PROPERTY

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

PROPERTY
COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

1. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter.
The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the
wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where
he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left
to his adopted daughter. Audreys will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken
on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's
estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property
is situated

Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by
her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose
succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the
Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the
national law of the testator.

2. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon City which approved the regulation of
establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total
area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park,
contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the
properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the
public.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintain a
public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the
property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the
state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

3. Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the
property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe
fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was
constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire
passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court
and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to
the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use
and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss
is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this
case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said
use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life

4. German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of
attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and
alleged that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their
farmholdings prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of
their property without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but
involved and prop)

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is
not an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners
to develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a
forcible entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate.

7. Associated Insurance and Surety Company vs. Iya, et al, 103 SCRA 972

FACTS:

Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty
Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond
subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house
in favor of the surety company. The spouses didnt own yet the land on which the
house was constructed on at the time of the undertaking. After being able to purchase
the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay.
The spouses werent able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company
foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and
lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses.
Also, Iya filed another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over
the property. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had
a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the
land wasnt owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real
property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building can be considered personal property?

HELD:

No. A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the land
on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. A building certainly cannot be divested of its
character of realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. To
hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion, for to
cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of the land,
would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the
ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the
only subjects of a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building
is null and void.

8. Bicerra vs. Tenezza, 6 SCRA 648

FACTS:

The Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and situated in
the municipality of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the house, asserting that they
are the rightful owners of the land. Failure to restore the house and to deliver the
materials by the defendants,
plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that the court
hold them as the proper owners of the house. The court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUES: Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable property?

HELD:

No. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which
it is built. The classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on
land belonging to another owner. But once the house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such
and the hence its character as immovable likewise ceases.

10. Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 SCRA 630

FACTS:

De la Rosa was the lessee of a piece of land, on which a house she owns was built.
She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitionerpurporting the leasehold interest
in the land and the ownership of house. After such, the petitioner moved for its registration
with the Register of Deeds, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record
of chattel mortgages. After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the
petitioner caused the same to be presented to the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of
deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record
of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, the respondent was of the opinion
that it was not a chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not
appear to be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and
registration was refused on this ground only.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents position is tenable?

HELD:

No. The respondents duties, as a register of deeds, in respect to the registration of chattel
mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which
confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of
which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. Generally, he should accept the
qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the instrument for
registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of the proper fee,
leaving the effects of registration to be determined by the court if such question should arise for
legal determination. The Civil Code supplies no absolute criterion in discriminating between real
property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The articles state general doctrines, nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that under
given conditions, property may have character different from that imputed to it in the
said articles. It is undeniable that the parties in a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature would be real property.

11. Punsalan vs. Lacsamana, 21 SCRA 331

FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his
failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which
PNB was the highest bidder. On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the
land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse. A deed of sale was executed
between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the
improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over
the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the
bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.

Petitioners complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action
being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property.

ISSUE:
W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies.

HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are
always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is
stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt
with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as
immovable property.
16. MANARANG AND MANARANG V. OFILADA AND ESTEBAN 99 SCRA 108

FACTS:
Manarang secured a loan from Esteban guaranteed by a chattel mortgage over a house of mixed
materials. Due to failure to pay the chattel mortgage was foreclosed. Before the sale of the property, Manarang
tried to pay for the property but the sheriff refused to accept tender unless there is payment for the publication of
the notice of sale in the newspapers. This prompted Manarang to bring this suit to compel the sheriff to accept
payment. He averred that the publication was unnecessary as the houses hold be considered as personal
property per agreement in the chattel mortgage, and the publication for notice of sale is unnecessary

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the parties entering into a contract regarding a house gave
said property the consideration of personal property in their contract.

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that a building of mixed materials may be a subject of chattel mortgage, in
which case it is considered as between the parties as personal property. The mere fact that a house was the
subject of chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties doesnt make the
said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale in public auction. It is
real property within the purview of Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture
on the land, which is real property.

19. TSAI V. CA
Gr. No. 120098, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom), secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and
the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract.
PBCom again granted a second loan to EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage
over personal properties similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. During the execution
of the second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment. Upon
EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation. PBCom, commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. PBCom leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the
factory, lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.

EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against
PBCom, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid, and that
PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were
not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the second
contract which is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither were those properties included in the Notice
of Sheriff's Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal properties

HELD:
YES, the machineries and equipment are personal properties. The nature of the disputed
machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged
does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code.
While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and
Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery
and equipment as chattels. If the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in
the real estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage
specifically with a listing of the machineries covered thereby.

Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties
from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel, where an
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as
security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.

20. MINDANAO BUS CO. V. CITY ASSESSOR DIGEST

G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962

FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by
motor vehicles. Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and
blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement
platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries
and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed on the ground that the same are not real properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment are considered immobilized and thus
subject to a realty tax

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court held that said machineries and equipment are not subject to the
assessment of real estate tax. Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable
property xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Said equipment are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not essential and
principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on
without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in
another shop belonging to another
Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land. As such, the equipment in question are not
deemed real property and not subject to realty tax, because the transportation business is not
carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law.

23. PIANSAY VS. DAVID, 12 SCRA 227

FACTS:

David obtained a loan of P3,000 with 12% interest from Uy Kim. To secure the payment of the
same, he executed a chattel mortgage on a house in Tondo. Upon Davids failure to pay, it was
foreclosed and Uy Kim bought the house at the public auction and thereafter sold the same to
Salvador Piansay. Later on, Marcos Mangubat filed a complaint against David before the CFI
Manila for the collection of the loan of P2,000. The complaint was later amended to implead Uy
Kim and Piansay praying that the auction sale and deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Kim in
favor of Piansay be annulled. CFI Manila ordered David to pay and annulled the chattel
mortgage. CA affirmed. David was ordered to pay and the house was levied upon. To prevent
the sale at the public auction, Piansay and Uy Kim filed a petition before the CA but it was
denied. Subsequently, the latter instituted an action against David and Mangubat praying that
judgment be rendered declaring Piansay as the true owner and restrain the levy and sale to
public auction. David demanded from Piansay the payment of the rentals for the use and
occupation of the house; the latter claims it is his property. Mangubat, on one hand, moved to
dismiss the complaint which was granted. CA affirmed it by explaining that Uy Kim had no right
to foreclose the chattel mortgage because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured
loan. Piansay assailed Mangubats right to levy execution upon the house alleging that the
same belongs to him, he having bought it from Uy Kim who acquired it at the auction sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the chattel mortgage and sale are valid

HELD:

No. Upon the theory that the chattel mortgage and sale in favor of Uy Kim had been annulled in
the original decision, as affirmed by the CA, the fact is that said order became final and
executory upon the denial of the petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Hence, Uy Kim and Piansay are now barred from asserting that the chattel mortgage and sale
are valid. At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a
house, as between the parties to said contract, the same cannot and does not bind third
persons, who are not parties to the contract of their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the
house in question in the proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is
null and void insofar as defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon Uy Kim, as
buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to said house, so that she could not have
transmitted to her assignee Piansay any such right as against Mangubat. In short, they do not
have a cause of action against Mangubat and David

24. SIBAL VS. VALDEZ, 50 PHIL 512

FACTS: As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal,
deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar
cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Within one year from the
date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to
the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest
thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and
the interest corresponding thereto. But Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the
sugar cane to the plaintiff.

As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was
attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels and that he had harvested
and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in another parcel,
amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of said palay belonged to the plaintiff.

After hearing and on 28 April 1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not
subject to redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal

ISSUE:

Whether the sugar cane in question is personal or real property

HELD:

Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the
Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits that growing
crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property. Moreover, from an
examination of the reports and codes of the State of California and other states we find that the
settle doctrine followed in said states in connection with the attachment of property and
execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are
considered personal property.

On the other hand, Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing crops
are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to
mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance
thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be
mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself
properly to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that
"growing crops" are personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion
hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by
section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as
mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words,
the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products."

We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified
by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the
purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.

25. RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72

FACTS: Bonifacio Gelito sold his share in the pilot boat Valentina, consisting of 2/3 interest
therein, to the Chinaman Sy Qui, the co-owner of the other 1/3 interest in said vessel; wherefore
this vendor is no longer entitled to exercise any action whatever in respect to the boat in
question. After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera, suit having been brought in the
justice of the peace court against the Chinaman Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain sum of
money, the latters creditor Fausto Rubiso. Rubiso later acquired said vessel at a public auction
sale and for the sum of P55.45. The certificate of sale and adjudication of the boat in question
was issued by the sheriff on behalf of Fausto Rubiso, in the office of the Collector of Customs,
on 27 January 1915 and was also entered in the commercial registry on 14 March 1915.

On 10 April 1915, the plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint that his
clients were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina, which had been in bad condition
since 1914 and was stranded in Tingloy, Bauan, Batangas; and that Florentino E. Rivera took
charge or possession of said vessel without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs and
refused to deliver it to them, under claim that he was the owner thereof. After the hearing of the
case and the introduction of documentary evidence, the judgment of 6 September 1915, was
rendered, , in which the defendant and appellant was ordered to place at the disposal of the
Fausto Rubiso the pilot boat in litigation. No special finding was made for costs. The defendant
appealed and moved for a new trial. This motion was denied and appellant excepted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with the costs against the appellant.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the vessel, is
necessary and indispensable in order that the purchasers rights may be maintained
against a third person

2. Whether or not the boat is a real property

HELD:

1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment solely
refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the two
purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one entitled to
enjoy the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the purchased boat,
and this latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers for, pursuant to article
582 of the said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has been executed and recorded
in the commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the vessel in favor of the creditors shall be
considered canceled. 1awphil.net

The purchaser at public auction, Fausto Rubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition,
opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the defendant
Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person, who was directly
affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition.

2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the
nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the world
commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of Commerce are nearly
identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.

26. PHIL. REFINING CO. VS. JARQUE, 61 PHIL 229

FACTS:

On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three
mortgages, denominated as chattel mortgage on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza.
The first two mortgages do not have an appended affidavit of good faith, while the third contains
such. The third mortgage was subscribed by Jarque and MN Brink (in what capacity the latter
signed is not disclosed) and was not registered in the customs house until 17 May 1932, or
within the period of 30 prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque. A
fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and
was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on 12 May 1932, or again
within the 30-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
A petition was filed with the CFI Cebu on 2 June 1932 in which it was prayed that Francisco
Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, with the result that an assignment of all the properties
of the insolvent debtor, was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. The petition on the matter of
Jarques insolvency was granted. However, the judge declined to order the foreclosure of the
mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the
mortgages.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with costs against appellant

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the vessel is a personal property

2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce a chattel mortgage on a vessel

HELD:

1. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article
585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the common law,
vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal
property. Since the term personal property includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage
agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. (Act 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has
heretofore been accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel
mortgage. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage
of other personality is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted
in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the
title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.
Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites
and validity.

2. Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law deemed it a requirement to have an affidavit of good
faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a
mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel
mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is
lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.

27. US vs. CARLOS 21 PHIL 553

FACTS:

Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court
issued a warrant of arrest. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what
he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny
applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited
away, hence a movable property. Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently
sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy cannot be
stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the
court of first instance affirmed the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in declaring that electrical energy can be stolen?

RULING:

Yes. Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can be stolen. However,
the true test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is
corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another other than the
owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of
science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used
jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

28. US vs. TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364

FACTS:

The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at
Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services
discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to
leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The
prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

RULING:

Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable

merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.

29. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER vs. RAMIREZ

44 PHIL 933

FACTS:

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity &
Surety Co. on March 10, 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while
another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also
in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity &
Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by
Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property.

RULING:
Yes. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the
property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal
property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of movable properties in
Article 414 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.

35
36
37
38

39. Chiao Liong Tan vs CA Nov.19,1993 GR no.106251

Facts:

Petitioner claims that he is the owner of a motor vehicle, relying on the fact that such was
registered in his name.Petitioner's brother private respondent averred that the vehicle was for
their family business use for the delivery of machinery to its customers.Prior to such dispute
private respondent asked Petitioner to look for a vehicle and give the latter P5,000 as down
payment,after a month private respondent himself paid the whole price out of a loan of
P140,000 although receipts for down payment as well as the payment of balance of the
purchase price was issued in the name of Petitioner.Allegations of private respondent has been
corroborated by witnesses.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner is the lawful owner of the vehicle?

Whether or not Petitioner action for Replevin proper?

Ruling:

The NCC recognizes cases of Implied trust other than those enumerated therein.Thus although
no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties,it is undeniable that an implied trust
was created when the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of
petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent.The principle
that a trustee who puts a Certificate of Registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration is one of the well known limitations upon a title. A trust which derives
its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers,does not
lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.

It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of
possession.Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing
more than the right of possession.However when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue
by the defendant's plea and by reason of this policy to settle in one action all the conflicting
claims on the property in controversy,the question of ownership may be resolved in the same
proceeding.

40. Felipe Calub vs CA April 27,2000 GR no.115634

Facts:

The Petitioner from DENR apprehended two motor vehicles which was carrying illegally sourced
lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code,and thereafter confiscated them.The owners of
the subject vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover such vehicles.They succeed in the trial
court averring on the ground that the Petitioner did not act in accordance with the law.Petitioner
appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and therefore
invalid.

Issue:

Whether or not Replevin may be instituted for the reconveyance of the vehicles under custodia
legis? and whether such replevin in the case is a suit against the State?
Ruling:

No.Writ of Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of law. This suit is not valid because the State may not
be sued without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his
duties.It has been established that the DENR acted within its authority as provided by the
applicable law.Hence,its action is the action of the State.

42. Bongato vs Malvar 387 SCRA 327

Facts:

Private respondent spouses filed a complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner for alledging
unlawful entry in a parcel of land and constructed a house of light materials thereon. Trial court
ordered Petitioner to vacate the lot and issued an order as to determine the location of the
houses involved in the civil cases the same with the one in criminal case for anti-
squatting.Judge made a warning that there will be no extension to be granted for the submission
of the survey and failure to do so would prompt the issuance of the writ of execution. Upon
failure of petitioner to submit a survey report,the judge ordered the return of the records of the
case to the court of origin for disposal.

Issue: Whether or not Forcible entry the proper action?

Ruling:

In Forcible entry ,one employs FISTS (fraud,intimidation,strategy,threat,stealth) to deprive

another physical possession of land or building thus,plaintiff must allege and prove prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant. Sole
question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession of the property.Neither a
claim of juridical possession nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly
prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.Ejectment cases proceed independently of
any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession on de facto and
undue deprivation thereof.

In the present case,the lower court lacked jurisdiction .First,the house of petitioner was actually
situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the
spouses.Second,house has been in existence prior to the alleged forcible
entry.Third,respondent's had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the alleged
date of entry.

43. Cagayan De Oro Landless Residents vs CA 254 SCRA 220

Facts:

A lot in dispute was formerly classified as timber land until the time it was reclassified by the
government as public land. Petitioner were authorized to survey the land for subdivision into
residential lots. Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceeding into the lot. Petitioner
intervened and said that instead of being paid through money it preferred acquisition of any
housing area of NHA.Upon learning of the annulment of the title over the same land NHA sought
the suspension of expropriation proceeding.Thereafter,SC finally resolved by annulling the title
and declaring the subject lot to be public land.The Bureau was furnished with the decision and
according to the investigation,members of the Petitioner was found settling in the land. A
presidential proclamation was then issued reserving entire subject land for a slum improvement
project of the NHA,leading to the rejection of the survey submitted by the Petitioner and the
demolition of settlement constructed by the members of Petitioner,and prompted the latter to file
a case for forcible entry on which trial court decided on its favor.During the pendency of the civil
case, a special patent was issued for the entire subject land.The petitioner sought the execution
of the decision which was countered by a case for quieting of title by NHA.

Issue: Whether or not writ of injunction is proper in this case?

Ruling:

NHA was entitled to the Writ of Injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for forcible
entry; the special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel of land.As an extraordinary
remedy,injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard.As such
injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used
cautiously,as it effects the respective rights of the parties and only upon full conviction on the
part of the court of its extreme necessity.

44. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanuevas parents, mortgaging the subject parcel of
land as security. Years after, the parcel of land became the subject for an application for
registration by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that they had a better claim over the land
than petitioner. After trial, the case was dismissed as the land has not been reclassified for
other purposes and remained a part of the forest reserve. Consequently, the brothers
were able to secure reclassification of the land and the same was registered in their name as
owners, and they later sold the land to Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know
of the registration and filed a complaint, which was dismissed.

HELD:

Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the
government as part of the forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the forest
reserve until such time it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of
the Ramoses. A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest, and to convert it into alienable and disposable land for other purposes. Until
such lands have been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no
disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification prior to the possession
and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription

45. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Fernandez, 358 SCRA 489

FACTS:

The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into by
EPZA and the newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity of
the documents executed as he alleged
that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by
their predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred
by prescription. This was denied by the trial court and the CA.

HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all
persons, and thus, a four-year period shall be counted therefrom. The action for reconveyance
based on fraud has already prescribed.

Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would have
already prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied
trust applies only when the plaintiff is in
possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they dont even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so
would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.

Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully

registered in the name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once
the property has passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not
have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
46. IDOLOR V CA (351 SCRA 402)

FACTS:
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.

Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay
which resulted into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which noted that the petitioner shall pay within
90 days and her failure would warrant the foreclosure of the property with the right to
repurchase within one year without interest.

Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed
an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public
auction to respondent Gumersindo and the Certificate of Sale was registered.

After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,
a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently
issued the TRO and the writ.

CA anulled the writ

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner has proprietary rights to the writ of preliminary injunction
2. Whether or not the Kasunduan was a form of novation

HELD:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before
an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:

1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;

2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem
the property but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists.

There was no novation that was brought by the Kasunduan, since it is essentially the same
agreement as the first, only that the conditions were changed a little. Novation requires the
extinguishment of the obligation, here the original obligation was not extinguished.

47. Lucero vs. Luot

GR L-16995
October 28, 1968

Facts:
The movant-appellant (Lucero) and oppositors-appellants (Luot, et al) are parties in a land
registration proceedings. The land registration court awarded the subject property to Lucero and
was granted a writ of possession. The oppositors claim that there were defects in the
reconstitution of records and that the motion was not under oath. However, the court claimed
this was untenable. It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession to whom
the subject property was to be awarded, in accordance with Land Registration Act 496, as
amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of posessesion should be awarded to Lucero

HELD: Yes, it should be awarded. It was in accordance with the law."the issuance of a writ of
possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the
registered owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of
prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, ..."
There would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful
litigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for
the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory."
We have heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person
who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the
land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the
decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the
said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any
time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a
writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by
the successful claimant.

48. VENCILAO V. VANO

182 SCRA 492

FACTS:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of
land in question.

On the first case, it was tackled that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for
registration of the subject parcel of land. A reconveyance case was filed against
them by petitioners on the ground that they are true owners of thereof.

The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owner of the subject
land. After her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in
the name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against the
petitioners.

Issue: WON a writ of possession may be issued against unlawful and adverse occupants in the
land

HELD:Yes.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the
said land registration case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for
registration. They have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which
began long before the application for registration; and that even after registration, they
continued to possess the land.

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its
registration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The issuance of
the writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by
the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. A writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final
decree.

49. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS

177 SCRA 495

FACTS:
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of
their parcel of land into a subdivision. Private respondents were occupying the land and
petitioner advised them to vacate but they refused. Thereafter, petitioner continued
their development and construction. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA.

Issue: WON the possessors of a land may file a case of forcible entry even against the owner
himself

Held:
Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible
entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a
quieting process, and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title
it presented, such evidence doesnt responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to
the property, the party in a peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatver may be the character of his prior possession, if he
has in favor priority in time, he
has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

50.
CAISIP V PEOPLE
36 scra 17

FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land
known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is
Roxas y Cia. The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for
forcible entry which orders them to vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried
out June 6, 1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix
Caisip harvesting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to stop what she was doing and
to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey to
help him shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave so the
two police officers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to
threaten her by drawing their guns :). As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Glorias
neighbours caught sight of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria was later
turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.

A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also
filed grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at
her- just in case sir asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self
help.) The petitioners were found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense?

RULING:
Article 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The complainant didnt usurp or invade said lot.
She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have
become its co-possessor. Appellants didnt repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of the property. They expelled the complainant from a
property on which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible
entry was filed against them.

51
52
53
54
55

5. Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands GR No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

Facts:
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated
in the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. The director of land opposed the
registration for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the
applicant nor his predecessor-in-interes possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land
appliedwas acquired from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land
in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the Manila
bay. The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be registered are
part of the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court could have declared the
land not to be part of the public domain.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land

Ruling:
No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called
upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited
there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government,
specifically from the executive department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a
land in question is no longer needed for public use, some public use or for the improvement of
national wealth.
 6. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter.
The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the
wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where
he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left
to his adopted daughter. Audreys will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken
on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's
estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property
is situated

Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by
her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose
succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the
Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the
national law of the testator.

7. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total
area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park,
contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the
properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the
public.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a
public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the
property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the
state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

8. Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the
property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe
fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was
constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire
passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court
and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to
the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use
and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss
is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this
case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said
use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life

9. German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of
attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and
alleged that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their
farmholdings prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of
their property without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but
involved and prop)

Ruling:
 Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is
not an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners
to develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a
forcible entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate.

6. Lopez vs. Orosa and Plaza Theatre, 103 SCRA 98

FACTS:

Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied lumber for the
construction of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k
thus leaving a balance of almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, with
Luzon Surety Company as their surety and the land and building were mortgaged as counter-
security. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid amount for the materials and was able to get a
judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. Also,
he was able to obtain a materialmans lien on the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting
to 42k shall be sold in public auction in case the respondents default. Petitioner wasnt happy
because he also wanted a lien on the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since
the building and the land are inseparable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable?

HELD:

No. The contention that the lien embraces both the land and the building or structure adhering
thereto is without merit. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the
building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct
from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Article 415 of the new
Civil Code) could mean only one thing that a building is by itself an immovable property.
Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building
is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it
is adhered to belong to the same owner.

7. Associated Insurance and Surety Company vs. Iya, et al, 103 SCRA 972

FACTS:

Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty
Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond
subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house
in favor of the surety company. The spouses didnt own yet the land on which the
house was constructed on at the time of the undertaking. After being able to purchase
the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay.
The spouses werent able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company
foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and
lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses.
Also, Iya filed another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over
the property. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had
a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the
land wasnt owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real
property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building can be considered personal property?

HELD:

No. A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the land
on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. A building certainly cannot be divested of its
character of realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. To
hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion, for to
cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of the land,
would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the
ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the
only subjects of a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building
is null and void.

8. Bicerra vs. Tenezza, 6 SCRA 648

FACTS:

The Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and situated in
the municipality of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the house, asserting that they
are the rightful owners of the land. Failure to restore the house and to deliver the
materials by the defendants,
plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that the court
hold them as the proper owners of the house. The court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUES: Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable property?

HELD:

No. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which
it is built. The classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on
land belonging to another owner. But once the house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such
and the hence its character as immovable likewise ceases.

9. Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. And Williamson, 37 SCRA 644
FACTS:

Compania Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company and
this was secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery and the building to which it was
installed. Upon failure to pay, the chattel mortgage was foreclosed, the building and
machinery sold in public auction and bought by the machinery company. Then Compania
Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land to which the building stood in favor of the
machinery company. This was done to cure any defects that may arise in the machinery
companys ownership of the building.

On or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was executed, Compania executed
a real estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate
from the land. This is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the
building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed. The machinery company then
filed a case, demanding that it be declared the rightful owner of the building. The trial
court held that it was the machinery company which was the rightful owner as it had its title
before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of Leung Yees certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building in question is an immovable?

HELD:

The building made out of strong materials in which the machinery was installed is real property.
The mere fact that the parties dealt with it as separate and apart from the land (or as personal
property) does not change its character as real property. In this case, it follows that neither the
original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor
the annotation in the registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any legal effect.

10. Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 SCRA 630

FACTS:

De la Rosa was the lessee of a piece of land, on which a house she owns was built.
She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitionerpurporting the leasehold interest
in the land and the ownership of house. After such, the petitioner moved for its registration
with the Register of Deeds, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record
of chattel mortgages. After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the
petitioner caused the same to be presented to the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of
deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record
of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, the respondent was of the opinion
that it was not a chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not
appear to be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and
registration was refused on this ground only.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents position is tenable?

HELD:

No. The respondents duties, as a register of deeds, in respect to the registration of chattel
mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which
confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of
which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. Generally, he should accept the
qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the instrument for
registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of the proper fee,
leaving the effects of registration to be determined by the court if such question should arise for
legal determination. The Civil Code supplies no absolute criterion in discriminating between real
property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The articles state general doctrines, nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that under
given conditions, property may have character different from that imputed to it in the
said articles. It is undeniable that the parties in a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature would be real property.

11. Punsalan vs. Lacsamana, 21 SCRA 331

FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his
failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which
PNB was the highest bidder. On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the
land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse. A deed of sale was executed
between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the
improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over
the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the
bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.

Petitioners complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action
being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property.

ISSUE:
W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies.

HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are
always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is
stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt
with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as
immovable property.
12. Prudential Bank vs. Panis 153 SCRA 390

FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a
real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy
the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which
the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same
bank. To secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same
properties. The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land
which was later on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the
REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the
spouses. The respondent court held that the REM was null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid REM mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the
belonging to another.

HELD: A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging
to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can
only mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of
land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings,
still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a
mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be considered as
immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original mortgage
on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the
sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it
is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own
building was a valid mortgage. As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent
was issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.

13. Tumalad vs. Vicencio

FACTS: Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over
their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee
a loan, payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs
were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as
they were the proper owners.

ISSUE: W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties
can be subject of a chattel mortgage.

HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are
immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal
property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of
estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as
chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as
personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage
could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to
treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand
by claiming otherwise.

14. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation vs Wennever Texttile Mills

FACTS:
To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and
assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To
secure the collection of receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials
and a machinery Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range (Dryer). Wearever defaulted thus the
properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. The sheriff, after the restraining order was
lifted, was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the Dryer.
The CA reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be
the subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the ground. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether the dryer is an immovable property

HELD: NO. The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials
can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no
innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable
since it is movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination. And treating it as a
chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is estopped from claiming otherwise.

15. Sergs Products and Gaquiloy vs. PCI Leasing and Finance 338 SCRA 499

FACTS:
PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the
seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in favor of PCI.
Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective
order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel
mortgage.

Issue: Whether or not the machineries become real property by virtue of immobilization.

HELD:
The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature.
Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

16. MANARANG AND MANARANG V. OFILADA AND ESTEBAN 99 SCRA 108

FACTS:
Manarang secured a loan from Esteban guaranteed by a chattel mortgage over a house of mixed
materials. Due to failure to pay the chattel mortgage was foreclosed. Before the sale of the property, Manarang
tried to pay for the property but the sheriff refused to accept tender unless there is payment for the publication of
the notice of sale in the newspapers. This prompted Manarang to bring this suit to compel the sheriff to accept
payment. He averred that the publication was unnecessary as the houses hold be considered as personal
property per agreement in the chattel mortgage, and the publication for notice of sale is unnecessary

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the parties entering into a contract regarding a house gave
said property the consideration of personal property in their contract.

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that a building of mixed materials may be a subject of chattel mortgage, in
which case it is considered as between the parties as personal property. The mere fact that a house was the
subject of chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties doesnt make the
said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale in public auction. It is
real property within the purview of Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture
on the land, which is real property.

17. NAVARRO VS. PINEDA

9 SCRA 631

FACTS:
Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of Navarro,
to secure a loan they got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land owned by the
mother while the chattel mortgage covered a residential house. Due to the failure to pay
the loan, they asked for extensions to pay for the loan. On the second extension, Pineda
executed a promise wherein in case of default in payment, he wouldnt ask for any additional
extension and there would be no need for any formal demand. In spite of this, they still failed to
pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The court
decided in his favor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended to the
complaint is valid notwithstanding the fact that the house was made subject of chattel mortgage
for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.

HELD:
Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may
be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the document
of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure, the validity
Of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage.
Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as a
chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract between them, has been
recognized, it has been a constant criterion that with respect to third
Persons, who are not parties to the contract, and especially in execution proceedings, the house
is considered as immovable property.

18. DAVAO SAWMILL V. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935

FACTS:
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. However, the land upon which the business was
conducted was leased from another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a building
which housed the machinery it used. Some of the machines were mounted and placed on
foundations of cement.. The contract of lease stated that on the expiration of the period agreed
upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by Davao sawmill shall pass
to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for
said improvements and buildings; which do not include the machineries and accessories in the
improvements.

In another action, a writ of execution was issued against the company and the properties in
question were levied upon. The company assailed the said writ contending that the machineries
and accessories were personal in nature, hence, not subject to writ of execution. The trial judge
ruled in favour of the company.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal property
HELD
Yes, the subject properties are personal in nature.
Art.415 (NCC) provides that real property consists of (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works. Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery only becomes
immovable when placed in a land by the owner of the property or land but not when so placed
by a tenant or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner. In the case at bar, the machinery is intended not by the owner of the land but by
the saw mill company for use in connection with its trade

19. TSAI V. CA
Gr. No. 120098, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom), secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and
the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract.
PBCom again granted a second loan to EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage
over personal properties similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. During the execution
of the second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment. Upon
EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation. PBCom, commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. PBCom leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the
factory, lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.

EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against
PBCom, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid, and that
PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were
not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the second
contract which is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither were those properties included in the Notice
of Sheriff's Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal properties

HELD:
YES, the machineries and equipment are personal properties. The nature of the disputed
machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged
does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code.
While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and
Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery
and equipment as chattels. If the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in
the real estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage
specifically with a listing of the machineries covered thereby.

Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties
from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel, where an
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as
security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.
20. MINDANAO BUS CO. V. CITY ASSESSOR DIGEST
G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962

FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by
motor vehicles. Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and
blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement
platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries
and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed on the ground that the same are not real properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment are considered immobilized and thus
subject to a realty tax

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court held that said machineries and equipment are not subject to the
assessment of real estate tax. Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable
property xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Said equipment are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not essential and
principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on
without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in
another shop belonging to another
Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land. As such, the equipment in question are not
deemed real property and not subject to realty tax, because the transportation business is not
carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law.

21. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS V. MERALCO

G.R. No. L-15334. January 31, 1964

FACTS:
Meralcos electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls,
Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running
from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission wires which carry high
voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers. Meralco has constructed 40
of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.

The QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. After
the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC
Board of Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay real property tax on the said
steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956.
MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations
and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company constitute real property for the
purposes of real property tax.

HELD:
NO. The steel towers of an electric company do not constitute real property for the purposes of
real property tax. Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of
Article 415 (NCC) because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the
soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a
square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and
moved from place to place.
They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration
upon the object to which they are attached. These steel towers or supports do not also fall
under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or implements, and
even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land.

Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports or
towers are constructed.

22. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS

114 SCRA 273

FACTS:

Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and assembled on
the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad as
immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks are within the Caltex refinery
compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants.

The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks, based
on the report of the Board of Assessors. Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not
fall within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article 415 of the Civil Code the tanks
are not attached to the land and that they were placed on leased land, not on the land owned by
Meralco.

ISSUE : Whether or not the oil storage tanks constitute real property for the purposes of
real property tax
HELD:

YES. While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may nevertheless
be considered as improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of
permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.

For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which should generally be
considered as personal property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classified as
real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle may be considered as
personal
property.

23. PIANSAY VS. DAVID, 12 SCRA 227

FACTS:

David obtained a loan of P3,000 with 12% interest from Uy Kim. To secure the payment of the
same, he executed a chattel mortgage on a house in Tondo. Upon Davids failure to pay, it was
foreclosed and Uy Kim bought the house at the public auction and thereafter sold the same to
Salvador Piansay. Later on, Marcos Mangubat filed a complaint against David before the CFI
Manila for the collection of the loan of P2,000. The complaint was later amended to implead Uy
Kim and Piansay praying that the auction sale and deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Kim in
favor of Piansay be annulled. CFI Manila ordered David to pay and annulled the chattel
mortgage. CA affirmed. David was ordered to pay and the house was levied upon. To prevent
the sale at the public auction, Piansay and Uy Kim filed a petition before the CA but it was
denied. Subsequently, the latter instituted an action against David and Mangubat praying that
judgment be rendered declaring Piansay as the true owner and restrain the levy and sale to
public auction. David demanded from Piansay the payment of the rentals for the use and
occupation of the house; the latter claims it is his property. Mangubat, on one hand, moved to
dismiss the complaint which was granted. CA affirmed it by explaining that Uy Kim had no right
to foreclose the chattel mortgage because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured
loan. Piansay assailed Mangubats right to levy execution upon the house alleging that the
same belongs to him, he having bought it from Uy Kim who acquired it at the auction sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the chattel mortgage and sale are valid

HELD:
No. Upon the theory that the chattel mortgage and sale in favor of Uy Kim had been annulled in
the original decision, as affirmed by the CA, the fact is that said order became final and
executory upon the denial of the petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Hence, Uy Kim and Piansay are now barred from asserting that the chattel mortgage and sale
are valid. At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a
house, as between the parties to said contract, the same cannot and does not bind third
persons, who are not parties to the contract of their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the
house in question in the proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is
null and void insofar as defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon Uy Kim, as
buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to said house, so that she could not have
transmitted to her assignee Piansay any such right as against Mangubat. In short, they do not
have a cause of action against Mangubat and David

24. SIBAL VS. VALDEZ, 50 PHIL 512

FACTS: As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal,
deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar
cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Within one year from the
date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to
the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest
thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and
the interest corresponding thereto. But Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the
sugar cane to the plaintiff.

As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was
attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels and that he had harvested
and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in another parcel,
amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of said palay belonged to the plaintiff.

After hearing and on 28 April 1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not
subject to redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal

ISSUE:

Whether the sugar cane in question is personal or real property

HELD:

Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the
Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits that growing
crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property. Moreover, from an
examination of the reports and codes of the State of California and other states we find that the
settle doctrine followed in said states in connection with the attachment of property and
execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are
considered personal property.

On the other hand, Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing crops
are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to
mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance
thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be
mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself
properly to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that
"growing crops" are personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion
hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by
section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as
mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words,
the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products."

We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified
by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the
purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.

25. RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72

FACTS: Bonifacio Gelito sold his share in the pilot boat Valentina, consisting of 2/3 interest
therein, to the Chinaman Sy Qui, the co-owner of the other 1/3 interest in said vessel; wherefore
this vendor is no longer entitled to exercise any action whatever in respect to the boat in
question. After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera, suit having been brought in the
justice of the peace court against the Chinaman Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain sum of
money, the latters creditor Fausto Rubiso. Rubiso later acquired said vessel at a public auction
sale and for the sum of P55.45. The certificate of sale and adjudication of the boat in question
was issued by the sheriff on behalf of Fausto Rubiso, in the office of the Collector of Customs,
on 27 January 1915 and was also entered in the commercial registry on 14 March 1915.

On 10 April 1915, the plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint that his
clients were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina, which had been in bad condition
since 1914 and was stranded in Tingloy, Bauan, Batangas; and that Florentino E. Rivera took
charge or possession of said vessel without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs and
refused to deliver it to them, under claim that he was the owner thereof. After the hearing of the
case and the introduction of documentary evidence, the judgment of 6 September 1915, was
rendered, , in which the defendant and appellant was ordered to place at the disposal of the
Fausto Rubiso the pilot boat in litigation. No special finding was made for costs. The defendant
appealed and moved for a new trial. This motion was denied and appellant excepted.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with the costs against the appellant.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the vessel, is
necessary and indispensable in order that the purchasers rights may be maintained
against a third person

2. Whether or not the boat is a real property

HELD:

1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment solely
refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the two
purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one entitled to
enjoy the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the purchased boat,
and this latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers for, pursuant to article
582 of the said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has been executed and recorded
in the commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the vessel in favor of the creditors shall be
considered canceled. 1awphil.net

The purchaser at public auction, Fausto Rubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition,
opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the defendant
Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person, who was directly
affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition.

2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the
nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the world
commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of Commerce are nearly
identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.

26. PHIL. REFINING CO. VS. JARQUE, 61 PHIL 229

FACTS:

On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three
mortgages, denominated as chattel mortgage on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza.
The first two mortgages do not have an appended affidavit of good faith, while the third contains
such. The third mortgage was subscribed by Jarque and MN Brink (in what capacity the latter
signed is not disclosed) and was not registered in the customs house until 17 May 1932, or
within the period of 30 prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque. A
fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and
was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on 12 May 1932, or again
within the 30-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
A petition was filed with the CFI Cebu on 2 June 1932 in which it was prayed that Francisco
Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, with the result that an assignment of all the properties
of the insolvent debtor, was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. The petition on the matter of
Jarques insolvency was granted. However, the judge declined to order the foreclosure of the
mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the
mortgages.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with costs against appellant

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the vessel is a personal property

2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce a chattel mortgage on a vessel

HELD:

1. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article
585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the common law,
vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal
property. Since the term personal property includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage
agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. (Act 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has
heretofore been accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel
mortgage. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage
of other personality is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted
in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the
title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.
Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites
and validity.

2. Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law deemed it a requirement to have an affidavit of good
faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a
mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel
mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is
lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.

27. US vs. CARLOS 21 PHIL 553

FACTS:

Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court
issued a warrant of arrest. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what
he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny
applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited
away, hence a movable property. Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently
sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy cannot be
stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the
court of first instance affirmed the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in declaring that electrical energy can be stolen?

RULING:

Yes. Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can be stolen. However,
the true test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is
corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another other than the
owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of
science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used
jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

28. US vs. TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364

FACTS:

The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at
Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services
discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to
leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The
prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

RULING:

Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable

merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.

29. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER vs. RAMIREZ

44 PHIL 933

FACTS:

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity &
Surety Co. on March 10, 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while
another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also
in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity &
Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by
Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property.

RULING:
Yes. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the
property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal
property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of movable properties in
Article 414 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.

30. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

384 SCRA 152

FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
AMARI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

31. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS

281 SCRA 639

FACTS:

Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon, which
was approved, provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of
five years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was established to be a
portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on
low tides. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms
that frequently passed through the area. Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands
from his investigation, that the land of Morato was leased to Advincula and it was also
mortgaged to Co. The government sought for the revocation of the patent issued. The trial court
and appellate court decided in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land granted under patent which was later on leased and mortgaged
should be revert back to the ownership of the State it being a foreshore land.

HELD:

Yes, foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the
high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies
between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow
of the tide. Foreshore lands may not anymore be the subject of issuance of free patents. Under
property of public ownership or dominion are foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code.

It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded
property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain. In accordance with
this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a pending patent application and
must be returned to the State.

32. LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

78 SCRA 130

FACTS:
 Lanzar filed for application for registration of title over a parcel of land, to which the
Director of Lands objected to as the land in question, according to him, was part of the
foreshore lands. The trial court adjudicated the land to Lanzar as the said land wasnt necessary
for public utility or establishment of special industries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

HELD:

Yes, lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain; it cannot be appropriated nor can it be acquired by
prescription. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
services, then the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estate
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

33. IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

108 PHIL 335

FACTS:

Ignacio filed for the registration of title over a mangrove to which he later said that he
acquired right to the mangrove through accretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ignacio has the right to declare that such land can be subject to
registration and does not anymore form part of the public dominion.

HELD:

No, only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and
power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea is not necessary for purposes
of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries or for Coast Guard Service
otherwise, the property continues to be property of public dominion ,further, it cannot be subject
to acquisitive prescription notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for such use or
service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms
part of the public domain. Under Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866. lands
added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form
part of the public domain. Since alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public
domain, it is not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.

34. VILLARICA V. COURT OF APPEALS

309 SCRA 193

FACTS:

Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarica, filed an application for confirmation of the title
over a parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said application was
opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the public
domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not available for private
appropriation. The trial court dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public
domain therefore the certificate of title is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land still forms part of the public domain

HELD:

Yes, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in
question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have not
introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise. Forest lands
cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long doesnt ripen to a
registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant or title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. Thus, if the land in question still forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.

35
36
37
38

39. Chiao Liong Tan vs CA Nov.19,1993 GR no.106251

Facts:

Petitioner claims that he is the owner of a motor vehicle, relying on the fact that such was
registered in his name.Petitioner's brother private respondent averred that the vehicle was for
their family business use for the delivery of machinery to its customers.Prior to such dispute
private respondent asked Petitioner to look for a vehicle and give the latter P5,000 as down
payment,after a month private respondent himself paid the whole price out of a loan of
P140,000 although receipts for down payment as well as the payment of balance of the
purchase price was issued in the name of Petitioner.Allegations of private respondent has been
corroborated by witnesses.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner is the lawful owner of the vehicle?

Whether or not Petitioner action for Replevin proper?

Ruling:

The NCC recognizes cases of Implied trust other than those enumerated therein.Thus although
no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties,it is undeniable that an implied trust
was created when the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of
petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent.The principle
that a trustee who puts a Certificate of Registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration is one of the well known limitations upon a title. A trust which derives
its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers,does not
lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.

It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of
possession.Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing
more than the right of possession.However when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue
by the defendant's plea and by reason of this policy to settle in one action all the conflicting
claims on the property in controversy,the question of ownership may be resolved in the same
proceeding.
40. Felipe Calub vs CA April 27,2000 GR no.115634

Facts:

The Petitioner from DENR apprehended two motor vehicles which was carrying illegally sourced
lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code,and thereafter confiscated them.The owners of
the subject vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover such vehicles.They succeed in the trial
court averring on the ground that the Petitioner did not act in accordance with the law.Petitioner
appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and therefore
invalid.

Issue:

Whether or not Replevin may be instituted for the reconveyance of the vehicles under custodia
legis? and whether such replevin in the case is a suit against the State?

Ruling:

No.Writ of Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of law. This suit is not valid because the State may not
be sued without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his
duties.It has been established that the DENR acted within its authority as provided by the
applicable law.Hence,its action is the action of the State.

41 . Sarmiento vs CA Nov.16,1995 GR no.116192

Facts:

The Private respondent owns a parcel of land adjacent to this lot is one wherein petitioner had a
house built on.Trying to cause relocation of her lot,Private respondent found out that petitioner
was encroaching on her property.When the latter talked to petitioner about constructing a new
fence, which will cover her true property,petitioner refused and threatened private respondent
with legal action.For fear of being sued,she sought judicial relief.Trial court decided in her
favor.Petitioner assailed that the issue was on ownership of the portion of land thus,the action
should have been an Accion Reivindicatoria and not forcible entry.

Issue:

Whether or not Accion Reivindicatoria the proper remedy?

Ruling:

Yes.The facts reveal that the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer,but
essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an Accion Reivindicatoria on
the issue of ownership over the portion of the land. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
are distinct actions.Private respondent cannot belatedly claim that Petitioner's possession of the
controverted portion was by mere tolerance.Complaint did not characterize Petitioner's alleged
entry on the land whether legal or illegal.Complainant admitted also the fact that the fence had
already pre-existed on the lot when she acquired the same.

42. Bongato vs Malvar 387 SCRA 327

Facts:

Private respondent spouses filed a complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner for alledging
unlawful entry in a parcel of land and constructed a house of light materials thereon. Trial court
ordered Petitioner to vacate the lot and issued an order as to determine the location of the
houses involved in the civil cases the same with the one in criminal case for anti-
squatting.Judge made a warning that there will be no extension to be granted for the submission
of the survey and failure to do so would prompt the issuance of the writ of execution. Upon
failure of petitioner to submit a survey report,the judge ordered the return of the records of the
case to the court of origin for disposal.

Issue: Whether or not Forcible entry the proper action?

Ruling:

In Forcible entry ,one employs FISTS (fraud,intimidation,strategy,threat,stealth) to deprive

another physical possession of land or building thus,plaintiff must allege and prove prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant. Sole
question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession of the property.Neither a
claim of juridical possession nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly
prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.Ejectment cases proceed independently of
any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession on de facto and
undue deprivation thereof.

In the present case,the lower court lacked jurisdiction .First,the house of petitioner was actually
situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the
spouses.Second,house has been in existence prior to the alleged forcible
entry.Third,respondent's had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the alleged
date of entry.

43. Cagayan De Oro Landless Residents vs CA 254 SCRA 220

Facts:

A lot in dispute was formerly classified as timber land until the time it was reclassified by the
government as public land. Petitioner were authorized to survey the land for subdivision into
residential lots. Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceeding into the lot. Petitioner
intervened and said that instead of being paid through money it preferred acquisition of any
housing area of NHA.Upon learning of the annulment of the title over the same land NHA sought
the suspension of expropriation proceeding.Thereafter,SC finally resolved by annulling the title
and declaring the subject lot to be public land.The Bureau was furnished with the decision and
according to the investigation,members of the Petitioner was found settling in the land. A
presidential proclamation was then issued reserving entire subject land for a slum improvement
project of the NHA,leading to the rejection of the survey submitted by the Petitioner and the
demolition of settlement constructed by the members of Petitioner,and prompted the latter to file
a case for forcible entry on which trial court decided on its favor.During the pendency of the civil
case, a special patent was issued for the entire subject land.The petitioner sought the execution
of the decision which was countered by a case for quieting of title by NHA.

Issue: Whether or not writ of injunction is proper in this case?

Ruling:

NHA was entitled to the Writ of Injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for forcible
entry; the special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel of land.As an extraordinary
remedy,injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard.As such
injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used
cautiously,as it effects the respective rights of the parties and only upon full conviction on the
part of the court of its extreme necessity.

44. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanuevas parents, mortgaging the subject parcel of
land as security. Years after, the parcel of land became the subject for an application for
registration by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that they had a better claim over the land
than petitioner. After trial, the case was dismissed as the land has not been reclassified for
other purposes and remained a part of the forest reserve. Consequently, the brothers
were able to secure reclassification of the land and the same was registered in their name as
owners, and they later sold the land to Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know
of the registration and filed a complaint, which was dismissed.

HELD:

Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the
government as part of the forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the forest
reserve until such time it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of
the Ramoses. A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest, and to convert it into alienable and disposable land for other purposes. Until
such lands have been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no
disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification prior to the possession
and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription
45. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Fernandez, 358 SCRA 489

FACTS:

The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into by
EPZA and the newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity of
the documents executed as he alleged
that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by
their predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred
by prescription. This was denied by the trial court and the CA.

HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all
persons, and thus, a four-year period shall be counted therefrom. The action for reconveyance
based on fraud has already prescribed.

Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would have
already prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied
trust applies only when the plaintiff is in
possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they dont even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so
would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.

Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully

registered in the name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once
the property has passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not
have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
46. IDOLOR V CA (351 SCRA 402)

FACTS:
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.

Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay
which resulted into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which noted that the petitioner shall pay within
90 days and her failure would warrant the foreclosure of the property with the right to
repurchase within one year without interest.

Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed
an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public
auction to respondent Gumersindo and the Certificate of Sale was registered.
After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,
a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently
issued the TRO and the writ.

CA anulled the writ

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner has proprietary rights to the writ of preliminary injunction
2. Whether or not the Kasunduan was a form of novation

HELD:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before
an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:

1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;

2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem
the property but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists.

There was no novation that was brought by the Kasunduan, since it is essentially the same
agreement as the first, only that the conditions were changed a little. Novation requires the
extinguishment of the obligation, here the original obligation was not extinguished.

47. Lucero vs. Luot

GR L-16995
October 28, 1968

Facts:
The movant-appellant (Lucero) and oppositors-appellants (Luot, et al) are parties in a land
registration proceedings. The land registration court awarded the subject property to Lucero and
was granted a writ of possession. The oppositors claim that there were defects in the
reconstitution of records and that the motion was not under oath. However, the court claimed
this was untenable. It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession to whom
the subject property was to be awarded, in accordance with Land Registration Act 496, as
amended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of posessesion should be awarded to Lucero

HELD: Yes, it should be awarded. It was in accordance with the law."the issuance of a writ of
possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the
registered owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of
prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, ..."
There would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful
litigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for
the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory."
We have heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person
who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the
land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the
decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the
said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any
time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a
writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by
the successful claimant.

48. VENCILAO V. VANO

182 SCRA 492

FACTS:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of
land in question.

On the first case, it was tackled that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for
registration of the subject parcel of land. A reconveyance case was filed against
them by petitioners on the ground that they are true owners of thereof.

The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owner of the subject
land. After her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in
the name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against the
petitioners.

Issue: WON a writ of possession may be issued against unlawful and adverse occupants in the
land

HELD:Yes.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the
said land registration case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for
registration. They have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which
began long before the application for registration; and that even after registration, they
continued to possess the land.

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its
registration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The issuance of
the writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by
the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. A writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final
decree.

49. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS

177 SCRA 495

FACTS:
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of
their parcel of land into a subdivision. Private respondents were occupying the land and
petitioner advised them to vacate but they refused. Thereafter, petitioner continued
their development and construction. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA.

Issue: WON the possessors of a land may file a case of forcible entry even against the owner
himself

Held:
Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible
entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a
quieting process, and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title
it presented, such evidence doesnt responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to
the property, the party in a peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatver may be the character of his prior possession, if he
has in favor priority in time, he
has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

50.
CAISIP V PEOPLE
36 scra 17

FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land
known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is
Roxas y Cia. The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for
forcible entry which orders them to vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried
out June 6, 1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix
Caisip harvesting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to stop what she was doing and
to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey to
help him shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave so the
two police officers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to
threaten her by drawing their guns :). As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Glorias
neighbours caught sight of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria was later
turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.

A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also
filed grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at
her- just in case sir asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self
help.) The petitioners were found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense?

RULING:
Article 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The complainant didnt usurp or invade said lot.
She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have
become its co-possessor. Appellants didnt repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of the property. They expelled the complainant from a
property on which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible
entry was filed against them.

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