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RULE 38

Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside. (2a)

Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case,
and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course. (1a)

Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections
of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be. (3)

Section 4. Order to file an answer. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in which
it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the receipt
thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as the court may direct, together with copies of the petition and the
accompanying affidavits. (4a)

Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. The court in which the petition is filed may grant such
preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the
petitioner of a bond in favor of the adverse party, conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or the petitioner fails on
the trial of the case upon its merits, he will pay the adverse party all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by
reason of the issuance of such injunction or the other proceedings following the petition, but such injunction shall not
operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may have acquired upon, the property, of the
petitioner. (5a)

Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. After the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period therefor, the
court shall hear the petition and if after such hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are not true, the petition shall
be dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the judgment or final order or other proceeding
complained of upon such terms as may be just. Thereafter the case shall stand as if such judgment, final order or other
proceeding had never been rendered, issued or taken. The court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if
a timely motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it. (6a)

Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower
court shall be required to give due course to the appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and
proper appeal had been made. (7a)

(Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115595, November 14, 1994)


Facts:
Petitioners brought an action in the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Tabaco, Albay which ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title to private respondent. The respondent falsely and fraudulently alleged that "the owner's
duplicate copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65878 was lost and/or destroyed while in the
possession and custody of herein petitioner as per her Affidavit of Loss and despite earnest effort to locate said
title, the same have been fruitless.
Their petition was, however, denied due course on the ground that the fraud alleged therein was not extrinsic
fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud which did not justify setting aside the final decision of the trial court.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent (Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, 72 SCRA 326 cited
in Canlas vs. CA. 164 SCRA 160). On the other hand, intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a
party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged or false document or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case" (Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17). In the present petition, the
allegation of fraud involves admission by the respondent court of an alleged false
affidavit of loss, which alleged fraud is intrinsic in character.

Issue:
WON the final decision was valid?
Held:
The appellate court is certainly right in holding that the use of a false affidavit of loss does not constitute extrinsic fraud
to warrant the invalidation of a final judgment.
BUT,
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Sera v. Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in
this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently
the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, 18 provide that "in case a certificate of title,
considered lost or destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title."
It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioners.
(Additional discussion on forum shopping)
We find that the allegation of forum shopping is without basis. While they indeed alleged that private respondent had
obtained a second owner's duplicate of TCT T-65878 knowing that 2/3 of the land covered by the certificate had been
sold to them and that the "2nd owner's copy should be cancelled and recalled considering the fact that the original is in
fact still existing and not lost," the allegation was made more for the purpose of demanding a partition, recognizing that
private respondent is the owner of 1/3 ofthe land. Petitioner's intervention is thus different from their action in
the Court of Appeals which is solely for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the judgment in CAD Case No. T-1024
granting private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title.

LAUREANO ARCILLA VS BASILIA ARCILLA et al

An action for Annulment of Sale with Damages was filed by private respondents before the CFI of Cebu.
After the issues were joined by the filing of defendants' Answer, the case was set for pre-trial conferences.
During pre-trial, lower court ordered the continuation of the pre-trial be set to October 2, 1975. Attys. Duaban
and Monteclaros (parties counsels) were notified in open court.
Defendants and their counsel did not appear.
Defendants were declared in default. Plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
On October 27, 1976, RTC rended judgment in favor of the plaintiffs declaring the Deed of Sale allegedly
executed by Segunda Vda. de Arcilla in favor of Laureano Arcilla as null and void;
A copy of the decision was sent to and received by defendants' counsel of record, Atty. Cosme D. Monteclaros,
on November 8,1976.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Set Aside the RTC decision denied
On April 16, 1977, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment.
That on July 29, 1975, a Court Order was issued setting the pre-trial of the above-entitled case to October 2,
1975; however, on October 2, 1975, the then Hon. Presiding Judge of this Court, without previous
examination of the records as to whether or not said defendants were duly notified of the setting for pre-
trial on Oct 2, 1975.

That, defendants, particularly the principal defendant Laureano Arcilla, learned of the decision of October
27, 1976 only on March 24, 1977 when the herein undersigned counsel showed him a xerox copy of the
same which the undersigned counsel procured a day earlier.

On May 18, 1977, respondent Judge issued an order denying petition for relief from judgment for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period.

xxx contention of the defendants cannot be given weight because notice to counsel is notice to the client
and since the defendants' former counsel Atty. Cosme D. Monteclaros received the judgment on November
8, 1976, then the date to be reckoned with is the date when the defendants' counsel received the judgment
which is November 8, 1976.

Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, petitioner elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE:
WON the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Relief
from judgment for having been filed out of time.

RULING:
NO. SC affirmed RTC ruling.

In order for a petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily
show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule 38. Consequently, in assailing the lower
court's dismissal of his petition for relief for having been filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein petitioner to show
that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38. He has failed to do so,
instead he argues on the merits of his petition for relief, without first showing that the same was filed on time in the
court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should be dismissed.

Moreover, We agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief was filed late. We note that the decision
sought to be set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976. Petitioner, through counsel, received a copy of the said
decision on November 8, 1976, and he filed his petition for relief from judgment only on April 18, 1977. Clearly, the
same was filed beyond the period allowed by Section 3 of Rule 38. As in previous cases, this Court holds and so rules
that the instant petition filed after the lapse of the reglementary period cannot be entertained.

Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief, petitioner's main contention is that the order of default was illegally and
improperly issued because he was not notified of the pre-trial on October 2, 1975, consequently, all subsequent
proceedings including the judgment by default were all null and void. But a deeper examination of the pleadings and the
record of the case would show that petitioner was present during the pre-trial conference on July 29, 1975 when the
lower court re-set the pre-trial to October 2, 1975. On the said date, however, although notified, both petitioner and his
counsel did not appear, hence, the declaration of default pursuant to Sec. 2, of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court.

Examining the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while the same appears verified and accompanied by an affidavit of
merit, the allegations of fact made therein do not prove either fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, nor
show a valid defense in favor of the party seeking relief . The general allegation made therein to the effect that
"petitioner has a good and valid defense considering that the late Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla voluntarily and willingly
executed the document of Sale", is not sufficient compliance with the rules. Since the Deed of Sale sought to be
annulled was written in English and it is admitted that Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla is an illiterate and do not know how to
read and write, it would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have secured the affidavit of Nemesio Jubay, the
Notary Public who allegedly notarized the document as well as the witnesses to the execution and signing thereof to
show that the contents of the document was fully explained to said Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla and that she voluntarily
signed the same. This way, petitioner could convince the Court that in his legal fight, he had a leg on which to stand. It
thus results that reversal of the order complained of, as well as the judgment rendered thereon would be an Idle
ceremony. It would not advance or for that matter serve the ends of justice. It would only result in another waste of
time, effort and expense. Paraphrasing what this Court has stated in Paner vs. Yatco 9 it would be pointless to re-open
this case, "for like a mirage it would merely raise false hopes and in the end avail her (him) nothing."

QUELNAN VS VHF

VHF Phil filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Andy Quelnan involving a condominium unit which
respondent claimed to have been leased by Quelnan.
On November 23, 1992, MeTC of Manila, on its finding that summons together with a copy of the complaint was
served on petitioner thru his wife by substituted service and that petitioner failed to file his answer within the
reglementary period, rendered judgment in favour of respondent.
Copy of the decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed despite
the postmasters three (3) successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7, 1992 and December 11,
1992.
No appeal having been taken by the petitioner.
MeTC decision became final and executory.
On May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioners wife.

On May 24, 1993, petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Alleging that he was never served with summons and completely unaware of the proceedings in the
ejectment suit.
He learned of the judgment only on May 18, 1993 when a notice of levy on execution came to his
knowledge.

RTC granted petitioners petition for relief.


That petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an appeal for
the reason that petitioners wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit
in the heat of a marital squabble.
To the RTC, this constituted excusable negligence as would justify the filing of the petition for relief from
judgment.

Respondent MR of the RTC decision denied.


Respondent elevated the case to the SC on a petition for review. Petition was remanded by this Court to the CA.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision finding that petitioners petition for relief was filed with the RTC
beyond the 60-day mandatory period under Section 3, Rule 38 of the ROC.

ISSUE:
WON petition for relief from judgment was timely filed on May 24, 1993.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner was first notified by the postmaster on November 25, 1992. Pursuant to Rule 13 Section 10 of the ROC,
it follows that service of a copy of the MeTC decision was deemed complete and effective five (5) days therefrom or
on November 30, 1992. Therefore, the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief must be reckoned from such date
(November 30, 1992) as this was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. Petitioner was deemed to have
knowledge of the MeTC decision on November 30, 1992. The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief thus expired on
January 29, 1993. Unfortunately, it was only on May 24, 1993, or 175 days after petitioner was deemed to have learned
of the judgment that he filed his petition for relief with the RTC. Indubitably, the petition was filed way beyond the 60-
day period provided by law.

SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,


vs.
SPS. FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA AUSTRIA, and the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title and/or reconveyance with damages against respondents.
The MCTC ordered the Director of Lands to cancel the OCT insofar as the 410 square meters owned and occupied by
petitioners were concerned. On appeal, the RTC of Palayan City, reversed and set aside the decision of the MCTC.
Petitioners, assisted by Atty. Villarosa, filed with the CA a petition for review. Dismissed, since the Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of. MR denied.
Atty. Villarosa withdrew his appearance. Petitioners, assisted by Atty. Hernandez, requested an extension of time to
file their petition before SC. Later, they abandoned the motion and the case was declared closed and terminated.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for relief from judgment since the gross negligence of their previous counsel
did not bind them. Denied. MR denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can avail of a petition for relief under Rule 38 due to their counsels negligence when he
signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

HELD:

No.

A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when
there is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only after a judgment, final order or other
proceeding was taken against the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

While the law uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. The
procedure in the CA and SC are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by this Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the
Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the Court
of Appeals

Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65. In seeking to reverse the appellate courts decision denying their petition for relief
from judgment by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy twice.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the merits of this petition, the same must still be denied. What
petitioners counsel did in this case was to attach an improper Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to their petition for
review with the appellate court. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to
gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceedings below.

For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be
shown. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court, the result of which is
that he is deprived of his property without due process of law. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend
his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is
the very essence of due process.

Here, the case underwent a full-blown trial. Both parties were adequately heard, and all issues were ventilated before
the decision was promulgated.

JULIO B. PURCON, JR., Petitioner,


vs.
MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. and MIGUEL L. RIVERA/MARITIME RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, Respondents

FACTS:
Purcon filed a complaint for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability
benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Purcon alleged that MRM Philippines, Inc. hired him as a seaman. He signed a contract for 3 months . His contract
was extended for another 3 months. At the port of Francee was diagnosed with hernia. He was repatriated due to
his ailment.
After medication in the Philippines, he was found by the company doctor that he is fit to resume work. When he
reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. he was told that there was no vacancy for him.
Later, after a thorough medical examination and evaluation, another doctor diagnosed him with EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT;
UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE XIV.
Respondents countered that since hernia is not work-related, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related
claims. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is not to be considered a permanent disability as this is easily
correctable by simple surgery. More importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release which was notarized.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Appeal with the NLRC was dismissed. MR denied. On January 27, 2006, the NLRC resolution became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Purcon filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with CA. Dismissed. MR denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA
resolution became final and executory.
Petitioner filed with SC a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Denied. On October 9, 2007, an Entry of
Judgment was issued.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 from SC resolution denying
his petition for review?

HELD:

No. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the SC.

First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.

The petition should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz.:

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside.
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.

Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of
Court. Neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the
CA. If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this
remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law.

Nevertheless, even if the Court delves into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of
the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioners lack of devotion in discharging his duty,
without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim
of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.

The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter.

AFDAL V CARLOS
1 December 2010
Petition for review of RTC Orders ordering dismissal of petitioners petition for relief from judgment

Facts:
- Respondent Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detained and damages against Guijabar and other petitioners
claiming rights before MTC Binan Laguna
o Alleged that petitioners were occupying by mere tolerance a parcel of land in respondents name
o That petitioner Afdal sold the property to him but that he allowed petitioners to stay in the property
o That respondent demanded the petitioners to turn over the property because he needed the property
for his personal use
o Petitioners refused to heed his demand and so he filed a complaint before Lupon ng Tagapamayapa
o Petitioners ignored notices prompting Lupon to issue a certificate to file action
- Respondent then filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position paper submitting the case for decision
based on the pleadings on record
o MTC ruled in favor of respondent; and then issued a writ of execution
- Petitioners then filed a petition for relief from judgment with the MTC
o To which the respondent filed a motion to dismiss or strike out the petition for relief
- Subsequently, petitioners manifested their intention to withdraw the petition for relief after realizing that it was
a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
o MTC granted request to withdraw
- Petitioners then filed the petition for relief before RTC
o Alleged that they are the lawful owners of the property which they purchased from spouses Ubaldo; and
denied that they sold the property to respondent
o That they learned of MTC decision only 2 months after; and did not participate in any Lupon
proceedings; moreover, that they were not served a copy of the summons and complaint
- RTC dismissed petition for relief
o That they did not have jurisdiction over the petition as this should have been filed before the MTC
pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 38

Issue: WON RTC erred in dismissing their petition for relief from judgment

Held: NO
- In this case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an
unlawful detainer case
- Cannot also file the petition for relief with RTC because it has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from
judgments of the MTC
- The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC under Rule 65 of the ROC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of petitioners in view of the absence of the summons of petitioners