlamlaştırılması. Bu. Bunun gerçekleştirilebilmesi için: • Bölgesel aktörler siyasi ilişkilerinde güç kullanımından vazgeçmeli ve birbirlerinin toprak bütünlüğüne. tüm sorunları ve öncelikleriyle birlikte bölgenin acilen yeniden değerlendirilmesine ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. bölgenin asıl öncelikleri ve ihtiyaçları hala büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilmektedir. bölgedeki jeopolitik istikrarsızlığın artması ve bunun belirli bölgelerde savaşa yol açabilme ihtimalidir. gaz. Ne var ki. kuzeyi güneye ve doğuyu batıya bağlayan stratejik konumunun yanı sıra. Karadeniz Komisyonu tüm bunları akılda tutarak ve kapsayıcı bir yaklaşımla. Karadeniz’in bölgeler arası bir bölge olarak ortaya çıkması ve güçlü iç ve dış aktörlerin birbirleriyle çatışan çıkarları. Bölgenin çözülmemiş çatışmaları ekonomik gelişmeyi geciktirmelerinin yanı sıra. Bu bir dereceye kadar. öncelik ve çıkarlarını dikkate alan kapsamlı bir strateji sunmaya çalışmıştır. bölgesel aktörlerin gelecek için ortak bir vizyonda birleşememelerine bağlanabilir. gelişmiş. böylece bölgenin güvenliği. Bu raporun hazırlanmasının ardındaki temel neden. bölgeye yönelik bunca ilgiye rağmen. bölgenin geleceğinin daha fazla demokratikleşme ve dünyanın geri kalanıyla daha fazla ekonomik bütünleşmede yattığı sonucuna varmıştır. Öte yandan Komisyon kaynaştırıcı. karşılıklı dayanışmanın yaratılması ve Karadeniz siyaseti ve ekonomisinin bölgeselleştirilmesi konusundaki çabaları desteklemelidirler. Bölgenin. bu raporda ‘barış ve güvenlik’. istikrarı ve refahını arttıracaktır. uluslararası anlaşmalara ve ilişkilerinde hukukun üstünlüğüne saygı göstermelidirler. sınırların ihlal edilmezliğine.
İklim değişikliğinin sonuçlarına karşı üretilecek akılcı çözümler ve doğal. İlgili konularda bir dizi güven arttırıcı önlem alınmalı ve planlı bir güvenlik diyalogu kurulmalıdır. flama ve logo bulunması amacıyla bölgede herkese açık. daha işlevsel bir örgüte dönüştürülmesi için bir fırsat olmalıdır. 2020 Vizyonu ilgili teşebbüslerin bütünleşmesinin altını çizecek bir stratejiye ihtiyaç duymaktadır. işbirliği çabalarını ve güven-arttırıcı önlemleri teşvik etmelidir. İş ortamını geliştirmek ve sınırlar ötesi ekonomik faaliyetleri artırmak için ilgili ülke yetkilileri arasında düzenli siyasi diyalog kuracak politikalar uygulanmalıdır. İlgili devletler bölgesel sorunlara bölgesel çözümler aramaya teşvik edilmelidir. Sorunlarla başa çıkma Bölgenin uzun süredir devam eden ihtilafları ve diğer önemli sorunlarının üstesinden gelmek amacıyla bir üst düzey danışma grubu oluşturulmalıdır. yıl zirvesi. KEİ’nin yeniden doğuşu. ulusal ve bölgesel düzeyde uyumlu politikalara dönüştürülmesi gereken kalkınma modeli için önemli bileşenlerdir. Üst düzey grubun çalışmasının nihai hedefi. bölgedeki değişimlere önceden hazırlıklı biçimde bölgesel işbirliğini teşvik etmeyi hedeflemektedir. 20 . Bu nedenle Komisyon şunları önermektedir: 2020 Vizyonu – Karadeniz Boyutu Bölgedeki aktörler ve ülkelerin katılımıyla 2020 yılına odaklanan yeni bir kapsayıcı kavram ve politika olarak Karadeniz Boyutu oluşturulmalıdır. Paydaşlar görevlerin üstesinden birlikte gelme ihtiyacıyla yüzleşmeli ve iş dünyası ve sivil toplum kuruluşları gibi hükümetler dışı aktörlerin sorunların çözümünde rol almasına izin vermelidirler. gelişen rolü ve artan bölgesel önemi yeni bir isimle sembolize edilebilir. Örgüte yeni bir isim. bölgesel bilinci arttırıcı bir yarışma düzenlenebilir. Karadenizde bölgeselleşmenin geliştirilip güçlendirilmesi Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü’nün (KEİ) yenilenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu. Ortak zorluklar ve gerçek ihtiyaçlara karşılık gelen ekonomik konulara odaklanma Karadeniz etrafındaki bölgesel işbirliğinin öncü felsefesi sürdürülebilir kalkınma prensipleri olmalıdır. Karadeniz siyasetine yaklaşım bölgesel olduğunda en iyi sonucu verecektir. tercihen zirve düzeyinde uluslararası bir toplantının gerçekleştirilmesi olmalıdır. üyelerin bölgesel işbirliğine bağlılıklarının yenilenmesi ve KEİ’nin daha geniş nüfuza sahip. insani ve toplumsal kaynakların sorumluluk bilinciyle kullanılması. Karadeniz’e ilişkin bölge devletlerini ve uluslararası paydaşları içeren. 2012’de yapılacak 20.Yönetici Özeti • Uluslararası toplum anlaşmazlıkların barışçıl şekilde çözülmesi yönündeki faaliyetlerin yanı sıra.
Bölgenin gelişmesinde sivil toplumun da rol almasının sağlanması için alışılmış yukarıdan-aşağı yaklaşımın ötesine geçilmesi şarttır. Ulusal yerine bölgesel düzeyde ele alınacak konuların belirlenmesi önceliklidir. sendikalar gibi iş organizasyonları da ortak sorunlara bölgesel çözümler bulunması hedefiyle birbirleriyle iletişim kurmaya özendirilmelidir. işveren birlikleri. diplomatların. Profesyonel gruplar için hedefe yönelik eğitim programları geliştirilmesi Bölgedeki kamu çalışanlarının. Karadeniz Eğitim Akademisi kurulması böyle bir sürece yön vermeye yardımcı olacaktır. Daha önce benzer konularla uğraşmış ve uğraşmakta olan Baltık. ya da Tuna gibi bölgelerin deneyimlerinden dersler çıkarılmalıdır. 21 . İyi yönetişim. sivil toplum ve soysal diyaloğun geliştirilmesi Politika oluşturma sürecine ve bu politikaların iyi yönetişimle ilişkilendirilmesine sivil toplumun dahil edilmesi desteklenmelidir. parlamenterlerin ve iş dünyası liderlerinin hedefe yönelik eğitimine ihtiyaç vardır. Balkanlar.Yönetici Özeti Tüm kademelerde bölgesel işbirliği planlarının geliştirilip düzenlenmesi Bölgenin potansiyelini tam olarak gerçekleştirebilmesi için hâlihazırda mevcut çok sayıdaki işbirliği programı ve teşebbüsü arasında koordinasyonun sağlanması gereklidir. Üniversiteler arasındaki işbirliği güçlendirilmeli ve bölgedeki gazetecilerin. Kültürlerarası diyalogun geliştirilmesi Karadeniz halkları arasında kültürler ve inançlar arası diyalogun güçlendirilmesi ve desteklenmesi gereklidir. Karadeniz bölgesindeki ülkelerde yer alan sivil toplum örgütleri arasında işbirliği sağlanması için çaba gösterilmelidir. bölge hakkında ve bölge için daha fazla haber yapması sağlanmalıdır. Ticaret odaları. Sorunlu bölgeler de dahil olmak üzere. genç liderlerin.
While the Black Sea states understood the need to replace the post-communist space with region-wide entities and initiatives that would provide it with an identity. dominated the rest. Turkey and Greece. With the end of the Cold War. Then. But for the newly independent states. For them. the Soviet Union. It led to the dissolution of a superpower. could contribute to geopolitical stability by facilitating collaborative action against the rise of new threats. guarded the south and south-east while Warsaw Pact members. which dominated and closed it to the outside world. the Black Sea has been a zone of contention and confrontation for centuries. albeit accompanied by marginalisation. the region was traditionally the backyard of one or two powers. during the Cold War. From antiquity. the geopolitical position of the Black Sea changed beyond recognition. The demise of communism unleashed armed conflicts and pent up historical tensions. a resurgence of competing nationalisms accompanied by longstanding animosities between the region’s players and the competing interests of key actors.Introduction: The State of Play Introduction: The State of Play Situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. political fragmentation and economic paralysis. through the adoption of confidence-building measures. At the same time the situation left isolated some of the region’s lands and peoples from the outside world. It also opened the region to outside influences and competition while at the same time witnessing the birth of a slow process of region-building. despite the fact that the region was divided by East–West strategic rivalry. Bulgaria and Romania. participation in regional cooperation schemes was regarded as a step towards integration into broader global economic. as well as generate opportunities for cooperation and deeper integration. this strained political and military balance did provide stability. For 40 years NATO members. These include uneven economic and political development. There was a widespread belief that these groupings and initiatives. The advent of regionalism in the Black Sea in the aftermath of the Cold War was seen by many as the most sensible way to overcome the economic and security vacuum left in its wake. the new regional organisations have often been seen as forums not just for cooperation with their neighbours but also as yet another venue at which to raise their national flags and underscore their newfound state identities. The existence of blocs precluded the possibility of much meaningful communication and cooperation across the sea. it found itself on the frontline of the global struggle for dominance. The driving force for cooperation in the post-Cold War era has been the need to move away from the disruptive influences of global ideological and military confrontation to the attractions of economic cooperation which would benefit all of the region’s people. the birth of six new sovereign states and several secessionist movements. However. social and political systems. their efforts have been seriously hampered by a number of factors. 22 .
Introduction: The State of Play
As a consequence, a number of regional initiatives were launched around the Black Sea and interstate interactions have increased, especially as a result of the work of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) which was established in 1992. It has, above all, two virtues. It is the most inclusive of regional organisations in terms of membership and, in terms of its remit, the most comprehensive. Since then, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BlackSeaFor), Black Sea Harmony, the Black Sea Forum, ODED-GUAM, the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, amongst others, have been established. Although all have different priorities, all profess a belief in the utility of regional cooperation as a basis of enhanced stability and security. The level of regional networking and interaction has increased as a result.
In this report the terms “Black Sea region”, “Black Sea area” and “Black Sea” are used interchangeably. The Commission considers the following countries as part of its definition of the area; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. They are the regional stakeholders. The other key players are the EU and NATO, both of whom are now present on the Black Sea, along with the United States. All three have openly expressed their interests in the region and have formulated policies accordingly.
Antagonisms have persisted however due to the emergence of an increasingly competitive environment, sometimes bordering on, or even exploding into, open confrontation. In geopolitical terms, being situated at the crossroads of the latest phase of EU and NATO enlargement, as well as the US-led “global war on terror”, the region has acquired a new significance, especially in the years since 9/11. With its roles in the transportation of energy resources and as an increasingly attractive economic space, the Black Sea region has gradually evolved into one of geopolitical significance. It has emerged as one of the key areas in an intensified competition between the major global powers; Russia, the United States and to a certain extent, the EU. All three have developed their own regional policies; the “near abroad”, the Wider Black Sea Region and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) respectively. All of them are characterised by exclusiveness and divisiveness. They have employed different means, from accession negotiations to the construction of pipelines and supporting friendly governments or undermining unfriendly ones, to strategically position themselves in the area, to expand their influence and secure economic and political dominance. The smaller Black Sea countries, caught in this spiral of competition have become, willingly or otherwise, players in this divisive game. While this attention has contributed to the creation of new regional and sub-regional geopolitical groupings, the fact that long standing conflicts remain unresolved, the acute problems raised by difficult energy-cum-security issues and the presence of strong actors has resulted in a fragile
Introduction: The State of Play
balance of power. In this context, the heightened involvement of the EU and the US alongside Russia and Turkey, the two most powerful countries of the region, has affected the process of regionalism, creating a complicated geopolitical jigsaw. Although various upheavals including secessionism, ethnic conflicts, political and economic crises and “coloured” revolutions were initiated at domestic level, the key actors have maintained a significant role throughout the region. In the current state of play, increased US attention to the region since 9/11, the war of August 2008 and the ongoing financial-cum-economic crisis, together with the emerging structures of new global political and financial governance are forcing a change of paradigm both in world politics and consequently in the Black Sea region too. It is to be expected that the involvement of global actors in Black Sea affairs will become ever more intense in the years to come. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the birth of its new foreign and security policy instruments plus negotiations over a new generation of agreements with Russia and other regional players, the EU can be expected to play a more assertive role. It is also likely that NATO, which is working on a new strategic concept and the United States, after the “reset” of its relations with Russia, will redefine their global and hence Black Sea priorities. As unipolarity has been steadily giving way since 2001 to an emerging new world order in which power is far more diffuse, the Black Sea has emerged as a geopolitical hub. The issues at hand are many, complex and challenging. By and large, global security paradoxes have been hard wired into the Black Sea system. In terms of paradoxes: • While the Black Sea has become a new strategic arena for Europe, Russia and the US in terms of energy security, conflicts, trade and migration - the incentives for regional cooperation are clear, even in the face of numerous disagreements and divisions. There is thus an ongoing battle between obstacles and incentives for regional cooperation. • The economic data and improving socio-economic indicators, at least until the onset of the global financial crisis, demonstrated that this was, and hence could be again, one of the fastest growing regions of the world. However, wide ranging disparities among and within the states of the region remain. • Despite the economic disparities of the region, the increased prosperity of some countries has led, in some cases, to higher military expenditure. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increasing economic prosperity may not be a sufficient guarantee against the resumption of armed hostilities. • The power and ability of certain issues to both divide and unite is paramount, especially in the energy sector. The correlation between energy supplies, competition for transit routes, pipeline security and political-cum-economic spheres of influence, contributes to enhancing fault lines as energy issues increasingly become hostage to power politics.
Introduction: The State of Play
• While in general terms the EU supports regional initiatives which favour integration and the creation of prosperity and stability, its economic and political attractions operate in relation to individual countries rather than to the region as a whole. As a result, regional stakeholders prefer privileged bilateral ties with the EU to the detriment of cooperation between one another. Specific EU policies with regard to regional cooperation have not yet developed into a comprehensive strategic design. The current debate regarding the confusing objectives, instruments and resources for the ENP, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership, is a case in point. It is also a paradox that while the EU desires a stable and democratic region, policy making and EU clout are weakened by the fact that member states often have diverging interests and policies here, especially in relation to Russia. • The notion of “neighbourhood”, which should be understood within a positive context in terms of developing regionally based economic and political support systems, has turned into a major conundrum. This is because all of the key stakeholders have started to develop their own overlapping “neighbourhoods” which, in the longer run, seem set to create further divisions rather than encourage cooperation. • While regional cooperation is sought by most of the stakeholders, its institutionalisation has proved difficult since some of the local players have consistently preferred bilateral arrangements to multilateral environments for policy discussions. • The most challenging paradox has to do with the conflict between globalisation and entrenched nationalism in the Black Sea area, which in and of itself, is one of the world’s most multipolar regions. Taking the above into account, the current state of play is, and will be, defined by the following key challenges: Energy & Energy Security: The energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine in the winter of 200809 was a clear indication of the importance of energy security for the region and for its customers. In the context of the Black Sea, the principal transport and pipeline routes for oil and gas from the Caspian basin and Russia to the West have become a key test of several types of relationship. Firstly, those between the producers; Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, secondly, between the transit countries; Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine and finally between the consumers; EU countries, Turkey and others. The ability to strike a rational balance between the respective interests of all players, meaning security of supply for consumers, security of demand for producers and security of steady revenue for transit countries, will be a make-or-break issue for the development of successful models of cooperation between the Black Sea states.
Thus the Commission was born. Commission members believe that it is imperative to foster innovative policies through meaningful political dialogue in the Black Sea region in order to contain and ultimately resolve existing differences by peaceful means and to turn the tide in favour of cooperation and stability. Russia is still wary about the gradual gravitation of post-Soviet countries towards the West. both from within the region and from outside. conventional and nonconventional. which demonstrated the explosive potential of the unresolved conflicts. As such. 26 . American and NATO relations with Russia will determine whether a cooperative or competitive mood will prevail in the region.Introduction: The State of Play Regional Security Dimensions: The prevailing vestiges of ideological or bloc divisions. as the August 2008 war demonstrated yet again. improved governance and the necessity of implementing politically painful and difficult reforms. the Black Sea area presents us with a unique combination of challenges. be highly relevant for stability in the Black Sea region. progress towards the establishment and proper functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of law has proved uneven and been marked by occasional setbacks and reversals. The advent of a new American administration with a reformist agenda and of a new team of leaders at the helm of the EU provided us with an additional spur. Finally. However. the political transformations of the past two decades have been impressive. The tendency among some of the region’s post-Soviet states to drift towards authoritarianism and restrictive economic policies. decided that it was high time to take a fresh look at the Black Sea with a view to finding solutions to ongoing and upcoming problems. The progress of the OSCE “Corfu Process” on security could therefore. old and new. The current attempt at redefining EU. Sustaining Prosperity and Increasing Standards of Living: This represents the greatest aspiration of all countries in the region. whether coming from Moscow or western capitals. It will prove highly challenging due to the global financial and economic crisis. remain a challenge. The same can be said for relations between Turkey and Russia. From Nation Building to Region Building: Considering that about half of the countries in the region have had little experience of sovereign statehood. Our sense of urgency was spurred on by the regional consequences of the world financial crisis and the legacy of the Russian-Georgian war. coupled with the challenges raised by separatist movements and inter-state disputes have inhibited the promotion of cooperative attitudes. persisting regional rivalries and domestic structural weaknesses which require greater transparency. and with regard to the prevailing geopolitical and economic realities. In the European security space. The Commission and its Genesis With the concerns outlined in this report in mind. a number of individuals.
27 .Introduction: The State of Play The alternative. just as regional stakeholders and outside powers are reassessing and redefining their Black Sea policies. The goal is to present not just short-term. To that end the Commission hopes to contribute to the mobilisation of the relevant resources and policies. in order to properly formulate conclusions regarding what needs to be done. harking back to Cold War-style competition and confrontation. transport or the environment and is mostly viewed from one-sided national or Western and Euro-Atlantic perspectives. regional cooperation. By addressing these four topics. The region’s increasing importance implies an urgent need to meet existing and emerging challenges. is too bleak to contemplate. decided to focus on four specific topics. As existing research tends to focus on specific topics. but to provide input for a new vision and long-term strategy for the Black Sea as a region. the Commission believes that the timing of this report and its recommendations are opportune. the Commission aimed to redress this imbalance by developing a comprehensive. economic development and welfare. peace and security. for example energy. multi-level and multi-disciplinary approach accompanied by policy-oriented. This report therefore recommends a comprehensive approach with movement on all fronts simultaneously. Conscious that any attempt to deal with all the events that deserve mention would be beyond the scope of this report. Commission members believe that an even-handed. policy-oriented study jointly with scholars and stakeholders from the region as well as from countries outside the Black Sea area. What is also needed is a commitment by all parties to realise the region’s potential. practical and adaptable recommendations can influence the deliberations of interested parties and thus the future of the area. Moreover. the Commission aims to contribute to a joint vision and a common strategy for the Black Sea region by developing new knowledge in areas of key concern. the Commission. Indeed. The four are interconnected and trying to address one without dealing with the others is not an option. democratic institutions and good governance and finally. with a view to being as objective and balanced as possible. Each of these encapsulates the key issues and the need to address the challenges they pose. sectoral or stakeholderspecific interests.
The attempt to expand NATO to the wider region was a consequence of the shift of transatlantic 28 . It is particularly relevant as it impacts on the progress of regional cooperation. While states like Ukraine. The increased activity of NATO. curbing NATO expansion and countering and suppressing separatism within its borders while encouraging the same beyond them. It has a geographic dimension given its Eurasian location and its major strategic transport and trade arteries. Its fear of encirclement was clearly discernible in its government’s statements made prior to and during the August 2008 war. whether of conventional or non-conventional types. as well as the threat perceptions of the stakeholders vis-à-vis one another. preventing the emergence of anti-Russian coalitions. economic development and good governance. people and drugs trafficking. the Russian position has gravitated towards bolstering its influence around its borders. either through its enlargement policy.Peace and Security Peace and Security The debate about the security dynamics of the Black Sea region is wide in scope. In this context. A basic dimension of the security paradigm is both its linkage to the bipolar model of the Cold War era and the unleashing and evolution of several ethnic. arms. The threat of social unrest as a consequence of global financial and economic turbulence is also a possibility. The security context has also been shaped by other post-Cold War trends. For Russia. These include globalisation and greater international cooperation coupled with the blurring of boundaries between soft and hard security threats. the main concern is the restoration and consolidation of its power in its “near abroad” while restricting the presence of other actors in the region. Georgia and Moldova might at times feel stifled by Russia. Euro-Atlantic policy on the other hand has evolved from the careful handling of Russia in the early postCold War period (“Russia-first”) to trying to prevent the then newly independent states from falling under the Russian sphere of influence and assuring a steady and secure supply of Caspian oil and gas. This is particularly evident in the power play between Russia and the EuroAtlantic community. its leaders consider their country to be the object of containment. The main challenges and concerns include: The conflicting interests of the main actors and stakeholders: The large number of regional and extra-regional actors implies clashing interests that pull Black Sea security policy options in different directions. It also has a natural resources perspective with regard to energy and involves the changing nature of threats and actors. This has meant demanding a say in all energy related projects. the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) or Membership Action Plans (MAPs) plus the signing of bilateral defence agreements with the US and support given to pro-Western elites have all served to increase Russia’s perception of insecurity. We also need to take account of the growing relevance of human security concerns such as environmental degradation. national and territorial conflicts suppressed during that period.
Meanwhile. the smaller littoral countries. ensuring that maritime security remains the exclusive concern of the riparian states and preserving the current legal regime of the Straits. Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “extra-regional powers” would not be needed in the security sphere. caught between the positions of the more powerful actors. Turkey however seems to offer a comprehensive vision for the area. came the Eastern Partnership with its emphasis on deeper integration with the EU through bilateral action. to balance the influence of the two main regional actors. oppose what they portray as a “Turkish-Russian condominium” and try to attract “extra-regional powers”. The changing nature of threats and actors: The sheer number and complexity of security threats.Peace and Security security concerns within the context of new geopolitical concepts such as the “Broader Middle East and North Africa” and the “Wider Black Sea Region” in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Black Sea Harmony and the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform. This means viewing the Black Sea as a single cohesive policy area. Then came the Black Sea Synergy with its promotion of regional cooperation and a region-wide. BlackSeaFor. projects-based approach aimed at encouraging the resolution of conflicts. security and prosperity in its wider neighbourhood. Some of these include the contested notions of “neighbourhood”. creating opportunities for political and economic cooperation and supporting the Black Sea area’s integration into the global economy are also Turkish goals. its policy has evolved from an emphasis on contractual. the EU or the transatlantic community. practice and apply differing policies respective to their degree of allegiance to Russia. EU members Greece. This succeeded the European Security Strategy of 2003 which emphasised the need for stability. By contrast. Bulgaria and Romania seek to enhance the influence and role of the Union in terms of its common foreign. As for the EU. Turkey’s overriding aim with these is the creation of a region where. bilateral relations to a more holistic approach. religious and other differences and the ramifications of Russia’s recognition of the independence of the Georgian breakaways. In consequence the Union has elaborated a number of policies towards the region. a concept first defined in its Black Sea Synergy policy of 2008. both potential and actual. hot on the heels of the August 2008 war. including its recently evolved “zero-problems with neighbours” and region-based foreign policy. Finally. Finally. It has also supported or initiated a number of regional cooperation schemes including BSEC. contribute to a general perception of the region as insecure and unstable. Assisting regional transition. are Turkey’s sine qua non. as they and the Russians say. These policies have been complemented by the appointment of Special Representatives and the despatching of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Consequently the EU is also becoming a relevant security actor here. especially Romania. Many of the area’s states. The first was the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2004 which offered a privileged relationship but without the promise of accession. especially the US. persisting ethnic. based on the Montreux Convention. 29 . security and defence policies due to the lack of a clearly defined NATO policy for the Black Sea.
This is also of concern with regard to the diminishing role of inclusive international organisations such as the OSCE and the increasing relevance of the EU with its selective membership. unaccountable and disorganised nature of some of the countries and entities in question contains the risk that they acquire the features of failed states. Energy has not only become of major national. the differing expectations. the future of the breakaways and the other protracted conflicts remains unclear. challenges and interests of its stakeholders is realistic or whether it is doomed to further instability despite its growing significance for “extra-regional” powers. it is therefore imperative to secure the implementation of the provisions now in place together with proper verification procedures. The issue of energy security is also a major concern. differences and regional security threats. Finally. The question is thus whether a single security structure for the Black Sea region which takes into account all the key concerns.Peace and Security In this context. regional cooperation and the security and stability of the Black Sea as a whole. perspectives and interests of the stakeholders prevent the development of a regional security regime. The weak. Common strategies aimed at addressing and overcoming deadlocks. at the same time. in the case of the Black Sea. in the hope of contributing to peace building in the region. militarisation and power politics are on the rise. a zone of rivalry. The capacity of Russia to meet Europe’s natural gas demand is intimately connected with its ability to deliver without making major investments in technology and infrastructure. arms and people. For these reasons. consumer and transit countries. international and regional concern but. the rule of law and human rights. The importance of the diversification of energy supplies and the risks related to dependency on Russia and the value of gas and oil from other sources to European markets are all issues with obvious ramifications as the 2008-09 dispute between Russia and Ukraine demonstrated. have proven difficult to arrive at. All this makes the Black Sea a potential energy transit hub while. While the EU and the United States promote norms and values based on representative democracy. It also implies vastly increased opportunities for the trafficking of drugs. Pending a negotiated agreement on some new arrangement concerning hard security issues in a broader European context. and organised crime in general. 30 . They continue to hinder the progress of the states concerned. This entails the danger of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. a test case for the development of a reliable and sustainable pattern of relationships amongst producer. The Black Sea region stands out as the most exposed area of Europe as a result of the unilateral suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and its accompanying confidence and stability-building measures. hitherto tried and tested conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms have been unsuccessful in the Black Sea region and there is a clear need for new and creative ideas with regard to conflict resolution. The military dimension of regional security remains a matter of concern and so is the growing tendency of some states towards authoritarianism and growing militarisation. (see Annex II). authoritarianism.
Both sovereign credit ratings and foreign direct investment figures have markedly improved since 1999. between 1995 and 1999. and policies aimed at promoting cooperation and economic integration with increased flows of people. even if it is unevenly distributed between and within countries. since then the region has seen a universal shift towards the market. as well as greater convergence with the EU. processes. from 2000 to the third quarter of 2008. goods and services across the region. capital. although they have slipped during the current economic downturn. Notwithstanding the adverse impact of the crisis. The transition from a state-led to a market-oriented economic system has. saw the stabilisation and consolidation of regional economies with improved security and political stability. There has been a greater degree of prosperity across the region. for some countries. been completed. inconsistent structural reforms and macroeconomic instability. the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the 1999 earthquake in Turkey. It saw rising living standards. dysfunctional financial sectors. Even for non-transition states like Greece and Turkey. Per capita incomes increased nearly five times in dollar terms between 1999 and 2008 – from roughly US $2. Lending growth has slowed sharply. fiscal imbalances and weak or uneven growth.Economic Development and Welfare Economic Development and Welfare While market economies encountered centrally planned ones in the Black Sea during the Cold War. which lasted until 1995. the economies of the Black Sea countries had to contend with the increasing volatility of energy prices. has been marked by a sharp halt in growth coupled with a low inflow of foreign capital due to the global financial crisis. increased trade and investment and the integration of Black Sea societies into the broader European and global economic context. resulting in a downturn in economic activity and. the Black Sea is a very different place today than it was in 1999 and even more dramatically so than in 1989. This was neither easy nor linear. was a period of high and sustained growth with real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increases for the region as a whole averaging 6% per annum. The first phase. The fourth phase. The crisis has subjected the region’s financial systems to extreme stress. was a period of sharp economic decline. This saw the collapse of the old systems of production and distribution. In the case of some transition countries the problems were compounded by the urgent requirements of nation and state-building.100 in 1999 to US $10. The third phase. since the third quarter of 2008.300 in 2008. at the same time. equal to a cumulative real expansion of 68% for the period. to a great extent. However. the strengthening of the first generation of market-oriented structural reforms and signs of macroeconomic stability. a painful process of deleveraging. weak or non-existent legal frameworks. The second phase. Intra-regional dynamics also improved thanks to the development of a number of organisations. Although government interventions succeeded in stabilising banks and 31 . this period was marked by relatively high inflation.
In this context. investment and official assistance. Contrast for example Greece. the nature of the crisis and the impact of the recession on key western European markets. the most significant parameter is the future evolution of relations with the EU. as in times of economic crisis the tendency of states is to exert more national control and not to commit their resources for initiatives which 32 . While the implications of shrinking populations in most of the region’s countries are wide ranging. This is mainly because. Romania. On balance though. Promoting regional cooperation is a basic challenge. whose decisions have direct impacts on the regional economy. unlike in other regions. the business environment and the sustainability of social security programmes. lending. pension systems. while a rapid recovery will be an undoubted boon. including the US. For 2010 growth to the order of 1–2% appears most likely. Their measurability is made more difficult by the different levels of integration of the countries into the global economy and the EU. Bulgaria and Turkey with the relatively small and sometimes isolated economies of Moldova and the states of the Caucasus. economic structure and levels of development. Then we need to consider the challenges of social heterogeneity. Dealing with the current global financial crisis is a priority as it has affected the region collectively and countries individually. A prolonged economic downturn in the EU will negatively affect growth prospects for the entire region. reforms in the areas of competitiveness and productivity are key to minimising their impact. it has developed relations with countries bilaterally. Russia and Azerbaijan. to the order of –6. The EU is a critical market for Black Sea countries and its principal source of financing. China and the Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries. a number of challenges and issues concern the region as a whole. a return to the high rates prior to the crisis is unlikely. all Black Sea countries experienced an economic contraction in 2009. While the worst in terms of economic decline appears to be over. It is hence the most powerful influence on Black Sea regional cooperation.Economic Development and Welfare averting a financial system collapse. Good relations with key actors. Despite the diversity of the countries in question in terms of size. With the notable exception of Azerbaijan. while at other times they facilitate increased cooperation under EU sponsored frameworks. While each state’s prescriptions vary. the need for cooperation and coordination through regional institutions such as BSEC is paramount. are important from an economic perspective. and while annual growth across the region may reach 3–4% thereafter. the EU. Challenges include long term demographic trends and the threat they pose for the quantity and quality of the workforce. suggest that recovery will likely be slow and uncertain in coming years. without much regard for the implications for regional cooperation. the political system and economic structure of Ukraine and the challenges of economic diversification faced by energy exporters. with EU measures sometimes dividing countries according to whether or not they are members.4%. the crisis has highlighted economic vulnerabilities requiring urgent attention. the EU’s impact on regional cooperation in the Black Sea has been more detrimental than beneficial.
meet a range of common challenges and the effort to mitigate the consequences of climate change can provide powerful incentives for joint action in a regional format. speculative attacks and other destabilising economic events.Economic Development and Welfare involve taking risks. but do not yet have one. The need to achieve sustainable economic development. These may involve reducing a country’s isolation or vulnerability. telecommunications. or pooling sovereignty. but deeper and more diversified cooperation is both possible and necessary. These include banking and finance. such as with initiatives that enhance economic security. although there are certain instances where incentives to cooperate may increase. at relatively low cost. The importance of a regional dialogue on key sectors has been heightened by the financial crisis. The widely divergent economies of the region make the prospects for economic integration difficult. transport. the Black Sea region enjoys a number of competitive advantages including its proximity to the wealthy markets of the EU. trade facilitation and environmental protection. The importance of extending free trade agreements between the EU and those states of the region which want one. or sharing information and pooling resources in a way that provides insurance against shocks. The use of the institutions and mechanisms of regional organisations like BSEC could provide much added value. trusting others. 33 . in terms of education and skills. The downturn is thus an obstacle for new common regional initiatives. favourable business environments and a high quality of human capital. The memories most countries of the region have of dealing with the crises of the 1990s indicate resilience. cannot be underestimated. These should be exploited in order to generate complementarities within which economic cooperation at a regional level may develop despite the many divergences and different priorities of the states in question. energy. a wealth of experience upon which to draw and a greater degree of flexibility now in implementing policy responses. Despite the crisis and its adverse implications.
Most of the states of the region have weak and volatile party systems with highly fragmented oppositions. and the fact that citizens have little experience in exercising their political rights. In the case of Ukraine. The legacies of the past in the vast majority of the countries of the region imply a particular set of problems to overcome with regard to democracy. The intervention of oligarchs in politics is commonplace. Nagorno-Karabakh. The state of democracy varies between the fully fledged and various forms of semiauthoritarian rule. The experience of organising effective party structures. it is politically heterogeneous and home to many different legacies. With the exception of Greece and Turkey. in contrast to the countries of central Europe. democracy in the region is affected by the communist heritage where members of the old nomenklatura still exert significant political and economic power. Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The relative weakness of democratic institutions across the region can be explained by the limited history of democracy in the post-communist states. The Black Sea region can be characterised by a series of challenges which compound the process of political transformation. 34 . On the other hand. The various unsettled disputes and protracted conflicts. its transformation has been largely determined by the struggle between members of the old nomenklatura who kept their positions in the state administration and the economy and the rise of new elite groups seeking to challenge their power. Georgia and Moldova. As a result. as is clientelism. may have prevented the country from experiencing further disintegration and brought about greater political and social stability. The revolutionary zeal of the “Orange” and “Rose” revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have petered out with unfulfilled dreams of democratisation across the region and sharp criticism from Russia regarding western-led notions of “democracy promotion” as opposed to its own brand of “managed” or top-down democracy. Even the more mature. This is particularly the case for the four “small” states of the region – Armenia. formulating adequate electoral platforms and the art of political compromise is lacking. They have had to grapple not only with the question of how to develop into democracies and market economies but also with how to manage their difficult state and nation-building processes. Azerbaijan. the absence in communist times of meaningful dissident movements.Democratic Institutions and Good Governance Democratic Institutions and Good Governance The systemic divide of the Cold War era still weighs heavily across the lands of the Black Sea in the area of democracy and good governance. The 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine are indicative of the need to promote a new discourse on democratisation.) attest to the difficulties they face. albeit controversially and not without costs. the evolution of the political system in Russia over the last decade has been characterised by an increasing recentralisation of political and economic power which paradoxically. consolidated democracies of the region occasionally go through difficult periods of political readjustment. (Transnistria.
35 . The current global economic crisis has only served to exacerbate this feeling of inequality thus undermining yet further the credibility of democratic values and stable good governance. in certain places. The other particular feature of the region which can affect democratisation is the persistence of minority problems in most countries. efficient and effective judiciaries. Likewise an independent media free of intimidation. the United States and international organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. the evidence suggests that the overwhelming number of issues linked to political transformation processes is resulting in growing voter discontent and distrust in the performance of their democracies. Nevertheless. the need for vigorous civil society organisations and the influence of interest groups are issues of concern. Other related dimensions are the role and impact of stakeholders such as the EU. Their influence to date has been weak and patchy as. Developing democracies with these features are in constant danger of being captured by formal or informal interest groups without being adequately able to react to external shocks. Accountable and transparent decisionmaking processes where good governance is the rule of thumb are also brought into question as are independent. The challenges faced in these circumstances are pervasive. transparency. corruption and governmental control of the media. By contrast. are problematic in all Black Sea states. accountability and efficiency. impartial. They are thus in danger of falling into a perpetual state of instability. Mounting welfare and income disparities discredit the transformation to democracy and market economies in the sense that they seem to favour the lot of political and economic elites instead of the nation as a whole. the emergence of a new generation of western educated technocrats in the political arena in some countries is a positive development. to varying degrees. All of these. Also of concern is the growing inequality between rich and poor. the rule of law. the quality of political parties and the proper functioning of national parliaments with requisite roles for both governments and oppositions. it clashes directly with Russia’s perception that it holds a droit de regard over its wider neighbourhood. They concern elections. all of which are champions of democratisation. it is necessary for all of the countries of the region to embrace all aspects of good governance. to minimise divisions both within states and between them. the widespread abuse of power. In the longer run. The rise of nationalism and populism in Europe and the Black Sea region are also damaging the standing of democracy. such as participatory democracy.Democratic Institutions and Good Governance The quality of democratic institutions is often questionable and horizontal and vertical accountability remains the principal challenge in the context of weak institutions.
The process of European integration also casts a long shadow and fundamentally impacts the progress of cooperation in the Black Sea. Black Sea regional cooperation reflects the complex security and socioeconomic circumstances of the area and the competing policies and priorities of its stakeholders. (see Annex I). There are also EU-led or initiated programmes such as the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA). In spite of permanent structures such as a secretariat. a think tank and thematic working groups. The Black Sea region is crammed with numerous regional structures and programmes that have appeared since the end of the Cold War. economic and political relevance. energy. regionalism has taken off since the end of the Cold War. In the Black Sea. water and energy respectively. BSEC is a prime example. environment. a lack of qualified expert staff and the limited participation of private sector and civil society actors. Then there are the wider EU policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. a parliamentary assembly. GUAM. In fact this proliferation of organisations must be seen against a backdrop of overlapping agendas. it suffers from a number of deficiencies such as slow decision-making. Moreover. This causes policy confusion. As a result. useful and effective. 36 . the systemic changes of the post-Cold War era. a shortage of funds. the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. the EU. a waste of resources and a reduced potential to build capacity in strategic policy areas such as trade. Most of the states of the region also participate in many of these processes and initiatives simultaneously. These include political and economic organisations such as BSEC. the Danube Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS) and the Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) which cover transport. the initiatives that do originate within the region are usually ignored by other stakeholders and donors. most notably. NATO’s open-door policy and EU enlargement. a business council. the political and economic transitions of the countries of the region and the international security context. Thus one might be forgiven for thinking that the region is a hive of international activity reflecting its strategic. a development bank. regional rivalry and tense bilateral relations coupled with insufficient institutional capacity for undertaking major projects of regional importance.Regional Cooperation Regional Cooperation The underlying idea of regional cooperation is that it assumes that each country can obtain additional benefits above and beyond what it might gain through independent action. It takes into account both the commonalities and differences between states in a particular geographic location in order to be coherent. transport and science and technology amongst others. the CDC and the Black Sea Forum. Finally the extent to which any regionally originated initiatives actually fit together well and how they synchronise with global trends and developments is difficult to ascertain. thanks to numerous local and external factors. These include globalisation.
Thus a commitment to serving the collective good of the region is missing and needs to be addressed. is important. to the exclusion of constructive and parallel region building. There is no clear understanding that national priorities are reinforced by regional interests.Regional Cooperation The fact that many of the states prioritise their own institution building processes. Given the growing impact and involvement of the EU. as is often the case. strictly intergovernmental nature of the organisation and the inability or unwillingness of its stakeholders to give it any autonomy or open it up to the initiatives of civil society or the business community. as opposed to their exclusive financing from external sources. Finally. the strengthening of existing institutions through necessary technical and financial capacity-building assistance and the carrying out of feasibility studies and cost benefit analyses with regard to specific projects in order to generate interest and sound policies. for all its weaknesses though. A dependence on this funding blurs the core purpose of regional cooperation and discourages the involvement of local actors. an important precondition is a proper policy mix between the approach of the local stakeholders and the EU. BSEC. local and non-state actors and that are of a cross-border nature. regional. Above all an understanding between the EU and Russia to ensure the success of regional cooperation is a prerequisite for effective partnerships. This is in contrast to other regional forums which also possess institutions but whose membership is limited and which also suffer from a lack of political support. results-oriented priorities. ultimately undermines the development of the latter and detracts from the long term benefits of the former. The generation of resources so that projects are funded from within. These concerns underline the need to increase awareness within the region about the importance and relevance of multilateral cooperation including a renewed effort to identify and implement projects of long-term and significant mutual benefit. has not been given its due credit despite the fact that it possesses all the right tools and elements to be the overarching regional framework for cooperation. including the EU. Thus the fostering of sustained development through regional cooperation can only be addressed through the setting of agreed goals and objectives. The prioritisation of regional policies is thus vital. This is made worse by the growing influence of the EU. This means focusing on sectors that have a truly regional character which necessitate a high level of interaction between state. Although it avoids addressing security issues as such. So is an emphasis on local ownership. it should be noted that these are dealt with in the context of its parliamentary assembly and its related research centre. the coordination of existing initiatives and the establishment of trust and confidence-building measures. 37 . other relevant concerns include overall policy coordination and coherence. The inclusive nature of BSEC is linked to its comprehensive institutional structures which assure a focus on relevant thematic issues. this simultaneously weakens the potential for more cooperation between the countries of the Black Sea but can also provide new opportunities for joint efforts for those countries that are able and willing to do so. However a serious issue that needs consideration is the top-down. As the centre of gravity increasingly shifts in the direction of Brussels.
These include regional organisations. at least in the short term. It would though. Considering such diversity. stability and economic and social development. What comes as a surprise perhaps is that the tools needed to address these challenges already exist. of the already existing processes of regional cooperation. regional cooperation and good governance. This should not however. it brings state and non-state actors together in a way which takes us towards this goal. their systems of governance. A major drawback is an across-the-board lack of political support and understanding. the focus should be on well defined problems. It is realistic for the Black Sea to become a model for new and imaginative types of positive relationships which bind rather than divide in a region that has been fragmented for far too long. Setting up or bolstering existing regional frameworks for policy coordination among stakeholders that would ultimately reduce instability does not have to entail immense political or financial costs. A persuasive indicator of political commitment to constructive regionalism is the willingness of participating countries to allocate resources. embodied in several regional institutions and multilateral forums. This in turn implies an emphasis on security concerns.Conclusions Conclusions The Black Sea region’s state of play and its increased relevance to various stakeholders suggests that much needs to be done to ensure that it evolves peacefully and constructively and that it becomes a reliable community that poses no threat to itself or to its neighbours. which can be seen and felt by ordinary people. However. In the short term though. within the region and internationally. it is difficult to create comprehensive regional integration schemes in the conventional sense. Current attempts at policy coordination in the Black Sea region. failure or the endless delaying of cooperation bears with it costs for the people of the region. financial institutions geared towards the region and many already existing policies and initiatives. The composition of the Black Sea region is highly diversified in terms of the size and power of its countries. to regional projects and to build the required capacity for the joint administration of those resources. By its very nature. The best way to achieve this is in a multilateral and regional format. sustainable development. the sophistication of their economic and financial structures and human development indicators. The analysis provided by this report finds that regional cooperation is fundamental if we are to achieve security. commensurate with their possibilities. fail to deliver substantive results. be an obstacle to broad ranging cooperation but rather an incentive to creative thinking and pragmatic action. 38 . require a change in the mind-set of policy makers to comprehend the value of regional approaches to policy making. These include adverse economic effects and obstacles to free trade which in turn slow growth and welfare. yielding visible results. Regional cooperation is not an end in and of itself but rather a gradual and multifaceted process which is long-term in scope.
These adverse security conditions need to be eliminated or their impacts reduced. the wish of certain members or sub-groupings to coordinate and cooperate should be respected by others. On the one hand. If they prove to be unable or unwilling to do so. are EU member states while Turkey is negotiating its accession. These need to be strengthened and efficiently channelled into regional policy making. integration and policy coordination. important security issues such as the unresolved secessionist conflicts undermine the drive for regionalism and obstruct collective action and institutions. The focus here is on a select number of recommendations which the Commission feels should generate support in order to enhance the profile of the wider Black Sea region and to contribute to its regional appeal. 39 .Conclusions Around the Black Sea. it is to be expected that the geopolitical forces now at play will continue to pursue their respective. target Armenia. trade and financial stability have generated demands for regional cooperation. there are two opposing conditions that affect the potential of regionalism. Three of the states of the Black Sea. the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. There is thus a need to clarify the Union’s status with regard to the formulation of regional policies and outputs. Bulgaria and Romania. economic difficulties and the need for managing regional public goods such as the environment. Georgia. should be seen as a wakeup call that the region is in need of serious attention and concerted action. their most important economic partner. for those states of the region which are not members. All the Commission’s recommendations are meant to mobilise international and local interest in the Black Sea region. This set of recommendations makes no claim to be exhaustive. the post-August 2008 setting and the discussion of a new European security architecture. On the other hand. insofar as such cooperation is not directed against the non-participants. Those who do not take part should not prevent others from going ahead. and not necessarily convergent. Greece. security and prosperity of the region. This is not an attractive proposition for the stability. The impact of the EU is extremely high as its power of attraction and policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. The role of the EU is key. but we hope it will serve as a point of departure for further discussion. For most of them it is becoming a catalyst of social and political change too. The current conjunction of developments including the global financial crisis. Azerbaijan. Where a regional initiative does not attract the interest of all participants. and in turn the participants should leave the door open for them to join at a later stage. It is the view of the Commission that the primary responsibility for articulating a clear and coherent vision of what the Black Sea region should look like in ten years time rests with the regional actors themselves. agendas. The EU has also become. while it has a strategic partnership with Russia. Moldova and Ukraine.
The resources of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank should be harnessed for this. Such steps. relying mainly on confidence-building measures and increased transparency. that there should be a clearer picture regarding Turkey’s membership and debate on which. • Adding a specific security dimension to BSEC activities. a Black Sea Dimension. of the other countries of the region will join. These should cover the main areas of BSEC concern where a regional approach provides value added compared to the individual efforts of member states. The 2020 Vision needs to be developed into a clear strategy which should mark the culmination of several linked initiatives. Preparations should begin without delay for a summit in 2012 to mark the 20th anniversary of the organisation. It is in need of rejuvenation. The aim of this would be to promote regional cooperation while anticipating changes in the neighbourhood. The Dimension should also take into consideration ongoing discussions regarding a new European security framework. • Developing an inclusive mechanism for regular consultation and coordination between BSEC and all the other regional organisations and initiatives. will have crystallised. similar to the Hellenic Development Fund. which should be in line with other international commitments undertaken by BSEC member states. the countries of the Western Balkans will have become EU members. This could also be done through the creation of specific funds. We should work towards proposing mid-term recommendations with 2020 in sight. could include: • Setting specific targets and deadlines for the development of a system of legally binding commitments and implementation mechanisms. We assume that by then. (governmental and non-governmental.) as well as with “extra-regional” partners. 40 . by the countries and actors of the region. It should be an opportunity to renew the commitment of its members to regional cooperation and to inaugurate an overhauled BSEC in order to make it a more relevant regional organisation with greater clout.Policy Recommendations Policy Recommendations 2020 Vision – A Black Sea Dimension The setting of consensus targets for the region is important. in order to enable BSEC to co-finance major projects of regional interest. Enhance the profile of Black Sea regionalism The first chapter in the history of BSEC has ended but a new one has not yet been properly opened. This would entail the creation. • Agreeing on a substantial augmentation of the BSEC budget. based on proportional contributions. of a new overarching concept and policy. The necessity of thinking about a new concept for the region is only underscored by the fact that most existing ideas and policies for and about the Black Sea were conceived before the August 2008 war. if any. This must not be a mere festive occasion.
The group should eventually suggest ways to provide international guarantees for the implementation of any peace agreements. expanded role and enhanced regional relevance should be symbolised by giving it a new name. human and societal resources are essential components of such a development model. is needed. and agreed upon measures under such mechanisms. the Commission proposes a number of confidencebuilding measures from hotlines between foreign ministers to regular meetings of senior officials of the foreign and defence ministries of the region in order to stress the need for regional solutions to regional problems. 41 . In this way we should seek to restore and preserve a rational and enduring equilibrium between economic development and the integrity of the natural environment in ways that society can understand and accept. Human and knowledge capital should be considered an integral part of a sustainable development model. as this discussion has immediate ramifications for the Black Sea which could be described as the shared neighbourhood of both the EU and Russia. Rational responses to the consequences of climate change and the responsible use of natural. The feasibility of an international gathering. involving the Black Sea states and international stakeholders should be the end point for any or all of these processes. such as the OSCE or the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE treaty). at least one cabinet meeting a year to an examination of Black Sea regional cooperation matters and to report accordingly to their parliaments as well as to the BSEC parliamentary assembly. migration and organised crime would be a valuable addition. There is a need for the region’s stakeholders to contribute to the ongoing debate about a new security architecture for Europe. preferably at a summit level. Focus on economic issues that meet common challenges and real needs Promote the principles of sustainable development as the guiding philosophy of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area. Establishing a structured security dialogue on relevant issues ranging from civil protection to coordination regarding man-made or natural disasters. A region-wide awareness raising competition could be opened for everyone in the region to suggest what it might be and also to design a new logo and flag for it. In the interim it should propose confidence-building measures in order to mitigate the corrosive impact of the conflicts on the goal and vision of putting the whole Black Sea region at a qualitatively new level. As part of this discussion. which should be translated into coherent policies at national and regional level. Deal with the conflicts – Start real security dialogue and confidence-building measures As part of our 2020 Vision we see an urgent need to tackle the protracted conflicts and other outstanding issues of the region. The Commission proposes to establish a high level consultative group in order to assess the issues and search for solutions. a renewed assessment of already existing mechanisms. • BSEC’s rebirth. Within this context. as opposed to just declaring that they will.Policy Recommendations • All members should undertake to actually devote.
the need to make this work more visible and coordinated is necessary if the potential of the Black Sea. 42 . whether governmental or non-governmental. thus creating common challenges which require cooperation and communication. energy. for example cross-country infrastructure and institutional linkages. is to be fully unleashed. transport. investment or financing. for example customs procedures and visas or in the form of a comprehensive trade facilitation deal. Cooperation could also aim to mitigate the negative effects of economic downturns. Conduct regular policy dialogues between relevant officials concerned with important sectors of the economy that would benefit from cooperation such as finance. Since economies are increasingly interlinked. to pool information or resources to create early warning systems or reciprocal assistance mechanisms or to reduce the vulnerability of countries to crises in the future and to devising forms of insurance. achievable solutions and appropriate cost benefit ratios. cross-country regulation. decisions or actions in one country often impact neighbouring states. in the sense of avoiding misunderstandings or undertaking policies which may have adverse “beggar thy neighbour” impacts. Promote and coordinate regional cooperation schemes at all levels Any examination of work done on the region shows that numerous schemes. These should include concrete steps to facilitate business activity by removing various non-tariff barriers that hinder trade. it is essential to supplement the mitigation measures taken in each country with a concerted regional approach to post-crisis recovery programmes relying on the concept of sustainable development. the basis of cooperation may be economic security oriented. However. EU-led or with a thematic focus have been actively promoting regional cooperation for years. not-for profit. environment. as a region. enhanced information sharing in order to stimulate growth and overlapping activities. fisheries and so on. This may be done by agreements relating to specific activities. These could include policy coordination and harmonisation. Take policy measures to improve the business environment and to facilitate greater economic activity across borders. The basis for such cooperation may entail undertaking new initiatives to create physical linkages. The key is for cooperation to meet real and identified needs which have tangible. programmes and initiatives.Policy Recommendations Since the on-going global financial and economic crisis has severely affected most countries in the Black Sea region. Alternatively. Annex I is indicative of this.
Another reference is the Alliance of Civilizations which was established in 2005. Working on this could also help draw in all relevant actors in the fields of their concern. A joint Black Sea Studies graduate programme needs to be established between the region’s universities in order to create academic linkages for the future. Funds should be found to address this problem. purposes and values. 43 . Promote intercultural dialogue A clear encouragement and sponsorship of intercultural dialogue among the peoples of the Black Sea would support regional cooperation. Identifying issues which could be better addressed regionally rather than nationally is a priority. training people together is a way to promote the cooperation of local public officials and others on issues of common concerns. such as the environment. A useful example that could serve as an inspiration and model is the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures which is based in Alexandria in Egypt and operates within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. there is much to be gained from the greater involvement of the business sector at national and regional levels. the Balkans. This should aim to improve the number of well trained individuals at the service of their countries.Policy Recommendations There is also a need to move beyond the top-down approach promoted by organisations such as BSEC and others. In terms of the media there are few foreign correspondents from Black Sea countries reporting on events in one another’s countries. aimed at bringing together the religious leaders of the region’s confessions. the Danube region and so on. under the auspices of the United Nations. Cooperation between universities should be enhanced as should student exchange programmes in order to create linkages and networks between young people of the Black Sea. to assure that civil society plays a role in the development of the region. NGOs. If we are to assume that civil society refers to uncoerced collective action around shared interests. at the initiative of the governments of Spain and Turkey. Doing this would serve as a good tool for coordination between institutions and programmes with a regional cooperation dimension. which contribute to regional development. governments and investors in deciding on their funding priorities. Lessons should be drawn from the experiences of other areas which have faced or are dealing with similar issues. would help streamline such a process. Similar models should be encouraged at the sub-regional level. parliamentarians and business leaders throughout the region. Promote the targeted training of professional groups There is a need for the targeted training of public servants. women’s groups and youth in Black Sea regional activities. The creation of a Black Sea Training Academy for example. The selection of key subjects which need addressing would also assist donors. diplomats. This means that what news there is often comes from external sources not well attuned to the interests of their readers or viewers. Intercultural dialogue should be promoted hand in hand with interfaith dialogue. young leaders. such as the Baltic. However. above and beyond that.
44 . Efforts should be made to encourage cooperation between civil society organisations in Black Sea countries including the conflict regions. We believe that our recommendations can serve as a means to begin to release it. The Commission believes in the potential of the Black Sea. Business organisations such as chambers of commerce and employers’ organisations and trade unions should also be encouraged to talk to one another in order to find and propose regional solutions for regional problems.Policy Recommendations Promote good governance. One idea could be the creation of a cooperation council for business organisations and chambers of commerce under the aegis of the renewed BSEC enhancing the scope of the already existing BSEC Business Council. which all countries in the region have signed up to through their membership of the Council of Europe. its people and governments. Countries should take practical steps in developing e-government services both on national and regional levels. Programmes should be implemented such that a focus on civil society is enhanced. More funds should be devoted to programmes and projects encouraging active and professional involvement of civil society in policy making throughout the region. civil society and social dialogue The involvement of civil society in policy making is linked to good governance and solid institution building.
to promote cooperation with other international and regional organisations. Moldova. Galati and Tulcea. Moldova. Romania. Goals / Activities Foster regional cooperation through its sectoral working groups: Agriculture. Georgia. BTA (Bulgaria). Romania. Provide a legal basis for economic. Albania. Culture. Other Regional Organisations and Initiatives: Black Sea Association of National News Agencies (BSANNA) 2006 International association AzerTAj (Azerbaijan). Customs Matters. Caucasus-Press (Georgia). ATA (Albania). Georgia. Greece. social. Serbia. Promote friendship and good neighbourly relations. Russia. Turkey and Ukraine. Romania. Education. Tanjug (Serbia). Turkey and Ukraine. SMEs. Turkey and Ukraine. to enact legislation needed for the implementation of decisions taken by the heads of state or government or by the ministers of foreign affairs. strengthen Armenpress (Armenia). AGERPRES (Romania). Romania.The Black Sea in Figures The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX I: Regional Organisations and Initiatives Name The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Est. Azerbaijan. Armenia. Anadolu mutual respect and trust among the agencies. strives to pursue applied. Banking & Finance. providing financing for commercial transactions and projects in order to help member states to establish stronger economic linkages. Russia. Greece. Foster multilateral cooperation among the BSEC member states as well as with their international partners. Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) 1997 International financial institution Independent research and training institution 3. freely and equally Agency (Turkey). Bulgaria. Constanta. Moldova. Environmental Protection. Black Sea Euroregion 2008 Regional initiative 45 . Armenia. Combating Crime. Armenia. Greece. Bulgaria. Emergency Assistance. help attract Foreign Direct Investment to the region. Accelerate development and promote cooperation between its shareholder countries. Moldova. International Centre for 1998 Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) 4. Russia. Bourgas. build capacity and promote knowledge on the Black Sea region. Region of Cahul. Exchange of Statistical Data & Information. Trade & Economic Development. Related Bodies / Affiliated Centres of the BSEC: 1. develop joint cooperation projects. Lobby and act for the continuous improvement of the business and investment environment. Municipalities of international organisations. Turkey and Ukraine. 1992 Type Regional economic organisation Member States / Parties Initiating party: Turkey Albania. Georgia. Moldrpres (Moldova). Transport. commercial. Moldova. Institutional Renewal & Good Governance. to represent and support Bulgaria their common interests and to cooperate with the existing Black Sea City of Idjevan. Initiating parties: Romania. Parliamentary Assembly 1993 of the Organization of the BSEC (PABSEC) Parliamentary assembly 76 parliamentarians from Albania. Tourism. provide a forum for a dialogue between the private and public sectors. policy-oriented research. Autonomous Republic of Adjara. Varna. Azerbaijan. Develop cooperation among its members. Shabla. Bulgaria. Azerbaijan. Braila. non-profit organisation National organisations representing the business communities of Albania. GHN (Georgia) and Ukrinform (Ukraine). Albania. ITAR-TASS (Russia). support regional trade and investment. Georgia. MIA (FYROM). Bulgaria. Nessebar. Healthcare & Pharmaceutics. Information & Communication Technologies. Counties of Braila. Russia. Greece. and Mangalia. Russia. Energy. Greece. Armenia. 2. help enhance the competitiveness of SMEs through management training. Constanta. collect and disseminate statistical data and information on business conditions and business opportunities in the region. Serbia. Azerbaijan. offering policy advice and coordinating activities. Turkey and Ukraine. BSEC Business Council 1992 International non-governmental. exchange information to facilitate its dissemination. to provide assistance to national parliaments so as to strengthen parliamentary democracy. cultural and political cooperation among the member countries. ANA (Greece). Serbia. HINA (Croatia). Georgia. Science & Technology. Armenia. Azerbaijan. tries to fulfil in the best possible way its institutional role and the assignments received by carrying out studies. Romania. Bulgaria.
The Black Sea in Figures Black Sea Littoral States Border / Coast Guard Cooperation Forum Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership 2000 International forum Regional platform Bulgaria. support stability and promote development. Ukraine and other EU member states. customs and external economic policy. Georgia. human rights and the rule of law. Bulgaria. Azerbaijan. Enhance peace. Tajikistan. develop a climate more conducive to the solution of conflicts in the region. Estonia. mine counter measures (MCM). territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states. Kazakhstan. Bulgaria. Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan. any other tasks agreed by all the parties. Romania. Georgia. focus on practical projects in areas of common concern. Bulgaria. shaping a common vision and setting a common agenda. Romania. Promote good governance. humanitarian assistance (HA). Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Georgia. Turkey and Ukraine. Russia. Romania. 100 NGOs from Armenia. to bring together methods of regulating economic activity and to create favourable conditions for the development of direct production relations. 2008 Black Sea Synergy 2007 Stimulate democratic and economic reforms. Latvia. visits. Georgia. Greece. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. services. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 1991 Regional organisation Initiating party: Russia Azerbaijan. Moldova. Foster greater synergy among international and regional organisations to create political preconditions for the success of regional cooperation projects. Initiating party: Romania Armenia. strengthening of tolerance and nondiscrimination. Armenia. stability and maritime security in the Black Sea Turkey and Ukraine. Russia. labour and capital. Create an economic union and form a common economic space grounded on free movement of goods. Kyrgyzstan. civil emergency planning. Moldova. Turkmenistan. Russia. Georgia. Georgia. respond to opportunities and challenges through coordinated action in a regional framework. as a means of strengthening NGOs and their capacity to influence regional and national policies. Russia. Belarus. Identify regional means and capabilities that can be mobilised to ensure sustainable development through more effective regional cooperation and highlighting the role and active involvement of the business community to this end. Strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability and to ensure the collective defence of the independence. Community of Democratic 2005 Choice (CDC) Intergovernmental organisation Initiating parties: Georgia. Moldova. Romania. tax. Russia. price. empowerment of youth through provision of better education and research opportunities. Moldova. FYROM.09). goodwill Turkey and Ukraine. post-conflict reconstruction and environmental protection. putting regional priorities in harmony with European and EuroAtlantic developments in these areas. area by increasing regional cooperation and improve working relationships. Ukraine Promote democracy. Armenia. Encourage regional cooperation by pooling relevant national experiences and best practices in crisis management. environmental protection. civil society capacity-building. Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 1992 International (as the organisation Collective Security Treaty)/ 2002 46 .08. Slovenia and Ukraine. Turkey. Georgia (until 17. Belarus. with a view to creating a regional environment conducive to the promotion of democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms. Lithuania. Kazakhstan. Increase the level of dialogue and cooperation among NGOs in the wider Black Sea region. Romania. Moldova. Greece. Belarus. 2006 Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) Black Sea NGO Forum 2001 Regional multinational maritime force Nongovernmental Organisation forum EU regional cooperation policy Initiating party: Turkey Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. Kyrgyzstan. Armenia. Russia. Turkey and Ukraine. to elaborate a coordinated monetary. in the attainment of which the member states shall give priority to political measures.
Turkey. Russia. Strengthen trade and economic ties. Brazil. Tajikistan. military reform and restructuring. Mauritania. Turkey. Kyiv Initiative 2005 Council of Europe initiative Show the added value of coordinated and inter-disciplinary planning across a range of key functions. and Uzbekistan. Ukraine. Serbia and Turkey. Initiating party: EU Armenia. Better management of water and its demand. Initiating parties: Azerbaijan. regional law enforcement trainings. France. Bulgaria. Latvia. Morocco. Cyprus. Ireland. FYROM. Russia. Romania. Lebanon. Belarus. Armenia. Russia. Romania. Georgia. United Kingdom and the United States. Greece. assuring sustainable tourism that may also become a leading economic sector. Spain. Sweden. Ukraine and the United States. identify the very broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black Sea nations and expose their officials and US participants to the strong common history and shared values of the region. expose Black Sea officials to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic American system and within the US national security community itself by engaging them with policy makers who represent a wide range of viewpoints. 2001 Regional organisation 2001 Programme 1996 Non-institutionalised regional cooperation structure 47 . Bulgaria. Exchange drug epidemiology/information. Slovenia. cultural development. Romania. Germany. Belgium. Georgia. Georgia.The Black Sea in Figures Harvard Black Sea Security Studies Programme 2001 Academic programme Senior military representatives and civilian security specialists from Armenia. Bosnia & Herzegovina. Greece. defence organisation. Israel. education and economic development. Georgia. Greece. Montenegro. Portugal. Azerbaijan. Bosnia & Herzegovina. Ukraine. Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan and Moldova (initially including Uzbekistan). Jordan. treatment for drug addicts. tourism. organised crime and drug trafficking. Moldova and Ukraine. Georgia. Malta. Croatia. Tunisia. Promote good-neighbourly relations. interact in the framework of international organisations. legal assistance. Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan. fight international terrorism. identify those issues which divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation. prevention of drug use. Moldova. Moldova. Luxembourg. at the same time. Kyrgyzstan. develop transport and communication arteries. including heritage and environmental protection. Azerbaijan. strengthen regional security. Moldova. an increased rational use of energy drawing on renewable sources. Moldova and Ukraine. the littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries. Switzerland. Ukraine and Romania. Armenia and Georgia. Ukraine. Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) 1995 Programme Support the development of energy cooperation between the European Union. furnishing incentives for sustainable urban development. Georgia. Moldova. International Federation for Sustainable Development and Fight Against Poverty in the Mediterranean-Black Sea 2004 International association Various institutions from: Albania. Algeria. FYROM. highlight the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest to these countries and. Increase shipping security along the Black Sea coast and track suspicious ships. Initiating party: Bulgaria Albania. cooperation in South East Europe. Armenia. Operation Black Sea Harmony Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (ODED-GUAM) South Caucasus AntiDrugs Programme (SCAD) South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) 2004 Naval operation Initiating party: Turkey Turkey. guaranteeing sustainable agricultural and rural development. Deepen participants’ understanding of global and regional strategy. supporting sustainable mobility through appropriate transport management. favouring sustainable development of the sea and its coastal zones. Syria. Turkey. Bulgaria. Italy. Initiating party: EU Azerbaijan. security. stability. Egypt.
promoting TRACECA projects as a means to attract funding from IFIs. building capacity in EU and WTO legislation. to foster regional. Turkey. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Black Sea Trade and Investment Promotion Programme (BSTIP) Union of Black Sea and Caspian Confederation of Enterprises (UBCCE) 2007 Intergovernmen. Romania. 48 .Greece. identifying problems and deficiencies in the region’s trade and transport systems. tal initiative 2007 International union National organisations from: Enhance economic cooperation. Bosnia & Herzegovina. Serbia. achieve sustainable management of marine living resources. in order to guarantee transparency and to also give an impulse to Trans-European transport cooperation on the basis of the mutual interest for the progressive integration of their respective transport networks and markets in accordance with EU and international legal and regulatory frameworks. Develop networking arrangements. Serbia. Russia. Slovakia. other bilateral donors. Turkey and Ukraine. development partners and private investors. Montenegro. Romania. Georgia. Romania. Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Russia. Austria. Provide a platform for cooperation for the protection of water and Bulgaria. Hungary. Germany. Georgia. other regional / international organisations with relevant functions. Greece. Kazakhstan. Slovenia and Turkey. Georgia. Slovenia.The Black Sea in Figures Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) 1995 Regional organisation Initiating party: OSCE Albania. FYROM. Moldova. Moldova. Greece. Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Rebuild trust in public institutions. water related ecosystems of the wider Black Sea region. Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan. The Baku Initiative 2004 Policy dialogue on Energy and Transport Integrate energy markets of the participating countries. Iraq. Bulgaria. Azerbaijan. Croatia. (the entire Hungary. Georgia. Romania. Turkey and Ukraine. pursue sustainable human development. Croatia. Bulgaria. Moldova. Stimulate cooperation among the participating states in all matters related to the development and improvement of trade in the region. Bosnia & Herzegovina. defining. in terms of contents and timing. Combat and improve coordination against trans-border crime in South East Europe. a Technical Assistance Programme to be financed by the European Commission. the EC. Moldova. to strengthen a critical set of institutions that lie at the nexus of state and society. The Black Sea NGO Network (BSNN) 1998 Regional association Bulgaria. Romania. Turkey. promoting optimal integration of the international transport corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia ‘TRACECA’ into Trans-European Networks (TENs). cross-border ties in the public. Serbia. Bosnia & Herzegovina. Romania. supporting the introduction of the Global Compact in the sub-region. BSEC and UNDP. Moldova. Main recipients can be located in Armenia. democratic values and good practices. Tajikistan. Bulgaria. Bulgaria. Azerbaijan. Tajikistan.Initiating party: EU tal programme Armenia. The Commission on the 1992 Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution (the Black Sea Commission or BSC) The Danube Black Sea Task 2001 Force (DABLAS) Intergovernmen. the Black Sea Commission. Azerbaijan. Turkey. Georgia. Kazakhstan. to affirm the value of citizen participation in the democratic process. The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (BST) – a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States 2007 Public-private partnership Transport Corridor Europe. Turkmenistan. Montenegro. Armenia. Kyrgyzstan. Protect the environment.1993 Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) Intergovernmen. Iran. Turkey. Black Sea basin including all tributaries). Georgia. Germany. Combat pollution from land-based sources and maritime transport. Russia. Georgia. Ukraine and Russia (the oblasts of Krasnodar and Rostov). tal organisation Turkey and Ukraine. Romania. Iran. Romania. the International Commission for the Protection ofthe River Danube (ICPDR). FYROM. Turkey. Ukraine. Armenia.Bulgaria. Azerbaijan. International Financial Institutions (IFIs). private and non-profit sectors. Cooperation programme Austria. Albania. Bulgaria.
700 - 11.600 14.379 66.900 9.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX II: Military Balance in the Black Sea Region Table I: Military Capacities and Reserves of the Black Sea Region States Armenia Azerbaijan Conscription (months) Capabilities Active Army Army Professionals Conscripts Airborne Navy Professionals Conscripts Coast Guard Marines Naval Aviation Naval Infantry Air Force Professionals Conscripts Strategic Deterrent Forces Command and Support Joint Space Forces National Guard Central Staff Paramilitary Reserve Army Navy Air Paramilitary3 National Guard Joint 3 Bulgaria No Georgia 18 Greece 9 Moldova 12 Romania No Russia 12 Turkey Ukraine 24 No 12 (Army / AF) 15 18 (Navy) 510.000 5.000 129.932 2.000 1.700 258.000 16.500 8.100 495 6.000 2.500 34.000 360. ed.500 79.767 14.767 156.000 302.530 34.000 15.200 160..000 - 1.000 102.000 170.000 65.000 325. (2) Included in “Navy” (3) Depending on the country.000 66.000 3.500)2 (3. J.600 402.747 18.530 - 6.000 77.150 1.000 8.000 40.000 915 4.105 2.000 190.840 25.600 93.000 50.000 80.578 11.753 42.500 45.310 31.000 250.000)2 45.000 - 7.000 20.000 142.000 31.500 57. Border Police.932 11.100 34.000.100)2 (2.000.000. 49 .000 Source: Hackett.000 449.240 13.600 4.000 48.500 - 2.150 17.773 21.027.500 163.500 (2.700 55.500 35.220 66.000 4.200 4.000 300.500 7.344 1.900 45.940 56.500 20.970 35.840 40. 2009). it might refer to Coast Guard Riot Police.000 1.000 - 84.500 11.000 20.080 38.000 60.200 378.479 850 73.200)2 (3.945 13. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS. etc.925 70.000 13.200 43.000 10.671 3.000 237.900 1.748 210.500 250.
000+ 15.. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS.666 77 32 236 Georgia 53 Greece Moldova Romania 1.474 18 214 2. ed.The Black Sea in Figures Table II: Comparison of the Black Sea Region‘s Armies Armenia Main Battle Tanks Light Tanks Reconnaissance (Recce) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles Armoured Personnel Carrier Artillery Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Aircraft Helicopters 104 136 229 110 127 468 282 Azerbaijan 320 Bulgaria 1. the Russian Baltic Fleet. Table III: Comparison of the Black Sea Region‘s Navies Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Submarines Principal Surface Combatants Frigates Corvettes Aircraft carriers Destroyers Cruisers Patrol and Coastal Combatants Mine Warfare Logistic and Support Amphibious Naval Aviation Aircraft Helicopters Naval Infantry Armoured Personnel Carrier Armoured Combat Vehicle Artillery Strategic Deterrent Forces Submarines 15 16 59 14 488 58 6 (3) 4 8 (2) 2 21 (11) 5 6 6 36 42 314 (245) 3 342 7 26 (10) 3 21 77 5 2 1 5 19 17 14 8 2 1 4 4 4 40 11 21 64 Greece Moldova Romania 10 17 14 3 17 11 11 7 3 4 1 2 10 7 90 + 7 Russia Turkey BS Fleet Total 1 1 11 8 67 43 21 2 1 15 4 72 46 422 + 26 43 22 49 46 5 4 36 3 14 23 23 Ukraine 1 4 1 3 Source: Hackett. J. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS.900+ 26. the Russian Black Sea Fleet.984 600+ 3.140+ 9.105 3. J. the Northern Fleet.163 12–18 43 161 44 315 148 1278 49 1073 838 316 Russia 23.028 1.432 3. ed. 2009).121+ N/A Turkey 4. 2009). the Russian Pacific Fleet..351 177 Source: Hackett. (1) Incl.409 1.620 242 377 2.000 150 2. and the Russian Caspian Flotilla (2) support aircraft (3) combat capable (4) operative (5) attacking 50 .643 7.205 250+ 650 3.450+ 215+ 168 280 Ukraine 2.
9 % Notes: (1) SIPRI.278 2.780 5 3.” http://milexdata.6 % Russia 33.sipri..3 % Moldova 17. “Military Expenditure Database. ed.6 % Georgia 720 9. Azerbaijan 102 (47) 35 4 Bulgaria 116 (80) 47 1 Georgia 27 (8) 33 - Greece 275 (271) 39 34 104 Moldova 6 6 - Romania 125 (72) 67 65 Russia 2222 (1859) 60 - Turkey 753 (435) 40 18 Ukraine 299 (211) 38 - 22 (16) 33 - 90 Table V: Military Expenditure Armenia Military expenditure million US$ (2007)1 Military expenditure % of GDP (2007)1 195 2 3% Azerbaijan 680 Bulgaria 806 2.1% Ukraine 3. 2009).5 % 4 Turkey 11. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS.3 2.3 0.974 1. J.155 2.The Black Sea in Figures Table IV: Comparison of the Black Sea Region‘s Air Forces Armenia Aircraft (combat capable) Helicopters Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Air Support Command Aircraft Helicopters Air Training Command Aircraft Strategic Deterrent Forces Aircraft Source: Hackett.5 % Romania 1.821 4 3.2 % Greece 8.org/ (2) Figures do not include military pensions (3) Figures do not include spending on paramilitary forces (4) Estimates 51 .
983.548 338. 14.320 18.2 % Romania 238.0% 9.803 337.cia.851 4.560.098.887 341.0% 1 4.661 12.aspx (4) Estimates (5) BSTDB.863.947 10.eu/tgm/table.615.220 93.688 344.9% 8.9 % Georgia 69.479.427.064 30. 2010) (2) Eurostat.700 4.5 % Russia 17.198 Notes: (1) CIA.126.html Table II: General Economic Data Armenia GDP billion US$3 GDP /capita US$3 GDP (PPP) billion US$ 3 GDP (PPP) / capita US$ 3 Avg. “The World Factbook.342.339.634. “FDI Statistics.8 % Greece 131.555 2.1863 77.378 42. 2009).2471 79.gov.260.105 915.683 3.320.676.706 3.304.1% 13.737 2.923.562 71.047 5.947.981 Greece 357.864 10.755.6721 90.604 115.238.856.852 Romania 200.unctad. “World Economic Outlook Database 2009. Inflation 5 Azerbaijan 46.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed April 7.6% 8.5512 83. do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin (3) State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.ukrstat.9 % Notes: (1) CIA.747.126 6. “The World Factbook.053 18.917 8.1% 2 2.” http://www.674 7.5% 1 Unemployment rate FDI (2008) million US$ 6 1.016.733 16.957 11.8% 7.915.498.990 9.041.” http://www.600.264.651 8.873 2.0 % Moldova 33.106 2.024 4.” https://www.048 12.” http://www.do?tab =table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (3) IMF.692.” http://epp.905 270.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed April 7.328 1.123 30.684.452 2008 20094 8.8%1 10.europa.068 Ukraine 179.391 4.” https://www.370 11.8% 6.310.305 70.518 10.743 2.660 9.002 Georgia 12.545 32.386 11.909.734 6.295 15.391 21.093 713 13.205 1.413 15.1% 4.org/Templates/Page.eu/tgm/table.777 6.6 % Bulgaria 110.8 % Turkey 783.614 2.imf.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 52 .6% 1 6.268 294.2% 2.460.873.404 9.6% 1 2.ec.9% 2 7.759.792.983 593.057 5.6% 2 5.559 2.eurostat.723 5.586 1.212 11.730 Bulgaria 49.772 251.564 7.904 44.352.6162 89.879 7.681.564 5. “Total Population.138.039.074 160.ua/ operativ/operativ2009/ds/kn/kn_e/kn0809_e.608 2.212 869.” http://epp.107 2.105.537.132 11 9.193 7.254.728 89.517.185 12. (6) UNCTAD.1% 7.1% 14.europa.941 13.ec.4022 93.1% 1 2008 20094 2008 2009 4 2.967.8071 83.1002 75. 2010) (2) EuroStat.741 Russia 1.242 140.eurostat.8 % 97.248 4.984 10.495.7481 78.693 2008 2009 4 11.424 20.495.808 74.658.806.390 Turkey 729. “Total Population.748 21.766.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/ weodata/index.0 % Ukraine 603.533 8.250 Moldova 6.321.505 5. “Total Population.869.606.600 8.856 81.547 1.916.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX III: General and Economic Data on the Black Sea Region States Table I: General Data Armenia Area1 (in km2) Population Majority population1 29. Annual Report 2008 (Thessaloniki: BSTDB.627 30.349.502.9% 1 1.004 1 Azerbaijan 86.550 46.
551. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).6 % 7.006.2 % 6. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).7 304.058.970.1 994.304.428.772.0 17.5 % 4.1 7.0 303.3 22. Thessaloniki.1 15.9 1.1 % 4.0 115.4 % 7.1 % 7.2 6.0 % 5.1 603.” http://epp.4 % 2.0 9.088.7 % 5.0 % 9.0 1.0 % 6.0 34.5 459.0 255.2 447.7 10.485.7 805.2 % 6.159.0 % 10.4 % 8.1 1.8 Romania 8.1 2004 345.798.imf.3 % 6.739.0 243.0 2005 431.0 93.0 % 7.4 2006 527.739.1 % 4.0 40.0 140.929.0 496.0 % 6.408.366.014.4 % 7.5 % Turkey2 6.719.624.6 659. 14.9 1.1 % Russia1 10. 53 .4 9.575.365. 14.0 4.9 % –2.729.618.9 % 9.8 % –15.004.6 % 2.0 13.9 2.544.755.082.821.2 % 7.0 11.0 % Romania2 2.5 2. “World Economic Outlook Database 2009.949.0 1.5 % 1.0 10.081.4 % 12.640.2 % 5.5 1.577.europa.3 830.7 2008 829.4 23.0 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.6 21.2 % –9.0 15.2 % 6.207. Table V: Total Exports of BSEC (in million US$) 1999 142.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/index.8 696.858.112.825.4 2000 181.0 78.354.2 % 6.6 % 2009 5 Notes: (1) IMF.0 4.0 % Georgia1 1.0 38.4 4.0 % Greece2 4.724.666.9 353.847.865.0 % 2.7 % 6.8 % 7.4 % 5.033.8 % –5.8 15.5 % 4.931.1 % –4.162.336.0 101.0 18.7 % 7.2 % 9.6 % 9.5 10.649.9 % 13.101.432.7 Armenia Azerbaijan 247.582.615.7 1.717.441.2 20.ec.2 % 3.2 % 13.840.5 Georgia 329.5 % 13.4 18.0 13.0 105.2 % 5.355.5 Turkey 29. “Real GDP Growth Rate.0 Serbia 1. 2008.6 1.0 354.0 1.472.754.535.0 67.0 49.4 % 5. 2009).2 1.0 68.212.” http://www.1 % 5.603. Annual Report 2007 (Thessaloniki: BSTDB.0 17.269.586.669.2 % 8. 2008).025.7 % 7.5 % 5.6 3.0 Russia 75.0 471.3 183.626.824. and Romania) Table IV: Exports of BSEC (in million US$) Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 275.0 30.319.8 2001 186.6 % 2.eurostat.1 % –5.0 % 3.3 656.385.9 % 4.078.024.5 % 4. Thessaloniki.3 1.6 % 12.301.1 % 6.3 2.4 12.025.0 3.6 % 6.1 % 5.3 Bulgaria 4.4 1.0 % –5.201.4 1.7 1.7 % 6.0 23.8 % 6.6 % –7.7 1.9 % 4.555.9 2.0 2.1 % 7.7 % 5.548. Annual Report 2008 (Thessaloniki: BSTDB.356.5 % 8.3 % 9.401.956.2 603.1 % 5. Greece.6 5.0 107.0 % 7.112.0 49.0 52.031.4 % 24.0 135.8 % Ukraine1 5.5 % Bulgaria2 5.1 % –7.876.0 Greece 8.0 % 10.991.6 % 13.0 17.743.503.1 1.3 476.5 % 11.7 32.631.585.1 % 10.5 % 10.0 % 25.9 2007 638.0 33.435.aspx (2) Eurostat.394.189.5 330.999. 2008.5 % 4.0 Ukraine 13.196.2 11.0 40.7 % 8.9 5.1 % 2.368.8 564.0 27.4 % 4. (5) Estimates (except for Bulgaria.7 Moldova 474.976.3 309. Head of Policy & Strategy.3 2.3 792.6 10.300.722. Head of Policy & Strategy. (4) BSTDB.9 % 9.0 % Moldova1 2.4 29.3 % 31.2 2002 202.475.078.0 23.645.6 1.4 2003 258.091.092.550.9 % 4.884.4 % 6.1 738.0 7.5 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.3 % 7.1 % –14.9 8.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb020 (3) BSTDB.3 30.729.The Black Sea in Figures Table III: Growth Rates of the Black Sea Region States Armenia1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 3 2008 4 Azerbaijan1 6.104. eu/tgm/table.0 35.9 % 6.062.611.2 % 14.2 % 4.1 513.
527.2 250.907.3 6.679.552.632.281.4 3. Table VII: Total Imports of BSEC (in million US$) 1999 139.0 38.676.6 20.2 94. Thessaloniki.181.9 3.0 25.615.686.0 634.566.353.9 65.7 60.007.2 5.313.4 1.8 375.048.862. 2008.460.643.0 6.9 Romania 9.3 Georgia 863.3 4.7 13.0 5.1 26.0 14.043.823.1 2003 251.5 3.130.015.581.5 344.1 87.6 1.011.2 2.585. 54 .3 343.1 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.843.050.1 47.1 Turkey 2.0 36.495.637.0 134.3 40.539.433.6 3.1 2.7 4.5 292.109.281.9 180.1 17.7 884.537.402.6 2008 826.468.5 3.1 1.440.691.337.527.123.6 1.5 2.882.0 1.0 10.966.1 368.5 51.564.899.9 17.3 2.0 291.0 37.018.275.6 30. Table VIII: Intra-BSEC Exports (in million US$) Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 44.0 60.6 38.9 267.0 1.5 2.037.9 2.2 100.802.0 22.3 608.113.3 13.595.The Black Sea in Figures Table VI: Imports of BSEC (in million US$) Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 938.6 2000 169.3 3.723.5 4.161.1 1.796.320.4 704.657.0 2.1 3.498.0 1.4 7.0 Serbia 2.775.6 209.393.653.155.271.6 2006 506.3 1.0 1.0 4.7 1.551.129.6 1.2 6.2 568.539.696.269.412.2 702.2 Greece 26.601.0 97.978.1 1.0 360.0 53.3 886.492.527.3 2004 330.0 91.7 Bulgaria 5.6 47.340.921.275.121.4 11.7 2.712.507.3 81. Head of Policy & Strategy.6 11.2 52.1 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.0 16.8 2005 403.5 298.129.1 5.754.0 3.204.821.644.221.7 Greece 1.122.965.450.025.5 Ukraine 3.621.194.8 2001 169.518.093.0 44.107.4 2002 192.3 2.0 17.8 12.0 16.7 128.7 21.984.183.296.331.0 76.261.3 8220.127.116.112.227.721.4 773.3 1.0 52.930.8 5.2 391.651. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).1 1.9 5.748.420.041.335.883.2 2.150.9 193. Head of Policy & Strategy.3 1.348.823.5 Serbia 244.134.5 Georgia 131.9 Russia 8.592.9 3.045.6 1.5 770.0 44.0 14.936.861.7 473.893.8 76.1 3.2 3.428.7 35.619.3 6.959.7 1.9 91.0 125.6 1.4 22.3 879.272.7 1.4 1.943.8 8.5 28.0 12.945.869.012.693.171.735.060.8 962.637.8 4.0 193.5 1. Head of Policy & Strategy.087.393.675.349.209.0 164. Thessaloniki.4 4.686.0 84.915.3 352.721.574.3 16.8 142.485.7 370.135.0 111.092.8 2.2 6.0 10.0 23.0 Turkey 38. Thessaloniki.8 1.5 184.1 73.9 2.5 64.106.663.4 2.3 2.685.440.0 162.2 498.0 7.0 65.2 1.0 Moldova 611.0 7.0 29.5 4.5 2.412.9 477.159.914.3 14.9 Armenia Azerbaijan 49.1 50.6 2.208.1 318.1 Romania 1.354.0 31.0 223.260.8 6.092.5 1.043.070.9 7.5 Armenia Azerbaijan 721.5 87.607.116.0 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.0 5.9 204.4 7.2 1.6 9.504.9 43.7 181. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).265.0 12.434.0 22.6 157.045. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).070..2 8.4 29.6 2.121.5 1.085.0 2.0 30.196.6 3.4 6.763.0 Bulgaria 1.486. 2008.5 529.0 2.886. 2008.173.0 Russia 39.1 1.6 17.9 33.0 545.205.6 267.783.792.465.4 970.0 Ukraine 12.6 93.477.702.7 4.0 10.8 499.143.0 72.4 69.9 750.0 12.765.8 2007 660.325.3 5.382.0 4.5 Moldova 280.3 125.0 47.360.6 10.0 51.461.487.213.4 773.000.
9 1. 2008.8 2.1 2.9 2.4 853.4 1.7 8.6 370.1 547. Thessaloniki.3 Russia 3.636.2 682.362.9 11.790.384.7 6.258.3 2004 59.2 1.8 2000 26.041.7 2. Thessaloniki.7 778.9 6.794.897.383.632.1 12.797.670.169.2 2004 54.9 4.724.7 2003 42.1 14.1 1.496.4 4. Head of Policy & Strategy.7 1.9 436.7 391.495.6 2000 27. 2008.6 9.343.9 6.8 4.7 2005 144.046.2 1.953.7 3.2 8.6 8.288.912. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).0 2.8 2007 232.956.5 Greece 1.583.2 27.0 3.850.9 4.0 13.9 7.818.407.0 2.4 10.4 2.4 2000 53.653.173.686.2 9.857.2 20.477.5 2005 69.0 2.811.1 367. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).8 1.8 26.171.554.308.211. Head of Policy & Strategy.2 2005 74.4 1.9 1.2 268.298.059.0 2. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).8 2003 80.782.1 2.9 Bulgaria 1.469.0 784.000.540.651.117.5 389.6 379.7 429.656.2 373. Table XI: Total Intra-BSEC Imports (in million US$) 1999 18.0 5.7 2.542.4 2006 88.0 5. Table XII: Total Intra-BSEC Trade (in million US$) 1999 38.984.474.7 516.2 14.736.148.5 694.4 544.6 12. Thessaloniki.5 596.2 6.335.4 2.6 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.333.619.806.5 2004 113.8 923.2 1.671.8 15.134.9 2008 152.893.8 45.8 34.3 2001 28.1 8.332.0 1.0 443.321.2 13.987.511.9 5.011.2 9.5 1.0 2008 149. Head of Policy & Strategy.3 1.323.3 2006 93.482.451.9 585.798.1 5.463.6 15.9 416. Head of Policy & Strategy.3 11.459.8 4.413.5 19.688.497.4 Moldova 329.721.2 20.171.4 1.1 3.837. Thessaloniki.370.1 3.7 2001 54.145.1 2003 38.0 2.743. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).4 2001 26.2 5.2 1.319.831.978.329.9 2002 60.1 427.9 2008 302.988. 55 .818.The Black Sea in Figures Table IX: Total Intra-BSEC Exports (in million US$) 1999 19.523.531.7 Romania 1.868.0 2002 31.088. 2008.127.527.813. 2008.212.6 2007 112.761.8 728.2 2007 120.5 Armenia Azerbaijan 250.092.530.7 2006 181.6 Ukraine 3.733.3 6.199.3 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.505.023.7 6.9 Georgia 336.998.607. Table X: Intra-BSEC Imports (in million US$) Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 361.1 944.3 925.771.3 499.277.467.605.557.9 Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.626.4 1.114.589.3 Turkey 4.348.1 348.3 Source: : Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.295.3 4.1 2.255.432.578.748.879.2 23.8 5.3 Serbia 611.8 7.4 272.9 2002 29.273.
5% 12.4% 18.7% 13.0% 53.8% 36.8% 14.9% 49.4% 11.5% 39.2% 36.7% 10. 56 .6% 18.9% 40.4% 20.9% 9.2% 46.3% 15.0% 15.8% 11.9% 30.4% 38.3% 15.4% Serbia 15.4% 30.9% Moldova 59.0% 33.8% 35.1% 49.8% 26.4% 36.4% 24.3% 62.9% 11.9% 14.3% 14.4% 33. Head of Policy & Strategy.9% 30.2% 36.7% 34.9% 27.3% 30.9% 20.3% 20.2% Armenia Azerbaijan 34.8% 40.0% 16.3% 30.2% 53.5% 34.2% 29.7% 13.9% 55.6% 14.0% Serbia 21.3% 31.7% 12.2% Turkey 7.3% 12.2% 14.7% 15.7% 2007 17.2% 8.0% 20.0% Georgia 40.2% 11.1% 12.1% 18.9% 42.6% Bulgaria 35.6% 34.1% Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.6% 18.3% 26.5% 13.8% 12.0% 12.8% 37.1% 33.9% 51.1% 35.6% 37.3% 37.4% 19.8% 47.7% 17.2% 2006 16.4% 23. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).3% Bulgaria 30.0% 14. Table XV: Intra-BSEC Imports / Imports of BSEC Ratio Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 38.2% 37.4% 20.7% 17.4% 30.6% 17.4% 2001 14. 2008.3% 15.7% 21.7% 12.0% 18.9% 36.5% 15.2% 18.6% 2008 18.4% 30.9% 16. Head of Policy & Strategy.9% 49.7% 2000 14.9% 35. Thessaloniki.0% 9.9% Georgia 38.3% 32.0% Ukraine 28.1% 11.3% 54.9% 35.2% 59.9% 40.7% 35.4% 17.9% 12.4% Greece 18.0% 51.6% 20.6% 18.5% 16.0% 14.7% 43.8% 8.8% 25.6% 41.2% 34.6% 49.3% 28.1% 31.3% 23.1% 13.0% 36.9% 36.5% 48.7% 13.1% 8.3% 54.0% 8.0% 38.2% 11.0% 11.7% 33.0% 22.2% 11.7% 43.0% 26.1% 28.1% 13.6% Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.4% 24.4% 2003 14.6% 9.4% 39.8% Source: : Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.6% 18.2% 10.8% 14.8% 2004 15.7% 27.5% 10. 2008.5% 56.6% 35.8% 18.5% 48.2% 18.7% 35.7% 33.1% 8.9% 54.9% 29.1% 16.1% 8.0% 21.0% 38.2% 38.7% 32.1% 10.7% 27.1% 15.9% 35.1% 38.7% 18.3% 14.1% 31.3% Russia 11.1% 11.1% 12.7% 29.0% 42.9% 35.9% 29.6% 12.9% 29.6% Romania 14. Thessaloniki.4% 8.8% 18. Thessaloniki.4% 35.3% 38.8% 2005 16.2% Russia 9.1% 34.1% 10.9% 28.1% 20.2% 9.3% 47.5% 14.8% 20.7% Greece 6.7% 10.9% 15.2% Turkey 11.0% Romania 13.0% 42.4% Moldova 53.9% 14.8% 52.6% 9.5% Ukraine 28.6% 13.5% 23.9% 50. Table XIV: Total Intra-BSEC Exports / Total Exports of BSEC Ratio 1999 13.4% 2002 14. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).7% 12.1% 21.2% 31. 2008.8% 31. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).9% 32.8% 18.1% 61.9% 17.2% 31.The Black Sea in Figures Table XIII: Intra-BSEC Exports / Exports of BSEC Ratio Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 16.4% 38.1% 18.2% 38.2% 38.2% 33. Head of Policy & Strategy.9% 32.5% 8.8% 17.6% Armenia Azerbaijan 20.1% 50.7% 19.8% 18.9% 30.
1% 12.0% 31.6% 19.5% Greece 9.4 % 2002 15.5% 44.2% 13.9% 20.7% 34.7% Moldova 56.4% 31.9% 53.9% 34.9% 2004 17.5% 23.2% 19.3% 12.0% Armenia Azerbaijan 31.2% 20.8 % 2005 17.6% Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.3 % Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.2 % 2001 15.3% 43.5% 23.0% 18.6% 14.4% 17.6% 16.6% 15.4% 22.6% 2002 16.5% Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras.5% 35.0% 36.0% 22.1% 2003 16.5% 34.3% 33.8% 18. Head of Policy & Strategy.The Black Sea in Figures Table XVI: Total Intra-BSEC Imports / Total Imports of BSEC Ratio 1999 13.2% 12.0% 2001 16.4% 27.2% 16.9% 35.1% Bulgaria 33.0% 13.3% 15.5% 2000 16.9% 36.1% 14.4% Russia 10.6 % 2000 15. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).2% 38. Thessaloniki. Head of Policy & Strategy.2% 50. 2008.3% 2008 18.4% 37.3% 51. 2008.8% 35.6% 18.7% 52.1% 11.8% 15.9% 54.7% 25.0% 35.7% 34.9% 15.8% 33.9 % 2008 18.6% 33.6% 33.6% 33.7% 11.5% 14.0% 37. Thessaloniki.5% 37.6% 38.0% 32.4% 11.9% 23.4% 28.6% 53. Table XVIII: Total Intra-BSEC Trade / Total Trade of BSEC Ratio 1999 13.2 % 2003 15.6% 43.3% 36.5% 2006 18.3% 23.6% 33.9% Turkey 9.9% 36.1% 34.2% 12.5% 31.7% 11.2% 32.6% 12. 2008.5% 2007 18.8% 46.3 % 2006 17.0% 18.2% 54.3% 20.8% Georgia 39.0% 13.7% Romania 14.7% 33.5% 23.4% 33.1% 25.1% 14.4% 35.3% 18. Table XVII: Intra-BSEC Trade / Trade of BSEC Ratio Albania 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 33.2% 37.2% 22. 57 .1% 29.6% 43. Thessaloniki.2% 15.0% 29.3% 12.8% 11. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).1% 18.6% 32.6% 11. Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB).7% 14.6 % 2007 17.9% Serbia 19.9% 2005 18.6% 51.3% 17.5% 51.2% 10. Head of Policy & Strategy.9% 27.1% 20.1% 11.9% Ukraine 28.3% 13.8 % 2004 16.1% 45.5% 28.
832 0.682 0.804 0.754 0. the goalpost for minimum income is $100 (PPP) and the maximum is $40.806 Ukraine 85 0.840 Georgia 89 0.org/en/indicators/81.787 Azerbaijan 0. to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GDP.935 0.942 Moldova 117 0. Since the minimum adult literacy rate is 0% and the maximum is 100%. so the longevity component for a country where life expectancy is 55 years would be 0.817 Turkey 79 0.895 0.835 Georgia 0. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each dimension.undp. The educational component of the HDI is comprised of adult literacy rates and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary.undp.712 0. expressed as a value between 0 and 1.html The Human Development Reports of the UNDP have introduced a new way of measuring development by combining indicators of life expectancy.777 Turkey 0.802 Ukraine 0. 58 .718 Romania 0. the literacy component of knowledge for a country where the literacy rate is 75% would be 0.783 0.872 0. For the wealth component.755 0.938 Moldova 0. The life expectancy component of the HDI is calculated using a minimum value for life expectancy of 25 years and maximum value of 85 years.683 0.780 0.705 0. the statistic for combined gross enrolment is calculated in a analogous manner. The scores for the three HDI components are then averaged in an overall index (http://hdr.768 Greece 0.738 0. The HDI uses the logarithm of income.org/en/indicators/81.735 0.874 0.789 Source: UNDP.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/).000 (PPP).731 0.821 0.758 0.739 0.undp. called goalposts and then shows where each country stands in relation to these goalposts.777 0. secondary and tertiary schooling.796 0.693 0.778 Greece 25 0. educational attainment and income into a composite human development index (HDI).837 Russia 71 0.” http://hdrstats.720 Romania 63 0.html Table II: Human Development Index 1990 -2006 – World Ranking Armenia 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 0.765 0.798 Azerbaijan 86 0.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX IV: Human Development Index Table I: Human Development Index 2007 – World Ranking Armenia Rank Rating 84 0.” http://hdrstats.730 0.829 0.773 Bulgaria 0.75.5.786 0.787 Bulgaria 61 0. “Human Development Report 2009.824 0.803 0.788 0. “Human Development Report 2009.796 Source: UNDP.811 Russia 0.
15 121 0 N /A 730 N /A Bulgaria 0.78 64.54 437.” http://tonto.035 0.78 2.67 134.02 1.93 5. “International Energy Statistics.010 4.84 16.35 120 144 N /A 0 N /A Georgia 0.015 3.21 4.27 370 230 N /A 0 N /A Source: EIA.01 37.eia.98 386.89 433.92 1.88 243.49 0 Russia 47.72 0 Greece 0.52 0 Romania 0.72 1.300 N /A 0 N /A Greece 0.120 N /A Russia 60.92 0 Azerbaijan 0.97 17 0.eia.40 131.395 101.39 3.60 115.19 Source: EIA.41 Turkey 0.” http://tonto.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.001 < 0.19 0 Moldova 0 0 2.cfm 59 .00 875.41 16. “International Energy Statistics.24 21.00 9.008 < 0.69 56.cfm Notes: (1) incl.005 0.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX V: Natural Resources Table I: Oil in 2009 Armenia Reserves (thousand mln barrels – 2009) Production (thousand barrels daily – 2008) Consumption (thousand barrels daily – 2008) Imports (thousand barrels daily – 2008) Exports (thousand barrels daily – 2008) Crude oil1 Refined products Crude oil1 Refined products 0 0 47 0 N /A 0 N /A Azerbaijan 7. lease condensate Table II: Gas in 2009 Armenia Reserves (trillion cubic meters – 2009) Production (billion cubic meters – 2008) Consumption (billion cubic meters – 2008) Imports (billion cubic meters) Exports (billion cubic meters) 0 0 1.19 10.doe.21 475.52 2.79 80.31 3.58 Moldova 0 0 15.02 4.18 36.08 0 Georgia 0.10 19.64 0 5.24 255 48 N /A 5.72 0.11 675.57 662.doe.008 1.27 0 133.80 0 N/ A 0 N /A Romania 0.05 Ukraine 0.19 3.789.28 297.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.916 174 N /A 0 N /A Turkey 0.30 46.42 Ukraine 1.55 Bulgaria 0.063 11.
” “Partly Free. 60 .cfm?page=274 Rating Status 0 – 30 Free 31 – 60 Partly Free 61 – 100 Not Free The Freedom of the Press index.” http://www.freedomhouse. and internet freedom in every country in the world.org/template.freedomhouse. The index assesses the degree of print. “Freedom of the Press 2009.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX VI: Freedom of the Press Table I: Freedom of the Press 2009 – World Ranking Armenia Rank Rating Status 151 68 Not Free Azerbaijan 168 78 Not Free Bulgaria 76 36 Partly Free Georgia 128 60 Partly Free Greece 63 29 Free Moldova 148 67 Not Free Romania 92 44 Partly Free Russia 174 80 Not Free Turkey 101 50 Partly Free Ukraine 115 55 Partly Free Source: Freedom House. is an annual survey of media independence in 195 countries and territories. It provides numerical rankings and rates each country’s media as “Free. political pressures that influence reporting.org/template. “Freedom of the Press Historical Data.org/uploads/fop/2009/FreedomofthePress2009_tables.” Country narratives examine the legal environment for the media.cfm?page=16).freedomhouse. and economic factors that affect access to information (http://www.” http://www.” or “Not Free.pdf Table II: Freedom of the Press – World Ranking (1995 to 2008) Armenia Rank Rating Azerbaijan Rank Rating Bulgaria Rank Rating Georgia Rank Rating Rank Greece Rating Moldova Rank Rating Romania Rank Rating Rank Russia Rating Rank Turkey Rating Ukraine Rank Rating 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 135 134 137 142 144 57 56 56 56 56 57 59 60 65 64 64 64 64 66 156 158 161 164 168 69 69 74 74 73 70 76 77 73 71 72 73 75 77 78 77 77 76 76 39 46 44 36 39 30 26 29 30 35 35 34 34 33 114 116 118 120 128 70 68 55 56 57 47 53 53 54 54 56 57 57 60 64 61 59 54 56 26 29 27 30 30 30 30 30 28 28 28 28 25 27 127 136 141 144 144 47 62 57 58 56 58 59 59 59 63 65 65 65 66 103 104 96 90 94 50 49 47 39 44 44 44 35 38 47 47 44 42 44 147 145 158 164 170 55 58 53 53 59 60 60 60 66 67 68 72 75 78 107 105 103 105 106 73 74 65 69 69 58 58 58 55 52 48 48 49 51 150 123 113 112 110 42 39 49 49 50 60 60 60 67 68 59 53 53 53 Source: Freedom House. elaborated by Freedom House. analyzing the events of each calendar year. broadcast.
The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX VII: Corruption Table I: Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 – World Ranking Armenia Rank Score Surveys Used Confidence Range 120 2.transparency. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009”.6 – 2.7 Greece 71 3.transparency.3 Moldova 89 3. Table II: Corruption Perception Indexes 1995 to 2008 – Ranks Armenia Azerbaijan 1995 (41 countries) 1996 (54) 1997 (52) 1998 (85) 1999 (99) 2000 (90) 2001 (91) 2002 (102) 2003 (133) 2004 (145) 2005 (158) 2006 (163) 2007 (179) 2008 (180) – 93 99 109 – – 78 82 – – – – 80 76 – – – – 96 87 84 95 124 140 137 130 150 158 Bulgaria – – – 66 63 52 47 45 54 54 55 57 64 72 – – 85 124 133 130 99 79 67 Georgia – – – – 84 Greece 30 28 25 36 36 35 42 44 50 49 47 54 56 57 Moldova – – – – 75 74 63 93 100 114 88 79 111 109 Romania – – 37 61 63 68 69 77 83 87 85 84 69 70 Russia – 47 49 76 82 82 79 71 86 90 126 121 143 147 Turkey 29 33 38 54 54 50 54 64 77 77 65 60 64 58 Ukraine – – – 69 75 87 83 85 106 122 107 99 118 134 Source: Transparency International. not all surveys include all countries.8 8 3.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table).org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range (http://www. http://www.transparency.2 – 4.7 7 2. The CPI tables show a country’s ranking and score.9 Ukraine 146 2.3 7 2.8 6 3.” based on 13 different expert and business surveys. the number of surveys used to determine the score and the confidence range of the scoring. 61 .org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table Notes: The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. http://www. allowing for a margin of error.2 8 2. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of publicsector corruption in a country/territory. The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys.0 Romania 71 3.9 – 2.6 Source: Transparency International.7 – 4.8 Azerbaijan 143 2. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country.9 – 4.0 – 2.1 7 3.0 – 2.4 Turkey 61 4.4 – 4. The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index.5 Georgia 66 4.2 – 4. The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that.2 – 4.8 8 3.2 8 1.6 Bulgaria 71 3. However.4 7 3. It is a “survey of surveys.3 6 2.3 Russia 146 2.
86 5.00 8.75 5.21 3.pdf 62 .75 5.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX VIII: Index of Democracy Table I: Democracy Index 2008 – World Ranking Armenia Rank Overall Score Electoral Process and Pluralism Functioning of Government Political Participation Political Culture Civil Liberties 113 4.56 3.94 Source: “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008.58 7.36 5.41 Moldova 62 6.02 9.50 6.56 6.69 7.00 Ukraine 53 6.92 6.29 6.89 3.58 7.58 5.06 9.11 5.00 0.11 5.24 Source: “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy.48 5.19 3.88 Azerbaijan 135 3.00 8.17 5.13 6.56 3.25 2.21 5.00 Bulgaria 52 7.79 4.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.11 5.00 7.02 7.08 0.29 6.00 3.75 5.63 8.67 5.75 5.58 6.33 5.31 3.90 7.94 Romania 50 7.50 9.62 7.” http://graphics.59 Ukraine 52 6.21 3.92 1.00 Turkey 87 5.70 7.09 4.41 Moldova 62 6.00 6.33 3.11 5.00 7.36 6.58 5.17 4.56 5.71 5.eiu.59 Turkey 88 5.94 9.53 Georgia 104 4.47 Greece 22 8.50 9.07 4.44 5.33 3.00 8.79 3.47 Greece 22 8.33 3.63 8.08 0.00 5.15 4.58 6.71 6.25 7.11 5.67 7.50 9.13 9.07 6.89 3.59 Bulgaria 49 7.06 9.07 6.67 7.58 5.18 Azerbaijan 129 3.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.79 3.13 5.82 Georgia 104 4.92 6.17 4.53 Russia 107 4.50 9.” http://www.79 3.44 3.10 9.79 4.13 9.94 9.economist.33 3.94 Romania 50 7.50 6.pdf Table II: Democracy Index 2006 – World Ranking Armenia Rank Overall Score Electoral Process and Pluralism Functioning of Government Political Participation Political Culture Civil Liberties 110 4.44 4.75 5.38 6.53 Russia 102 5.
35 – – – 0.The Black Sea in Figures Table III: Democracy Index – Comparison between 2008 and 2006 Armenia Rank Overall Score Electoral Process and Pluralism Functioning of Government Political Participation Political Culture Civil Liberties –3 – 0.59 – – 0.30 Azerbaijan –6 – 0.62 – 0.41 – 0. political participation.30 Ukraine –1 – Overall Score Status 8 – 10 Full Democracy 6 – 7.9 Hybrid Regime 0 – 3. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent conceptual whole (http://graphics.75 – 0.00 +1.92 – 1.59 Turkey +1 – 0.11 – 0.8 – 0. 63 .com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.35 – 0.35 – +0.06 – – – – – 0.12 – – – – – 0.59 Bulgaria 3 – 0.29 Georgia – – 0.56 +0.pdf).9 Flawed Democracy 4 – 5.01 – – 0.54 – 1.eiu.25 – 0. civil liberties. and political culture.72 – +1.9 Authoritarian Regime The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism.28 – 0.62 – Greece – – – – – – – Moldova – – – – – – – Romania – – – – – – – Russia –5 – 0.63 +0. the functioning of government.
0 4.3 7.0 8.75 Azerbaijan 86 4.27 3.0 5.0 6.5 7.0 6.7 4.8 9.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 6. Detailed country reports provide information on the underlying factors of assessment for each country examined.68 6.2 4.5 2.8 62 5.5 6.0 5.8 6.4 9.3 5.0 7.0 9.5 5.0 8.67 2.5 7.41 4.8 9. Source: “The Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) 2010”.3 8.7 4.0 8.5 8.8 7.8 7.bertelsmann-transformation-index.3 9. http://www.0 6. The rating scale for each area ranges from 10 (best) to 1 (worst) (http://www. 64 .0 3.de/en/ Table II: Managmenet of Transformation.5 5.5 6. It sheds light upon the political and economic status of each country as well as upon the political management performance by the relevant actors.3 8.0 4.bertelsmann-transformation-index.0 8.0 5.3 5.0 6.0 4.0 4.8 8.0 5.0 5.3 8.4 3.8 7.55I.3 4.The Black Sea in Figures ANNEX IX: Democracy and Management of Transformation Table I: Status of Democracy and Market Economy Index.0 7.70 Turkey 20 7.3 4.5 7.7 4.0 6.0 5.0 9.2 6.5 6.3 4.8 7.0 5.0 Georgia 42 5.0 8.5 6.0 8.8 7. BTI 2001 Armenia Rank Overall Score Status I.7 4.3 Romania 25 6.0 7.0 5.5 8.2 6.54 Ukraine 37 6.92 3.0 3.7 Azerbaijan 95 4.5 8.36 Georgia 52 6.0 8.5 8.0 Bulgaria 14 6.36 4.4 6.6 8.0 7.23 Russia 65 5.3 7.5 4.8 8.0 6.0 6.5 5.0 7.0 4.0 8.0 6.0 4. http://www.7 Source: “The Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) 2010”.3 8.0 6.0 9.de/en/ The Transformation Index BTI of the Bertelsmann Stiftung is a ranking of 128 developing and transition countries.3 9.0 3.34 3.0 4.3 8.0 6.0 4.79 Romania 16 8.0 6.0 Turkey 23 6.0 8. BTI 2010 Armenia Rank Management Index Score Level of Difficulty Steering Capability Resource Efficiency Consensus-Building International Cooperation 85 4.9 5.5 8.0 5. Democracy Stateness Political Participation Rule of Law Stability of Democratic Institutions Political and Social Integration II.0 6.0 6.0 2.0 6.3 9.0 5.5 7.05 5.0 7.5 6.3 6.85 Bulgaria 14 8.de/en/).3 8.3 8.49 5.5 4.5 7.5 4.3 Russia 107 3.6 8.8 4.0 7.5 5.0 5.0 6.7 5.5 7.0 7.0 3.03 Moldova 61 5.1 4.7 Moldova 79 4.0 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.0 8.3 Ukraine 66 4.bertelsmann-transformation-index.8 6.6 6.0 8.3 4.5 5. Market Economy Socioeconomic Level Market Organization Currency and Price Stability Private Property Welfare Regime Economic Performance Sustainability 4.5 7.8 9.
k. the Black Sea Commission) The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Black Sea NGO Network Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation – a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States Black Sea Trade and Investment Promotion Programme Black Sea Trade and Development Bank Confidence-Building Measures Community of Democratic Choice Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Commonwealth of Independent States Common Security and Defence Policy Collective Security Treaty Organisation The Danube Black Sea Task Force European Neighbourhood Policy European Union Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gross Domestic Product German Marshall Fund of the United States Organization for Democracy and Economic Development International Centre for Black Sea Studies International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River International Financial Institution International Monetary Fund Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe Membership Action Plan (NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organisation Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC Partnership for Peace Purchasing Power Parity South Caucasus Anti-Drugs Programme South East European Cooperation Process Small and Medium Enterprises 65 .a.Abbreviations Abbreviations BLACKSEAFOR BSANNA BSC BSEC BSNN BST-GMFUS BSTIP BSTDB CBMs CDC CFE Treaty CIS CSDP CSTO DABLAS ENP EU FYROM GDP GMF GUAM-ODED ICBSS ICPDR IFI IMF INOGATE MAP NATO NGO OSCE PABSEC PfP PPP SCAD SEECP SME Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group Black Sea Association of National News Agencies The Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution (a.
Abbreviations TEN TEPAV TRACECA UBCCE UN UNDP US / USA WTO Trans-European Networks Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia Union of Black Sea and Caspian Confederation of Enterprises United Nations United Nations Development Programme United States / United States of America World Trade Organization 66 .
They are the International Policy Research Institute – IPRI. As such it has direct access to policy makers in the BSEC member states and a vast network of contacts in research institutes and with other stakeholders.Initiators Initiators International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). it is a related body of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and in this capacity serves as its think-tank. Ankara The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) is an independent. the ICBSS has a accumulated rich experience in policy-oriented research and advocacy work. established in October 2004. policy recommendations and events with the overarching aim of fostering cooperation among and with the countries of the Black Sea region.tepav. the Economic Policy Research Institute – EPRI and the Economic Stability Institute – ESI.org. non-governmental. non-partisan think-tank. Athens The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) was founded in 1998 as a non-profit organisation under Greek law. It plays a central role in strengthening Black Sea – EU cooperation and regularly produces publications. it is an independent research and training institution focusing on the wider Black Sea region.org Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). www. TEPAV makes its findings and analysis widely available through its publications and events.icbss.tr 67 . TEPAV aims to increase the knowledge content of policy discussions in Turkey. TEPAV is composed of three institutes. Since its founding. The goal of TEPAV research is to remove the gap between academic research and policy implementation. It has since fulfilled a dual function: On the one hand. www. On the other.
a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Gütersloh Founded in 1977. civil society. a preventative healthcare system. modern government. an international ranking of 125 developing and transition countries which permits a focused comparison of the status of a country’s democratic and market-economy structures. The broad goals of the Black Sea Trust are four-fold: • To rebuild trust in public institutions • To affirm the value of citizen participation in the democratic process • To strengthen a critical set of institutions that lie at the nexus of state and society • To foster regional. GMF started the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.org/blacksea Bertelsmann Stiftung. the Bertelsmann Stiftung has gained expertise in fields such as democracy and integration. It focuses on areas in which it has accumulated a wealth of experience over many years. A public-private partnership. the Bertelsmann Stiftung is a private. Bucharest In order to promote regional cooperation and good governance in the wider Black Sea region. European integration. In the area of international politics.de 68 . private. and democratic foundations. independent and non-partisan foundation that aims to identify social problems and challenges at an early stage and develop solutions to address them. as well as the efficacy of its reform strategies. and non-profit sectors www. It has developed the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI). cross-border ties in the public. www.Initiators The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. a vibrant civil society and greater international understanding. as well as security policy. The Bertelsmann Stiftung is both a think tank and an agent for social change and is working to promote steady development that leads to a sustainable society. Its work is geared towards improving education. a just and efficient economic system.bertelsmann-stiftung. the Black Sea Trust (BST) works in collaboration with a range of donors to provide grants to local organisations working to foster and strengthen regional cooperation.gmfus.
(Istanbul. 25 September 2009. The Observer and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) amongst others. and the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies. as Special Advisor at the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs. the New York Review of Books. His reports and commentaries have been published by the BBC. In addition to serving on the advisory and executive boards of several national and international research centres and various scholarly journals. Iraq. Harvard University.tr Dimitrios Triantaphyllou is Director General of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). Johanna Deimel. he has published extensively on Black Sea issues and Turkish foreign and security policies. Previously he served. He is a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum and a member of the Governing Board of the European Studies Institute which is based in Moscow. Ankara. Berlin.triantaphyllou@gmail. d. the EU Institute for Security Studies.edu. (Franz-Lothar Altmann. He is also Assistant Professor at the University of the Aegean. inter alia. Acknowledgements This report has benefited from analysis and insight provided by the experts who participated at two roundtable discussions and two editorial meetings. maydin@khas. Previously he held different teaching and administrative positions in various Turkish universities as well as research positions at the University of Athens. He is also an Associate Editor of the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 9 June 2009. Mitat Çelikpala. Alina Inayeh and Yannis Tsantoulis for their detailed comments on previous versions of the report. Istanbul. North Korea and Darfur. He is also President of the International Relations Council of Turkey (UIK) and Director of the International Policy Research Institute (IPRI) of the Turkish Economic Policy Research Foundation (TEPAV). Panayotis Gavras and Panagiota Manoli) or shared their expertise and time with us while we were working on this report. Armando García Schmidt. He is the author of several books and served as a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the London School of Economics.The Rapporteurs Mustafa Aydın is Professor of International Relations and Rector of Kadir Has University. 24 January 2010.) organised by the Commission on the Black Sea and others who either contributed through written reports. Berlin. 69 . 25 November 2009.com The Editor Tim Judah is a foreign correspondent and author. Special thanks are due to Nikolaos Olma for all his hard work on compiling the annexes and to Sergiu Celac. the EU Institute for Security Studies and as Deputy Director of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He writes most of the Balkan coverage for The Economist but also covers other parts of the world. Moscow. These have included Afghanistan. Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. He has reported from Georgia for The Economist.
Istanbul Dimitrios Triantaphyllou. Bielefeld 70 .O. London Design Nicole Meyerholz. 2010 Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 P. Athens Editor Tim Judah. Bielefeld Photo Thomas Kunsch. Box 103 33311 Gütersloh GERMANY Responsible Armando García Schmidt. Gütersloh The Rapporteurs Mustafa Aydın.Imprint Imprint © May.
de www. “The Commission believes in the potential of the Black Sea. its people and governments. Box 103 33311 Gütersloh GERMANY Armando García Schmidt Phone +49 5241 81-81543 armando.blackseacom. What is needed are regional solutions for regional problems.garciaschmidt@bertelsmann-stiftung.The Report The Black Sea region is coming into its own – but it is a contested and sometimes dangerous neighbourhood. We believe that our recommendations can serve as a means to begin to release it. It was formed to provide policy-oriented research on the challenges and opportunities of the Black Sea region and to suggest ways to secure its peace and prosperity.eu An initiative of: The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation .” Address | Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 P.bertelsmann-stiftung.O. but how do we get them? The Commission on the Black Sea was formed to suggest ways for this increasingly important but volatile region to move in the direction of cooperation and collaboration and away from conflict and rivalry.de www.