Curling v.

Kemp et al
Press Conference Materials
July 6, 2017

Filed July 3, 2017 Fulton County Superior Court (2017CV292233)
Link to complaint and exhibits--
2-Complaint-With-Verification-and-Exhibits )

Organizing plaintiff: Coalition For Good Governance
(Members include GA06 electors, and other Georgia electors)
Executive Director -- Marilyn Marks (

Individual plaintiffs;
Donna Curling, Donna Price, Founders--Georgians for Verified Voting
Ricardo Davis, Laura Digges, William Digges III, Jeffrey Schoenberg

Defendants: Secretary of State Kemp, State Election Board, Cobb County Elections Director
and Board of Elections; DeKalb County Elections Director and Board of Elections; Fulton
County Elections Director and Board of Elections; Merle King (CES/KSU); Center for Election
Systems at Kennesaw State University.

Attorneys: Holcomb Ward

Goals of the Lawsuit:
1. Overturn the June 20 election because results are indeterminable.
2. Prohibit use of DRE-based voting system in November municipal elections
3. Secretary of State Kemp must re-examine the voting system.


Election must be voided when the result cannot be determined. June 20 election was
conducted on equipment with long-term vulnerability to extreme risk. The system must be
presumed to be compromised. No one can determine whether results were manipulated. A
public policy that permits bad actors to access and manipulate the results without detection
must be rejected.

Testing is Ineffective—More theater than substance
Georgia’s pre-election machine testing is not designed to detect system manipulation or
certain types of programming errors. Testing has limited functions and effectiveness related to
tabulation. Machines are tested in “test mode.” Like VW emissions tests, they can be
programmed to pass the tests, although the underlying operation is flawed. Even modestly
talented hackers can accomplish this.

August 2016: Cybersecurity expert Logan Lamb explores Georgia’s Center for Election
System’s pubic website and discovers massive files of all voter information, (including private
information), and information for programming the system, passwords, and election databases.
Logan informs CES, was threatened, and CES did not disclose to SOS. (Politico, “Will the
Georgia Special Election Get Hacked?”, June 14)

March 1,2017: Lamb and colleague Chris Grayson are able to access the same and updated
filed on the CES public website. Grayson informs KSU professor and matter becomes public.

March 14, 2017: 24 experts send letter to Kemp warning of security issues after news of
Lamb’s access.

March 16, 2017: Georgia Democrats send letter to Kemp demanding answers and examination
of the system.

April 15, 2017: Early voting check-in books-- which can be connected via Internet to the voting
registration working database-- are stolen from the pick-up truck of a poll worker.

April 18, 2017: Special Election day. A number of problems occur. Approximately 150 voters’
ballot choices were not recorded at all on the machines, causing empty ballots to be cast.
Fulton County’s voting system malfunctioned when improper memory cards were introduced
into the system, and were initially undetected. Voters sent to wrong polling places because of
poll book software “glitch." Investigation announced, but not completed by Kemp.

April 25, 2017: IT security report on Center for Election Security published with damning
indictment of security issues.

May 10, 2017: 10 Georgia citizens send letter to Kemp for re-examination of the system under
formal statutory process.

May 17, 2017: Citizens’ letter resent, updated to provide CES IT security report and more
information asking for system to be sidelined, as unsafe. Kemp’s office does not respond.

May 19, 2017: Follow-up sent to Kemp asking for 3rd time under FOIA, asking what voting
system is certified. Kemp's office provides no answer.

May 24, 2017: Experts send second letter to Kemp warning of their grave concerns and urging
paper ballots.

May 25, 2017: Lawsuit filed by members of Georgians for Verified Voting and the Rocky
Mountain Foundation, calling for the state to cease using its insecure voting machines and
replace exclusively with paper ballots.

May 31, 2017: Kennesaw State University's CES responds to FOIA request stating that they
have no state or federal certification documentation for the state voting system in use.
June 2, 2017: Citizens' letter sent to Kemp again asking for response to their May request that
he examine state's voting systems for security issues.

June 5, 2017: Kemp responds to inquiry, says it will cost $10,000 and take 6 months’ time to
re-examine voting systems-- AFTER the November 2017 elections.

June 26, 2017: Each County Board meets to certify the June 20 election results refuses voters’
rights to re-canvass selected precincts with anomalous-appearing results. Cobb County Board
told citizens to file a lawsuit to challenge the results. Kemp was informed and certified the
results immediately upon receipt.

July 3, 2017: Plaintiffs file election contest, and claims for injunction relief to prohibit the use of
the system in November, and to force Kemp to re-examine the system.

DRE systems have long been unacceptable to experts

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 2011 statement—

“The Auditability Working Group found no alternative that does not have as a likely
consequence either an effective requirement for paper records or the possibility of
undetectable errors in the recording of votes. If undetectable errors can be introduced at
any point in the process, then the argument for the correctness of the process as a
whole inevitably has a missing link. “

System Connections to Internet:

“No voting system has an internet interface. None of these systems are online,” said King,
emphasizing why the original results would not change. “There is a lot of attention paid to that,
to none of the servers being online. “ Merle King, CES

Georgia officials have been blatantly dishonest with claims of security, presumably meant to
maintain voter confidence.

Lamb’s experience proves that the system has been fully exposed to the risks of the Internet.
The system is also being exposed by use of memory cards and flash drives exposed to the


As a matter of sound public policy, the unverifiable election results from a failed and
compromised voting system cannot be permitted to stand. This lawsuit seeks to turn around
officials’ policy of promoting unverifiable elections on unreliable equipment unfit for use