CHI MING TSOI, petitioner VS. C.A.

& GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents January 17, 1997 FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy, normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent. The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. RULING: Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husband’s senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to “procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.
SANTOS v. CA -240 SCRA 20January 4, 1995 FACTS:

Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20, 1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents. On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven month’s after her departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. ISSUE: Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. RULING: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,

respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code, which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.” The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents February 13, 1997 FACTS: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt

should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. (3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. FERRARIS V. FERRARIS 17 July 2006 FACTS: This is a resolution of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner regarding the dismissal of her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to the respondent. ISSUE: How shall psychological incapacity be proven?

RULING: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his socalled marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan’s statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan’s information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of respondent’s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent’s parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent’s character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or

unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.
Antonio v. Reyes 10 March 2006 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the “number one moneymaker” in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void RULING: “It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person

unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. “From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave. But the requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. “From the totality of the evidence, however, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. RP V. IYOY 21 Sept. 2005 FACTS: After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for

declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines. ISSUE: Should the marriage be declared void under Art. 36? RULING: The evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos, respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained. In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO -October 4, 2004-

FACTS: Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour. The trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not both Manuel and Juanita are psychologically incapacitated. RULING: The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature, and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law

that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is reinstated and given full force and effect. RP V. HAMANO MAY 20, 2004 FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. ISSUE: Is abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity? RULING: We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. MACARRUBO V. MACARUBBO 27 FEBRUARY 2004 FACTS: Complainant averred that respondent, a member of the bar, started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latter's Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will to a "sham wedding" to protect her and her family's reputation since she was then three-months pregnant. Respondent submitted in evidence the final and executory October 30, 2000 Decision of Branch IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Civil

Case No. 5617, "Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves," declaring his marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial court's findings on the basis of his evidence which was not controverted, that the marriage was indeed "a sham and make believe" one, "vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment" and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent also submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office that complainant's name does not appear in the National Index of Marriages for Bride; another certification from the National Statistics OfficeOffice of Civil Registrar General that it has no record of the December 28, 1991 marriage of complainant and respondent; and an attestation from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. Municipal Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221 which was used in complainant and respondent's marriage is not on file in its records. Admitting having sired complainant's two children, Juris Alexis and Gabriel Enrico, respondent denied ever abandoning them. Respondent claimed that he left complainant and their two children with her consent after explaining to her that the pain and shame of living in sin and ridicule was unbearable. In both his marriages to his first wife and to complainant, respondent claimed that he was made to enter into the marital union against his will. ISSUE: Is a “sham” marriage a null and void one? RULING: That claim is an affront to the intelligence of the members of this Court to distinguish fact from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter into any marriage. One incident of a "shotgun marriage" is believable, but two such in succession would tax one's credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T. Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment case. It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case, he would again put blame on his third wife in order to send the marriage to oblivion. Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then leaving them behind by the mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The impact of respondent's conduct is incalculable upon his ex-wives as well as the children he had by them, their lives having been dislocated beyond recall. Respondent's assertion that he has not failed to support his children by complainant is not totally supported by the evidence on record. He may have secured educational plans for them and doled out some sums of money in the past, but it appears that he has failed to provide them regular, monthly support. In fact, he admitted that even before he left complainant's residence in 1995, he was only giving intermittent support to his children with her.

Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant. Let respondent's name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. CA & SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL, respondents January 29, 2004 FACTS: David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Preisdential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse,

even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s judgement and ordered the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity. RULING: No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. As held in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition denied.

REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS: Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk and would forced his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated? RULING: The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered. LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent April 17, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. They did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together – when respondent was on vacation. It started in 1988 that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not the psychological incapacity is present in this case. RULING: The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent October 19, 2000 FACTS: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment. Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the CA. ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. 2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. RULING: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a

conditio sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

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