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Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes, GR No. 180771, Apr.

21, 2015

FACTS : Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to
conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service
contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the
purpose of review. Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court
narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing
to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other
domestic laws.

ISSUE: Under the “alter ego” or qualified political agency doctrine, was the act of DOE through Secretary
Perez in signing the service contract deemed the act of the President?

RULING: No. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been
entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the
said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that
Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

Gonzales vs Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4 2012 & Jan. 28, 2014 (MR)

FACTS: Two petitions have been consolidated because they raise a common thread of issues relating to
the President's exercise of the power to remove from office the petitioners, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
A. Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit, who claim the protective cloak of
independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the

ISSUE: Being the appointing authority and under the doctrine of implication, can the President remove
the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?

RULING: No. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.
However, an exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise – that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. Section 9, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, while the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in
the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the

of all other public officers. authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers. including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. who are not subject to impeachment. under Section 2.Constitution itself. who are not subject to impeachment. .