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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF MOST AFFECTED BARANGAYS BY


SUPER TYPHOON LAWIN IN TUGUEGARAO CITY

by:
Abraham M. Maguigad, Jr.1, Reynald A. Cario1, Rizza P. Galera1, Catherine Simon1, Ruth A.
Peralta1, and Charissa Joy Q. Ferrer1and Joel Binasoy, MPA2

ABSTRACT
This study assessed the emergency management of ten barangays in Tuguegarao City that
had the most number of affected families by Super Typhoon Lawin. Specifically, this study assessed
the level of preparedness of barangays contingency plan and early warning system, evacuation
management, response/relief system, and responsiveness in the execution of calamity response and
after-calamity protocols for the said super typhoon. It likewise assessed the affected families level of
satisfaction in the implementation of emergency management focused on preparedness and response.
The emergency management initiatives that the barangays had, issues and problems encountered,
and recommendations for emergency management enhancement were also determined. Descriptive
design with the use of triangulation method of research was employed in the study. Interview, survey,
documentary analysis and on-site observation were used as data gathering techniques. Descriptive
statistics were used in treating the data.
Findings showed that the affected families were ambivalent as to the existence of
contingency plan for typhoon and/or flood and early warning system before the super typhoon. Also,
they do not know whether or not their barangays were prepared for evacuation management before
and during the super typhoon and possess response/relief system after. The affected families were
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied in the implementation of activities and services covered by
preparedness and response. Common emergency management initiatives among the barangays after
the super typhoon were relief distribution, clean-up drive and damage assessment. Generally, the
problems encountered by the BDRRMC and affected families were as follows: inadequate equipment
and facilities, insufficient funding for disaster preparedness, lack of seminars and trainings
pertaining to disaster risk reduction and management, lack of manpower and manpower
incompetency. Particularly, affected families encountered unfair and discriminatory distribution of
relief goods and other relief assistances.

Keywords: Emergency Management, Super Typhoon Lawin, Preparedness, Responsiveness,


Satisfaction, Emergency Management Initiatives, Issues and Problems, and Recommendations

1
BPA Students
2
Instructor I
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INTRODUCTION second among the top ten most disaster prone


cities in the world. The high danger posed by
Since time immemorial, it was known in the entrenching myriad of natural hazards that
human history that natural disasters had claimed the city is exposed to justify its rank among the
increasing death toll in the past, giving out an worlds most at risk cities.
indicator that natural forces are getting stronger. In October 19, 2016, Tuguegarao City
The Philippines, as a country located in the was ravaged by another disaster named Super
Pacific Rim, is vulnerable and experiences Typhoon Lawin. The Super Typhoon had a
dreadful disasters like typhoon and flood that maximum wind of 225 km/h and gustiness of
often cause high death rate and high economic 315 km/h (CNN Philippines Staff, 2016). The
loss in the agricultural sector and other industry devastating strength of the Super Typhoon upon
in which Filipinos engaged. Livelihood and the its landfall ravaged intended shelters for
safety of communities, particularly in coastal evacuees such as schools and gymnasiums
areas and major river basins, are at risk which within the city. In the news article published by
leaves discomfort and frustration. Inquirer.net on October 23, 2016, this
The Philippine National Government monstrous calamity made a total of P581
highly recognizes the adverse effects of natural million to P657 million damage against
disasters made possible the enactment of infrastructure and P75.8 million against
Republic Act No. 10121 or also known as the agriculture across the four regions that were
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and affected. According to the Terminal Report
Management Act of 2010 which provided the from the City Disaster Risk Reduction and
legal basis for the creation of the National Management Council of Tuguegarao dated
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan November 11, 2016, there were 33, 244 families
(NDRRMP), the Local Disaster Risk Reduction being affected and P14, 754, 944 worth of
and Management Councils (LDRRMCs) and damage to agriculture and livestock were
Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and recorded. In addition, the disaster incurred P1,
Management Committees (BDRRMCs) in the 704, 600, 000 of damage to the infrastructure
multifarious Local Government Units (LGUs) sector of the city.
nationwide. The NDRRMP was established to As a result of the adverse effects caused
correspond to RA 10121 for the formulation of by Super Typhoon Lawin, the capacity to cope
policies, plans, and programs that concerns of the barangays within the City of Tuguegarao
disaster related phenomena. This plan revolves in addressing problems with regards to
around four thematic points or concerns, preparedness and response were challenged.
namely: (1) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation; This research assessed the emergency
(2) Disaster Preparedness; (3) Disaster management of the ten barangays in Tuguegarao
Response; and (4) Disaster Rehabilitation and City that had the most number of affected
Recovery (NDRRMC, 2011). The establishment families by Super Typhoon Lawin.
of these thematic areas covered by NDRRMP
empowered LGUs nationwide in building STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
community resiliency and in the
institutionalization of measures in reducing The study assessed the emergency
disaster risks. management of the ten (10) identified barangays
Locally, LGUs in the Province of in the City of Tuguegarao that had the most
Cagayan traversed by the Cagayan River and number of Super Typhoon Lawin affected
other water tributaries, experience yearly the families.
ravaging effect of flood caused by massive Specifically, the study sought to answer
rainfall during wet seasons and typhoon the following:
occurrences. In particular, the City of 1. What is the level of preparedness of
Tuguegarao which grew on the banks of the ten identified barangays in terms
Cagayan River in 2015 was considered as of:
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1.1.Contingency Plan for typhoon CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK


and/or flood before the Super
Typhoon Lawin; The concepts that were used in the
1.2.Early Warning System for formulation of this study were based on the
typhoon and/or flood before the principles of Anticipatory Government by
Super Typhoon Lawin; Gaebler and Osborne, phases of Emergency
1.3.Evacuation Management before Management, UN Humanitarian Resolution
and during the Super Typhoon 461182 of 1991, the Hyogo Framework for
Lawin; and Action, Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
1.4.Response/Relief System during Management Act of 2010 (RA 10121), the
and after the Super Typhoon National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Lawin. Management Framework of the Philippines, and
2. What is the level of responsiveness the National Disaster Risk Reduction and
of the ten identified barangays with Management Plan 2011 to 2018.
respect to the execution of: The principle of Anticipatory
2.1.Calamity response protocols Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler
before and during the Super (1992) postulates that the government should
Typhoon Lawin; and engage in prevention rather than cure. This
2.2. After-calamity protocols after principle implies that by governing with
the Super Typhoon Lawin. foresight, government institutions can anticipate
3. What is the level of satisfaction of problems in the future. Likewise, the concept of
the Super Typhoon Lawin affected Emergency Management involves preventive
families in the ten respondent measures and futuristic undertakings to at least
barangays with respect to the decrease the effect of disasters.
implementation of plans, activities The UN Humanitarian Resolution
and services contained in the 461182 of 1991 provided that each State has the
following thematic areas of responsibility to first and foremost to take care
emergency management: of the victims of natural disasters and other
3.1.Preparedness; and emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence,
3.2.Response. the affected State has the primary role in the
4. What are the emergency initiation, organization, coordination, and
management initiatives that the implementation of humanitarian assistance
identified barangays had initiated within its territory.
after the Super Typhoon Lawin? In the concept of governance, it is indeed
5. What are the issues and problems true that a governments primordial role is to
related to emergency management of protect the welfare of its constituents through
the ten respondent barangays that initiatives, proper coordination and provision of
were encountered by the BDRRMC humanitarian assistance to the severely affected
members and affected families citizens in times of emergency. In connection to
before, during, and after the Super this, the concept of emergency management is
Typhoon Lawin? inherent to the function of the government as the
6. What are the recommendations of main instrumentality in delivering services for
the affected family respondents and the protection and advancement of humanitarian
BDRRMC member respondents that welfare during emergencies. There are different
may help the ten respondent phases being attached to emergency
barangays in the enhancement of management which the government have to
their emergency management? fulfill and these are: mitigation, preparedness,
response/relief, and recovery (Baird, 2010). At
the outset, preparedness and response were dealt
with in this study.
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Moreover, bases for assessment of Typhoon Lawin affected families in Tuguegarao


respondent barangays emergency management City. The barangays were as follows: Ugac Sur,
can be traced out in the following international Ugac Norte, Cataggaman Nuevo, Linao East,
protocols: the UN Humanitarian Charter and the Cataggaman Viejo, Caggay, Annafunan West,
Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response Buntun, and Cataggaman Pardo and Tanza.
and the UN Hyogo Framework for Action These barangays were ranked in accordance to
(HFA). The UN Humanitarian Charter and the the Terminal Report of the CDRRMO of
Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response Tuguegarao pertaining to the impact of Super
is a United Nation established project aimed at Typhoon Lawin dated November 11, 2016.
upgrading the quality of disaster response in
terms of its effectiveness and accountability of Respondents and Sampling Method
the humanitarian system to the people who are
strained by natural hazards (The Sphere Project, There were two groups of respondents in
2011). On the other hand, the UN Hyogo this study: the BDRRMC members and the
Framework for Action (HFA) was formulated affected families. Purposive sampling and
and adopted because of the heavy losses and complete enumeration were used to determine
damages to lives, properties, livelihood and the number of BDRRMC members based on RA
environment caused by natural calamities such 10121.
as typhoons, floods, and the like (UNISDR, In the case of affected family
2005). Furthermore, this international respondents, Slovins formula was used to
framework was adopted for the member states determine the general sample size. The number
to utilize a set of guidelines to reduce of affected family respondents was distributed
vulnerabilities to natural hazards. per respondent-barangay through stratified
The National Disaster Risk Reduction sampling technique.
and Management Framework, in connection to The affected family respondents were
the provisions of RA 10121, was adopted and identified by the City Social Welfare and
envisioned to attain sustainable development Development Office as referred by the City
with safer, adaptive and disaster-resilient Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Filipino Communities (National Disaster Office of Tuguegarao. There were 100
Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011- BDRRMC members but 95 were only
2018, 2011). This movement is geared towards interviewed while all the 389 affected family
paradigm shifting from a reactive to proactive respondents were interviewed.
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
(DRRM) to be fulfilled by citizens who have Research Instruments
increased awareness and understanding of
DRRM for amassing their resilience and Interview guides and survey
mitigating their vulnerabilities. questionnaires were used in this study.

METHODOLOGY Data Gathering Procedures and Techniques

Research Design The researchers coordinated to the City


Mayors Office of Tuguegarao for the
The researchers used triangulation in the endorsement of the conduct of survey and
study since both qualitative and quantitative interviews across the respondent barangays. The
methods were employed. immersion included the gathering of disaster
risk reduction and management documents and
Locale of the Study reports of the barangays. Upon the endorsement
of the City Mayor, request letters were cascaded
The study was conducted in the ten to the Punong Barangays for the formal conduct
barangays that had the most number of Super
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of interviews, surveys, and acquiring of Further probing showed that seven (7)
documents. barangays had their respective contingency plan
List of identified affected families were for typhoon and/or flood, but were not posted in
acquired through the City Social Welfare and conspicuous places, before the Super Typhoon
Development Office and became the basis in the Lawin. Moreover, five (5) barangays had an
determination of affected family respondents. available local disaster risk map, yet only two
The data gathering techniques that were (2) barangays posted it in their respective
employed in this study were interviews, survey, barangay halls.
documentary analysis, and on-site observation. Analysis of records in all barangays
showed that only Cataggaman Viejo had a drill
Statistical Tool and Treatment for the testing of their contingency plan before
the super typhoon. Disaster related signages
Descriptive statistics such as frequency, before the super typhoon in Buntun,
mean and percentage were used in the treatment Cataggaman Pardo, Cataggaman Viejo, Ugac
of the data on the level of preparedness and Sur, and Cataggaman Nuevo were posted but
level of responsiveness of the barangays, and destroyed during the super typhoon.
level of satisfaction of affected family
respondents. Moreover, in measuring the level B. Early Warning System before Super
of preparedness, response, and satisfaction, Typhoon Lawin
Likert scale was used with the following
arbitrary scale and descriptive value; 4.21 Generally, the ten respondent barangays
5.00: Very Much Prepared/Very early warning system before the onslaught of
Responsive/Very Satisfied, 3.41 4.20: Super Typhoon Lawin was perceived as
Prepared/Responsive/Satisfied, 2.61 3.40, ambivalent with a mean of 3.07. This indicates
Ambivalent/Moderately Responsive/Neither that there was an uncertainty on the barangays
Satisfied nor Dissatisfied, 1.81 preparedness.
2.60:Unprepared/Unresponsive/Dissatisfied, and On the other hand, records analysis
1.0 1.8:Very Much Unprepared/Very showed that only three (3) barangays had their
Unresponsive/Very Dissatisfied. early warning system prior to the onslaught of
Moreover, frequency counts and ranking the super typhoon. However, all the respondent-
were used in treating the data on the problems barangays dont have an installed early warning
encountered by the different groups of system. Instead, their early warning systems
respondents and their recommendations that revolved in the use of whistles, megaphones,
may help their barangays emergency and sirens. This indicates that the barangays
management. were still using the old and practical way of
providing early warning.
FINDINGS
C. Evacuation Management System
Level of Preparedness before and during the Super Typhoon
Lawin
A. Contingency Plan before the Super
Typhoon Lawin Generally, the barangays were
ambivalent in terms of evacuation management
The respondent barangays were system before and during the Super Typhoon
generally perceived as ambivalent with respect Lawin with a mean of 3.00. It can be inferred in
to their contingency plan before the Super general that the respondent barangays
Typhoon Lawin with a mean of 2.77. This preparedness was uncertain.
shows that the preparedness of the contingency Individually, all barangays designated
plan of the respondent barangays were their evacuation centers before and during the
uncertain. super typhoon. It was revealed that the most
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common evacuation centers were Barangay barangay halls as the sole barangay operation
Hall, Covered Court/Gymnasium, center after the super typhoon. Members of the
Church/Chapel, and Multipurpose Hall. BDRRMC also said that their respective Punong
Interviews with the BDRRMC members Barangays acted as the persons-in-charge. In
in Cataggaman Pardo revealed that they did not addition, all barangays were able to deploy
housed the evacuees in the covered personnel for search and rescue after but were
court/gymnasium because of its vulnerability to not during the super typhoon. Relief distribution
the strength of the super typhoon. Specifically, was tackled in the barangays but only two (2)
it was revealed that only three (3) barangays had barangays documented it.
an available evacuation map/route and
evacuation management plan. Level of Responsiveness
Food pack with potable water was the
most common basic necessity in the evacuation A. Execution of Calamity Response
center while sleeping mats were the least. Protocols before and during the Super
BDRRMC members from barangays Ugac Typhoon Lawin
Norte and Tanza disclosed they did not provided
sleeping mats, blankets and pillows in the Generally, survey shows that the barangays
evacuation centers because evacuees brought were moderately responsive in terms of calamity
their own sleeping paraphernalia. Power supply response protocols execution with a mean of
and health facilities were the most common 3.04. This indicates that their responsiveness
basic facilities while priority areas for pregnant was average.
women, elderly and persons with disabilities Majority of the BDRRMC members
was the least basic facility. It can be deduced affirmed in the execution of the calamity
that the establishment of priority areas for response protocols before the super typhoon.
pregnant women, elderly and persons with However, records analysis revealed that only
disabilities have to be strengthened since these two (2) barangays were able to make
are the vulnerable sectors. announcement or issuance of advisories, alerts
All barangays had their own power and warnings before the super typhoon. It was
supply and mobile communication system. found out that there were series of
Their communication before, during and after announcements done by the BDRRMC
the super typhoon relied on cellular phones and members upon the transmission of information
handheld radio. For instance in Caggay, from the city government.
BDRRMC members used cellular phone and In terms of evacuation and search
handheld radio in transmitting information and equipment, search light was the most common
calling. Moreover, all barangays were able to while extrication kit was the least. Other
deploy their barangay tanods to secure the evacuation and rescue equipment such as
evacuation centers. chainsaw, and rope were also present.
Cataggaman Nuevo and Cataggaman Pardo
D. Response/Relief System during and have their own boats.
after the Super Typhoon Lawin Probing into the mobilization of
BDRRMC members revealed that they were not
Generally, survey showed that all fully mobilized before the super typhoon
barangays were ambivalent in terms of because they secured first their own families
response/relief system during and after the super and properties. Some of the CSO representatives
typhoon with a mean of 3.33. This shows that were not informed and mobilized. It was also
there was an uncertainty in the preparedness of found out that BHWs, BNS, and other barangay
the barangays in terms of response/relief system officials were referred to as the trained
during and after the calamity. personnel who were deployed before the super
Interviews and on-site observation typhoon for food handling, orderly distribution
showed that all barangays designated their of relief goods, provision of medical, counseling
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services and law enforcement, and in settling encompassed by preparedness to uplift peoples
interpersonal conflicts. satisfaction.
Enforcement of pre-emptive and forced
evacuation became a bottleneck before the super B. Affected families satisfaction on the
typhoon due to community resistance. People in implementation of barangay-based
the community chose to stay in their house plans, activities and services on the
rather than to take shelter in the evacuation thematic area of response
centers. The deployment of search and rescue
and Barangay Emergency Response Teams The affected family respondents, in general,
were not done during the super typhoon because were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied in the
unpassable roads caused by fallen trees and execution of the various activities and services
debris from houses and buildings. covered by response with a mean of 3.18. These
findings show that there is also a need for the
B. Execution of After-Calamity Protocols improvement in the implementation of activities
after the Super Typhoon Lawin and services encompassed by response to gain
higher satisfaction.
Generally, survey in the barangays
revealed that they were moderately responsive Emergency Management Initiatives that the
in the execution of after calamity protocols after Barangays had after the Super Typhoon
the super typhoon with a mean of 3.20. This Lawin
shows that their responsiveness was average.
Interviews revealed that majority of the Activities such as damage assessments,
BDRRMC members affirmed on the inspection relief distribution, clean-up drive, rehabilitation
of affected areas in their barangays before of streetlights and after-calamity monitoring are
evacuees returned. Likewise, it was revealed the common activities that the affected families
that there was a provision of relief assistance, and BDRRMC members regard as emergency
including medical and psycho-social services. management initiatives.
There were barangay clean-ups done within 24
hours after the calamity. Issues and Problems encountered by the
In the contrary, records showed that not BDRRMC Members and Affected Family
all barangays had executed the after-calamity Respondents before, during, and after the
protocols. It revealed that there were five (5) Super Typhoon Lawin
barangays who had the inspection of affected
areas and damage assessments. Moreover, only The most common issues and problems
two (2) barangays had documentations during encountered by the two groups of respondents
the clean-up activity. before, during and after the super typhoon were
inadequate equipment and facilities, inadequate
Level of Satisfaction
budget for disaster preparedness, lack of
A. Affected families satisfaction on the seminars and training pertaining to disaster risk
implementation of plans, activities and reduction and management, lack of manpower,
services on the thematic area of and lack of manpower competency.
preparedness. Particularly, the affected family
respondents encountered unfair and politicized
Generally, the affected family
distribution of relief assistances while the
respondents were neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied in the preparedness of the barangays BDRRMC members experienced challenges on
with a mean of 2.82. This means that there is a the distribution of relief assistances due to
need for the barangays to enhance the peoples confusions and misconceptions.
implementation of activities and services
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Recommendations of the BDRRMC and documentary analysis showed that


Members and Affected Family Respondents only two (2) barangays were able to
execute the calamity response protocols
The two groups of respondents commonly while two (2) barangays were able to
recommended the provision of additional execute the after-calamity protocols.
funding, facilities and materials for disaster Respondent barangays were not able to
execute the calamity response protocols
preparedness, search and rescue and
during the super typhoon due to strong
response/relief; enhancement of early warning winds and unpassable roads.
system and provision of trainings and seminars 3. The affected family respondents, in
for disaster preparedness; encouragement of general, were neither satisfied nor
more barangay residents to participate during dissatisfied in terms of the
barangay assemblies and other activities; and implementation of activities and services
procurement of upgraded equipment for search encompassed by the thematic area of
preparedness. They were also neither
and rescue, and strengthening of the
satisfied nor dissatisfied in terms of the
dissemination of disaster advisories, alerts and implementation of activities and services
warnings. covered by the thematic area of
response.
CONCLUSION 4. The most common emergency
management initiatives that the
Based on the findings, it was concluded that respondent-barangays had were relief
1. The respondent-barangays were distribution, clean-up drive and damage
perceived as ambivalent in terms of assessment. The respondent barangays
contingency plan for typhoon and/or also had after-calamity monitoring.
flood and early warning system before 5. The affected families and BDRRMC
the super typhoon. They were also members both encountered inadequate
perceived as ambivalent in terms of equipment and facilities, inadequate
evacuation management before and budget for disaster preparedness, lack of
during the super typhoon and ambivalent seminars and training pertaining to
with respect to response/relief system disaster risk reduction and management,
after. lack of manpower, and lack of
However, interviews and documentary manpower competency.
analysis showed that seven (7) In particular, the affected families
barangays were prepared in terms of experienced issues and problems in the
contingency plan while three (3) distribution of relief assistances due to
barangays were prepared in terms of unfair, discriminate, and politicized
early warning system before the super distribution. Likewise, the BDRRMC
typhoon. Only two (2) barangays were members experienced issues and
prepared in terms of evacuation problems in relief distribution due to
management before and during the super peoples confusions and misconceptions.
typhoon while all of them were prepared 6. The affected families and BDRRMC
in terms of response/relief system during members commonly recommended the
and after. provision of additional funding, more
2. The respondent-barangays, in general, facilities and materials, more trainings
were moderately responsive in terms of and seminars for disaster preparedness,
calamity response protocol execution. search and rescue and response/relief;
They were also moderately responsive in enhancement of early warning system;
the after-calamity response protocol encouragement of more barangay
execution. On the other hand, interviews residents to participate during barangay
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assemblies and other activities, conspicuous places aside from barangay


procurement of upgraded equipment for halls and schools.
search and rescue; and strengthening of 5. Provide trainings and seminars to create
the dissemination of disaster advisories, social awareness, and encourage citizen
alerts and warnings. participation and skills development of
frontline respondents.
RECOMMENDATIONS 6. Capacitate BDRRMCs on community
based Disaster Risk Reduction
Based on the conclusions, the following Assessment for inputs on DRRM
recommendations are formulated: management.
1. Establish a barangay based DRRM 7. Forward the results of this study to the
program reinforced with the conduct of city government as a basis for policy-
series of capability building seminars making towards Disaster Risk and
and trainings that will enhance the Reduction Management.
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