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On balance, economic sanctions are reducing the threat Russia poses to Western Interests

Sanctions Effective
Ukraine not Western Interest
Pushes Ukraine to West
Hurts Oil Tech
Undermines Putin
Angers Elites
Disrupts Russian Political Leadership
Inducing Regime Change
Created Recession
Coercive Diplomacy
Impact: Reduces aggression
Impact: Reduces Ukraine War
January Specific
Ukraine Impacts
Impact: Syria Cooperation
Better than Military
Hurts Russian Military
Link: Spending down
Link: Access to Tech Down
Russian Military Spending/Modernization Bad
Russia wanted more
Econ link alt causality
Capital Flight
State of Russia
R/T Neg
R/T Human Rights Abuses
R/T No Change in Ukraine
R/T Iran Pivot
R/T China Pivot
R/T Offsets Sanctions Impact
R/T Gas Deal
China Pivot Good
R/T Support to Syria

R/T Putin Approval Rating
R/T Propaganda
R/T Nationalism
R/T Destabilizes Russia
R/T Loose Nukes
R/T Natural Gas Suspension
R/T Hurts Western Economies
R/T Russia Leaves the Dollar
R/T Russia Diversifies Economy
R/T Import Substitution
R/T Countersanctions
R/T Cyber
R/T Democratic Backsliding
R/T Small Arms Transfers
R/T Russia wants to sell more
R/T Triggers widespread civil wars
R/T Space, Bitch
R/T Siloviki Gain power
R/T Russian Economy Rebounding
R/T Destabilization Shift
NEG Disads
Human Rights Abuses
R/T Abandoned NovoRossiya
R/T Instituted Ceasefire
January Specific
Political Warfare
Support to Syria
Brinksmanship with NATO
NATO Military Spending Bad
Geopolitical Shift
Natural Gas Suspension
Splinters NATO
Democratic Backsliding
Increases conflict

Econ Root Cause of Russian problems
Hurts Western Economies
Angers Russian People
Food Shortages
Destabilizes Russia
Impact: Loose Nukes
Dollar Hegemony
Black Market
Space, Bitch
No Threat → auto-negate
Econ causality delink
Russia didn’t want more
Squo worsening
R/T Aff
R/T Threat
R/T Cyber Threat
R/T Iran example of success
R/T Deterrence
R/T Hurts Russian Military
Disad: Russian Military Modernization Good
R/T Undermines Putin
R/T Pits Elites Against Putin
R/T Undermines Iran
R/T OIl Hegemony via Saudi Arabia
R/T Reduces Aggression
R/T Sanctions Effective
R/T “Smart Sanctions”
R/T Naming and Shaming
R/T Social Movements Increase
R/T Oil Tech Sanctions
R/T Prevents Arctic Development
R/T Hurts Turkey
R/T Legitimizes ILaw
R/T Decreases FDI
R/T UN Syria Resolution
R/T Reserve/Running Outta Money
R/T Budapest Memorandum/Military Alt
R/T Ceasefire
R/T Less Arms Trade
R/T Coercive Diplomacy


In addition the import. The embargo was initially in place until 31 July 2015 but it was extended in June 2015. Stop military export to Russia Stokholm International Peace Research Institute. and defence sectors. The third is an embargo on exports to Russia of designated military and dual-use The prohibition includes the export of items that are to be subsequently re-exported from Russia to a third country. unless contracts or agreements had been concluded before 1 august 2014 and with the exception of items and services necessary for the maintenance of equipment already within the EU. The first restricts access to Western financial markets and services for designated Russian state-owned enterprises in the The prohibition includes involvement in transport or financing of arms and dual use goods for military use for Russia. until 31 January 2016.htm There are three types of economic sanctions.Background Definition of Econ Sanction http://www. purchase or transport of arms from Russia was prohibited.nato. energy.pdf The sanctions prohibit any involvement in the supply of arms and services related to military to Russia or dual use items for military use or military end-users in Russia by nationals of EU states or from the territories of EU states. . “EU Arms embargo on Russia” http://www. unless contracts or agreements for such supplies had been concluded before 1 august 2014. The second places an embargo on exports to Russia of designated high-technology oil exploration and production equipment.sipri.

Advantages .

stock markets have lost 14% of their value and the rouble is down 8% against the dollar. The effects [of sanctions] would cascade down the economy. <http://www. Russian banks can’t refinance Almost $64bn was moved out in the first three months of 2014. Russia's credit rating has been downgraded to one notch above junk and growth is expected to stall completely this year. and more capital flight and pressure on the rouble. Michael (Professor of Economics at City University in London).24679 So what is to be done? The only realistic policy available is the imposition of economic sanctions that would cut Russia off from world markets. it means less and less growth.russia-work>. “The Tiny Estonian Town That Could Spell the End of NATO”. 2014 http://theconversation. 05 May 2014. Despite Putin's drive to stop wealthy Russians squirrelling away their riches in foreign countries. . the country has been haemorrhaging capital. This scenario spells deeper pain for an economy already hurting. Web." said Timothy Ash of Standard Bank.Sanctions Effective Sanctions could Make Putin Change His Policies Ben-Gad. Guardian News and Media. "If they can't refinance then it means higher interest rates. who so far has run rings around his western Such a policy would leave it unable to export its gas to the West. it means less investment. Published March 25. would no longer be able to sustain his government’s budget. Vladimir Putin. This for a population used to average annual growth as high as 7% in Putin's first two terms. as banks and firms struggled to raise funds to roll over debts worth $193bn that need to be refinanced this year. Could Tougher Sanctions against Russia Work?" Theguardian. "As Tensions in Ukraine Mount. The hyperinflation and shortages that would ensue might just make the idea of further adventurism abroad unpopular and force him to consider rapprochement with the the-end-of-nato. counterparts. Since the start of the year. as much as in the whole of 2013.

Ukraine not Western Interest Ukraine can’t be a buffer state Mitchell.” but to a rickety “statelet” that is susceptible to subversion and eventual state-capture. cant-be-buffer-state the idea that making Ukraine into a buffer state can offer a solution to the mounting In short. . conflict there is a fantasy. http://cepa. defendable borders—all things that we are currently not willing to do. The current course of denying military aid while providing a trickle of monetary support is likely to lead. We would have to pump into its economy many times the amount of money currently on offer from the International Monetary Fund and large Western donor states. arm it and give it coherent. Even getting Ukraine to the point where it could be a sustainable. February 20th. not to an Eastern European “Finland. Wess. Why Ukraine Can’t be a Buffer State. nonaligned entity would require the West to feed it.

2015.forbes. of course. There’s very little the Ukraine produces which is of a quality that anyone in Europe will actually pay for it. . Thus by imposing sanctions against Ukraine Russia is simply accelerating the integration into the European economy–exactly the thing they are trying to prevent. But the situation here is more complex. Tim. if denied that outlet for cheap and not very good goods to the east. And goods which find a ready market there are going to. affect the Ukrainian economy.http://www. almost certainly. a few specialist metals certainly.Pushes Ukraine to West Russian sanctions on Ukraine are going to force Ukrainian integration into the European economy. Russia and EU Play Tit for Tat With Sanctions Over Ukraine. but almost no consumer goods would be purchased by Europeans at any price at all. Yes. In the longer term though those sanctions are going to have the opposite effect. this does punish the Ukraine’s economy–as well as Russia’s. contrary to the normal effect of sanctions. Russia is the natural outlet for those products so banning their import will indeed. December 22nd. Worstall. is simply going to have to upgrade to export to the European market. those against the Ukraine by Russia over the new EU trade deal. Ukrainian ukraine/ Then there’s the third set of sanctions. Some bulk items possibly. end up being over specified for the Russian market in the future.

redevelopment and the discovery of new resources just to maintain its current production levels. Russia needs reinvestment. Moreover. “Russia Begins to Buckle Under Sanctions Pressure”. but the United States ratcheted up sanctions the following month. if not later. . an Energy Ministry official noted that the ministry does not expect drilling to return to the Arctic Sea until 2020 at the earliest . As many of Western Siberia's Soviet-era fields decline. On Sept. sanctions somewhat inhibit access to technology for shale oil and gas development.Hurts Oil Tech Russia won’t be able to expand oil sector at all until 2020 at earliest Stratfor Global Intelligence. September 2015. instead of during the crucial 2020-2025 period. 15. ExxonMobil and Rosneft began drilling in the Kara Sea last August. Pushing back the development timetable by six years likely means that the project will not come online until the second half of the 2020s.stratfor. forcing the first oil from ExxonMobil to pull out of the project entirely.and medium-term projects. Thesanctions have delayed long.

iss.economist. No one expects the Kremlin to make an about-face in its opposition to the West. 8th December 2015. but the shift in tone was notable . But he lost. gains tapering off 2 .com/news/europe/21679701-popular-president-muffles-his-anti-western-rhetoric-russias- economy-shrinks-vladimir-putin But most of the speech was more pacific. and he even called an early presidential election in 2000 with the hope of cementing another term.pdf One of the main arguments against sanctions is that they have bolstered Putin domestically.Undermines Putin 1 . October 2015. focusing on the economy. Anti-Americanism was nearly absent. Mr Putin may simply be reading the weather. LEADS TO → read the 55 percent and declining.TURN: Strong leaders in crises often experience short term gains from rally round the flag effect. http://www. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds that 75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. is reinforcing the rally-round-the-flag effect and ensuring that the Russian president’s approval ratings remain high – at International crises often strengthen leaders in the short term least for now. Russia’s economy is in a precarious state. refused to acknowledge defeat and was eventually ousted amidst street The outbreak of the First World War was heralded with a wave of jingoism in many European states. Ukraine was not mentioned. Crimea appeared only briefly. Vladimir Putin softens his tone”. the need to prepare for low oil prices. “Sanctions and Russia: Lessons from the Cold War”.TURN: Putin softening anti-western rhetoric over the past two months The Economist. the Tsar was toppled and. not just politicians. The belief propagated by the Russian media that the country is at war. Examples abound: in 1913 Russia celebrated with great pomp and much public display of unity 300 years of the Romanov dynasty. only to doom them at a later stage. Mr Putin may also be reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: “By changing nothing. can also be popular. Yet this is nothing unusual. one year later. particularly in their initial phases. http://www. European Union Institute for Security Studies.europa. shot. but this declines over time Nicu Popescu. and social issues. The bombing campaign by NATO against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 led to a brief boost in his popularity. Within less than four years. Some of them – including the Russian and Habsburg empires – collapsed just a few years later. “As Russia’s economy shrinks.” . we will simply run out of reserves and the economic growth rates will linger around zero. Wars themselves. Or take the case of Serbia’s former president Slobodan Milosevic.

And at some point. 4 May 2014. Chekist corporation. he thinks that during this period the “desperate residents of Luhandosiya” will disappear immediately. They will “not be Sakharovs or Mandelas but rather some post-Putin Ivanov-Sechenovs. With increasing pressure a very significant gap is appearing here: Putin is interested in his personal power and his inner circle is not. Mar. targeted sanctions. Ken.S. when a split takes place between the interests of Putin and those of the ruling elite. and does not want the total isolation of Russia and its leader. and European governments can also more rigorously enforce existing laws against organized crime syndicates and money laundering that could ensnare many Russian government officials and key damage to the economic interests of senior business leaders who support the Putin government.” Piontkovsky said.46 The subsequent government officials and Russian business leaders. and then there are the personal interests of Mr.” Hurting the economic interests of senior government officials would undermine Putin.Angers Elites Divide between Putin and elites means that political change will produce more moderate future leaders Anna Mostovych. the U. Putin. “Rift emerging between Putin and his circle — Russian analyst”. Sofer. February 2015. where it has assets and a certain lifestyle. as covered by the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012.p. .” When it comes to relations with Ukraine. who represent a vital constituency for President Putin. He noted that the Russian elite is not interested in a total rupture with the West. government can readily impose sanctions on existing violators of human rights within Russia. it(the inner circle) inevitably will conclude that Putin is hurting the corporation . According to Piontkovksy . http://euromaidanpress.S. In addition to preparing new.45 U. the thieving.. 2014. N. new people will somehow come to power. especially to fully review their relations with the West. and “the new government will begin some serious negotiations with Ukraine on the issue of Crimea. Web." Center For American Progress. "Concrete Steps to Address the Crisis in analyst/#arvlbdata “There are interests here of the ruling corporation. EuroMadian Press. At that point it will be possible to speak about a new stage of Russian-Ukrainian relations.” He also believes they will be “forced to distance their policies from the fiasco brought about by Putin and. could cause enough domestic political backlash to force Putin to take a more conciliatory approach to the crisis.

the crisis generally works by a number of experts. Putin reportedly is increasingly suspicious of oligarchs who have retained their wealth as a result of their loyalty to him and who are being hurt by Western sanctions (several of whom are skeptical about the war in Ukraine). the siloviki are digging in and trying to legitimize their influence on economic policy and secure control of key cash flows. since he could easily crush them. as part of a reorganization of the natural gas sector. Putin prefers to deal with foreign policy and national security issues over domestic policy.Disrupts Russian Political Leadership Economic and political elites are confused and have begun infighting Donald Jensen. since the elites did not anticipate the West’s determination to impose effective sanctions and underestimated the effects of those sanctions. On the other hand. lie just below the surface. http://imrussia. 21 October 2015. Institute of Modern pie Inside the ruling elite. Energy giant Rosneft has revived a proposal to split off the transport arm of Gazprom. according to one expert. The “economic storm” has caused “bewilderment” and nervousness at the top. he has relied more frequently on the government apparatus. (As a rule. in favor of economic liberals and supporters of a conservative budget and structural reforms. Some power players are reportedly critical of Putin in private but cannot challenge his authority. its great adversary. however. longstanding competition over power and property has intensified as the resource base has shrunk. despite their differences. and reportedly Putin himself). Longstanding tensions among the leaders who seek to replace Dmitry Medvedev as prime minister.) economic crisis has come to the fore. and thereby formally become Putin’s heir apparent. (Gazprom has had its performance roundly criticized On the one hand. government officials. Especially noteworthy has been the increased rivalry among the large state corporations controlled by the so-called siloviki. Putin was widely reported to have relied on a tight circle of advisors from the “power ministries” in the planning and execution of “Operation Crimea” last year and as the invasion of As the Ukraine unfolded. “Russia’s Elites Battle Over a Shrinking Economic Pie”. .

24 The model also predicts that severe sanctions lead to surrender. pp. by treating 0 as independent of s. On the one hand.e. These results evolve because of the twofold impact of sanctions. 274 (May. On the other hand. If 0 is high. 185-206). then weak sanctions are more likely to hurt the challenger. I assume that those two effects cancel out. the equilibrium is engagement. can have positive impact on the challenger's resolve. such was an effect of the international sanctions on South In addition. the incumbent is less willing to select relatively more In other words. 2015. by showing the world's solidarity with the challenger. Then. If s is high. are illustrated by the indifference Weak sanctions can hurt the challenger. a negative effect of s on 0 signifies what Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1992. however. London School of Economics. if s = 0. sanctions s induces shifts from deterrence (if 0 was sufficiently low) to engagement and then to surrender. can easily accommodate situations when 0 is a function of s. Published May 2002.pdf. and s is low (to guarantee the attractiveness of victory for the incumbent). More generally. Thus. To understand the impact of sanctions on the expected utility of the challenger group. while for strong sanctions the reverse is true. http://www. Figure 1 illustrates these findings. international sanctions.Inducing Regime Change Sanctions show international solidarity with domestic social movements. which makes deterrence expensive. Deterrence is the equilibrium for sufficiently weak sanctions s (which makes victory attractive for the incumbent) and low offence efficiency parameter 0 (which makes deterrence less expensive). The results imply that the presence of sanctions is a necessary condition for surrender. The proposed analytical framework. Throughout this paper. 1] and 8 > 0. then the equilibria are either engagement or deterrence. p.jstor. My findings.e. Accessed December 22. p. greater resolve of the incumbent group to continue its policies in defiance of the pressure from abroad. Vol. The inefficiency of the challenger in his struggle against the incumbent (low 0) and the heavy burden of sanctions that falls on the challenger (low A) exacerbate this effect. i. I treat strength of sanctions s and offence efficiency 0 as parameters independent of each other. High s makes victory more desirable for the challenger and less attractive for the incumbent. derived in Appendix B. sanctions reduce incomes in the economy if the challenger fails. 0 = O(s). we need to evaluate the function CB(s. No. the more elongated the indifference curves are. the lower the value of A is. if the challenger bears the heavy burden of sanctions (low A). The deterrence-engagement threshold value of 0 is a decreasing function of s. . Lowenberg and Kaempfer (1998. the exogenous increase in the severity of expensive deterrence to ensure its victory. 156) call a 'rally- around-the-flag' effect. i. That means that. 69. sanctions make the challenger's victory more likely. as shown in Appendix B. 192) note that the anti-apartheid sanctions helped the black majority to 'organize collective actions among its members'. For weak sanctions the latter effect outweighs the former. at least at some point. however."Sanctions and Civil Conflict". causes surrender/victory (Dmitriy Gershenson – London School of Economics) Dmitriy Gershenson.26 This relatively stronger negative impact of weak sanctions on the challenger's expected utility explains why the switch from deterrence to engagement resulting from an increase in sanctions' strength reduces the expected utility of the challenger (a move to a lower indifference curve in Figure 2). 9) for s E [0.22 Levy At the same time. 2002). (1999) suggests that. 0 can depend on s.

and the military coup. Vol. Nossal 1989). who in turn will pressure their government to yield to the demands of the initiating states (Galtung 1967. current sanctions policy– particularly U.Conversely. Oxford. Davis. Marinov 2005. Renwick 1981. impose sanctions to inflict economic costs on targets with a view to alter another state's behavior. and Radcliff 1997.. research addressing why. sanctions can influence the behavior of leaders by imposing economic hardship on the targeted public. Economic Coercion and Political Consequences The modern concept of sanctioning developed from the early warfare tactic of the siege. "the wealthy bribe. 196) points out. probing how economic sanctions affect the domestic political dynamics of targeted states.Sanctions influence behavior by creating a divide between the public and the elites and shifting power within the target state (Susan Hannah Allen – University of Mississippi) Susan Hannah Allen. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. it is unsurprising that the economic effect of sanctions and the resultant isolation has been considered the single most important predictor of the coercive impact of these measures (Dashti-Gibson. The findings presented here As states become more suggest that domestic political response to sanctions varies greatly by the regime type of the target. as domestic publics are unable to impose political costs and the economic constraints of sanctions often allow leaders to extract greater rents while overseeing the trade of scarce goods. To test this causal mechanism. in autocratic states. University of Mississippi. sanctions policy. and by what processes sanctions influence behavior has only recently begun to emerge (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999/2000. Crawford 1999. As Huntington (1968. With so much attention on whether or not sanctions work. http://www. I examine whether these activities increase when economic sanctions are in place.pdf?acceptTC=true. The basic expectation is that sanctioning states apply economic pressure to bring about a change in political behavior of the targeted I start from the assumption that states states.S. Rowe 2001. politically open. Accessed December 22. The Hufbauer. 52. Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). In light of these This view of sanctions has influenced American foreign policy toward a variety of countries. students riot. Conventional wisdom suggests that economic Brooks 2002. but there is very little empirical evidence as to whether this is what actually occurs on the ground in states targeted by sanctions. Despite formal work by Smith (1996) and some anecdotal evidence. while failed sanctions have an impact of only a 1. 916-944. To increase efficacy. No. I explore how international economic sanctions can be used to the greatest effect to create policy change. Schott.1 Following from the logic of the siege. Lindsay 1986. suggesting that the population may be empowered by the actions of the international community or may believe their rulers to be weakened by the sanctions? All actors within a state have tools to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the regime. sender state to put pressure on the economy of the target state with the expectation that economic deprivation caused by sanctions will create shifts in power within the target state. 6 (Dec. Despite the frequency with which economic sanctions are implemented. 2008). In this article. ." Given this understanding of state-society relations. Does antigovernment activity become more common under sanctions. Hart 2000). Published December 2008. and Elliott (1990) study shows that successful sanctions have an average economic impact of a 2. workers strike. I examine how sanctions affect the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in targeted countries. very little is understood about how these measures can and do bring about the political change they are initiated to create. whereby an attacker hoped to close off a walled city to such an extent that the citizens inside would be starved into submission (Simons 1999).0 percent decrease. the domestic political institutions of the target state must be taken into account directly. which frequently targets states with closed political systems– may be flawed. how. mobs demonstrate.4 percent Economic effectiveness allows a decrease in GDP. Kirshner 2002. pp. 2015.). to some degree– create political costs for leaders who resist sanctions. the domestic public can– and does.jstor. “The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions”. Drury 1998. leaders may actually benefit from sanctions.

a sending state hopes to increase its bargaining leverage over the target.This logic is similar to that which underlies punishment strategies of air power (Pape 1996). Lopez. Renwick 1981). sanctions may also be designed to create international political costs in addition to the domestic ones that are the focus of this study.2 but unless there are political costs imposed on the leader. civilian punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state. Recently. with the idea that inflicting high costs on civilians leads to popular uprising and demands for the target government to change its behavior to end the suffering of its people. advocated punishing bombing campaigns against urban centers to break the morale of the enemy population. Successful sanctions then serve to encourage dialogue to gain compliance rather than creating isolation to do so (Cortright and Lopez 2000). While the basic cost hypothesis does depict part of the story of sanctions. Baldwin 1985). much less autocratic states (Jentleson 2000. change. sanctions are unlikely to alter the status quo policy. often in the form of financial sanctions on the private wealth of political figures. dividing masses from elites. and efforts have been made to diminish the general impact of sanctions with the imposition of targeted sanctions. in particular. and Rogers 2002). . as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. concede. the coercive power attempts to impose costs on civilians. The punishment logic is still consistent. Douhet. which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to greater focus on survival. From this perspective. Even in cases in which elites are targeted. Italian air-power strategist and early proponent of punishment strategies Douhet (1921) perceived that these societal costs would create mass-elite divisions in society. Theoretically. When sanctions succeed. When a punishment strategy is used (either with air power or economic sanctions). the benefits of compliance exceed the value of the offending behavior that triggered the sanctions initially. sanctions are a bargaining tool rather than a punitive one. Sanctions policies that are thought to fail often do To effect have economic effects. targeted states must sufficiently value the benefits gained by compliance. According to Losman (1979. this is a good solution. Regardless of the amount of the economic pressure exerted. and thus. 128). without political costs. sanctions must be politically costly relative to the issue at stake between the target and the sender (Morgan and Schwebach 1996). high levels of economic impact. even in democratic states. Lopez 1999. there is no reason for targeted states to comply (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999/2000). In practice. the morality of punishment strategies (both in terms of sanctions and air power) has been questioned. however. By imposing sanctions. but that impact is not successfully translated into the desired political out come (Kirshner 1997). it ignores the possibility of adaptation by the target and does not go far enough in its explanation of the coercive mechanism behind sanctions (Galtung 1967. and a "swift social breakdown" could be achieved if elites could be detached from the masses (Freedman 1998). sanctioners aim to alter the power relationships within the target state. but many practical challenges arise in implementation (Cortright. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change. In this view.

Drawing on rational-actor explanations of political violence (Jenkins and Schock 1992). and Elliott (HSE) data (1990) have political destabilization of the target state as a goal. sanctions anticipates a political response. How such changes can and do come about is not well understood (Rowe 2001). and after that threshold is reached. 6 (Dec. Oxford. Following this logic. From the deprivation perspective. The economic scarcity caused by sanctions can heighten feelings of deprivation. 916-944. one likely consequence of sanctions is internal conflict. Schott. this pattern should be more pronounced than in their absence. In the face of any external threat. Bearing the pain of sanctions is not in the national interest of states. they may be motivated to act to encourage their government to concede to sanctions pressure. their frustrations will lead them to lash out at the government. A greater percentage (roughly 70 percent) involve demands for smaller alterations in domestic policies in the target state. Published December 2008. pp. Embedded in this understanding of sanctions is the assumption that the opposition in the target state feels a sense of common cause (however vague) with the sender state and that it will bring further pressure to bear on its government. http://www. I explore the possibility that the opportunities afforded by domestic political institutions will moderate the relationship between political action and economic hardship. prerequisite (Susan Hannah Allen – University of Mississippi) Susan Hannah Allen (Department of Political Science: University of Mississippi. political disintegration will quickly occur. The deprivation explanation for the coercive impact of sanctions suggests that there are limits to what a society can and is willing to withstand. The idea that economic hardship caused by sanctions will lead to political action closely resembles that of relative deprivation theories of political violence (Gurr 1970). The domestic politics of the targeted state may greatly influence the response to sanctions pressure. and relative deprivation theories suggest that these feelings should lead to action against the government. Roughly 20 percent of cases in the Hufbauer. Following the political-opportunities explanation of political violence. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Sanctions and the Politics of the Target State Domestic political change in the target state is often a goal for sanctions-sending states. as a positive relationship between economic hardship and internal conflict is expected. coercive influence increases. 52. As citizens begin to feel the economic burden of sanctions. which suggest that when citizens have a sense that they are entitled to a certain level of goods but feel as though they are unable to attain that level ("value expectations" exceed "value capabilities"). the level of economic hardship that sanctions can create is critical to their success . 2008). this deprivation logic of As the economic pressure rises. however. which forces concession. the interactions between the ruler and the ruled are complex. “The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions”.pdf?acceptTC=true. I suggest that targeted publics will take action against their government when the benefits associated with such action are high and the costs are reasonably low. it is assumed that the response of targeted populations will be consistent regardless of the political context. Vol. While the deprivation not all antigovernment activity that occurs during a given sanctions episode is directly caused by sanctions. When sanctions are in place.Strong correlation between levels of economic hardship and drive for internal political change. As discussed above.. Collective interest in survival leads to collective action. Accessed December 22. perspective suggests that there will be a significant increase in antigovernment activity under sanctions as the public experiences economic hardship.jstor. 2015. especially if the issue at stake is of lesser value. .). as sanctions exacerbate divisions in society. When the population feels the pinch of sanctions.

That’s a faster growth rate than China’s. but these sanctions are much more serious. they will affect businesses that are most crucial to the Russian economy. New Republic). And they’ll hit the population. Here’s a hint: “Russia’s economy would collapse faster and quicker” than Europe’s. https://newrepublic. a prominent (and normally bullish) Russian market analyst and senior partner with Macro-Advisory. dead since 1996—there’s not much bluster this time around. Maybe it won’t be immediate. We Should Consider What Happens Next”. Now. So they’ll affect a fairly large number of people. they’re sectoral. 2015. has the West really considered what will happen if they are successful? The reservations expressed on both sides of the Atlantic have mostly been about the impact on Western economies. both sides have delivered. So far.” says Weafer. sanctions was met with ridicule among the Kremlin elite—Vladimir Putin’s gray cardinal Vladislav Surkov. Gennady Timchenko.If Putin fails to uphold contract. “Vladimir Putin Might Fall. to more than $14. If the first round of U. “They’re not personal. and the GDP per capita has increased from $1. The crushing majority of Russians support the Kremlin’s line or avoid politics like the plague.” . Putin’s tacit social contract with the Russian people is based on a very basic exchange: Putin makes sure the Russian people become materially better off.S. Published August 6. “we’d see a change in the political dynamic like we’ve never seen before. Accessed December 25. political dynamic will change when economy plummets (Julia Ioffe – New Republic) Julia Ioffe (Princeton sanctions-against-russia-succeed-what-follows-putin. leaving aside the question of whether or not sanctions are necessary punishment for Putin’s reckless policy in eastern Ukraine. is overcoming his allergy to the limelight to moan publicly about how he can’t go on vacation to southern France with his family or visit his 19-year-old son at university in Switzerland. rather than on what would happen inside Russia. 2014. Additionally. “Our public opinion is given to underestimating them.000 today. joked that what he likes in the United States is Tupac Shakur.771 when Putin “If there were a material came to power in 2000. but it will happen. and the Russian people leave the politics to Putin .” However. sanctioned back in March. says Chris Weafer. a Putinist hawk who sits on the foreign affairs committee in the Russian Civic Chamber. And that brings with it a huge problem.” says Sergei Markov. change in the way people live in Russia. who magically became a billionaire many times over since his old friend Putin came to power.

Recent data released by the Pew Research Center. <http://money. But longer term. In addition.2015. could be domestic demand." the IMF> The Russian public recognizes the economic impact sanctions are having in Russia.4%] that decline. By any metric.2 The Russian public has take notice of the economic downturn and specifically attribute it to sanctions. more than $150 billion in private sector capital left Russia so as to avoid the prospect of financial sanctions. Center for Strategic & International Studies 2015 “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” October 2015.tandfonline.1041297 Another way that financial sanctions seemed different was that they generated fewer incentives for third-party actors to defect from the sanctions regime. Once banks factor in the potential implications of getting caught. have a major effect on the Russian economy. real wages. as falling real wages. and 33 percent blame Western sanctions for Russia’s economic struggles (33 percent blame falling oil prices. <http://nationalinterest. access to US capital markets—and US dollars—to conduct cross-border transactions. “Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. the incentive to act illicitly is considerable. Unemployment has begun to creep up from very low levels. As previously noted. while only 25 percent believe current government policies to be responsible for the current economic situation). up from 44 percent who held that view a year ago. Simond De Galbert. the sanctions busting incentive is much lower. 73 percent acknowledge that Russia’s economic situation is worsening. This access matters more to banks and nonbank financial actors than the potential profits from violating US Treasury regulations. http://www. and Russia's retaliatory ban on imports of food and agricultural products. and millions more have fallen . the calculation of costs and benefits changes because of American preeminence. the higher cost of borrowing and shattered confidence hit western sanctions. Banks are concerned about the reputational and financial costs of being prosecuted for violating sanctions. the United States has been the undisputed financial hegemon International financial actors needed as financial sanctions have been developed as a policy tool (Drezner> The IMF expects Russian GDP to shrink by 3. as the loss of access to foreign finance and technology hurts investment and makes Russia's economy even less efficient. Mark Thompson CNN 2015 “How badly have sanctions hit Russia?” August 4. whereas they tend to weaken trade sanctions. International Interactions”. more than double the figure of 2013. These dynamics mean that market forces strengthen financial sanctions. August 2015.4% this year. "Prolonged sanctions could lead to a cumulative output loss over the medium term of up to 9% of GDP. 2015.18 built on suggests that 45 percent of those polled believe sanctions to a survey conducted in Russia in early 2015. With financial sanctions.Created Recession Power of dollar meant that cut-off caused capital flight → capital flight doubled from 2013 to 2014 Daniel Drezner. for example. International Interactions. with trade sanctions. In 2014. and poverty rates. Russians are feeling the pain.1080/03050629. the impact could be even more significant. Russia has already seen empiric harms to their GDP (-1. 2014).cnn. And responsible for nearly half [of the 3. Tufts

com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return- Russia. with his Ukrainian adventure. Russia has been moderately effective at driving wedges between Germany and the United States. Putin appears to be condemning his country to an ever-darker future of poverty and marginalization. From the Western point of view. more successful than China at geopolitics but less successful than Iran. meanwhile. Web. tightened his hold on Crimea. brought Armenia into his orbit. But Putin doesn’t believe that history has ended. and from his perspective. Nevertheless. and.something it cannot afford to do.foreignaffairs. “The Return of Geopolitics. dealt the West an unpleasant and humiliating surprise. but Russia will have to get serious about reform if it wants to avoid relative stagnation. . To build a real Eurasian bloc. He has dismembered Georgia. he has solidified his power at home and reminded hostile foreign powers that the Russian bear still has sharp claws.into poverty. Anemic growth could return in 2016.” Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs. according to the IMF. has emerged as the middling revisionist: more powerful than Iran but weaker than China. as Putin dreams of doing. but Vladimir Putin’s preoccupation with rebuilding the Soviet Union has been Russian President hobbled by the sharp limits of his country’s economic power. Putin. He has stopped NATO expansion dead in its tracks. IMPACT: Putin’s expansionist policies are limited by Russia’s economy Walter Mead. has been remarkably successful at frustrating Western projects on former Soviet territory. despite his weak hand. Russia would have to underwrite the bills of the former Soviet republics -. http://www. May/June 2014.

There is a better chance for a real diplomatic resolution of the current crisis with sanctions than without them. At a global level.Coercive Diplomacy Sanctions encourage future cooperation Richard Nephew Center for Global and Strategic Monitoring “The National Interest”. http://www. a useful effect of the the risk that Russia will seek to openly destabilize other parts of Ukraine or.Sanctions forced Iran to compromise. including through a more faithful implementation of the Minsk ceasefire. Do sanctions against Russia work?. http://www. Published Decemebr finally. Sanctions won’t change Russia’s strategic Sanctions do not get countries to cave in or to renounce strategic russian-offensive-poroshenko-547830. Tehran did not agree to scrap the nuclear infrastructure that could one day produce nuclear weapons. But sanctions forced Iran to accept significant constraints that will make doing so less likely and much more complicated for the next decade at Moldova and Georgia. sanctions also signaled to other actors that unilateral military ventures will come at a cost. sanctions is “UPDATED: Penalizing Russia will prevent more attacks - Poroshenko”December 5 2015. not to capitulate. October 2015. The separatist areas of the Donbas form only a tiny part of what is called by nationalist elements of the Russian public Novorossia.cgsmonitor. <http://uatoday. http://www. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said on Friday addressing the troops on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. but they could potentially lead Moscow to compromise more. when it easily could have been. The sanctions. "Extension of sanctions will provide certain .europa.html> Extending sanctions against Russia will provide guarantees that Russia will refrain from full-blown offensive and will also facilitate return of temporarily occupied areas of Donbas back under Ukraine's control. in other words.iss. Do sanctions against Russia work?. and signal that unilateral action for any country will come at a cost Iana Dreyer (European Union for Security Studies). The coastal city of Mariupol was not seized by Russia. they do minimize In other words. let alone Odessa and Transnistria. Impact: Reduces aggression Sanctions decrease the risk of Russia destabilizing other regions. Ukraine President Poroshenko. say. Russia in deterred from seizing bigger chunks of territory Iana Dreyer (European Union for Security Studies).iss. even if they do not help the EU much in its policy on Crimea. Published Decemebr 2014.pdf. constrained Russia as they deterred Moscow from seizing even bigger chunks of territory. Impact: Reduces Ukraine War Sanctions have prevented all-out war. Ukraine Today. Despite the strongest and most comprehensive sanctions in recent history imposed against Iran. There has been no attempt by Russian forces to forge a corridor bridging mainland Russia to Crimea.pdf.

to dot the i's in the issue of the extension of sanctions against Russia. Foreign Minister of Spain said that the European Union had reached an agreement to extend the economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation for another six months." said Poroshenko . The Ukrainian president is to visit Brussels on December 16. and create better conditions for strengthening international pressure of our coalition on Moscow on the issue of the return of the occupied areas of Donbas under the sovereignty of Ukraine. Read also Lithuanian president slams Russia's aggression in Ukraine.guarantees that Russia will not go on a full-blown offensive. calls for extending sanctions On December 2. . Poroshenko also stressed that no one had forgotten about Crimea.

2016. and France). even if the full implementation of the ceasefire has not yet been achieved. The US could spoil Russia and Ukraine’s delicate compromise. Sanctions created an atmosphere that likely helped put a negotiating process in place. 871 in July. The extension was negotiated through the Normandy Four format. In addition.diary/us-could-spoil-russia-and-ukraines-delicate-compromise DOA: 1-5-16 Following a last-minute deal between Russia and Ukraine to extend the Minsk negotiations into the new year. Simond de Galbert.January Specific Sanctions have established the grounds for political negotiations. sanctions could have altered the method through which these objectives were implemented. disputing the requirement for elections in eastern Ukraine and pointing out the continued cease-fire violations in the region. and then in February 2015 in the so-called Normandy format (Russia. However. just before the four leaders involved in the talks held their phone call. Center for Strategic and International Studies “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” October 2015 Still. first with Ukraine in September 2014. notable changes are occurring in eastern Ukraine that hint at possible concessions made by both sides. with the SMM reporting 373 ceasefire violations in May. Center for Strategic and International Studies “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” October 2015 Whatever the exact incentive sanctions provided for negotiations. The extension of the deadline appears to have led to notable changes on the battlefield in eastern . require Kiev to decentralize power and require elections to take place in eastern Ukraine. Moscow pushed for the extension but Ukraine wavered. Russia and Ukraine agreed to extend the deadline for implementing the Minsk protocols . Ukraine. will be important to watch because Washington's support for Kiev and pressure on Moscow could stall early indications of progress. which was only recovering from the ruble’s December 2014–January 2015 free fall. Sanctions first came as a surprise to the Russian leadership. there continue to be daily violations of the ceasefire. despite the restrictions imposed locally on the SMM’s access and freedom of movement. The biggest player left out of the formal negotiations. 30. and 971 in August 2015.stratfor. the United States. https://www. French President Francois Hollande indicated after the four-party call that elections are part of the agreement. Ceasefire has reduced most of the fire Simond de Galbert. which includes France and Germany alongside Ukraine and the February 2015 agreement managed to decrease the intensity of the fighting in eastern Ukraine. the level of violence observed before the February 2015 Minsk agreement was much higher than what has been observed since then by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine. 682 in June. Germany. which call for a full return of the border between Russia and the separatist territories to Ukrainian control. This incentive might have been complemented in February 2015 by Russia’s monetary situation at the time. However. which assumed division within the West and the European Union would prevent any tough decisions.24 Ukraine conflict de-escalating now → Number of ceasefire violations fell over holidays Stratfor. The therefore prospect of even stronger sanctions created an incentive for Russia to complete the negotiations. German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a private call to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that likely led to his concession. January 5. Clearly. On Dec.

Hama. http://www. "The work of our aviation group assists in uniting the efforts of government troops and the Free Syrian several of its units numbering over 5. according to local news network RT. and Russia cooperating on Syria as of YESTERDAY David Sanger New York Times “After Years of War in Syria. the NATO partner and U. Aleppo and Raqqa. U. and the rest of Europe that Putin will later claim only he can solve.S. During the past week. What Russia’s been doing in Ukraine since you stopped paying attention. it could very well create a security threat for Poland.ibtimes. to find common national interests to stop the killing. cease-fire violations have decreased significantly. succeeds in destabilizing Ukraine. Impact: Syria Cooperation U. either. Russia began providing material support to Free Syrian Army (Explicitly Against Assad) Suman Varandani. Security Council to embrace a plan for a cease-fire and a peace process that holds the distant prospect of ending the conflict." he said. which is fighting against terrorists in Syria. in the provinces of Homs. 11 December 2015. 2015.html?_r=0 world powers agreed on Friday at the United Nations For the first time since the nearly five-year-old Syrian civil war began. The comments by Russian President Vladimir Putin came during a meeting with the Russian defense ministry. even if they cannot yet agree on Syria’s ultimate future. Putin Vows To Destroy 'Targets Threatening' Its Forces In Syria”. International Business DOA: 1-5-16 But this not the time to abandon Ukraine. Air Support To Free Syrian Army. ally. If the Kremlin Simply put: Ukrainian politics are a mess.nytimes. December 31. but over the holidays the number of incidents dropped from more than 50 per day to about a dozen a day. December 18. 2015. referring to the Free Syrian Army. There had been a relative increase in the exchange of fire following the breakdown of the withdrawal process. . Ukraine Impacts Unstable Ukraine could trigger security threats to Poland and rest of Europe Terrell Jermaine Starr. "Now engaged in offensive actions against terrorists. http://theweek. Passes Resolution on Talks”. A resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council reflected a monthslong effort by American and Russian officials. alongside regular forces. http://www. who have long been at odds over the future of Syria." Putin said. “Russia Supplying 2221577 Russia said Friday it is supplying weapons and air support to the opposition Free Syrian Army.000 troops are Army.S.

Russian anti-corruption activists fight an uphill battle. although these traditions partially explain why the regime’s propaganda has such resonance for the people. American Interest. internal political conditions and to the Kremlin’s policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old traditions. That Russia’s aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the country’s dysfunctional internal system is a more or less banal In the absence of high oil prices. “Myths About Russia and Swedish Non-Alliance”.the-american-interest. the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought 2 April 2014. http://www.ft. http://www. but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. As a small neighboring country. 18 August 2015. or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks. Now that loyalty must be secured in some The country’s revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to other way.html#axzz3vvv9LYIt Other The country’s government has always been reluctant to investigate corruption on its own territory. democratic – and thus peaceful – Russia. Russia’s political system = root cause of conflict Thomas Bertelman. we cannot afford wishful thinking. governments can and should help to locate and freeze corrupt officials’ foreign assets. Both will certainly contribute to the arrival of a new. .Democratization Sergei Guriev. Financial Times “Corruption Has Laid Waste to The Russian Economy”. That will undermine support for Mr Putin within Russia’s ruling class – and support for the elite among the general public.

Baldwin (1985) postulated that this could be one unobserved benefit from sanctions implementation.1.46 to 0.ward. The 2015 US National Security Strategy is equally explicit about this prospect.18 in Model 3 and from 0. however.35 to 0. Rethinking Economic Sanction Success: Sanctions as Deterrents. the issue-specific models demonstrate some evidence for hypothesis 2. Peterson (2013) has measured the deterrent effect of United States sanctions on potential target governments.18 in Model 4). Hovi et al. DOI: 10.364. noting that the “use of targeted sanctions and other coercive measures are meant not only to uphold international norms. 41:4. the prospect of facing smart sanctions will make Target less likely to violate international norms.” The ability of these sanctions to generate significant costs on Iran and Russia might act as a deterrent effect going for. http://citeseerx. Drezner (2015) Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. Miller (2014) has similarly demonstrated a deterrent effect of sanctions for nuclear nonproliferation.psu.S. Additionally. contrary to the aggregate history models.Deterrence Backing down sanctions reduces success of other sanctions by 55% TImothy Peterson. First. Published December 2010. countries that were sanctioned due to their involvement in a militarized dispute are less likely to participate in future disputes because they try avoiding the economic and political costs associated with economic sanctions. The central intuition of this paper is that economic sanctions imposed on countries involved in militarized conflicts show sender’s disapproval of militarized conflicts and a willingness to impose economic costs on countries involved in militarized supporting hypothesis the current target’s likelihood of acquiescence the coefficient for US backed down t)1 is again negative and significant in the acquiescence equation of both of these models (p £ . Accessed 12/10/15.1041297 As more foreign policy leaders become aware of the cost of financial sanctions.4777. 2013. Models 3 and 4 utilize issue-specific US sanction threat history variables.2015. Daniel W. 755- 764.wiley. Petrescue (University of Maryland). their effectiveness might change from that learning. decreases on average by 55% when the United States has recently capitulated against a resistant target (from 0. Paradoxically. International Studies Quarterly.12017/epdf Accordingly.1111/isqu. University of South Carolina. (2005:499) observe that “to the extent that Target considers smart sanctions more potent than traditional sanctions. Substantive results are comparable to those in Models 1 and 2. http://onlinelibrary.01 in Model 3 and p £ . the ability of financial sanctions to impose significant costs might lessen their use over time. but to deter severe threats to stability and order at the regional level” (Executive Office of the President 2015:23).1 in Model 4). Thus. International Interactions.1080/ . sanction threat behavior”. Warrant for deterrence Ioana M. “Sending a message: the reputation effect of U.

Rethinking Economic Sanction Success: Sanctions as Deterrents. it is a reliable predictor that it is likely to be so in the' Lidegaard believes that if the EU had not imposed any sanctions. One can hope that this at a time makes them realize how completely hopeless a project that they're up to. or Stalin’s in the same period. Russia had been "far deeper in Ukraine and even more aggressive. Human Rights as Politics. Russia would be far deeper in Ukraine without sanctions (Frederik Kulager – Politiken) Rasmus Dam Nielsen and Frederik Kulager (Politiken). Thus. there seems no doubt that Western Consider the example of Hitler’s regime. economic sanctions decrease the probability that a country in the militarized This study finds that dispute will participate in another dispute only if the sender is large. http://citeseerx.pdf Even when a state’s domestic behavior is not a clear and present danger to the international system. Petrescue (University of Maryland). governments’ failure to sanction or even condemn their domestic policies encouraged both dictators to believe that their international adventures would go unpunished and unresisted. 2016.not Danish weapons .ist. he replies: "I will not give Putin an answer book for what it takes to get the conflict to escalate. 2015." . And where exactly our red line at-makke-ret/.364. When asked what it would take before Lidegaard believe that military aid is in order. The deterrent effects produced by a large sender is a drop of 8% in the probability of future disputes. Published February 5. 2000. http://tannerlectures. http://politiken. Accessed 12/10/15. no. and EU 16x bigger than Russia) Ioana M. The deterrent effect is present when the GNP ratio between sender and target is larger than 100. 1933–38. I find that decreasing trade and aid to a country involved in a militarized dispute without imposing economic sanctions have no effect on the future military behavior of this country. In hindsight." "We have not stopped them.utah.4777. Michael Princeton University. Accessed January 16.S. Lack of sanctions to Putin and Russia made them emboldened. the larger the deterrent effect. Then.psu. “Lidegaard: EU sanctions . Published December 2010.8% decrease in probability of conflict if it’s done by a large sender (the U. But sanctions have a stronger every day that goes along with falling oil prices. the larger the sender relative to the target.1. But our red line is exceeded. the deterrent effect increases with the GNP get Putin to toe the line”. For GNP ratio values higher than 100.

Sanctions make it too expensive for Russia to hold territory (Henry Pascoe – Journal of Conflict Resolution) Daniel McCormack and Henry Pascoe (Journal of Conflict Resolution – Browne Center for International Politics. University of Texas at Austin). Sanctions worked [by] in this instance not by forcing a Russian surrender of Crimea or Donbass but by preventing a Russian seizure of Kiev. Russia might be willing to bear the costs of sanctions in order to communicate its resolve over eastern Ukraine. In the ten years preceding the Ukrainian civil war. 2016. leading a Brookings report to conclude that ‘‘[w]hat Russia [can] could not afford is to win Ukraine’’ (Gaddy and Ickes 2014). “Sanctions and Preventive War. 2015. they also decreased Moscow’s ability to pay for occupying larger slices of Ukraine: even before the invasion Russia subsidized Ukrainian industry {for} to the tune of US$5 to US $10 billion per year.sagepub. Sanctions not only forced a cut to Russian military spending. http://jcr. Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov announced that military spending would have to be cut. lowering the risk of conflict by reducing the chances one party to a dispute makes an offer unacceptable to its adversary. Published December 30. University of Pennsylvania and.abstract. suffering the costs associated with either sending or bearing sanctions communicates resolve over an issue. Russia was forced by the sanctions regime to cut these subsidies. Russia doubled its military spending. Despite taking indirect control of several Ukrainian cities. ‘‘reconsider[ing] the amount of resources that will be spent from the budget [on the military] in order to make it more realistic’’ (Kelly 2014).” Accessed January 16. The 2014 sanctions regime put paid to this pattern. By October. But sanctions have also had a direct effect on Russian military power. amidst decreased economic growth projections—from 6 percent to 0.5 percent—and concerns over the stability of the ruble. . For In these studies.

effectiveness assessed and lessons drawn. The people . 00038. the sanctions will be to the targeted regime. http://webcache. January 15 2013. then warn Kiev that. They have been increasingly used over the two decades . Not only most of its defects can be removed through more coherent policy planning and monitoring but there is hardly anything which could replace sanctions. Mil intervention causes escalation Patrick Buchanan.001. And. as the spokesman of Poland's military regime of the 1980s. Or Putin could order in the Russian army before U. and slowness in achieving results.-Russia Clash in Ukraine?”.the less credible. Which is why it is important for the people to be informed about the nature and goals of sanctions targeting their country. Konstanty. In particular. Sanctions may be flawed. weapons arrive. we should improve it -not give up on it. awkwardness. Gebert. to debates about the morality of sanctions. WorldNet Daily.tufts. “Sanctions: a useful but flawed alternative to war.S. does not engage in warfare. he could take U. “U. http://www. February 2015. As the three cases analyzed indicate. each new sanctions episode will pose a myriad of dilemmas associated with the use of this instrument. it is clear that the less the sanctioning power is willing to suffer some of the consequences of the sanctions policies .62 While complete clarity about the effectiveness of sanctions may always lag behind the policymakers need for precise information. University of Notre Dame “The Sanctions Era”. economic sanctions are a viable alternative to military intervention as the century draws to a close. and then tell Kiev he is ready to negotiate.not necessarily. If our sanctions policy is defective.00006+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us Our existing knowledge about sanctions should provide a useful springboard for ongoing scrutiny and policy debate about their advantages relative to military intervention as a means of settling disputes in the post-Cold War Implementation must be monitored and policed. we know a For all of their great deal about the conditions under which sanctions can achieve certain objectives without a resort to military force. Since these measures are taken allegedly in their> “Does this mean that the EU should give up such a muddled policy? Definitely not.the EU imposes now more sanctions than the United Nations . The goal of the sanctions must be realistic. they should have the possibility of being able to assess that themselves. 1995.” European Council on Foreign Relations. Jerzy Urban famously said: "The government will always feed itself". Moscow will intervene militarily. These range from the traditional difficulties of ensuring international cooperation.S. establish a land bridge to Crimea. to questions about economic and political More in character. Lukashenka will not agree to democratisation.and can claim a number of targeted successes. However.ecfr. . They are the union's sole coercive instrument of power short of military action and Brussels. intervention as a challenge and send in armor and artillery to enable the rebels to consolidate their gains. which would deprive him of his power. but they are the only feasible alternative to war. capture Mariupol. economically and politically. <http://www. rather than see the rebels routed.Better than Military Sanctions comparatively better George Lopez. mercifully. a number of simple principles have to be factored into the union's sanctions policy.

binghamton. appear to increase the likelihood that the conflict will continue by about 50%. and military interventions are unrelated to the expected duration of a conflict. however. a rare reason to hope that things might actually get better. For example. 2004. economic interventions tend to prolong a conflict.pdf “The results suggest that diplomatic interventions dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict. “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention: Combined Strategies and the Duration of Civil War”.3 times over a conflict without a diplomatic intervention.3 times while military interventions don’t change duration (define Russian aggression as an ongoing conflict that needs to be curbed) Patrick Regan. though we will address this when we interpret the full results (see Model 1). Economic interventions by themselves. made more complicated by the decay function used to model the effects of interventions over time. on the other hand. This interpretation is.It is often our sole instrument of coercion and for the unfortunate subjects of oppressive regimes. a diplomatic intervention increases the probability that a conflict ends by about 3.” .edu/cdp/docs/diplomacy-otherforms. Binghamton University. http://www. Diplomatic interventions reduce length of conflict by 3.

<http://nationalinterest. on the other hand. sanctions also impacted Russia’s ambitious plans for the modernization of its military. Russia cannot ignore the military exercises being conducted in its backyard in May by NATO countries. “Cash Crunch: Sanctions Hurting Russia’s Grand Plans to Modernize Military. efforts to isolate Russia - . Kaylan.” International Business Times. a defense think tank in Moscow. Russia planned to replace 30 percent of its military equipment. At the same time. On one hand. October 2015. and the country has seen failures in military technology. budget has imposed measures to delay investments in modernization projects.17 Russia’s ability to find substitutes to replace Ukrainian-made gas turbine engines may be questionable in the short term. Things Russia’s declining public could possibly get worse in the years ahead. For example. the opportunity for renewing the Russian armed forces and its equipment is looking bleak .S.500 total troops. which have rarely been fully implemented in the recent past. Any thought that NATO is still rattled by Russia's annexation of Crimea seems passé as a new rapid-reaction force has given NATO the strength to deal with any contingency in Eastern Europe. Such disruptions to the military industry supply chains may be overcome but represent today an obstacle to Russia’s modernization modernize-military-1913725 But This> In addition to purely economic consequences.16 More importantly. plans for an aircraft carrier) and plans for military modernization.with the aim of forcing regime change. “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” Center for Strategic & International Studies. sectorial European sanctions against the Russian military industry and Ukraine’s own decision to ban military exports to Russia are causing delays in the Russian navy’s shipbuilding plan inter alia.ibtimes. Kumar. government statistics reveal that defense budget will have to take a cut of 5 percent in 2015.000 Estonian. May 8 2015. http://www. So. in which he paints Russia as a victim of U.Hurts Russian Military Sanctions delay investments in modernization and cut off the supply chains of the Russian military Simond De Galbert. Russia has had to cut back its defense budget (i. NATO’s rising assertiveness will likely draw conspiracy theories from Putin. This impact has so far been twofold. . CAST. Latvian and Norwegian troops. the northern borders of Russia are witnessing convergence of 21. with 13. The NATO-led "Operation Hedgehog” has been designed as a ground exercise involving Estonia and others. Adding frustration was the embarrassing breakdown of a T-14 Armata tank during Victory Day preparations. said that the Russian economy is not generating enough revenue to pay for the 2011-20 defense modernization program.e soldiers salaries. launch 50 new warships and introduce T-14 Armata tanks.

not enough intellectual resources.” said Ruslan Pukhov. Most of Russia's military equipment is left over from that period. two warships. Russia started on an ambitious rearmament program to equip at least 75% of its armed forces with more powerful technology by 2020.” said Rafel Mirzoyan.2 billion ($1. The spending program would cost at least $700 billion and included a new generation of . But while Russia hasn’t officially cut its budget for arms procurement or research and budget-gets-squeezed-1440709682. rocket programs and Western the next-generation fighter jet. All three types of Russian heavy bombers pounding Syria were built by the Soviet Union and only inherited by Russia. not enough technological partners. the T-50. 2016. industry officials say state defense and security firms have been asked to reduce their expenditures by 10%. the Admiral Kuznetsov. and value of currency dropped 20%. an engineer at Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies. President Barack Obama’s nominee to become the Pentagon’s top military officer. a Moscow- based defense think tank. Russia’s Military: Don’t Believe the Hype. Russia. the rubles allocated are worth less when it comes to buying foreign parts and acquiring Western technology. a spending plan worth $680 billion when it was announced. but we can only do less and less with what we are being given . military leaders including Gen. Accessed December 25. was launched in 1990.35 billion) contract to deliver cutting Russia off from a much-needed glimpse at Western weapons technology. “You can’t do everything: [There are] not enough resources financially. But in one high-profile blow.Military expenditures dropped 10%.wsj. national security. “Russia Shows Off Military Might as Budget Gets Squeezed”. January 4. In 2010.S. “You can name up to a dozen project but you can realize a maximum of five. Almost all of the Russian Ground Forces' tanks and armored vehicles date back to the 1980s. while sanctions have added additional strain on some of Russia’s largest businesses. http://www. due to its nuclear arsenal and recent aggressive behavior toward its neighbors. with Moscow spending $54 billion on the military in 2015. including some defense firms now on Western blacklists. Link: Spending down Revisions of the massive budget plan our opponents described was heavily revised down. The Russian leader used the venue this week to host Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al- Nahyan and Jordan’s King Abdullah II. budget going up by 1% in 2016. 2015. blacklisted by Western defense firms through sanctions (Thomas Grove – Wall Street Journal) Thomas Grove (Wall Street Journal). The modernization has encompassed a range of space projects.S. The Week. Russian defense spending is finally trending upward. France this month broke a €1. U. Just as importantly. director of CAST. have recently named Russia as the biggest threat to U. Russia's lone carrier. http://theweek. after decades of starvation budgets brought on by the end of the Cold War and a poorly performing economy. based in southern Russia’s Stavropol region.” The International Aviation and Space Show started in 1993 and gained force over the 2000s as Russia benefited from rising oil revenues and arms importers looked to diversify away from Western weapons systems. the Russian government announced an ambitious program to replace 70 percent of Cold War-era equipment with new weapons by 2020. Joe Dunford. “The budget hasn’t shrunk. of course. means modernization can’t happen Kyle Miizokami.military-dont-believe-hype DOA: 1-4-16 Russia has the world's fourth largest defense budget. Published August 27. Russia’s currency has slumped some 20% against the dollar over the past month. In 2011. remains a formidable power. It is unclear how much Russia’s plans depend on imported parts and technology that are now off limits because of Ukraine crisis. But a sharp drop in oil prices has sent shock waves through Russia’s economy.

expenditures rank seventh or eighth globally. Ahead of the crisis last year. Russian military spending was ranked as the third-highest in the world in dollar terms. however. Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said the Russian military was reducing its first purchases of the newly designed fifth-generation T-50 jet fighter to around a dozen. Russia's defense budget increased by a staggering 33 percent. with GDP alone slipping 4 percent in the past 12 months. Thomas Grove. and the increase was revised downward Unable to forecast an end to Russia's economic problems. The Russian economy has slipped into recession. a new class of aircraft carriers. the defense budget is to 25 percent. and c) being bumped from third to eight in global military expenditure. This year. but Andrey Frolov. While Putin might ostensibly protect the military from budget cuts. Russia’s military just isn’t doing as much stuff. but it Russia’s financial has mostly been dropping old-fashioned bombs. had fallen behind and was in arrears of $78 million to the ministry. said it is likely only six would be completed by the deadline. But some of the more traditional programs have fallen behind schedule. While Mr. has hit its spending power . brought on by Russia's annexation of the Crimea as well as plunging oil prices have quickly taken a heavy toll on the economy. the Armata became an object of rare public criticism as it ran behind schedule and over budget. International sanctions.tanks. along with the devaluation of the ruble. Needless to say. . A person close to the defense ministry said the initial order was for as many as 100. Last Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the factory in 2012 and again this week to give it a personal endorsement.” Mr. Borisov said in July. crisis. defense officials say he’s asked them to slash spending. Russian Defense Industry Hits Speed Bumps. Now the military is slashing its initial orders. an analyst at Moscow-based defense think tank CAST. Russia's ambition to spend $700 billion on armaments is as dead as Julius Caesar Empirically. WSJ. before the year was over some of that spending had to be taken back. maker of Russia’s noted assault rifles. That has raised questions about the industry’s ability to fulfill 2015 procurement orders. b) only meeting 38% of Russian military export contracts. slated to go up less than 1 percent in 2016. CAST says.wsj. The defense ministry has defended the accuracy of its airstrikes. Interfax quoted him as saying. http://www. defense industry officials say firms have been asked privately to make voluntary cuts in expenditures. However. In 2015. Putin has publicly protected the armed forces from budget cuts. Russia’s arms industries only fulfilled 38% of their contracts. adding that state companies that failed on their contracts would be punished. 11-26-2015. The navy is expecting at least eight next-generation Borei nuclear submarines to be produced by 2020.The Russian technology on display in Syria also has its limitations. “For the first half of the year. Even Kalashnikov. 15. and new generation of heavy bombers. according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.A falling economy has affected military spending. This has manifested through a) reducing the number of new fighter jets by 88%. Now.

Russian Military Spending/Modernization Bad Advanced militaries require more pre-mobilization. http://theweek. 2016. Russia is not self-sufficient in a great deal of high tech industry and relies on international vendors — when the Russian shipyard Sevmash refurbished an aircraft carrier for India. Chris Demchak. sometimes in the unlikeliest of ways: For example. with or without full civilian understanding. August 1995. January 4. Even in minor crises. The leaders of central Europe . there is greater potential for each otherwise noisy but survivable crisis to escalate through regrettable military guidance and destabilizing military actions.plan to deploy likely without their knowledge.Poland. a large amount of equipment was sourced from the West and Japan. modern fighters and the Armata tank make extensive use of LCD displays to convey information to the crew. organizational effects they induce. which causes leaders to mobilize even in minor crises. . more professional forces equipped with advanced weapons and support systems. Advanced technologies can compound the normal problems of civilian ministerial control by altering modernizing The more intricate. University of Arizona “Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central Europe”. The Week. changing their organizations accordingly. Journal of Public Policy. has no domestic LCD industry.. critical and expensive the machines. That sort of sourcing is just not going to happen The public policy issues of modernizing public agencies in Central Europe are nowhere more pressing than in the process of modernizing militaries. Russia’s Military: Don’t Believe the Hype. the Czech Republic and Slovakia . Under these circumstances. the more military organizations in unexpected ways. This paper argues that the political and organizational circumstances roughly common to Central European countries make such modernization highly problematical for effective civilian policy in crises. Russia. military leaders will probably want to move to heightened states of readiness to be sure the machines are in place and functional.Link: Access to Tech Down Access to high tech means military suffering Kyle Miizokami. Russia's defense production will be hampered by a lack of a domestic high tech industry. Hungary.http://www. Struck by sanctions. increasing threat of escalation and destabilization.military-dont-believe-hype DOA: 1-4-16 Sanctions will also effect defense production. unlike the much smaller South Korea.

Overviews .

Zaporizhia. Accessed December 25. The question for Putin going forward is whether his stumbling economy can support his geopolitical ambitions. 2014. http://www. Sanctions make military action more expensive and thus make aggression a bad investment opportunity (Ilan Berman – The National Interest) Ilan Berman (The National Interest). As Russia’s president attempts to reassert his nation’s ascent. Russia is now spending some $105 million monthly on hardware and personnel deployed in Ukraine’s east. The areas under threat go beyond Crimea. “The Economics of Deterring Russia”. Economy and geopolitical ambitions intertwined (Michael Shuman – TIME Magazine) Schuman. 2015. http://time. the Kremlin’s current “burn rate” is already significant. and Luhansk. An ancillary strike may soon develop in Transdnistria. 2015. 1/26/15. by far the world’s largest economy. Accessed December 25. he is doing so on an ever shakier economic foundation.the-american-interest. 2015. the cities of Odessa and Kharkiv and beyond—all places he identified before the war began as part of his “Novorossiya” project. Why Ukraine is Our Business. According to authoritative estimates. ukraine-is-our-business/ Putin’s sights are set firmly inland on This weekend’s fighting in Mariupol has already claimed thirty dead and 83 wounded.5 billion or more annually).economy- ukraine-sanctions-putin-geopolitical-ambition-foreign-policy/. One of the axioms of global geopolitics [for Russia] is that a country can project power only as far as its economic might allows. Published May 22. which would allow Putin’s Russia not just to dominate the entire Black Sea northern littoral but also to expand its territory to the borders of Moldova and Romania. They include in addition Dnepropetrovsk. and Mikolaiv. Published November 20. And we can see China now rising to superpower status on the back of its spectacular economic Vladimir Putin should take note. Nevertheless. and potential funders stay away. There is good reason why the United States. These costs have been compounded by the added drag on the Russian economy imposed by last year’s annexation of Crimea (some $4. The message to those companies is clear:“Russia’s Lackluster Economy Means Putin Simply Can’t Afford a New Cold War”. Michael (TIME Magazine). clout in Europe. By all indications. has been the dominant force in all things political and military for the past 60 years.Russia wanted more Its more than just crimea Andrew Michta. In the world of venture capital. The attendant military mobilization now taking place within the Russian Federation itself is believed to be considerably more expensive. or perish. as well as reduced governmental revenue from artificially low world oil prices. This lesson is applicable to Russia as well. which has begun to practice mobilization bordering on the Odessa region. the operative figure used by potential investors to calculate the solvency and profitability of a company is its A venture with an unsustainable “burn “burn rate”—the amount of capital that it expends monthly on its operations. Kherson. the size of Russia’s . http://nationalinterest. Donetsk. rate” is seen as inefficient and a bad investment bet.

from parsing the specifics of Putin’s policies to actually limiting his ability to mobilize. Doing so requires targeting not high- profile public figures in Moscow. That would be a sound investment indeed. Western nations can help change the terms of the debate surrounding Russia. domestic factories and associated industries that help provide the critical components of the mechanized divisions. to fuel a long-range bomber. And once it does. . the quicker it will end up depleting its savings. artillery and hardware that Russia will use if and when it again goes on the march. The logic is simple. But not if the West drives up the marginal costs of the Kremlin’s war effort.foreign exchange reserves (currently estimated at upward of $353 billion) suggests that Moscow can keep up its present rate of expenditure for some time yet. Moscow will find its potential for aggression profoundly constrained. or to properly outfit a warfighter. In this way. The more it costs Russia to build a tank or submarine. but the cogs in the Kremlin’s war machinery: the foreign suppliers.

Capital Flight Russian repression causes capital flight Lee S Wolosky. The Russian economy grew rapidly between 2000 and 2007. His popularity at home is sky high even as his nation’s economy is in turmoil. Putin denies involvement in Although Ukraine. Accessed 2015. Sanctions. A year after the annexation. Published October 16. 2015. a possibility that Russian officials said would be tantamount to an act of war. Russia is still fueling a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost more than 6. Face OFF. https://www. have The oligarchs' malfeasance has deprived Russia of the private investment it needs to complete its economic transition.Econ link alt causality Russian recession not due to economic sanctions (Michael Birnbaum – Washington Post) Michael Birnbaum (Wahsington Post).washingtonpost. analysts say. March/April 2000. and he shows little sign of backing down.000 lives. The effectiveness of the sanctions is becoming a burning question as President Obama comes under growing bipartisan pressure to arm Ukraine if a shaky cease- fire falls apart. but growth decelerated after the 2008-09 global financial crisis. much of Russia’s current economic weakness has to do with the 48 percent drop in the price of oil since June. European Union and United States sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions. 2015. have become a punching bag.S.foreignaffairs. leading to further deterioration of the business and investment climate. U. However Russia’s negative output trends have deeper structural and institutional roots. According to Anatoly Chubais. the principal architect of Russia's privatization program. Some in Congress have floated cutting off Russia from the international bank-transfer system. http://bruegel. Many economists say that problems would have erupted even if there were no sanctions. They can be tracked back about a decade to when previous market-reform policies started to be reversed in favour of dirigisme. Russia needs hundreds of billions of dollars for industrial restructuring and modernization. Russia needs capital -- far more than is available from public sources. are sanctions working”. http://www. Economic sanction did not cause the Russian recession (Mark Dabrowski – Breugel) Mark Dabrowski (Breugel). the West’s primary tool to try to sway Kremlin policies. Published March 17. the West has been able to do little to alter President Vladimir Putin’s battlefield calculus. Yet private investors have abandoned . He could also ramp up sanctions. prices. and since mid- A number of short-term factors have caused recession: lower oil 2014 Russia has moved into recession. “A year into conflict with Russia. Breugel. Foreign Affairs. analysts say. The ruble is dropping. officials say. the conflict with Ukraine.html Prices are are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story. But the wave of Western penalties against the Russian economy has inadvertently given the Kremlin political cover with its own people. But most Russians are pointing their fingers toward the White House. Accessed 2015. And Russian living standards are falling a year after the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean systemic-roots-of-russias-recession/.

their legal and economic rights are abused there with consistency and impunity. . among other things.the country because.

Here in Eastern Europe. not only in Russia but other nations as well. Not Policy. 2014. Unlike Soviet communism. Month by month. Lavrov as saying. particularly in the energy sector. They want a regime change. Published September 21.State of Russia Putinism is an inherently authoritarian government system against Western interests (Richard Rahn – Center for Global Economic Growth) Richard Rahn (Center for Global Economic Growth). Russia sees no connection between sanctions imposed against it by the United States and the European Union and the deepening crisis in Ukraine. the new Russian state does not seek to direct every aspect of political and economic life. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says the West's sanctions are aimed at promoting regime change. 2015. Published November 8. Bucharest. http://www. a view that analysts warn will make compromise over Ukraine even more difficult. In a speech last week. "Western leaders publicly state that the sanctions must hurt [Russia's] economy and stir up public protests. "Many people [in official circles] believe that the sanctions package was .csmonitor. Instead.. That model can now be named: Putinism -a Russian nationalistic authoritarian form of government that pretends to be a free market democracy. 2015. that are perceived to be most beneficial to Russia's long-term interest more easily find sources of funding. The view of Russia is clear from where I am writing this. Putin returned to power in 2012 and began strongly asserting Russia's national interests. Lavrov argued even more explicitly that sanctions were part of a US-led campaign to oust Russian President Vladimir Putin rather than an effort to find peace in Ukraine . including by opposing US policies around the world. "Specific facts have been stated that signal that the unilateral sanctions introduced against us are illegitimate and undermine stability of the global economy and have nothing in common with the goal of de-escalating the Ukrainian crisis. "The West doesn’t want to change Russia’s policies. http://www. Romania. makes Russia less likely to compromise with the West over Ukraine. Pro-Putin analysts argue that even if the Ukraine crisis had not erupted.” Accessed December 22." the official Tass agency quoted Mr. 2007.. Practically nobody denies Russia-insists. Accessed December 22. Some analysts warn that this view of the sanctions." he said.. Sanctions aim to reverse Russian revisionist policies which are intended to challenge the US (Fred Weir – Christian Science Monitor) Fred Weir (Christian Science Monitor). Russia-US relations have sharply deteriorated ever since." Lavrov appears to be confirming a view many Kremlin-connected experts have been expressing for some time: that Washington has had it in for Russia ever since Mr. something else would have triggered the sanctions war against Russia. “From Communism to Putinism. plus strategic investments in both institutions and people. Russia Insists". Infrastructure projects.brusselsjournal. which is becoming increasingly ingrained. Instead it views them merely as a "destabilizing" effort to inflict damage. direct control and intimidation. through limited. "Ukraine Crisis: West's Sanctions Target Putin. President Putin of Russia has been erecting a new authoritarian model that owes more of its lineage to fascism than communism. the Kremlin seeks to ensure favorable global press and decisions beneficial to its interests from political and business leaders around the world. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told journalists Friday. it has been noticed some politicians who take a Kremlin-friendly line suddenly seem to have more campaign

" Russia is an existential nuclear threat to the West (Jacqueline Klimas – Washington Times) Jacqueline Klimas (Washington Times). Another consequence of the Kremlin's hardening view might be to make Russia far less likely to compromise with the West or Kiev as Ukraine's own internal crisis deepens. such as bolstering domestic political support for Putin and accelerating Russia's drift toward an economic alliance with China. but the activity of Russia since 2008 has been very. "There is evidence to support the view that the US has decided that Russia under Putin is a revisionist power.washingtontimes.prepared well in advance. Accessed December 25." says Mr. Vladimir Putin's Russia is becoming increasingly expansionist on the international arena. annexing the Ukrainian territory as part of Russia. http://www. But they've also had unforeseen impacts. as lawmakers questioned the wisdom of cutting an Army base in Alaska. Other spheres in which Russians have acted aggressively include their jets approaching other nations’ airspace and buzzing U. the sanctions have visibly hurt Russia's economy.S.S. I don’t know.S. “It’s an existential threat to the United States. the naming of Ukraine's eastern regions as Novorossiya (New Russia) using tsarist terminology. a leading Moscow foreign policy journal. Russian expansionist foreign . It's about containment. 2015. so it has capability. coercive creation of the Eurasian Union. "It's a very convenient pre-emptive explanation. Georgia. 2016. and has supported ethnic-Russian rebels in the eastern part of its neighbor. “Russia is the only country on earth that contains a nuclear capability that could destroy the United States. including a plunge in the ruble and a spike in inflation.”. aggressive use of Gazprom as a political tool. American Jewish Ukrainian Bureau for Human Rights). Intent. and that it should be firmly dealt with now. ArmyGen. planes and ships in acts the Pentagon called “provocative and unprofessional. Published This is my tag. http://www. faces today. the sponsorship of terrorism and separatism in Ukraine. "Since Russia doesn't believe the sanctions are connected with Ukraine.neweasterneurope. very aggressive. Milley told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing to consider his nomination to serve as the next Army chief of staff. “Military leaders name Russia as top threat to U.” Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014. the organisation of frozen conflicts in Moldova. 2015.” Gen. and anti-humanitarian (Volodymyr Valkov – Ukrainian Bureau for Human Rights) Volodymyr Valkov (New Eastern Europe Magazine. People in Moscow have come to believe that US sanctions will not be lifted for a long time. and the formulation of a right to protect Russian speakers abroad – it is not hard to find examples of Russia's aggressive expansionism. regardless of whether peace breaks out in Ukraine tomorrow. “Expansionism: The Core of Russia's Foreign Policy”. Mark Milley joined other top military brass Tuesday in naming Russia as the top threat the U. and Ukraine was the pretext for launching it. Published July 21. policy. Armenia and Azerbaijan. and we should dig in for the long haul.” Russian foreign policy is inherently authoritarian. By imposing a credit squeeze and tough curbs on technology imports. The annexation of top-threat-us/?page=all. there is no feeling of pressure to do something about it. bent on challenging US positions." he says. revival of Soviet symbolism and mythology. Lukyanov. Accessed January 15." says Fyodor Lukyanov. editor of Russia in Global Affairs. referring to the cold war policy that contributed to the eventual collapse of the USSR.

Human capital is underestimated and human life in general is one of the cheapest. uncertain as it may be. Russia continues to dwell on the glory of the Soviet Union. surpassing the fighting during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 in terms of infrastructure damage and casualties. Russia is reviving the direct geographical rivalry with the US as might be seen from the cancellation of Cuba's Soviet era debt. especially in the former Soviet republics and even more so in Ukraine. but never under Putin's regime and only if Ukraine does not fail as a democracy. That is the fear that Putin has exploited so far to steal their liberties in return for his “effective management”. Russian expansionism is directly opposed to the spread of democracy. Putin's Latin American tour and the creation of the BRICS development bank. Russian current leadership views Ukraine as part of its own “original” territory and considers Ukrainians as part of the same Russian people. invasive military and foreign policy doctrines. Putin's territorial claims. most undervalued resources in Russia. desperate to use force in order to prevent a successful democratic transformation of Ukraine. anti- European and anti-American rhetoric all suggest the following: Putin's dictatorship is Europe's greatest threat. Russian politics is run mostly by a network of former communists and ex-KGB officers. One of them is Russian facilitation of activities that expose American intelligence practices. The downing of Malaysian flight MH17 also demonstrates Russia's extremely poor judgment in creating. overcome Soviet-era corruption and build democracy. Russia seems to be particularly interested in issues that have a high potential of breaking coalitions between the United States and its European partners. The EuroMaidan is now being vilified by The Russian government is using every available opportunity the Russian puppet media as a fascist coup d’état. equipping and using terrorist groups for achieving dubious foreign policy objectives. Now. and – citing the Ukrainian example – that democracy in a weak . Russian expansionism was not clearly visible. After the economic misery of the 1990s. The Kremlin seeks to show that democracy is incompatible with the Russian tradition of government. One of the most disturbing examples of such government-sponsored Ukraine bashing was performed at the open-air show in Crimea on August 9th. Russia is still a backward country in the political. Most of the budget is spent on arms acquisition. the Russian people are distrustful of democracy. as Ukraine is making Russia is another attempt to leave Moscow's authoritarian geopolitical orbit. provocative preludes to war. anti-democratic. opposition to the US on Syria and repeated attempts at intensifying Russian- Chinese relations. to smear Ukraine's growing commitment to democracy. The list of Russian backwardness continues. distortion of history. Ukraine's resistance to Russia has led to the greatest conflict in the post-Soviet area. Ukraine's resistance to Russia’s unprovoked aggression demonstrates that the dissemination and spread of democratic values works. social and economic aspects. to intimidate the society is that of democracy itself. where Ukraine was theatrically portrayed to the audience as a having been overrun by fascist forces and later gloriously liberated by Russian troops. Democratic and European aspirations are transforming Georgia and Moldova. Until the Maidan protest that united most Ukrainians in their choice for a democratic future. They will eventually work in Russia.policy is clearly marked by anti-Americanism. Putin offers a minimum standard of living and “stability” in exchange for the Another national fear that the Russian government is manufacturing curtailment of individual freedoms. This position was presented clearly by Putin during a state-organised live TV call-in show in April 2014 as well as on many other occasions. Perhaps symbolically. and victory in the Second World War. but at this point from what we have seen happening in Ukraine due to Russian actions compellingly indicates that Russian expansionism is a very dangerous development in the international system. Democracy has succeeded in Poland and it is now changing Ukraine. incitement of inter-ethnic hatred. incapable to meet the needs of the Russian people. Today Russia's militarism has reached its highest level. Human rights do not exist in Russia and Russia's budget and export consists mainly of oil and gas revenues.

inflaming conflict areas in other parts of the world and professionalising terrorism. Crude futures are steadier. Russia's currency has gained about 4% since the start of 2015 to trade at about 58 to the U. the corrupt Russian ruling elite will continue to promote xenophobic and anti-democratic fears in the Russian society. this time presumably cleared of any Russian military supervision and the process of its distribution is also highly likely to become a source of provocation with the potential to create a pretext for the deployment of Russian military forces in buy/index. Yet Russia's stock market. It illustrates that Russia is not only at war with the West. Accessed December 29. which is said to consist of a convoy of 280 trucks. including Ukraine. The toughest European and American sanctions are absolutely justified and necessary to stop Russia from acquiring control over Ukraine. It must be clearly understood by the western countries. or any of its parts. continuing to change the map of Europe. including the illegal annexation of Crimea. That compares with the record low of 80 hit in late December. If Russia succeeds in swallowing Ukraine. The repeated attempt on August 12th to deliver humanitarian aid from Russia. but also at war with itself. That's positive for the Russian economy. Yes. currency and bonds are all bouncing higher. And it also means that the Russian- Ukrainian War is not simply a war of military muscle. but a war of values. Without a successful example of democracy in a country that most Russians can most easily relate to.cnn. Almost 70 years of Soviet communism and 44 years of Cold War did not suddenly end in 1991. really.html?iid=EL. the essence of its internal policy is isolation. The occupation of eastern parts of the Ukrainian territory is evidently on the Kremlin’s immediate agenda. The oil-dependent economy is on track for a deep recession this year. as seen from the Russian earlier unaccomplished efforts on August 9th to send “humanitarian aid” escorted by Russian troops to the areas controlled by the Russia-sponsored terrorists and separatists. Published March 31. The West must double its support for the democratisation of the former Soviet countries that are showing their interest in such values. Is the worst over for Russia? Some brave investors seem to think so and are piling back into its markets.state can bring fascists to power. Putin's regime is intent on blocking ideas and shutting down criticism not only from outside but also from its own people. by imposing its own vision of order. or parts of Ukraine. The most recent example of the disappearing freedom of expression in Russia is the law adopted in April 2014 that requires a registration of bloggers who have more than 3000 subscribers. Bond . http://money. that some parts of the population in the former Soviet republics. Helping revive the currency's fortunes has been a halt in oil's recent slide. This is the section of population that is being used by Putin in eastern Ukraine in order to sustain his expansion. enticing the people to accept dictatorship as a preferred model.S. dollar. many of whom have little or no experience of the Soviet system. it will subsequently enable Russia to impose its decision-making authority over other post-Soviet states. still feverishly hope for the restoration of some semblance of the Soviet Union. 2015.”. The democratisation of Ukraine is the most pragmatic. Clearly. “Now might be the time to buy Russia. which must be reversed. realistic and affordable long-term strategy against Russia's expansionism and authoritarian values. More sanctions in the future are very likely (Virginia Harrison – CNN Money) Virginia Harrison (CNN Money). While the core of Russia's foreign policy is expansionism. trading just below $50 a barrel as tensions in the Middle East stoke supply concerns. 2015. The internal restriction of political and civil rights provides an important insight. Another law adopted by the Russian parliament in May 2014 prescribes criminal responsibility for saying that Crimea is a part of Ukraine. After a horror year that saw the ruble roughly halve in value. which relies heavily on oil revenues. and there's a risk that the West may impose more sanctions over Ukraine.

6 million in the week to March 25. ignoring Russia as an investment destination could be shortsighted. David Hauner. Yields." Bank of America Merrill Lynch is also bullish on Russian bonds. recently picked ruble-denominated government bonds as his top bet in eastern Europe." New trade restrictions would exacerbate Russia's economic problems. are still well above where they were a year ago but the drift lower is positive. While Russia's financial markets are calmer than they were in December. Fund flows appear to support the view that sentiment is shifting. A ceasefire deal reached in February between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists remains fragile. Still. an analyst at the bank. which move in the opposite direction to bond prices. the Middle East and Africa. "It's still a very large economy with potentially very interesting opportunities." Russian stocks have brightened too. and Europe deteriorate further." Risk said.5% from 13. The stock market saw capital inflows of $ are also showing promise. The MICEX index has rallied more than 14% so far this year.perhaps triggered by the lifting of sanctions on Iran.7 million. Hauner said instability in Ukraine may be steering investors away from the "best [trade] of the year. said there is a "reasonably strong likelihood of more sanctions." said VTB Capital chief Russia economist Vladimir Kolychev. principal Russia analyst at London- based political risk firm GPW. Violence in contested eastern Ukraine appears to be receding but an escalation of fighting could trigger additional sanctions. "That's a product of broader stabilization in financial markets.5% at the start of the year. citing data from EPFR Global.S. the investment climate could sour again quickly if relations with the U. Andrew Risk. "It seems that trend is sustainable. or if oil prices resume their slide -. And past political tension between Russia and the West hadn't prevented successful investments in the past. Russian media reported. That may sound small but it's a big swing from the previous week when the markets recorded an outflow of $57. Russia's 10-year government bond yields have eased to about 11. .

R/T Neg .

and democracy and human rights do not necessarily advance hand in hand.utah. . human rights activists need to face up to the fact that human rights advocacy can set in train secessionist pressures that do threaten existing states and may make the human rights situation of ordinary people worse rather than better in the short term. Human Rights as Politics. Princeton University. 2000.R/T Human Rights Abuses Acting on human rights actually creates more human rights abuses in long term. Michael Ignatieff.pdf Beyond the speciŠcs of the Indonesian case. The painful truth is that national self-determination is not always favorable to individual human rights.

They can be strengthened or eased in order to restrain or stimulate certain actions. We are now seeing these “smart sanctions” in action against Russia. The architects of modern-day sanctions understand these issues very well and nowadays attempt a new approach: targeted sanctions against specific members of the elite. We do not know how far military activity in Ukraine would have gone otherwise. 8-13-2015. since the ceasefires and agreements negotiated in Minsk were largely the result of the sanctions. or the seizure of bank accounts and real estate assets that are It would be naïve for the West to expect the rapid elimination of the fairly unimportant for their owners. In the light of all this. The aim of the sanctions was to send a clear signal of the West’s political position and. it is no longer correct to say that the sanctions have had no effect.R/T No Change in Ukraine 1. "Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia. Yet no one ever believed this was the real goal. root cause of the sanctions—a restoration of the Russian-Ukrainian border of mid-February 2014. to try to prevent a further escalation of the conflict. The growing discontent inside the Russian elite shows that this attempt is having some effect. The sanctions are dynamic. . not static." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. There is more to this than the fact that some members of the Russian ruling class are being forced to schedule routine medical operations in Israel rather than in Germany. more importantly. Sanctions are designed to prevent aggression in the future not end current expansion – sanctions prevented further aggression and were largely responsible for ceasefires (Oleg Buklemishev – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Oleg Buklemishev.

NATO's top military commander. Kherson. Putin is making conciliatory statements. An ancillary strike may soon develop in Transdnistria. even if the full implementation of the ceasefire has not yet been achieved. but "they are definitely capable of moving into Ukraine and dramatically After Russia annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea earlier this influencing the situation in the east." Gen. "Those formations are growing every day and their capability grows every day. including propaganda campaigns and the use of separatist proxies within several countries. The renewed military buildup of recent weeks is causing unease among Western leaders. Clearly. he added. Putins Novorussia Project demanded more than just Crimea. and European Union. said Moscow is sending contradictory signals about its intent. on the other hand." Mr. who said the troops were well-equipped and capable of mounting a rapid incursion into Following Ukraine's presidential election last May won by Petro Poroshenko. the February 2015 agreement managed to decrease the intensity of the fighting in eastern Ukraine.wsj. Moscow stationed about 40." NATO officials are concerned about what they see as a sort of ambiguous or shadow warfare by Russia. we see a continuation of covert military operations and other operations in Ukraine with the aim to continue to destabilize the situation in eastern Ukraine. the level of . Moscow's motivation isn't entirely Putin’s sights are set firmly inland on This weekend’s fighting in Mariupol has already claimed thirty dead and 83 wounded. "You see a kind of a double game from the Russian http://www. 2015. "We see again a presence on the Ukrainian border by large Russian formations." year. which would allow Putin’s Russia not just to dominate the entire Black Sea northern littoral but also to expand its territory to the borders of Moldova and Romania. Kharkiv. Published July 14. Russia withdrew all troops and became conciliatory after sanctions (Naftali Bendavid – Wall Street Journal) Naftali Bendavid (Wall Street Journal).S. said last week. “Russia Increases Troop Numbers on Border With Ukraine”. as well as sanctions imposed by the Ukraine. and Russian President Vladimir Putin began making conciliatory statements toward Ukraine. Mr.2. and Mikolaiv. The American interest. Why Ukraine is Our Business. Center for Strategic and International Studies “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” October 2015 Whatever the exact incentive sanctions provided for negotiations. Ceasefire has reduced most of the fire Simond de Galbert. the cities of Odessa and Kharkiv and beyond—all places he identified before the war began as part of his “Novorossiya” project. Philip Breedlove. Donetsk. Russia withdrew almost all of those troops. They include in addition Dnepropetrovsk.000 troops along the border with Ukraine. in a speech in San Francisco. Rasmussen said. 1/26/15. U." NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The areas under threat go beyond Crimea. The fact that Putin’s expansion has stopped is enough to prove that Ukraine is better of than it would have been had Putin continued on his expansionist path. and Luhansk. and that is concerning. "but then. Andrew Michta. the military officer added. which has begun to practice mobilization bordering on the Odessa region.the-american- interest. http://www. Zaporizhia. The move was condemned by Ukrainian and Western leaders.

In addition.violence observed before the February 2015 Minsk agreement was much higher than what has been observed since then by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine. On Dec. https://www. conflict casualties decreased by 232% (Ukranian News) (Ukranian News). “UN Says Over 9.610 injured recorded in the previous quarterly report released in September. a drop of 232 percent from the previous period of May 16 to Aug. The report said that despite a high number of casualties.diary/us-could-spoil-russia-and-ukraines-delicate-compromise DOA: 1-5-16 Following a last-minute deal between Russia and Ukraine to extend the Minsk negotiations into the new year. notable changes are occurring in eastern Ukraine that hint at possible concessions made by both sides. Overall. German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a private call to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that likely led to his concession. The extension was negotiated through the Normandy Four format. the United States. require Kiev to decentralize power and require elections to take place in eastern Ukraine. adding: “I urge all sides to fully implement the Minsk agreements and to actively work to ensure the application of the rule of law and international human rights norms everywhere in Ukraine. 2016.N.24 Post-sanctions.000 Injured”. Russia and Ukraine agreed to extend the deadline for implementing the Minsk protocols . 30.198 people have been killed and more than 20. January 5. will be important to watch because Washington's support for Kiev and pressure on Moscow could stall early indications of people-killed-in-eastern-ukraine-since-last-year-more-than-20000-injured/. and thus in new casualties.N. and 971 in August 2015. 9. which call for a full return of the border between Russia and the separatist territories to Ukrainian control. The biggest player left out of the formal negotiations.000 People Killed In Eastern Ukraine Since Last Year.” said U. The extension of the deadline appears to have led to notable changes on the battlefield in eastern . Moscow pushed for the extension but Ukraine wavered. a senior U. the organization reported 413 civilian casualties that comprised of 105 deaths and 308 injured .” Ukraine conflict de-escalating now → Number of ceasefire violations fell over holidays Stratfor.000 people have been injured in fighting. 2016.000 people have lost their lives. is very welcome.883 deaths and 17. 682 in June. according to the Associated Press (AP). a “ceasefire within a ceasefire” agreed upon by Russia and Ukraine in August has According to the report. which includes France and Germany alongside Ukraine and Russia. the reduction in hostilities. official involved in the report. with the SMM reporting 373 ceasefire violations in May. 15. just before the four leaders involved in the talks held their phone call. 178 civilian casualties largely held and contributed to a decrease in the number of casualties. up from 7. More Than 20. Published December 10. 16 and Nov. “After more than 9. — 47 deaths and 131 wounded — were recorded between Aug. “This increase of almost 1. according to the AP. Accessed January 16. 15. http://ukrnews. human rights chief Zeid Raad al-Hussein. The US could spoil Russia and Ukraine’s delicate especially the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. there continue to be daily violations of the ceasefire. despite the restrictions imposed locally on the SMM’s access and freedom of movement. However. disputing the requirement for elections in eastern Ukraine and pointing out the continued cease-fire violations in the region. 2015. adding: “We tried to bring the figures … in line with available information at the present time. French President Francois Hollande indicated after the four-party call that elections are part of the agreement.200 killed and over 3. However.000 injured is because of the counting that is made by official authorities.stratfor.” said Gianni Magazzeni.” Clashes in Eastern Ukraine have been ongoing between pro-Russian rebels demanding secession and government forces. 871 in July. In the May-August period.

cease-fire violations have decreased significantly. . There had been a relative increase in the exchange of fire following the breakdown of the withdrawal process.Ukraine. but over the holidays the number of incidents dropped from more than 50 per day to about a dozen a day. During the past week.

remains a revolutionary nation seeking to transform the region and to bolster the sway of fellow Shiites all the way to Lebanon and Yemen. Published 10/22/15. 2016. “So are Russia and Iran best buddies now? Um. let alone the elimination of the state of Israel. For example. Iran. Iran is now competing with Russia in the global energy markets. where as much as 15% of the population are Sunni Muslims. Iranian officials openly call for regime change in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf cage/wp/2015/11/12/so-are-russia-and-iran-best-buddies-now-um-maybe-not/. Even though Russia supported United Nations sanctions against Iran in 2010. a leading expert in Russia-Middle East relations at the Carnegie Moscow Center. don’t agree on Syria policy (Yaroslav Trofimov – Wall Street Journal) Yaroslav Trofimov (Wall Street Journal). the Iran nuclear deal is a net loss for Russia for two reasons. For Moscow. Published November 12. isn’t something that appeals to Russia.washingtonpost. Assad as establishing a precedent that Egypt. 2016.R/T Iran Pivot Russia ≠ leverage over Iran. such as the need to secure its naval facility on the Syrian coast. Second. maybe Russia has lost its diplomatic leverage over Iran. Russian economists fear that Iran’s increased production will keep oil prices low for years longer than expected. Accessed January 15. Iran’s way of operating in Iraq. further regime changes would no longer be tolerated—a message intended as much for the West as for opponents of President Vladimir Putin at home. This diversification has not been met with approval from anti-Western hawks in the Kremlin’s inner circle. sees Russia as competition A) Iranian Trade deals with the west B) Iran competes with Russia in global energy market (Samuel Ramani – The Washington Post) Samuel Ramani (The Washington Post). Russia’s only outlet in the Mediterranean Sea. Lebanon—and now in Syria—is to weaken these states by building up proxy Shiite militias. So it’s hardly surprising that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov enthusiastically praised the nuclear spite the trade benefits.”. however. by contrast.wsj. in some regions with a history of unrest. 2015. the Syrian war fits into its global strategy of creating a “multipolar” world in which Russia would re-emerge as one of the key powers alongside a declining America. the Kremlin has been consistently critical of damaging effects on sanctions on the Iranian economy and has emphasized the need for the West to end Iran’s international isolation. https://www. That’s the conclusion of Alexei Malashenko. who recently told me that that’s because Russia is no longer needed to mediate between Iran and the West. De-link: Iran and Russia cannot work together. First. which makes Russia less important to Iran. Following this logic. “Can Russia’s New Iran Alliance Last?”. . Accessed January 15. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin uncharacteristically refused to comment on the nuclear deal. Stoking sectarian strife. Tehran doesn’t care about Moscow anymore. The Kremlin is focused on preventing “color revolutions” and regime changes such as those in Ukraine or Moscow views propping up Mr. Second come Moscow’s other considerations. http://www. Iran has now signed multi-billion dollar trade deals with Europe and with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

That revealed how deeply divided Russian elites were about the credibility of Iran’s nuclear plans. maybe not”.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/12/so-are- russia-and-iran-best-buddies-now-um-maybe-not/. . as an act of imperial hubris. through provocative actions like a 2011 lawsuit against the Russian government over its decision to suspend S-300 missile shipments. In 2012. 2016.’s expanded influence in Central Asia. Mark Katz.History of distrust between Iran and Russia (Samuel Ramani – Washington Post) Samuel Ramani (Washington Post). But Russia-Iran cooperation polarized each country’s elites because of their long-standing distrust for one another. Both countries opposed Turkey’s strategy in the Middle East and the U. the country had a tense relationship with the Soviet Union. Igor Rodinov. This distrust showed up in a number of ways. leading Russia to cut assistance to the project. sold arms to Iran. In 1996. Russia’s relationship with Iran thawed. Accessed January 15. Putin denied that Iran had nuclear aspirations while Medvedev said in 2010 that Iran was close to producing a nuclear bomb. a professor of politics at George Mason University and a noted expert on Russia-Middle East relations. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The USSR supported Iraq during the After Iran’s 1979 revolution. Iranian elites saw Russia as imperial and arrogant. “So Are Russia and Iran best buddies now? Um.S. After the Soviet Union collapsed. This animosity stemmed from Iran’s opaque military buildup and Russia’s historic ambitions of enveloping Iran within its sphere of influence. Putin expressed concern that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Middle East — making it clear that Russian support for Iran could evaporate if it developed a nuclear bomb. Russia’s defense minister under Boris Yeltsin. Iran made clear that it opposed Russia’s disapproval. That’s because Iran and Russia shared some geopolitical interests. and by the mid-1990s was actively helping Iran in the development of its nuclear program. https://www. argues that Iran viewed Russia’s insistence that it be Iran’s only supplier of uranium. as it feared an Iranian victory would spread Khomeini’s Islamist ideology across the Middle East. Russia expanded commercial ties. In 2009. Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev took opposite points of view about Iran’s nuclear program. Published 11/12/15. A 2003 Ministry of Defense report revealed Russia’s disdain for Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In turn.washingtonpost. listed Iran as a country whose military buildup could threaten the post-Soviet region that had recently formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian elites saw Iran as untrustworthy.

with the exception of energy ties. which depicts the West as decadent and hell-bent on destabilizing Russia and bringing about regime change. Russian trade and economic deals with China will not the Ukraine crisis. needs to pursue a strategy. Moscow.delink . something that Poland has been doing for the past few years to try to puncture Russia’s state propaganda. That won’t lead to change. It is as if populism.R/T China Pivot 1 . August 2014. Europe. Putin boasted that his decision to ban the import of certain European products in retaliation for EU sanctions would be to Russia’s benefit. Georgia or Moldova.S. The U. Published December 18. the best-case scenario is a relationship that. but not very deep. meanwhile. 2015. And reverse the decline. http://www. economists and academics. .themoscowtimes. Russia could easily compensate by relying on its own agricultural produce and other The main reason the Kremlin has been trumpeting ties with the Chinese during the Ukraine crisis is not because officials believe that China will help directly.html neither country is in a position to The most important cause for skepticism about a stronger Chinese-Russian entente is that play a primary role in helping the other accomplish its core goals. in the meantime. But instead of using Western sanctions to introduce reforms and loosen the state’s grip on the economy and modernize the country’s infrastructure. Russia has let the opposite happen. Accessed December 25.newsweek. In both areas. cannot reverse decline (Judy Dempsey – Newsweek) Judy Dempsey (Newsweek). 2015. despite the ever-increasing costs of delaying them. and not by building new pipelines for Russian gas. http://www. only reason Russia shifted to China was to get leverage in negotiations with the West Christopher Miller. “Russia Can’t Replace the West with China”. “Lifting Sanctions Against Russia Would Be a Terrible Mistake”. is broad and visible. Yet China has little interest in Ukraine. Europe and Asian countries will be far more important to China's economic development than Russia will.. Europe’s strategy needs to focus on expanding as much as possible scholarships for terrible-mistake-407061. aimed at the younger generation and at Russia’s pockets of civil society and centered on soft power. Don't expect the Kremlin to agree to that. Russia can play a role. however much the Kremlin tries to promote the idea that it does not need the West and can find a savior in China. Instead. but only a minor one. and is unlikely to get seriously involved. From Russia's perspective. but because the appearance of closer ties gives Moscow greater leverage in negotiations with the West. Few other analysts believe that Putin will embark on domestic reforms. the European approach should involve something more sustained. is currently focused on its western frontier. A full alliance with Beijing holds little appeal in Moscow because Russia would be the junior partner. China's main aims are to safeguard economic growth at home and expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. R/T Offsets Sanctions Impact Turning to China will not compensate for losses from US trade via sanctions. Europe should pursue youth exchanges. the Kremlin maintained. More worrying for an economy that relies on oil and gas exports to maintain growth—exports whose prices are at record lows—is the creeping stagnation that began before as Guriev argues.they can’t help each other with large scale goals. bravado and the rejection of globalization were substitutes for growth. The Moscow Times.

com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/22/russian-energy-sector-struggles- as-u-s-and-europe-tighten-sanctions/ The biggest victim of the energy sector sanctions so far has been a plan for three natural gas pipelines to China.washingtonpost. or economically influential than they are now. https://www. EU trade still much higher and set to stay that way Andre Yakunin. even though in the first half of 2015 alone it still totalled $30. And neither would mind being more politically. Should Russia look East or West for Economic Presoperity. May 2014. Russian energy sector struggles as U. Vox News. trade from Russia to China has actually fallen steadily over the past three years. which currently relies heavily on exports to . Delink – Gas Deal Fell Appart. but there's little evidence either China or Russia wants that. undermining the rationale for the pipeline. Again.Nope. New Europe. both countries would like to be the big dog in their respective spheres of influence. But neither has shown any interest in helping out with the other's border conflicts. they have been postponed.No evidence of any other alliances. The Russian pivot to China was supposed to open up a major new market for Russia. these statistics bely the reality on Sino-Russian trade is not likely to surpass the total trade between Europe and the ground that Russia or even reach a level of parity in the immediate future. That's . 1-5-16. 2015. it turns out that neither China nor Russia really has it in their interests to form a military alliance. A non-aggression pact. militarily. While it is true that trade with the EU has also declined. perhaps for years . Steven Mufson The Washington Post. and another thing altogether to want to remake the world security order.6bn. “The big problems in the Russia-China relationship can’t be solved by a gas deal”. True. But it's one thing to be regionally expansionist. as Russia and China are. Although the deals haven’t been scuttled. According to the Russia-China investment fund. An increase in worldwide natural gas supplies and liquefied natural gas facilities has cut the global price of natural gas in half during the past year.russia-look-east-or-west-for-economic-prosperity/ DOA: 1-5-16 The idea that Russia and China’s economic relationship is a seamless alignment of natural allies should therefore be brought into question.vox. or if they wanted to work together in some act of aggression beyond the propaganda value of talking about an Neither Russia nor China have really strong reasons to be allies anti-American alliance. R/T Gas Deal 1 .Nonunique . 2 .probably needed more oil buyers anyway in wake of global decline in oil prices 2. mutual defense treaty. between the two because they don’t really care Zack Beauchamp. Dec 22nd. both state medias like to talk about challenging the world order.S. or any other kind of alliance would only be useful if either country was at imminent risk of invasion (they're not). political or military. http://www. A Russia-China alliance only really makes sense as a full-scale challenge to the American-led world order: an enemy-of-my-enemy is my friend kind of deal. http://neurope. and Europe tighten sanctions.

Defensive allies reduce chance of war by 28% → China will exert pacifying influence on Russia Brett 2003. the stance of cooperation rather than confrontation is obviously a much wiser one to take.pdf This is easiest to see by examining the bar graph pictured in Figure 1.Reduces Conflict with Russia because China acting as an intermediary Larisa Smirnova. 07>. Russia and the World: Foreign Policy Outlook 2016. available for purchase at Russia-direct. Washington has an opportunity to pursue limited engagement with Moscow in the Asia-Pacific. as long as the confrontation over Ukraine does not become the basis for a global stand-off on the model of the Cold War. <http://csis. Web.Asian pivot gives U.S. Russia’s As it turns out. notably China. Russia and China haven't built deep diplomatic partnerships or economic links. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes”. Doing so would allow the United States to maintain a working relationship with Russia at a time when tensions over Ukraine threaten to unleash a protracted Such engagement can also help address some of Asia’s major security confrontation in Europe. The first bar shows that target state has an ally committed to its defense. Midwest Political Science Association. 2A . 2B . challenges. territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. has never amounted to much of a politico-military organizing group China Pivot Good 1 . Even as the United States and Russia continue to spar over European and Eurasian security. http://atop. “Russia’s resulting support for maintaining balance and stability in Asia is largely compatible with U. interests in the region. 2 DOA: 1-6-16 it is actually in the best interests of the West to encourage. One of the closest things to a formal bond in those realms. Russian International Affairs Council. the influence of China as an intermediary can be extremely instrumental in reaching this goal. 2015. December 2015. At a point when international politics has reached a dangerous phase of a shifting balance of power. cooperation with the Asian nations.rice. There are no reasons for the West to either be apprehensive of the successes or applaud the potential failures of Russia’s Asia pivot. This figure shows the percentage change in the probability of dispute when a initiation that can be attributed to outside allies when all other variables are held at their mean values.. Even assuming that the main goal of Western policy makers is to contain Russia’s unilateral belligerence (real or perceived). since the end of the Cold War. rather than fear. N. the probability of dispute initiation is 28% . 2015. including the nuclear stand-off on the Korean Peninsula.part of why. the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Rice University. and engage it back into the politics of compromise.S. better opportunities to engage Russia diplomatically and improve relations "Russia's Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation?" Center for Strategic and International Studies.

the probability of dispute initiation is 47% higher than it is in the case in which neither the challenger nor the target has any allies committed to intervene. . in this instance.lower than the probability of dispute initiation in a dyad with the mean characteristics in the dataset but no outside allies. The second bar represents the case in which the challenger has an offensive ally.

Moscow helped out its protégé. most of all. with deceived by these strong-arm tactics: diplomacy and military aid. fear of populist uprisings. like a power grab. (Putin's Syria strategy is also unlikely to be very effective: Propping up Assad and partnering with Shia Hezbollah and Iran seems likely to worsen the sectarianism and anti-Assad sentiment that is driving much of the war.) To understand how Putin sees Syria. Accessed 12/10. Fear of anarchy.dw. The Kremlin has raised the stakes in Syria by building an air force base in Latakia and firing several cruise missiles from battleships. Published 9/22/15. 2. and fear that he himself could succumb to these forces. But no one should be even before that.R/T Support to Syria 1. and then his call at the United Nations for a global "anti-Hitler coalition" to fight ISIS there. Russian President Vladimir Putin's military intervention in Syria. http://www. or a coup. http://www. “Putin's Syria intervention isn't grand. can certainly look. brilliant strategy.economist. have been pushing back the border of the small statelet he still controls (small geographically. ALT Causality A) To keep Assad from shifting his alliance towards Iran B) It finally started to look like Assad was losing. fear of Western meddling. by Why is Russia doing this just now? Explanations are various and there will be several parts to the answer. that might in the worst case deprive bulk of Syria’s dwindling population. would be risking Russia’s only ally in the middle east C) Tartus Military base (Economist) (Economist). As a permanent member of the UN Security Council. His intervention in Syria is most likely driven not by boldness but by reactiveness and. 2015. Deutsche Welle Opinion: Putin's 'Syria card' in the Ukraine conflict. that is: it still comprises the Fear of a collapse. One is simply that over the summer it genuinely started to look as though Mr Assad was losing. Putin's boldness seems like a sign that President Obama's passivity has allowed the Russian leader to run roughshod over US interests in the Middle East — particularly to hawks already frustrated that the US has refused to do more in Syria. It's an act of fear. Why Russia is increasing its military presence in Syria. Some reports suggest that Tartus is being expanded. from the American perspective. 2016. Published September 30. as well as other less extreme opposition groups. Ingo Mannteufel. Putin’s Syria strategy is a sign of weakness and fear () (Amanda Taub – Vox) Amanda Taub (Vox News). Russia was propping up Assad beforehand. At worst. to be able to take the largest Russian ships. fear of any weakening of strong government rule.) Russia of its naval base at Tartus. will have been genuine. Russia’s means have shifted. 2D. http://www. But don't be taken in by Putin's carefully cultivated image of strength and decisiveness. the only military facility Russia still controls outside the former Soviet Union. 1/3/16.vox. fear/in/9204014. And Russian airstrikes aren't likely to rally Syria ns around Assad. Assad. Yet Russia's power in the Syrian war should not be overestimated . and why he's getting himself into .” Accessed January 16. Russia has certainly always possessed enough means to put stumbling blocks in the way of the West's foreign policy.

and each helicopter $3. The figures by IHS Jane's show that bombing raids. 2016. according to the Defense Ministry. Each warplane costs $12. Russian air strikes in Syria are costing Moscow up to $4 million per day. is temporary (Peter Hobson – The Moscow Times) Peter Hobson (The Moscow Times). some 36 Russian warplanes and 20 attack helicopters have flown around 40 sorties per day for the past three weeks. Russian involvement could dramatically escalate.500-2. De-Links Russia can’t afford to take on additional costs and fight another war (Amanda Taub – Vox) Amanda Taub (Vox News). Published September 30. or. supplied via naval and air transport through the Black Sea and Iranian and Iraqi airspace.000 per hour.vox. That was a huge boost to Putin's popularity. Syria adventure costs Russia $4M per war-in-syria/540015. Russia's economy is already struggling. 2015.html. 2015. supply runs. how it led him to misunderstand the West — and why both Libya and Syria are the sum of many of his worst foreign policy fears. 30. that is small change. Published October 20. Russians' skepticism of Putin's Syria policy is especially stark when contrasted with the overwhelmingly positive response to his actions in Ukraine. new war will be an expensive additional burden. you have to understand how he looks at Libya. Precise data is scarce. and if soldiers problem/in/9204014. that could damage public opinion even further. Accessed January 16. but media reports say servicing and protecting the air force are around 1. worse.1 trillion ruble ($50 billion) defense budget this year. infrastructure and ground personnel — along with a salvo of cruise missiles fired into the conflict zone — have cost Russia $80 million-$115 million since strikes began on Sept. strafing targets belonging to rebel groups and the jihadists of the Islamic State. 2016. A handful of warships in the eastern Mediterranean adds extra reinforcement.000 per hour to fly. Accessed January 16. http://www. “Putin has a big problem in Syria that no one is talking about”. helping his regime weather Russia's 2014 economic problems with high public support. . data collated for The Moscow Times by a defense think tank showed. http://www. the lessons he drew from its collapse. If Russia's presence in Syria makes its forces a target of terrorist attacks there. according to IHS. Analysts warn that the conflict in Syria could drag on for years. But the Kremlin could see its costs and commitments grow .themoscowtimes.this mess. “Calculating the Cost of Russia's War in Syria”. cost is increasing unsustainably. and a But Putin's public opinion problems on Syria could be just the beginning. if it coincides with attacks at home. Flying out of an airbase in territory controlled by Syrian President Bashar Assad.000 personnel on the ground. Compared to Russia's 3.

perhaps Russia will build it out into a larger invasion that really can change the overall trajectory of the have plummeted from highs that until last year helped fill the Kremlin’s coffers and gave it the wherewithal to pursue an aggressive. and quietly sneak in enough military equipment to radically alter the military balance on the ground.S. "Europe: Caught Between Islamic Terrorism and Russian Imperialism. expensive. Sanctions could turn Russia’s bombing into an ally in the fight against ISIS (Moises Naim – The Atlantic) Moises Naim. Putin desperately needs the EU and U. then. it is not really feasible for Russia to significantly increase the size of its force and thus escalate its position in Syria. Some of the commentary on Russia's intervention has expressed concern that although the initial force is relatively small.vox. It’s not surprising.html In late September. but that typically requires flying over countries that bar such flights. and the Russian government needs it to rise to $105 to balance its budget.Russia is geographically incapable of escalating conflict. http://www. Putin will travel to New York for the first time in 10 years to address the United Nations General Assembly. http://www. “With Stepped-Up Syrian Intervention.newsweek. But geography will get in the way of that. They have already cost the Russian economy more than 1 percent of its GDP. going to address the issue of does matter on its that Putin is interested in doing whatever is necessary to eliminate Western sanctions. Accessed January 16. which (along with sinking oil prices) caused the Russian Foreign Minister economy to shrink by over 4 percent last year. and thus pressuring the Kremlin to abandon its attempts to “recover” the country—a relatively good outcome could be fashioned from . oil and gas. 12-8-2015. according to spokesman Dmitry Peskov. It will be his first appearance there since the Russian annexation of Crimea last February and the war in Eastern Ukraine that followed it." Atlantic. while this deployment difficult. Published September 30. to ease sanctions—and Sergei Lavrov hinted in talks with U. do not expect Russia to do what it did in Ukraine. Putin Is Playing a Greater Game. http://www. this would be In other But these leaders may be overlooking what is perhaps the main determinant of the less combative Putin now on display: The price of Russia’s main exports. which resulted in the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines MH-17 and draconian international sanctions against Russia. He’s also. Russia cannot ship the equipment there via its navy without being spotted as it passes through Turkey. Logistically. “Putin's military intervention in Syria. 2015. 9-18-2015. Oil that once sold at more than $100 a barrel is now at less than $60. if it's even within Russian capabilities. Secretary of State John Kerry in Doha in August that Russia will trade cooperation in Syria for the scrapping sanctions. especially without the West finding out (Max Fisher – Vox) Max Fisher (Vox News). explained”. If Europe stays united—ensuring that sanctions on Russia are preserved until there is a credible and durable ceasefire in Ukraine. Russian military flights to Syria have to get there somehow. and time-consuming. All indications are that Putin will use the speech to cast himself as a peacemaker in Syria—and in the process try to restore Russia’s position as a pillar of world security. 2016.theatlantic. and even if it wanted to move in its equipment in broad daylight.” Newsweek. TURNS Sanctions coerce Russia to cooperate in Syria (Owen Matthews – Newsweek) Owen Matthews. fiercely independent foreign policy.

Hasakeh. Russia’s inclusion in the fight against ISIS appears to have made a significant dent in the terror group’s ambitions to build a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. towns and villages in Syria were liberated from ISIS control in 2015 and thus far in 2016.ibtimes. chief of the main operations department of the Russian General Staff. Published January 11. according to a top Kremlin general. Homs. Idlib. Russian airstrikes in 2016 help fight ISIS (Christopher Harress – International Business Times) Christopher Harress (International Business Times). http://www. said Rudskoy.S. Lieutenant General Sergey Rudskoy. Russian air force jets had hit military infrastructure. a Russian news site based in Moscow. “Russia Airstrikes in 2016: Thousands of ISIS Targets Hit By Moscow’s Jets This Year”. "In December 2015. Accessed January 14. according to a report by Tass. That wouldn’t be so bad. and areas where militant military equipment was kept. "While U. Hama. even as the West gains an important ally in the fight against the Islamic State. 2016." said Rudskoy. Damascus. hundreds of cities.a welter of conflict: Putin’s imperialistic adventurism in Europe could be contained. . and its coalition partners began airstrikes more than a year ago. 2016. Deraa and Raqqa. oil producing and processing facilities. reportedly said. Russia has already conducted more than 1. Deir airstrikes-syria-2016-thousands-isis-targets-hit-moscows-jets-year-2259339 . As a result. militants were driven from 134 cities and towns and from 19 settlements more in the first days of the new year. Latakia.000 airstrikes in Syria this year amid a continued push to beat the Islamic State group.097 facilities in the provinces of Aleppo. "A total of 311 sorties have been made over the first 10 days of 2016 during which strikes were delivered at 1.

In a culture especially used to compartmentalizing public and private personas. The most recent poll by the Moscow-based Levada Center reports a staggering 89 percent approval rating for the Russian president. support is much lower than polls indicate. one year later. Amanda Azinheira (US News). “Not Mr. a public opinion poll doesn't necessarily represent what's being said at home among friends. 2 – Putin’s willingness to murder political figures has instilled fear in his population that skews his polls in his favor.”.europa. and fear certainly plays a role in influencing public opinion. was required to register as a "foreign agent" under recent laws cracking down on Russian report/2015/07/21/putins-high-poll-numbers-dont-mean-hes-popular. The bombing campaign by NATO against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 led to a brief boost in his popularity. making Russians far more leery of voicing their discontent to a "foreign agent" on the other end of the particularly in their initial phases. has demonstrated that nothing can hold him down. refused to acknowledge defeat and was eventually ousted amidst street protests. the accusation doubtless detracted from its legitimacy. Western policymakers might it's important to consider the environment in which these polls want to inquire whether he truly is.R/T Putin Approval Rating 1 – TURN Leaders in crises often experience short term gains from rally round the flag effect. But he lost. European Union Institute for Security Studies. is reinforcing the rally-round-the-flag effect and ensuring that the Russian president’s approval ratings remain high – at International crises often strengthen leaders in the short term least for now. Accessed December 25. http://www. Some of them – including the Russian and Habsburg empires – collapsed just a few years later. stemming from its Soviet origins as jargon to describe foreign spies. and he even called an early presidential election in 2000 with the hope of cementing another term. paradoxically. not just politicians. Yet this is nothing unusual. Putin's government has a firm grasp of the power of intimidation.iss. As Vladimir Putin's international image continues to decline. were taken. Levada. reached an all-time high. Your answer might not accurately reflect your actual views. Here. Examples abound: in 1913 Russia celebrated with great pomp and much public display of unity 300 years of the Romanov dynasty. but this declines over time. The term has a particularly negative connotation among Russians. in spite of a stumbling economy. shot. Wars themselves. While Levada bravely refused to register. Or take the case of Serbia’s former president Slobodan Milosevic. http://www. Published July 21. To add to the fear. Within less than four years. 2015. In a country where a prominent political figure can be murdered steps from the seat of government without consequence. The belief propagated by the Russian media that the country is at war. imagine receiving a telephone call from a stranger asking whether or not you support the current leadership. the polling agency that released the results of the latest public opinion poll. But instead of asking themselves exactly how Russia's leader remains on top.usnews. Popularity: There's more than meets the eye to Putin's sky-high poll numbers. . when Russian nationalism was at an all time high four years before the people overthrew the tsar Nicu Popescu. the Tsar was toppled and. The outbreak of the First World War was heralded with a wave of jingoism in many European states. only to doom them at a later stage. it seems. declining living standards.pdf One of the main arguments against sanctions is that they have bolstered Putin domestically. October 2015. his domestic popularity has. rampant corruption and deepening international isolation. 2015. can also be popular. “Sanctions and Russia: Lessons from the Cold War”. Nicu Popescu of the European Union for Security Studies gives the example of 1913. In reality. Putin.

but almost none doubts that it is genuinely high.3 – Support for the government and its policies is declining in the sqou." http://www. “Not Mr. but 14 points higher than when Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. "Lowdown: What Russian Citizens Really Think of Putin and Why. it's only a matter of time before the Russian public breaks free of Putin's report/2015/07/21/putins-high-poll-numbers-dont-mean-hes-popular. 07 Dec. 2015.000 left Russia) and 2014 (when 200. meanwhile. for example. Mr Putin may also be reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside think-putin-why-13933>. causing intellectual brain drain on a massive scale.p. 3C) – TURN: 75% of Russians want better relations with the West. 12-8-2015. Accessed December 25. and surging five-fold between 2011 (when 37. When it does.000 did). nor is the government’s. nor are fly in the ointment is that those of government Mr Putin may simply be reading the weather. The no other politician’s ratings are half as high. are voting with their feet.usnews. N. http://www. today. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds that 75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. 2015. Many of Putin's critics. Those that can't. What's more. (Amanda Azinheira – US News) Amanda Azinheira (US News). this sense of Putin’s leadership as the best guarantee of continued stability helps to explain Putin’s popularity. 2015. together with the strong tendency to blame Russian woes on the United States. Facing a bleak economic and political future.nationalinterest. "As Russia’s economy shrinks. but the sentiment persists and the 85 percent support for the annexation has scarcely budged since March 2014). The country's soaring emigration rate amounts to a resounding vote of no confidence in Putin's Russia by those who can afford to leave. do their best to stay on the Kremlin's good side.. Russia’s economy is in a precarious state. still pressure to back down Robert Levgold. Web. Already. as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: “By changing nothing. Nonetheless. The National Interest. Popularity: There's more than meets the eye to Putin's sky-high poll numbers. 25 Sept. understanding that further antagonism will only hurt their economy more (The Economist) Economist. Many Russians will tell you that it is not really at 83 percent.” 3B) people are fleeing Putin faster than ever before. Published July 21. 2015. although approval of the direction in which the country is headed last month was 55 percent.". Vladimir Putin softens his tone.”. the outside world will get a chance to see just how popular Russia's president truly is. But this state of affairs won't persist forever. emigration from Russia has reached its highest point since the 1990s. we will simply run out of reserves . rising inflation and soaring commodity prices are beginning to generate discontent on the Russian street. those leaving tend to be part of Russia's educated middle and upper-middle class. <http://www. down nine points from June. “Added to the deepening and spreading sense of nationalism (the “krim nash” [“Crimea is ours”] tee-shirts are less on display.economist. empirical indicators of the true state of Russian society can still be found . as the polls show.

focusing on the economy. Ukraine was not mentioned. 8th December 2015.and the economic growth rates will linger around zero. Mr Putin may also be reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. despite media control.” The economic hardship is beginning to hit groups normally loyal to the Russian leadership. dictatorship in which whatever he says goes. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds that 75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. Putin’s actions in Ukraine are best understood through the lens of his domestic political Russia is not a simple In light of all this. Putin softening anti-western rhetoric in annual address. The Economist. Mr Putin may simply be reading the weather. http://www.” read the banner on one lorry in southern Russia. we will simply run out of reserves and the economic growth rates will linger around zero. “As Russia’s economy shrinks. The drivers have come out against a new toll system for heavy cargo on federal highways. Crimea appeared only briefly. Henry Hale. but the shift in tone was notable. The Gaurdian Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlin’s Actions on Ukraine. They also object to the fact that the man paid to run the system is Igor Rotenberg. The USSR and eastern Central Europe show that control over media cannot by itself generate support for a regime. Russia’s economy is in a precarious state. “Rotenberg is worse than ISIS (Islamic State). . 2014. 4.” IPMACT: Policy change because public opinion is still incredibly important in Russia. August 29th. Stability there depends heavily on public support for the leadership. one of Mr Putin’s oldest cronies. No one expects the Kremlin to make an about-face in its opposition to the West. http://www. as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: “By changing economy-shrinks-vladimir-putin But most of the speech was more pacific.economist. and social issues. Anti-Americanism was nearly absent. Vladimir Putin softens his tone”. the son of Arkady Rotenberg. the need to prepare for low oil prices. A nationwide protest by lorry drivers has been slowly rolling across Russia since mid-November. no matter what.

the holding company that runs a number of media assets for Putin's close friend Yury Kovalchuk. Moscow has no doubt been very effective in mounting guerrilla-marketing campaigns aimed at sowing doubt and confusion in the West. In the regions most favorably inclined toward Russia—Asia and Africa—it’s just 37 percent. decided to cut between 15 and 30 percent of its staff. 2016. But guess what? to the world. it’s only 29 percent. Putin’s is dismal. The government-owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta. including 15 to 17 percent of the employees of Lifenews. which holds the monopoly on the official publication of new laws and government decrees. after all this. “Putin's Propaganda Industry Tightens Its Belt”. after unleashing armies of trolls to disrupt Western news sites. a median of just 30 percent of respondents viewed Russia favorably. the Russian government is sequestering the 2015 budget to cut spending by 10 percent. In Europe. just 26 percent view Russia favorably. only three countries in the world have a net positive opinion of Russia: China. Worldwide. 2016. the TV channel that has carried some of the most powerful domestically-targeted propaganda on the Ukraine crisis. News Media. Published January 2015. tightens-its-belt. According to the Pew Research Center’s new report. Published 8/12/15. Dmitry Peskov. is letting go 10 percent of its staff. just 15 percent do. Russia’s global image is in the toilet. “Putin Gets Caught in His Own Trap”. the entity that runs a Russian-language news agency that competes with TASS. after launching the most widespread disinformation campaign since the end of the Cold War. In Latin America. In Europe.R/T Propaganda 1: Non unique: incentive for Putin to prop up nationalism exists without sanctions 2: TURN: Financial Sanctions have harmed the government’s budget: money to finance propaganda cut by 10% Leonid Bershidsky (Bloomberg). just 24 percent trust him. only 25 percent do.” And the numbers are dismal across the board. 3. and Ghana. http://www. Writing in Bloomberg View. in the Middle East. Government-financed media are not exempt from the cut. And Russian officials have been skillful in manipulating and surreptitiously influencing media narratives on issues like the war in Ukraine and the After spending nearly half a billion dollars to get its message out downing of flight MH17. And if Russia’s global image is bad. At some point Russia will have to wake up to reality: Propaganda has caused the entire world to turn against Putin (Brian Whitmore – The Atlantic) Brian Whitmore (The Atlantic). political commentator Leonid Bershidsky quipped that “the money might be spent just as wisely buying more $600. they received official word from the finance ministry that their funding will be reduced by 10 percent.000 watches for Putin’s press secretary. Accessed January 15. TASS is only the latest propaganda outlet to make cuts. http://www. Vietnam. Last week. This concerns the national TV channels and Russia Today. a Russian radio station and an international TV operation under the RT brand. .com/international/archive/2015/08/putin-russia-ukraine-energy/401003/. Accessed January 15. Faced with a steep drop in oil revenues.

In 21st century America. and therefore predictable. U. Western politicians have consistently denounced the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin. History has proven that the West is much more effective at ousting dictators than at building democracies. Do Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria violate international laws? Yes. We dominate the Western Hemisphere and are isolated on both sides by water for thousands of miles. Published January 2. presents a serious threat to Russian interests. the truth is that Russia’s behavior is highly pragmatic. Putin reacted like any rational actor would in his position. Such rhetoric is misleading. But our rivalry with Russia is nothing unique or personal. the contention that all states pursue power to maximize security contradicts the narrative of exceptional America. it is difficult to think of security as a scarce commodity. most powerful military on the planet. Despite fears of terrorism and weapons proliferation. and that conflict is therefore inevitable. a country with the moral authority to institutionalize freedom and fight injustice. Russia. United States and Russian relations have taken a dangerously negative turn in recent years. Russia is a security issues dominate Moscow’s political discourse. Our navy controls the seas and.” international relations scholar John Mearsheimer articulates the theory of offensive realism. we tend not to view the world through the lens of power politics because it clashes with our identity as a benevolent nation. The implication is that states must acquire power in order to ensure their survival. In the Donbass region. 2016.S. Rationalism > nationalism. officials have repeatedly called for regime change in Damascus without providing a feasible alternative to Assad.” and making provocative comparisons to Adolf Hitler.S. But security. the international trade routes upon which the global economy depends. Should the U. but rational”. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Putin has demonstrated that he is willing and able to support a bloody and protracted civil war in order to prevent NATO from incorporating Ukraine into the alliance. expensive. Vladimir Putin’s conduct of international relations prioritizes security above all other objectives. still rules the day in international politics. acts in its own self-interest to enhance its chances of survival.R/T Nationalism 1. he sent troops into Crimea to secure vital military assets. The 2014 Ukrainian coup d’état brought to power Western-backed political factions who. as Putin has publicly and consistently declared. Tensions erupted initially in Ukraine and more recently in Syria. like virtually all other states in history. and we must not allow moral indignation or blind antagonism to do further damage to a vital strategic . to deter threats in Russia’s geopolitical backyard. by extension. Russia is deeply concerned by Western actions. The U. and even brutal tactics. http://amarillo.S. not morality. In Syria. continue to oppose them? aggressive-rational. almost certainly would have kicked the Russian naval fleet out of the Crimean base at Sevastopol. possesses the largest. Accessed January 16. America enjoys an unprecedented level of security in an anarchic world. where Russian air strikes against moderate rebels are impeding Western efforts to combat Islamic State. given the opportunity. As Americans. NATO/EU expansion different story. We have abundant natural resources and the strongest economy in the world. Putin is extremely pragmatic and predictable (James Walker – Texas A&M University) James Walker (Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University). The core assumption of this theory is that the world is anarchic — that there is no global governing power that constrains states’ behavior. our differences in Ukraine and Syria are interest-based. labeling him “delusional. 2016. and he is willing to use aggressive. “Walker: Russian actions are aggressive. No country has the capacity to invade or conquer the United States. and Russia is not willing to allow Syria — an ally and geostrategic neighbor — to become another Libya.

patriotism might not last long in the absence of tangible economic prosperity. The USSR crumbled after its economy collapsed in the 1980s. “As Russia’s economy shrinks. 8th December 2015.europa. Crimea appeared only 12-2014. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds that 75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: “By changing nothing. “Do sanctions against Russia work?” European Institute for Security Studies. http://www.pdf Equally (if not more) important is that sanctions shattered Putin’s ‘contract’ with the Russian people: namely. proven by Russian history (Iana Dreyer – European Institute for Security Studies) Iana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu. Mr Putin may also be reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. The collapse of the Russian empire in 1917 occurred in the wake of the initial patriotic boost of the First World War. are forcing Putin to tentatively replace his model with nationalism and anti-Westernism. 3 . Depicting Russia as an evil or unpredictable “rogue state” whose actions circumvent the principles of rational decision-making will do exactly that. Russia’s economy is in a precarious state.TURN: Putin softening anti-western rhetoric TWO WEEKS AGO The Economist.economist. improving collective prosperity in exchange for accepting authoritarianism and the siphoning off of Russia’s riches by elites. we will simply run out of reserves and the economic growth rates will linger around zero. as Russian history suggests. Anti-Americanism was nearly absent. Ukraine was not mentioned. http://www. 2. Vladimir Putin softens his tone”. No one expects the Kremlin to make an about-face in its opposition to the West.” . the need to prepare for low oil prices. And support for Yeltsin and liberal democracy in the 1990s plummeted after reforms failed to yield economic dividends. but the shift in tone was notable. Mr Putin may simply be reading the economy-shrinks-vladimir-putin But most of the speech was more pacific.iss. and social issues. The restrictive measures. Nationalism won’t last long in the wake of economic setbacks because people have to face the tangible costs eventually. combined with the other factors now hitting the country’s economy. However. focusing on the economy.

He is a Russian International Affairs Council expert. it has not been After Russia claimed its right to a more assertive foreign and Russian society seems ready to endure harsher economic conditions for the benefit of a more ambitious foreign policy course: at least 59 percent of Russians support the country’s foreign policy. http://nationalinterest. But this endurance challenge is set to continue at least for the coming year. The Truth About Sanctions Against Russia.about-sanctions-against-russia-14789?page=2 DOA: 1-4-16 So far. 2015. completely broken. January 4.R/T Destabilizes Russia Downturn caused by the sanctions won’t cause instability and war Nikolay Pakhomov is a political analyst and consultant in New York City. . its economy has found itself in a far more challenging international environment. The National Interest.

the quantities of plutonium known to have been trafficked have been minute. The people who designed them are not—do not know how to set them off.cfr. these are listed in Table “Well. 4/16/10. So just getting the bombs—and they also have locks on them which will. Russian authorities say that in the past three years alone they have broken up hundreds of nuclear material smuggling deals . In October 2001. In the case of Pakistan. somehow know how to put tab A into slot B. The number of people—as I say. will cause a conventional explosion. December 2005 Twenty confirmed incidents have involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239 (Pu239). If you did actually buy or sell—buy or steal a nuclear weapon. although there are suspicions that it came from a Soviet weapons laboratory. this would still have been about two-thirds short of the 25kg of HEU required for a basic bomb. With the notable exception of 363g of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel seized at Munich airport in Germany in 1994. The total for all IAEA-confirmed trafficking cases involving HEU for the decade from 1993 to 2003 was just 8. for example.).org/weaponsofmassdestruction/loosenukes/p9549#p4 “Have terrorist organizations ever tried to obtain Russian nuclear weapons? Yes. And the people who maintain them do not know how to set them off. find—go to another secure location and buy or steal the other half. The largest single haul of pure plutonium was a tiny pellet of extremely highly-enriched ‘super-grade’ metal seized at Tengen in Germany in 1994. what you’d find is that it’s got a lot of locks on it.35kg. so you’d people who know how to unlock it. shortly after the World Trade Center attacks. even if it had all been weapons-grade material and all in one shipment. no trafficking incident known to the IAEA involved more that a very small fraction of the quantity required to build a weapon. it seems to me.R/T Loose Nukes Weapons kept in pieces John Mueller (Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University). and there’s very few they keep their weapons in pieces. most ‘featured very small quantities.” All the fissile material isn’t enough Robin Frost International Institute for Strategic Studies.) No one has really been able to find anything that’s a loose nuke. or less than one-twelfth of the amount needed for a basic bomb. mainly because they don’t exist. if tampered with. the source of the substance remains unknown. authorities discovered several alQaeda plots . the number of people who know how to set them off is very small. (Emphasis added.3g. Emily He Council on Foreign Relations (January 2006) “Loose Nukes” http://www. In the 1990s. So the danger is extraordinarily small (Emphasis added. and the number of those that have involved true weapons-grade fissile materials is debatable.’ As of December 2004 (the most recent year for which the agency has released complete data). in a conventional explosion. U. a Russian nuclear official reported having foiled two separate incidents over the previous eight months in which terrorists had “staked out” a secret weapons storage site. According to the IAEA. which will cause the weapon itself to self-destruct. The total amount of IAEA-confirmed plutonium trafficked between 1993 an 2003 was 374. and set it off.S. Russia doesn’t want people stealing their nukes. “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11”. ‘There are no "loose nukes” http://atomicinsights. have to steal or buy one half. effectively.

to obtain nuclear materials. and former CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Osama bin Laden had sought to “acquire or develop a nuclear device.” .

" Forbes. the issue that may work most in Europe’s favor is Russia’s own dependence on energy revenue from the west. (2) TURN: Within 2 years. Christopher." means-for-europes-energy-security/ Finally. Christopher. The price points in Asian markets are currently far more attractive and will likely remain the preferred destination for US gas exports. reducing its fiscal ability to act aggressively in the Ukraine conflict Coats. First.htm “3. while also increasing liquidity to help increase EU bargaining power The NATO Review. 2014. Any suspension of oil would only harm Russia.forbes. even if the EU should be conservative about how much actual US gas will end up in Europe. http://www. First shipments of US LNG [liquefied natural gas] will not come online until 2016 with larger quantities to follow only after 2018. But in the medium-term allowing unrestricted US LNG exports to Europe would be a great contribution to overall efforts to increase the energy security of European allies. the United States could further improve the negotiating power of European buyers.” (3) TURN: Russia relies on EU customers for 3% of its total daily economic output. For European customers. Transatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis: A blessing in disguise? http://www. The United States cannot directly help Europe with gas supplies in the short term. Europe has a number of factors working in its favor should Russia decide to again halt the flow of gas through an increasingly uncertain Ukrainian landscape. http://www. Forbes Magazine. This would increase energy security. especially those in Central Europe and the Baltic. Russia provides a significant contribution to . "Why Russia Is Unlikely To Use Natural Gas As A Weapon In Ukraine Crisis. the US could supply the EU with liquefied natural gas to help diversify from Russia.nato. the recent recent tension comes after a mild European winter that has allowed countries to build sizable reserves that could last months if the issue was forced. 2014.R/T Natural Gas Suspension (1) Europe Has Reserves Coats. And this would also have the symbolic value of promoting open and transparent global energy markets versus resource nationalism and protectionism. 03 Mar. 03 Mar.forbes. But by increasing liquidity on the global LNG Ukraine-crisis/EN/ means-for-europes-energy-security/ To be sure. Forbes Magazine. "Why Russia Is Unlikely To Use Natural Gas As A Weapon In Ukraine Crisis.

This would likely result in lower prices and would certainly mean more choice for countries like Ukraine in the not so distant future. “Beyond the Crimea Crisis: Comprehensive Next Steps in U.” The Heritage Foundation. Indonesia. The exporting company. an import terminal in the United States is being retrofitted to serve as a bi-directional export terminal and will likely be online by the end of 2015. Ultimately. Opening markets would provide a diversity of suppliers and greater energy supplies for the global market. but for Moscow. Despite the lengthy time needed to permit and build an export facility. Establishing free-market reforms now and increasing energy supplies would help to prevent future incidents and price shocks not just in Ukraine. Australia. accounting for about 3% of the country’s overall economic output Alt solvency: global oil market openings reducing ability of Russia to make credible threats Gardiner. EU consumers provide about $100 million a day to Russian coffers. but it would send an important signal to Russia and the rest of the world. lifting gas export restrictions might not have a direct impact on the Ukraine crisis in he near term. Cheniere. Along with exports from countries like Qatar. engineering. international markets will put pressure on Russia and reduce its ability to use energy as a political bargaining chip..Russian Relations. but across the globe. and constructing a new LNG terminal takes. 25 March 2014.its energy needs. and others. Nile et al.S. It would show any leader from any country that derives power from controlling energy interests that such strategies will no longer be effective. permitting. has already entered into long-term contracts with Spain and the United Kingdom. Given the five to seven years that approving. Web. providing that choice would be what diminishes Russian power. .

" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. the EU's financial sector is not considered to be systemically threatened by its exposure.R/T Hurts Western Economies 1. . sanctions harming western economies is a calculated risk and not a Russian threat. 2 – Their study is terrible: Figures largely inflated and group all harms of Russian economic crisis. all of Europe’s overall losses from the Russian economic crisis are being lumped into this How much do the latter sacrifice? A new study published by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) estimates that the Ukraine- The related sanctions and counter-sanctions could cost the economy of the European Union up to 100 billion euros and two million jobs. The most visible direct effect is the substantial fall in EU agri-food exports to Russia. trade volume between the European Union (EU) and Russia decreased. It is hard to disentangle the effects of these sanctions from those stemming from the deteriorating economic situation in Russia. although many of them are unrelated to the sanctions. Topicality: At best. but indicate overall that the European economy is resilient to the adverse effects of falling trade with Russia. Published October 2015. however.europarl. but it would be especially bad news for Russia. mitigated to a large extent by redirecting exports to alternative markets. mainly due to the impact of the recession on the Russian economy. In 2014.pdf. Secondly. Mercedes sales. http://www. Still. http://carnegieendowment. Russia is the European Union's third-biggest trading partner. That is because it seems that Western politicians have concluded that the considerable losses they suffer from sanctions are still lower than the moral and political victory of keeping them in place. Importantly. Russia has retaliated with an embargo on certain EU agricultural products. Beginning in early 2014. The losses are. 2. are clearly falling for other reasons. let’s consider the hypothetical possibility that Europe really will suffer 100 billion euros in losses. authors do not disclose their research methodology. the luxurious repertoire of European food on offer in Moscow restaurants suggests that many of Russia’s counter-sanctions are not actually working and are therefore doing little harm to European agricultural producers. Accessed January 14. while the Russian measures have been extended until June Although the overall impact on the EU economy has been rather limited. as well as the conflict in Ukraine which led to EU sanctions and Russian countermeasures. the higher the value that Russia attaches to Europeans’ economic losses. the EU introduced and extended a range of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation in protest at Russian involvement in destabilising Ukraine and violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. So. 2016. certain sectors and countries are more significantly affected.europa. “Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict” . for example. the greater the threat that the EU feels from Russia and the greater the importance it attributes to sanctions as a means of containing this threat. 8-13-2015. The EU's economic sanctions will be in place until at least January 2016. Estimates of the impact vary. (Oleg Buklemishev – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Oleg Buklemishev. First of all. De-Link: losses from sanctions are mitigated by the redirection of western exports to other markets (Marcin Szczepanski – European Parliamentary Research Service) Marcin Szczepanski (European Parliamentary Research Service). That would be very bad news indeed. "Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia. but their figures appear to be greatly inflated.

much of which is still in a fragile recovery from the global financial crisis.p.russian- economy-1406666111>. It is clear that the sanctions are not a miracle cure to fix it all.TURN: Hardship builds extra credibility in the eyes of Moscow because accepting the hardship signals resolve from western states Liik." WSJ. Paris. by excluding existing contracts. N. 4 . Kadri.or medium term goals. France wanted to protect its contract to deliver two warships worth more than $ These calls were not listened to – largely because the West’s track record. rather than just a calculation of how to sway Mr. one very important implication of the sanctions – regardless of whether one considers it a goal or a by-product – is to boost Western credibility in the eyes of Moscow. Putin. European markets could suffer modest and short-lived losses from the chill in relations with Russia. <http://www.3 – De-link Updated deals are designed to limit the harms to western companies. Berenberg's Holger Schmieding said the hit to Germany's economic growth would be at most 0. Tuesday's deal seeks to dampen the impact of sanctions in Europe's economy. 2015.” 3B: This is why according to Mark Thompson of CNN. An EU compromise that targeted some business dealings with Russia while sparing others was designed to spread and limit the sacrifices among the bloc's 28 countries.K..S. N. Mark. near. That means France could still sell at least one ship to Russia. Alanna and Thompson. <http://www. ussia_sanctions3091>. It was telling how in the days following the fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime in February 2014.term and multi-layered. "The Limits and Necessity of Europe. such as its reaction to the Georgia war of 2008. if lasting. “Crimea: Economic Fallout of a ‘yes’ vote” CNN Money. The U." European Council on Foreign Relations. has a chance to influence Moscow’s calculations at similar junctures in the future. a flurry of phone calls went from the Western capitals to Moscow.5 billion to Russia. Europe needs to be aware that our problem with Russia is long.. Marcus. most economists expect the fallout from sanctions to be contained.. asking Russia not to intervene in Ukraine. That would leave the European recovery intact. 2015. as credibility is . 29 July 2014. “The new package of measures reflects what governments in Berlin. which. Walker. "Europe. at least in the short term. assuming the crisis is limited to Crimea. London and elsewhere were able to agree on. while German engineering firms could continue supplying Russian energy giants OAO Rosneft and OAO Gazprom. 3 Aug.p. 2014. Petroff. Web. is important. U. allowed Moscow to assume that it will get away with annexation relatively easily. The fact that the West adopted serious sanctions and is prepared to bear some economic hardship also itself has undoubtedly left an impression on Moscow. although a strong supporter of sanctions.1% to 0. March 16. was worried that rich Russians and their companies could turn away from its financial center in London. 2015.wsj. Getting that right. but they need to be a small They are instrumental in restoring our credibility and possibly fixing a few part of a bigger strategy. however. Still.2% over the next 12 months. given close business and trading ties.ecfr. Germany sought to preserve its business selling advanced equipment to Russia's energy sector. 06 Dec. “At the end of the day. economists expect the fallout to be contained. Significantly Expand Sanctions Against Russian Economy. 05 Dec.

” .something Europe badly needs if it wants to influence processes in the future. Hence the necessity of sanctions – despite all their limits.

there is room to grow: Russia is the world’s largest energy exporting nation. and China a big consumer as the world’s second-largest economy. monopoly on currency demand 2 .West =/= U. a move that in the long term could make the dollar less relevant to business between the two nations. New York Times.nytimes. behind the United States. And yet when a railroad tanker of Russian oil crosses the border into China.” . and the Russian ruble.” 12/14/10. Although China’s business with Russia is only a sliver of what it does with the United States.delink .. the renminbi. it could eventually cut the dollar out of a portion of Russian and Chinese trade.S.html?_r=0 “Russia and China are poised to take a small but symbolic step in their expanding economic relationship.Russia been trying to dump dollar since 2010 Kramer. Andrew. On Wednesday. If the market develops. a Moscow securities exchange is scheduled to open direct trading between the Chinese currency.S.R/T Russia Leaves the Dollar 1 . Dollar. “Sidestepping the U. the transaction is settled in dollars.S. Europe would benefit from the dilution of U. a Russian Exchange will swap Rubles and Renminbi.

3 . Moreover. with the Urals crude around $50 a barrel. rather than trusting the market to allocate capital to the most efficient Russia’s economy dependence on hydrocarbons is a bad story that is destined to get worse. For years Vladimir Putin has been reminding Russians that urgent action is needed to modernize and diversify Russia’s economy.economist. Nick Ottens. http://atlanticsentinel. including dramatic income tax cuts. and takeover of the energy business by energy reform never became a viable option. The Kremlin distributes oil money via state banks to firms and projects which it selects on the basis of their political importance and their pro-Putin stance. sound fiscal consolidation and education and infrastructure The state maintains a heavy hand in investments which helped fuel economic expansion. Russia is the world’s second-most unequal country. The Diplomat. . http://thediplomat. December 2014. because of sanctions.R/T Russia Diversifies Economy 1 .Failed to diversify in past 10 years → why would they suddenly be able to now The Economist. they have recently taken steps that run contrary to their stated goal. Atlantic Sentinel 2012 “Russia Fails to Diversify Economy Away from Energy”. most recently evidenced by Putin’s intervention in a dispute between the European Commission and Russian energy giant Gazprom when he shielded the latter from an antitrust probe. shortcomings in the rule of law. The company still reported a $44 billion profit last year but exports are falling and domestic gas production in Europe is on the rise. Instead. “China Can't Solve Russia’s Energy Technology Trap”. corruption and entrenched interests block further growth. Russia faces severe limits on its residual ability to acquire the technologies that the country needs to develop the promising but nonetheless geologically challenging offshore and onshore sites in the Arctic and Eastern Siberia. Today. February 2015. Its working-age population is shrinking fast. Despite the economic reforms that were enacted during Putin’s first eight years in the Kremlin. Russia’s ability to harness Western technology is greatly undermined. trapped in a vicious circle whereby its capacity to hire foreign specialists and purchase required energy technologies depends heavily on revenues from oil and gas exports. It is horribly corrupt. The Kremlin is a majority shareholder in Gazprom which alone accounts for 12 percent of Russian exports.Can’t diversify because diversification programs themselves funded by oil money → low oil prices = no funds to use Morena Skalamara. Indeed. key President Vladimir Putin and his deputy Dmitri Medvedev have talked for years about the need to reduce the Russia’s dependence on oil and natural gas exports but progress in this area is Russia is highly dependent on oil revenues (hydrocarbons contribute over The problems were long in the making. http://www. develop domestic expertise. If you look at wealth. and thus. on oil and gas prices. Russia has been politically favored interests. This unsustainable situation was in place even before the two disastrous – from Russia’s perspective – recent developments: sanctions and the decline in the price of oil. Consequently. Economy minister Andrei Klepach has warned that Gazprom could find itself under pressure from shale gas competition as early as 2014. Russia has – unsurprisingly – largely failed to address the state’s meddling in business. “What’s Gone Wrong with Russia’s Economy”. has weak institutions and no real property rights. But given that his own system rests on the informal glue of corruption. and foster energy market reforms. 2 .Russia has history of talking about diversification and then not following through. half the federal budget and two-thirds of exports) and over the past decade it has failed to diversify its economy.

December 2015. and exports of dual-use DOA: 1-4-16 The sanctions include bans on oilfield equipment. . December 2015. Heritage. The Regime of Vladimir Putin. Russian banks have been cut off from Western capital markets.TURN: Sanctions depriving them of investment needed to diversfiy economy James Carafano et al. Continuing the sanctions will increase pressure on Russia over the long run by reducing its ability to diversify its economy in the face of lower world energy prices.heritage.4 . http://www. the import and export of arms.

5. Creating new businesses in Russia from scratch requires investment. However. Import substitution would only occur in sanctioned industries. Import substitution–– The last. "Can Russia Really go it Alone?. and domestic demand is falling.e guns and oil production. too much to refinance domestically. Sanctions make Russia less efficient at producing those goods because they A) have less technology B) can no longer leverage their comparative advantage within those fields to be productive -> increases the prices of those goods.R/T Import Substitution 1. http://www.ibtimes. Lots of prerequisites to successful import substitution. pharmaceuticals. and makes it less attractive for potential buyers of the export. reducing total growth. “Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia”. What possible benefits could the Russian economy gain from sanctions? In theory. Moscow State University). i. Putin has railed against Russia's reliance on imports for years but that rhetoric has changed very little on the ground. which maintains that sanctions are helping rather than hindering Russia’s economic development. if domestic producers don’t have to worry about competition in certain sectors. investment in import substitution only makes sense if there is a guarantee that vacant niches remain open for a long time and that there is no overall economic turbulence. strangest and perhaps most pervasive myth is Myth No. Russia has none of them (Oleg Buklemishev – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Oleg Buklemishev (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Published August 13. and high-quality raw materials. That is not the case in Russia at the moment. It relies on imports of food. Furthermore." International Business Times. Moreover. The group has begun refinancing 27bn Roubles worth of deals with Russian banks after talks with international lenders broke down. in effect. machinery. There are few sectors of the economy which can provide these. which are fields that require large exports to be sustainable. 2015. Even the most basic increase in production requires. in part due to sanctions. there is a big gap between theory and practice. Businessmen are Moreover. http://carnegieendowment. since it most completely defies logic. Russia's lack of investment in its domestic production capacity is a long-term problem and that can't be changed on a whim. in addition to working capital. and therefore cheap sources of lending which are currently in short supply. Petrochemical giant Sibur is part-owned by sanctioned businessman Gennady Timchenko. Accessed December 30. is import substitution. 4-25-2014. 3. they can capture those sectors. This. Russia had $624bn in foreign debt at the start of the year. Director of the Economic Policy Research Center. The president and . This may be the most authentic myth. The government has the reputation of changing its economic policy at short notice for political reasons—counter-sanctions could be repealed at a moment’s notice. Some Russian banks have picked up business in wake of the West's sanctions against key Russian businessmen. analysts believe thatthe system would not be able to sustain itself if international lenders were to fully withdraw. textiles and plastics. surplus capacity. Import substitution is unsustaibible occur (Nigel Wilson – International Business Times) Nigel Wilson. Moscow's reliance on imports is the biggest factor drawing it away from isolation and rooting it in the international community. the economy is entering a recession. unlikely to view this as an auspicious time for import substitution. 2015.

Russia's slow integration into the global economy can be reversed.the country is at a crossroads. . But while relatively short term measures like credit ratings companies and national payments systems may offer a degree of autonomy. Putin certainly sees the benefit of insulating Russia as he seeks to consolidate his grip on power. it will take years of investment in the country's production infrastructure before Russia can really go it alone.

Ukrainian exports to the EU by 14.8% in 2013).within the margin of error of literally zero Michael Emerson. As a result the share of exports going to the EU reached 53. Accessed 12/19/15. (Interpreted from table) – EU food exports to Russia make up just . In the first five months of 2014 exports to the EU grew by 22. which at a time of delayed recovery from recession is a serious matter. and thus Russia’s influence is declining in these areas. putting certain quantities into storage.8%.5% compared to the same period of 2013. and organic chemicals. The policy response blends in with the overall task of getting resumed macroeconomic growth. on October 2nd. The Commission also intervened in various markets for fresh agricultural produce in August to reduce the market impact of the sanctions.03% of EU GDP. while the CIS share dropped to 31. .org/attachments/26652/uploads. while the share of exports to CIS countries shrank dramatically. Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine.ciaonet.9%.03% of EU GDP. Denis Cenusa (Centre for European Policy Studies).eu/publications/eu-ukraine-russia-sanctions-triangle Food imports from the EU.9% in 2013). What that means is that they’re no longer dependent on Russia. Norway and Australia have been banned for one year. animal feed. the impact of sanctions will be about .5 billion was already affected by restrictions imposed early in the year. In addition. however. and Georgia. the US.14 This shows that Moldovan exporters are effectively targeting the EU market and understand the sectors where they are most competitive." Center for European Policy Studies. and Georgian exports increased by 90% during the Russian embargo. by 18. The European Commission estimates that about 40% of EU agri-food exports to Russia are being sanctioned. "The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. €1. a huge programme of asset purchases amounting potentially to one trillion (a thousand billion) euro. Fucking flames 1.09% of the EU’s GDP. Cenusa of the Centre for European Policy Studies finds that Moldovan exports to the EU have grown by 22. Of the €5 billion worth of flows that are hit. but the proportions are marginal.5%. https://www. This has hurt some EU producers and suppliers.8% (39. The overall impact of the new sanctions may thus be estimated to be 0. https://www. There is an unquantifiable negative macroeconomic impact through damage to the business climate. all of these countries are increasing their trade with the West. vegetal oil and fats. with large increases in cereal products. Published September 2014.R/T Countersanctions Michael Emerson concludes that in the EU. Sanctions have backfired against Russia because now. 10-13-2014. the composition of the exports changed.8% (44. Resulting reorientation of exports towards the EU.ceps. Moldova. for which the European Central Bank announced.

donors and partners. and Georgia. the Russian embargo did more good than harm to the Georgian economy. The combination of Russia’s punitive actions and the EU’s unilateral opening of its market by introducing autonomous trade preferences pushes exports towards the EU. Georgia’s agricultural sector also continued to remain attractive to foreign direct investment (FDI) despite the Russian embargo.3% over the same Germany and Singapore. According to the State Statistics Services of Ukraine. Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine. Net positive impact of Georgia Eric Livny. https://www. http://iset.9% compared to 24. overall.9% in the first half of 2014 compared to a year earlier. Whereas before the embargo Georgian wine was exported to 36 countries. https://www. All this happened in the context of economic and financial crisis. Tbilisi State University School of Economics. Moldova.3% a year before. It was introduced at a time when Georgia had the economic slack to cushion the negative impact of the embargo. and Georgia. it created strong incentives for the Georgian private sector to modernize and To Consequently.Denis Cenusa (Centre for European Policy Studies). Poland. Moldova.6 exports to the EU grew by 14. “Impact of Russian Sanctions on the Georgian Economy”. Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine.ciaonet. including China. . it catalyzed an increase in economic aid and technical assistance from the international community. Published September 2014. the share of exports to the EU reached 33. while exports to Russia dropped by 23. perhaps ironically. Thus. and before concluding the DCFTA with the EU.7% in 2013. the Russian embargo contributed to a healthy trend of diversification in Georgian exports. Reorientation of exports towards the EU. 2007. Accessed 12/19/15.1% of total exports compared to 27. In the years of the Russian embargo Georgia’s total agricultural exports grew by 90%. by 2011 Georgian producers had entered 15 new markets. Accessed 12/19/15. while the share of exports to Russia dropped to 19. Denis Cenusa (Centre for European Policy Studies). Published September 2014.

Edwards University of New Mexico "Hype and Heavy Tails: A Closer Look at Data Breaches. the treaty negotiators cannot proceed further. inconclusively determined origins. The United States and Israel were able to nonviolently set back Iran's nuclear program through Stuxnet without a single casualty. we study a popular public dataset and develop Bayesian Analysis of the model shows that neither size nor Generalized Linear Models to investigate trends in data treaty-on-cyberwarfare/cyberwarfare-a-viable-nonviolent-alternative-to-military-strikes. according to a Benjamin. (US News) “Cyberwarfare a Viable Nonviolent Alternative to Military Strikes”. Given the difficulty of attribution. If the definition of the subject of the treaty cannot be agreed Moreover. De-Link: The Number of Cyber Attacks has remained stable over the past 10 years. Each thought will be addressed in turn below." . and the burden of proof on that attribution. much like the League of Nations. First. cyberwarfare. Moreover. to the factual uncertainties behind attribution and the lack of desire to escalate tensions in response to computer hacking. Rather than "civilizing" cyberwarfare. Estonia specifically requested the attacks it absorbed from Russia be treated as a cyberattack by NATO and its request was denied due. http://www. Considering the alternative drone strike that would surely have brought about human loss. may turn out to be something the international community may wish to encourage rather than discourage.pdf “Recent widely publicized data breaches have exposed the personal information of hundreds of millions of people. But. 2015. most cyberattacks have come from upon.R/T Cyber 1. spurring institutions around the world to address what appears to be a worsening situation. Lawrence L. international negotiators will have to create a heightened bar to establish a signatory's responsibility.econinfosec. Muir Jr. even if such a treaty would be promulgated. Nations that rely on non-state actors will have more incentive to continue using loosely controlled "hacktivists" to carry out attacks to slip under that standard. Moreover.usnews. In 2007. http://www. there is a strong reason not to curtail cyberattacks. At the very least. Specifically. due to the abilities of attackers to disguise them. if correctly deployed. University of New Mexico. A cyberwarfare treaty would be ineffective. International legal standards disagree on two points: the level of control a state must have in order to be liable. is the problem actually growing worse? In this paper. De-Link: We can’t conclusively trace most cyber attacks. frequency of data breaches has increased over the past decade. These distributions . 2012. We find that the increases that have attracted attention can be explained by the heavy-tailed statistical distributions underlying the dataset. claiming both a lack of control and that an aggrieved party must prove that control beyond any doubt. so no idea whether these actually came from Russia (Lawrence Muir of US News). vaguer treaty be more protective? Accessed January 16. De-Link: “More attacks” doesn’t mean that they’re effective 2. Some reports point to alarming increases in both the size and frequency of data breaches. the United States would be foolish to sign away a weapon it can so effectively and nonviolently deploy. any treaty would have the effect of unleashing computer partisan rangers against critical cyberinfrastructure. there is no concrete definition of cyberwarfare. Any ratified cyberwarfare treaty should be printed on the same stock of paper as the euro note to remind the signatories how ultimately without value some forms of international cooperation may sometimes be. we find that data breach size is log-normally distributed and that the daily frequency of breaches is described by a negative binomial distribution. it is not in the best interests of the United States to join. Published June 8. 3. in large part. there has been a lack of international appetite to support the aggrieved nation and respond in kind to the aggressor nation. 2016. why would a larger. with potentially devastating consequences. If NATO's treaty failed to protect Estonia.

De-Link: Only 1. Services from password theft to spamming to denial of service attacks are relatively easy to acquire from Russian hackers. “Cyberattacks on Russian Authorities Increase”. unveiled charges against Evgeniy Bogacgev. The first widely reported bank hacking case—the transfer of $10 million from a Citibank account in 1994—involved a hacker in St. leading to more than $100 million in thefts. Russian hackers accounted for a measly 1. Does this all mean that Russia is the world capital of hacking? In volume terms. Published August 6.7 percent of attacks. we find that in the next year there is only a 31% chance of a breach of 10 million records or more in the US.may provide clues to the generative mechanisms that are responsible for the breaches. and India. In a report last year. was arrested in Guam on suspicion of stealing data from hundreds of thousands of credit cards. 2014. “Is Russia Really the Cybercrime Capital?”. For example. What Russia does have is a fairly robust underground cybercrime market." Patrushev said at a briefing in the Russian port city of” Patrushev said at a conference in the Russian Pacific city of Vladivostok. stressing improved information protection in the country is required. And in June. Experts report the presence of foreign intelligence code in Russian information systems. "The use of information-communication resources located outside Russia by regional and local authorities for official purposes presents a serious danger. . 2016. who is accused of installing malware on computers around the world to access banking data. Russian hackers are also blamed for about a third of all new viruses. He’s currently the subject of a diplomatic scuffle between Washington and Moscow. particularly in the east of the state. De-Link: Alt-Causality: Russia got hit with cyber-attacks earlier this year. Turkey. Check-ups held by Russian technical control watchdogs and the Federal Security Service have revealed ineffective information protection in a number of Russian regions.S. accounting for 38 percent of the worldwide total.html. Sputniknews August 26 2015. http://www.slate. Taiwan. putting them behind their counterparts in the United States. Petersburg. “Today experts record a noticeable increase in the number of cyberattacks on information and telecommunication networks and information systems of the [Russian] authorities.7% of all cyber attacks come from Russia (Joshua Keating –Slate) Joshua Keating (The Slate). http://sputniknews. Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said ey_re_just_really. and we combine the model with two different cost models to project that in the next three years breaches could cost up to $55 billion. data breaches are costly.html Secretary of the Russian VLADIVOSTOK (Sputnik) — The number of hacker attacks on Russian networks online is increasing. Additionally. alleged hacker Roman Selezev. it’s not at all.” 4. Regardless of any trend. cloud services provider Akamai reported that Indonesia had overtaken China as the leading source of cyberattacks. Accessed January 16. our model predicts the likelihood of breaches of a particular size in the future. 5. Earlier this month. the U. reportedly valued at around $2 billion per year. Patrushev added. known online by the alias Track2. according to Patrushev.

NPR. "this could dramatically alter the way in which we think about warfare.9 million people. the research arm of the Pentagon. and today many countries large and small invest in cyber warfare." Cate nations/. former head of cybersecurity policy at the National Security Council. especially considering that Pyongyang isn’t exactly known for its centers of higher learning. he says. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Russia Wages Cyberwar Against Ukraine. indicates that Russia has had to shift its tactics away from militaristic to covert. 2016. It allows these countries to pull off attacks without as much risk of getting caught and without the repercussions when they are [caught]." says Law. TURN: Ceasefires reduce the amount of cyber-attacks. 2015 “As the U. breach offers the opportunity to mitigate the damage.” There are many reasons why a nation-state or non-nation entity would pursue a cyber war program. said those advocating for hacking back are overreacting. 4-28-2015 Researchers also found that when both sides negotiated a cease-fire last June. http://fortune. if you can get them to do the wrong thing. "It's like the adversaries are actually thinking of themselves as attacking. which usually continues even during a ceasefire. government faces cyber attack.” Speaking at a recent Atlantic Council panel debating the consequences of cyber revenge. In 2012 the U." This research is among the few documented examples of theres-no-playbook-for-fighting-back. According to recent intelligence studies more than 140 countries have some level of cyber weapon development programs.html Robert Knake. 2014.pcworld.54 billion cyber budget for 2013 to 2017. But it’s not devastating. The program was only one part of DARPA’s reported $1. Published December 21. Kulwant Saluja. “It is cheaper for and far more accessible to these small nation-states. PCWorld. "and so they stop those attacks when a cease-fire's in place — as opposed to thinking of themselves as just intelligence gathering. it does reveal the edge of a new weapon against enemies. the cyberattacks stopped for that same period as well. 15. “Cyber warfare is a great alternative to conventional weapons. "If you can substitute fake instructions. Report: To Aid Combat. a “foundational cyber warfare program” that aims to harness computing power to wage war more effectively. (Peter Suciu – Fortune Magazine) Peter Suciu (Fortune Magazine) “Why cyber warfare is so attractive to small nations”." It looks like the hackers see themselves as part of the battlefield. That may seem like a large figure for the nation of 24. Accessed January 16. a cybersecurity expert and professor at Indiana University Maurer School of incredibly interesting. Aarti Shahani. Once armed with this knowledge.” says Amy Chang. a research associate in the technology and national security program at the Center for a New American Security. the .” said Knake of the confidential data exposed by the breach.6. Sept. if you can get them to send the troops where you want them sent. “It’s bad.S. "That is Fred Cate. “The reason it’s not devastating is that we know Knake said identifying the about it. TURN: Cyber warfare is really cheap. TURN: The fact that we know about Cyber Attacks and Identify them decreases the effectiveness of Cyber attacks. 'there's no playbook' for fighting back” http://www. invested $110 million in Plan X. While it doesn't pinpoint specific stolen data that reconfigured a specific battlefield. Yet many small nation-states—even those that are in regions that lack universities with notable computer science programs—are finding that cyber war provides more bang for the buck than investment in conventional weapons." 8.S.

could respond with misdirection by changing personnel. http://www.131 attempted cyberattacks from 2010-2014. “VIDEO: Security expert says successful hack against power grid likely”. This hasn’t happened yet.government can use the hack to its advantage. Department of financial support for their efforts. The hackers were successful about 14 percent of the time.elp. far and away. Education was categorized. The energy-utility sector was ranked fourth among sectors. he argued. Another report. as the most vulnerable to cyber attack by BitSight. Published 09/22/2015. this one released Tuesday by cybersecurity ratings BitSight.S. slightly above health care and behind finance.S. indicates that the energy industry only ranks fair to middling when it comes to cybersecurity efforts. 9. in the event that a nation uses information gleaned from the breach to identify Americans involved in sensitive activities. IMPACT DEFENSE: Attacks fail 86% of the time (Rod Walton – ELP International) Rod Walton (ELP International). 2016. with 1. but the potential is getting closer as bad actors compile knowledge of the grid’s cyber weaknesses and gather illicit A recent USA Today report indicated that the U. For example. . government and retail. Energy was under constant siege in recent years. Knake said the hack-against-power-grid-likely. Accessed January 16.html. or in 159 of the attempts. according to the article.

com/science/article/pii/S1879366510000345 And yet. 2003). https://www. Other sanction goals can be to fight nuclear programs or terrorism or to help end civil wars abroad.R/T Democratic Backsliding Targeted sanctions don’t cause democratic backsliding because they weaken the government. the consensus of scholarly analyses and popular perceptions in the West indicates that. “Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. Russia hasn’t been trending toward democracy. Evans." Journal Of Eurasian Studies.sciencedirect. in turn. single most important goal when initiating sanctions against authoritarian regimes .inatory measures inflict on democratic freedoms (Cortright and Lopez 2002.1080/03050629. financial asset freezes or international travel bans on the political elites will not worsen the economic well-being of the opposition. we put sanctions on countries that are already undergoing democratic backsliding (Christian von Soest – Journal of Peace Research) Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman. the most important test case for democratization was largely a disappointment. Selection bias. directly aim at the target leadership might help decrease the corrosive impact that the sanctions with no discrim.” Journal of International Interactions.2010. Wallensteen et al. http://www.washingtonpost. 1-31-2011. From the point of view of those in the United States and Western Europe who had high hopes for the spread of such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms embargoes. http://www. "How The West Selectively Promotes Democracy Through Sanctions. “Smart” sanctions that disrupts their political viability to pressure the government for more political reform and openness." Washington Post. we gather statistical data on all “democratic sanctions” issued by the European Union and the United States to systematically study when and where Western democracies use sanctions to promote We find that the promotion of democracy or punishing of backsliding has been the democracy. Putin pushed Russia back into the realm of authoritarianism (Alfred Evans – Journal of Eurasian Studies) Alfred B. they might directly hurt political elites and subsequently make them less intransigent against foreign demands for greater respect for political rights and civil liberties. At minimum. and may actually solve the harms of broad sanctions (Dursen Peksen – East Carolina University) Dursun Peksen and Cooper west-selectively-promotes-democracy-through-sanctions/ In a recently published article (temporarily ungated) in the Journal of Peace Research. Instead. most Western academic specialists regarded that country as a .3 During the 1990s. 1-10-2015.502436 This project points out that economic sanctions often disproportionately hurt the economic well-being of opposition groups that. if Russia did enter a transition to democracy. while Boris Yeltsin was the president of Russia. as the current decade nears its end. that transition was not successful. so there’s nothing to lose. 2010. "The failure of democratization in Russia: A comparative perspective.

2009. 81). 2004). 2005. . journalists. and policy-makers in the West” that Russian politics had moved “significantly off a democratic pathway” (Whitefield. Most Western scholars who focus on that country would seem to agree with Steven Fish’s assertion that “democratization has failed in Russia” (Fish. the assessment of that regime by most political scientists specializing in the study Russia changed. however. there was an “increasing consensus among scholars. however. Between 2000 and 2005 the outlook of Russia watchers in the West shifted. 2004 and McFaul. Considering both the undemocratic features and the elements of pluralism remaining in Russian politics. 93). 2003) to the Russian political system. Within a few years after Vladimir Putin became the president of that country. it would seem justifiable to apply Marina Ottaway’s category of “semi- authoritarian” (Ottaway. Stephen Whitefield has noted that during Putin’s time as president of Russia. with some imperfections that did not negate the fundamentally democratic character of the political regime. so that many began to refer to the political system of that country as authoritarian (Hahn.democracy that was in an early stage of transition.

the overall decline in arms sales is associated with increased activities of the Russian defense industry.pravdareport.TURN because the internal link is retaliation against the West. the report said. According to the SIPRI.reverse causality because instability will cause arms dealers to inflow weapons in first place. the report does not take account of Chinese companies due to the shortage of reliable data. significant increase in Russian arms sales was the result of the government's continuous investment in the 2000s to modernize production and arms to reach the level of Western countries. “Russia named world's only country to increase arms sales in 2014”.they don’t show that this has happened in any exporting country 3 .the only impact they provide to Western countries themselves is econ harms. Noteworthy. The decrease in the arms exports that the United States and several European countries have shown can be A explained with the withdrawal of NATO mission from Afghanistan and Iraq. as well as with the reduction of defense budgets.delink .Make them isolate the impact to the West and not just the global economy 4 . R/T Russia wants to sell more 1 .Increase in arms sales was because of rapid increase in Russian military spending IN EARLY 2000s Pravda Report. guns don’t fuel conflict unless there are people who want to fire them 2 .R/T Small Arms Transfers 1 . December 2014. as well as with new players on the market. but stability within Europe vastly outweighs . decreased desire to attack West turns the internal link R/T Triggers widespread civil wars 1 .

delink . 2014.S. yet those are the people who will suffer the most over all of these sanctions. It good Marina Koren. privately-owned SpaceX already has operational rockets that can be commissioned for use. We can only hope that common sense will prevail so we can all return to peaceful and productive scientific collaboration. IFLScience. the International Space Station has been a place where over 200 people from 15 countries have come together in the pursuit of exploration and knowledge. The rosy pic-ture of col-lab-or-a-tion has soured since then. 2020 is a long way away. “Russia Threatens to Ban US Access to ISS In Retaliation To Sanctions”. the whole situation is still fairly sad. who are work-ing to launch as-tro-nauts from Amer-ic-an soil by 2017. is also working toward delivering humans to a low Earth orbit. law-makers have long called for end-ing Amer-ic-an de-pend-ence on Rus-si-an space trans-port. National Journal.iflscience. Though the US will be able to overcome any roadblocks put into place by Russian rocket engines are used by the United Launch Alliance for their rockets that are used to bring military and defense satellites into space. That said. U.delink . Orbital Sciences. “Russia Threatens to Ban US Access to ISS In Retaliation To Sanctions”.” At the time. That kind of talk is enough to change the situ-ation on the ground even as co-oper-a-tion con-tin-ues in space. Bitch 1 . and the re-cent threats from Mo-scow could rally sup-port in Wash-ing-ton. 2014. The bottom line is that this back-and-forth disagreement over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has nothing to do with scientists. In early April.nationaljournal. http://www. While SpaceX is currently fulfilling a contract with NASA. Since 2001.iflscience. the next two years’ worth of launches.rocket stockpiles solves Lisa Winter. SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft could launch from the US as soon as 2017 with the capability of carrying seven astronauts as once. another privately-owned company. they are seeking to gain a contract with the Department of Defense as well.S. Rus­sia’s threat of kick­ing U. Additionally. should the need arise. 2 . 3 .US has enough resources to overcome any Russian cutoffs Lisa Winter. All of the components for the Falcon 9 rockets are designed and manufactured in the United States. http://www. Now the fu-ture of those op-er-a-tions is in doubt. and a great number of things could happen before then. IFLScience. 2014. “Russia Threatens to Ban US Access to ISS In Retaliation To Sanctions”. “What’s Going to Happen to the International Space Station?”. NASA sus-pen-ded con-tact with Rus­si­an gov­ern­ment rep­res­ent­at­ives. hat’s actually not a huge problem despite the fact If Russia won’t allow American astronauts to travel to and from the ISS using their spacecraft after 2020. as­tro­nauts off ISS could add more fuel to NASA’s part­ner­ship with private Amer-ic-an space-flight com-pan-ies. despite any socioeconomic or political differences. cit­ing the coun­try’s “on­go­ing vi­ol­a­tion of Ukraine’s sov­er­eignty and ter­rit­ori­al in­teg­rity.delink . ULA has stated that they already have enough engines stockpiled to perform the However. op­er­a­tions aboard the ISS were ex­empt from the sus-pen-sion. . Orbital Sciences uses a modified Russian NK-33 engine in its Antares rockets. t that NASA cancelled the shuttle program in 2011. IFLScience.R/T Space.iflscience.SpaceX solves Lisa Winter. http://www.

foust is the editor and publisher of the space review. the burden on the US taxpayer. nimbleness and accountability of the marketplace. Lewis Former Republican Rep.Removing Politics in Space Jeffrey Kluget.” It’s such commercial efforts. stodginess and glacial pace of Washington with the speed. http://www. NASA can ignite an economic. 2-8) Tuesday morning the Competitive Space Task Force. 2010. Enhancing the role of robotics will lower the cost of human missions beyond LEO even more by deferring the expense of .html# If old NASA hands winced at this kind of giddy talk. provided that the agency is more willing to work with such ventures than it has in the past. technological. in Physics and an M. Incentives solve best. said. a self-described group of fiscal conservatives and free-market leaders. http://www.S. “Fiscal Conservatives call for increased privatization of space”.time. makes the case for an enhanced role for private ventures in space. Astronauts Inc. TIME Magazine.A. in Science.” Task Force chairman Rand Simberg. we cannot abandon our commitment to space exploration and human spaceflight. December 17.2037089. http://www. In the face of contracting federal budgets and an expanding private sector.thespacereview. and innovation renaissance. “Review: The Privatization of Space Exploration”. earned under a NASA Space Grant Fellowship at George Washington University (Andre. they kept it to themselves — and wisely so.thespacereview. Members of the task force issued several recommendations to Congress.reinvigorates public interest and jumpstarts NASA Foust 10 (Jeff.” Private sector is crucial for tech breakthroughs Bormanis 7/19/10 – holds a B. of the Competitive Enterprise If NASA is still building Ares 1 and Orion when the federal government begins to make the draconian cuts necessary to move toward a balanced budget. The fastest path to space is not through Moscow. hosted a press conference to encourage increased privatization of the space industry. Privatization solves space leadership Nelson 11 ( Nelson is a staff writer for the daily caller. 5-3) In The Privatization of Space He links the increased interest in commercial human spaceflight to the flights of SpaceShipOne in 2004 that won the $10-million Ansari X PRIZE: “it got people excited to dream again about human spaceflight. “By opening space up to the American people and their enterprises. so its advocates say. http://dailycaller. Robert S.: The Private Sector Muscles Out NASA. we will be stuck in LEO for a very long Shifting more of the cost to the private sector and international partners will help alleviate time. including finding an American replacement to the Space Shuttle (so to minimize the costly expenditures on use of Russian spacecraft) and encouraging more private investment in the development of manned spacecraft. and the United States will regain its rightful place as the world leader in space. the space agency of the golden years is being blown up and rethought — transformed from a government operation into a public-private partnership that. he argues. “If we really want to ‘win the future’. that can lift NASA from decades of “stagnation”. Walker of Pennsylvania said.8816. Technology and Public Policy. but through the American entrepreneur.00. will replace the politics. a law professor at George Washington University. “Critical partnerships for the future of human space exploration”.

as well as surveillance and intelligence. scientific and technological returns of space At what cost? Is there a price to inspiration and creativity? exploration have far exceeded the investment. missions have yielded their maximum scientific returns . predictions and management of hurricanes and other natural disasters. we can continue to test the waters of the great ocean of space with whatever resources and ingenuity we can muster. Wealth-generating medical devices and instrumentation such as digital mammography and outpatient breast biopsy procedures and the application of telemedicine to emergency care are but a few of the social and economic benefits of manned exploration that we take for granted. it generates infinitely more than wealth than it spends. meteorological forecasts.P. Observing Earth has provided G. 43 countries now have their own observing or communication satellites in Earth orbit. By taking a more incremental.P. Human exploration of the solar system won’t begin in earnest until a radical reduction in the cost of getting humans and payloads into LEO is achieved. confident that someday we’ll be making waves. as opposed to the largely inflexible Apollo-style architecture represented by Economic. NASA has done so much with so little that it has generally been assumed to have had a huge budget. not back to NASA. and global monitoring of the environment. Studying humans living in the microgravity of space has expanded our understanding of osteoporosis and balance disorders. http://freakonomics. by-step approach. Impacts Stephen Dubner. cell phones. Royalties on NASA patents and licenses currently go directly to the U. step- human Mars landing and return vehicles until after Ph. and has led to new treatments. global banking. In fact. and TV. Freakonomics. Treasury.D. if ever.3 billion is a minute fraction of the $13 trillion total G. Satellite communications have changed life and business practices with computer operations. 2008. I firmly believe that the Life Sciences Research Program would be self- supporting if permitted to receive the return on its investment. Such a breakthrough may not come for decades.S.D. . “Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum”. or it could happen sooner than we dare believe. In the meantime. Space exploration is not a drain on the economy.S.. the 2007 NASA budget of $16. unforeseen technological breakthroughs can more easily be integrated into future systems. Globally.

Are the Kremlin Hardliners Winning?. . and not the siloviki.R/T Siloviki Gain power 1. should the liberals sound the alarm about any threat to Putin’s position from the far right. "That would be a victory for the . Putin is siloviki. the liberal clans in the . Published 9/18/14. it is almost certain that he would listen. Though Putin may be preparing to tighten the screws that would marginalize them even further. The liberals still have enough sway to push for things like the ceasefire (Jensen – IMR) Donald Jensen (Institute of Modern Russia). Accessed 1/14/16. who pushed for the ceasefire in Ukraine. but they are not sitting idly As for and waiting to be cut down. according to Minchenko. Although the hardliners have gained in influence. The fuck are you running this argument 2. But ultimately. 3. http://www. Russian troops would already be in Kyiv. http://imrussia. Published 10/1/14. He believes that the conservatives are defining developments in Russia at the moment." Bremmer is also careful when analyzing the role played by the "Siloviki" in the Kremlin. It was they. Kremlin hardliners rule in Putin's Russia. Accessed 1/14/16." he said. the president has the final say over Moscow's course.dw. The Siloviki don’t actually have political control (Bushuev – DW) Mikhail Bushuev (Deutche Welle). they are relatively weaker than the “war party” at the moment. their importance should not be overemphasized. "If the hawks had won the upper hand.

are being extended until mid-2016 due to Russia’s non-compliance with the “Minsk 2” ceasefire The sanctions. Lack of structural reforms. the US official said. The sanctions. imposed by the EU and US in mid-2014. to go down sharply. wich curb Russian firms’ access to credit and which prohibit exports of energy technology. The slump in world oil prices. Sanctions to have little impact on Russia in 2016.5 percent more than it would have done in 2015. such as loosening state control on major firms. it might have grown by up to 5 percent . also had a bigger impact than the Western measures. for instance. prompted the Russian economy to contract by 1 to 1. https://euobserver. US says. in Austria. Not doing better than it would have done absent sanctions Andrew Rettman Jan 13 2016 World Vision. EU Observer. percent in total in 2015. They also led international investors to write down the vaue of Russian assets by some 10 percent and saw The Russian economy shrank 4 Russian-linked deposits in certain European banks. a State Department official told press in Brussels on Tuesday (12 January). was the main factor. .R/T Russian Economy Rebounding 1. costing at least 4 percent of GDP. which coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In normal circumstances.

This would in all likelihood trigger more painful economic sanctions by the EU and its partners. José Luengo-Cabrera EU Institute for Security Studies “On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools” September 2015 http://www. buttress its defenses and become more resilient than it was at the beginning of the conflict.pdf Judged through this tactical prism. . Russia’s failed assault on Marinka in June 2015 appears to reelect Ukraine’s improved military capabilities . We outweigh: Sanctions have bought time for Ukraine to re-fortify its military. it was ’thanks’ to the EU’s sanctions that the Minsk negotiations and an imperfect cease re were made possible at all.R/T Destabilization Shift 1. bought invaluable time for Ukraine to elect a new political leadership. Such moments of brief respite were essential for Ukraine to strengthen the core structures of its state (notably its defence sector and security services). Ukrainian state performance remains weak in terms of governance.europa. Russia would have to signifcantly step up its use of violence to alter Ukraine’s defence lines. Thus. which was previously but sanctions against Russia deeply in infiltrated by Russia. preventing Russian expansion into Marinka.iss. sanctions have provided Ukraine with some breathing space before the next round of fighting.

the sanctions represent a fairly efficient and low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and dissuade Russia. sanctions increased the costs to Russia of expansion. and France). Sanctions have established the grounds for political negotiations. while Ukraine is still poorly governed. Sanctions created an atmosphere that likely helped put a negotiating process in place. rather than having a weak government. Center for Strategic and International Studies “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” October 2015 Whatever the exact incentive sanctions provided for negotiations. the February 2015 agreement managed to decrease the intensity of the fighting in eastern Ukraine. first with Ukraine in September 2014. According to the Polish Institute of International Affairs. without the sanctions debate there would be today not a discussion about imperfect governance in Ukraine but about the absence of governance in a worst-case scenario. https://www. too. which by that time may have threatened Ukraine’s neighbours. The sanctions escalate the price Russia pays for Crimea’s annexation. giving time for presidential and parliamentary elections as well as military mobilisation). which was only recovering from the ruble’s December 2014–January 2015 free fall. rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to take root and thrive in Ukraine. even if the full implementation of the ceasefire has not yet been achieved. Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russia’s military aggression. which assumed division within the West and the European Union would prevent any tough decisions. the level of violence observed before the February 2015 Minsk agreement was much higher than what . The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se.g. The therefore prospect of even stronger sanctions created an incentive for Russia to complete the negotiations. This incentive might have been complemented in February 2015 by Russia’s monetary situation at the time. Critics argue that despite the sanctions Russia has not vacated Crimea and instead has put troops and sent munitions to Donbass. Center for Strategic and International Studies “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” October 2015 Still. This allowed Ukraine to fill power vacuums by having an election. the sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia. Ukraine would have had no government at all Stanislav Secreiru November 25 2015 Polish Institute of International Affairs.“ 3. Ceasefire has reduced most of the fire Simond de Galbert.pism. Seen in this perspective. Russia is preoccupied with how to keep the conflict burning and less about another major military thrust in Ukraine (which by now would result in higher casualties on the Russian side). Simond de Galbert. Sanctions first came as a surprise to the Russian leadership. and then in February 2015 in the so-called Normandy format (Russia. preoccupying it with continuing the conflict rather than expanding. Probably the most essential aspect often neglected is that the sanctions bought the time needed to fill the political and military power vacuum in Ukraine (e. in tune with the popular demands expressed in 2013–2014.2. Clearly.With the sanctions in place. most probably it would now have had to devise a more expensive and risky answer to Russia’s aggression. But this is only part of the story. meaning that without sanctions.. sanctions could have altered the method through which these objectives were implemented. “Last but not least. Germany. If the West had stayed away from the issue in 2014. As the West has ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine.

with the SMM reporting 373 ceasefire violations in May. there continue to be daily violations of the ceasefire. However. despite the restrictions imposed locally on the SMM’s access and freedom of movement.24 . 682 in June.has been observed since then by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine. and 971 in August 2015. 871 in July.

NEG Disads .

interests such as sustaining a large export sector in a nation’s defense industry.hrw. the Great Lakes region of Africa. and the UN itself. harassed. “Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the Presidency. Michael (Moscow) – The Russian government has unleashed a crackdown on civil society in the year since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency that is unprecedented in the country’s post- Soviet history. Instability in the past. the treason law. and the assembly law. . 2000. chief of which is human rights. and the southern Islamic frontier of the former Soviet policy framework of states. When values do not actually constrain interests.utah. and documents how they have been used. The authorities have introduced a series of restrictive laws. has been caused by human rights Human Rights as Politics. If taken seriously. The report analyzes the new laws. Princeton University. Princeton University. It becomes incoherent for states like Britain and the United States to condemn Indonesia or Turkey for their human rights performance while providing their military with vehicles or weapons that can be used for the repression of civilian dissent. and sought to cast government critics as clandestine enemies.utah. and in a number of cases imprisoned political activists. Human Rights is chiefly balanced against national interest Michael Ignatieff. Human Rights as Politics.pdf human rights has become “main-streamed” into the From being the insurgent creed of activists during the Cold War. 2000. The 78-page report. “Russia: Worst Human Rights Climate in Post-Soviet Era”.”describes some of the changes since Putin returned to the presidency in May 2012.Human Rights Abuses Human Rights bad in Russia Human Rights Watch. human rights values put interests into question. begun a nationwide campaign of invasive inspections of nongovernmental organizations. Obviously these regions have fragmented in part because of the šagrant human rights abuses committed by ethnic majority tyrannies that tried—and failed—to create stable nation states. https://www.pdf The overwhelming problem of the post–Cold War world system has been the collapse of state order in three key sectors of the globe—the Balkans. 24 April 2013. the chief problem of the post cold war era. intimidated. an “ethical foreign policy”—the self-proclaimed goal of Britain’s Labour government—becomes a contradiction interms. multilateral lending institutions like the World Bank. But in part fragmentation also results from the destructive impact of demands for territorial autonomy and independence on the part of secessionist groups. http://tannerlectures. http://tannerlectures. including the so- called “foreign agents” law. But human rights is not just an additional item in the policy priorities of states. The foreign policy rhetoric of most Western liberal states now repeats the mantra that national interests must be balanced by due respect for values. for example.

repeated. The effect is always significant (95% confidence interval below 0). and systematic violence against its own citizens. Movement from the lowest to highest amount of respect decreases the probability of conflict by Governments and multinational bodies impose economic sanctions to try to alter the strategic decisions of state and non-state actors that threaten their interests or violate international norms of behavior. Yet the juridical status of a right of intervention is exceedingly unclear. Council on Foreign Relations. .edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01. Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of joint respect of physical integrity rights. as the states in the pair increasingly respect physical integrity rights. but it decreases as the index reaches the higher levels. it also prohibits the use of force against other states and forbids internal interference. the probability of conflict decreases. however. The gulf in international law between the nonintervention language of the charter and the interventionist implications of human rights covenants has never been bridged More impacts Jonathan Masters. 8 April 2015. Figure 1 examines physical integrity rights. while supporters contend they have become more effective in recent years and remain an essential foreign policy tool.utah. Impact: Decreasing Human Rights Abuses reduces the probability of interstate conflict by 88% David Sobek. Since 1991. Princeton University. and Kosovo. Human Rights as Politics. http://www. 2005 LSU “The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad. most loudly by the French. Bosnia. Critics say sanctions are often poorly conceived and rarely successful in changing a target’s conduct.11 In general. Extension of Democratic Peace Theory. but also by other governments seeking to justify interventions in Iraq. Warrants for above Claim 1. including Iran’s nuclear program and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. the only effective way to protect human rights is direct military intervention. Michael Ignatieff. Sanctions have become the defining feature of the Western response to several geopolitical challenges. 2000.Increasing action based on human rights.37 While the UN Charter calls on states to proclaim human rights.pdf Where all order in a state has disintegrated and its people have been delivered up to a war of all against all.cfr. This implies that movements toward higher respect when at the lower levels have a larger substantive impact on decreasing conflict than the same movement when already at a high level.36 The armed forces of the Western powers have been busier since 1989 than they ever were during the Cold War. Rather than looking at the substantive effects of each variable. “What Are Economic Sanctions”.Nations with aligned political ideologies around human rights are less likely to disagree and face political grievances. or where a state is engaging in gross. http://tannerlectures. and the legitimizing language for this activity has been the defense of human rights. does not necessarily indicate substantive significance. this “right of humanitarian intervention” has been asserted.” Statistical significance. The human rights covenants that states have signed since 1945 have implied that state sovereignty is conditional on adequate human rights observance.

It is easier for nations. to justify intervention against nations that are actively violating human rights. especially democratic ones.2. .

the Russian government announced that it would switch to a system of prepayment from Ukraine for natural gas. What is clear is that the mood in official Moscow is still grimly determined. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in. Published 12/18/15.structed the head of Gazprom. and 4) sharply expanded the territory under the separatist’s control.107 Ukraine does not have the resources for such payments. . which were introduced in stages. was to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine. tomorrow switch [Ukraine] to prepayment”. 3) effectively transformed a significant part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions into a territorial entity independent of Kiev by autumn of 2014 (the time of the first Minsk agreements).Retaliation Russia’s tactics are reactionary to the West International Crisis Group. http://globalinterests.pdf Putin may well not be pursuing a rigid tactical plan. opportunity to boost up patriotism by using a nationalistic rhetoric to criticize the economic restrictions. The main goal of the sanctions. Accessed 12/18. However. there is no indication of any shift in Russia’s foreign policy towards Ukraine. 2) unleashed an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. http://reliefweb. http://neurope. as Ukraine was struggling to respond to the referendum fallout. May 14 2014. the state-owned natural gas giant. EU’s Economic Sanctions exalt Putin’s Nationalism. nor that the economic sanctions will be annulled in the near future. including the logistically important Donetsk airport and the city of Debaltseve. Ukraine: Running out of Time. Accessed 12/ or indeed whether he eases the pressure on Kyiv and agrees to dial back the crisis. On 12 . Russia paid no attention to the sanctions and subsequently 1) annexed the Crimean peninsula. Retaliation (Maxwell – New Europe) Frank Maxwell (New Europe).ties he pursues. Vladimir Putin’s strong nationalism is nothing new. Retaliation (Aleksashenko – CGI) Sergey Aleksashenko (Center on Global Interests).Sanctions One Year Later: Did They Even Matter?. may depend to a considerable extent on how he assesses the Western reaction and the cost of a long-term confrontation. Published 9/23/14. however since the Ukrainian crisis the Russian leader’s discourse has increasingly turned The EU’s flurry of economic sanctions have given the Russian President a new anti-Western. “No more nannying. Instead. in February 2015 (Minsk-2). Which of the above nationalism/ .int/sites/reliefweb.

com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more- dangerous-confrontation .5 While many of these conspiratorial narratives are based more on hyperbole than actual facts.” says NATO’s new secretary-general. Western powers were attempting to encroach upon the traditional Russian Empire. http://www. Ukrainian military intelligence reckons there may be 9.” Russia’s current stance displays a willingness to create South-east Ukraine shows the new model army at much to the consternation of Moscow. throughout history. Since November a new build-up of Russian forces has been under way. http://www. Accessed 12/18.000 were sent to relieve Luhansk and Donetsk while threatening the coastal city of Mariupol—enough to convince Mr Poroshenko to draw his troops back. confuse and wear down an opponent. fallout from the Orange Revolution. 8 Retaliation (Economist) (Economist).pdf . Published 2/14/15. One must recognize that Putin’s desire to initiate conflict in Ukraine stems from a decade – 2004 to 2014 – of antagonistic relations between Russia and its Western neighbors.It is hard to tell how many Russian troops have seen action in Ukraine. as their vehicles and uniforms carry no identifiers. A combination of instruments. the Ukrainian government vacillated between aligning with the West and placating Russia.Retaliation (Cumbo – CNAS) Benjamin Cumbo (Center for a New American Security). Published 7/8/15. Accessed 12/18. a full-scale invasion and subsequent occupation is beyond Russia. But around 4. which seriously damaged relations between both countries. one can appreciate their popularity in Russian society by looking toward the past.000 in their country (NATO has given no estimate). But a Russian- controlled mini-state.From cold war to hot war. A combination of a transition in Ukrainian leadership. some military and some non-military. which precipitated the rise of a conspiratorial narrative that views external actors – particularly those in the West – with suspicion. Russia “has invested heavily in defence. and the growth of divisive nationalist fervor greatly contributed to the Putin’s decision to annex Crimea and invade five oblasts in eastern Ukraine. For Putin. letting an area that historically belonged to Russia – arguably the birthplace of Russian society – slip into the orbit of an aggressive amalgamation of European states was unacceptable. Another 50. making it hard for multinational bodies such as NATO and the EU to craft a response. Russian MotivesAn Essay Exploring Russia’s Approach to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. choreographed to surprise. his inner circle. Novorossiya. In the view of Putin. But without the ability to apply hard power. But when the Ukrainian government began to make headway in early summer. hybrid warfare is ambiguous in both source and intent. a former Norwegian prime minister. Mr Putin’s preferred method is “hybrid warfare”: a blend of hard and soft power. Despite Mr Putin’s claim last year that he could “take Kiev in two weeks” if he wanted. Russia’s version of soft power would achieve little. And it would end Ukraine’s hopes of ever regaining sovereignty over its territory other than on Russian .economist. external actors committed nearly every Having been attacked by a number of European powers deprivation their country has experienced. could be more or less economically sustainable. Spetsnaz units first trained the Kremlin-backed separatist rebels in tactics and the handling of sophisticated Russian weapons. During this decade. similar to Abkhazia and Transdniestria. The current Russian approach to governance and outsiders stems from decades of a Russian sense of victimization. Russians are uniquely sensitive to any actions that would supposedly seek to limit or infringe upon Russian notions of sovereignty. Jens Stoltenberg.000 are on the Russian side of the border. and a number of everyday Russians. Russia had regular forces near the border to provide a calibrated (and still relatively covert) response. “It has shown it can deploy forces at very short notice…above all. it has shown a willingness to use force.

terms. and within reach with the hard power he controls. which would undoubtedly include staying out of the EU and NATO. Not a bad outcome for Mr Putin. .

Associated Press. to extremely damaging cyber strikes that can destroy data and machines. military is ill-prepared for waging cyber warfare and needs to bolster defenses against the growing threat of cyber attacks against both military systems and private infrastructure.S. and potentially threaten the U. http://www. Commander Warns.nytimes.S. Military Not Prepared for Cyber Warfare. Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.washingtontimes. such as stock exchanges and financial Panetta said. financial networks.html?pagewanted=all “Defense Secretary Leon E. economy and endanger American lives. http://www. “They could derail passenger trains. or an attack on U. or even more dangerous. “Those attacks are coming and I think those are near term and we’re not ready for them. the commander of U. “Despite our progress at U. I worry that we might not be ready in time.” 95% of U." Washington Times. derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. 2013 . Alexander. or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country. [Cyber Command]. Cyber threats are increasing.Cyber US is not prepared for a Cyber War Gertz. transportation system.” The main concerns are cyber attacks from nation states such as China or Russia that could create massive power outages in the United States.” said Army Gen. “Threats to our nation in cyberspace are growing. “An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. Web.S. in prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Cyber Command told Congress on Thursday. sounded the alarm on the need for better cyber attack and defense capabilities. private sector networks are vulnerable Associated Press. The Washington Times. October 2012. “The U. Bill. financial networks and government. "U. Panetta warned Thursday that the United States was facing the possibility of a “cyber-Pearl Harbor” and was increasingly vulnerable to foreign computer hackers who could dismantle the nation’s power commander-w/?page=all.” Mr.S. 02 May 2014. head of Cyber Command and also outgoing director of the National Security Agency.S. that could cripple the economy. 28 Feb. New York Times. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities.” he said. Mike Rogers.S. February 10.S. 2014. Keith Alexander. (United States Representative Mike Rogers serves as the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) ([Lawmaker: Cyberattacks against US getting worse. shifting from temporarily disruptive attacks.S.” “A Cyber Pearl Harbor” Thom Shanker.

20 Homeland Security Policy Institute.Rep. 20 Mar.” Russia uses cyber attacks through their military and “patriotic hackers” [Cilluffo.gwumc.gwumc.) although Russia denies official involvement. research and development have resulted in Russia being deemed (along with China). the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee said Sunday. Mike Rogers says 95 percent of private sector networks are vulnerable and most have already been hit. http://www. (Chairman of Homeland Security Review Panel for GW University) "Cyber Threats from China. .edu/hspi/policy/Meehan_Cilluffo%20Testimony%20March%202013. however. Relying upon “patriotic hackers” guidedby government handlers plus a little help from the Russian intelligence service. etc.. Frank. 2013. is vulnerable to cyberattacks that could shut down financial services or destroy information that companies need for daily operations..” Russia is conclusively a cyber threat to the US [Cilluffo. Russia and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure." .against- us-getting-worse_print.html] “The U. 19 Russia was also behind the 2007 distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on Estonia (its government.[and] we must assume that the Russian military has studied the lessons learned”. though not fully successful..http://www.” by the NCIX. ." .pdf] “Russia’s extensive attacks on U..S. (Chairman of Homeland Security Review Panel for GW University) "Cyber Threats from cyberattacks.S. Russia and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure. Web. http://www. Web. Frank.” .Russia’s 2008 combined cyber and kinetic attack on Georgia was the first practical test of this doctrine. does not alter the reality that activity undertaken by those hackers is state-sponsored and directly implicates Russia.pdf] “Ambassador David Smith notes: “Russia has integrated cyber operations into its military doctrine. “a national long-term strategic threat to the United States. 2013. Homeland Security Policy Institute. banks.

Aggression On January 2nd. but against a corrupt Western way of life in order to defend Russia’s distinct world view. which has complex and interrelated nature. Russia released it’s first National Security brief in 6 years that named the U.” a deputy chief of staff said recently. servants and priests. but its consequence. but responded to Western aggression. It replaces a 2009 version.confrontation> Now. it says. "both international and domestic" has caused "counteraction from the USA and its allies. It says Russia has managed to heighten its role in solving global problems and international /news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part. It is this sacred state which is under threat. was signed by President Vladimir Putin on New Year's Eve. but in imperial and even clerical ones (see article). a nationalist writer who backs Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox church.S." That in turn is likely to lead to "political. while others can do only what is in that leader’s interests. in order to shift the balance of nuclear power towards America. Dmitry Kiselev. In this view Russia did not start the war in Ukraine. the most important of which is a monopoly on state power." Narrative of opposition and adversarity → sanctions feed The Economist. “No Putin—no Russia. “Maybe some want to live in a semi-occupied state. was not the cause of Russia’s conflict with the West.broader-and-moredangerous.” said Mr Putin in 2013. "About the Strategy of National Security of Russian Federation".” The Donbas rebels are fighting not only the Ukrainian army. Alexander Prokhanov. the Russian state acquired religious A new appraisal names the United States as one of the threats to Russia's national security for the first time. America “wants to freeze the order established after the Soviet collapse and remain an absolute leader. Destabilising Ukraine is not enough to counter that force: the magnet itself must be neutralised. on the other an unconstrained state that can sacrifice its citizens’ interests to further its destiny or satisfy its rulers’ greed.” February 14th. and American soldiers are killing Russian proxies in the Donbas. by contrast. Mr Putin has said. the document says. Bluff or not. Russia had no choice but to act. By this he means its values. as a threat to Russian national security for the first time ever Vladimir Soldatkin.economist. including their Christian values. “has always been a state civilisation held together by the Russian people. the Soviet empire—he knows this is impossible—but to protect Russia’s sovereignty.” Russia has taken to arguing that it is not fighting Ukraine.Americanism is not only the reason for war and the main pillar of state power. 2 Jan 2016. Once Mr Yanukovych had gone. Both under communism and before it. but we do not. but by the European Union and NATO. as it once exported communism. the Russian language. The document. “We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries are in effect turning away from their roots. On one side are human rights. It sees them as “occupied” by America. compares European civilisation to a magnet attracting Ukraine and Russia. a sign of how relations with the west have deteriorated in recent years. http://www. American envoys offered Ukraine’s interim government $25 billion to place missile defences on the Russian border. .President Dmitry Medvedev. which are striving to retain their dominance in global affairs. Reuters. therefore. America would have found some other excuse Mr Putin’s purpose is not to rebuild to contain Russia. the Kremlin saw this as a threat to its model of governance. Anti. the current prime minister. When thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets demanding a Western-European way of life. Mr Putin sits at its apex. who has the undoubted support of the . endorsed by then. and entitled to its riches.” Mr Putin said recently. Behind Russia’s confrontation with the West lies a clash of ideas. which mentioned neither the United States not NATO. Conducting an independent policy. “From Cold War to Hot War. His former KGB colleagues—the Committee of State Security—are its guardians.reuters." the document says. The Ukrainian army is just a foreign legion of NATO. The Maidan uprising and ousting of Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president were engineered by American special services to move NATO closer to Russia’s borders. thinking it can do whatever it likes. even a decision about the use of nuclear arms “will be taken personally by Mr Putin. economical. "The strengthening of Russia happens against the background of new threats to the national security. Russia feels threatened not by any individual European state. That heightened role has caused a reaction by the West. Russia. “Putin names United States among threats in new Russian security strategy”. this reflects the Russian elite’s perception of the West as a threat to the Russian people” very existence of the Russian state. which it regards as expansionist. which seeks to exploit Western values to gain influence over the rest of the world. Anti-Westernism has been dressed not in communist clothes. according to Russia’s chief propagandist. Expropriating a private firm’s assets to benefit a state firm is therefore not an act of corruption. but America in Ukraine. Ukraine. military and informational pressure" on Russia. 2015 <www. an accountable bureaucracy and democratic elections. but also an ideology that Russia is trying to export to Europe. but an elite and hereditary calling. Even without Ukraine. Theirs is not a job.

Such a collision in the Baltic region. three were classified as carrying a high risk. The consequences of a military accident involving NATO and Russian military forces will surely be much more serious and dangerous for both sides.escalating Russia-West Military Tensions Before it’s Too Late” Friday 4 September 2015 <http://www. but the question now is how would this goal be best achieved in the current circumstances? To provide some solutions. for example by using surveillance aircraft and long-range strategic aviation. The key asset that Russia wants to keep under its control in order to continue pressuring the Kiev government on political matters and to support pro-Russian rebel groups in Eastern Ukraine is the long border with Ukraine. it has been reported that there is an increasing pattern of military activities on the part of both Russia and NATO. intensified geopolitical and geo. the West and Ukraine who view the current ceasefire as shaky and the renewal of heavy fighting between the parties quite possible. Indeed. Despite the fact that this agreement is more comprehensive than the first ceasefire agreement signed in September 2014 (although this was never implemented). Ö zdem Sanberk. the wider military build-up in the Euro-Atlantic area carries an immediate danger of military conflict as a result of a mistake or miscalculation by either side. The latest ceasefire agreement contains a number of measures to de-escalate the crisis and provides the basis for a political solution in the future.html> The Ukraine crisis has caused the biggest rift between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. first and foremost we need to look at where we are in the Ukraine crisis. many would agree with these words.Putin’s aggressiveness leads to military action and increased likelihood of conflict. Thus. the European Leadership escalating. there is not a single provision in the agreement that Ukrainian and pro-Russian rebels fully agree on. this cycle of continuous military activities carries a high risk – a picture reminiscent of the Cold War confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. as the Ukraine crisis remains unresolved. The ceasefire agreement. and has caused billions of dollars of destruction. and it has undermined international cooperation against common threats such as ISIS in the Middle East. Russia has also deployed additional air and sea defensive and offensive military equipment to Crimea. On both sides. This situation is not sustainable. Black Sea and some other regions is now not out of the question. Most agree that a renewal of heavy fighting would not bring any It is because of the ongoing risk success to Ukraine's 250. and other states. it is not difficult to find many analysts in Russia. The Position Paper argues that military exercises have also increased in size and number on both sides. a London based think-tank and one of the partners of the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe alongside my Ankara. Since March 2014.russia-west-military-tensions-before-its-too-late-_3091. It seems clear that Western countries inside and outside NATO will change their approach towards Russia only if Moscow demonstrates a more constructive position in the Ukraine crisis and Moscow itself is so far .000 rebels supported by Moscow. The conflict has also reverberated on a regional and global level in the form of an increased risk of military conflict between NATO and Russia.europeanleadershipnetwork. Of these military encounters. However. The crisis has resulted in thousands of deaths. Although NATO and Russian military forces as well as national armed forces have so far shown restraint in these military encounters and exercises. when one thinks of the reality of a confrontation occurring between a nuclear armed alliance and a nuclear armed state. is largely holding between Ukraine and pro-Russian rebels. and increased military activities. such a danger must be kept to a minimum even if it cannot totally be neutralized. and between the Russian military and those of Sweden and Finland. Russia continues to express that it is not a combatant in the conflict in Ukraine and so there is no need for Moscow to be bound by any provisions of the agreement. of the renewal of the conflict and an inability to prevent ceasefire violations that western countries extended sanctions against Russia until January 2016. including the downing of a Malaysian passenger jet over Ukrainian airspace in July 2014 that killed all 298 people on board.000 strong military forces in the face of a pro-Russian army of 100. As pointed out in that paper. It is the context of fragile ceasefire in Ukraine and ongoing disagreements between western countries and Russia on the Ukraine crisis that has not only maintained the risk of a renewal of the military clashes in Ukraine but also continues to increase the risk of military collision between NATO and Russian military forces. has identified 66 military incidents between NATO and own International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) in Russian forces. reflecting contradictory positions on the nature of the conflict. produced through the efforts of Germany and France on 18 February 2015. the risk of a military encounter between Russia and NATO during the recent period is well documented by the latest position paper of the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe. Director of the International Strategic Research Organisation “De. Perhaps most importantly.economic divisions.

European Union foreign ministers didn’t endorse broad new economic sanctions against Russia but pledged to step up diplomatic efforts in Kiev and Moscow. And NATO.nytimes.. militarily and economically Given both.wsj. October 2015. it is unlikely that Putin will consent to anything less than a bona fide geopolitical buffer zone.html?_r=0 Again. New York Times. “The Myth of Putin’s Strategic Genius”. or Kyiv dominance in the affairs which might take place below the 47th parallel.showing no signs of changing its own position. Putin has also been compelled to abandon the Novorossiya project: His proxies in eastern Ukraine neither enjoy popular support nor run an effective government. alliance in search of a mission. the empire Ronald Reagan had confused in his state of dementia. is now focused again on deterring Russia Mr. http://www. Nov 17. R/T McFaul Card McFaul attributes the end of the Novorossiya policy not to sanctions but to the inability of Putin to gain influence in Ukraine Michael McFaul. The most important factor in the meantime. once an . October 2015. http://www. And his actions have guaranteed that Ukraine will never join his Eurasian Economic Union or line up with Russia again. Pravda Report. historic reality and Russia's uncompromising desire for self-preservation as an influential regional power. therefore. And no bully-nation or criminal sanctions will hold Vladimir Putin hostage to the true evil empire. Georgian Leader Warn of Russia’s Cold War-Style Meddling Abroad. R/T Abandoned NovoRossiya Expansion plans won’t stop until Putin has his buffer zone Ben The leaders’ warnings reflected recognition in European capitals that sanctions haven’t deterred Russian President Vladimir Putin from seeking to increase the Kremlin’s sway beyond the costs of these brief gains piled up. Merkel. one which will preclude NATO membership for Ukraine. or east of the 35th meridian. the Russian economy has shrunk to $1. http://www. 2014.pravdareport. “Phoenix rose from ashes. is the need to keep the mutual military activities of Russia and NATO under control Even EU officials have admitted sanctions don’t work ANTON TROIANOVSKI. As a result of sanctions and falling energy prices.. In Brussels on Monday. . Novorossiya will rise from Western sanctions”.2 trillion from $2 trillion in 2014.

uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-fears-big-war-as-russia-sends-in-more-troops- 10457571.000 armoured troop carriers reported to be at “full combat readiness”. the firing of banned “Grad” multiple-rocket launch systems restarted last Wednesday evening. He has multiple channels to attack Ukraine. THe Independent.R/T Instituted Ceasefire At best. according to reports from the country’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) seen by The Independent on Sunday. 15 August 2015. According to SBU official Oleksandr Tkachuk. According to retired U. "Russian special services are intensifying their activities in peaceful cities.400 so-called “illegal armed mechanised assault units and communications command systems. the recent surge is worrying.000 Russian Federation Armed Forces personnel are believed to be based inside Ukraine.newsweek. 15 August 2015.independent. formations” of Russian-backed separatist soldiers inside eastern Ukraine. Almost 9. who visited Ukraine seven times in 2015. “Ukraine fears 'big war' as Russia sends in more troops”.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-fears-big-war-as-russia-sends-in-more-troops- 10457571. The rest are based in the neighbouring Rostov region of Russia. . implemented back in February after talks in Minsk. economically.They’re increasing sabotage and terrorism IHOR KOZAK. raising fears of a substantial escalation in the conflict raging in Ukraine's eastern regions. trying to destabilize the situation and trying to show that Ukrainian law enforcement bodies and Ukrainian authorities are not able to protect their citizens. THe Independent. Army General Wesley Clark. politically. While the levels of fighting have decreased since there is concern at the number of violations of a ceasefire agreement. including This is in addition to 33. in order to achieve its long-term strategic goals." Recent developments on the security front within Ukraine's borders are disturbing. The Ukrainian security service (SBU) and other law enforcement agencies report a significant increase in acts of sabotage and terrorism. militarily.html Western officials have been quick to talk of their “concern” at the rise in the number of attacks and rocket fire between Ukrainian forces and the Russian-backed separatists in recent days. that was aimed at ending the conflict. Newsweek. "Ukraine is a work in progress by Putin. “Ukraine fears 'big war' as Russia sends in more troops”. Specifically. former NATO Supreme Allied Commander. For example.html Military authorities in Ukraine believe the number of Russian troops within and close to its borders has risen to more than 50.S. with dozens of separate Grad rocket attacks recorded through to yesterday [SAT] morning. Recent uptick in ceasefire agreement and instability in Ukraine Adam Nathan. with 400 main battle tanks and close to 2. the Kremlin's leadership is emphasizing alternative aspects of hybrid warfare." Russian troops built up near Ukraine recently increased to 50K. 12/25/15 PUTIN PLOTS TO MAKE UKRAINE A FAILED STATE And so it seems that. Ukrainians worried about escalation. 33K separatists at “full combat readiness” Adam Nathan. russia is simply changing the way it attempts to destabilise Ukraine . diplomatically. http://www.000.

On the other. Peace Remains Elusive. However. Opinion: Putin’s Syria Card in the Ukraine Conflict. On the one hand. have been removed from the front lines. in turn. it is not expected that the Minsk agreement will be fulfilled in 2016. December 31. Moscow is working to ensure that the situation in Donbass becomes what is known as a "frozen conflict. 1-5-16. Russia is pushing Ukraine and the Europeans to give the separatist territories more autonomy with constitutional amendments. the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe has been largely responsible for monitoring both sides of the conflict since the signing of the last .com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/12/31/as-ukraine- enters-2016-peace-remains-elusive/ DOA: 1-4-16 The multinational watchdog group. DOA 1-5-16 But the increased Russian involvement in Syria can be understood only by viewing it through the prism of Ukraine. making it difficult to move toward a lasting resolution of the conflict. prescribed by the Minsk II agreement. As Ukraine Enters 2016. http://neurope. 2015. between Russia and the separatist territories first. Their evidence is old – fighting increased at the end of December Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a staff writer and a former Marine infantryman. Vladimir Putin wants the sanctions imposed on Russia to be enters-2016-peace-remains-elusive/ DOA: 1-4-16 Despite a ceasefire signed in February that was supposed to have been completely implemented by the start of 2016. As Ukraine Enters 2016. but Kiev and the West insist that Moscow must give back control of the border The two sides are interpreting the Minsk agreement differently. such as tanks and artillery. _ Fighting has not been reduced Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a staff writer and a former Marine infantryman. The labyrinth of transatlantic prosperity.ukraine-conflict/a-18956434. http://www.dw. New Europe. Their existence would be called into question if the Minsk II agreement were fully implemented and Kyiv regained control over its own border with Russia.transatlantic-prosperity/ DOA: 1-5-16 The Minsk talks saw some success in September and Russia and Ukraine have made very little progress in broader strategic when the cease-fire between pro-Russia separatists and Ukrainian security forces was observed almost completely. The fulfillment of Minsk II is.washingtonpost. Instead.washingtonpost. he wants Ukraine to be destabilized to the point that its road to Europe is obstructed. Peace Remains Elusive. 1-4-16. Minsk agreements not being implemented David McCalister. but fighting has more recently increased along the line of contact between the two sides in eastern Ukraine and there is still a failure to advance the political components of the Minsk agreements. the prospect of peace in Ukraine remains elusive. October. December 31. https://www.the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). both sides still clash daily. That is the purpose served by the Moscow-dependent power structures in eastern Ukraine . While some heavy weapons. as they are being hesitant about changing the constitution to grant more autonomy to the regions - especially in the disputed east . a requirement for the lifting of Western sanctions. The war in the country’s east between government troops and Russian-backed separatists — periodic lulls in the fighting notwithstanding — has remained largely unchanged since earlier this year.January Specific Russia blocking Minsk II implementation DW." And Ukrainian politicians are playing into the hands of Moscow. https://www.

In December there was a marked increase in fighting. Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan. A spokesman for the Ukrainian troops. On Thursday the OSCE’s chief monitor for its mission to Ukraine. but reiterated that a true ceasefire is a way off. According to the monitoring group’s reports. On Sunday. there have been multiple reports regarding the use of BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems.” Apakan said in a statement. villagers stated that separatist troops had entered the town. The small village is in a grey zone between government and separatist forces.Minsk agreement. OSCE observers came under fire from separatist forces near Kominternovo after heading to the village to investigate if it had. Anton Myronovych called the move a “large-scale provocation. according to a Monday report.” during an interview with a Ukrainian television station. along with tanks and other vehicles entered the town of Kominternovo near the strategic port city of Mariupol. in fact. a weapon explicitly banned by the Minsk ceasefire. expressed hope for peace. Last week. the OSCE could not confirm if Russian-backed separatist troops were still in the town because they were restricted from proceeding past its western border. however. especially around the city of Donetsk. .“The fact that the number of ceasefire violations in the last weeks of December had increased again in eastern Ukraine reflects a worrying development as the year ends. been taken over and to conduct crater analysis following fresh fighting there. In addition to heavy machine guns and mortars. The villagers also recalled hearing armored vehicles at night. Ukrainian forces reported that separatist troops.

an adviser to Ms Le Pen. SUZANNE. “In The Kremlins Pocket”. 2015. "It’s Time to Kill the Feel-Good Myth of Sanctions. As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss put it in “The menace of unreality”. “From Cold war to Hot war”. With no sign of Russia knuckling under. 9 June many pro-Russian. how long can the sanctions and isolation continue and to what end?” Russia funds divisive politics in West The Economist. “In The Kremlins Pocket”. <http://foreignpolicy. 14th Feb who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket Russia has already found a use for its European friends: to legitimise (to some) its dodgy elections. independent election observers.Political Warfare Putin has now created a “spate” of policies counter to western ideals. the question becomes. from creating his own credit agency to financing European green parties that will oppose fracking and compound dependency on Russian oil — aimed to thwart his antagonists and undermine their efforts to isolate him. . http://www. Among them were Mr Kovacs and Aymeric Chauprade. 04 dangerous-confrontation Mr Putin’s most devious strategy." Foreign who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket POPULIST parties of both right and left. Russian media falsely portrayed these lackeys as official. however. Russia used fringe politicians to legitimize aggression The Economist. A motley crew of populists were flown in to give ringing endorsements of the Crimea referendum and the election in the Donbas. is to destabilise the EU through fringe political parties (see article). N. Web. 14th Feb 2015. This has raised fears of a coherent pro- Russian block forming in Strasbourg.” _ Pro-Russian parties took ¼ of EU seats The Economist. 14th Feb 2015.economist. organised by separatists. http://www. sanctions seem to have galvanized Putin in pursuing a spate of policies — everything “If anything. taking between them a quarter of the seats. a paper on Russian soft power: “The aim is to exacerbate divides [in the West] and create an echo-chamber of Kremlin support.p. http://www.economist.sanctions-russia-iran/>. Russia’s approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right groups..economist. did well in last May’s European elections. NOSSEL.

” . The First Coastal Division is one of several groups that have received foreign military support including Russian air strikes in Syria's Latakia province killed a rebel commander and four other fighters from a group armed by President Bashar al-Assad's foreign enemies. “More than 90%’ of Russian airstrikes in Syria have not targeted ISIS. The group. a spokesman for the group said on Tuesday. He said a further 15 civilians had been killed in the air strike in Jabal Akrad. which fights under the umbrella of the "Free Syrian Army". http://www. and then struck the same target again after rescue workers had arrived on the scene.theguardian. Ahmad said a fighter trained in the use of the anti-tank TOW missiles had also been killed. confirmed the death of its chief of staff. targetting-isis. a rural. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights earlier put the death toll at 45 rebels and civilians. The attack on Monday evening marked the third time Russian war planes have targeted the First Coastal Division group since Moscow began its air strikes in support of President Bashar al-Assad on Sept.reuters. mountainous area in the province. the US State Department said on Wednesday. Reuters “Third Russian air strike on Syrian rebel group kills leader”. 30.“Greater than 90% of the strikes that we’ve seen them take to date have not been against Isil or al- Qaida-affiliated terrorists. the group's spokesman Fadi Ahmad said. 2016. Accessed January 14. US says”. Russia’s military strikes in Syria have not been aimed at the Islamic State group or jihadists tied to al-Qaida. A large majority of and have instead targeted the moderate Syrian opposition. the most potent weapon in the rebels' arsenal. formerly a captain in the Syrian military.Support to Syria Russia Killed the FSA’s mans.Oct 20.-made anti-tank missiles. Published October 7. The Russian jets had struck one of the group's headquarters. 90% Russian airstrikes against Assad opposition (Daily Mail) (Daily Mail).S. Basil Zamo. 2015 http://www.” said spokesman John Kirby.“ They’ve been largely against opposition groups that want a better future for Syria and don’t want to see the Assad regime stay in power.

The coefficient for the remaining population variable-- POPGROWTH--had the expected negative sign but was insignificant at any conventionally accepted level of significance.29 percent. April 2001. Of course. The negative constant shows that in the absence of the independent variables.695--not an insignificant amount. as expected. the most interesting result produced a one percent by this estimation procedure was the negative and significant coefficient for the military spending variable--DEFENSE.69% (logic: funded by new money) John Aiyedogbon. For example.Brinksmanship with NATO NATO Military Spending Bad 1% increase in military spending decreases income by $3. https://www.69 percent while a one percent increase in capital military expenditure is capable of decreasing inflation by 0. Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology. Bigham University. inflation rate in Nigeria would be negative. The estimated coefficient for government spending less military spending--GOVERNMENT--was positive but insignificant.pdf Also. only recurrent military expenditure is statistical significant in explaining inflation in Nigeria. June 2014. 1% increase in military spending increases inflation by .rose-hulman.pdf Table 4. None of these results were unexpected or at odds with most other published studies. However. http://rah-net.695 Dale Bremmer.3 further shows that the impact of capital military expenditure and exchange rate on inflation rate are negative while recurrent military expenditure. “Military Spending: Is the Peace Dividend real or Illusory”. In fact. LFORCE--the percentage of the population between ages 15 and 64--had a positive and significant impact on GDP. . according to the estimates increase in military spending reduces per capita GDP by $3. expenditure has the tendency to increase inflation by “Impact of Military Expenditure on Inflation in Nigeria 1980-2012”. interest rate and money supply a one percent increase in recurrent military exert positive influence on inflation in Nigeria within the period under Review of Arts and Humanities.

Putin’s announcement of a pullback of Russian forces from the Ukraine border was likely to help calm the situation there before presidential elections scheduled for china. Russia Will Turn to China Heritage. This is huge. But it could also be seen as a gesture to Chinese sensitivities about separatism.S. “Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China”. boasts to have isolated Russia because of Ukraine. "Who Made the Pivot to Asia? Putin. If The West Isolates Charles. 22 May 2014. Forcing home the symbolism of his trip. Reuters. In Shanghai. given Beijing’s continuing troubles with Tibet.washingtonpost.html?tid=pm_opinions_pop. . “Putin looks to Asia as West threatens to isolate Russia”. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a spectacular energy deal — $400 billion of Siberian natural gas to be exported to China over 30 years. And now Putin has just ostentatiously unveiled a signal 30-year energy partnership with the world’s second-largest economy. but still very loud) to cut European imports of Russian gas. a trusted lieutenant was making his way to Asia to shore up ties with Russia's eastern allies. Russia Pulling Back Troops to Appease China MacFarquhar. The Russia-China deal also makes a mockery of U. Igor Sechin gathered media in Tokyo the next day to warn Western governments that more sanctions over Moscow's seizure of the Black Sea peninsula from Ukraine would be counter-productive. 2014. the Uighurs and scores of lesser-known ethnic and religious minorities. Published May When President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty this week annexing Crimea to great fanfare in the Kremlin and anger in the West.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0 Mr. 2014.nytimes. Putin has just defiantly demonstrated that he has other places to go.reuters.krauthammer-who-made-the-pivot-to-asia- putin/2014/05/22/091a48ee-e1e3-11e3-9743. The New York Times. Some isolation.Geopolitical Shift China Russia Has Made Pivot To China Krauthammer. By indelibly linking producer and consumer — the pipeline alone is a $70!billion infrastructure project — it deflates the post-Ukraine Western threat (mostly empty. Not even Germany wants to risk a serious rupture with Russia (hence the absence of significant sanctions). Published May 19. http://www. Neil. The Washington Post. Timothy." Washington Post. http://www. http://www.bb9b59cde7b9_story.

Neil. Moscow needs an alternative… The centerpiece of Mr. is expected to allow the issue on to the agenda for dinner. "Syria Crisis: China Joins Russia in Opposing Military Strikes. China. Moscow will look East for new business. Rosneft.” said Vasily china. The two have been haggling over the deal for a decade. military contracts and political alliances. was clear: If Europe and the United States isolate Russia. “Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China”. a China expert at the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) think thank. if only to let Washington and Western Europe know that it has other markets for its gas and important friends in the world. energy deals. Putin’s two-day visit to China could well be a long-stalled deal with Russia to ship natural gas from new Siberian fields to China starting around 2019. China will militarily back up Russia over the US based on the Syria crisis Wintour. 05 Sept. If it can be signed when Putin visits China in If China supports you. a key strategic priority.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0 The crisis in relations with the West over Ukraine has made ties to Asia." said Vasily Kashin. they have no alternative. http://www. With Europe trying to wean itself off Russian gas.theguardian. “China has joined Russia in opposing military strikes on Syria.strikes. saying it would push up oil prices and create an economic downturn. no one can say you're isolated. a . Guardian News and Media. "The worse Russia's relations are with the West.” NATO Sanctions Will Force Russia To Make a Gas Deal with China MacFarquhar. Published May 19. Web. “Because of this current disaster in our relations with the West." Theguardian. The Holy Grail for Moscow is a natural gas supply deal with China that is apparently now close after years of negotiations. The Russian president. and the possibility of far more serious Western sanctions looming should the crisis deepen. A strong alliance would suit both countries as a counterbalance to the United States.nytimes. he will be able to hold it up to show that global power has shifted eastwards and he does not need the West. 2014. Kashin. Patrick. reflecting the reality that the fate of the world economy is inextricably intertwined with the risk of a Middle East conflagration. http://www. Experts anticipate that Russia is finally prepared to come to terms.The underlying message from the head of Russia's biggest oil company. The New York Times. the closer Russia will want to be to China. 2013.The Chinese intervention came as G20 leaders gathered in Saint Petersburg on Thursday for a summit likely to be dominated by a China expert at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Vladimir Putin. but could not agree on a price for the gas. and particularly relations with its economic engine.

21 May 2014.krauthammer-who-made-the-pivot-to-asia- putin/2014/05/22/091a48ee-e1e3-11e3-9743.” said Ildar Davletshin.” Gas Deal Threatens US Global Power Krauthammer. “They need to go to Asia to make any deals possible as quickly as possible. the head of oil and gas research at Renaissance Capital. This is an open challenge to the post-Cold War. Emerging China-Russia Military Alliance Threatens US Interests "China Calls for New Security Pact with Russia. http://www. 22 May 2014. If carried through.Moscow policy organization.with-russia-iran/. China and Russia together represent the core of a new coalition of anti-democratic autocracies challenging the Western-imposed. but because it will open the road for further. much bigger agreements in natural gas and other raw materials.” Russia needs new markets because it is hugely dependent on commodity exports. Their enhanced partnership marks the first emergence of a global coalition against American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The retreat is compounded by Obama’s proposed massive cuts in defense spending (down to below 3 percent of GDP by 2017) even as Russia is rearming and China is creating a sophisticated military soon capable of denying America access to the waters of the Pacific Rim. Charles. but a struggle nonetheless — for dominion and domination. with communism dead. with sanctions escalating. It marks a major alteration in the global balance of power. Kashin “There will be a natural gas agreement. Xi Jinping proposed a brand-new continental security system to include Russia and Iran (lest anyone mistake its anti-imperialist essence) and exclude America. “Russia has become more desperate to get a real outlet." Washington Post. China's president called Tuesday for the creation of a new Asian structure for security cooperation based on a regional group that includes Russia and Iran and excludes the US. given the threat of sanctions. at this week’s Asian cooperation conference.-dominated world that Obama inherited and then weakened beyond imagining. . Web. http://www. The Washington Post. one not — though. “There is no more time. Financing from China would also help offset reluctance by Western banks to extend new loans. "Who Made the Pivot to Asia? Putin.” Mr. post-Cold War status quo. it would mark the end of a quarter-century of unipolarity. U. an investment bank." CBSNews. which is very important not for the agreement itself. And herald a return to a form of bipolarity — two global coalitions: one free.html?tid=pm_opinions_pop This alignment of the world’s two leading anti-Western powers all the more significant. Not a fight to the finish. CBS Interactive.cbsnews. not as structurally rigid or ideologically dangerous as Cold War bipolarity. earning some 67 percent of its export income from oil and gas alone.washingtonpost.bb9b59cde7b9_story. Indeed.

Gas Deal Will Lead to a More Broad and Threatening Alliance MacFarquhar. The New York Times. agricultural processing and transportation infrastructure." said Xi. with large parts of the world lining up against them and expressing strong concerns over their behavior. The proposal marks the latest effort by Beijing to build up groups of Asian or developing governments to offset the influence of the United States and other Western governments in global affairs. Babbage said. and President Xi Jinping was one of the few world leaders to put in an appearance at the Winter Olympics in Sochi. experts said. There is no current land link to the annexed territory. http://www. . That earned China special praise from Mr. an obscure group that has taken on significance as Beijing tries to extend its influence and limit the role of the United china. mining. speaking to an audience that included President Vladimir Putin of Russia and leaders of Central Asian countries. Gaddy noted. 2014. "There's an interesting synergy from shared circumstances.S. The Russians are hoping that China will also agree to help build a bridge linking the mainland to the Crimean port of Kerch. “Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China”. Both Putin and Xi are grappling with economic and political challenges and being assertive abroad can help to build nationalist support at home.Russia over Ukraine and China over its territorial disputes and U. Neil. Published May 19. the Obama administration has virtually ignored that it is pushing Russia toward greater dependence on China. Russia and China are also scheduled to hold joint naval exercises in China toward the end of the month.” Mr. Putin mentioned possible joint projects in airplanes and helicopters. China abstained from a United Nations Security Council vote in March rejecting the referendum that Russia organized in Crimea before annexing it. "We need to innovate our security cooperation (and) establish new regional security cooperation architecture. but both sides tend to keep those secret. accusations of cyber spying.President Xi Jinping spoke at a meeting in Shanghai of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building measures in Asia. lending not only valuable expertise but also tacit endorsement of an annexation that much of the world considers illegal.nytimes. so details might not emerge for some months. Other technical and military cooperation agreements will also be discussed.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0 In highlighting that the sanctions are helping to disrupt the Russian economy. Mr. which it sees as a strategic rival. Aside from what he described as a “strategic energy alliance. Putin's presence at the meeting was significant for China-Russia relations at a time when both are diplomatically isolated -." he said. Putin in his speech announcing the annexation.

If sales of high-tech kits to China continue. "Russian Sanctions Might Be Obama's Greatest Blunder | OilPrice. and have begun to protect each other at international forums like the United Nations. Taiwan and India. will now also run up against Russian pipeline gas through China. But the sale of S-400 missiles not only reduces Russia's technological superiority over China. cut-off of sea bourn energy supplies.Greatest- Blunder. Josh.. Currently russia and china are actively working together to stop the spread of if China and other authoritarian states like Iran and Russia can form a more coherent bloc. “The China Syndrome” Carnegie Endowment. Russia’s Asian pivot also improves the Chinese military capacities Berke. N.http://carnegieendowment. within international bodies China argues that sovereignty trumps any need for international intervention in a country. Already. 07 Dec. is to help repair a major hole in China’s military Kurlantzick. this is a gift that fulfills its wildest dreams.S. this sovereignty- first principle could become a concerted challenge to democratic nations.themoscowtimes. it also shifts the military balance between China and its neighbors. It’s also a gift that could severely undermine the West's plans to deliver expensive Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) to China and Asia. it may be evidence that Moscow sees less need to fear military competition on its Eastern border." OilPrice. and more room for cooperation. and Central Asian authoritarian states have issued joint communiqués denouncing the export of democracy. “Russia Can’t Replace the West with China”. China has long been an important arms export market for Russia. 25 Jan. in that one move. Robert. The Moscow Times. which until now was one of the greatest fears of Chinese military strategists. What Russia has done. especially Japan. the Kremlin ensured that Russian forces maintained a technological edge. but the Kremlin's recent decision to sell S-400 surface-to-air missiles to China marks an important shift.html>.html The second sign of improving ties is military relations. To this end. Web. . while already facing competition from Qatar and Australia 2007. 2015. making it invulnerable to a U. Russia's arms exports to China were limited by the geopolitical rivalry between Moscow and Beijing. thereby undermining the rationale for Western states to fund democracy promotion in developing nations.p. In the long run. Accessed 2015. At the same time. August 2014. In the past. From the Chinese perspective. http://www. <http://oilprice.Military Shift → increasing arms sales China Christopher Miller. China.

http://www. 2014." The Huffington Post. 28 Mar. Moscow finds a closer strategic ally in Tehran. its current . Majid. TheHuffingtonPost.Iran Russia will support Iran in their Nuclear Endeavors Rafizadeh.bolstering_b_5045450.The Ukraine crisis and Russia-West standoff might not interfere with reaching a final nuclear deal between Tehran and the P5+1. Web.” Iran and Russia will become much closer politically Rafizadeh.N. can now focus more on their own terms and agenda. but the terms of the agreement are likely to be much less strict on Tehran as Russia and the Islamic Republic strengthen ties and feel less pressured to cooperate or make concessions to the rafizadeh/ukraine-crisis. Several other crucial reasons contribute to this geopolitical security (President of the International American Council) "Ukraine Crisis Bolstering Iran-Russia-China Axis. Iran's state-run Press TV announced that Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani agreed that Moscow would build two additional nuclear power plants for Tehran and construct new facilities next to Iran's power plant in the city of Bushehr." in response to the actions taken by the United States and the European Union. working to resist the West and retain their strategic depth in the region. Moscow is more likely to play the "Iran card" on Ukraine by changing its stance on Iran's nuclear talks. In addition." The Huffington Post. China has followed the Russian position in the nuclear negotiations.bolstering_b_5045450. Last week. sanctions against Iran and later condemned the unilateral sanctions).html “If the Russian-West standoff over Ukraine crisis continues. and its demands on Iran's nuclear program. Generally. is likely to become less firm. While the Western powers attempt to significantly scale back and reduce Tehran's centrifuges from approximately Moscow has been far more lenient.html “As the current Western-Russian tensions continue and due to the geopolitical security interests shared between Russia and Iran. First of all. Web. including building nuclear reactors for Iran. in retaliation and high- stakes gamble to counter sanctions by the United States and the European rafizadeh/ukraine-crisis. 28 Mar. Russia and China (who reluctantly supported the four rounds of U.huffingtonpost. According to the Interfax news agency. As the current Ukrainian crisis continues. Majid. pointing out that it is willing to accept a final deal with a Tehran retaining most of its nuclear infrastructure and keeping even nearly 20. Moscow finds no better geopolitical ally than the Islamic Republic. TheHuffingtonPost.000 centrifuges to a few thousand.huffingtonpost. the Ukrainian crisis makes both Russia and the Islamic Republic much closer due to the convergence of interests and geopolitical objectives between Putin and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in resisting Western hegemony in the Middle East. for China. http://www. 2014.000 centrifuges. Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov pointed out that Moscow may have to use the Iranian talks to "raise the stakes. The Russian position. (President of the International American Council) "Ukraine Crisis Bolstering Iran-Russia-China Axis.

and Beijing closer to one another to counterbalance the West and resist Western hegemony. The Ukraine crisis has moved Moscow.interests are to strengthen strategic ties with Moscow and Tehran for security.” . providing a platform for them to create the strategic geopolitical axis in the region. Tehran.

nato. Diversifying away from Russia is within grasp but will come at a security premium. Parallel to a push for increased usage of renewables and energy efficiency. Transatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis: A blessing in disguise? http://www. Transatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis: A blessing in disguise? http://www. cybersecurity and strategic energy relations with partner countries.htm “The Ukraine-crisis will help Europe confront its energy security challenges and may bring closer the transatlantic alliance on energy Ukraine-crisis/EN/index.” . The EU is in a good position to access external gas supplies.Natural Gas Suspension EU struggling with foreign fossil fuel dependence.nato.” Other gas routes are unstable since they go through regions of political and hard security risk The NATO Review. 1. But there are three strategic dilemmas that the transatlantic partners will need to respond to in the coming years. unconventional gas production may potentially offset the declining conventional production on the continent. suspension of Russian natural gas harmful The NATO Review. Europe will need to consider its own indigenous unconventional gas potential. At the same time virtually all existing and prospective external gas supply sources and routes are fraught with political and hard security risks the EU and NATO will have to be acutely aware of and grapple with for decades to Ukraine-crisis/EN/index. It is worth recalling that the Ukraine-crisis occurs at a time when the European Union - similar to other major global consumers with the notable exception of the United States – is struggling with increasing fossil fuel import dependence and huge import bills. critical energy infrastructure protection inside and outside EU and Alliance territory. While it is unlikely that Europe will be able to replicate the American unconventional revolution.htm “2. as it is surrounded by major producing regions. This will require a strategic rethinking of co- operation and burden sharing on issues such as energy intelligence gathering and analysis.

businesses and military figures. On this.” Russia funds divisive politics in West The Economist.html>. http://www. <http://www.SPIEGEL ONLINE. who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket POPULIST parties of both right and eu-economic-sanctions. 14th Feb 2015. BBC News." SPIEGEL ONLINE International.” Pro-Russian parties took ¼ of EU seats The Economist. 2 Mar. 14th Feb 2015. did well in last May’s European elections.Splinters NATO Sanction debate causing divide between NATO countries Peter Apps. is to destabilise the EU through fringe political parties (see article). Russian gas makes it particularly vulnerable to Russian reprisals. and the eurozone's economic recovery remains fragile. and Ralf Neukirch. But the US does far less business with Russia. “In The Kremlins Pocket”. in the end. however. Merkel is afraid that. dividing the Europeans. taking between them a quarter of the seats. including those beyond President Putin's inner circle. . Europe's reliance on sanctions. a paper on Russian soft power: “The aim is to exacerbate divides [in the West] and create an echo- chamber of Kremlin support. As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss put it in “The menace of unreality”. Denying particular technology used in agriculture and metal processing could also boost the effect of But the West seems unwilling to tackle Russia's energy sector." BBC News. “There is likely to be a split between the EU and US on the possibility of widening economic sanctions. 2014. and could go much further that Europe. the US would be alone. their differences in opinion make themselves felt in internal “Although the 28 EU member states try hard to project a sense of unity to the outside world. European firms have much closer ties with Russia. 12 May 2014. Experts believe the first step would be widening that sanctions list.economist. New sanctions could target a wider selection of state companies. This has raised fears of a coherent pro- Russian block forming in Strasbourg. many pro-Russian. "Russian Dilemma: Why EU Sanctions Are a Bluff dangerous-confrontation Mr Putin’s most devious strategy. "West's options: Russia's Ukraine challenge. Web. http://www. Jö rg Schindler. http://www. “From Cold war to Hot war”. Russia’s approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right groups. It has already imposed sanctions on Bank Rossiya and imposed asset freezes and visa bans on Russian politicians.” Triggers disunity Schult. the Union's disunity could spill into the open and Putin would have accomplished one of his important goals.economist. 5 May 2014.

Restricting business with Russia hurts Europe more than the U. He may be calculating that if he holds out. and Europe because of asymmetry in economic impact. Among them were Mr Kovacs and Aymeric Chauprade.S. A motley crew of populists were flown in to give ringing endorsements of the Crimea referendum and the election in the Donbas. use of sanctions is riling some beyond the target countries”.S. an adviser to Ms Le Pen.S. Europeans will eventually cut back their sanctions because of the economic pain to companies in their own countries. perhaps in who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket Russia has already found a use for its European friends: to legitimise (to some) its dodgy elections. “U.html Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no sign that he intends to reverse the annexation of Crimea or ease support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.latimes. is causing strain with Europe. computer systems.S.S. . 14th Feb 2015. Russian officials have threatened to halt cooperation with the U.economist.Russia used fringe politicians to legitimize aggression The Economist.S.S. on placing pressure on countries such as Iran and Syria. In the meantime. Europe feels 10 times as much pain as U. Russia and other targets of sanctions have other ways to retaliate. Russian media falsely portrayed these lackeys as official. “In The Kremlins Pocket”. L. because Europe has 10 times more trade with Russia. independent election observers. January 2015. Sanctions dividing U. intelligence officials have seen worrisome signs that Russians have been breaching unclassified U. Times. Paul RIchter. organised by separatists. interests. which could damage http://www. And U.A. http://www. Schott said. America's eagerness for sanctions. for example. particularly the moves against Russia.

their growth rate five years prior to being sanctioned averages 2. while political elites remain insulated from the coercion (Andreas 2005. Weiss 1999. 240-264. Below.4% and their inflation rate averages 48%. 240-264. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. First warrant explained in greater detail Dursun Peksen & A. 1997).502436 This view of sanctions is problematic. Second warrant explained in greater detail Dursun Peksen & A. Gibbons 1999.2010. International Interactions.g. A growing body of literature shows that economic coercion hardly harms the coercive capacity of the targeted regimes. International Interactions.1080/03050629. a cost that Hufbauer et al. International Interactions. DOI: 10. (2008) estimate to be 3. economic sanctions can cause significant .502436 Economic sanctions inadvertently help the targeted regime consolidate authoritarian power by enabling elites to enhance their ties with the key political supporters.3% of GNP on average. 240-264.1080/03050629. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy.1080/03050629.2010.3 Second. DOI: 10. however. On the contrary.Democratic Backsliding Two warrants for why sanctions decrease democracy Dursun Peksen & A. we discuss how each aspect of this argument thwarts political freedoms. sanctions generate new incentives for the state to restrict democratic freedoms by (1) creating audience costs if the leadership concedes to the sender’s demands and (2) providing encouraging signals to domestic opposition groups to be more active. we argue that sanctions consolidate the regime’s power and create incentives within the target that lead the regime to restrict the democratic freedoms of citizens in order to preserve its hold on power.6 Therefore. Peksen 2009. the typical sanction causes a real reduction in the overall wealth of the target.2010. growing economies. Weiss et al.5 Most countries targeted with sanctions do not have robust. 36:3. 36:3. while at the same time economically disrupting its opposition groups (e. 36:3. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. First. DOI: 10. Deriving insight from this research. sanctions also provide new incentives to restrict political rights of opposition groups. the country’s economy must bear that cost. Once sanctions are imposed on the target.502436 In addition to consolidating the regime’s hold on power. the target leadership can use the economic disruption (caused by sanctions) as a strategic tool to manipulate access to and redistribute resources made scarce by sanctions to enhance its authority and subsequently to weaken opposition groups. First. sanctions generally harm the socioeconomic and political status of average civilians. an opposition party or an anti-regime social or political movement) to sustain their political relevance..

502436 To put these results in perspective.domestic political costs for the target. 36:3.2010. limited sanctions cause only a 6% decline in democracy in target countries. First. DOI: 10. the anticipated audience costs caused by conceding to external economic pressure—especially to the pressures demanding more domestic reforms—create an incentive for the regime to be less conciliatory toward foreign coercion and gives another excuse to employ repression against opposition groups to show the regime’s determination against any external pressure. 240-264. Using the Freedom House regime measure. 240-264. Impact: 6% decrease in democracy for partial sanctions (basically smart sanctions) and 16% for regular. It is possible that instead of sanctions causing a deterioration of democratic freedom. DOI: 10. if it concedes to the sender’s demands (Galtung 1967. The substantive effects of extensive and limited sanctions illustrate the much greater negative impact on political liberalization from extensive sanctions. but perhaps most importantly. the leadership is likely to surmise that conceding to the foreign pressure will decrease their legitimacy and support in the country. while the democracy score drops by more than 16% when extensive sanctions are employed. Schultz 1998). we address the endogeneity issue.2010. our model predicts a 7% reduction in the average political liberties score the year after the sender state initiated sanctions. we use the first differenced model (column 2 in Table 1) to show how large the immediate impact economic sanctions have on the target country. democratic states have used sanctions in reaction to authoritarian coups in the past. International Interactions. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. Specifically. Dursun Peksen & A.1080/03050629. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. While we tried to make a strong argument that economic coercion changes the conditions and incentives within the target that lead to suppression of democratic freedoms. if we change the lag structure of the model so that the sanctions variable is lagged more than one year.502436 Finally. Specifically. the results remain .1080/03050629. Controls for reverse causality in two ways: Dursun Peksen & A. When an external actor demands policy changes from another regime. International Interactions. Morgan and Schwebach 1997). see also Fearon 1994. the targeted leadership usually perceives the foreign pressure as a threat to sovereignty and particularly to regime survival (Morgan 1995. Hence. there is also considerable empirical evidence that sanctions are the cause rather than the effect. 36:3. Certainly. Such actions of restricting political pluralism and participation by the political leadership in the face of sanctions also demonstrate to the public the regime’s strength and resolve against challenges to its leadership. antidemocratic actions by the regime cause economic sanctions to be initiated.

1080/03050629. Dursun Peksen & A. https://www. Instead. we used economic. The difference. was around 13 . International Interactions. Maddala 1983). which we regard as the estimated effect of democracy. and while the size of the coefficient grew somewhat smaller. for example. and four years. The results showed that sanctions still had a significant. 240-264.significant. disrupts their political viability to pressure the government for more political reform and openness. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. financial asset freezes or international travel bans on the political elites will not worsen the economic well-being of the opposition. Stanford University. January 2011. “The Democratic Peace: An Experimental Approach”. roughly 34% of respondents wanted to attack a nondemocratic target. The level of democracy was not associated with sanctions. “Smart” sanctions that directly aim at the target leadership might help decrease the corrosive impact that the sanctions with no Democracy reduces likelihood of attack by 13% Michael Tomz. to argue that a reduction in democratic freedoms in one year would cause sanctions to be levied four years earlier. We used the same independent variables for the first model as in all of the democracy models. In the second equation (predicting sanctions). 36:3. We lagged the sanction variable one. in turn.. while the four-lag specification provides strong evidence that slips in democracy are not causing sanctions. At minimum.1080/03050629.pdf As expected. In the U. 240-264. whereas only 21% supported strikes against a democratic target (see Table 1).502436 This project points out that economic sanctions often disproportionately hurt the economic well-being of opposition groups that.2010. It seems hard. and political control variables as well as the appropriate temporal controls. such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms embargoes. Does say that smart sanctions might solve back for harms. negative effect on democracy.K. three. financial. citizens were much less willing to attack another democracy than to attack an autocracy. 36:3.502436 Second.princeton.2010. we also ran a two-stage simultaneous model where the level of democracy was the first dependent variable and the presence of sanctions was the second dependent variable (Amemiya 1978. so be careful Dursun Peksen & A. to say the least. DOI: 10. they might directly hurt political elites and subsequently make them less intransigent against foreign demands for greater respect for political rights and civil liberties. 2003). Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. International Interactions. DOI: 10. Wallensteen et al.inatory measures inflict on democratic freedoms (Cortright and Lopez 2002. but the reverse was not true. it remained negative and very significant. two.

http://www. “Corruption Has Laid Waste to The Russian Economy”. requiring money. Table 4 shows how the probability of a militarized dispute changes from a baseline value where everything is held at its mean value to four dyads in which both political and economic similarity are one standard different sets of conditions.tandfonline. 2 April 2014. On the other hand. deviation below themean leads to an increase of about 42% in the likelihood of a militarized dispute. One standard deviation increase in political dissimilarity increase risk of conflict by 42 percent Mark Suova. and toughening regulations. dyads with both political and economic similarity one standard deviation greater than the mean decreases the likelihood of a dispute by about 57%.59 At least for a while. It is not surprising that Mr Putin’s approval ratings now stand at 80 per cent. I identified cases in which economic similarity was greater than one standard deviation above the mean and political similarity less than one standard deviation below its mean. https://www. 2004.percentage points. For an authoritarian regime that is always a difficult task.ft.mutex. Post 2914. First. To better understand the individual influences of economic and political similarity. Tangible victories – no matter how small or how costly – boost the ruler’s 522_Gelman. the Russian leadership received carte blanche from its fellow and vice versa http://www.gwu. http://www. spawned aggressive foreign policy that has created a threat to global security Sergei Guriev. foreign policy to which western leaders are now struggling to respond. Political rights declined in Russia following Crimea standoff Vladimir Gel’man. targeting the opposition. “The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia”. according to numerous surveys.ixzz3vvxHDPFk Recession caused Russian elites to turn to aggression to maintain hold on power. Financial Times. with the goal of reducing the opportunities for undermining Putin’s rule. that democracy exerted substantively large and statistically significant effects on public preferences in the U. jamming public dissent. and given the interactive relationships between the variables this is especially useful.gmu. Petersburg.html . Recession means Russia’s government can no longer use money to buy public acceptance. with a 95% confidence interval that stretched from The Russian . Russian corruption has indeed become a threat to global security. “Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict”. and used this support to strengthen its dominance by tightening the the Russian elite has to find a new way to stay in power. the public applauded Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and Putin’s approval rating climbed above 80 percent.html#axzz3vvv9LYIt Having driven the economy into recession. In these circumstances. Against this background.1080/03050620490492213 One useful way to illustrate the substantive influence of the institutional similarity variables is to employ fitted values and compare ideal-type cases. Repression and propaganda have to take up the slack. On the contrary. it has spawned an aggressive Russia’s corruption can no longer be considered to have the salubrious effect of keeping the elite in check.6 to -7. International Interactions Journal. Florida State University. We conclude. nothing could be more helpful than a small and victorious military adventure.0. European University at St. repression and propaganda.pdf the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the following But this equilibrium is partial and unstable: confrontation with the West over Ukraine has shaken it to a great therefore.

American Interest.S. I like the concept put forward by Robert Cooper who has said. In mid-April. that the world is governed by power centres and smaller states and nations are simply pawns in their hands. and the Kremlin wages a quiet but well-funded war on social media. Most U. or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks.president. .” and its freedom. Russia does not have an official ideology. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have moved their offices outside Russia. “DISCUSSION: IS THERE ANY REASON TO FEAR A NEW COLD WAR? ”. but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought it. that states not only have interests. literally classified by Freedom House as not a free country James Carafano et al. Thus the question is whether they need to bother with winning over the people.” To paraphrase the Boney M song Rasputin. because Moscow does not have a particular ideology. The murder of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in Moscow in February 2015 eliminated an outstanding democratic voice in Russia. National Centre for Defense Studies. and political rights scores all declined in 2014. commenting that the only way to campaign in Russia is “leaderless resistance so that it’d be unclear who to target. https://www. internal political conditions and to the Kremlin’s policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old orchestrated an aggressive campaign against the West and its domestic supporters. In the absence of high oil prices. civil liberties. although living abroad is no guarantee of safety as the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive polonium-210 in London in 2006 demonstrated. Heritage. which determine how states define their That Russia’s aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the country’s dysfunctional internal system is a more or less banal DOA: 1-4-16 Freedom House ranks Russia’s 2015 status as “Not Free.the-american-interest. that does not really help them win allies in Europe and therefore they are less dangerous than Communist Russia. who have a very specific set of beliefs. http://www. turned into a “Russian hate machine. Every democratic indicator fell in Russia in 2014. I believe that this argumentation is not to the point. although these traditions partially explain why the regime’s propaganda has such resonance for the people. which increasingly relied upon lies and fear in both the domestic and international arenas. Thus. Yevgenia Chirikova. which was sparked again by the poor performance of his United Russia Party in the December 2011 parliamentary elections.pdf Today’s There are people who argue that a new cold war is impossible. and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. when they can just buy off politicians? root cause of it all lies in the fact that Russia failed to become a democracy in the early 1990s along with the rest of Eastern and Central Europe. Even campaigners who are not directly political have fled. http://www. but also identities. and most Russian opposition figures are now in exile. They tend to believe in conspiracy theories. we cannot afford wishful thinking. However. Russia failed to change its identity. The Regime of Vladimir Putin. Or maybe they have? Russia is characterized by a nationalist- chauvinist world view.”[7] The Russian media is similarly controlled. Root cause of problematic Russian Ideology = failure to democratize Kadri Liik. we must bear in mind that today’s Russia is I believe that the wealthier than in the Soviet era. that would clash with that of the West. 2008. I believe that this mindset inevitably leads to conflict. where hundreds of paid employees crowd municipal Russian forums with pro- regime comments and fake arguments. December 2015. all relentlessly and frequently crudely anti-American and anti-Western. Russia’s leading environmentalist. Russia’s political system = root cause of conflict Thomas Bertelman. December 2015.[8] Behind this effort and Putin’s victory in the fraudulent 2012 election rests an obvious unease with both the West and the Russian people. Russia is not a free country. departed for Estonia. Russia is governed by former KGB agents. Russia ranks on par with Iran. which was popular in Russia in the 2010s under the reign of Putin. And Russia tends to define its interests at the expense of its neighbours. who were labelled a “fifth column. 18 August 2015. As a small neighboring country. Iraq. “Myths About Russia and Swedish Non-Alliance”. Now that loyalty must be secured in some The country’s revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to other way. because they did not rethink their position in the early 1990s.” the 1970s.

Increases conflict
Sanctions double the probability of militarized conflict in a diplomatic crisis
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
and Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
Substantively, the effect of sanctions can be seen by calculating the change in the predicted
probability of a crisis involving militarized action with and without sanctions, while holding the
other variables in the model constant at their means. The effect of sanctions on the likelihood
of a crisis involving the use of military force is to increase the probability of militarized
conflict by 17%, resulting in a near doubling of the probability of conflict from .18 without
sanctions to .35 with sanctions.

Increases 195% when a democracy is the government initiating the sanction (see warrants
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
and Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
Table 2 summarizes the substantive effect of sanctions on the probability of a use of military
force. Scenario 1 shows that the effect of sanctions initiated by a nondemoc- racy in a crisis is to
reduce the probability of militarized conflict by about 58%. As we can see in scenarios 2 and 3,
the result is changed greatly when the initiator of sanctions is a democracy. The probability of a
militarized conflict increases by 195% when a democracy initiates sanctions in a crisis.
Scenario 3 reveals the substantive difference between a democracy and a nondemocracy using
sanctions in a crisis. Democracies are an astonishing 600% more likely to be involved in a
militarized conflict following the use of sanctions than are nondemocracies. Observing these
changes in predicted probabilities confirms our earlier expectation that the strength of the
coefficient on sanctions in Model 4 is weakened due to the difference in dispute propensity
after sanctions for democracies and nondemocracies.

Controls for the reverse causality and find that it has no impact on the results.
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
Because our theoretical argument concludes that sanctions are likely to lead to militarized
conflict, we have been careful to always lag our sanctions variables on the right-hand side.
However, one might still object that the analysis only shows that sanctions and conflict are
coincidental, and not that sanctions lead to military conflict. Therefore, as a final test, we
analyze a model of sanctions initiation that includes militarized conflict as a lagged

explanatory variable for the occurrence of sanctions onset. If one form of conflict simply
makes another form of conflict more likely,19 then we should be just as likely to see lagged
militarized conflict as a positive explanatory variable for sanctions. However, if we find that
lagged sanctions lead to militarized conflict (as we have) but that lagged militarized conflict
does not lead to sanctions, this would strengthen the argument made here. The previous
models in this article were focused on militarized conflict and are not intended to explain the
onset of sanctions. Therefore, we modify our model in accordance with an existing model of
dyadic sanctions onset (Lektzian and Souva 2003) and include a lagged variable on the right-
hand side for militarized conflict. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis and confirms that,
while sanctions tend to lead to militarized conflict, the reverse is not true. Previous work by
Lektzian and Souva (2003) used a GEE model to estimate the onset of sanctions and only
focused on politically relevant dyads. The results, reported in Table 4, for the all-dyads model
are very similar to their findings. The only variables to change sign or significance are relative
capabilities, which they found to be negative and significant, and we found to be negative but
insignificant, and the effect of distance. They found distance to be insignificant, and we found
that the further states are from one another, the less likely they are to use sanctions.

Warrant 1: Democratic governments are typically under pressure from the audience to stand
strong by sanctions; backing down makes them appear weak, making them more likely to
stick behind sanctions to the point where a tense situation can devolve into conflict
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
There are two reasons for expecting the relationship hypothesized above. The first reason
concerns the political costs of sanctions to the sender, and the second is related to the
economic costs. Democracies are the primary users of sanctions, and democratic leaders face
greater political costs for foreign policy failures. The audience costs associated with backing
down in a public dispute tend to tie the hands of democratic sanctioners, increasing their
costs for backing down against a resolute target state. While an increased incentive to stand
firm on the part of democratic sanctioners may increase the probability of sanctions being
successful, the risk of the dispute spiraling into militarized conflict also increases. According to
Fearon (1997, 81), while tying-hands signals are initially cheaper, and thus more attractive, they
generate a greater risk that the countries in the dispute will wind up committed to an
unwanted conflict. However, a major problem for democracies when using sanctions is that
they tend to send a mixed signal. While their audience costs signal resolve through the tying of
hands, the overt action of sanctioning, more often than not, signals weakness because the
sanctions are designed to be economically costless to the sender.

Warrant 2: Interpreted as sign of weakness because they show a lack of resolve to commit to
costlier foreign policy actions, which emboldens the target state to the point of militarized
conflict (This is my tag – This is my tag)
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
The implication is that when sanctions are chosen as the initial response to a crisis, there is a
danger that the target of the sanctions will interpret this as a sign of weakness on the part of
the sender. This can increase the probability of war if it emboldens the target against
acquiescing to the sender’s demands. The suggestion is that sanctions viewed as “foreign
policy on the cheap” may increase the probability of military conflict by signaling a lack of
willingness to commit costly resources, indicating weak and uncertain statesmanship on the
part of the sender rather than an indication of firm commitment. Moreover, as noted above,
when democracies use weak sanctions while simultaneously tying their hands with audience
costs, the probability of war should be greatest.

and promotes "nationalist bidding wars. If democracy continues to spread. UC Berkeley. Warren. many questions are unanswered. generates biased strategic assumptions.wustl.pdf This paper identifies the strong causal relationship between nationalism and state aggression.pdf Scholars use nationalism to explain international conflicts from the Napoleonic Wars to the U. However. 2013. different forms of nationalism may not have similar effects. nationalism should increase the probability of data on the existence and type of state-level nationalism from war initiation. Does nationalism increase the risk of war and if so. UC Berkeley.squarespace. The findings hold under various statistical tests and are not affected by minor changes to the design. the author finds that nationalism significantly increases the probability of interstate war initiation. “NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY ANALYSIS”. . Thus. but it often comes with feelings of pride. Nationalism is generally defined as the belief that a national group should have the right to self-rule (Cottam 1979." When these processes exist. and victimization (Anderson 1983.Nationalism Andrew Bertoli. [and] permits the suppression of opposition groups. superiority. Journal of Conflict Resolution. motivate societies to fight costly wars (Posen 1993). Moreover. not all forms of nationalism are created equal in this regard. http://polmeth. undermine international cooperation (Rosato 2011). 2013.S. But unless the international system undergoes a revolutionary change. how? Which types of nationalism are most likely to trigger warfare? The author argues that nationalist persuasion campaigns produce several mechanisms that encourage conflict. The impact is more future conflicts.wustl. Cederman. But. “The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War”. creates domestic interest groups that favor war. the results can be replicated using the FIFA regional soccer championships. Gellner 1983). Penn State University. http://static1. Nationalism provokes "national enemies" and their foreign allies. Gretchen 8/Journal+of+Conflict+Resolution-2012-Schrock-Jacobson-825-52. Mearsheimer 1990). nationalism remains a key source of interstate conflict. Using original 1816 to 1997. it may help constrain the effects of nationalism in worsening state relations. “NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY ANALYSIS”. 2012. invasion of Iraq (McCartney 2004. As these international sporting events make clear.pdf Many scholars assume that nationalism is inherently aggressive without systematically exploring the relationship between nationalism and interstate war and cause governments to overestimate their relative military power (Schrock-Jacobson 2012). Andrew Bertoli. and Sornette 2011).edu/files/polmeth/nationalismandinters_1. we should expect nationalism to continue to be a divisive force in world politics. Scholars have argued that it can increase enmity between countries (Woodwell 2007). http://polmeth.

Gibbons 1999). the ethnic minority in power had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. These divisions will likely enhance feelings of deprivation. and individual wealth was strictly limited (Niblock 2001).org/stable/pdf/27638645. Before sanctions. To this end." Societies that are divided or naturally heterogeneous before sanctions may become further splintered by the economic effects of sanctions. 37) suggests that "the frustration aggression mechanism is in this sense analogous to the law of gravity: men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustration. the government worked to shield white supporters from the pain of sanctions. Accessed December 22. and its failure to find a satisfactory pattern of development following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 4 June 2015. . Vol. Published December 2008. there was no private investment. and their interests do not necessarily coincide. http://www. One innately human response to perceived feelings of deprivation is discontent or anger. especially if the economic pain is not equally distributed across groups in society. Gurr (1970." citizens will experience increased frustration as the economic hardship of sanctions affects them more and more.. scholars have found a link between economic hardship and human frustration and aggression (Dollard et al. the distributional effects of sanctions may heighten feelings of deprivation. which often occur in the wake of severe economic effects because of sanctions. In Rhodesia. Under sanctions.jstor.4 while employment in the manufacturing sector dropped by 80 percent (Gibbons 1999). Basic Phycology says that the Russia’s response to sanctions will be informed by violence and anger. or for that matter to prevent. 1971).pdf?acceptTC=true. Susan Allen The Journal of Conflict Resolution. which is a prerequisite for political violence (Gurr 1970). Royal Institute of International Affairs. further increase the intensity of feelings of deprivation. which in turn exacerbated racial tensions. inflation in Haiti increased by 138 percent. “The Russian Challenge”. Inflation and unemployment. Under sanctions in the early 1990s. 52. 2008 “The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions”. Drawing on psychological studies. regime change in Russia.3 The other 96 percent of the population felt the international opprobrium of sanctions validated their antigovernment efforts (Baldwin 1985). Unable to attain their "just desserts. But Western countries need to consider the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system. The opening of this gap was particularly problematic in Libya in the 1990s because the regime. Anger can lead to acts of aggression and violence. When the economic burden is not equally spread across the population. like South The root cause of the challenge posed to the West by Russia lies in the country’s internal development. support for the Rhodesian government increased among whites. Conditions such as these are likely to create economic discontent. especially if economic elites are able to profit from black marketeering.chathamhouse. https://www.Econ Root Cause of Russian problems Failed development = root cause of Russian Aggression Andrew Wood. refuting Western economic theory. 6 Dec. No. Vladimir Putin and his circle are not the same as Russia and its people. 2015. The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote. had staunchly touted egalitarianism as a key social value. but the white community only accounted for 4 percent of the population. Sanctions frequently broaden the gap between rich and poor (Niblock 2001.

Banking.Hurts Western Economies Sanctions cause huge economic risk to Europe and US "Sanctions: What Could Be the next Move?" BBC eu-economic-sanctions.against-russia-unlikely-a-968913. Gazprom retaliates by limiting supplies. for example. <http://www. 2014.html>. and 0. Targeting Russian energy companies also has its consequences.” German Growth would decline by approximately 1% Schult.” . The situation looks even direr in other countries. "Russian Dilemma: Why EU Sanctions Are a Bluff .bbc. of Open Europe. British Broadcasting Company.3 percent next year. 12 May 2014. Neither the UK company nor the UK government would want BP's interests undermined. 21 Mar. that Russian companies have $653bn of foreign debt.http://www. Christoph. “Genuine economic sanctions would clearly be expensive for the Europeans. is a two-way process. 05 May 2014. What happens to the gas price if. Jö rg Schindler. According to a confidential report by the European Commission. Another Russian energy giant." SPIEGEL ONLINE International. and Ralf Nina Schick. Any financial shocks in Russia will impact on the banking systems in Europe and the US. Web. Rosneft. especially for Europe.SPIEGEL ONLINE. has close ties to BP. Web.9 percent in growth this year. estimates “Wouldn’t a trade war also hurt the West? Quite possibly. Germany would have to reckon with a loss of 0.

27 Mar.hoover. Birnbaum. the main anger the sanctions seem to have leaders say mounting economic woes will eventually turn Russians against Putin. 73 percent acknowledge that Russia’s economic situation is worsening. 2015. <https://www. “What they are doing is smashing the foundations of a great geopolitical construction that will become their competitor.”” . 2015. some observers say. Some opposition . after he was gunned down last month. Recent data released by the Pew Research Center. and 33 percent blame Western sanctions for Russia’s economic struggles (33 percent blame falling oil prices. while only 25 percent believe current government policies to be responsible for the current economic situation). a pro-Kremlin pundit given heavy rotation on Russian state TV. “The options have split Russia’s weakened ranks of Kremlin critics. October 2015. "A Year into a Conflict with Russia. These sanctions have created significant amounts of anti-Americanism. The Washington Post.washingtonpost. Boris Nemtsov. up from 44 percent who held that view a year ago.russia-are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5. In addition. who were also deprived of a charismatic ringleader. “A Year of Sanctions against Russia— Now What?” Center for Strategic & International ⅓ of Russians blame the West for the recession De Galbert. Michael.18 built on a survey conducted in Russia in early 2015. But so far fueled here is anti-Americanism.” Nikolai Starikov. 01 Dec. which is reaching heights not seen since Stalin. Web. <> The Russian public recognizes the economic impact sanctions are having in Russia. suggests that 45 percent of those polled believe sanctions to have a major effect on the Russian economy. told a seminar as the ruble swooned in December.b893e7ac3fb3_story.html>. Are Sanctions Working?" Washington Post. “The full financial force of the West is concentrated on attacking us.Angers Russian People with. Simond.

public indignation has been deepened by Russian media reports that the agriculture ministry was tendering to buy "mobile food crematoria" to speed up the destruction. a retail distribution center. 2015. 06 Aug. The Rosstat statistics agency says the number of Russians living below the poverty line .8 percent in the year to April 2015. .p. The Russian Ministry of Agriculture. N. Russia's main export. the total hit 23 million. Food shortages leads to more poverty "Russian Food Crematoria Provoke Outrage amid Crisis. "20 million Russian citizens are below poverty line. .com/article/russia-crisis-food.idUSL5N10G23620150806#OuXQV Aq7JOcjD0pK." DW. or 11 percent of Russians last year. 03 Aug. 31 May 2015. phytosanitary (agricultural product) control or Rospotrebnadzor (consumer rights) find sanctioned produce during an inspection of. In the first quarter this year.400 roubles ($160) a month - has jumped. <http://www. One meat seller explained that she pays 5. has been expanded beyond border controls to the entire country.2015. right up to starvation. the food will be destroyed in accordance with general regulations.97>.COM | 31.05. as reported by Russian news service Sputnik International. More than 50 percent of Russians have reduced their spending and almost 20 percent have no disposable income left after paying for food and housing. <http://www. Sanctions have led to a major growth in food prices on Russian shelves." Reuters. veterans. 40 percent of its value against the dollar and overall inflation is above 15 percent.p. Opposition figure and former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov responded with bitter irony. 2015. Thomson Reuters. a Russian government representative said. the disabled and other needy social groups were forced to greatly restrict With annual food price inflation running at their diets. Now the soaring food prices are hurting the poor at a The rouble has lost more than time when the economy is in crisis due to the effects of the sanctions and a steep fall in the price of oil. <http://www. as well as several independent watchdogs.dw. the Russian daily Kommersant reported Monday.000 rubles (about 90 euros) a day to rent a one meter length of bench space (unrefrigerated) to sell her pork. Famine Memories. Web. Some real triumph of humanism. 09 Dec.. Russia's crackdown on finding and destroying contraband foods imported from the EU or the U. Agriculture minister Alexander Tkachev declined to comment on Wednesday. or 16 percent of the population. Web. why destroy it?" over 20>. were set to perform checks for illegally imported food and destroy it if found across the nation.Food Shortages Putin placed ban on agriculture imports from Europe in retaliation from sanctions "Russia Food Import Sanctions: EU. Hurts Russian Consumers Sanctions: Who's Really Hurting in Russia? | Europe | DW." Kasyanov said on Twitter.reuters. "That means that if officials from the customs service.6." Vasily Itskov.. Government statistics show retail spending has dropped 9. up from more than 16 million people. N. for example.defined as those earning less than 10." International Business Times. And businesses are feeling the pinch. 08 Dec. Russian eu-us-contraband.>. 2015. They're cancelling holidays abroad and tourism to Europe is down 30 percent. 2015. US Contraband Nationwide Crackdown Ordered By Putin. 2015. Their president ordered food products destruction from Aug. Clothes shops and restaurants are shutting their doors and over the past few weeks I've noticed that stalls at my local food market are disappearing as increased rents drive vendors out.COM. "If you can just eat these products. 09 Dec.S. Web. large families." it says. Low oil prices can have serious social impacts simply because. Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.and when they become unhappy with what they see. when Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can no longer milk the state oil company for public payouts. and Tanya Charlick-Paley. Russia. Web. 25 May 2014. pag. 19 June 2012. Indiana University. The study reported here would suggest that this actually would make the breakup of Russia more likely because reducing the number of Russian regions would make it more likely that these regions will be able to coordinate their actions in a way that could present the federal presidency with a situation of dual power. Analysts see similar vulnerabilities for the rulers of Iran.” not possessing a core ethnic region for Russians.ponarseurasia.Destabilizes Russia Russian federal makeup background Henry Hale. (Professor of Energy Security at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service) "The Coming Oil Crash. http://www. with less free cash. The conditions that led to the string of Arab Spring ousters were not so much the lack of democracy as widespread public dissatisfaction with personal economic prospects. Putin and other Russian nationalists have sometimes called for reducing the number of Russian regions. http://www.S.pdf “Russia: Russia falls into the category of “stable ethnofederations.rand. Steve. creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict. his political support could be in jeopardy. and Keeping Russia Stable. however. 2001. CA: The RAND Corporation. http://www. Preserving Pakistan. for instance. and Venezuela. Web. Introduction. . combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension. perhaps combining many of the oblasts and krais. and facilitate the imagining of a “Russia” without its ethnic minority units” Russia is Uniquely Vulnerable to Civil War due to their Oil Economy LeVine. threaten minority regions. the fact that economic. RAND: Project Air Force. 2002. 25 May 2014. political. Air Force. Ironically. people tend to start more closely scrutinizing their surroundings -. and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently.pdf Local economic Problems would create instability in Russia Oliker." Foreign Policy Magazine. Santa Monica. Olga. Ethnofederalism: Lessons for Rebuilding Afghanistan. 2007. they start looking for a

Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. civil war is likely. and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. food.foreignaffairs. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. 1 Jan. 1999. would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing.Impact: Loose Nukes Causes Civil War Which Could Easily Leads to Nuclear War Steven R. particularly attacks on nuclear plants. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the . If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force. 25 May 2014. "Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars. power devolves to the periphery. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow.does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. With the economy collapsing. increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. and medical care. housing. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. it is not at all clear which side the military would support.” “A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -. the consequences for the United States and Europe will be coming-civil-wars “If internal war does strike Russia. Damage from the fighting. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Meanwhile. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. Draftees serve closer to home. Should Russia succumb to internal war. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Russia's 89 republics.personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders." Foreign Affairs. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership. krais. But with the Communist Party out of office. and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay. nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Web. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far). Within Russia. http://www. what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -. and wages. republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. however. economic deterioration will be a prime cause. David (Professor of International Relations and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Education at Johns Hopkins University). the consequences would be even worse.

privations of Soviet communism.pared with 200 or more hours for their U.itary’s tradition of political neutrality. Russia’s early warning system is decaying as gaping holes develop and susceptibility to false alarms grows. Web. Summer 1999. (Bruce Blair is a senior fellow and Clifford Gaddy a fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program) "Russia’s Aging War Machine Economic Weakness and the Nuclear Threat. Budget shortages. Russia retains some 20. and at times cannot even do that. Even the famous nuclear suitcases that accompany the president and other top authorities are falling into disrepair. So far. For Russia’s conventional forces. but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. such as the laboratories that design nuclear weapons.marines out of a fleet of twenty-six at sea.pdf Economic weakness is strengthening the anti-Western. The Strategic Rocket Forces strain to disperse out of garrison into covert field locations a single regiment (nine missiles) of mobile rockets.” Russia Can’t Afford Nuclear Security Blair. The strategic weapons themselves are fast reaching the end of their shelf life. rising nationalism draws additional strength from its growing politicization.S. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war. Current aging forces have become more vulnerable. antidemocratic. making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. But nowhere does the weakness and inefficiency of Russia’s state economy have more serious implications than in maintaining the sophisticated systems and men of the nuclear weapons complex. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces." Brooking's Review (1999): 10-13. Russian bomber pilots receive only about 20 hours of flight training a year. in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. The Russian navy struggles to keep one or two ballistic missile sub. Prestigious institutes. counterparts. If war erupts. Bruce. build . 0bruce%20blair%20and%20clifford%20gaddy/blair. however. and Russia cannot afford replacements. the government has managed to prevent the los]s of any weapons or much materiel. http://www. out of a total mobile force of 350. and antimarket reform trends in Russia today. among other probbems. Underground command posts are crumbling. Although the military’s aversion to Bonapartism appears to remain intact. a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. and Clifford Gaddy. prevent Russia from dispersing submarines and mobile land rockets into the sanctuaries of the oceans and forests. Surveillance satellites and radars are wearing out. the combination of lack of resources and the time and effort that must be diverted to sheer survival has been devastating to combat readiness. Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken.000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more.brookings. It is also steadily eroding the mil. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

it goes down to 9%.3%.5 billion to the world Paul Collier. sometimes interfering with operational activities). no one has yet vented frustration by threatening to use.5 billion. At $500 million. with ten-year gains of $75 billion. cases of disobedience and protest have so far been rare (though the wives of nuclear officers often stage demonstrations. or trying to use or steal. and political activity (the latter illegal for active military personnel). to around 12. Each percentage point drop in conflict possibility worth “The first cost-benefit analysis of peacekeeping initiatives reveals that the risk of future conflict depends upon the scale of military deployment. April 2008. nuclear weapons. and at $850 million drops to 7. have sharply increased the rate of suicides.the deep underground command posts. worsening conditions of life and work in the nuclear forces decrease proficiency in managing weapons and sap motivation to adhere strictly to safety rules. Compared with no deployment.project- syndicate. spending $100 million on a peacekeeping initiative reduces the ten-year risk of conflict from around 38% to 16.5%. compared to the overall cost of $8. The competence and integrity of the generals who lead them have declined. which no longer holds them in high esteem. But conditions that might drive individuals or groups to violate nuclear safety rules or threaten to fire weapons are ripening. crime. and engineer the communications links that would be used to send the “go code” to the strategic rockets.8%.” . At $200 million per year. University of Oxford. Like the conventional forces. Does Military Intervention Work?. Hardship and disaffection at all ranks. They are themselves less impressive individuals owing to declining standards for admission to the higher military academies. Remarkably. Russia’s nuclear units suffer from housing and food shortages. This is a very promising investment. The most expensive deployment reduces the risk of conflict by a massive 30 percentage points. To our knowledge. each percentage point of risk reduction is worth around $2. Because of war’s massive costs.5 billion to the world. the risk falls further. extended duty shifts owing to man. At the least. and the society. http://www. which fails to support them. are virtually bankrupt. enlisted and officer corps alike. and “moonlighting” to make ends meet.power shortages (massive draft evasion has depleted the enlisted ranks). pay arrears. They are demoralized and alienated from the state.

because use of these tools is new and Washington is learning how they work by trial and error. http://www. Also. where China has the muscle and the motive to create its own institutions. Russian president Vladimir Putin called upon other BRICS leaders to develop “a system of measures that would help prevent the harassment of countries that do not agree with some foreign policy decisions made by the United States and their allies.S. and the musings of target country leaders. and where there is less dollar-denominated debt to complicate the process. International Interactions”. http://www.”3 A few months later.2015. though. consequences are high. 5 January 2015. These projects. “Top RIsks 2015”.com/doi/pdf/10.1041297 There has been speculation since the 2008 financial crisis that the dollar’s standing as the world’s reserve currency will begin to erode (Eichengreen 2010. “Top RIsks 2015”. others will diversify away from reliance on the dollar and US-dominated institutions. After experiencing Western-based financial sanctions for a few months. rogue states. In the background looms the ultimate threat: that the United States will financially isolate rogue states by severing Risks of miscalculation and unintended their access to capital and the infrastructure used to clear payments. Kirshner 2014). Putin explicitly warned the United States about the blowback of sanctions on the dollar’s status:4 Most obvious example of weaponization of finance is U. Eurasia Group. The Asia infrastructure investment bank.Dollar Hegemony Basic explanation Daniel Drezner. International Interactions. Europe will become more frustrated with an American unilateralism that Europe (and European banks) must pay for. Over the longer term. Political risk analysts predict that this “weaponization of finance” could trigger a politically motivated diversifi- cation away from US capital markets and the dollar (Bremmer and Kupchan 2015). Weaponization of finance is causing countries to shift away from dollar → no efficacy in future Ian Bremmer. August 2015. combined with . as well as their state and private sector allies. among policy analysts (Hallinan 2014. “ Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance.1080/03050629. The use of targeted financial sanctions could exacerbate the decline of US financial hegemony by incentivizing a financial equivalent of balancing behavior. The most important near-term challenge is the damage inflicted on transatlantic relations. sanctions on Russia Ian Bremmer. Less obvious are large-scale measures against financial institutions (mostly European banks) that help finance international entities under US sanction. particularly in East Asia. Indeed.eurasiagroup. the BRICS bank. 2015#4 Of critical 2015#4 The United States is expanding its ability to track the financial transactions of government leaders of concern. the US could well slap new sanctions on Russia and/or Iran.tandfonline. this contingency has been the subject of widespread speculation in the press (Evans 2014. and the Silk Route Maritime and Overland initiatives are all steps in that direction. in order to close their access to capital and property. Tufts University. Richter 2015). the weaponization of finance is a tool that can be used with minimal cooperation from other governments. Eurasia Group. 5 January 2015. It is pressuring others who engage in business with these individuals to cut Most obvious is the steady escalation of sanctions against Russia and other perceived them off. Steil and Litan 2006). eliciting a backlash in 2015.

edu/rethinking- financethe-future-of-the-dollar/ The best hope for salvaging financial globalization. Washington's ability to use these tools to lean on financially weak states. and contain financial crises domestically will dissipate to the point where its sovereignty is meaningless. http://hir. interest rates. The largest market in the world for a single financial asset is the multi-trillion dollar market for American bonds. While no one’s suggesting the dollar will lose its status as the main currency of business any time soon.5 billion since July 1 to prevent its currency from rallying as the sanctions stoked speculation of an influx of Russian cash. Russia’s second-largest wireless operator. dollar has lost over 11% since 2001. like Without foreign confidence in a dollar which is used globally. shifted some cash holdings into the city’s The second benefit of this system is its effect on the market for US government debt. http://www. The greenback’s share of global reserves has already shrunk to under 61 percent from more than 72 percent in 2001. sanctions. which oversees about $380 billion. http://hir. Trust. allows any nation or large investor to park massive amounts of cash into a stable asset with a relatively desirable rate of return. when subprime- mortgage loans soured. The use of the US Treasury securities in currency reserves has created an almost unlimited . Sanctions accelerating decline. that can be an accelerator toward a more multicurrency world. OAO MegaFon. where dollar selling has led the central bank to buy more than $9.S. Harvard International Review. an event that began in the U.harvard. also spikes out financial crisis as an alternative causality “Russia Sanctions Accelerate Risk to Dollar Dominance”. Trading of the Chinese yuan versus the Russian ruble rose to the highest on July 31 since the end of 2010.’s U. 2009.harvard. While the depth and stability of US financial markets as a whole were part of the original reason nations gravitated toward the dollar as a reserve currency. This would no doubt lead to very different Fed behavior when faced not only with rising inflation. The drumbeat has only gotten louder since the financial crisis in 2008. Harvard International Review. “The Future of Dollar Hegemony”. “The crisis created a rethink of the dollar-denominated world that we live in. control inflation. One place the shift has become evident is Hong Kong. the explosive growth of US government debt has made US Treasury bonds the center of the foreign exchange market and the most widely held form of dollar reserves.S. Bloomberg Business. the Fed’s ability to guide gold. allows for high levels of spending that fuel U. considered by many to be the most liquid in the world. 2012.S.” said Joseph Quinlan. will eventually undermine Beijing's determination to broaden and deepen commercial and investment relations across the according to the Moscow Exchange. Dollar hegemony creates infinite demand for U. August 2014.S. debt. and European Union sanctions against Russia threaten to hasten a move away from the dollar that’s been stirring since the global financial crisis. “The Future of the Dollar”.” Impact: loss of monetary sovereignty and ability to use economic policy effectively Ben Steil.” printing the world’s reserve asset. is a renewed statutory framework for the Fed. hegemony Josh Zoffer. one which explicitly acknowledges the global role of the dollar and the dependence of the American economy on foreign confidence in it. is one which America will in the future have to do far more to sustain. What Charles de Gaulle once called America’s “exorbitant privilege. chief market strategist at Bank of America “This nasty turn between Russia and the West related to Corp.S. This market. but with evidence of persistent dollar selling in favor of alternative monetary assets. its dominance is ebbing. and the largest emerging-market nations including Russia have vowed to conduct more business in their currencies. then.

Whether or the ability to finance its debt has allowed the United not you agree with US fiscal policy. and it becomes simpler to move to the currency in which trade is being done. the United States has relied on its excessive spending to fund its position of privilege and relied on the dollar’s position as the international reserve currency to fund this spending." Vladimir Pantyushin. told The Moscow Times. senior strategist at the investment bank Sberbank CIB. http://www. Since the establishment of the post-World War II international order.businessinsider. afford sweeping bailouts at the height of the recession. Elena.dollar-2015-6 "Two state energy companies. "Gazprom Neft's swift embrace of the yuan was likely spurred by no nation wants to call in its debt for fear that it would devalue the rest of its dollar holdings. Business Insider. the United States will have a blank check that no one wants to cash. "The Russian Central Bank said it was working to create a new funding instrument in yuan. excluding spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.demand for US debt. and the Finance Ministry said it was considering issuing debt in the currency. ex. the United States has used the demand for American debt to fund its military apparatus. More importantly. with more restrictions. the head of Gazprom. For the past sixty-five years." Alexei Devyatov. The United States has used its unlimited allowance. Domestically. more recently. dollar hegemony has served as the backbone of US primacy. someone will buy it if only as a way to acquire dollar holdings. to finance its high standard of living and maintain the prosperity required of a hegemon. afforded by dollar hegemony. said they would use more Chinese currency in trade. “Weaponization of Finance: Russia is turning to the Chinese Yuan." Gazprom Neft announced that it began settling shipments of oil to China in yuan. while Russia's largest bank. it is indisputable that States to provide its citizens with a high standard of living and fund its enormous military programs. the United States spends over US $600 billion on its military. The ability to intervene militarily in any conflict that threatens US interests and maintain US geopolitical influence and hegemony is a direct result of dollar hegemony.” 6/16/15. the United States and its allies have relied on US military might to enforce their wishes upon the world and maintain the Western- dominated order. This artificially high demand means that the United States can issue debt at extremely low interest rates. especially relative to its national debt and overall economic profile. Holodny. constituting over forty percent of global military spending. gas producer Gazprom and its oil arm Gazprom Neft. Essentially. told The Moscow Times. Sanctions triggered Gazprom’s currency switch. "Western banks work slower." The Moscow Times' Peter Hobson writes. Each year. Additionally. if the federal government wishes to issue debt.” . the reality is that as long as the dollar is the international reserve currency. While precarious and arguably dangerous in the long term. has also promoted the use of the yuan. Sberbank. Alexey Miller. And while the United States has had to pay off its existing debt by issuing new securities. chief economist at UralSib Capital. said in a TV interview that the company was negotiating with China to use yuan and rubles for gas deliveries via a planned pipeline in Western Siberia. not profits. the ability to run effectively unlimited budget deficits has allowed the United States to fund its massive entitlement programs and. And previously.

Remarkably little attention. fostering a symbiosis between political leaders. International Interactions. “ Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. Trade sanctions and black market activity go together because sanctions outlaw otherwise ordinary market activity. As Andreas (2005) has demonstrated.tandfonline. contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the rule of law. Brown University. 2005. and transnational smuggling net-works.Black Market Increases black market activity and smuggling Daniel Drezner.00347. Sanctions create permanent corruption and black market structures and degrade the rule of law PETER ANDREAS. In this article. The more comprehensive the sanctions. in has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. however. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case. Sanctions give both private-sector entrepreneurs and public-sector officials a strong incentive to take the criminal route—earning above-normal profits in the process.1080/03050629. the greater the economic incentive to violate them.1041297 A related policy problem was the link between trade sanctions and the spread of corruption. Tufts University.1111/j. http://onlinelibrary. http://www. The article is one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanc-tions and transnational crime. as the UN’s oil for food scandal in Iraq made clear. and apply and evaluate this framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. The article suggests that sanctions can unintentionally contribute to the criminal-ization of the state.0020- 8833. and civil society of both the targeted country and its immediate neighbors. International Interactions”. I develop an analytical framework identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanc-tions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period).x/epdf The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. and suggests that the criminalized collat-eral damage from sanctions and its post-sanctions legacy should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions. organized crime. can persist beyond the lifting of sanc-tions. “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy”.com/doi/pdf/10. This symbiosis.wiley. .2005. economy. trade sanctions encourage the creation of organized crime syndicates and transnational smuggling networks in both the target state and neighboring countries. International Studies Quarterly. August 2015.2015. the analysis is briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans (Croatia and Iraq).

Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space and Senior Fellow at The Nuclear Policy Research Institute. Gagnon 03 (Bruce. Privatization also means that existing international space legal structures will be destroyed in order to bend the law toward private profit . . Bitch Causality Joseph Stromberg. " corporations intend to control resources and maximize profit. International Space Station. an ally of the aerospace industry. Privatization does not mean that the taxpayer won't be paying any more . p. where space pollution will be so great that an orbiting minefield will have been created that hinders all access to space. corporations the chances of accidents.000 m. The so-called private "space pioneers" are the first step in this new direction.000 bits of debris are now tracked on the radar screens at NORAD in Colorado as they orbit the earth at 18. in retaliation for sanctions levied by the US because of Russia's invasion of Crimea. becomes a serious reality to consider. space law.Space. The time as certainly come for a global discussion about how we treat the sensitive environment called space before it is too late. 6-21. And ultimately the taxpayers will be asked to pay the enormous cost incurred by creating a military space infrastructure that would control the "shipping lanes" on and off the Privatization really means that profits will be planet Earth.space4peace. 2014. The International Space Station (ISS) recently was moved to a higher orbit because space junk was coming dangerously close .org/articles/road_to_conflict. http://www. In this vision the taxpayers won't see any Plans are now underway to make space the next "conflict zone " where return on our "collective investment. Space privatization leads to space pollution. http://www. and privatization of any profits. has introduced legislation in Congress to make all space profits "tax free". As the aerospace industry moves toward forcing privatization of space what they are really saying is that the technological base is now at the point where the government can get out of the way and lets private industry begin to make profit and control space . Vox. " Of course this means that after the taxpayer paid all the R & D. especially in the U. have paid billions of dollars in space technology research and development (R & D). “Russia is kicking NASA out of the International Space Station in 2020”. One Republican Congressman from Southern California. Several space shuttles have been nicked by bits of debris in the past resulting in cracked windshields. and profit in space. Very soon we will reach the point of no return. Serious moral and ethical questions must be raised before another new "frontier" of conflict is created .com/2014/5/13/5714650/russia-just-evicted-nasa-from-the-international-space-station Russia announced that starting in 2020. h.htm) Three major issues come immediately to mind concerning space privatization . We've all probably heard about the growing problem of space junk where over 100 .vox. Some As we see a flurry of launches by private space space writers have predicted that the ISS will one day be destroyed by debris. privatized .7 million for each one-way ticket. How can Russia bar American astronauts from a station that both countries own? Simple. “Space Privatization: Road to Conflict?”. waste of taxpayer dollars. and thus more debris. S. Thus the idea that space is a "free market frontier. Right now. NASA relies on Russian rockets to get its astronauts to and from space. it will no longer allow NASA astronauts on the On Tuesday. The taxpayers. where NASA has been funded with taxpayer dollars since its inception. private industry now intends to gorge itself in profits. Space as an environment. paying them $70.

Overviews .

No Threat → auto-negate .

31 May 2015. A year after the with.Econ causality delink Recession would’ve happened anyway. 27 Mar. But the wave of Western penalties against the Russian economy has inadvertently given the Kremlin political cover with its own people. 18480370>. 2015.COM | 31.” . His popularity at home is sky high even as his nation’s economy is in turmoil.b893e7ac3fb3_story. giving the first to raise rates a cherry picking opportunity. A devalued ruble makes Russia's raw materials more competitive on the world market - ironically helping many of the oligarchs on the sanctions list to increase their profits. 2015. U. 01 Dec. but sanctions give Putin political cover which bolsters his domestic support Birnbaum. “If they act unilaterally they risk a flood of resignations as staff flock to the higher paying company. 01 Dec. The Washington Post.S. <https://www. analysts say.” Local companies have actually had increased exports due to the sanctions. officials say. Deutsche Welle. the West has been able to do little to alter President Vladimir Putin’s battlefield calculus. And it's good for exports.washingtonpost. Fiona.html>." DW. and he shows little sign of backing down. "A Year into a Conflict with Russia.dw. Clark. Web. that problems would have erupted even if there were no sanctions.COM. Putin denies involvement in Ukraine. "Sanctions: Who's Really Hurting in Russia? | Europe | DW.05.russia-are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5. Web. Are Sanctions Working?" Washington Post. <http://www. The ruble is dropping. Russia is still fueling a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost more than 6. Many economists say “Prices are soaring. And Russian living standards are falling a year after the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.000 lives. 2015.

2014.Russia didn’t want more (If about Ukraine) Because of the complexities of Russian nationalism. August 29th. Henry. . Beyond this. often violently.theguardian. Eastern Ukraine is the only area that makes sense for Crimea hits the “sweet spot” for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian majority that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation. Unrest in recent years has shown the latter can take to the streets in substantial numbers. potentially inflaming ethnically exclusive Russian nationalists. Hale. http://www. territorial expansion starts to become more complicated politically for Putin. Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlin’s Actions on Ukraine.

economist. claim that supplies to its separatist proxies. The Economist. “From Cold war to Hot war”. http://www. 14th Feb 2015. Wielding power or gaining influence abroad—through antiestablishment political parties. 68 “hot” identifications and interdictions occurred along the Lithuanian border alone. and snap exercises by Russian forces close to NATO’s northern and eastern borders. disgruntled minority groups. WITH American boots on the ground in Ukraine. in turn. In the first nine months of the year. Russia could not remain quiet. the Kremlin said it could “destabilize the situation”. A recent uptick in violence. http://www. few now expect the Minsk peace deal to endure. media outlets. Latvia recorded more than 150 incidents of Russian planes entering its airspace. Sanctions don’t stop destabilization (Galbert – CSIS) . This perversion of “soft power” is seen by Moscow as a vital complement to military engagement. While Russia may refrain from further action until after the European Union votes on whether to renew sanctions in July. environmental activists. Published 4/24/15. and the foreign ministry declared that the peace process has hit a "dead end". Then the Russian defence ministry accused America of deploying the trainers to the conflict's front lines. Last year NATO planes carried out more than 400 intercepts of Russian dangerous-confrontation Destabilisation is also being achieved in less military ways. perhaps in preparation for a fresh offensive . More than 150 were by the alliance’s beefed-up Baltic air-policing mission—four times as many as in 2013. When American paratroopers began a training mission in western Ukraine earlier this week.Squo worsening Russia increasing provocations of West The Economist. Training Wheels. especially near the prized port city of Mariupol. has already jangled Ukrainian nerves. 14th Feb 2015. American Russia is building up its forces along the border with Ukraine and increasing officials. Destabilization Increasing (Yavoriv – Economist) Yavoriv (Economist). “From Cold war to Hot war”. supporters in business. propagandist “think-tanks”. and others—has become part of the Kremlin’s hybrid-war strategy. Even a transition from over military tactics doesn’t prevent ongoing russia-protests-american-military-trainers-ukraines-army-has-long-way-go-training-wheels . dangerous-confrontation A pattern of provocation has been established that includes a big increase in the number of close encounters involving Russian aircraft and naval vessels.

the Minsk II agreement concluded in February 2015 remains the only pathway currently on the table toward a long-term political settlement. But sanctions have likely pushed Russia toward negotiating the conclusion of the Minsk ceasefire agreements and to a certain extent implementing them. Published 10/15. use military force to destabilize Ukraine and retain influence over its future. Despite frequent violations. Accessed 1/14/16.pdf transatlantic sanctions have not altered Russia’s strategy to Despite their impact on the Russian economy.Simond de Galbert (CSIS). . A Year of Sanctions against Russia—Now What? A European Assessment of the Outcome and Future of Russia Sanctions.

R/T Aff .

R/T Threat

R/T Cyber Threat

We trigger cyber threat

Russia-US Cyber war will occur with NATO intervention
[Miles, Kathleen. "Security Experts Warn Of Possible Russian Cyberattack Against The U.S., Ukraine." The
Huffington Post., 30 Apr. 2014. Web. 03 May 2014.
< ukraine_n_5237377.html>.]
““If we move to the heavy sanctions, the sectoral sanctions ... the Russians are going to strike
back in some way,” said former U.S. counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, who spoke on a
panel about cybersecurity at the Milken Institute Global Conference in Beverly Hills, California.
Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who also spoke on the panel, said the U.S. should work
with Ukraine to prepare a defense against this potential cyberattack.“We’ve seen [Russia] use
[cyber warfare] in Georgia. We’ve seen some elements of that being used in Crimea,” Panetta
said. “If [Russia] has an attack It takes down communications, takes down missile systems,
takes down the counter attack...”

R/T Iran example of success
1 - delink - Despite international sanctions, Iran continued to develop their nuclear agenda.
Sangar, Arti. "Sanctions in Iran: How Effective Are They? - Diaz Reus International Law Practice." Diaz Reus
International Law Practice. N.p., 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <
Since 1987, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, among others, have levied significant economic sanctions against Iran. The goal of these sanctions is to force Iran to
suspend uranium enrichment and allow unfettered supervision of its nuclear operations. To meet these goals, the sanctions regime has imposed numerous restrictions, including limitations on
foreign trade and business with Iran and Iranian-owned companies. The latest U.S. sanction, labeled the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act (the “CISADA”),

Despite these economic
imposes a new array of penalties aimed at drying up foreign investment in Iran, and blocking Iranian access to the U.S. financial system.

penalties, Iran’s leaders have not altered their nuclear agenda. In what can only be seen as a
snub to the current sanctions regime, Iran will be launching its first nuclear power plant
shortly. Leaders around the world must now decide whether stiffer penalties will be an effective course of action, despite the failures of the current sanctions program.

2 - TURN: The sanctions didn’t force Iran to the table, and a deal would’ve happened earlier if
it wasn’t for Western hardlining
Parsi, Trita. "No, Sanctions Didn’t Force Iran to Make a Deal." Foreign Policy No Sanctions Didnt Force Iran to Make
a Deal Comments. Foreign Policy, 14 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <
sanctions- didnt-force-iran-to-make-a-deal/>.
In reality, it was neither the sanctions nor Iran’s centrifuges that produced the current
breakthrough. The diplomatic opening came about for the same reason it did during the Cuban Missile crises: Both sides compromised. Tehran stopped advancing sensitive
parts of its program and agreed to greater transparency. And Washington finally accepted enrichment on Iranian soil in the November 2013 interim agreement. Tehran had long insisted that if
its enrichment was accepted, it would agree to transparency as well as restrictions. For all practical purposes, accepting Iranian enrichment is the modern equivalent of removing Jupiter

If this unrealistic and legally questionable red line had been discarded earlier, the
missiles from Turkey.

breakthrough could have been achieved much earlier — long before the Obama sanctions
were imposed. Mohamad ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, has written that the "interim agreement, facilitated by Rouhani’s low-key diplomacy,
could have been reached 10 years ago." But, he added, it took the "West a decade to realize
that bare-knuckle competition for regional influence was not a viable strategy for dealing
with Iran." _

3 - TURN: The myth perpetuated that sanctions forced Iran to the table can permanently alter
US foreign policy, and lay the foundation for sanctions being the typical response from
lawmakers when tension arises. This is a dangerous blueprint that won’t work for other
Parsi, Trita. "No, Sanctions Didn’t Force Iran to Make a Deal." Foreign Policy No Sanctions Didnt Force Iran to Make
a Deal Comments. Foreign Policy, 14 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <
sanctions- didnt-force-iran-to-make-a-deal/>.
Yet the myth that sanctions produced the current diplomatic breakthrough persists. Lawmakers continue to argue for more sanctions, even though such action would cause the talks to

If the myth of the sanctions
collapse, claiming that since sanctions brought Iran to the table, more sanctions will give the United States even more leverage.

success prevails, American foreign policy will be led down a perilous path. A false and
dangerous blueprint for dealing with proliferators and international disputes in general will

emerge: Forget diplomacy, never compromise, impose sanctions, threaten war — and hope
for the best. With Iran, thanks to the quiet compromise on enrichment, war is more distant than ever since the crises erupted. The world may not be as
lucky next time it goes down an all-out sanctions path.

4A - TURN: Economic sanctions forced Iran to operate on the black market and develop
economic ties with other countries not in agreement with Western sanctions
Sangar, Arti. "Sanctions in Iran: How Effective Are They? - Diaz Reus International Law Practice." Diaz Reus
International Law Practice. N.p., 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <
The sanctions against Iran continue to punish foreign investors doing business with Iran by cutting off access to international banking services, capital markets, international airspace and
waters for commercial trade. Because of these sanctions, major international firms are unwilling to risk their position in the global market to do business with an increasingly isolated Iran. This
has caused a drastic decrease in U.S and European investment in Iran’s petroleum sector. The Iranian economy, which sits on the world’s second largest reserve of both oil and gas,

Iran continues to work around these sanctions,
undoubtedly feels the brunt of this decline in U.S. and European capital. However,

relying on black market goods and services to complete their deals. For example, Iranians
have resorted to using banks and shell companies throughout the Middle East to avoid
sanctions. Additionally, Iranian banks and corporations now remove their Iran-based names and locations from transaction documents. Iran has also
increased business with nations that are not on-board with the current sanctions regime.
China has nearly $100 billion tied up in Iranian oil and gas reserves. Russia’s economic
interest in Iran is comparable.

B - Impact 1: Geopolitical Power lost b/c forms anti-Western geopolitical bloc

C - Impact 2: Sanctions create permanent corruption and black market structures and degrade
the rule of law
PETER ANDREAS, Brown University. “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy”.
International Studies Quarterly. 2005.
The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. Remarkably
little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, I develop an analytical framework identifying and
categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanc-tions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply and evaluate this
framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case, the analysis is

sanctions can unintentionally
briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans (Croatia and Iraq). The article suggests that

contribute to the criminal-ization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted
country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders,
organized crime, and transnational smuggling net-works. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist
beyond the lifting of sanc-tions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the
rule of law. The article is one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanc-tions and transnational crime, and suggests that the criminalized collat-eral damage from sanctions
and its post-sanctions legacy should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions.

5 - TURN: So many other examples flow neg ex Syria and Cuba
NOSSEL, SUZANNE. "It’s Time to Kill the Feel-Good Myth of Sanctions." Foreign Policy. N.p., 9 June 2015. Web. 04
Dec. 2015. < sanctions-russia-iran/>.
“On top of all this, there is mounting evidence that isolation often simply doesn’t change
countries’ behavior. Obama’s decision late last year to reestablish relations with Cuba
acknowledged what had been obvious for decades: Isolation hadn’t reshaped the behavior of
the Castro regime. Western countries and the Arab League isolating Syria in response to
President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal crackdown beginning in 2011 did not deter him in the least,
and actually prompted both Iran and Russia to step up in his defense.”

R/T Deterrence
1A - TURN: More sanctions reduce future effectiveness of sanctions
Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, University of Notre Dame. “On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An
Empirical Analysis ”. Midwest Political Science Association. 1997.
there is
That fact should encourage further systematic analyses on a number of issues that our study does not address. First, our data suggest that for goals other than destabilization,

a modest but real downward trend over time in the likelihood that sanctions will succeed. There
are two plausible explanations, both of which depend upon the fact that the majority of sanction episodes in our sample were imposed by the United States (either alone or in conjunction with

One possibility is that the frequent use of sanctions by a single nation has produce
other states).6

declining credibility over time (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; Paarlberg 1983). Put differently, the more often the same
state imposes sanctions, the less credible that country's commitment or seriousness appears
to target nations. It may also be the case that sanctions have become less useful over time
because of the increasing propensity of the United States to use sanctions for entirely
symbolic reasons. In other words, we suspect that sanctions are not always specifically designed to succeed, or at least not to succeed in their ostensible (i.e., publicly
stated) goals. If, instead, the actual goals are purely symbolic or expressive, they can hardly fail to succeed in their true goal of showing disapproval, but are nonetheless judged as unsuccessful
because they did not produce the change in behavior that was the official, rhetorical goal. To understand how and when sanctions work, then, we need better data on what they are in fact
meant to achieve.

B - stat = -7% effectiveness every 10 years
Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, University of Notre Dame. “On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An
Empirical Analysis ”. Midwest Political Science Association. 1997.
the reference case-year at the temporal midpoint of the sample and
For goals other than destabilization,

financial sanctions not invoked-has a probability of success of .37. This increases to .44 if we
move backward a decade in time. The use of financial sanctions has a much stronger impact, increasing the probability of compliance almost twofold to .64.
These results are rather more encouraging, suggesting asthey do that policymakers can dramatically affect the probability of success (other things being equal) by the available intervention
strategy of using financial sanction

(If about Ukraine) Because of the complexities of Russian nationalism, Eastern Ukraine is the
only area that makes sense for Putin.
Hale, Henry. Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlin’s Actions on Ukraine. August 29th, 2014.
Crimea hits the “sweet spot” for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian majority
that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation. Beyond this, territorial
expansion starts to become more complicated politically for Putin, potentially inflaming
ethnically exclusive Russian nationalists. Unrest in recent years has shown the latter can take to
the streets in substantial numbers, often violently.

R/T Hurts Russian Military
1 - delink - Putin has shielded the defense budget from the sanctions’ economic effects.
“Putin's defence fixation deepens Russian budget problems.” Reuters, January 15 2015. <
President Vladimir Putin's insistence on huge defense spending makes it hard to see how a government plan to make deep budget cuts will see

Russia through a deepening economic crisis. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov called on Wednesday for a 10 percent cut in planned

expenditures, warning that if oil were to average $50 a barrel this year, the budget would face a shortfall of 3 trillion roubles ($46 billion). But
defense spending will not be affected because of a Putin directive that dramatically limits
room for maneuver: military and security costs swallow up more than a third of the budget
and are set to rise by about 30 percent this year. Siluanov had signaled opposition to the huge outlay on the military.
"One needs to redistribute and restructure expenditures in favor of infrastructure, education and so on. Such military expenditures are heavy to

carry," he said. However, that was on Dec. 26 and on Wednesday he performed his about-face, acknowledging that defense was off-limits.
Despite the crisis gripping the economy, Putin is preoccupied with boosting Russia's
international might, being tested in the standoff the West over Ukraine. He has also shown he will not
put his popularity at risk by cutting social expenditures such as pensions, which rely on federal subsidies that consume another quarter of the

budget. Last month he said pensions must be indexed to inflation, which is now running at more than double the annual rate of 5.5 percent

projected in the 2015 budget. "For Putin the priority is the army, the secret service and the bureaucracy. And also financing pensioners, the

main supporters of the regime," Boris Nemtsov, an opposition leader and former deputy prime minister, wrote on his Facebook page.

2 - delink - Putin has also shielded the modernization program from cuts, and it will continue
to go on in spite of any economic harm from sanctions.
Franz-Stefan Gady. “Putin to Press on With Russia’s Military Modernization.” The Diplomat, June 27 2015.
Despite a crippling recession, Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to press on with his 22
trillion ruble (more than $400 billion) military modernization plan, according to Sputnik News. Addressing a group of
recent graduates of Russian military staff colleges in the Kremlin yesterday, Putin emphasized that structural reform within the

Russian Armed Forces and new weapon acquisitions programs will continue unhindered over
the next few years. “A strong army equipped with sophisticated weapons guarantees Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also guarantees that millions of our
fellow citizens can live in peace. I am sure you understand it quite well,” Putin said, explaining Moscow’s rationale for the massive rearmament program. Sputnik News summarized the rest of
his speech: Touting the strengthening of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and space defense units, Putin also praised the increasing combat capabilities of almost all branches of the armed
forces. He mentioned the ongoing delivery of state-of-the-art aircraft, submarines and surface ships to the Russian military, which is also being equipped with high-precision weapons, combat
robots and unmanned aerial vehicles that were showcased at the recent International Military-
Technical Forum Army-2015.

"Backgrounders: Sweatshops and Globalization. “While domestic and foreign entities could provide capital inflow for the Russian upstream sector. and West Takes Notice”. <http://www. and has applied for approval from the Dutch government for other projects.College of Charleston. “Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground. Financial Times.FT.d. despite the falling price of oil and international sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea. 11 Dec. Shell is also still working on its Salym joint venture with Gazprom Neft. Jack. 14 July 2015.): n. Russia’s response to the sanctions is “According to Anna Belova. and the sanctions could provide the impetus for a restructuring of the subsoil law. highlighting how western companies are learning to live with the restrictions placed on Moscow.people.Oil companies have found ways to restructure around sanctions.cofc.” B . 2007. while Eni and Statoil have received approval from European capitals to continue work on their joint ventures with Rosneft. "EU’s Russia Sanctions Fail to Dent Oil Deals . reaching $81 pag. a common measure of military expenditure. Putin and. Web. the oil arm of the Russian gas giant. 2015.” Beolva explains. Jesus Sandoval-Hernandez.nytimes." (n. 2016. 2015.Sanctions are not effectively stopping Western interactions with Russian oil companies Farchy.” Disad: Russian Military Modernization Good . Russia’s oil and gas industry is actively seeking foreign participation in the domestic sector and lobbying for legal incentives to foreign investments. people familiar with the matter told the Financial Times. 14." Financial Times. 2015. http://www.ft. centered on addressing the issues it faces without affecting its strong production numbers. both would require regulatory changes. Radley. or 4. “In addition to strengthening and extending geopolitical ties on the international stage.Russian military spending after sanctions surged to the highest level in 25 years at $81B (Eric Schmitt – New York Times) Eric Schmitt (New York Times). “Europe’s biggest oil groups are extending business deals with their Russian energy partners despite this month’s EU vote to continue imposing School of Business & School of Languages and World Affairs . BP is close to agreeing a deal to acquire a 20 per cent stake in a Siberian oilfield from state- owned Rosneft that could be worth $700m.2 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. PhD. Accessed January 15.html#axzz3t72hNV1h>.pdf>. 00144feabdc0. 1 Jan. A . Published military-uses-syria-as-proving-ground-and-west-takes-notice.html?_r=0 Russian military spending bottomed out in the mid-1990s but has risen steadily under Mr. <http://sandovalhernandezj. it has surged to its highest level in a quarter-century. driving incentives to reform laws Balko. 01 Dec. GlobalData's senior upstream analyst covering the Former Soviet Union.

a country feeling vulnerable. 2012. While no one really supposes that such weapons will be used in any confrontation with the West. It will thus be perceived as weaker. http://web.gmu. “Russian Military Modernization: Cause. except this time with nukes (escalates brinksmanship and animosity) Bettina Renz. another state that feels vulnerable. George Mason University “Russian Military Modernization: Cause. hair triggers and tactical nuclear weapons are not comfortable bedfellows. with a military undergoing a lengthy and painful transformation. the Russian military will. Like israel. 2012. for a certain period into the future. 2 . Problems of Post- Communism. vulnerability generated has led Russia. . the sense of What is clear is that. the best modern military counter to mass is to employ either PGMs or tactical nuclear Problems of Post-Communism.Russia will act more aggressively to try and convince possible enemies that they’re stronger than they really are Bettina Renz. ironically.ebscohost. we may see the Russian military adopting a very dangerous hair-trigger b8c91e24d8a5%40sessionmgr4005&vid=1&hid=4214 with its armed forces currently weakened by the process of change. Russia is more likely to engage in aggressive and preemptive military action to create that element of surprise that can overcome its “weakness. and will continue to be. at least for a period of time. Moscow may begin to look more and more toward the inflexible tool of its tactical nuclear weapons as its principal defense 7fa5-4589-b7c1-b8c91e24d8a5%40sessionmgr4005&vid=1&hid=4214 Naturally.A weak military magnifies any perceived threat which pushes them more towards more threats. to magnify the threats it faces. any major transformation in any military will. Course. given the problems inherent in this transformation.Two reasons why modernization reduces aggression 1 . in classic confirmation of the security dilemma concept. and Consequences”. real or imagined.ebscohost. is already. and Consequences”. the Russian military has hardly any of the former but plenty of the latter. the same cannot be said of any possible conflict with the as the early twentieth-century Russian military thinker anton Kersnovskii put it. Beijing’s military still relies on mass. http://web.” thus. or thinks it faces.”5 Russia. Conscious of its vulnerability to threats. leave it falling between two stools. Course.mutex. be in a state of flux.a. “the main difficulty of military organizational development lies in the dualism of the task: preparing for tomorrow’s war and at the same time correcting yesterday’s mistakes in case war breaks out today.

Besides. National pride usually trumps cost. they cry. February 24 2015. and reverse actually worked better (Logic: richer citizens can afford to oppose govt) Abdelmalek Alaoui. and theories supporting the assertion that Russia is the victim of a “vast conspiracy” aiming at destroying the only alternative to US supremacy over the world are flourishing throughout state-controlled medias. Until now. Tunisia. international economic sanctions have been widely used since the Second World War in various parts of the world by western countries in the “sanctions approach”. and more recently. stupid" applies to international relations.theguardian. This will teach sanctions-are-ineffective-against-toxic-leadership/> For several months. and by some accounts has radicalized Vladimir Poutine’s supporters and allies. Burkina Faso. cancelling barter deals and suspending joint projects. This will deter them.R/T Undermines Putin 1 .TURN: Sanctions give Putin the ability to paint us as the bad guy Simon Then come the celebrated "options" – the nuclear sanction of freezing bank balances. "The west's do-somethings will do nothing for Ukraine. On the contrary. this strategy has mainly proven ineffective at turning around the military situation in the region. <http://www.forbes. and is the long-term glue most likely to reduce friction between Europe and Russia. in an attempt to pressure Moscow into loosening its grip on eastern Ukraine. However. The rationale is puzzling. economic sanctions have been stepped up against Russia and its Nomenklatura by western countries. 2 . Beyond the specific case of Russia and its territorial dispute with its neighbor.TURN: Sanctions give Putin political cover and radicalize the population → sanctions never created regime change. small poor countries that western governments can easily impoverish to suit their moral whims. 2014. clearly opposes cutting relations with Russia over Crimea. “From Russia to Africa: Why Sanctions Are Ineffective Against Toxic Leadership. somehow commensurate with Putin's increasing lawlessness. praised by many western diplomats." March 11. stopping credit lines. Guardian. An upward ratchet of supposed misery is to be imposed on Russians. Russia is now a serious economic player. Putin will have embarked on his Crimean adventure with some assessment Pushing back at Nato and the EU of possible retaliation and. if not. never contributed to create a regime change. It has always been doubtful that the maxim "It's the economy. especially those involving the economies of authoritarian regimes. such as Egypt. Trade is in all of Europe's interest. with an acceptance that the retaliation was worth it. Germany. It is not Iraq or Afghanistan or Burma. . as indicated in last week's leaked (and sensible) Downing Street memorandum. after two decades of sustained advance along Russia's eastern border has been hugely popular. has almost order to trigger policy changes in authoritarian regimes. a rally of the Russian president’s supporters gathered thousands in support of his Ukrainian policy.” Forbes. Russia can at least reply with a degree of mayhem. www. increasingly a point of sanity in European diplomacy. Last week. if not on the scale of China. revolutions took places in countries that were widely supported economically by western countries. It is the diplomats' equivalent of "bombing the enemy back to the stone age".

delink . with the expectation that these societal costs would create "mass-elite divisions in society. on which 78 percent 39 of sanctions have been imposed over the past three decades.authoritarian-states-lessons- learned?print>. travel bans and arms embargoes. Middle East Policy Council. O'Sullivan also makes a critical distinction: the impact and the effectiveness of sanctions are "by no means synonymous.mepc." Economic Sanctions on Authoritarian States: Lessons Learned. 09 Dec. the sender state attempts to impose costs on civilians. Katerina. Oskarsson. it could happen. 2015."35 The assumption that the economic damage caused by sanctions will "somehow seamlessly translate into political change" is far from obvious. But in reality.41 This has led to a shift of attention toward targeted."38 As Drezner points out. In theory. so-called "smart" sanctions: financial measures. and a swift social breakdown could be achieved if elites could be detached from the masses. asset freezes. the collateral disaster in Iraq did not lead to destabilization of Saddam's regime or weaken his grip on power. among others. Particular attention is now being paid to the political economy of authoritarian countries. it doesn’t.3 . leading policy makers to question the effectiveness of comprehensive sanctions on authoritarian targets.40 Moreover. <http://www. . Winter 2012. the relative failure of this logic to materialize has led to a shift in emphasis in sanctions research toward the exploration of mechanisms within the black box of the target state.36 It is believed to have developed from the logic underlying the strategy of punitive air strikes.Empirically.37 When either air power oreconomic sanctions are used. political revolutions don’t occur as a result of economic frustration caused by sanctions. "Economic Sanctions on Authoritarian States: Lessons Web.

"Then so too we could expect to see the Russian elite trying to find some way of instituting Putinism without Putin. seeking to undermine Western norms. When faced with a serious crisis. Putin finds an effective short-term solution — but in doing have secured and increased their wealth by relying on and bolstering the centralized power of the state.TURN: If my opponent's arg is true and Putin is threatened. Vox. United States. The Moscow Times. far from being titans of industry motoring the modernization of the Russian economy or independent centers of power pushing for reform. they will probably be looking for a consensual leader willing to rule in the name of the elite as a whole.Elites want same strongman. they were born out of fear — from Putin's turn to nationalism in a desperate ploy to shore up his popular support after the 2011 crisis of legitimacy. 3 .vox. 2 . November 2013. “Russia’s Coming Regime Change”. Political . not a powerful leader. Dawisha.themoscowtimes.The Political elites won’t bite the hand that feeds Putin's invasion of Crimea and military support for Once again. will just seek “Putinism without the Putin” “Who Will Replace Vladimir Putin in 2018?”. as a threat.delink . the ruling authorities will follow in the footsteps of the Politburo after Josef Stalin's death in 1953. The wealth of the oligarchs and political elites who came to power with Putin in 2000 has been more stable than in any other Group of 7 country. as with the Soviet elite. Ukraine's rebels seem like aggressive. http://www." 4 . most realize that their regime will be uncompetitive in the long run. http://www.html If Putin leaves without choosing a successor.html?_r=0 the Kremlin’s present rulers see the example of the democratic West. powerful moves. And by creating a problem between Putin and Russia's elite that Putin This is a pattern that has repeated itself over and over again: cannot solve.R/T Pits Elites Against Putin 1 . from human rights to business transparency and international law. New York Times. "However.TURN: Oligarchs want to confront West → they’ll choose someone worse (Logic: Oligarchs get profits from Russian influence which is threatened by West)(reject their logical warrant that oligarchs will seek profits by reducing confrontations) Andrei Kozyrev. 8 July And these billionaires. he creates deeper problems that he has no way to solve. the way he responded to that in the past is by engaging in more aggression out of fear Amanda Taub.delink . But in Yet the oligarchs cling to power as long as possible through intimidation and disinformation. their vulnerability to the leader. 20 July 2015. he said. above all the Like their Soviet predecessors. Karen “The Putin Principle: How it came to Rule Russia” World Affairs Journal June 2015 Accessed 12-18- 15 http://www." Galeotti said. "The Soviet elite wanted to try and find some way of preserving the elements of the system they liked and shedding the elements they did not — above all. http://www. Instead of preaching a Communist-style supremacy. they have undermined the stability of his regime. this is a serious weakness masked by a veneer of strength. “Putin is Weak”.worldaffairsjournal.

have become billionaires who understand that their wealth and power will be secure as long as they don’t challenge Putin politically. according to Forbes. they nearly fell into a relaxed state of complacency in the middle of 2015 (fortunately. they help to consolidate the Russian elite and most members of this elite adapted to this economic reality. elites rallying around Putin DMITRY POLIKANOV.Russia and the World: Foreign Policy Outlook 2016. and the oligarchs around them. PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy Studies. For the Western politicians who keep extending the sanctions they are valuable per se to indicate the Atlantic solidarity and their commitment to the principle of inability sanctions are the punishment for Russia’s revival as a great power and. . it has become clear for everyone that the sanctions have nothing to do with the alleged stipulations – be it the status of Crimea. 5 . “to do business as usual. at least. the state nationalizes the risk but privatizes the rewards to those closest to the president in return for their loyalty. December 2015. available for purchase at Russia- direct. December 2015. Under this return to state capitalism. or the execution of the Minsk agreements. hence. they will be indefinite DOA: 1-6-16 After nearly two years of this regime.leaders close to Putin have become multimillionaires. Hence. it is clear that the will last for another 3-5 years.TURN: In status quo. the awakening shock in autumn was rapidly decreasing oil prices). In fact.” For Russian politicians. Polikano is member of the Board.

nytimes. signed in 2007. 5 Dec. Moscow finds no better geopolitical ally than the Islamic Republic. "Immigrants Are Makers." The Huffington Post. quite audaciously. Web. Web.html “As the current Western-Russian tensions continue and due to the geopolitical security interests shared between Russia and Iran. Sanctions Hurt the Wrong People. proponents of Iran sanctions adhere to the myth that sanctions are targeted at the regime and do not affect the lives of ordinary people. Still others assert. 2013.TURN: Sanctions undermine reform Farshneshani.failures/in-iran-sanctions- hurt-the-wrong-people>. 2A . Several other crucial reasons contribute to this geopolitical security interests. the Ukrainian crisis makes both Russia and the Islamic Republic much closer due to the convergence of interests and geopolitical objectives between Putin and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in resisting Western hegemony in the Middle East.” B .com/majid- rafizadeh/ukraine-crisis. .com. As the current Ukrainian crisis continues. head of Russia's Rostec arms firm. 22 Jan. breaking the collective will and marginalizing democratic voices while solidifying the power of the ruling elite. Tehran." Center for American Progress.TURN: Pushes Russia to Iran Rafizadeh. Beheshta.Russia is shipping Iran weapons by defying weapons sanctions → Push Iran to Russia together 28 Mar. Russian officials say the first batch could be delivered 18 months after Iran has specified the S-300 type that it wants. and Beijing closer to one another to counterbalance the West and resist Western hegemony. The Ukraine crisis has moved Moscow. http://www. Majid. They argue that economic pressure will weaken the Islamic Republic and bring it to revise its nuclear and democratic calculus.R/T Undermines Iran 1 . its current interests are to strengthen strategic ties with Moscow and Tehran for security. President Vladimir Putin unfroze it in April. Moscow finds a closer strategic ally in Tehran." New York Times. providing a platform for them to create the strategic geopolitical axis in the region. "In Iran. working to resist the West and retain their strategic depth in the region. Despite the desperate circumstances. First of all. Web. 2015. 2014. 02 Oct. Marshall. 8 Feb.huffingtonpost. was frozen by Russia in 2010 because of the international sanctions. 2013. 2015. In addition.bolstering_b_5045450. Not Takers. But severely weakening the middle class." said Sergei Chemezov. "The deal to supply the S-300 to Iran has . The not only been signed between the parties but it has already come into force. (President of the International American Council) "Ukraine Crisis Bolstering Iran-Russia-China Axis. Technical talks are continuing. that the calamitous conditions engendered sanctions on Iran are only by the sanctions are naturally necessary to provoke a ground-up revolution that will ultimately result in regime change. <http://www. for China. TheHuffingtonPost. speaking at the Dubai Airshow-2015 $800m (£545m) contract.

com/World/Security- Watch/Backchannels/2014/0128/US-support-for-human-rights-abroad-The-case. And even this modest percentage is declining. 07 Dec. military power has never offered an appropriate response to whatever ails the Islamic world.” B .accounting for about 20 percent of oil imports. Web. While the annual country reports on human rights from the State Department. and. For whatever reasons.delink . The disconnect between the US government's rhetoric of steadfast support for human rights and its tendency to turn a blind eye to misbehavior by friends and allies hardly needs to be pointed out. Columbia University. 2015.U. U.washingtonpost. “Even if we defeat the Islamic State.of-Saudi-Arabia>. Washington’s national security elites seem oblivious to the implications these resources have for policy in the Middle East. http://www. Total crude oil imports have declined by 23 percent since 2008.TURN: United States loses international credibility when it supports Saudi Arabia "US Support for Human Rights Abroad: The Case of Saudi Arabia.S." The Christian Science Monitor. the errand is also proving still-lose-the-bigger-war/2014/10/03/e8c0585e-4353-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story. oil supplies adaptable John Glaser. And worse.S. mandated by Congress.d. America’s war for the Greater Middle East will end in failure.html “Yet even as the United States persists in its determination to pacify the Greater Middle East. We’ve committed our troops to a fool’s errand. Americans will discover that it was also superfluous. with ambassadors and other diplomats in embassies around the world generally hoping they stay there (since their jobs are ultimately about building and maintaining good relations with foreign powers. October 2014.R/T OIl Hegemony via Saudi Arabia 1A. if the nation's leaders aren't really willing to follow through. projected to fall 55% in coming years. With abundant North American energy reserves now accessible — all that shale oil and fracked gas — we don’t need the Persian Gulf oil that ostensibly made our post-1980 military exertions imperative. are thorough and honest looks at almost every member of the UN. oil reserves mean we don’t need the Middle East for oil anymore Andrew Bacevich.S. Persian Gulf oil only has a modest impact on the U. The Christian Science Monitor. <http://www.S. 28 December 2014. not antagonizing them). economy. we’ll still lose the bigger war”. is also relatively insulated . Energy Information Administration. No matter how long it lasts. according to the U.Gulf oil is only 20% of imports. they are then set aside to metaphorically gather dust. The U. The National Furthermore. the final verdict is already in.S. in the case of favored countries. New York Times. or abandon it completely. But the apparent hypocrisy (witness ongoing deliveries of advanced US weapons to Egypt since its military coup) undercuts the message and I often wonder if it would be better for the US to tone down its rhetoric. B- 2A . “America’s Toxic Middle East Allies”. “net import volumes of crude oil and liquid fuels on a volume basis are projected to decline by 55 percent between 2012 and 2020. And when it does. n. http://nationalinterest.

global energy markets adapted rather quickly through increasing production from other sources. rerouting shipping transportation. and putting both private and government-held inventories around the world to use.” . In every major oil shock since 1973.from sudden disruptions in supply.

not the elite. . "In that sense." he said. Wang. and not our own systems and institutions.” Canadian Center of Science and Education. most of all. December 21). thus. because the channels for economic cooperation with the West are blocked now.dependence on oil revenue. "Sanctions without popular dissent will hardly work" in weakening the government. hurting workers whose jobs are already under pressure. Russia still maintains political stability domestically. the initiators of the sanctions have really lost out. Government estimates say inflation could hit 12 percent this year. However. 2014.delink ." Despite a year of sanctions.” CNBC. 2014). <http://www. Wan." He said the oligarchs have not yet become restive. said Shevtsova.html> Sanctions aimed at individuals failed to change Kremlin behavior and the broader economic punishment introduced later is mostly hurting ordinary people this year. But there's absolutely no sign yet Sanctions are routinely cited in state media as the cause of most of any open discontent or pressure on the president. 3 . that's clear. while Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine are mostly in response to internal factors in Ukraine rather than as a reaction to the behavior of the West (Inozemtsev. The international sanctions led by the US and Europe have hindered the development of the Russian economy.TURN: Sanctions give Putin political cover for his complicity in the destruction of the Russian economy.php/jpl/article/viewFile/45567/25287> sanctions have not changed the Vladislav Inozemtsev. indicating that the US and European sanctions have played a certain deterrent role in Russia’s attitudes and behaviors towards Ukraine (Jian Jisong &Wang Hongxin.R/T Reduces Aggression 1 . At a meeting with high-ranking military leaders on December 19. However. it should be noted that Russia might never intend to allow the pro-Russian cities in eastern Ukraine to duplicate the Crimean annexation and eventually join the Russian Federation. they relocated aggression to Syria 2 . which only increases his popularity and makes it less likely that he will back What Russia wanted probably was to maintain its influential power in the eastern region of Ukraine. they have not changed the situation in Ukraine and Crimea to date. “Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis. November 15).sanctions-hit-russia. they mostly hit the ordinary "If the sanctions continue. doesn’t reduce. <http://www. Russia still adheres to its original positions on the Crimea and Ukraine issues. February 27 2015. Some people have thought that Russia respected the election results in Ukraine by not responding to the request of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine for the reunification of Oblast to the Russian Federation that was proposed after the referendum." he said. It is undoubtable that sanctions have had an impact to a certain extent. The government has managed "to shift the responsibility for it onto the West.Just deflects. the director of the Russian think-tank the Post-Industrial Research Center. Putin vowed that Russia would never abandon the patriots who supported the Crimean peninsula (Boxun. Gontmakher said. there's a certain discontent. despite economic indicators showing that the sanctions have crippled the Russian economy.delink . "Inflation is a tax on the poor. These include woes more properly blamed on over. 2014. believes that the status quo: Crimea is still under Russian control. “American farmers among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia.cnbc. something even the White House admits. President Vladimir Putin's approval rating has hovered well over 80 percent in recent months. an economics professor and former deputy minister of social affairs." current economic problems. Even if Russia shifted from Ukraine. and Putin's support rate has been at all-time high levels. "Among the business elite. A senior administration official in the White House admitted that.Russian policy in Ukraine and Crimea has not changed since sanctions. April 1 2015. according to Evgeny Gontmakher.ccsenet.

" says one security official.. "Sanctions Will Not Deter Russia. only 5 are appropriately considered successes.” Russia has little foreign debt. and Ralf Neukirch. . giving it a transitional period of at least two years -. transparent and accountable [and] include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue. Of HSE’s 115 cases. <http://www.” “Practically none of the claimed 40 successes of economic sanctions stands up to examination. 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions. Jö rg Schindler. http://www. and could survive sanctions for 2 years. And there has been no "broad national dialogue" about constitutional reform. Web.S.html>. Stanford University. eu-economic-sanctions.7% failure rate] Sanctions have been ineffective thus far David Cameron.” [MATH: 5/115 = 4. Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force.enough time to find new buyers and distribution routes for Russian gas. 12 May 2014. 2014. lead in implementing the de-escalation measures."We'll be sitting in the cold before the Russians run out of success rate = 95. Christoph. In German security policy circles. http://www. "Russian Dilemma: Why EU Sanctions Are a Bluff . Many governments are also skeptical that the sanctions could actually get Putin to back down. that a monitoring mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. OSCE. At Geneva.R/T Sanctions Effective Sanctions fail about 95% of the time Robert Pape. with outreach to all of Ukraine's regions The pro-Russian militias continued to hold government and political constituencies." SPIEGEL ONLINE International. buildings throughout the Donetsk region and took buildings in additional cities. A military mission attached to the OSCE consisting of Ukrainian officers and European officers was detained and paraded before the media as "prisoners of war" by the self-proclaimed mayor of Slavyansk.html “The sanctions were imposed after it became apparent the agreement reached on April 17 in had failed to de- escalate the crisis. large currency reserves." May 5. that outcome is considered almost impossible. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. Russia has little foreign debt and large currency reserves.pdf “115 identified cases in all. in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions. They reported sanctions success in 40 cases or 34 percent of the total. one security official argued. and 3 are indeterminate.against-russia-unlikely-a-968913. EU. The thumbscrews the West has thus far implemented "haven't instilled much fear" in Putin and his associates. the ONLINE. Ukraine and Russia agreed that all illegal armed groups must be disarmed and all illegally- seized buildings and illegally-occupied streets." None of that happened. and that the constitutional reform process be "inclusive. squares and parks vacated. Yale University.

. controlled by the forces that have controlled it since February 22 and are likely to control it after May 25. and notwithstanding the recent sanctions. 2014. it will continue to apply pressure on Ukraine. http://yaleglobal. Yale Clifton. although it certainly has done that.stanford. Russia will in all likelihood. Published May 1. David. the American sanctions on the 17 companies – mostly banks and energy companies – and revocation and tightening of export licensing on high-tech items with military uses will complicate business for the companies involved and perhaps impose modest costs on the economy in general. Concerned About Its Security Interests in Ukraine”. but in order to protect and secure what it regards as its national interest. Extended) Sanctions will not stop Putin’s actions (Article acknowledges economic damage and concludes neg) Parker. "Annexing Crimea and loosening Kiev's control over the eastern Ukraine have strengthened Putin's domestic position. As long as Russia’sinterests and security are threatened. 2014. Stanford scholars say” Stanford News.Sanctions Will Not Alter Putin’s Actions Cameron." said Stephen Krasner. continue to do what it has been doing – not simply in order to destabilize the Kiev government..yale.. “Sanctions against Russia may inflict some pain." . Published May 7. “Sanctions Will Not Deter Russia. constitutes a threat to Russia’s national interests and security. a Stanford professor of international relations and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. he believes Kiev. But they won’t cause Putin to “walk the walk” – for the same reason the earlier sanctions didn’t stop the annexation of Crimea: Rightly or wrongly.html "Sanctions will not alter (Russian President Vladimir) Putin's policies. security-interests-ukraine Unlike the EU sanctions. which have had and will have no effect.

R/T “Smart Sanctions”

1 - delink - Sanctions on Russia haven’t really been narrowly targeted “smart sanctions;” they
target large Russian energy companies, which have a big impact on the economy. In fact,
they’re more expansive than all other sanctions programs combined.
Joseph J. Schatz (Politico). The transatlantic cost of Russia sanctions. Accessed 12/9/15. Published 12/9/15.
U.S. officials like to say that the Russia sanctions program is larger than all other sanctions programs
combined. So the goal for the EU and the U.S. was to write a joint sanctions program that would hurt Russia’s economy by cutting its
banks and energy companies off from Western financing — but not so much that it would disrupt the global financial system, or European and

American economies.

2 - TURN: Hurting leadership means they increase repression even more
Daniel W. Drezner (2015) Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance, International Interactions, 41:4, 755-
764, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
The first and most straightforward question is whether targeted financial measures are as smart as policymakers claim. The logic behind asset

freezes and financial restrictions is that they hurt the target elites at least as much as target populations, thereby sparing the suffering of the

powerless. And indeed, Peksen (2009) shows that comprehensive sanctions lead to a far greater decline in the physical integrity rights of

individuals in target countries than targeted sanctions. Because financial sanctions are designed to be more costly to the target, however, it is
as an
possible that this category of sanction generates greater costs to human security. Escribà-Folch (2012) argues, for example, that
authoritarian regime faces greater financial constraints, it will opt for repression over
rewarding key members of the electorate as a tactic for staying in power. By definition, financial
sanctions are designed to place such restrictions on the target government. It is therefore possible that targeted financial sanctions are more

likely to trigger repression. Because targeted financial sanctions are a relatively recent phenomenon, it has been difficult to assess its empirical

effects. With their widespread use, however, both case studies and econometric analyses will be necessary as more data becomes available.

TURN: promotes cohesion among targeted elites
Daniel Drezner, University of Chicago. “How Smart are Smart Sanctions?”. International Studies Review. 2003.
Stepping back, more serious theoretical problems with the concept of smart sanctions become clear. For example, the contributors’ implicit

theory of how sanctions yield results rests on shaky ground. Smart sanctions could lead a target regime’s supporters to pressure the

government to acquiesce, but the authors fail to acknowledge alternative scenarios. Even with smart sanctions, a target
regime may shift the costs to its domestic opponents. Similarly, embargoes targeting a coterie of the regime’s
supporters may merely reinforce group cohesion rather than weaken support for the government.

Smart Sanctions increase elite nationalism (Yurgens – The national interest)
Yurgens (The National Interests). The West vs. Russia: The Unintended Consequences of Targeted Sanctions.
Accessed 12/10. Published 10/8/14.
consequences-targeted-11427?page=5 .
So far, Russia’s “internal diseases” have harmed it much more than Western sanctions. Likewise, the sanctions do not undermine the stability of
sanctions contribute to the Putin-driven soft
the Russian political regime. On the contrary, the “personal”
nationalization of the elites, and the state can more than make up for financial losses
sustained by certain individuals and companies. For the elements of Russian society already dissatisfied with the
Russian government, such sanctions are a “bonus” of sorts that adds to their satisfaction over the Crimea annexation—Russia gets Crimea and

despised elites are punished too.

Warrant: Galvanizing the political, economic and social elites
Yurgens (The National Interests). The West vs. Russia: The Unintended Consequences of Targeted Sanctions.
Accessed 12/10. Published 10/8/14.
consequences-targeted-11427?page=5 .
Neo-conservative Russian isolationists are already influential around President Putin. In the
absence of any visible carrots from the West, using the stick endlessly will only strengthen
the neo-conservative segment of the Russian elite and population. Russia today is far from the
Iranian situation, where the supreme leader decided to avoid selecting a belligerent president
to make negotiations possible. In Russia, the current situation can persist for a relatively long
time, although the country already feels a strain on its budget and public expenditures.

R/T Naming and Shaming

1 - TURN: Backlash for Naming and Shaming can be gamed by political figures to increase
domestic control, sometimes via violence
Nigam, Sonya. "Naming and Shaming of International Human Rights Abuses." Naming and Shaming of
International Human Rights Abuses. Canadian Law Magazine, 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2015.
< international-human-rights-abuses.html>.
One reason is that some governments’ capacities for reform vary by types of human rights violations—it may be easier for some governments to reform their legal or political structures, at
least on paper, by holding elections or passing legislation to better protect some political rights, than to stop agents of terror that are out of their direct control. Another reason is that

some governments abuse human rights strategically—when faced with global pressures for
reform, some despots use terror, such as killings or beatings, to counteract the effectiveness
of political reforms they make in response to international pressures, such as holding

2 - TURN: Naming and shaming specific regimes can actually increase that regime’s support
from its allies.
Nigam, Sonya. "Naming and Shaming of International Human Rights Abuses." Naming and Shaming of
International Human Rights Abuses. Canadian Law Magazine, 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2015.
< international-human-rights-abuses.html>.
Aid relationships that are not politically important to the donor are maintained for charitable
reasons or to promote a positive image of the donor state, both of which are negated when
the recipients are caught abusing human rights. On the other hand, if the aid relationship provides more tangible benefits to the donor — it
satisfies demands of a donor’s domestic public, preserves profitable economic ties, confers a strategic or military advantage to the donor, or politically benefits the donor in some other way--

The larger the donor’s benefit from the
these benefits will weigh against the reputational cost of cooperating with a known offender.

relationship, the less naming and shaming matters. In some situations, a donor might even
increase aid to a shamed state in order to compensate it for aid lost from other sources

3 - nonunique - G-8 suspended them and named-and shamed them too
Felicity Vabulas, University of Chicago. “Does the G-8’s Suspension of Russia Actually matter?”. Washington Post.
April 3 2014.
Second, there is increasing evidence that naming and shaming states that violate both explicit
and implicit commitments in the international arena is both costly and can ultimately change a
state’s behavior. Why? States care about their reputations, and as Michael McFaul, the just-
departed American ambassador to Moscow, states, “symbols do matter.” While the Russians
have tried to downplay the G-8 suspension, it is likely that they are seething behind closed
doors. For them, the G-8 was an indication to the rest of the world that they were part of the
“big-boy” great power club of democracies. The role of prestige is paramount when rising
powers choose to join international clubs.


Does Russia’s Protest Movement Have a Future?. and soon this will be reflected in the approval ratings. http://imrussia. Accessed 12/11. since most people consider the ruling regime to be legitimate. . The government’s high approval rating has caused protest activity to drop to an all-time low. however.R/T Social Movements Increase 1 . Calls for political protest fall on deaf ears.TURN: Putin confronting the west is bad for activism b/c increases approval rates to deter protests Denis Volkov (Institute of Modern Russia).org/en/analysis/nation/2184-does-russias-protest-movement-have-a-future . One of the main indicators of this fact is Putin’s 85% approval rating. The social discontent and anxiety caused by the economic crisis are growing. (It is worth noting here that the main driver of Putin’s increased popularity was the annexation of Crimea and a large-scale confrontation with the West). Published 2/24/15.

" he oil/ To some extent. That might protect Exxon's Arctic exploration and drilling in Russia's massive Bazhenov shale region. “Where do the latest U. July 2014.S. https://www." He says that oil service companies will be able to continue to do business as long as their equipment had been previously contracted. Just a couple of days before the U. a major international oil services firm. "Even from a multiyear perspective. the new rules are highly unlikely to be game- changing. but also because Russia has fairly well-developed capabilities in energy technology/infrastructure (though admittedly not much when it comes to unconventionals). "This is partly because of how narrow the rules are.S.washingtonpost. Washington Post. sanctions announced in mid-July.R/T Oil Tech Sanctions Sanctions preserved existing oil tech including arctic and shale operations Steven Mufson. . Rosneft completed a deal to buy the Russian operations of Weatherford. an oil analyst at the investment firm Raymond James. believes the sanctions will have "minimal" impact. Rosneft has already been girding itself for sanctions. sanctions leave Russian Oil?”. Pavel Molchanov.

the oil arm of Gazprom. gives Russia a strong incentive to localize oil production. where the Greenpeace activists were seized. Russia can decrease its dependence on the West . we pioneered the development of Russia's Arctic shelf."Putin symbolically commanded to start the pumping from Moscow and proclaimed it commenced "our country's big. Russia's state-run natural gas For Russia. much of Russia’s military construction in the High North more likely appears designed to counter or deter suspected growing threats due to the West’s sanctions." Gazprom's CEO Alexei Miller said in a 9f9c8f2c16df6822b0b8e1a2f75af#. “Russia's failing designs for Arctic oil exploration”.R/T Prevents Arctic Development 1 . That reliance on Western technology to develop and extract Arctic oil and gas deposits. http://www. extensive work in the Arctic".html The Prirazlomnaya platform.they solved via shifting to Vietnam Mansur 150316075032235. http://www. September 3).jamestown. Western sanctions slapped on Moscow specifically restrict access to drilling technologies . Gazprom will continue the conquest of the Arctic.Russia has a drilling platform now. Russia is becoming increasingly beholden to China for the investment necessary to sustain the ongoing construction of energy infrastructure in the Arctic (Novatek. 4 . November 2014.and Russia simply lacks the Gazprom said in November that it would team up with PetroVietnam for a project expertise. http://theechonews. clearly have the tech Mansur Mirovalev. Less than a year later. in the Pechora Sea. This interpretation seems particularly plausible given the location of these explosion-proof. “Russia’s New Arctic Base Continue the Militarization of the High North”.com/indepth/features/2015/03/russia-failing-designs-arctic-oil-exploration- 150316075032235.takes 5 years for Russia to develop own tech Joe Friedrichsen.they solved by shifting to China Stephen Blank. oil and gas extraction in the Arctic will require the creation of cost-effective technological solutions. this shipment is very late.delink . "The fanfare surrounding its departure looks more like a PR stunt than a credible new source of oil. "No doubt. is the world's first ice-resistant rig that weighs half a million tons and is supposedly spill. Environmentalists and experts were less optimistic. it contains very poor quality oil and it poses a huge risk to the pristine Arctic environment. Yet." Greenpeace International Executive Director Kumi Naidoo said in a statement. “Under the Radar: War for the Arctic?”.aljazeera.delink .However.Nonunique .aljazeera. "Today. http://www." 2 . Jamestown Foundation. and the launch was hailed in almost operator. military terms.VnbE0horIb0 Russian rhetoric about Western threats notwithstanding. “Russia's failing designs for Arctic oil exploration”. said Russia can’t rely solely on foreign companies to provide it with equipment.The Prirazlomnaya oil was proudly christened ARCO ("Arctic oil") and was described as similar to Kuwait's Ratawi and Saudi Arabia's Arabian Heavy brands.html The only fly in the ointment was Gazprom's admittance that Prirazlomnaya's production was profitable only when oil prices exceeded $80 per barrel. says its The rig started pumping oil in April 2014. though. Alexander Mandel. Al-Jazeera. March 2015. not far from the Prirazlomnaya. A promotional film glorified the rig as a continuation of the USSR's groundbreaking efforts to subdue the forces of nature. Al-Jazeera. including those in the Kuriles. "Despite the president's celebratory tone. the price slumped well below that. from China. 3 . November 2015. Echo News. March 2015.delink . adviser to the director general of Gazprom Neft. combined with Western sanctions.

.by developing solutions to these issues. Mandel also noted the creation of standard offshore platforms and ships to accomplish such a goal will take about five years to develop.

html .R/T Hurts Turkey Proxy War in Syria Threatens But the bombings may have contributed to already-rising tensions between Turkey and Russia over Syria. . The area includes towns such as Dabiq. Mixed into those delicate obstacles is the renewed tension between Russia and Turkey.ft. Root cause of proxy war = Russian bombings in Syria Vox. Russia could also see the border offensive as a potential target for meddling. And it's not just the flights: Russia intervened in Syria to support Bashar c1fb87bef7af. 11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af. beyond the small groups of rebels the US and Turkey are currently That is not to say that Turkey necessarily shot down the Russian plane in cold-blooded vengeance for Russia bombing ethnic Turkmens. but Turkey has been involved in Syria for a few years seeking to topple Assad. Turkey has warned the Kurds not to try and take control of the border strip. Financial Times. Turkish and US aircraft to be operating in a narrow area and conducting very different operations.html#axzz3uhmGggnH http://www.ft.ft. http://www. They're on opposite sides of a deadly serious proxy war.-led strikes Geoff Dyer. where Isis is believed to have a strong and fortified presence.vox. Escalation was not out of the question.html - ixzz3uhmdZG3b There are also unresolved questions on who will do the fighting. the reported Russian air strikes in Azaz underline the potential for Russian. but Moscow could be tempted to encourage the Kurds to grab more territory.ixzz3uhmnyrGY As it looks for ways to impose consequences on Turkey. If confirmed.http://www.

more than any other power. has in these years repeatedly ignored international law.S. yet it now reserves the United States. But Schmitt’s dictum also became a philosophical foundation for the exercise of American global power in the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. in Schmitt’s terms. its global sovereign. as the planet’s the right to defy those same laws with impunity. pervasive surveillance. so Washington is now well into the second decade of an endless War on Terror that seems the sum of its exceptions to international law: endless incarceration.thenation. February All that should be impressive enough for a discredited. So last superpower or. A sovereign ruler should. said Schmitt. extrajudicial killing. Created at the cost of more than a trillion dollars since 9/11. torture on demand. The Nation. Washington. “You Must Follow International Law (Unless You’re America)”. and immunity for all of the above on the grounds of state secrecy. discard laws in times of national emergency. http://www. Yet these many American exceptions are just surface manifestations of the ever-expanding clandestine dimension of the American state. . long dead authoritarian thinker. has violated International Law for decades with the War on Terror → 1 policy isn’t going to change all of that Alfred McCoy.R/T Legitimizes ILaw The U. created the modern international community of laws and treaties. the purpose of this vast apparatus is to control a covert domain that is fast becoming the main arena for geopolitical contestation in the twenty-first century. drone strikes in defiance of national boundaries. Just as Schmitt’s sovereign preferred to rule in a state of endless exception without a constitution for his Reich. following instead its own unwritten rules of the road for the exercise of world power.

02 Decreases FDI 1% increase in FDI increases income gap in that country by . However. foreign capital reversals. “Limited Linkages from growth engines and regional disparities in China”. “The Macroeconomics of a Financial Dutch Disease”.run negative effects of the financial Dutch disease we describe. because we lack reliable data on the scale of inter-regional capital flows.19 percent. Post Keynesians Economics Study Group. We also provide support to a developmentalist monetary policy that targets competitive nominal and real exchange rates in order to favor the process of production and export diversification. it indicates that a one percent increase in the ratio of the number of urban employees to the number of total employees reduces the income gap by 0. we could not include this effect in our empirical model. in the form of taxes on exchange rate-based capital gains. http://www. . Such a spiral easily gives rise to exchange rate volatility. University of Cambridge. 2002.pdf In this paper we describe the medium-run macroeconomic effects and long-run development consequences of a financial Dutch disease that may take place in a small developing country with abundant natural resources. Such a policy stand can be particularly effective to counter-act the long. such acute macroeconomic instability as well as overdependence on natural resource exports all dampen the development of non-traditional tradable good sectors and curtail labor productivity dynamics. the movement of domestic capital may increase regional income inequalities because capital has been flowing from the poor inland regions to the fast-growing coastal regions since the reforms began. it indicates that a one percent increase in the average FDI in coastal provinces relative to that in inland regions increases the income gap by about 0. Journal of Comparative Economics.02% Xiaolan Fu. This result suggests that an increase in FDI in the coastal regions relative to the inland regions leads to a larger income gap between the regions. Finally. We advise the introduction of constraints to short-term capital flows. 2014.bust cycles. and sharp macroeconomic instability.” FDI inflows into resource sectors causes Dutch Disease Alberto Botta. This result suggests that urbanization in the inland regions reduces the income gap between coastal and inland regions. In the long run. PDF on Dropbox. An initial surge in FDI targeting domestic natural resources sets in motion a perverse cycle between exchange rate appreciation and mounting short-term capital flows. “The relative FDI ratio also exhibits a significant positive impact on the income gap. The estimated coefficient of the structural variable is negative and statistically significant. The first move of such a peculiar Dutch disease is on financial markets. to tame exchange rate/capital flows boom-and.

. Malesky (2008) argues that FDI can contribute to the autonomy of subnational actors.FDI increases chance of coups b/c 1 – increases attractiveness of controlling govts and 2 – gives more funding to economic elites that could launch a coup. domestic assets owned by elites or the military may increase in value and contribute to increased elite autonomy. If FDI leads to increases in the productivity of domestic firms through technology spillovers and forced adjustment due to increased competition. elites become less dependent on patronage distributed by the dictator and more willing to pursue independent political goals.research. 2012. loosen central government control and lead to de-facto decentralization. http://wpsa.pdx. “Investing in Violence: Foreign Direct Investment and Coups”. FDI may provide an independent resource base to elites which can then be used to launch a successful coup. By developing an independent resource FDI may also contribute to a shift in the balance of power within a particular state and make the threat of a coup more credible by providing additional resources to actors within the dictator’s ruling coalition.pdf Not only does FDI increase the attractiveness of state control. decreasing their need to be loyal to the dictator Andrey Tomashevskiy.

.” Less than 48 hours later.html THE U. killing scores of people. It was a blatant violation of the resolution Russia had just voted for — and an indication of how Vladimir Putin actually regards the diplomatic deals on Syria the Obama administration has been pushing.And Russia is to Blame.N. https://www.N Resolution on Syria is Shattered . A U. 2015. December 21st. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution Friday demanding that “all parties immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects” as well as “any indiscriminate use of weapons.washingtonpost. Russian planes carried out at least six airstrikes on civilian targets in the northern Syrian provincial capital of Idlib. including through shelling and aerial 11e5-9b92-dea7cd4b1a4d_story.R/T UN Syria Resolution Putin violated the resolution immediately after it was put in place because he doesn’t give a fuck Editorial Board.

Accessed 1/14/16. the fact that the Central Bank still has a sizable (if reduced) pile of money sitting around won’t do very much to help the average Russian citizen. Does any of this matter? Well. Russia is creating a $100 billion rival to the IMF.R/T Reserve/Running Outta Money 1. The following chart clearly shows the extent to which falling oil prices have simply stopped having an impact on Russia’s currency holdings: The fact that it’s not doing that. 15. Russia has just formed a 100-billion-dollar reserve fund with BRICs countries that includes 41 billion dollars in funding from China. . and South Africa. Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified an accord Saturday to set up a $100 billion reserve fund for the so-called BRICS — the leading emerging economies Russia. Published 5/03/15. which was set up after an agreement signed in July in Brazil. well behind the $41 billion China has promised to pour into the fund. Russia’s foreign currency reserves have been in the towel last March. and that has deliberately maintained a significant reserve of “dry powder” despite for the better part of a year it ongoing and even accelerating economic damage. China. AFP (Business Insider). 11-13-2015. Goldseek. http://news. rising unemployment.businessinsider. More importantly. Russian central bank officials have previously said that Russia views gold bullion as “100% guarantee from legal and political risks”. Elvira Nabiullina spoke monetary asset – in her words as a “financial cushion. Russia Has been stocking up on gold. Elvira Nabiullina spoke about Russia’s gold and foreign currency reserves today saying Russia intended building them up to $500 billion in the coming years.forbes. the Central Bank essentially threw Over the past 10 months. essentially stable despite an accelerating collapse in the price of oil. Russia and China have been the leading official sector gold buyers over the last 15 years. Brazil. she confirmed that Russia continues to see gold reserves as an important Russian central bank governor. Russia Sees Gold Reserves As “Additional Financial Cushion” In Face Of “External Uncertainties”. http://www. But it does suggest that the country’s fundamental stability is not at risk and that the policy makers are not panicking and continue to macroeconomic focus on the long-term. Russian reserves stable (Adomanis – Forbes) Mark Adomanis (Forbes). they could very easily just tap into these russias-international-reserves-are-stable-for-now/#2715e4857a0b257c661a631a After spending the better part of a hundred billion dollars in an (ultimately futile) effort to defend the ruble. 4.goldseek. and deepening recession. India.” about Russia’s gold and foreign currency reserves today saying Russia intended building them up to $500 billion in the coming years. Russia's International Reserves Are Stable (For Now).php Russian central bank governor. creating a reserve independent of political risks like sanctions Mark O' Amidst A Deepening Recession. Moscow is expected to contribute $18 billion to the reserve. suggests that the bank’s leadership understands that what’s happening is a “new normal” that won’t change anytime soon. whose living standards have been battered by a nasty combination of high inflation. The emerging economies also plan to form their own international bank based in Shanghai to challenge western dominance over international money markets. Published 1/14/16. http://www.

sabotage and terrorism Ihor Kozak. Newsweek. http://www. disgruntled minority groups. who visited Ukraine seven times in 2015. Politically. "Ukraine is a work in progress by Putin. Shifts to less costly methods of political destabilization. economically.S.5. Wielding power or gaining influence abroad—through antiestablishment political parties. former NATO Supreme Allied Commander. 14th Feb 2015. Army General Wesley And so it seems that. According to SBU official Oleksandr Tkachuk. He has multiple channels to attack Ukraine. and others—has become part of the Kremlin’s hybrid-war strategy. militarily. diplomatically. “From Cold war to Hot war”. supporters in business. the Kremlin's leadership is emphasizing alternative aspects of hybrid warfare. trying to destabilize the situation and trying to show that Ukrainian law enforcement bodies and Ukrainian authorities are not able to protect their citizens. propagandist “think-tanks”. 12/25/15 PUTIN PLOTS TO MAKE UKRAINE A FAILED STATE http://www. According to retired U." Recent developments on the security front within Ukraine's borders are disturbing. in order to achieve its long-term strategic goals. The Economist. This perversion of “soft power” is seen by Moscow as a vital complement to military engagement." . environmental activists. The Ukrainian security service (SBU) and other law enforcement agencies report a significant increase in acts of sabotage and terrorism. media outlets. 5b. "Russian special services are intensifying their activities in peaceful cities.economist. politically. dangerous-confrontation Destabilisation is also being achieved in less military ways. economically.

in other cases. A Year of Sanctions against Russia—Now What? A European Assessment of the Outcome and Future of Russia Sanctions. we put sanctions then intervened anyway when they failed George Lopez. to produce the desired results. however.pdf . But on 8 November. Although Russia’s aggression was politically unacceptable.001. it has taken sanctions months. that President George Bush had little faith in the ability of sanctions alone to achieve allied goals in Kuwait. By late September 1990. through multiple statements by President Putin. http://csis. In most cases.00038. the White House ordered a massive increase in the military deployments as the U.S. since so many other factors were involved. “Sanctions: The Economic Weapon In The New World Order”. the President's chief military advisor. “The Sanctions Era: An Alternative To Military Intervention”.2 ' By contrast. less than two months after sanctions were imposed and well before they could have had any substantial impact on Iraqi policy. to impress upon Western countries how much escalation could cost— even the consideration of having nuclear weapons playing a role in the crisis—if they considered interfering militarily in Ukraine. 1993. if not years. Political and Social Affairs Division of the Canadian Government.R/T Budapest Memorandum/Military Alt No legal obligation to intervene under Budapest Memorandum (Galbert – CSIS) Simond de Galbert (CSIS). sanctions have failed to prevent the use of military force.N. dl. Sanctions have not proved to be the surefire alternative to military action hoped for by President Woodrow Wilson and others after the First World War .edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149. appears to have argued for giving sanctions more time to work before resorting to military force.tufts. General Colin Powell. considering the underlying risks of a military escalation between the West and Russia. Published 10/ 1995. University of Notre Dame. Ukraine is not a NATO ally and assurances such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum are political ly more than legally binding. . Kuwait. Russia understood this hesitancy well and made sure. Accessed 1/14/16. it is difficult to determine to what extent sanctions were responsible. And Western leaders quickly discarded the option. for instance in Rhodesia and South Africa.00006 The evidence suggests. Security Council (resolution 678) and later the U. Congress approved the use of "all necessary means" to force Iraqi withdrawal. Not proven to be adequate alternative Michel Rossignol. the transatlantic alliance has no legal obligation to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty militarily. Indeed. even where there were positive results. should other means (vis-h-vis sanctions) fail. the President began to argue within the small decision group that guided White House policy that the use of military force would be necessary to expel Iraq from Kuwait. ex.

still constant inflow of weapons. http://www. Europe.reuters.N. Despite Minsk.”.. still pour into east Ukraine from Russia: U. 2015." the report said. chief of the Americas. particularly due to the withdrawal of certain heavy weapons by the Ukrainian military and armed groups from the contact line.R/T Ceasefire 1. This is just posturing. sanctions have yet to dissuade Russia from its strategic objective of steadily escalating its support for separatists and consolidating the territory under pro-Russian control in eastern Ukraine.000 people pdf/CNAS%20Report%20Economic%20Statecraft%20%232%20FINAL.pdf On the other hand. an area where we have 800. while warning of a new build-up. however. “Lessons From Russia For The Future Of Sanctions”. foreign fighters. or to a point where it expects any sanctions imposed will be manageable. and conflict (Stephanie Nebehay – Reuters) Stephanie Nebehay (Reuters). Accessed January 15. A fresh ceasefire last August has led to a significant drop in hostilities. Russia de-escalates to avoid more sanctions and then re-escalates Peter Harrell. where artillery systems are being deployed.cnas. Magazzeni said.. and then tactically de-escalating the situation or launching a new peace negotiation to avoid sanctions actually being implemented. Gianni Magazzeni. "There are increasing skirmishes taking place along the line of contact. Center For American Security. "There idUSKBN0TS0TQ20151209. but it is actually the use of Howitzers and other very heavy weapons." . an inflow of ammunition. http://www. arms. Russia appears to be engaging in a cyclical strategy of escalating its intervention just below the point where it expects further sanctions to be imposed. leaving the situation highly flammable. "That gives you a very clear sense of the implications of resumed fighting especially if it's not any longer remnants of war and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices). 2016. told a news briefing: "There is still a continuing flow of foreign fighters including in some cases retired or former servicemen of the Russian Federation and a continuing flow of weapons.N. September 2015. and Central Asia Branch of the U. Published December 9." he said. In some respects. it said. “Men. human rights office. It remains to be seen whether the continued impact of sanctions on the Russian economy in 2015 will convince Russia to support a more durable deescalation in eastern Ukraine. areas controlled by armed groups. weaponry and fighters from the Russian Federation into the territories controlled by the armed groups." Ceasefire violations have occurred near Donetsk and Horlivka.

com/2015/11/19/putins-alternate-ukraine-strategy-blitzkreig-schleichkrieg/#arvlbdata. and now. 2 . Three formal rounds of sanctions to date—and subsequent expansions of existing restrictions by both Washington and Brussels—have taken aim at obvious targets of opportunity within Putin’s regime. Western capitals should focus less on possible Russian actions. The United States and Europe have already begun to do so. in November. Saudi Arabia’s active and ongoing attempts to depress the global price of oil through increased production—a reaction to both the unfolding rapprochement between the United States and Iran. But achieving a satisfactory answer to the question of what Russia might do has proven maddeningly elusive. According to former Kremlin economic adviser Andrei Illarionov. 2015. Russian military spending— which long averaged between 2. Published May 22. members of Putin’s inner circle (including influential oligarchs and power brokers Igor Sechin and Gennady Timchenko). Western nations have begun to drive up the marginal costs to Russian decision makers of their Ukrainian misadventure. Since the end of the battle of Debaltseve. This is because much of Moscow’s policies to date have been opportunistic in nature—driven by perceived Western weakness and divisions within the NATO alliance. perhaps we simply aren’t asking the right questions. http://nationalinterest.5 and 3. fighting has escalated at least three times. When diplomats and journalists talk about Minsk Putin himself recently argued is perceived in Moscow as fleeting in nature and unsustainable in the long run. “The Economics of Deterring Russia”. For months now. the climactic battle of the war in Ukraine (so far) occurred after the Minsk II agreement was signed on 11 February 2015 (Ukrainian troops finally fought their way out of Debaltseve on 18 February). Accessed December 25. “Putin’s Alternate Ukraine Strategy: Between Blitzkrieg and Schleichkrieg”. http://euromaidanpress. they rarely mention that the final Russian assault on the Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve. Given this state of affairs. and high-ranking government officials (such as Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin). in August. but today some of Ukraine’s Western friends are more willing than ever to end the war in Ukraine at almost any additional cost to Ukraine. 2016.Russia believes sanctions are running dry and thus gearing up for a European war (Ilan Berman – The National Interest) Ilan Berman (The National Interest). When it comes to the prospects of war in Europe. Published November 19. as well as America’s unfolding fracking “revolution”—has had a pronounced collateral effect on Russia’s energy-heavy economy. 2015.Fighting has escalated thee times to pre-ceasefire levels despite Minsk II (Alex Leonor – Euromaidan Press) Alex Leonor (Contributor for the Euromaidan Press). Accessed January 15. Which is why that the Russian economy has now weathered the worst of the resulting economic downturn. Yet this trendline.2 percent of national GDP—is today rising to levels analogous to the . 2015. It is also why Russia appears to be preparing for a wider war in Europe. Russia watchers within the Beltway and in European capitals have been preoccupied with anticipating the next moves of Russian President Vladimir Putin in the year- old conflict taking place in Ukraine. rather than by a clearly defined end state on the part of the Russian government. The world oil market has arguably done much more. Rosneft). These are threefold: state-owned enterprises (like natural gas giant Gazprom and its oil analogue. like Western sanctions themselves. In this way. and more on how to constrain its potential for aggression. In April. Then there was the Minsk II ceasefire. Russia has so far been unable to capture any more Ukrainian territory.

jstor. Imposed armistices. rivals the initial mobilization that accompanied the start of hostilities in Ukraine (in excess of 10 percent of GDP). Illarionov notes. Nato's intervention in the Kosovo crisis follows this pattern. But fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. meanwhile. Give War A Chance. artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace. . Each time. unless followed by negotiated peace accords. It has recently been true in the Balkans. the opponents used the pause to recruit.pdf it can resolve political An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil. 3 . and Muslims in Bosnia. The amount of money now being spent by Moscow. http://www. and equip additional forces for further combat. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. again. train. and between the Serbs. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends and it does usually end. they have typically been interrupted early on. Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council. wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of Instead. which actually increases the number of deaths Edward Luttwak of Foreign Affairs. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. suggesting that Russia is preparing for escalation. however. which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate.Cease-fires prolong conflict by allowing both parties to re-arm. it does have a great virtue: conflicts and lead to peace. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49. prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina. between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army.period immediately preceding last spring's incursion into Ukraine. Croats. in Ukraine and perhaps even beyond. Cease-fires and armistices have frequently been imposed a cease- under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting. Aug 1999. before they could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting settlement.

2016. http://www. and energy sales.”. September 15. represent greater danger than in the past . especially those with dual use potential. even at the displeasure of the least for the time being. at least for now”. “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East. Evidence is provided not only by domestic figures. coupled with the impact of Western sanctions (including some directed against the defense sector).R/T Less Arms Trade Russian arms trade not affected (Dmitry Dokuchaev – Russia Direct Magazine) Dmitry Dokuchaev (Russia Direct Magazine). • As ideological considerations have yielded to economic interests in the drive behind arms sales. “Russian arms market unhampered by sanctions. the natural result of the Cold War ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet One would be forgiven for thinking that Russia’s economic recession. unhampered-sanctions-least-now.inss. Published November 2005.IS. though not at the expense of foreign policy interests. As long as the political price is not prohibitive. is a major factor in its foreign policy decisions. • arms sales and energy sales. Accessed January 15.pdf. • At the same time.russia-direct. http://www. Russia's desire to court favor among Middle East states. Russia has always been a significant player in the international arms market. would have seriously undermined Russia’s position as an arms exporter. which in turn can help curb Islamic Economic necessity drives Russia to promote fundamentalist threats. Russia can no longer afford to transfer arms freely as did the Soviet Union for many Russia will pursue lucrative arms. Accessed January 15. but also by the results of studies by influential international think tanks that specialize in arms-related matters. Sales now are driven by profits more than by ideological interests. But that is not the case . nuclear. certain weapons. Economic necessity drives Russian arms sales so sanctions supercharge (Paul Rivlin – Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) Paul Rivlin (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies). 2016.

Art stated that applications of coercive diplomacy by the United States only succeeded in meeting its policy objective 20 percent of the time. http://rbth. Accessed January 15. research on applications of coercive diplomacy by U.S.usip. policymakers to wield effectively Art asked. 70% of Russians do not want to make a compromise on sanctions (Levada Center) Yekaterina Sinelschikova (Russia Beyond the Headlines). The current official Western view is . sociologists say that a third of the population is experiencing difficulties due to the 633." Yet despite this outward defiance.“One year of western sanctions against Russia: We still live in different worlds”. Published July 10. Just 20 percent of those polled said that Russia "should look for a compromise and make concessions in order to have the sanctions lifted.brookings.R/T Coercive Diplomacy Coercive diplomacy fails 80% of the time (Robert Art – United States Institute of Peace) Robert Art (United States Institute of Peace). 2016. which recently reached a record 89 percent. We and the Russians are fundamentally at odds on what sanctions are all about. Sanctions make Russia insecure– they’ll never change the way they act diplomatically (Clifford Gaddy – Brookings Institution) Clifford Gaddy (Brookings Institution). which range from U. Accessed January 15. policy which has failed so far and which has no chance of succeeding in the future. 70 percent of Russians believe that the country should not make any compromises because of the sanctions imposed by the West over Moscow’s role in the Ukrainian coercive-diplomacy-past-present-and-future. according to Robert Art. Published 3/9/2015. "The United States and Coercive Diplomacy: Past. and Future.". "coercive diplomacy fails more often than it succeeds. interventions in Somalia and Kosovo to the Clinton administration's 1994 negotiations with North Korea. Present. http://www. 2016. 2015. policymakers In fact." Discussing the cases in his study. although paradoxically this does not seem to be having an effect on the popularity rating of Russian President Vladimir Putin. http://www. While Art noted that political objectives often will change during coercive diplomatic actions and that it was also difficult to define clear policy success. his over the past 12 years shown that.html. According to a Levada Center survey taken in June. he stressed that the study's finding was consistent with the findings of other research in the field.S. 2016. What makes coercive diplomacy such a difficult tool for U.S. the West thus remains committed to a against Russia in March 2014 for its actions in Ukraine. how they think about security. Accessed January 15. “70 percent of Russians opposed to compromise on sanctions – report”.edu/blogs/order-from- chaos/posts/2015/03/09-one-year-western-sanctions-against-russia-gaddy. The United States and the European Union have now both announced that they are extending the economic sanctions they first imposed One year on. Published 8-8-2003. The [Western] sanctions policy was destined to fail because it was based on false assumptions about how most Russians think—in particular.

It can only be guaranteed by everyone adhering to a rules-based system. No multinational or supranational organization can guarantee that. Russians see us as forcing them to choose: either accept a political and military situation that will threaten the survival of their nation or be subject to a constantly intensified campaign of economic warfare. as long as it feels insecure and still remains capable of defending against threats. and trust. those in the West who think Russia is headed for collapse internally. there is only one way we can win. and as a result. Russia will never respect those rules as long as it Sanctions can therefore not solve remains convinced that our order prohibits Russia from guaranteeing its own security.” The meaning was that he has a completely different frame of reference. . This is certainly true as regards concepts of global and national security. There are. and on what sanctions represent. whose value Russia weighs against the cost of seizing it. It believes that the only real guarantee of its own security and sovereignty is its independent ability to defend itself. namely. our “Russia problem. In its own view. Russia acted in Ukraine to defend against an existential threat.” Russia will act as it has in Ukraine. as a way to force Russia to change its behavior and obey the rules of our order. Ukraine is not loot from a robbery. misunderstanding that is rooted in our fundamentally different views of how nations can best ensure their security in today’s world. Russia must collapse completely. we think we are pressuring Russia to shift its behavior towards a more acceptable form. one of our own making. Western leaders explain that sanctions are intended “to change Putin’s calculus. Russia rejects that idea of security. and that sanctions will hasten the day. If “winning” in this conflict for us means that we force Russia to acknowledge that our version of international security prevails over its version of security. and worse. of course.” This assumes that there are some gains he would be willing to forego in return for easing the pain of current or future sanctions. We are therefore caught in a trap. perhaps sooner rather than later. We adopted a policy that could never work as it was intended. This is a very dangerous bet. For Russia. These diverging views are only the tip of the iceberg of mutual misunderstanding between Russia and the West. By applying sanctions. that he does not views events and actions the same way that we in the West do. It is defeat in either case.that sanctions are a way to punish Russia for violating the rules of the international order and to thereby correct its behavior in the future. The Russians believe the sanctions are designed to weaken Russia and reduce its ability to defend itself. dialogue. on Russia’s actions in Ukraine. this is not a choice. What Merkel said of Putin applies to the majority of Russians. Our Western view is that security in an interconnected world has to be based on cooperation. The West and Russia are worlds apart on what constitutes a security threat. Yet when we apply this cost-benefit model—which is one adopted from the realm of the economics of crime and law enforcement—we fundamentally misunderstand what is at stake for Russia. Angela Merkel famously said that Vladimir Putin “lives in another world.