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29th Annual

HANDS-ON
RELAY SCHOOL
March 12 - 16, 2012

BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION

Brent Carper, PE
P r o te c t i o n & I n te g r a t i o n E n g i n e e r
b r e n t . c @ r e l aya p p l i c a t i o n . c o m
OUTLINE

Protection System Failures and Breaker Failures


BF Protection versus BF Relaying
BF Relay Schemes and Logic
Special BF Situations
BF Setting Calculation Exercise
Impacts from Changing Technology
Testing and Maintenance of BF Schemes

P r i m a r y Re f e r e n c e :
C 37. 1 1 9 - 2 0 0 5 I E E E G u i d e f o r B r e a ke r Fa i l u r e P r o te c t i o n o f Pow e r C i r c u i t B r e a ke r s
PROTECTION FAILURE

Protection System Failures Breaker Failures


Relay failure Fails to trip
Settings failure Trips too slow
Control system failure Fails to interrupt fault current
CT/PT failure Fails to interrupt load current
Batter y system failure Flashover when open
Catastrophic control house failure Fails to close
(fire) Auxiliar y contact problems
Catastrophic failure
Breaker Failure Protection
versus
Breaker Failure Relaying
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B

Advantages: Disadvantages:
S i m p l e N o ex t r a e q u i p m e n t S l ow
Simple No risk of misoperation M ay n o t b e p o s s i b l e f o r t h e b a c ku p
U l t i m a te p r o te c t i o n . C ov e r s A L L r e l ay i n g a t [ A ] to s e e a l l f a u l t s
f a i l u r e s , n o t j u s t B r e a ke r Fa i l u r e
( f a i l u r e o f b r e a ke r, r e l ay, s e t t i n g s ,
c o n t r o l s a n d w i r i n g , b a t te r y, e t c . )

Conclusions:
C o m m o n p r a c t i c e f o r D i s t r i b u t i o n , b u t t y p i c a l l y n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r Tr a n s m i s s i o n .
T h e r e i s B r e a ke r Fa i l P r o te c t i o n eve n t h o u g h t h e r e i s n o t B r e a ke r Fa i l Re l ay i n g .
B r e a ke r f a i l u r e p r o te c t i o n i s b u i l t - i n to g o o d p r o te c t i o n p r a c t i c e s .
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B

T M 3

5
BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B

T M 3

[ A ] c a n p r o b a b l y b a c k u p [ B ] a n d s e e a m i n i m u m f a u l t a l l t h e way a t t h e e n d o f t h e l i n e .
[ M ] m ay n o t b e a b l e to f u l l y b a c k u p t h e f e e d e r b r e a ke r s f o r a n e n d o f l i n e f a u l t .

Example: Assume 200A load per feeder section, and 800A minimum fault current at the end of line.
[A] has 400A max load and needs to pickup on an 800A fault.
[M] has 1000A max load, so it cannot be set to pickup on an 800A fault.
IEEE EXAMPLE

B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
PROPER CLEARING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
PROPER CLEARING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE

B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
REMOTE BACKUP
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
REMOTE BACKUP
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load

Advantages: Disadvantages:
C o m p l e te l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f S l ow s y s te m i n s t a b i l i t y
Substation B. S l ow vo l t a g e d i p s
Wide area outage
M ay n o t b e p o s s i b l e f o r t h e b a c ku p
r e l ay to s e e a l l f a u l t s
IEEE EXAMPLE

B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load

BFR on breaker [3] detects breaker failure condition


B F R t r i p s a L o c ko u t r e l ay
L o c ko u t r e l ay ( 8 6 ) t r i p s b r e a ke r s [ 2 ] , [ 5 ] , a n d [ 7 ]
L o c ko u t r e l ay b l o c k s c l o s e o f [ 2 ] , [ 5 ] , a n d [ 7 ]

What else?
Tr a n s f e r Tr i p to b r e a ke r [ 4 ]
Cancel reclose of [4]
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING

01
21
87B
Z1
21
Z2
21
Z2
67
G 86B
67
G

50 BFI
62 trip all
bkrs on bus

DTT/RC to
86BF
remote bkrs

trip all
adjacent bkrs
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING

21 21
87B
P B

BFI
BFI 50 BFI
86B
62

86BF
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING

1 2 3

87B 87B

BF BF
1 2
21
B

21
P
BF
3
21
B

21
P
BREAKER FAILURE LOGIC

1. Basic Breaker Failure Scheme


2. 50BF Torque Control
3. Breaker Re-Trip Logic
4. BFI Control Timer
5. BFI Seal-In
6. Minimal Current Scheme
7. Timer Bypass Scheme
8. Dual Timer Scheme
9. Special Schemes
BASIC BREAKER FAILURE SCHEME

Four Par ts to a Breaker Failure Scheme:


Fault Detector (50) or other Failure Detectors
Initiator Circuit (BFI)
Logic and Timers (62)
Output Circuit (BFT)
50BF TORQUE CONTROL
BREAKER RE-TRIP LOGIC
BFI CONTROL TIMER
BFI SEAL-IN
MINIMAL CURRENT SCHEME
TIMER BYPASS SCHEME

Note: This logic is for illustrative purposes only. Not intended as a complete scheme. The timer bypass scheme should
be supervised by a fault detector, which may not be compatible with torque controlled 50BF.
EXAMPLE BE1-50BF LOGIC
DUAL TIMER SCHEMES

Use fast BF timer for multi-phase faults (L-L, L-L-G, 3P)


Use slower BF timer for single-phase faults (SLG)

Multi-phase faults have larger impact on system stability, and may


require fast breaker failure times.
Single-phase faults are more common.

Dual timer allows fast BFT for the multi-phase fault, but keeps the
security of a slower BFT for the most common fault scenario.
SPECIAL SCHEMES

Voltage dif ferential


Frame leakage detection
Breaker dif ferential
IPO breakers
Redundant breakers
BF SETTINGS

Logic
Fault or Load Current Detector Pickup
Other Breaker Failure Detectors
Set Timers
CALCULATING BF SCHEME TIMERS

MAXCRITICALCLEARINGTIME
CRITICALCLEARINGTIME
CALCULATEDBYSTUDY

BYCOMPANYPOLICY
PROPEROPERATION
FAULTCLEARED
FAULT

NORMALCLEARINGTIME

PROTECTIVERELAY BREAKER 50FD


OPERATETIME OPERATETIME RESET MARGIN

BFI BFTIMER 50FD BFR 86BF LOCALBACKUPBREAKER


INPUT SETTING P/U OUTPUT OPERATE OPERATETIME
P/U RELAY TIME
TIME TT REMOTEENDBACKUPBREAKER
CHANNEL OPERATETIME
TIME

CONTROLTIMER
SETTING
CALCULATING BF SCHEME TIMERS

MAXCRITICALCLEARINGTIME
CRITICALCLEARINGTIME
CALCULATEDBYSTUDY

BYCOMPANYPOLICY
PROPEROPERATION
FAULTCLEARED
FAULT

NORMALCLEARINGTIME

PROTECTIVERELAY BREAKER 50FD


OPERATETIME OPERATETIME RESET MARGIN

BFI BFTIMER 50FD BFR 86BF LOCALBACKUPBREAKER


INPUT SETTING P/U OUTPUT OPERATE OPERATETIME
P/U RELAY TIME
TIME TT REMOTEENDBACKUPBREAKER
CHANNEL OPERATETIME
TIME

CONTROLTIMER
SETTING
EXERCISE
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

Digital Relay BF Protection: Faster, Better, Cheaper, More


Solved transient stability problems previously unsolvable
Better protection against wide-area and cascading outages
Protect against all breaker failure modes, not just one or two
Can be more secure if designed well

Most utilities moving away from Stand- Alone BF Relays


Some utilities (not many) are reversing the trend and going back to stand alone
Breaker Failure Relays
Reduce misoperations unscheduled maintenance tests
Use longer maintenance cycles for BF protection systems
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B

BFI
BFI 50 BFI
86B
62

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B

BFI
BFI BFI
BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B
BFI

BFI
BFI
BF BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B

I
BF

BFI
BF BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21 BFI
BF 87B
P B
BFI

BFI
BF BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

1 2 3

87B 87B

BF BF
1 2
21
B

21
P
BF
3
21
B

21
P
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

1 2 3

BF BF
87B 87B
1 3

BF 21 BF
1 B 2

BF 21 BF
1 P 2

BF 21 BF
2 B 3

BF 21 BF
2 P 3
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

Digital Relay Timing and Logic


Precise timing eliminates relay misoperations due to calibration drift
Precise timing and logic allows reducing design margins

Digital Relay I/O


Sensitive BFI inputs (transients, DC grounds)
Solid state relay outputs (sneak circuits)

Digital Relay Protective Elements


Used to be limited to a 50FD
Now we can use 50L and other sensitive detectors that may pick up a lot
Solution: Consider using other elements to help add Security, not just Sensitivity
(negative sequence, voltage elements, synch check and frequency elements, etc.)
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

Challenges from Complexity


Elaborate/exotic BF logic
Wide variety of BF schemes, even in the same model of relay at the same utility
May have more than one BF scheme in a single relay
May have more than one BF scheme for single breaker
Solution: Engineering Standardization
Solution: Documentation (written setting descriptions, logic diagrams, and test plans)

Challenges with Integrated BF


May not be able to disable all BFIs
May not be able to disable all BFTs
Trend is to completely eliminate all hardwired BFT and lockout relays (IEC 61850)
Solution: Design with test switch to relay input that disables the BFI and/or BFT.
Especially important for BFTT or 61850.
TESTING AND MAINTENANCE
OF BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
Challenges with BF Protection
D i f f i c u l t to te s t i n te n t i o n a l l y
E a s y to te s t u n i n te n t i o n a l l y
TESTING AND MAINTENANCE
OF BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
There is a dif ference between testing the BF Relay
and testing the BF Relaying System

M a ny u t i l i t i e s p e r f o r m m a i n te n a n c e te s t i n g o f t h e B F Re l ay, b u t a r e n o t te s t i n g t h e
e n t i r e B r e a ke r Fa i l u r e P r o te c t i o n S y s te m .
G o o d m a i n te n a n c e p r a c t i c e s ( a n d N E R C c o m p l i a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s ) a r e to te s t t h e
P r o te c t i o n S y s te m :
Maintenance program for the BF Relay
Maintenance program for CTs/PTs
Maintenance program for the Battery and DC system
Maintenance of the BFR Protection System must include:
Rolling lockout relays and tripping breakers
Best practice: simultaneous functional test (clear the bus)