Ong vs Republic

Facts
-petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto,
Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less.

-They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the
same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently
unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

-After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141

-Other contentions of the Republic: that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and merely
shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892;
and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

-RTC ruled in favor of Ong but this was reversed by the CA. CA explains: petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945
or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is
dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able
to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application.

SC Ruling
-pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), applicants for registration of title must prove: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. These are questions of fact. After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

-There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The
Report dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone
as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21, 1927." This finding is,
likewise, embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy of the plan covering the
subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

-The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on
August 24, 1998, who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16,
1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10,
1979. The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606 issued in 1971 in
the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject
property. Even if we were to tack petitioners claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the
required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
[NOTE SEQUENCE OF PURCHASE: from Cacho to Abellera and Sarmen in 1979; from Abellera and Sarmen to
Bautista and Villamil in 1997; from Bautista and Villamil to Ong in 1998]

-Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands
of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. The law speaks of possession and occupation.
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
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his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

-Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in
1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most
that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that
he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo
Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the
character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners
evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.

-The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing
evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.

Canete vs GIC
Facts
-Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-140441; 14399; RT-94384 (292245); RT-94794 (292246); and 292247. Petitioners alleged
that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued "under mysterious circumstances," considering that the holders thereof
including their predecessors-in-interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the property, rendering
them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar Lands Act. Petitioners also sought to nullify Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.

-Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss9 on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed
to exhaust administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied.

-Petitioners Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action:

1. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession in concept of owners of unregistered parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat,
Quezon City, Metro Manila.
2. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land known as "Piedad Estate," which property is intended for
distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
3. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were
issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious
and null and void, for the following reasons: (a) that no record of any agency of the government shows as to how and in what
manner was OCT 614 issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether judicial or administrative, can
support defendants claim that the above-described property originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer certificates of
title over the above-described property were issued under mysterious circumstances for the above-named defendants and their
so-called predecessors-in-interest never had any actual, adverse, physical possession of the said property, thus, not allowed to
acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
4. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer certificates of title in violation of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws are prejudicial to plaintiffs rights over the above-described property.
5. That equity demands that defendants transfer certificates of title be declared fictitious, spurious and null and void ab
initio.

-Petitioners Prayer:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants transfer certificates of title over the property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel defendants transfer certificates of title and all transfer
certificates of title derived therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands
Act and other existing laws.

SC Ruling
-The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine
Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the
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British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120
(Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.

-After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the
provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the
course of disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands
thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even before the Second World War, all
lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the
public domain and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens system following the procedure for the
confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the
public domain.

-One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to
purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought
by the Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902,
not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only
"actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were given preference to lease,
purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government
acquired the lands.

-In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a
contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its
invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.

-"Cause of action" has been defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3) an act or
omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not
extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In the
resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as
its annexes must be considered. The test in such case is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint
based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.

-It is not difficult to see the need for particularity and incipient substantiation in the petitioners Second Amended Complaint.

-FIRST, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the other subject titles are derivatives is null and void, has been
proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the
name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.

-SECOND, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources, which was specifically tasked to investigate
the historical background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as the period prior to the Second World War, all lots in
the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of.

-THIRD, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land registration, which means that all lots
therein are titled.

-FOURTH, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his
successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which
means that petitioners claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of
no moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said
lands were acquired by the Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though they were in occupation of
the same before the government acquired the land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.

-While there are allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious, spurious and obtained under
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"mysterious circumstances," the same are not specific to bring the controversy within the trial courts jurisdiction.
There is no explanation or narration of facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be fictitious or spurious,
contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity; otherwise,
the allegation of fraud would simply be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments, the complaint
is defective, for it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.

-As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of the subject property within the
contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of
the property, although it is not stated for how long and since when. They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject
property despite their alleged adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide occupants" thereof. In other
words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the property. Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real
parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles.

-In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate the existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom that
whatever right might have been violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff.

-Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. If petitioners are to be
believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy
conditioned upon the fact that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they
would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the property under the Friar
Lands Act. Only to the State does the privilege belong.

-On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state that since petitioners do not possess the
necessary interest to prosecute the case for cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they have the right to pursue
administrative remedies outside thereof. They are not the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It has not been
shown by their complaint that they have previously taken steps to avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands Act, since all
they seek, should the questioned titles be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property covered by the
questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that they possess the qualifications necessary to enable them to avail of the
preference granted under the Act.

-Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent belatedly filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the same.

-Petition was denied.

Republic vs Naguit
Facts
-On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of
Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.

-On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government,
and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of
Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition.

-The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property
and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted
Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees,
such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and
paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which
have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly
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and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration. [NOTE SEQUENCE OF PURCHASE: from Urbano to Maming in 1955 or 1956; from
Maming to Naguit]

-When oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice, on September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation
of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed
in the name of Naguit.

-The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was
declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not
alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

-All the MTC, RTC and CA ruled in favor of Naguit.

Issue
The central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.

SC Ruling
-There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) (a) that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

-Petitioner [The Republic] suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of
ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.

-Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia [meaning: relative words must ordinarily be referred to
the last antecedent, the last antecedent being the last word which can be made an antecedent so as to give a meaning]

-Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment,
the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. Before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

-Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

-This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals. Therein, the Court noted that "to prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." In that case, the subject land
had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the
land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow
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the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property
was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.

-This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid
at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years
before the property was declared alienable and disposable.

-A different rule obtains for forest lands, such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, forest land is not registrable
and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly
classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.

-There are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the
Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly, the subject
lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the
same type.

-Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws." Prescription is one of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.

-When land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years
old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no
impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower
courts.

-The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts.
Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession
in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.

Republic vs Herbieto
Facts
-Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23
September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.

-Documents presented:
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(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423,
in the name of respondent David;
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for
Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding
that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering
Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994; and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject
Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was
sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.

-On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents'
application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.

-On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of
respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on
02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.
-Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment. The CA affirmed the decision of the MTC. CA explains: the subject
property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in
any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the
year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land
in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for
registration of title to the land in 1998.

-Republics contentions:
1. Respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic,
possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of
possession required by law.
2. The application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of
land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. Since the respondents failed to comply with the
procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the
latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

SC Ruling
ON JURISDICTION
-This Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the
respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.

-The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration. Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

-This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear
their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
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-The Property Registration Decree recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single
application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered; and (2) the
filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same
province. The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a
single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of
land in their respective names.

-Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to
determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of
Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient."

-Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed
with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the
misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of
a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties).

-Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration
Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court. This Court has discovered a defect in
the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed
with respondents' application for registration. Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be
given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.

-Publication in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Reason for publication:
The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper
and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties
on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate.

-In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the
land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants.

-In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10
August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in
the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three
months after the initial hearing.

-The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication
at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively
seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. The decision of MTC
rendered is null and void.

ON POSSESSION
-Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or
legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for
their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony,
claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.

-The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963. As
already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his
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title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.

-The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and
privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed,
as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

-Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific
requirements and application procedure for every mode. Since respondents herein filed their application before the
MTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.

-Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of
by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073.

-Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject
Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that respondents could
not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

-The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under
the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act,
the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an
interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. As established by this
Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

-However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject
Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with
the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands
under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying
that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act.

-Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of
land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land
Act may be considered a special law that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established
rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus
non derogant.

Malabanan vs Republic
Facts
-On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay,
covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
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inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. [NOTE ON
SUCCESSION/PURCHASE: from Lino to 4 sons including Esteban and Eduardo; from Esteban to Virgilio; from Eduardo to
Malabanan]

-Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which
stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002,
the RTC approved the application for registration.

-The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

-Malabanan died while case was pending with CA. It was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.

-With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the
property had already been "converted" into private property through prescription.

-The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers
to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide a
case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code.
The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should
be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Issues

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of
forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?

SC Ruling
-Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for
public and quasi-public uses.
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-May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of
"by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization."

-It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.

ON COMPARING PUBLIC LAND ACT AND PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE

-It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than
establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073
effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for
the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
[NOTE RSPol: Public Land Act is on establishing right for the first time; Property Registration Decree is on registering a
pre-existing right]
[NOTE: Public Land Act primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession
of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.]

-Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and
the Civil Code.
[Note RSPol: possession is applicable to both PRD and PLA; prescription is applicable to both PRD and CC]
[Note RSPol: 30 years in PRD refers to 30 years of possession; 30 years in CC refer to 30 years of extraordinary prescription]
[Note RSPol; Registration under PLA is based on 30 years of possession; Registration under PRD is based on 30 years of
extraordinary prescription]

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes
and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession
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for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they
presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
[NOTE RSPol: In this case, there is no express government declaration that the alienable or disposable land is a patrimonial
property in order for prescription to apply.]

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