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GRANDE v.

CA
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother,
Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930s, the Grandes decided
to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan
River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and an alluvial
deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an action for
quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession
of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into
their property. The Calalungs, however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.

The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and pay for
damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian owners?

HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land. However,
this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have become imprescriptible.
The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not
included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they
have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the
Grandes single witness who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs
have been held to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is
because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the
New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. Hon. CA, Domingo Calalung, and Esteban Calalung
GR No L-17652 June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 3.5 hectares in Magsaysay, Isabela.
When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was
the
Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern
side
took place, by action of the current of the river, so much so, that by 1958, a 19,964 sq. m. had been
added to the registered area
Respondents in this case claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in
OCENCO of said portion of land since 1933. Petitioners moved for an action to quiet title to the land.
The trial court adjudged the ownership of the land to petitioners
ISSUE:
WON the alluvial property belong to petitioners and if it is whether such bcomes automatically
registered land.
HELD:
NO. There can be no dispute that petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as
they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. It does not however, become a registered
land
just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property
imprescriptible.
Ownership of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system is quite another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining the river is governed by the civil code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and
thereafter
protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties.
But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration Laws.
The
fact remains that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property.
The increment therefore never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to
the protection of Imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens System.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by 3
rd
persons.

O c t o b e r 2 , 1 9 1 5 G . R . N o . L -
8 9 3 6 CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO,
plaintiffs-appellants,vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant -appellee.S i n g s o n ,
L e d e s m a a n d L i m f o r a p p e l l a n t s . D . R . W i l l i a m s
f o r a p p e l l e e . JOHNSON, J.:FACTS:Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby
are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila. Between their lots is a stone wall
which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March 2, 1906, Consuelo and her
husband presented a petition in the Courtof Land Registration to r egister their lot.
The registration was allowed on October 25, 1906. They were then issued an
original certificate and the title was registered. Both included the wall.On March
25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for registration. The court decreed the registration of the land which
also included the wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, herhusband, discovered
that the wall has also been registered to N.M. Saleeby.They presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for adjustment and correction of the error where the
wall was indicated in both registrations. However, the lower court contended that
during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant
s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including
the wall, in the name of the defendant.ISSUE: WON the defendant is the owner of
the wall and the land occupied by it?RULING: NO. The lower court

s decision would call for the plaintiffs to be always alert and see to it that no other
parties will register the wall and its land. Else, if they spotted someone registering
such wall in their own name, plaintiff must immediately oppose. Such would
become defeat the real purpose of the Tor renssystem of land registration.

The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever toany
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the

mirador de su casa,

to avoid the possibility of losinghis land.

So who owns the land? According to Torrens system, the plaintiffs.Under our law,
once a party registers the land, final and in good faith, no third parties may claim
interest on the same land.

The rights of all the worlda re foreclosed by the decree of registration.

The registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the owner any better title
than he had. The registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future
litigation over the same between th e same parties. It is a notice to the world and no
one can plead ignorance of the registration.Adopting the rule which we believe to
be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system,
we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail. The presumption is that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. This presumption i s IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The
rule must be absolute. Anyvariation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation.DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall and the
land where i

t sits is awarded to the plaintiffs.

TITLE:
October 2, 1915 G.R. No. L-8936 CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband
MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita,
Manila. Between their lots is a stone wall which is located on the lot of the
plaintiffs. On March 2, 1906, Consuelo and her husband presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration to register their lot. The registration was allowed on
October 25, 1906. They were then issued an original certificate and the title was
registered. Both included the wall. On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M.
Saleeby presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for registration. The
court decreed the registration of the land which also included the wall. The
plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her husband, discovered that the wall has also been
registered to N.M. Saleeby. They presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for adjustment and correction of the error where the wall was
indicated in both registrations. However, the lower court contended that during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the

defendant

s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including
the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

RULING:

NO. The lower court

s decision would call for the plaintiffs to be always alert and see to it that no other
parties will register the wall and its land. Else, if they spotted someone registering
such wall in their own name, plaintiff must immediately oppose. Such would
become defeat the real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration. The real
purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question
of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. So who owns the
land? According to Torrens system, the plaintiffs. Under our law, once a party
registers the land, final and in good faith, no third parties may claim interest on the
same land. The rights of all the world re foreclosed by the decree of registration.
The registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the owner any better title
than he had. The registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future
litigation over the same between the same parties. It is a notice to the world and no
one can plead ignorance of the registration. Adopting the rule which we believe to
be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system,
we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail. The presumption is that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. This presumption is IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The
rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation. DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall and the
land where it sits is awarded to the plaintiffs.

VINALOU G. VIZCOCHO INSURANCE LLB RMTU


Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic GR 179987 Apr 29, 2009 Facts: 1)

Mario Malabanan applied for the registration of 71,324 sq. meters of land. 2)

He claims that he bought the land from Eduardo Velazco who also claims that his great
grandfather owned the land 3)

Malabanan submitted a certification from DENR CENRO stating that the land is alienable and
disposable in 1982. 4)

The prosecutor did not oppose the registration. 5)

RTC granted Malabanans request for registration.


6)
Republic interposed an appeal claiming that Malabanan did not adhere to the requirement of time
required by the law and the he failed to prove that the land is an alienable and disposable land. 7)

CA ruled in favor of the republic reasoning that the possession of the land before it is declared
alienable and disposable cannot be included in the computation of possession of the land, thus
Malabanan did not adhere to the period requirement of the law. Issue: Can the heirs of
Malabanan register the land? Held: No. ARGUMENTS: Petitioner: 1)

14(1): With respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of alienable
property as disposable may be counted in computing the period of possession. (Naguit Doctrine)
2)

14(2): possession of the land for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private
property, regardless of its classification. So long as during the time of application, it is classified
alienable and disposable. OSG: 1)

The land should have been declared alienable and disposable prior to June 12, 1945. (Herbieto
Doctrine) 2)

14(2): 14(2) speakes of private lands. The Court has yet to decide a case that presented 14(2) as a
ground for application. Assuming that the 30 year period can run against public land, the period
only runs after the land has been declared alienable and diposable.

COURT: 1)

14(1): 14(1) of CA 141 is virtually the same as 48(b) of PD 1529. 48(b) is more descriptive in
nature of the right enjoyed by a possessor. 14(1) seems to presume the pre-existence of a right. If
the position of OSG is to be followed that the land has to be declared alienable and disposable
prior to June 12, 1945, then all lands not classified as alienable and disposable AFTER June 12,
1945 cannot be registered. As explained in Naguit, it is sufficient that the land is declared
alienable and disposable at the time that it is registered. Hebierto Doctrine is indeed obiter
dictum. 2)

14(2): 14(2) provides the registration of land whose possession is after June 12, 1945. It involves
application of those who acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of the existing law.
The law mentioned in the provision refers to the Civil Code. Under the CC, prescriptive
acquisition may be ordinary or extra ordinary. It is therefore proper to refer to CC on the
provisions of property. Artcle 422 is controlling in the conversion of the land of public dominion
to patrimonial property. It is only when a land becomes patrimonial that it becomes susceptible
to prescription. There must be an express declaration by the State that an alienable and
disposable land is no longer intended for public service. It is only after such express declaration
that the period may begin to run. CONCLUSION: 14(2) applies for the case at bar. Possesion of
the land is traced back to 1948. Since the land in question has no express declaration of being
patrimonial, Malabanan failed to adhere to the period as required by law.