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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

RULE 1, Sections 1 to 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the
lower courts decision.
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001 o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
PATRICIA NATCHER make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The lower
vs. court went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS acts that is proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person.
FACTS: o What the lower court should have done was to rule on the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement to
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that
Respondents, Sps. Graciano Del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra purpose.
(Graciano and Graciana, LOL), were registered owners of a parcel Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 in the
of land located in Manila. Supreme Court, assailing the CAs decision for being contrary to
o When Graciana died, her husband Graciano and their 6 law and the facts of the case.
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement, dividing
among themselves the land owned by Graciano and RULING:
Graciana.
o Heirs executed and forged an Agreement of The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The petition
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of bears no merit.
Rights where they subdivided among themselves the
properties already given.
o Graciano married petitioner Patrician Natcher. Then Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
Graciano sold his part of the property to Patricia Natcher. and special proceedings, in this wise:
o Later, Graciano died. His heirs being Patricia Natcher and
the 6 children. "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
Civil Case was filed in the RTC of Manila. Wherein the private enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
respondents (6 children) alleged that upon the death of Graciano, a wrong.
Patricia Natcher through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery
acquired the property by making it appear that Graciano executed a "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
Deed of Sale in favor of her. government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
o Natcher averred she was legally married to Graciano rules prescribed for a special civil action.
making her a compulsory heir. She further alleged that
during Gracianos lifetime, he already distributed, in
"XXX
advance, properties to his children, hence, respondents
may not anymore claim against the estate of Graciano.
o RTC said: The Deed of Sale in favor of Natcher is null and "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
void. establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of Natcher.
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or The trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. Hence, the decision of
fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required the CA is affirmed.
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." Hernandez vs Rural Bank 81 SCRA 75

According to American Jurisprudence: Facts:


"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the Spouses Hernandez obtained a loan secured by real estate from
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, Rural Bank (1961) a sum of 6ooo payable on 1962
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not - 3 months after they loan the bank became distresses
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to and later was suspended to operate by Monetary Boars in
some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without its resolution No. 928
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore The bank filed with CFI Manila a complaint for seeking to restraint
be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, the implementation of the Resolution
such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or Hernandez before the expiration of the term of loan went to bank
motion upon notice." and offered payment by means of check drawn against the bank by
depositor San Pablo Colleges payable to Hernandez
Applying these principles, matters relating to settlement of the estate of a -payment was not consummated and check was
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, dishonored because the banks operations was suspended
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires - Hernandez after several requests to offer payment finally
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. mailed the same check he presented to the bank and
request to cancel the loan
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to Monetary Board decided to liquidate the bank.
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any Meanwhile, CFI Manila rendered decision restraining the
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the enforcement of MB Resolution 928 and required the bank to
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be undertake reorganization and curtail its operation
binding. - Central Bank (CB) appealed the decision before SC
- Sc reversed the decision of CFI manila and dismissed
The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, the complaint for injunction
is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of CB filed a petition before CFI MANILA for liquidation of bank
advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher. The and it was granted
RTC of Manila Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
- Among the receivables of bank was the account of liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent.
Hernandez In this case Hernandez files a separate action in CFI LIPA and not in the
- Hernadez went to bank requested to cancel the liquidation bank which is CFI MANILA.
mortgage and claimed that he already paid it
- CB claimed that no payment was made because the THEREFORE, Venue is improper and the separate action filed therein is not
check cannot be honored because the bank was allowed and the REMEDY available for Hernandez was to intervene in the
already closed when it received the check and Liquidation Proceedings in CFI MANILA.
advised to settle it in cash
Hernandez disregarded it and filed separate action in CFI Lipa to * Sorry cant really see the connection of this case with Rule 1. This
compel the bank to accept the check and cancel the mortgage case is about jurisdiction.
and ask for damages.
CB filed motion to dismiss contending: G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993
- that the venue is improper because the
encumbered property was situated in QC thus JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner,
the case should be filed in QC vs.
- since bank is under liquidation his assets are Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First
under custodial egis and may be reached only Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES
by motion or petition in CFI MANILA (the COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J.
liquidation Court) ELUMBA,respondents.
MD was denied
CFI LIPA ordered the bank to accept the check and pay the
damages
Rural Bank went to SC to appeal the decision arguing that: Facts:
- Venue is improper
- CFI MANILA has Jurisdiction over the claim Petitioner PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA entered into an
oral contract of lease for an indefinite period (P150.00 per month) of a
RULING: VENUE ISSUE: the complaint of cancellation of real estate
commercial space in Ozamiz City.
mortgage is a personal action because the mortgagee has not foreclosed
the mortgage. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (a)). When the action is personal
plaintiff may file the action in his residence or defendants residents at the P subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a partition wall
election of plaintiff. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (b)). HOWEVER in this case in between. He then took possession of the other half, allegedly with Jose
Elumbras consent.
BATANGAS was the domicile of Hernandez and their actual residence is in
QC. The term resides in Rule mentioned refers to place of actual residence
not domicile. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City
R instituted an action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the
SEPARATE ACTION FILED ISSUE: It is not maintainable because it is period of lease at five (5) years.
provided that if there is judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank all claims P moved for its dismissal
against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings. Judicial

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
action was a real action, jurisdiction is with the Court of Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED.
First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz
City where the property in question was situated. Erminita Munoz v. Victoriano Yabut
Motion to Dismiss DENIED (case merely involved the enforcement
of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the CA.
property, there was no question of ownership raised hence, venue The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she sold to her sister
was properly laid Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses
P filed MOR but was also Denied defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the
highest bidder at the auction and the property was sold to the Chan
spouses.

Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with the RTC for
SC - P filed petition for prohibition
annulment of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT in the spouses
Gos names and for revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the
PADERANGA - inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the annotation of a lis pendens.
portion surrendered to P, being a real action, venue is laid in the court
having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies. The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and Munoz was driven out of the property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a
ELUMBA - present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of
breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but it was dismissed.
merely incidental.
The RTC rendered its judgment against Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It
found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of sale was forged.
ISSUE: WON CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City has
Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and that the Go spouses
jurisdiction over the case
were not innocent purchasers for value. The sale was null and void.

HELD: NO. Emilia Ching appealed the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed
the decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their successors in
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for interest to vacate the premises.
recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The
instant action therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and After the RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment, the
prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent motion to stop the
portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the execution against them. They asserted ownership and possession on the
ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of basis of a clean title registered in their names, also contending that the final
possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real judgment cannot be executed against them as they were not parties to the
property, such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce case and that they purchased the property from BPI without any defects to
be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part the title.
thereof lies (Ozamiz City)

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Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim and notice of lis Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the RTC orders holding
pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to transfer and registration that the Chans right to due process was vitiated by impleading them only at
from Go, to BPI then to the Chans. the execution stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil case
was null and void, and considering they are strangers to the case and they
It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT could hardly be are innocent purchasers for value.
regarded as proof that Munozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
were missing from the original, also pointing out that the registration in the Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt with the RTC against the Chan
day book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world. There was no more spouses and Atty. Yabut. Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of
need to annotate the title. They were deemed to have taken the property execution and application for surrender of the owners duplicate TCT, in
subject to the final outcome of the present dispute. which she prayed to direct the RD not only to cancel the TCT of Go, but all
documents declared null and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens
The RTC then issued an alias writ of execution and the subject property was and encumbrances.
taken from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied. In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt, but ordering an
alias writ of execution to deliver the property to Munoz, ordering Go to
Munoz then instituted a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for vacate. It also ordered the RD to cancel from the records all documents
preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed men, determined void and to restore Munozs TCT.
Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of possession.
Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing out that the
They claim Chan to be the true owner that his possession was never spouses Chan are the present occupants and that the property could not be
interrupted, and the men were there to attend services at the Buddhist delivered unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was denied
Temple on the fourth floor of the building on the property. Munozs claim of reiterating the rule that once a judgment has become final only clerical errors
forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and legal basis. may be corrected.

The MeTC granted Munozs petition and restored possession to her. Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was remanded to the CA in
observance of the hierarchy. The CA dismissed Munozs petition agreeing
Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through a petition for with the RTC that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of
certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil case.
RTC. They asserted that they were not bound by the final judgment between
Go and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the MeTC order was Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case binds not only Ching, the Go
an interlocutory order, and is thus a prohibited pleading under the rules of spouses and BPI, but their successors in interest, assigns or persons acting
summary procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to on their behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for
enjoin the implementation of the MeTC order. value.

The RTC found that the MeTC had committed grave abuse of discretion for Ruling
not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens
as the issue to who had a better right to possession between Chan and The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion for clarificatory
Munoz was the subject of a pending proceeding. The RTC dismissed the order seeking that the Chans be executed against because the prior civil
ejectment suit. case against Go is an action for reconveyance which is an action in

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
personam. Since the Chans and BPI were not impleaded as parties, the o That La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make
effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again.
alias writs of execution. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to o The act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss
judgment rendered to the court. of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists
because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that
Although the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard
determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had. Munoz cannot o And that its permanent closure would not only prejudice
collateraly attack the title that the Chans have; they must be given their day their right to free and unhampered use of the property but
in court in a proceeding designated for that purpose. would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
JCHA prayed for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary
G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, from stopping and intimidating
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners,
them in their use of La Paz Road.
vs.
RTC issued a TRO for a period of 20 days and a WPI, to stop
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., Respondents
preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and
motorists from using the La Paz Road.
Facts:
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss.
o Arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
On January 20, 1999, Petitioner (JCHA), together with individual and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration.
(collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying the motion to dismiss
damages in the RTC of Binan, Laguna, in its own behalf and as a and motion for reconsideration.
class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of
Fil-Estate filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived
o They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause
of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-
of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
Estate).
CA affirmed the denial of the RTC of the motion to dismiss.
o The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular
o CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards
action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that
the direction of Manila and Calamba, used the entry and
they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10)
exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by
years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate
passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz
closed and excavated the road.
Road.
o It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly
o They had been using La Paz Road for more than 10
filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
years.
common interest and that the individuals sought to be
o That in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and
represented were so numerous that it was impractical to
deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so
include all of them as parties.
JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said
Hence, this petitions for review.
road;

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Fil-Estate explains that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is
land covered by TCTs all registered in the name of La Paz. determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the
The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a defendant.
passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or
which was the Juana Complex I. essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the
spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters
Complex I to the Municipality of Bian. aliunde are not considered.
The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to public The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
roads and were opened for use of the general public. constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
The La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with
excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a the prayer of said complaint.
shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to develop several real Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
properties in Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz contributed some of its real same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may
properties to the Municipality of Bian, including the properties be asserted by the defendant.
constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project. In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the
Fil-Estate insists that the complaint did not sufficiently contain complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action.
the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a
They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an demandable right over La Paz Road.
allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading. These are:
o (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their
Issue: Whether the complaint states a cause of action. allegation that they had been using the road for more than
10 years; and
Held: Yes. o (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted
over the said roads.
o There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as
the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route
an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) may use.
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-
Estate, when they excavated the road and prevented the
1. the legal right of the plaintiff, commuters and motorists from using the same.
Third, JCHA, consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment
2. the correlative obligation of the defendant, and could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal therein.
right.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Sub-Issue: Whether the complaint was properly filed as a Class Suit. have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying
their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
Held: Yes. claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals
follows:
claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian,
Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join PNB vs Court of Appeals
all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to
be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION OF THE CA
protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend WHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES
for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest. FACTS:

Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUG


The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
mortgaged several parcels of land situated in Pampanga, the
property served as a guarantee for the loan granted by PNB
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to
o LOAN TO Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani
many persons;
In 1963, MONTEMAYOR also mortgaged 2 parcels of land to
guarantee the loan of her son VITUG
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them The TCTs mortgaged were all in the name of Donata
all to court; and MONTEMAYOR
VITUG failed to pay, and the properties were foreclosed and sold at
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or public auction
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all o Jaramilla and Bacani also failed to settle the loan
concerned. o Cert of Sale was issued to PNB
o PNB later on sold the properties
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and HISTORY
motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: o Clodualdo Vitug was married twice, his second wife is
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the MONTEMAYOR
closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially o He died intestate (with no will) and his estate was settled
shown to be of common or general interest to many and distributed
persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals

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MONTEMAYOR was the administratix (meaning, o PNB was only included because the subject properties
the court made her the administer the estate of were sold.
Clodualdo) A mortgaged property should be in the name of
MONTEMAYOR entered a contract of the mortgagee, because the assumption is the
lease with two of her children mortgagee will be in default (eventually). The
o But then the other children filed an action for partition and property is a security for the payment of the loan.
reconveyance and damages against the administrator of PNB relied on the Torrens title, why would they
MONTEMAYORS estate (by this time Montemayor even question the validity of the titles? The titles
already passed away) were in the name of MONTEMAYOR. Therefore,
o They also included PNB in the action, because PNB they dont have to look beyond the title.
sold the mortgaged properties Actions for the recovery of real property and for partition ARE
THE SUBJECT of the action is 30 parcels of REAL ACTIONS, but they are also actions in personam that
land, which they claim to be CLODUALDOs and bind particular individuals who are parties thereto.
MONTEMAYORS o PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by said
They argue that decisions
o The mortgage to PNB as well PNB was also not aware of the case and the said
as decision, because of they knew the conjugal
o The PUBLIC AUCTION are null nature of the property, they would have required
and void. the consent of all the heirs (co-owners).
They invoke a previous court decision WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
wherein the properties were decided to hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
be of conjugal nature. DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay
1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Reversed lower court decision stating
that the public auction of the properties
are valid, but only HALF. MANILA HOTEL V CA (384 SCRA 515) a petition for review on certiorari
SO NOW, PNB filed a petition for
FACTS:
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a party to action for reconveyance and
Alcordo was hired by petitioner Manila Hotel on March 23, 1998 as
damages? Food and Beverage Director however, his services were terminated
on the ground of loss of confidence
HELD: NO.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
Remember that there was a previous decision stating that the illegal dismissal on the ground that Alcordo, was hired not only to
parcels of land are of conjugal nature oversee the operations of the restaurants but precisely to improve
o PNB cannot be a proper party thereto. their profitability. Hence, the failure of private respondent to meet
this condition despite regular monthly evaluation by petitioner,

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
showing the substantial drop in the profitability of the department the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment
under his control, justified his dismissal for loss of confidence. is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;
- Petitioner was ordered to pay private respondents one
month salary of P80,000.00 in lieu of the 30-day advance (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
notice of dismissal, plus an indemnity of P5,000.00 for its
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the
failure to comply with procedural due process
sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the
Petitioner appealed to (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the
injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree
Labor Arbiter
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
-It ruled that petitioner failed to prove that Alcordo was
prescribed
hired subject to the condition that he would improve the profitability
of the restaurants, and that the unsatisfactory performance of said
Oversight have become an all too familiar and ready excuse on the
restaurants was due to the fault or negligence of Alcordo
part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with established
A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. rules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict
Appeals adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be
- CA dismissed the petition on the following grounds: 1) the relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and
petition was not accompanied with copies of the decision substantial justice.
of the Labor Arbiter and the position paper of the parties;
2) the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by THEREFORE, In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown any cogent
Atty. Martin B. Isidro, petitioners counsel and Assistant reason for the Court to be liberal in the application of the rules.
Vice-President, Personnel Department; and 3) the petition
was not accompanied with a board resolution authorizing G.R. No. 146611 February 6, 2007
Atty. Martin B. Isidro to act for and in behalf of petitioner.
MR was filed with documents that was not attached in petition and TANCREDO REDEA, Petitioner,
claimed that failure to attached those documents was due to vs.
oversight. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEA, Respondents.
- CA denied MR stressing that under Rule 46, Section 3, in
relation to Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Facts:
Procedure, failure to append copies of relevant documents
is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
CFI San Pablo City, Laguna
Hence, petition for review on certiorari praying for a liberal
petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition of their common
interpretation of the rules of procedure
fathers several pieces of realty, to wit: a residential lot at M. Calim
Street, Famy, Laguna; a riceland at Poroza, Famy, Laguna; and
RULING: Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by
another parcel of land at Maate, also in Famy, Laguna, against his
SUPREME Court in the following cases:
older half-brother, herein private respondent Leocadio
(1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or Court ordered Leocadio to partition only the property located at
miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that Maate, Famy, Laguna

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P filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal - The court gave due It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally construe and
course to the notice and directed the elevation of the records of the even to suspend the rules, presupposes the existence of substantial rights in
case to the CA whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CA- favor of which, the strict application of technical rules must concede. The
G.R.CV No. 59641. facts are borne out by the records pertaining to petitioners purported
undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna, and the
CA property in Poroza clearly showed that these two properties had been
no appellants brief filed within the extended period, CA considered subject of an agreement (Exh. "1") whereby petitioner recognized
the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same. respondents rights to said properties. This fact binds this Court, there being
After 8 months, P filed a motion for reconsideration thereof - CA nothing on record with the trial court as to the herein alleged fraud against
denied the motion the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed substantial rights
P filed a Petition for Relief praying CA to set aside its dismissal, claimed by the petitioner with the court below, the Court finds no cogent
reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of forty-five (45) basis to favorably rule on the merits of the appeal even if it may be given
days from notice within which to file his appellants brief. Denied due course which is indispensable to justify this Court in considering this
P filed special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 case as an exception to the rules.
Rules of Civil Procedure to SC
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Issue: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED.
for Relief
Tesorero v. Mathay
Held : NO
Facts
In Hagonoy Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
This is a petition for review on certiorari, with a prayer for a restraining order,
G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002, then Associate Justice, now Chief
seeking the annulment of the decision of the Board of Energy (BOE).
Justice Reynato S. Puno, reminded us that
Davao Light and Power (DALIGHT) filed an application with the BOE for the
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the approval of the sound value appraisal of its properties and equipment in
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object service. The first appraisal for 339M was made by Technical and
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive Management Service Philippines (TAMSPHIL), and was rejected by the
determination of every action and proceeding. Courts, therefore, BOE after hearings and an ocular inspection because the TAMSPHIL
not only have the power but the duty to construe and apply President was a technical consultant of DALIGHT and there were
technical rules liberally in favor of substantive law and substantial discrepancies of serious proportion in the appraisal.
justice. Furthermore, this Court, unlike courts below, has the power
not only to liberally construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in DALIGHT again filed an application for approval and appraisal, this time
favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently conducted by Asian Appraisal Co. in the amount of 309M, but it was
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-making opposed by petitioners.
power by no less than the Constitution.

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The BOE constituted a team to conduct and ocular of DALIGHTs properties, CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN
equipment, books and papers related to the appraisal made by Asian, but REBOLLIDO, petitioners
only approved 282M as a fair and reasonable value. vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
Seventeen (17) days after receipt of the decision, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, but were denied, hence the instant petition with Davao Facts:
city as intervenors.

Issue - Is ceritiorari the proper remedy? Note: Pepsi Cola is the defendant while Pepsico is the Private
respondent.
Ruling
On August 7, 1984, (take note of the date) the petitioners filed
There is no question that certiorari is not the proper remedy in this case. The Civil Case for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the
BOE charter provides for an appeal to the Office of the president within Philippines, Inc. (Pepsi Cola) and Alberto Alva before the Regional
seven (7) days from the receipt of a decision or orders. After, final decisions, Trial Court of Makati.
orders, awards or resolutions of all quasi-judicial bodies other than those o The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1,
specifically excepted are reviewable by the IAC. 1984, (take note of the date) involving a school bus
owned and driven by petitioners, and a truck trailer owned
In the broader interest of justice this Court has given due course to this
at that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by Alberto Alva.
petition, although the proper remedy is appeal and since litigations should,
The sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the
as much as possible be decided on their merits not on technicalities. The
defendants.
records also indicate that this case will not only affect herein petitioners, but
It was received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to
also the consumers of Davao.
be the authorized person receiving court processes as she was the
It is well settled that this Court cannot substitute its judgment or discretion for secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
that of the BOE whose decisions and determinations particularly on matter of Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in
fact carry great weight. But, it is equally accepted that exhaustion of default.
remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of The lower court heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the
exception, as when the question litigated upon is a purely legal one the rule defendants jointly and severally liable for damages.
may be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable When the default judgment became final and executory, the
damage. petitioners filed a motion for execution, a copy of which was
received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by private
respondent PEPSICO, Inc.
At that time, the private respondent was already occupying the
RULE Rule 2, Secs. 1 to 6 place of business of Pepsi Cola.
Private respondent, a foreign corporation organized under the
G.R. No. 81123 February 28, 1989 laws of the State of Delaware, USA, held offices here for the
purpose, among others, of settling Pepsi Cola's debts, liabilities and
obligations which it assumed in a written undertaking executed on

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June 11, 1983, preparatory to the expected dissolution of Pepsi Held: Yes.
Cola.
The dissolution of Pepsi Cola as approved by the Securities and The petitioner posits:
Exchange Commission materialized on March 2, 1984, (take note o It is Pepsi Cola which is the real party in the case before
of the date) one day after the accident occurred. the trial court because when the accident happened on
Respondent PEPSICO opposed the motion for execution and March 1, 1984 or one day before the date of legal
moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. dissolution, Pepsi Cola was still the registered owner of
The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of the truck involved.
summons to a mere clerk. o Being solidarily liable with its driver for damages under
Lower court denied the motion of the private respondent holding Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, there appears to
that despite the dissolution and the assumption of liabilities by the be no question that the complaint and summons were
private respondent, there was proper service of summons upon correctly filed and served on Pepsi Cola.
defendant Pepsi Cola. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that:
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with CA to annul and set aside the judgment of the Parties in interest - Every action must be prosecuted and
lower court and its order denying the motion to vacate the defended in the name of the real party in interest. ... .
judgment, for having been issued without jurisdiction.
CA granted the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
S.C. states that a real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a
ruling that there was no valid service of summons.
legal right while a real party in interest-defendant is one who has a
o The appellate court stated that any judgment rendered
correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal
against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is a "liability" of the
rights of the former.
private respondent within the contemplation of the
For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the
undertaking, but service of summons should be made
real party in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the
upon the private respondent itself in accordance with
petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the truck
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued,
o It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that
Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party
the private respondent be summoned and be given its day
involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another.
in court.
The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against
Pepsi Cola.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. o A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
Hence, this petition for review. and its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or
Issue: Whether Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
interest to whom summons should be served in the civil case for
damages.

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The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has Baliwag filed a complaint for damages against the Philippine National
ceased can still be made a party to a suit. Under paragraph 1, Railways, which was held liable for its negligence in a decision rendered on
Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation: April 6, 1977, by Judge Benigno Puno. Hughes was absolved of any
contributory negligence.
...shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for
Hughes claims that soon after the decision against the PNR, he had his
three (3) years after the time when it would have been so
driver's license renewed and then sought reinstatement with Baliwag Transit.
dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
He repeated his request several times even after the dismissal of the
suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its
criminal case. He then decided to seek the assistance of Minister Ople, who
affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to
wrote the petitioner on April 24, 1980, and "implored" the private
distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing
the business for which it was established. respondent's re- employment. As this request was also ignored, Hughes
finally demanded his reinstatement on May 2, 1980. On May 10, 1980, the
petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstated because his driver's
In the case at bar, the right of action of the petitioners against
license had already been revoked and his driving was extremely dangerous
Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the complaint
to the riding public."
was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of
action accrued, on March 1, 1984 which is the date of the accident CIV PRO FACTS
and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong.
The private respondent's reaction to this rejection was to file on July 29,
G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989 1980, a formal complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, illegal dismissal against the petitioner, with a prayer for his reinstatement
vs. with back wages from May 10, 1980.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, and ROMEO
HUGHES, respondents. On January 22, 1981, the complaint was dismissed by Director Francisco L.
Estrella, National Capital Region, on the ground of prescription, "it appearing
The petitioner is a duly organized corporation with a valid authorization from that although the private respondent was separated from the service on 10
the Board of Transportation to operate a bus line. The private respondent August 1974 (date of the accident), it was not until 29 July 1980, or a little
was hired by it in 1966 and continued serving therein as a bus driver until the less than 6 years thereafter, when he filed the complaint."
incident in question, when he was relieved of his duties.
The regional director was, however, reversed by Minister Ople in his order
The incident occurred on August 10, 1974. Romeo Hughes was driving dated May 21, 1981.
Baliwag Transit Bus No. 1066 when it was stalled at the railroad crossing in
The question that has to be settled is the date when the cause of action
Calumpit, Bulacan, because the vehicle ahead of it had stopped owing to a
accrued and from which the period shall commence to run.The contention of
jeep that was making its way into a garage. As thus positioned, the bus was
Baliwag is that it should be August 10, 1974, when the collision occurred.
hit at its rear end by an onrushing train of the Philippine National Railways
Hughes insists it is May 10, 1980, when his demand for reinstatement was
that dragged it several meters.
rejected by the petitioner.
Eighteen passengers died and fifty six others suffered serious physical
SC said Hughes is correct its May 10, 1980.
injuries.

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It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, (1) a Corazon and his brother Gonzalo co-owned a property
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it - They obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to the Philippines (DBP) and as collateral, they executed a
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of DBP.
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. - They failed to pay their amortizations.
- DBP foreclosed the real estate mortgage on September
We hold that the private respondent's right of action could not have accrued 15, 1983. Purportedly, no redemption was made within
from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August 10, 1974, as one year, and thus, DBP consolidated ownership over the
he was not considered automatically dismissed on that date. At best, he was subject property.
deemed suspended from his work.
Corazon died her sole heir was her daughter respondent
Cristina who asserted ownership over the subject property to
There was no apparent disagreement then between Hughes and his
the extent of one-half thereof
employer. As the private respondent was the petitioner's principal witness in
- However she discovered that the property was
its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, we may
already registered as early as June 13, 1989 in the
assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of terms when
name of DBP
the case was being tried.
Cristina filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
We agree with the private respondent that May 10, 1980, is the date when of Dagupan City a complaint for reconveyance, quieting of title
his cause of action accrued, for it was then that the petitioner denied his and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
demand for reinstatement. (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent DBP from
conducting any auction sale on the subject property during the
Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right pendency of the case
of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also an act or - RTC granted the TRO
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right the cause of action - DBP moved to lift the TRO arguing that it violates
does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to Section 2of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 385which
comply with its duty. prohibits the issuance of a restraining order,
temporary or permanent, against government
Hughes's complaint was filed not later than three months only after such financing institutions like DBP to enjoin any action
rejection, there is no question that his action has not prescribed. taken pursuant to the mandatory foreclosure clause of
the decree.
- Motion was denied and granted respondents plea for
an injunctive writ.
- DBP moved to reconsider the Order and at the same
DEVELOPMENT BANK v CASTILLO GR 163827 a petition for review on time sought the dismissal of respondents complaint
certiorari under Rule 45 on the sole ground that the same states no cause of
action
FACTS: - December 23, 1998, the writ of preliminary injunction
was issued

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- RTC denied DBPs motion for reconsideration of the Hence an appeal was filed before SC. DBP claimed that it is
denial of its motion for the lifting of the TRO and evident from the face of the complaint that respondent failed to
DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered state a cause of action.
DBP to file an answer.
- DBP moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to RULLING: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
dismiss. But even before the RTC could resolve said a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains
motion, DBP filed its Answer three essential elements:
- A manifestation was later filed by DBP indicating that
the answer it filed was a mere cautionary measure or (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it
what is known as an answer ad cautelam and thus arises;
without prejudice to any right of action it may take and
without any waiver of any of the grounds for the (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and
dismissal of the complaint and any favorable
resolution or order that a superior court may issue (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If
hereinafter any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
- the RTC issued an order denying DBPs motion for motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
reconsideration of its denial and in the same time
emphasized that DBP already filed an answer thereby
All the above elements of a cause of action are alleged in the
rendering the motion to dismiss moot and academic.
complaint: (1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject property
DBP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the foreclosed premised on the fact that she is the sole heir of one of the owners
following issuances of the RTC: who is entitled to the right of redemption; (2) the correlative obligation of
- TRO against DBP enjoining it from proceeding with defendant DBP, as the foreclosing entity, to respect such right of
the scheduled auction sale of the disputed property; redemption; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
- Order denying its motion to lift the TRO and legal right, i.e., the act of DBP and its co-defendant Zarate to cause the
granting the respondents prayer for a writ of ostensible foreclosure of the subject property and the subsequent execution
preliminary injunction; of a deed of conditional sale between the defendants even prior to the lapse
- Order denying DBPs motion to dismiss and motion of redemption period to deprive respondents mother of her right over the
for reconsideration of the December 14, 1998 Order; property.
and
- Order denying DBPs motion for reconsideration of
the March 8, 1999 order. THEREFORE, Petition is denied.
CA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds.
- It held that the petition questioning the first three orders
was filed late as the petition should have been filed within G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939
60 days from receipt of the assailed orders and stated
that DBPs subsequent filing of its Answer to the
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
complaint rendered its motion to dismiss moot and
vs.
academic.

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ESTEBAN ICARAGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., YES.
INC., defendants-appellees.

On June 11 , 1930, defendant, with one Jacinto Figueroa executed a REM in SC


favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc a parcel of land in Pagil, Section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure which provides that a
Laguna. They also executed a promissory note for one thousand six creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a
hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614) as a security for the REMs payment. mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between
Promissors defaulted in the payment. enforcing such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim
before the committee and share it in the general assets of the
CFI estate. Under this provision, It has been uniformly held by this court
Plaintiff filed an action for the collection of the amount due on the that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he
note. waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
A writ of execution was issued and the provincial sheriff of Laguna The same rule applies under the Insolvency Law.
levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has
been mortgaged by Esteban Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff. But, even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law, we have still the
The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though
interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of not contained in any statutory provision, has been applied by this
execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court court in all appropriate cases.
of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the
mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had
already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent
1933. repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of
controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid
In consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old
plaintiff remained unsatisfied. maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be
twice vexed for one and the same cause). And it developed, certainly not as
Plaintiff instituted ANOTHER action to foreclose the mortgage an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon
Dismissed principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to
repeated and unnecessary litigations
Hence, this appeal at SC
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real
ISSUE: WON plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the
mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus,
mortgage was constituted as a security. an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties

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of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged buying the lots. Their motion was denied by the RTC, so they assailed the
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his denial on certiorari in the CA, which annulled the RTCs decision for being
remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon tainted with grave abuse and dismissing the civil case against Benelda.
would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case,
all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are The Chus, Cunanans and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise
again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his agreement. The RTC approved it.
remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages
attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and After, the Chus brought another suit against the Carloses and benelda,
are all under his right of election. seeking cancellation of the TCTs plus damages. They amended this
complaint to included the Cunanans.
Chu v. Cunanan The Cunananas and Benelda moved to dismiss mainly on the reason that
the action was barred by res judicata. The RTC denied the motions, holding
Facts
that the amended complaint stated a cause of action against all defendants;
The Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving that the action was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity
five (5) parcels of land in favor of the Cunanans stipulating that ownership of parties and subject matter with the prior case.
would remain with the Chus until complete payment and total compliance
On appeal the CA granted the petition for certiorari nullifying the RTCs
with the terms of the deed of sale with mortgage. Thereafter, the Chus
orders, ruling that the compromise agreement had ended the controversy
executed and SPA authorizing the Cunanans to borrow money from any
and that the filing of the case violated the rule against splitting of a cause of
banking institution and to mortgage the five (5) lots as security, then to
action, rendering the case subject to a motion to dismiss on bar by res
deliver the proceeds to the Chus net of the balance of the mortgage and
judicata. Hence, this appeal
downpayment.
Issue Was the case barred by res judicata, although Benelda was not
The Cunanans were able to transfer the title of the five lots in her name
a party to the compromise agreement?
without the knowledge of the Chus and to borrow money with the lots as
security without paying the balance of the price to the Chus. She later Ruling
transferred two of the lots to the Carloses and three to Cool Town Realty,
despite the annotation of a vendors lien on the last three lots. Petition denied. The compromise agreement was not limited merely to th
three lots sold to Cool Town, it included the two sold to Benelda as it would
The Chus commenced a civil case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance contravene the object of the civil case to enforce or rescind the deed of sale.
from the Cunanans. Five (5) years later they amended the complaint seeking
annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and the TCTs It was apparent that petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of
issued pursuant to the deed with damages. They impleaded Cool Town action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Realty and the RD of Pampanga. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suit, the purpose of
which is to avoid unduly burdening the courts. Their contravention of the
The Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate policy merited the dismissal of the case on the ground of bar by res judicata.
Development, so the Chus amended the complaint impleading Benelda.
Benelda filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming that the amended In order that res judicata may be invoked, the following requisites must
complaint stated no cause of action because they had acted in good faith in concur:

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
a. The former judgment must be final; in their favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of
b. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
subject matter or the parties; On November 18, 2000, respondent allegedly forcibly and
c. It must be a judgment on the merits; unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded
d. There must be between the first and second actions: the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the
a. Identity of parties road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested several tons of
b. Identity of subject matter milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.
c. Identity of cause of action On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed MTC in Sagay
Although Benelda was not made a party to the compromise agreement is City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary
inconsequential as they were deemed successors in interest of the Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages,
Cunanans. It has been held that absolute identity of parties is not a condition against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.
sine qua non for res judicata to apply because a shared identity of interest In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the
sufficed. As both actions involved the same properties the requisite of same Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent
subject matter was met, and it is obvious that there has been a final alleging:
judgment on the compromise agreement. Hence, the Chus are guilty of o That defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men
splitting their cause of action. They should not be allowed to make a single forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the
cause of action the basis of several suits. plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the
fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going
to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted
away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
G.R. No. 170916 April 27, 2007 o That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their
forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and
RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds.
Petitioners, NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR
vs. Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent materials taken away by defendants men. Religious icons
were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even
In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
file an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession o That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction
had occurred. of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the
fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without
Facts: any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the
New Civil Code.

CGR Corporation, claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of


1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the
public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental
sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and
even before the notarized separate 3 Fishpond Lease Agreements
Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
way of actual damages and such other amounts as proved use and occupation of the premises,
during the trial; attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render
2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of judgment for the defendant to recover his
P100,000.00 each as moral damages; costs. If a counterclaim is established, the
court shall render judgment for the sum found
3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of in arrears from either party and award costs
P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages; as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)

4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus
P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use
with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the
appearance fees. property" and attorneys fees and costs.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners complaint for It bears noting that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in
damages on three grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for
shopping. damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of
RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity. the premises.
o Holding that a complaint for damages may only be It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away
maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their
cases has been made." fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner
CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even
decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of
Hence, the present petition for review.
dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity
Issue: Whether Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages is between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights
considered as splitting of a cause of action. asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered
on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res
Held: No. judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it
may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: damages.
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry
SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the
court finds that the allegations of the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees.
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for
favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to
rent or as reasonable compensation for the res judicata in the former.

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Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of
those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused Cebu.
by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not
thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is hereby
G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985 required in favor of the defendant.

1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay


GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate
a) P10,000.00 as moral damages;
Estate of Susana Agustinvs.
b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU
c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by


the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated 2. With costs against plaintiff
demands an action to eject him was filed.
The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of execution
A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-appellant Agustin, was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real properties
as adiministrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, against belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff
defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu. to satisfy judgment.

Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immediately vacate the Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied.
place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00
representing arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V,
actually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy
Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of
Bacalans answer included a counter-claim alleging that the present action Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the
was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void from
bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff against the beginning for the following reasons:
the defendant, the latter suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual and
moral damages in the amount of no less than P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in
(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs)
concept of exemplary damages. In addition, defendant has been compelled
distributed thus:
to retain the services of undersigned counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless,
P10,000.00 as moral damages
malicious and frivolous claim and to protect and enforce his rights for which
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
he obligated himself to pay the further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees."
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees
which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu.
City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and
ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the
P150.00 as attorney's fees. plaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant and ruled:

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid cause of on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to
action. October, 1981;
- second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion
Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
appeal before the Court of Appeals. representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to
Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court January, 1982.
which granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he Private respondents opposed the action and filed motion to
seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment. dismiss for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec 19 of BP 129, the
regional trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of
the demand is more than P20,000 and although, the other
Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the
respondent was indebted in the amount of P10, 212.00, his
defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
jurisdiction of the court of origin?
respondent.
The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents)
SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of Flores appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court and maintains
P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being the that lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff- totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of
appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper the Interim Rules.
remedy.
- The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:
The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal,
cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since ... Provided, That where there are several claims or
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in causes of action between the same or different parties,
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
jurisdiction over the same. demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
Flores v Mallare-Phillips 144 SCRA 144 SCRA 377 an appeal by certiorari arose out of the same or different transactions. ...
Facts:
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Flores sued the respondents Binongcol and Callion for refusing to
pay him certain amount of money as alleged in the complaint: Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the
- first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum
P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and
costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that
for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
specifically alleged. pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there
- He argued that the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against
and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of which falls within its jurisdiction.
action arose out of the same or different transactions. THEREFORE, dismissal of complaint is legal.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the
[G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005]
permissive joinder of parties under the Rules of Court.
Ruling: YES PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER
BUNCAN, petitioners, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section and MARTINA GICALE, respondents.
33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is
Facts:
subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: A bus of Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander
Buncan, also a petitioner, hit the left rear side of the jeepney driven by
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or Crispin Gicale owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent
against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out herein. After hitting the jeep, Buncan sped away.
of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent
to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total
may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint,
only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance ofP13,415.00.
where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement
but the court may make such orders as may be just to from petitioners Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed refused.
or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest. RTC
R to filed a complaint for sum of money
P specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has
furnish the jurisdictional test and instead of joining or being joined in one jurisdiction over the case
complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount judgment is rendered in favor of the R
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
CA
P filed an appeal but was dismissed

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Ps MOR was also denied In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is,
P filed petition for review on certiorari to SC Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a
common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There
being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter have the same cause of action against petitioners.

YES, RTC has jurisdiction To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained
whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause
of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the
SC Petition DENIED first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the
same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since
action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the
the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same
court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit
transaction and that there are no common questions of law and fact common
and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such xxx
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection
money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.

The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action


Permissive joinder of parties requires that:
which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same
[8]
(a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of
transactions; whether respondents claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the totality
(b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among
defendants; and others, that where there are several claims or causes of action between the
(c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
Rules on jurisdiction and venue. the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.

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As previously stated, respondents cause of action against petitioners The petitioners claim the action for rescission and damages is a personal
arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be one and may be filed in the RTC of their residence, and that their second
the totality of the claims. cause for the recovery of possession, although a real action, may be joined
with the rest of their causes under Sec. 5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC.
Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent
Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit and found merit in the
Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all petitioners contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 is applicable.
other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value
of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos Meanwhile the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the Malolos RTC. In a
(P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant motion the respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial courts
case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 order. The motion was granted and the complaint was dismissed. It ruled
expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal that the principal action was a real one and should have been filed at the
Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, RTC of Paranque, where the subject matter was located.
1994.
Hence, the present recourse.
Sps. Decena v. Sps. Piquero
Issue Whether the venue was properly laid.
Facts
Ruling
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC.
After due consideration, we find and rule that Sec 5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC
The Decenas are owners of a parcel of land with a house located in does not apply. This is because the petitioners had only one cause of action
Paranque. They executed a MOA wherein they sold the property to the against respondents, namely, the breach of MOA upon the refusal to pay,
Piqueros through installments in pst dated checks. They stipulated to oblige and in turn over the property, as well as the house constructed upon it. The
themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of action for the rescission an reconveyance of property is a real action and
the MOA with the condition that if two (2) postdated checks bounce, the must therefore have been filed in the proper court where the property was
Piqueros would be obliged to return the property. located, in Paranque. Having filed the complaint at the RTC of Bulacan
venue was improperly laid; the trial court acted conformably with Sec 1(c),
Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC of Bulacan for the annulment of
Rule 16 of the ROC when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
the sale and recovery of possession with damages. They allege that they did
not transfer ownership because the first two checks issued to them were not
G.R. No. 153829 August 17, 2011
honored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced by cash.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA
and lack of jurisdiction over the subject property. Respondents aver that the represented herein by the incumbent Archbishop, Petitioner,
principal action for rescission of the MOA, and recovery of possession is a vs.
real action, not a personal one; hence, it should be brought to the EDUARDO SORIANO, JR., EDNA YALUN, EVANGELINA ABLAZA,
Paranaque RTC. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, being FELICIDAD Y. URBINA, FELIX SALENGA, REYNALDO I. MALLARI,
located in Paranque. MARCIANA B. BARCOMA, BIENVENIDO PANGANIBAN, BRIGIDA
NAVARRO, EUFRANCIA T. FLORES, VICTORIA B. SUDSOD,

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
EUFRONIO CAPARAS, CRISANTO MANANSALA, LILY MASANGCAY, o The appeal was dismissed because of their failure to file
BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR., MARTHA G. CASTRO and LINO TOLENTINO, the appeal memorandum.
Respondents.
When defendants elevated the case to the CA, their petition for
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x certiorari was not given due course for failure to file the same within
the extended period.
G.R. No. 160909
Hence, the decision ejecting the defendants from the premises
BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR., Petitioner, became final.
vs. The RCA filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA Execution, which the MCTC granted.
represented herein by the incumbent Archbishop, Respondent. Seeking to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and
the notice to vacate, Guinto filed the instant Petition for Injunction
Facts: with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the ejectment case at the
The RCA of San Fernando, Pampanga,claimed that it is the owner MCTC, some of the defendants therein, filed Civil Case against the
of a vast tract of land located near the Catholic Church at RCA for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title
Poblacion, Macabebe, Pampanga and covered by an OCT issued before the RTC of Macabebe, Pampanga.
by the Registry of Deeds of San Fernando on February 21, 1929. o They claimed that they are in actual possession of the
The RCA alleged that several individuals unlawfully occupied the land in the concept of owners and alleged that the OCT in
the name of RCA is spurious and fake.
subject land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.
Having no other recourse, the RCA filed an ejectment case, before
the MCTC of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga against the alleged The RCA moved to dismiss the case on grounds of noncompliance
intruders, the defendants. with a condition precedent, laches, and for being a collateral attack
Defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against on its title.
them because its title is spurious. RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
o They contended that the subject land belonged to the o Found that plaintiffs have a cause of action.
State, but they have already acquired the same by
acquisitive prescription as they and their predecessors-in- The RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
interest have been in continuous possession of the land denied.
for more than thirty (30) years. The RCA filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
MCTC ruled in favor of the RCA. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
o The trial court held that the OCT in the name of the RCA Filed an M.R. but was denied.
remains valid and binding against the whole world until it is Hence, this petition for review.
declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Defendants appealed to the RTC.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Issue: Whether the action for quieting of title and declaration of nullity of title an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on
filed by the defendants should be dismissed for violation of the rule an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
on joinder of actions. construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the
Held: No. President withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public
land and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy
of NSC.
The RCA submits that an action for quieting of title is a special civil
action covered by Rule 63, while an action for declaration of nullity Since certain portions of the subject public land were occupied by
of title is governed by ordinary rules. private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, MCFC, LOI
o It contends that these cases should have been dismissed No 1277 was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with MCFC for
for violation of the rule on joinder of actions under Section the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the
5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as subject land.
amended, which requires that the joinder shall not include When negotiations failed, petitioner ISA commenced eminent
special civil actions governed by special rules. domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC in the RTC
Such contention, however, is utterly bereft of merit. of Iligan City.
Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides that misjoinder of On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and
control of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however,
the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988.
Rule 3, Secs. 1 to 3 MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a
G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995 juridical person.
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY The trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss. The dismissal
vs. was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER "only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
CORPORATION be parties in a civil case."
Facts: Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order,
contending that despite the expiration of its term, its juridical
Petitioner, ISA, was created by PD 272 dated 9 August 1973 in existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic
in the Philippines. of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be
P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA.
counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration stating, among
10 October 1978, its term was extended for another ten years by other things, that the expropriation is not for public use but for
EO 555 dated 31 August 1979. private benefit.
The National Steel Corporation, NSC, then a wholly owned Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself order of dismissal of the trial court.

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The CA ruled that the action for expropriation could not prosper alleging that Travel Wide Associated Sales (TWA) and
because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its Trans World Airlines, Inc. had failed to comply with their
delegated authority to expropriate, had become ineffective as a obligations under Travel Pass '73 U.S.A., a package deal
result of the delegate's dissolution, and could not be continued in consisting of a TWA ticket to Los Angeles, New York and
the name of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Boston, in the United States, and hotel accommodations,
Solicitor General. for which the plaintiffs had made the corresponding
payment in Manila.
Issue: TWA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
W/N the Republic is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the the complaint did not state a cause of action,
expiration of ISA's term RTC ordered the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and
particularize their averments. The Plaintiffs complied.
Held: TWA and Trans world move to dismiss on the ground that
Yes, the Republic is entitled to be substituted for ISA in the the amended complaint still did not state a cause of
expropriation proceedings. action- denied by RTC holding that the allegations were
now "sufficiently particular
Ratio: TWA and Trans wold filed a joint answer in which they
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or alleged the special defense that they were not the real
delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a parties-in-interest because they had acted only as
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of agents of a disclosed principal
powers and attributes which are compendiously described as "legal Subsequently, they filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary
personality." Hearing of Special Defense, which was opposed by the
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in Plaintiffs on the ground that the special defense was
its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the barred, not having been raised in the two motions to
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. dismiss the amended complaint- motion was nevertheless
272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and granted.
for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA. After the preliminary hearing, Judge. Fernandez issued his
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the order dismissing the complaint
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation MR was denied
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of Case was elevated to the CA- reversed the trial court and ruled that
ISA having expired. petitioner should have pleaded the special defense that they were
not real parties-in-interest in their motion to dismiss, conformably to
the omnibus motion rule. Not having done so, they are deemed to
Travel Wide Associated Sales vs. CA, 199 SCRA 205 have waived that ground, which therefore could not be used as the
basis of the motion to dismiss.
FACTS: Sc- Petinvoke Rule 16, Section 1, of the Rules of Court and argue that
"the defense of not being a real party-in-interest" is not one of the
Decision Systems Corporation and its President, Manuel A. Alcuaz, grounds enumerated therein for a motion to dismiss. Consequently, they
Jr., filed a complaint in the RTC-Mla

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
could not have pleaded it in their motion to dismiss but only in their MARINELA all surnamed RALLA, and COURT OF
answer as a special defense. APPEALS, respondents.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are real parties-in-interest? Facts:


RULLING: YES.
Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo and Pedro. The father apparently loved
A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the former but not the latter.
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Rule 3,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that "every action must be Probate Court
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in- interest." The Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving everything
party-in-interest is one who prosecutes or defends and is benefited or he owned to Pablo, to whom he said he had earlier sold a part of
injured. The term applies not only to the plaintiff but to the defendant, and his property for P10,000.00. Rosendo himself filed for the probate
the suit may be dismissed if neither of them is a real party-in-interest. If the of the will but pendente lite died on October 1, 1960.
suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party-in-interest, a On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an
motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no intestate proceeding.
cause of action. The last will and testament of Rosendo Ralla was allowed on June
7, 1982
The Court believes that the evidence, particularly the terms and conditions of On October 20, 1982, the disinheritance of Pedro was
the brochure distributed by the petitioners and the significance of the disapproved.
Miscellaneous Charges Order which was issued by TWApoves that CA
petitioners were not mere agents of a disclosed principal and so could be Pablo elevated the October 20, 1982 order to the Court of Appeals
held liable on the complaintand even the trial court observed the active In a decision dated July 25, 1986, CA Reversed the trial court and
participation of TWA in the promotion of the travel pass plan as an additional reinstated the disinheritance clause after finding that the requisites
source of revenue for its airline business. And even if the petitioners were of a valid disinheritance had been complied with in the will. The
indeed acting as agents of the passengers, as the brochure stipulates, they appellate court noted that Pedro had threatened to kill his father,
could still be held liable under Article 1909 of the Civil Code. who was afraid of him and had earlier sued him for slander and
grave oral defamation.
Therefore, the petitioners are real parties-in-interest as defendants in the suit
below, the motion to dismiss for lack of a cause of action should not have
SC
been granted.
Pedro assailed the July 25, 1986 order of CA - dismissed
MOR was denied with finality
G.R. No. 78646 July 23, 1991

RTC
PABLO RALLA, substituted by his wife and co-defendant CARMEN Pedro had filed on May 19, 1972, a complaint to annul the
MUOZ-RALLA, and his legal heirs, HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, BELISTA, transaction the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of
RENE RALLA-BELISTA and GERARDO M. RALLA, petitioners, Pablo over 149 parcels of land on the ground that it was simulated.
vs. declared the sale null and void
PEDRO RALLA, substituted by his legal heirs, LEONI, PETER, and

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
upon Pablos MOR, judge held the deed of sale to be valid. RTC:
CA
Upon Pedros appeal, reinstated the original decision invalidating Tanpingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with
the deed of sale. damages against Horca.
SC
Pablo elevated CAs decision Tanpingco was Horca's leasehold tenant over an agricultural
riceland.
Tanpingco was asked to desist from working on the land because it
ISSUE: WON sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo over 149
had been donated to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
parcels of land is valid
as a school site.
Petitioner claims he was being openly ordered to leave and ousted
NO.
in violation of law.
Petitioner is willing to accept disturbance compensation, but prays
The decision of the CA (previos case) approved the disinheritance to remain as a tenant.
of Pedro Ralla and the decision has long since become final. Since
then, Pedro Ralla no longer had the legal standing to question the
validity of the sale executed by Rosendo in favor of his other son The case was called in for pre-trial and Horca filed a motion to dismiss. He
Pablo. alleges that the complaint states no cause of action because he is no longer
The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or a party-in-interest having already donated the property. The motion was
injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. granted, while petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
"Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished IAC:
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect Finding no merit in the appeal the case was dismissed.
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an
action. Hence, the current controversy.
Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as
Ruling:
he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance
had rendered him hors de combat.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be
Reversed CA, complaint dismissed.
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to
this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party-in-interest,
G.R. No. 76225. March 31, 1992. or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered
therein.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, and The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or be injured by
the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
BENEDICTO HORCA, SR., respondents.

Facts:

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
If the suit is not brought against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss Petitioner House International Building Tenants Association, Inc.
may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (ASSOCIATION) is a domestic non-stock, non-profit civic
(Section 1 (g), Rule 16, Rules of Court). corporation, whose incorporators, directors and members
constitute the great majority of more than a hundred heads of
Hence, the resolution of the dispute hinges upon the determination of families who are tenants of long and good standing of the 14-
whether or not the private respondent is the real party-in-interest against storey House International Building located at Binondo, Manila.
whom the suit should be brought. The land and the improvements thereon were formerly owned by
Atty. Felipe Ang who mortgaged the same to the GSIS to secure
We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner
payment of an obligation.
should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the
After foreclosure of the mortgage and for failure of Ang to exercise
party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
his right of redemption over the foreclosed property, the ownership
Court of Appeals, a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in
thereof was consolidated with the GSIS which subsequently sold it
an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee
to CENTERTOWN in a deed of conditional sale, without notice
and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
to the tenants of the building and without securing the prior
the property donated.
clearance of the then Ministry of Human Settlements.
Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose As CENTERTOWN was not authorized by its Articles of
of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an Incorporation to engage in the real estate business, it organized a
incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from sister corporation, TOWERS, for the primary purpose of engaging
donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect in the real estate business.
the rights of the tenant. Subsequently, CENTERTOWN assigned to its sister corporation
TOWERS all its rights and obligations under the Deed of
Conditional Sale, with the consent and approval of the GSIS.
G.R. No. 75287 June 30, 1987
RTC: ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE.
ALLEGATION: DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE IS VOID FOR
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
BEING ULTRA VIRES.
petitioner-plaintiff,
o Petitioner filed a complaint against CENTERTOWN,
vs.
TOWERS and GSIS for THE ANNULMENT OF THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CENTERTOWN MARKETING
DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE and the subsequent
CORP., MANILA TOWERS DEVELOPMENT CORP., AND THE
assignment thereof by CENTERTOWN to TOWERS.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents-
o Alleged that the Deed of Conditional Sale is null and void
defendants.
ab initio for being ultra vires, since defendant
CENTERTOWN is not qualified to acquire real estate
RULING: THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ARE THE TENANTS NOT property or to engage in real estate transactions.
THE ASSOCIATION. o DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT.
o DENIED M.R.
Facts:
CA:
o AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
o DENIED M.R. ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," Petitioner, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner (the Association) has the personality to sue, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
on its own, as a corporation representing its members who are G.R. No. 164747
tenants of the House International Building. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner, vs. ALLAN C. GO, doing business
under the name and style "ACG Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO
HELD: NONE. and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents

For review is the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the
In the present case, the real parties in interest are the tenants of RTC of QC.
the House International Building and not the petitioner
ASSOCIATION, which has a personality separate and distinct from FACTS:
that of its members and therefore it has the capacity to sue and be
sued although it is composed of the tenants. Cordero is the vice president of Pamana Marketing Corp. He
Petitioner has not shown any real, actual, material, or ventured into the business of inter-island passenger vessels with
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. (Subject Robinson, an Australian based in Brisbane, Australia and is the
matter: Deed of Conditional Sale) managing director of Aluminum Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
In this connection, the Court of Appeals properly observed: o Robinson appointed Cordero as exclusive distributor of
AFFA fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. With every sale,
Appellant has sued in its name, but has not alleged any he will get a commission. Cordero offered for sale
right belonging to it that was violated or any wrong SEACAT 25.
that was committed. The reason is obvious, the benefits o Landicho and Tecson are lawyers of Go. Go is the owner
are not really meant for appellant but for the unnamed of ACG Express Liner in Cebu. Landicho, Tecson and Go
great majority" of its members who have allegedly been made negotiations with Cordero to purchase 2 SEACAT
tenants of long standing of the building in question. 25s. (Dont get confused with many names, basta si
CORDERO ang biktima dito, sila LANDICHO, TECSON at
GO ay mga kalaban)
And, quoting from the Brief for the respondent-defendant GSIS, the
o Cordero made trips to AFFA with Go and Landicho to
Court of Appeals further said:
monitor the building of the SEACAT 25. Cordero
shouldered all the expenses.
Assuming arguendo, that the tenants have the alleged o Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with
right, such rights of the tenants are personal and Robinson. Cordero tried to contact all of the respondents
individual rights which can only be claimed by the to clear the issue, but they were not answering.
tenants who must necessarily be the indispensable o Cordero flew to AFFA to clarify matters with Robinson but
and real parties in interest and certainly not the Go and Landicho were already there to negotiate sale of
plaintiff-appellant organization. the second SEACAT 25.
o Cordero wrote a letter to Go and informed him that dealing
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010 directly with Robinson violated his exclusive
distributorship. ACG Express Liner thru Go, executed

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations that Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
amounted to a breach of Corderos Exclusive and to transmit the records to the CA.
Distributorship. Petition for certiorari was filed with the CA.
o Robinson, in his defense, claimed that the appointment of o CA issued a TRO in the execution orders of the trial court.
Cordero was for one transaction only and that Cordero o CA granted the petition for certiorari.
was offered the exclusive distributorship but failed to o The trial court set aside their orders.
submit it within reasonable time. o Cordero appealed in a petition for review. DENIED.
o Landicho, Tecson and Go, in response to the letter, said o CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is
that they are willing to amicably settle. However, it never entitled to damages for the breach.
materialized. o Motion for reconsiderations were DENIED.
o Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs to Supreme Court: Petition for review under Rule 45 were filed by both
prohibit entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on parties.
misdeclaration and undervaluation. o According to Go (the relevant issue for CivPro):
Civil Case was instituted by Cordero to hold the 4 respondents for Cordero is not a real party in interest
conniving and conspiring to violate his exclusive distributorship,
thus depriving him of his commissions. ISSUE: Whether Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents
o AFFA cancelled the exclusive distributorship agreement. for breach?
o Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of RULING:
action. Denied.
According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is
o Robinson was declared in default for failure to file his
such party as the one to be benefited or injured by the judgment.
answer with the period prescribed.
o Go and Tecson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state
The purposes of this provision are:
a cause of action. Denied.
o Subsequently, they filed their answer, denying that they 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any
had anything to do with the termination of Corderos right, title or interest in the case;
authority to distribute exclusively. They averred it was
Cordero who was mishandling them in the perfection of 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one
the sale. to prosecute the action;
o Pre-trial was reset twice to give opportunity to reach a
settlement. 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and
o The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cordero.
Respondents filed a motion for new trial, claiming 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds,
that they were unduly prejudiced due to their pursuant to sound public policy.
counsels negligence. DENIED.
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
Respondents moved to reconsider and filed a
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a
notice of appeal. Both were DENIED. Notice of
cause of action.
appeal was denied for failure to pay docket fee.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that Cordero is the exclusive FACTS:
distributor. Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made
decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship. Golangco,(1995) as a complainant initiated a prosecution for libel
against the respondent Fung in RTC
Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised Corderos lack of personality to sue, Allegedly, the respondent had issued an office memorandum
they did so only before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana dated May 10, 1995 maliciously imputing against the petitioner
(Corderos Company) and not Cordero, who was appointed and acted as the commission of bribery and had sent copies of the
exclusive distributor for AFFA. We find no error committed by the trial court memorandum to the petitioners superiors in the POEA and to
in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to summons by other public officers and personalities not connected with the
publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam, POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner.
notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising After 6 years, the Prosecution presented only two witnesses
the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction (2001) the Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad
over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the testificandum be issued to and served on Atty. Oscar Ramos,
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel him to testify in
upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary the libel case
appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes The hearing of February 20, 2001 was, however, reset to May
a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based 23, 2001 due to the unavailability of Atty. Ramos.
on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have On Hearing day the Prosecution still failed to present Atty.
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been issued
to and served on him for the purpose.
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson RTC judge issued an order terminating the Prosecutions
specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal presentation of evidence
jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file Pet. went to CA on certiorari to assail the order and claimed that
an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing
summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the
appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his prior request for the
but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been
acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that
for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena
having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked again should it not be served in the first time.
the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner and dismissed the
additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts petition for certiorari
jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Hence , a Petition for review on certiorari was filed in SC
Court.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for
certiorari of the petitioner?YES

Golangco vs. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, SEpt. 8, 2009 Petition for review RULLING:
on certiorari

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
The gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner in the Court of in favour of one Gabriel Ching. Before the words "With my Marital Consent"
Appeals appearing in the REM is a signature attributed to Antonios wife Matilde.

The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in On October 5, 1998, Antonio executed an Amendment to the Real Esate
his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He ignored that the Mortgage (AREM) increasing the amount secured by the mortgage to P26
People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his Million, also bearing a signature attributed to his wife Matilde above the
objective being to set aside the trial courts order dated May 23, words "With my Marital Consent."
2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case The
omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary
Antonio died on December 26, 1999.
rejection of his petition for certiorari.
The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very RTC
least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari petitioner filed in a "Petition for Sale" for the extrajudicial
to the OSG prior to the filing. Pet. violated Administrative Code foreclosure of the AREM and the sale at public auction of the lot
which mandates the OSG to represent the Government in the covered thereby.
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff scheduled the public
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the auction on December 17, 2003.
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or On December 16, 2003, R filed a Complaint/Petition against
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which petitioner and the Clerk of Court-Ex Oficio Sheriff, for
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is annulment of the AREM, injunction with prayer for issuance of
a party. writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
and damages
Therefore, the trial judge did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in AREM is without force and effect, the same having been
issuing the assailed order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed executed without the valid consent of the wife of
the petition for certiorari. mortgagor Antonio C. Tiu who at the time of the execution
of the said instrument was already suffering from
G.R. No. 178529 September 4, 2009 advance[d] Alzheimers Disease and, henceforth,
incapable of giving consent, more so writing and signing
her name
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. (now known as BANCO DE ORO - EPCI,
The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of
INC.) Petitioner,
preliminary injunction.
vs.
P filed a Motion to Dismiss DENIED
HEIRS OF ANTONIO C. TIU, namely: ARLENE T. FU, MICHAEL U. TIU,
Ps MOR DENIED
ANDREW U. TIU, EDGAR U. TIU and ERWIN U. TIU, Respondents.

CA
Facts:
P filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with
prayer for preliminary injunction- DENIED.
Antonio C. Tiu (Antonio), executed on July 6, 1994 a REM in favor of
petitioner covering a lot located in Tacloban City to secure a P7 Million loan

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by respondents-children of Antonio, without The AREM was executed by Antonio, with the marital consent of Matilde.
impleading Matilde who must also be Antonios heir and who, along with Since the mortgaged property is presumed conjugal, she is obliged
Antonio, was principally obliged under the AREM sought to be annulled, is principally under the AREM. It is thus she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil
dismissible for lack of cause of action. Code vis a vis Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, who is the real party in
interest, hence, the action must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to
YES be benefited or injured in the action.

SC Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal guardian who


the petition is GRANTED. should file the action on her behalf. Not only is there no allegation in the
complaint, however, that respondents have been legally designated as
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on annulment of contracts reads: guardians to file the action on her behalf. The name of Matilde, who is
deemed the real party in interest, has not been included in the title of the
case, in violation of Sec. 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by
all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who
are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they G.R. No. 157830. November 17, 2005.*
contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, petitioner,
influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
vs. MARILOU M.
these flaws of the contract. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
PASCUAL, respondent.
Upon the other hand, the pertinent provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
(Parties to Civil Actions) read: Facts:

SEC. 2 Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands RTC:
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
Dante filed a civil case against his sister Marilou, for the annulment of a
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
TCT, Deed of Absolute Sale, and for the reconveyance of property with
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
damages.
party in interest. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Dante is a permanent resident of the U.S., who appointed Sagario
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be as his attorney-in-fact through an SPA.
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the caseand shall
be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee Marilou filed a motion to dismiss.
of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for There was non-compliance with requirement of the LGC that there
the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining must have been a confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the Pangkat, before filing a claim in court.
principal. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) There is no showing that the dispute was referred to barangay court

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
before the case was filed. except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
RTC granted the respondent's motion to dismiss. agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;....
Where real property or interest therein is involved, the dispute shall
be filed before the barangay where the property is located, In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held that where the parties
regardless of the residence of the parties. are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining
Ordinarily non-compliance with the condition precedent could affect barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the
the sufficiency of the cause of action and allow the complaint to be lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis-a-vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. [B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the
same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually
The court was of the opinion that the attorney-in-fact shall be reside adjoin each other. (Italics supplied)
deemed the real party in interest, he was therefore obliged to bring
the case before the barangay. To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as
SC: applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by
respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as
Dante elevated the case straight to the SC, questioning the "palpable legal defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-a-vis Section
errors' of the RTC. 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood
by respondent.
Petitioner argues that, he, not his attorney in fact is the real party in
interest, since he resides abroad, the lupon would have no In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an
jurisdiction. actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent
Ruling: resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior
referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.The
lupon of each barangay G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., Petitioners,
same city or municipality for
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, Respondents.
amicable settlement of all disputes except:

. RULING: PETITIONERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI.

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different 1. Have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
cities or municipalities, controversy.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
2. Failed to particularize how the implementation of specific Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco,
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
organization and members. Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de
3. There are other parties not before the Court with direct and Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for
specific interests in the questions being raised. certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
4. Did not show an actual or immediate danger of sustaining Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa
5. None of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical
direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of
Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by
Facts: their respective officers who are also bringing action on their own
behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
Petitioners RESPECTIVELY filed a PETITION FOR No. 178890.
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION BEFORE THE S.C. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL), Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
9372, the Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST),
other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern Tagalog Region, and individuals followed suit by filing a
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non- petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R.
concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari No. 178581.
and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
represented by their respective officers who are also bringing the Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554. Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Students, Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Teachers, Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
and Agham, represented by their respective officers, and joined by impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National
Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation,

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
elements. "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers.
ISSUE: Whether the various petitioners in this case has locus standi.
1. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the
HELD: NONE. (ALL OF THEM) outcome of the controversy.
o None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR,
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so allege that they have been subjected to "close security
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or offices monitored by "men with military build."
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
being challenged. the [S]tate."
A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. o Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of have yet to show any connection between the purported
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show
that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. Agham, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for
question, it must show that: the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing,
the National Peoples Army (NPA).
1. it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; proscription without following the procedure under the law. The
petition of BAYAN-ST, pleads the same allegations.
2. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
o The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
3. the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. petitioners.
o No ground was properly established by petitioners for the
taking of judicial notice.
IN THE CASE AT BAR:

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
o Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-
plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,
belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat 3. There are other parties not before the Court with direct and
emanating from the so-called tagging. specific interests in the questions being raised.
o The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR, o Of recent development is the filing of the first case for
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP proscription under Section 17 of RA 9372 by the
and NPA. Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial
Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.
2. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their o Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link
organization and members. to the Abu Sayyaf Group.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist 4. Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the
organization, the United States of America (US) and the European imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past
Union (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf rebellion charges against them.
Group as foreign terrorist organizations.
The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary o The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save
Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the the day for petitioners.
Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of o Those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another,
Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as Code.
domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. o Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by
Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment
From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much elements not having been altered.
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372. o Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA
by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, 9372.
Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan, urged the government to o It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the
resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of charged.
the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Petitioners IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their
Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration of sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render o To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine
assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest
shared by the general public.
o The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law 6. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual
does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its petitioners as taxpayers and citizens.
members with standing. o A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of
o The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional citizen standing must rest on direct and personal
rights and duties. interest in the proceeding.
o Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to o RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for
even a single arrest or detention effected under RA any appropriation from Congress for its implementation,
9372. while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged
any direct and personal interest in the implementation of
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have the law.
been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. o It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
establish locus standi.
o Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest
o Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
threat of being charged under RA 9372.
o Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator
Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite Rule 3, Sec 4 to 6 (Parties to a Civil Action)
their being respectively a human rights advocate and an
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON,
oppositor to the passage of RA 9372.
JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN,
o Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete
petitioners,
injury to them has been pinpointed.
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON,
5. Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. respondents.
Soliman Santos Jr. in also conveniently state that the issues they
raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled Facts:
early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any
specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on
or may be charged. certiorari
o Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda
nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with o They have three children but had been most of the time
locus standi. living separately
o Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger o Romarico bought a parcel of land in Angeles City from his
of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson
enforcement.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
o Meanwhile, in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an o alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because
agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and
to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale Yumul appeared solely for Katrina
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day The lower court issued an order restraining the Register of Deeds
period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value of Angeles City from issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer
Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check which, however, was Certificates of Title in favor of the winning bidders (Santos and
dishonored for lack of funds Joson)
o Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Upon motion of Romarico, the court issued a writ of preliminary
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City injunction enjoining the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case the land
o Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision holding
estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in that Romarico was indeed not given his day in court
payment of a pre-existing obligation o Pursuant to a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and the effect that the Court of First Instance or a branch
her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to try and decide an
money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court action for annulment of a final and executory judgment or
Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only order rendered by another court of first instance or of a
in behalf of Katrina branch thereof (Gianan vs. Imperial)
o Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino, The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
appeared for the defendants, it is not shown on record that o said court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court
said counsel also represented Romarico judgment had not attained finality as the decision
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions in favor of the Wongs, therein was not served on him and that he was
which ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the former not represented by counsel
A writ of execution was thereafter issued estoppel may not be applied against him as, not
o Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City covered by having been served with the decision
TCTs in the name of Romarico married to Katrina The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
The public auction sale was first set for October 30 but since said the appellate court but the same was denied for lack of merit
date was declared a public holiday, the sherrif reset the sale to Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari
November 11
The property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by
the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on account of the mortgage Issue: W/N Romarico Henson was guilty of laches and may not now
loan which they obtained form the bank belatedly assert his rights over the properties because he and Katrina were
o Santos and Joson were the highest bidders in the sale represented by counsel
Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision in as well
Ruling: No
as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale
therein in the same Court of First Instance. Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into
a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that business transaction
eventually resulted in the filing of the case, Romarico acted, or, as charged

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was not involved in the in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of
personal dealings of his estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00.
fact that the complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as Motion for the discharge of the attachment was filed by
the husband of Katrina. Lourdes- denied
she went up to CA on certiorari- ordered Trial Court to receive
Laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside from the fact evidence on whether or not the attachment had been
that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged wife, he was improvidently or irregularly issued
also not afforded an opportunity to defend himself The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the
attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and
There is no laches or even finality of decision to speak of with respect to consequently dissolved it.
Romarico since the decision in the case is null and void for having been RTC ruled in favor of defendant Lourdes.
rendered without jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements Sanchez filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on
prescribed by law appeal.
Pending approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano
Failure to notify Romarico may not be attributed to the fact that the plaintiffs
filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment
in the case acted on the presumption that the Hensons were still happily
which the CFI granted.
married because the complaint itself shows that they did not consider
The sheriff garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas
Romarico as a party to the transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita
Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property
Wong. In all likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and her
nominal party in the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of
husband, Daniel
the Rules of Court
Esther then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as Appeals, praying for the annulment of the execution pending
he has not yet had his day in court and, necessarily, the public auction sale appeal authorized by the Trial Court- dismissed.
is null and void. Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of Husband filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the
judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the CFI-QC in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership
judgment debtor He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made
to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife,
Mariano vs. CA, G.R. No. 151283, June 7, 1989 an appeal to decision of and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on,
CA such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in
the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution.
FACTS: He also applied for a preliminary injunction pending
adjudication of the case on the merits.
Esther Sanchez file a case against Lourdes Mariano in CFI- Lourdes moved to dismiss the complaint- denied
caloocan for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses She instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to
allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. th th
enjoin CFI QC-7 div. granted but the 8 div. dismissed
A writ of preliminary attachment was issued at Esther Sanchez' th th
Lourdes motion.(8 div decided the case cause Justice in 7
instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company th
was transferred to 8 he brought the case)

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
CA ruled that QC Court had not interfered with the execution THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and
process of the Caloocan Court because Daniel Sanchez's ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
action in the former court raised an issue-the validity of the
sheriffs levy on the conjugal partnership assets of the Sanchez Facts:
spouses different from those adjudicated in the Caloocan
Court, and Sanchez was not a party to the case tried by the 1
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision of the
latter. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the
Hence Lourdes filed the present petition in SC. motion for reconsideration thereof.
Lourdes contention: Her action against Esther Sanchez was justified, the
litigation being "incidental to the ... business in which she is engaged and The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was
liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business RTC Branch 19 Bacoor, Cavite
since the income derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
expenses for the maintenance of the family and the education of the (Erlinda)
children, had redounded to the benefit of the partnership. It was therefore Said action originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising
error for the CA to have rule that Husband is not bound by the decision of from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by
CFI Caloocan. petitioners.
Ordered Erlinda to pay damages.
RULLING:The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of
"stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. Whether by Appeals and this Court. It became final and executory on 5
intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is March 1992.
unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek TC issued a writ of execution
preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy
assets. For it being established, that Esther had engaged in business with the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real
her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had been property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of
expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the Cavite
conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January
be disputed. 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo
was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put
Therefore, CA decision is reversed and CFI-QC is ordered to dismiss the up a sheriffs indemnity bond.
case. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest
bidder.
G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
RTC Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a
vs. complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Respondent, alleged that the petitioners, connived and directly If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit
the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer
posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the
that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
sold at a "very low price" of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved
obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing
execution. the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the judgment originated and which issued the order of the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of from the date of the filing of the bond.
sheriffs sale.
dismissed respondents complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping
jurisdiction over the case. of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed.
MOR denied. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any
third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a
separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming
CA damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
Reversed the TC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
the complaint filed by appellant.
Petitioners MOR - denied on 23 August 2000. When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such
bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer
SC rule 65 is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented
Petitioner filed the instant petition attributing grave abuse of by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual
discretion on the part of CA damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
SC remedy should be appeal but SC decided on the case Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the
anyway. purpose. (Emphasis Supplied)

Issue: WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action,
action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution? the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
YES and Branch 21 has jurisdiction over the case seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse,
the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability
claim in the court that issued the writ.+ of the debtor-spouse.

This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit The civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other Erlinda coun NOT have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" partnership.

In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction
On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of
Discaya, the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to
action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is Branch 21 for further proceedings.
therefore justified in bringing an independent action to
vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
paraphernal property.lawphil.net Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the No. L-25916. April 30, 1970.
obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. GAUDENCIO A. BEGOSA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAIRMAN,
PHILIPPINE VETERANS

ADMINISTRATION;and MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF


ADMINISTRATORS,PHILIPPINE
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122
16
of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, defendants-appellants.
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to Facts:
the benefit of the family.
Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain benefits to which he believed
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by he was entitled to under the Veteran's Bill of Rights.
either spouse by reason of a crime orquasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the He filed a claim for disability, but it was erroneously disapproved
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not due to his dishonorable discharge from the military.
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal The PVA finally approved his claim entitling him to Php 30/month,
to begin on Oct 5, 1964.

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
CFI in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. As a matter of fact,
in an earlier case where we sustained the power of a private citizen claiming
Believing that his pension should have taken effect in 1955, and that he is title to and right of possession of a certain property to sue an officer or agent
entitled to a higher pension as an incapacitated person, he filed a case of the government alleged to be illegally withholding the same, we likewise
against the PVA. expressed this caveat: However, and this is important, where the judgment
in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
The PVA claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial
the case, because, in reality, this is a suit against the government liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against
and they invoke the non-suability of the state without its consent. the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly
The CFI ruled in Begosas's favor approving the back payments and entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government.
adjusted amounts.
The PVA elevated the matter to the SC on appeal. G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966
Ruling:
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
The fourth assignment of error assails what it considers to be the failing of vs.
the lower court in not holding that the complaint in this case is in effect a suit CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS,
against the State which has not given its consent thereto. We have recently defendants-appellees.
had occasion to reaffirm the force and primacy of the doctrine of non-
suability. It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the suit were in fact against RULING: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS CANNOT BE SUED, PROPRIETARY
the State, the lower court should have dismissed the coinplaint. Nor is it to FUNCTION (ARRASTRE SERVICE) IS ONLY AN INCIDENT TO
be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, ITS PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTION.
the defendant may in reality be the government. As a result, it is equally
well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the Facts:
public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property,
the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity,
4 cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S.
then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no
"Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.,
application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be
(Petitioner).
instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute
The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was discharged to
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the
the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the
present case.
Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein.
The doctrine announced by us in Ruiz v. Cabahug finds relevance: We hold The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, consignee 3 cases only of the shipment.
which should be taken on its face value the suit is not one against the CFI OF MANILA: RECOVER THE VALUE OF THE
Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel UNDELIVERED CASE PLUS DAMAGES.
them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending o Petitioner filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre
architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value
contending architects have established their respective rights and interests

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of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs
other damages. Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962.
o DEFENDANTS: MOTION TO DISMISS THE o It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under
COMPLAINT. the first two abovementioned categories of natural or
o ALLEGATION: not being persons under the law, juridical persons.
defendants cannot be sued.
o DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a
o DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUABLE. function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its
being suable.
PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE SC. o If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
CONTENTION: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IS DISCHARGING incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS AND AS SUCH, CAN BE SUED. thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to
such government entity.
ISSUE: Whether the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
can be sued. IN THE CASE AT BAR, The Bureau of Customs is part of the
Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from
HELD: No. that of the national government.

Cannot be sued, such proprietary function is but an incident to 2. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
its principal government function, thus, Bureau of Customs is collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff
immune from suit. and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties.

The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide: To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be
SECTION 1. Who may be parties.Only natural or juridical assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported
action. and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration
tallies with the merchandise actually landed.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person;
And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be
(2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued.
hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it
1. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function requires arrastre operations.
unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary
o They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
o The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department
of Finance; and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau o plaintiff has adopted a credit system known as the
liable to suit. American Express Credit Card
For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function o defendant applied for one such card to the plaintiff at the
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. latter's office in New York City
Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as Thereafter and before the card expired was cancelled as of June
to the necessary means to that end. 20, 1961 the defendant used it in making purchases and obtaining
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for services on credit in various foreign countries
obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its plaintiff made demands for payment upon the defendant, and after
consent. the latter refused to pay filed the presented suit for collection
Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General
Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which Issue: W/N plaintiff has no cause of action against him, not being a real
money claims against the Government may be filed. party in interest. (He alleged that American Express merely introduced him
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State to different establishment, who shouldve brought the suit upon his non-
immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of payment)
immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
Held: No
inferred.
From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease Ratio:
arrastre operations to private parties, Court sees no authority to sue
the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct With regard to the proper party filing the suit
said operation itself.
The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the This corporation pays for the purchase and the defendant has to reimburse
national government in the operation of the arrastre service, such payment to the owner of the credit card; in this case to the plaintiff
pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, On the same point the witness also stated that the charge orders of the
there being no statute to the contrary. appellant were in due course of business submitted by the establishments
concerned to the appellee for payment and paid by the latter. There can be
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, INC. v CIRIO H. SANTIAGO no doubt, therefore, that the appellee is the creditor of the appellant and as
such is the proper party to file this suit for collection
Facts:

This case is on appeal directly to this Court by the defendant from


With regard to Sec.20 Rule 24
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sentencing him
to pay the plaintiff
The appellant also objected to the admission of the aforesaid deposition as a
The plaintiff is a foreign corporation with main office in New York whole on the ground that the procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 24
City and a branch office in the Philippines which is duly registered was not followed, particularly that portion which states that the officer who
and licensed to transact business as a travel agent took the deposition shall "promptly file it with the court in which the action is
pending or send it by registered mail to the Clerk of Court thereof for filing."

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The non-compliance with this rule, according to the appellant, consists in the o Trial Court ruled in favor of Bulawan. Register of Deeds of
fact that it was the appellee's counsel who picked up the deposition from the Legazpi City is ordered to cancel the title.
Department of Foreign Affairs and delivered it to the Clerk of Court instead CA: Yan appealed to the CA. Dismissed. Affirmed Trial Court.
of its being filed directly with the latter o The Trial Courts decision became final and executory.
Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trail courts writ of
We do not believe that the manner, in which the deposition was delivered to execution.
the Clerk of Court, as above related, so affected its integrity as to render it Aquende questioned the trial courts writ of execution. He alleged
inadmissible. After all there is no pretense here that the appellant did not that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property. He
contract the indebtedness for the collection of which he is being sued or that received no Summons or notice, nor was he aware of any adverse
the same has been paid, the only important issue posed in this appeal being claim as no notice lis pendens was inscribed in his title.
whether or not the appellee is the real party in interest. On this score the Respondent filed a third party claim against the writ because it
finding of the lower court, supported as it is by the evidence before it, is affected his property and he is not bound by the trial courts orders
conclusive. because he is not a party to the suit. Clerk of Court said it was the
wrong remedy because his property was not in sheriffs possession
nor was it up for auction.
Rule 3, Secs 7 to 12 (Parties to a Civil Action) Respondent filed a notice of appearance with third party motion.
Aquende also filed a Supplemental Motion where he reiterated that
G.R. No. 182819 June 22, 2011 he was not a party in the Civil Case and that since the action was in
MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN, Petitioner, personam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the case are bound by
vs. the decision.
EMERSON B. AQUENDE, Respondent. Trial Court denied Respondents motions. According to Trial Court
their jurisdiction was lost when CA affirmed.
Facts: Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court
Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
damages against Yap and the Register of Deeds. Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due
o Bulawan is the owner of a lot bought from Yaptengco process of law. Bulawan conveniently failed to implead him despite
Brothers, who claims they inherited the property from Yap her knowledge of the existing title in his name and prevented him
Chin Cun. from participating in the proceedings and protecting his title.
o Petitioner alleged that Yap claimed ownership of the Aquende added that he is an indispensable party and the trial court
property and caused the issuance of a TCT in Yaps did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not
name. impleaded as a party in the case. Trial court went beyond the
o Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of the lot, and that jurisdiction conferred by the allegations on the complaint because
according to an earlier civil case, the trial court declared Bulawan did not pray for the cancellation of the TCT.
that the lot of Bulawan was simulated by the Yaptengco CA ruled in favor of Respondent.
Brothers. The trial court ruled that Yap Chin Cun was the o MR was denied.
rightful owner. o The Court of Appeals ruled that it may still entertain the
o Yap Chin Cun sold the property to the Aquendes petition despite the fact that another division of the Court
(respondent) of Appeals already affirmed the trial courts Decision. The

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other division of the Court of Appeals was not given the the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
opportunity to rule on the issue of Aquende being an presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
indispensable party because that issue was not raised precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the
during the proceedings before the trial court and on action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders
appeal. all subsequent actions of the court null and void
o The CA declared that Aquende was an indispensable
party affected by the trial court. Trial court should have The trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as
impleaded Aquende under Section 11, Rule 3. Jurisdiction defendant or to order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule
was not properly acquired over Aquende, the CA ruling 3 of the Rules of Court. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of
affirming the trial court is void. The Court of Appeals indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court,
added that the trial courts decision was void because the respectively.
trial court failed to note that the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate and Partition, from where the Yaptengco brothers Even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition
derived their ownership, as heirs of Yap Chin Cun and for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need
now being claimed by Bulawan, had already been not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is
declared void in an earlier Civil Case. The Court of that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use
Appeals also said that a reading of Bulawans complaint of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby.
showed that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order the
nullification of TCT because this was not one of the reliefs We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable
that Bulawan prayed for. judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented
Hence this petition in the SC assailing the decision of the CA. Aquende from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting
his title over his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the
Issue: Whether Aquende is the proper party to sue for the annulment of 26 November 1996 Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was
judgment? deprived of his property without due process. Moreover, a person who was
not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered
Ruling: therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a
stranger.
Petition has no merit.
The Petition for Annulment of Judgment is the Propert Remedy as Aquende
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as was affected by the Trail Courts decision even if he was not a party to the
parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an case.
action. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
courts action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs
or as defendants. Dael vs. Teves, 136 SCRA 199 (1985) Petition for Review on certiorari R
65
In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,
FACTS:
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and

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Dael spouses filed in CFI-Misamis Oriental a complaint for: Section 2.Parties in interest. Every action must be
"Ownership, Recovery of Possession & Damages" against the prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
private respondentsEdorot interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the
EDOROT filed Answer with Counterclaim action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined
The case was set for pre-trial on various occasions to give the as plaintiffs. All persons who claim an interest in the
parties more chance to arrive at an amicable settlement (the controversy or the subject thereof adverse to the plaintiff,
original Judge was Malvar but he was transferred and TEVES- or who are necessary to complete determination or
one of respondents was appointed to take Malvars place) settlement of the question involved therein shall be joined
the case was set for pre-trial before Judge Teves who ordered as defendants.
amendment of complaint to include the heirs or representatives
of 2 deceased defendantsHerminigildo and Petra Section 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.
EDOROT filed an Ex- Parte Manifestation, praying that the Parties in interest without whom no final determination can
case be dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
of Court for failure of petitioners to file an amended complaint- defendants.
granted
MR- denied In the case of Garchitorena, et al. vs. de los Santos, et al. No.L-
Hence direct appeal to SC. 17045, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 490, citing Bautista vs. Teodoro, 54 O.G.
619; Dizon vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-14690, November 29, 1960 the SC
Daels contention: Respondent Judge abused its discretion in ordering them
held that: Where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its complaint
to file amended complaint to include the heirs of deceased defendants. NO
within a certain period of time in order to implead as party defendants
one who is not a party to the case but who is an indispensable party,
RULLING:
plaintiff's refusal to comply with such order is a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioners here claim that they are owners of the parcel of land in
question while respondents also claim to be the owners and possessors,
Therefore, Heirs of deceased defendants are indispensable parties
pro-indiviso by inheritance from their deceased parents, of the subject
who should be compulsory joined as defendants in the case and since the
litigated parcel. Then, deceased defendants have an undivided interest, right
petitioners failed to comply with this Order, respondent Judge acted within
and participation adverse to that of the petitioners' in the property in
his prerogative in dismissing the complaint.
litigation. Since both of them are already even prior to the filing of the
complaint against them in the court below and their interest in the property in
question having inured by intestacy to their heirs, the latter thereby G.R. No. L-44339 December 2, 1987
became the real parties in interest who should be impleaded as
defendants without whom no final determination of Civil Case can be CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL SENO, JR.,
had. DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY SENO and WALTER SENO, plaintiffs,
vs.
Sections 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides- MARCOS MANGUBAT and Spouses FRANCISCO LUZAME and
VERGITA PENAFLOR, ANDRES EVANGELISTA and BIENVENIDO
MANGUBAT, defendants.

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Facts: 2) the annulment of a subsequent sale to defendant spouses
Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor of a parcel of land in
This is an appeal that was certified to this Court by the Court of Barrio Dongalo, Paranaque, Rizal.
Appeals 1 from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1,
dated September 29,1972 in Civil Case No. 12205 dismissing the action for On motion of defendant spouses Luzame and Penaflor, TC the
2 inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
reformation of instrument and annulment of subsequent sale.
Mangubat on the ground that they are indispensable parties,
Plaintiff Crisanta Seno, a widow and herein defendant Marcos Mangubat plaintiffs filed their amended complaint impleading Andres
agreed on a mortgage for the sum of P15,000.00 with a stipulation that as Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as defendants.
long as the 2% per month interest is being paid, the mortgage over the The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the
property will not be foreclosed. On the assurance of defendant Marcos case against them on the ground of prescription - granted
Mangubat, a practicing lawyer, Seno agreed to the execution of a Deed of Defendants Luzame, Penaflor and Mangubat in their motion for
Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of P5,000.00 in reconsideration asked the court a quo to dismiss the case against
favor of defendant Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and all the defendants- GRANTED
Bienvenido Mangubat on July 17, 1961 court is no longer in a position to grant plaintiffs' demands,
principally the reformation of subject Deed of Absolute Sale.

On January 8, 1962 Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat executed


Plaintiffs MOR - denied
a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring their share in the subject property to
CA
defendant Marcos Mangubat;
Plaintiffs filed an appeal praying for the reversal of the orders of the
TC dismissing the complaint
Someyim in 1963, when plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno failed to pay the monthly
interest of 2%, she was sued for ejectment by defendant Marcos Mangubat
alleging non-payment of rentals; SC
CA certified the instant case to this Court holding that the
Seno also learned that defendant Marcos Mangubat sold the subject assignment of errors made by plaintiffs in their appeal raised purely
property in favor of spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor and legal questions
Sena claimed that the spouses Luzame and Penaflor bought the property in
bad faith since they had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the ISSUE: WON defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat
transaction between plaintiff and defendant Marcos Mangubat. indispensable parties in the case without whom no action can be properly
taken thereon?
Defendant spouses Luzame filed an ejectment case against plaintiff Crisanta
Seno for alleged non-payment of rentals. NO.

RTC For the determination of this issue, We find it necessary to consider the
Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking: distinction between indispensable and proper parties as clearly stated in
1) the reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of Sections 7 and 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:
defendant Marcos Mangubat and,

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Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can enforce their rights against defendant Marcos Mangubat.
be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. In fact the plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat as shown by their non-inclusion in the complaint and
Sec. 8. Joinder of proper parties. When persons who their opposition to the motion to include said defendants in the complaint as
are not indispensable but who ought to be parties if indispensable parties. It was only because they were ordered by the court a
complete relief is to be accorded as between those quo that they included the said defendants in the complaint. The lower court
already parties, have not been made parties and are erroneously held that the said defendants are indispensable parties.
subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of
process and venue, the court shall order them summoned Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
to appear in the action. But the court may, in its discretion, Mangubat not being indispensable parties but only proper parties, their
proceed in the action without making such persons joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in
parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
without prejudice to the rights of such persons.
By the dismissal of the case against defendants Andres Evangelista and
Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always be joined either as Bienvenido Mangubat, the court a quohad lost jurisdiction over them. We
plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. have already pointed out that the joinder of proper parties is necessary in
Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the order to determine all the possible issues of the controversy; but if for some
whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits. reason or another it is not possible to join them, as when they are out of the
jurisdiction of the Court, the court may proceed without them, and the
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that judgment that may be rendered shall be without prejudice to their
a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot rights. Hence, notwithstanding the absence of said defendants, the court
proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose could still proceed with the trial of the case as against the remaining
presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose defendants in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their
absence without affecting them. Nevertheless, the court is constrained to affirm the dismissal of the
complaint against all the defendants as there is merit in the argument raised
In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista by defendants-appellees that plaintiffs are barred by laches to bring suit
and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be against them.
in fact an absolute sale not if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage.
Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject A perusal of the records shows that from the time of the execution of the
property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned deed of sale on July 17, 1961 to the time of the filing of the present
defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in complaint on August 29, 1969 or a period of 8 years, I month and 12 days,
the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be plaintiffs never took any step to enforce their rights which they claim to have
reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible despite the several opportunities available to them.
issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an
absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will

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Defendant Marcos Mangubat filed an ejectment suit against plaintiff Crisanta DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ, ARNOLD
Seno in 1963 and this fact was admitted by the plaintiffs in their complaint. SAN PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI JIMENEZ, JEFFREY
For failure of plaintiff to appear in the case, a decision was rendered by the BUENO, CHRISTOPHER CAGAYAT, GERARD CABILES, JOAN
25
trial court ordering plaintiffs to vacate the subject property which decision ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ, NELLY CLERIGO, DULCE
26
was duly executed. NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO, DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN BAUTISTA
and BALTAZAR FERRERA, Respondents.
It further appears from the complaint that plaintiffs were well aware of the
transfer of the title from the name of plaintiff Crisanta Seno to the names of Facts
defendants Marcos Mangubat, Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the Court of
Mangubat and subsequently to the name of defendant Marcos Mangubat Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
alone as early as 1963 when the ejectment case was filed against plaintiffs,
and also they did not do anything about it. Private respondent (petitioner herein) Lotte Phils., Inc. (Lotte) and 7J
Maintenance and Janitorial Services ("7J") entered into a contract with
In January 1969, plaintiffs learned of the sale of the subject property to private respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility,
defendants-spouses Luzame. but it was only on August 29, 1969 when janitorial and other services to the latter. However, private respondent
plaintiffs brought this action and only after an ejectment case was filed by dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of
said defendant spouses against plaintiff Crisanta Seno before the Municipal the service contract by respondent with 7J.
Court of Paranaque, Rizal on August 4, 1969.
Labor Arbiter
Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a labor complaint against both private
As defendants-appellees contend, before the nine-year period lapsed,
respondent Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment of
plaintiffs never raised a voice to protest against all these proceedings. They
corresponding backwages and related employment benefits, 13th month
chose to sleep on their rights and to rely on defendants' alleged word that
pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
their true agreement would be respected rather than bring their grievances
fees based on total judgment award.
to a court of law. However, when an ejectment case was filed against them
just when the 10-year prescriptive period for bringing of their suit was nearly
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring 7J as employer of respondents.
over, they finally decided to stake their claim against the defendants.
The arbiter also found 7J guilty of illegal dismissal Respondents appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that Lotte be
By the negligence of plaintiffs in asserting their rights for an unreasonable declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only
length of time, they are now forever precluded from enforcing whatever right contractor. In its decision, the NLRC found no cogent reason to disturb the
they may have against defendants. Indeed, it is an indicia of the infirmity of findings of the labor arbiter and affirmed its ruling that 7J is the employer of
their claim. respondents and solely liable for their claims.

G.R. No. 166302. July 28, 2005 Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in a
LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., Petitioners, resolution dated June 18, 2002.
vs.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LEONOR MAMAUAG, LOURDES CAUBA, CA
JOSEPHINE DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM, VIVIAN

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Undaunted, they filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals against court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
the NLRC and Lotte, insisting that their employer is Lotte and not 7J. parties but even as to those present.

Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It prayed that In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest
the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter
sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents.
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with
7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J.
and the NLRC. In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the
real employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties
contracting was merely the agent of Lotte. is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of
Lottes motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an
Lotte asserts that 7J is an indispensable party and should have been indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
impleaded in respondents petition in the Court of Appeals. It claims that the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefore.
petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissible for failure to comply
with Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Revised Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the
Rules of Civil Procedure. NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction
Issue over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J,
Whether or not the Petition is dismissible for failure to comply with Section 3, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the
Rule 46 in relation to Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair play.
Procedure.

Ruling G.R. NO. 93010 August 30, 1990.


Petitioners contention is tenable.
NICENCIO TAN QUIOMBING, petitioner,
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
vs.
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. FRANCISCO AND MANUELITA A.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with SALIGO, respondents.
jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a RULING: INCLUSION OF BISCOCHO AS CO-PLAINTIFF WOULD BE
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The USELESS FORMALITY, BEING SOLIDARY CREDITORS, EITHER ONE
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the OF THEM MAY SUE FOR THE RECOVERY OF DEBT.

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Facts: ISSUE: Whether Biscocho should be joined as co-plaintiff in this case.

This case stemmed stemmed from a Construction and Service HELD: NO.
Agreement whereby Nicencio Quiombing and Dante Biscocho
jointly and severally bound themselves to construct a house for It did not matter who as between Quiombing and Biscocho filed the
private respondents Saligo for P137, 940.00 which the latter complaint because private respondents were liable to either of
agreed to pay. the two as a solidary creditor for the full amount of the debt.
Subsequently, Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a Full satisfaction of a judgement obtained against respondents by
second written agreement whereby the latter acknowledged the Quiombing would discharge their obligation to Biscocho and vice
completion of the house and undertook to pay the balance of the versa.
contract price. Hence, it was NOT necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho
Manuelita signed a promissory note for P125, 363.50 to file the complaint.
representing the amount still due from her and her husband Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was
payable on or before December 31, 1984 to Quiombing. competent to sue by himself alone, would be useless formality.
RTC: PETITIONER: RECOVERY OF MONEY. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one of the
RESPONDENTS: MOVED TO DISMISS. parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary
ALLEGATION: BISCOCHO WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, because complete relief may be obtained from either.
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS CO-PLAINTIFF. The participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary, much
o On October 9, 1986, Quiombing filed a complaint for less indispendable.
recovery of the said amount.
o Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011
the complaint, contending that Biscocho was an
indispensable party and therefore should have been AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO,
included as co-plaintiff. FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S.
RTC: MOTION GRANTED, COMPLAINT DISMISSED. CAYETANO, Petitioners,
o Motion was denied but subsequently reconsidered and vs.
granted by the trial court. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE
o Complaint was dismissed but without prejudice to the filing PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,Respondents.
of an amended complaint to include the other solidary
creditor as co-plaintiff.
- Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege
PETITIONER: APPEALED THE DISMISSAL.
speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!" In his privilege
ALLEGATION: SOLIDARY CREDITOR, COULD ACT ALONE. speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional
o Quiombing appealed the order of dismissal to the CA. insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act particularly
o He argued that as a solidary creditor, he could act by the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President
himself alone in the enforcement of his claim against the Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension
respondents.
- Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706 and was referred
CA: AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee)
Hence, this appeal.

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- Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name - Respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to
their representatives to the Ethics Committee. After consultation proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference
with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the was set
body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics - Petitioners came to this Court for relief
Committee. - In its Comment, respondent argues among others that the instant
- Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an
their representatives to the Ethics Committee.Senator Pimentel indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be
stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been
members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard
caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final.
- Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official ISSUE: W/N Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator
Gazette Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition
- Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he
HELD: Indispensable Party
would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
before the Ethics Committee.
- Due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
SEC. 7 Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest
fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the
as plaintiffs or defendants.
Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was
approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:
abstentions.
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or
- Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence,
hearings. Petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such
questioned the determination of the quorum. nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
- petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may
Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been
Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there
adopted. cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court
- Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is
proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
- Respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S.
Resolution 706. A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the
- The Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
preliminary report decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an

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indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued a Summary Deportation
between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest Order against respondent Scheer
in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple respondent, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
litigation. Summary Deportation Order
o complaint was dismissed
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition
before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the BOC did not resolve the respondents motion. The respondent was
outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this neither arrested nor deported
case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate
Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator District Court of Straubing dismissed the criminal case against the
Madrigals interest. The nature of Senator Madrigals interest in this case is respondent for physical injuries.
not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her o He was later on issued a regular passport to the
participation. respondent

Petition partly granted.1awphi BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration

COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF


petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed
IMMIGRATION, Petitioner, vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL
office and upon her orders, Marine operatives and BID agents
SCHEER, Respondent.
apprehended the respondent in his residence and held him in
custody while awaiting his deportation
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision of o Despite entreaties from the respondents
wife[21]and his employees, the petitioner
the Court of Appeals
refused to release the respondent
Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt,
respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
Germany, applied for avpermanent resident status and the same
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining
was granted
order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from
o An Alien Certificate of Registration was issued in his favor
proceeding with the respondents deportation
The Vice Consul informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn,
the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the
Germany, that respondent had police records and financial
liabilities in Germany petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond

BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution pendente lite denying the


respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a
warrant of arrest had been issued against him respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for
Bail/Recognizance

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petitioner alleged that BOC was an indispensable party to the
petition as it was a real party in interest and that petitioners failure However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition the dismissal of an action
o petitioner claimed that the fact that Immigration o Parties may be added by order of the court on
Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If
four Commissioners the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court,
Court of Appeals ruled: the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for
o There are quite a number of cases in relevant the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.
jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration Commissioner o The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be be indispensable..
deported o Supreme Court has full powers, apart from that
o the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party power and authority which is inherent, to amend
interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the the processes, pleadings, proceedings and
petition. The court before which the petition is filed must decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real
first require the joinder of such party. It is the party-in-interest.
noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for
the dismissal of the petition In this case, the CA did not require the respondent to implead the
BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in
ISSUE: whether the members of the BOC were indispensable parties some cases
HELD: Yes o The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however,
misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases
BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents petition were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those
forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even
an indispensable party in the aforecited cases
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires indispensable
parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
o The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Chua vs. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, Aug. 30, 2005 Petition for
Without the presence of indispensable parties to the ReviewR.45
suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality. Facts:

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent


Chua filed a complaint for damges in RTC-caloocanimpleading her
actions of the court null and void.
brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff against
defendants Jorge Torres(owner of Caltex) and Antonio
The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on Beltran(employee)
the petitioner/plaintiff

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The complaint alleged that Jonathan issued in favor of the petitioner. There is no allegation in the complaint alleging any violation or
Caltex Service Center his personal RCBC Check (P9,849.20) omission of any right of Jonathan, either arising from contract or from law.
in payment for purchases of diesel oil. However, the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment MISJOINDER OF JONATHAN, EFFECT: A misjoined party plaintiff has no
on the ground that the account was closed. Beltran sent business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would
petitioner a demand letter informing her of the dishonor of the make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the
check and demanding the payment thereof. Petitioner ignored requirements expected of plaintiffs.
the demand letter on the ground that she was not the one who
issued the said check.Beltran instituted against petitioner a Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
criminal action for violation (B.P. 22) filed in MTC-caloocan-
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The police officers
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
tasked with serving the warrant looked for her in her residence,
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
in the auto repair shop of her brother, and even at the Manila
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
Central University were she was enrolled as a medical student,
and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
all to the alleged embarrassment and social humiliation of
severed and proceeded with separately.
petitioner.
Respondents move to dismiss the damage suit on the ground
that Jonathan did not signed the verification and cerftification Misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits
against non-forum shopping- granted dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties, and
Chua moved for MR-denied the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done
motuproprio by the court,at any stage, without need for a motion to
such effect from the adverse party.
Hence she went to SC via R.45

Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous,
RULING:
may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance
to the prosecution of the suit. It should then follow that any act or omission
JONATHAN AS NECESSARY PARTY: Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment
Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as one who is not indispensable to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no
to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since
claim subject of the action. Necessary parties are those whose presence is the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either
necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever
far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or
affecting them. certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential.

In this case Jonathan does not stand to be affected if RTC rule Therefore, Jonathans failure to sign the certification against forum-
either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. This is due to the nature of shopping was not a ground for dismissal of complaint.
the cause of action of the complaint, which alleges an injury personal to
petitioner, and the relief prayed for, which is to be adjudicated solely to

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G.R. No. 84895 May 4, 1989 necessarily extends to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. who is the
son of said Mr. Jose Y. Campos.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, JOSE D. CAMPOS, private respondents opposed petitioner's motion
JR., petitioner-intervenor, Sandiganbayan DENIED petitioner's and Jose D. Campos, Jr.'s
vs. motions to drop him from the complaint. MOR was also DENIED
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, TEODORO Q. 1) The PCGG did not then and does not now have the
PEA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLANDO PACIENCIA, JESUS power to grant civil immunity;
TUPALAR SEVERINO DELA CRUZ, and FE CORTEZO, respondents. 2) Even if it did, the grant of immunity itself rendered in the
PCGG's resolution dated May 28, 1986 has not been
Facts: shown to cover the transactions involving the corporations
and or properties for which Jose D. Campos, Jr., is now
sought to be held accountable, i.e., Metroport Services,
Sandiganbayan
Inc.;
petitioner filed with respondent Court a complaint for reconveyance,
3) The fact is that nowhere, either in the original motions
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Alfredo
(Bejo) T. Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, or in the Motion for Reconsideration before this Court has
Jose D. Campos, Jr. and forty five (45) other defendants including it been shown that, save for the alleged unqualified
the above-named private respondents, seeking to 'recover from immunity, there no longer exists any demandable claim
against Jose D. Campos, Jr., arising from the transactions
them ill-gotten wealth at the expense and to the grave and
resulting in his being impleaded thereon. In other words,
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
defendant Jose D, Campos, Jr., filed a 'Manifestation and Motion were it not for the supposed grant of immunity, Jose D.
to Dismiss Complaint with Respect to Jose D. Campos' praying that Campos, Jr., would remain liable in the matter of
he be removed as party defendant from the complaint on the Metroport Services, Inc., and for the 60% which Alfredo
grounds that he had: (Bejo) Romualdez acquired therein according to
paragraph 14 (c) of the Complaint (supra) which does not
voluntarily surrendered or turned over [any share in his name
appear to have been restored or compensated for. (p. 54,
on any of the corporations referred to, aside from claiming any
interest, ownership or right thereon] to the Government of the Rollo)
Republic of the Philippines' and that The petitioner contends otherwise. The Solicitor General asserts
he was 'entitled to the immunity granted by the Presidential that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in
the complaint through mistake or oversight and that pursuant
Commission on Good Government pursuant to Executive
to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has a
Order No. 14, under the Commission's Resolution dated May
right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any
28, 1986 ... to Mr. Jose Y. Campos (and) his family he 'being a
party. The Solicitor General also maintains that although the
member of the immediate family of Jose Y. Campos.'
petitioner (RP) filed with the respondent Court a 'Motion' seeking to defendants in the case were charged solidarily, Campos, Jr. was
drop defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. from the Complaint on the not an indispensable party since Article 1216 of the Civil Code
allows the petitioner as solidary creditor to choose among the
ground that the Presidential Commission on Good Government
solidary debtors against whom it win enforce collection.
(PCGG for short) had, in a Resolution dated May 28, 1986, granted
immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family, which immunity Jose Campos, Jr. adds that the petitioner's motion to drop him as
defendant should be considered as one filed under section 1, Rule

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17 of the Revised Rules of Court thus giving it the absolute right to the dropping be 'on such terms as are just-just to all the
dismiss the action by mere notice of dismissal. other parties.
SC
The petitioner (RP) charges the Sandiganbayan with grave abuse There is nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the petitioner-intervenor
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying from the complaint. Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and salutary
its motion to drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as defendant in its complaint reasons.
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
filed against Jose D. Campos, Jr. and the other defendants The PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No.
Petition in intervention of Jose D. Campos, Jr. Was allowed. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that
Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the
ISSUE: WON the petitioner (RP) can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as complaint does not make him an indispensable party. We have ruled in the
party defendant by virtue of the PCGG's grant of immunity in favor of his case of Operators Incorporated v. American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154 SCRA
father Jose Y. Campos and the latter's family. 738 (1987)] that "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil
The PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as Code says that the creditor 'may proceed against anyone of the solidary
defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states: debtors or some or all of them simultaneously."

SECTION 11, RULE 3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as in defendant
parties Misjoinder of parties.-is not ground for dismissal of would be unjust to the other defendants in the civil case because, the other
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of defendants can still pursue the case and put up their defenses.
the court on motion of any patty or of its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. ... WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
(Emphasis supplied) resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is ordered to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil
We interpreted this rule in the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425 Case No. 0010.
(l975):
G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009
... the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners,
irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. that vs.
it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR
and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents.
a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously
later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes Facts
that the original inclusion had been made in the honest Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping Court are the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the resolution
is requested because it turned out that such inclusion was denying reconsideration of the challenged decision.
a mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that

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RTC Ruling
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for
before the Court of First Instance. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that disposition on the merits.
judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject
property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may
pay damages. bring an action for ejectment. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to
Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners allegation of ownership and be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the
possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the
subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
Francisco Plasabas.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit
allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to
land. the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the
plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the
argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties. ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
The trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
prejudice. and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
CA complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further, declared that the non-
joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due G.R. No. 182585 November 27, 2009
process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied
considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title JOSEPHINE MARMO, NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR and
or a reivindicatory action. MARISA DEL PILAR, Petitioners,
vs.
With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed MOISES O. ANACAY Respondent.
December 1, 2004 Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition.

RULING: ANY ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS MAY BRING AN ACTION IN


Issue:
EJECTMENT. RESPONDENTS CHILDREN ARE NOT
Whether petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties gave rise to a
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
ground for dismissal.

Facts:

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RTC: RESPONDENT: ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECOVERY OF M.R. DENIED.
TITLE WITH DAMAGES. CA: PETITIONERS: RULE 65.
o On September 16, 2003, respondent Moises O. Anacay GROUND: DID NOT DISMISS CASE AFTER RESPONDENT
filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with FAILED TO INCLUDE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
Damages against the petitioners and the Register of CA: DISMISSED PETITION.
Deeds of the Province of Cavite. GROUND: RESPONDENTS CHILDREN NOT INDISPENSABLE
o The complaint states, among others, that the respondent PARTIES.
is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife, Gloria M.R. DENIED.
P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of HENCE, THIS PETITION.
land and the house built thereon, covered by TCT No. The petitioners submit that the respondents children, who
815595 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners of the property,
o They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the are indispensable parties because a full determination of the case
subject property; petitioner Josephine sold the property
cannot be made without their presence.
to petitioner Danilo for P520,000.00, payable in monthly
They argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal
installments of P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June 2006;
jurisdictional defect.
o Petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment payments
The respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondents
from December 2002 onwards.
children are not indispensable parties because the issue involved in
o Respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No.
the RTC whether the signatures of the respondent and his wife in
815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 were falsified
issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a
- can be resolved without the participation of the respondents
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20,
children.
2001;
o Petitioner Josephine subsequently transferred her title to
ISSUE: Whether respondents children are indispensable parties in this
petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name. case.
o The respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the HELD: NO.
cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the alternative, he
demanded petitioner Danilos payment of the balance When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article
of P347,000.00 with interest from December 2002, and 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "any one of the co-
the payment of moral damages, attorneys fees, and owners may bring an action in ejectment."
cost of suit. We have explained that the term "action in ejectment" includes a
PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. suit for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
GROUND: RESPONDENTS CHILDREN AS CO-OWNERS That the term "action in ejectment" includes "also, an accion
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS PLAINTIFFS. publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria
RESPONDENT: CHILDREN NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, (recovery of ownership)."
CAN BE RESOVLED WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION.
DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS.

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We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit him. Thus [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses
without impleading other co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of Carandang] for the payment of said total amount. [The spouses
the Civil Code. Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-
In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang]
below, never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed and [de Guzman], for [Arcadio Carandangs] technical expertise, his
to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
In fact, he recognized that he is a "bona-fide co-owner" of the radio/communication equipment. [de Guzman] filed his complaint,
questioned property, along with his deceased wife. seeking to recover the sum of money together with damages. The TC
Moreover and more importantly, the respondents claim in his rendered in favour of de Guzman. The spouses Carandang appealed
complaint is personal to him and his wife, i.e., that his and his the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the courts
wifes signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner decision.
Josephine were falsified.
The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require Issue: W/N the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section
the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court?
determined without their presence because they are not parties to
the document; their signatures do not appear therein. Held: No.
Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately protected by
their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay, since the Ratio: The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC,
complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for
possession of the properties owned in common, and, as such, will failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In the
redound to the benefit of all the co-owners. present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative
In sum, respondents children, as co-owners of the subject of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal representative
property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased; neither had the
case. complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal representative
of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be substituted for
the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution was effected,
Carandang v Feirs of Quinrino de Guzman, GR 160347, November
consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the
2006
purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision
binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of the estate
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
of her deceased mother. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de
Appeals Decision.
Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In
Facts: [Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are
doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in
stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting
the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of
System. The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to
such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The heirs of
P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by [the
de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the
spouses Carandang]. MBS again increased its capital stock [the
RTC. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply
spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. [De Guzman]
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express
claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by

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waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because o Petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also
there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These
proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel. grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action
inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void,
since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was
not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors
are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question
the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever
G.R. No. 186979 August 11, 2010
occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO
of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3)
DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
respondents claim is barred by laches.
FRANCISCO P. ODONES and ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents.
o Respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses,
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing as
FACTS: owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the
1972 Absolute Deed of Sale.
Spouses Odones (respondent) filed a complaint for Annulment of o Petitioners served upon respondents a Request for
Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Limos, Delos Reyes Admission of matters pertaining to the family history of
and Sps. Delos Reyes before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac. Donata, her heirs, and the validity of the Extrajudicial
o Sps. Odones are owners of a parcel of land. Obtained Succession of Estate and Sale.
from an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale by o Respondents failed to respond to the Request for
Donata Lardizabal (She had the original title coz shes Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for
awesome) Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
o It took a while before the Odones decided to register their Defenses, arguing that respondents failure to respond or
property. However, they found out that their Original Cert. object to the Request for Admission amounted to an
of Title (OCT) was cancelled and replaced by a TCT in the implied admission pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26. A
name of the petitioners. (say whut?) hearing on the affirmative defenses had become
o Petitioners subdivide the property among themselves. imperative because petitioners were no longer required to
o Respondents sought to cancel the TCT of petitioners. present evidence on the admitted facts.
They claim that Donatas signature was forged in the 1972
Deed of Absolute Sale, because Donata died in 1923. (Im o Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending
talking about dead people at 1:33am, scary.) that the facts sought to be admitted by petitioners were not
o Petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars claiming material and relevant to the issue of the case as required
ambiguity in respondents claim that their vendors are the by Rule 26.
only heirs of Donata. RTC denied this motion and ordered o RTC denied the motion, because the information that is
petitioners to file their answers. contained in the Request for Admission had either been
pleaded and/or denied.
o Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Denied.

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CA: Petitioners elevated the case to the CA by Special civil action latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
RTC. thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission
o CA dismissed the petition. Affirmative defenses by rule in Section 2, Rule 26. In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily
petitioners were not indubitable and could be best proven vexatious nature of petitioners Request for Admission rendered it
in full blown trial. ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the
o Motion for Reconsideration was Denied. implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
Supreme Court:Petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses
raised in their Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly A perusal of respondents complaint shows that it was sufficiently clothed
admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the with a cause of action and they were suited to file the same.
Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the said
affirmative defenses must be conducted pursuant to our ruling in Rule 3, Sec. 13 to 19
Gochan v. Gochan.
Chiang Kai Shek School vs. CA, G.R. No. 58028. April 18, 1989petition
RULING: for review on certiorari

Pertinent to the issue are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in FACTS:
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Under these rules, a party
who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have
Faustina Oh was employed by petitioner for 33 years as teacher
impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized,
but was dismissed.
however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon
Oh filed illegal dismissal case against the petitioner
the sound discretion of the court.
school.
Petitioner file MD on the ground that the it could not be
The matters set forth in petitioners Request for Admission were the same
sued
affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already
the complaint was amended.
traversed in their Reply. Petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny
Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to
once again the very matters they had already denied. It will serve no
make them solidarily liable with the school.
purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule
CFI- Sorsogon dismissed the complaint
on admission as a mode of discovery.
On appeal CA- set aside the decision of CFI and ruled that the
school is suable and liable while absolving the other defendants.
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
The motion for reconsideration denied
allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant
The school then came to SCvia petition for review on certiorari
evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to
establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that
purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy. ISSUE raised by petitioner: WON a school that has not been incorporated
may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition
If the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were by the government?
already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the

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WON a complaint filed against persons associated under a Therefore, SC ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed and
common name will justify a judgment against the association itself and not entitled for damages.
its individual members?
G.R. No. 78295 & 79917 April 10, 1989
RULLING:SUABILITY OF SCHOOL: the school itself may be sued in its own
name ATTORNEY CELSO D. LAVIA, REMEDIOS M. MUYOT, SPOUSES
VIRGILIO D. CEBRERO and SEGUNDINA MAGNO-
Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that "only natural or CEBRERO, petitioners,
juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the vs.
school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should not HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA C.
prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the GABRIEL, respondents.
school.
Facts:
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by
C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: On April 6, 1983, Maria Carmen Gabriel y Paterno (CARMEN), executed a
donation mortis causa of the SAMPALOC PROPERTY (3,081 sqm) in
Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of favor of her widowed sister-in-law Josefina C. Gabriel (JOSEFINA)..
Public Instruction, any private school or college
recognized by the government shall be incorporated under On August 11, 1983, Carmen, who was already gravely ill with breast
the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation cancer, executed a Last Will And Testament in which she leaves the same
Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall Sampaloc property to her cousin and companion, Remedios C. Muyot
file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its (REMEDIOS), and willed a small lot (240 sqm) in Antipolo, Rizal to Josefina.
incorporation papers and by-laws. She named a friend, Concepcion M. De Garcia, as executrix of her will.

Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to On August 15, 1983, Carmen executed a General Power of Attorney
incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. appointing Remedios, as her attomey-in-fact
It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed
notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The On November 3, 1983, Josefina registered an adverse claim on the title of
petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to the Sampaloc property based on the donation made by Carmen in her favor
immunize it from the private respondent's complaint.

November 4, 1983, Remedios, as Carmen's attorney- in-fact, hired Atty.


There is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons Celso D. Lavia, as Carmen's counsel.
joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with
such association because the school itself may be sued in its own name.
On November 19, 1983, Carmen thumb-marked an "AFFIDAVIT OF
Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of
DENIAL" repudiating the donation of the Sampaloc property to Josefina
trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private
because it was allegedly procured through fraud and trickery. She alleged
respondent's dismissal.
that in April 1983, she still could sign her name, and that she had no

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intention of donating the property to Josefina who had not done her any death. She also assailed the service of summons to the decedent's
favor and in fact abandoned her during her illness. Carmen also thumb- Estate through Muyot and reiterated her motion for the appointment
marked a "REVOCATION OF DONATION" of a special administrator for the Estate. Atty. Lavia opposed the
motions
November 21, 1983, Remedios, as Carmen's attorney-in-fact, sold the Josefina's motion to disqualify - denied
Sampaloc property to Virgilio D. Cebrero. motion to appoint a special administrator for the Estate denied
the deceased left a Will naming an administratrix (executrix)
On November 29, 1983, Carmen passed away. and the latter has accepted the trust
Cebrero filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the
Sampaloc property
On December 1, 1983, the "REVOCATION OF DONATION" was registered
CA
on the back of Carmen's TCT of the Sampaloc property
Josefina filed a petition for certiorari assailing TCs order Josefina's
motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia and praying for a writ of preliminary
RTC Manila injunction to stop TC from further proceeding in the case
Josefina filed a complaint against Carmen's estate and the Register GRANTED restraining order, ordering the lower court to "desist
of Deeds of Manila to annul the Deed of Revocation of Donation from proceeding with the Case until further orders."
She alleged that the deed of revocation, made only ten (10)
days before Carmen's death, was false and fictitious. She
However, on March 16, 1987, in spite of the restraining order, TC Judge
asked the court to appoint an administrator ad litem for the
Vicencio issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens because he
estate of Carmen
believed the Appellate Court's restraining order of February 10, 1987 expired
Josefina caused to be recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title
on March 3, 1987, i.e., after 20 days.
of the property
Without appointing a special administrator for Carmen's estate, the
court caused summons to be served on the estate which was May 4, 1987 - On motions of Josefina, CA set aside Judge
received by Remedios Vicencio's order and required him, as well as his branch clerk of
court and Attorney Lavia to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt of court. The Court of Appeals held that the
On January 24, 1984, the Cebreros registered the sale of the Sampaloc
20-day limitation on the life of a restraining order did not apply to it
property to them and obtained TCT No. 158305 in their names
but only to lower court "judges.
Sept 15, 1987 - CA rendered the following decision:
Josefina's complaint was amended to implead Muyot and the (2) declaring that the lower court did not acquire
Cebrero spouses as additional defendants. In addition to the jurisdiction over the person of the estate of Maria Carmen
original causes of action, the amended complaint sought the P. Gabriel;
nullification of Muyot's General Power of Attorney and the sale respondent Remedios Muyot was not capacitated
of the Sampaloc property to the Cebrero spouses to receive summons for the estate because the
Atty. Lavia filed an Answer (later an "Amended Answer with general power of attorney constituting her as
Compulsory Counter-claim") for the Estate and Muyot agent of the deceased became inoperative upon
Josefina filed a motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia on the ground that the death of the principal hence the service of
his authority as counsel for Carmen was extinguished upon her summons upon her was void.

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(3) ordering respondent Atty. Celso Lavia to refrain from Carmen's death likewise divested Attorney Lavia of authority to represent
representing the estate of the deceased Maria Carmen P. her as counsel. A dead client has no personality and cannot be represented
Gabriel by an attorney.
Attorney Lavia may not appear "as counsel for
the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel because his Petitions for review are dismissed.
authority as her counsel was extinguished upon
Carmen's death" (Art. 1919, Civil Code). G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986
(4) declaring that all pleadings, motions and papers filed SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner,
by Atty. Lavia are sham and ordered expunged from the vs.
records of said case. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, [as Judge, CFI,
SC Cebu, Branch VIII], and PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents.
Lavia, Muyot, and Cebrero filed in this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the CAs May 4, 1987 decision Facts
Lavia, Remedios Muyot, and the Cebrero spouses appealed by This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
certiorari to this Court assailing the Sept 15, 1987 CAs decision from the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for
(petitions were consolidated) certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules against respondent Judge Bernardo
L. Salas
ISSUE: WON TC had acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Carmen P.
Gabriel Trial Court
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint against petitioner's
NO. father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of
land. Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer resisting the claim and
The estate of a dead person may only be summoned through the executor raising the special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in
or administrator of his estate for it is the executor or administrator who may a previous special proceeding. During the presentation of evidence for the
sue or be sued (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court) and who may bring or plaintiff, the defendant died, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a
defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the notice of death wherein were enumerated the thirteen children and surviving
deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). The general power of attorney spouse of the deceased.
appointing Remedios as Carmen's agent or attorney-in- fact was
extinguished upon Carmen's demise. Thereafter, Remedios was bereft of Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed
authority to represent Carmen. judicial administratrix of the estate of her late father.

During trial the respondent trial judge issued orders. The orders substituted
The petitioner's contention that the agency was "constituted in the common
the heirs of the deceased defendant, namely, his thirteen children and
interest of the principal and the agent" and that hence it was not
surviving spouse, as defendants; treated the case submitted for decision,
extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1930, Civil Code) is refuted
after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and
by the instrument itself which explicitly provided that the powers conferred
directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant
on the agent were to be exercised for the "sole benefit" of the principal,
be furnished copies thereof.
Carmen P. Gabriel

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The respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the
deceased defendant. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party.
Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes
Ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
the deceased defendant through their counsel. This was denied admission incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his
by the respondent trial judge for being already moot and academic because executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
of the earlier decision. The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro
Sepulveda, complied with this rule by filing a notice of death on
The widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the
counsel, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration of the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of
decision, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside his their client their contract with him was also terminated and none
decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the
plaintiff, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs heirs had instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the
who had filed the motion. The respondent trial judge lifted the order setting intestate proceedings.
aside his decision, despite the verbal petition for postponement of the
hearing made by one of the three heirs on the ground of the absence of their Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in
counsel. considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for
the heirs of the deceased. It was only after that the respondent trial judge
Petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of the issued an order substituting the deceased defendant with his fourteen heirs.
deceased defendant and who was one of the heirs who had filed an Answer This was followed with an order authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to
filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. The present his evidence in the absence of the deceaseds counsel, and an
respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had order treating the case as submitted for decision.
already become final.
Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
CA Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of extinguished, the court shag order, upon proper notice, the legal
Appeals to annul the proceedings in the respondent trial court. However, the representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, the present for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
appeal. time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
Issue procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
Whether within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
Ruling deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
The appeal is meritorious. appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. The heirs of the de ceased may be allowed to be
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows: substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of

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an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian RULING: GENERAL RULE: FORMAL SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS MUST
ad litem for the minor heirs. BE EFFECTUATED FOR THEM TO BE
BOUND BY A SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT.
As this Court has held:
... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's EXCEPTION: FORMAL SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS IS NOT
death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice NECESSARY WHEN THE HEIRS
the legal representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days THEMSELVES VOLUNTARILY APPEARED,
or such time as it may grant. Since no administrator of the estate of the PARTICIAPTED IN THE CASE AND
deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending PRESENTED EVIDENCE IN DEFENSE OF
determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of the THE DECEASED DEFENDANT.
deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within
which to file appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should Facts:
have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal
representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: RESPONDENTS:
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
EJECTMENT.
deceased at the cost of the deceased's estate, and such representative shall
GROUND: PERSONAL CULTIVATION AND CONVERSION OF
then 'immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
LAND AGAINST PETITIONERS DECEASED HUSBAND.
Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the o On July 23, 1970, both private respondents Primitive
appearance of the legal representative of the deceased and instead Nepomuceno and Emerenciana Nepomuceno filed
dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be substituted in the separate complaints with the then Court of Agrarian
pending appeal. Relations of Malolos, Bulacan, for ejectment on the ground
Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the of personal cultivation and conversion of land for useful
deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in non-agricultural purposes against petitioner's deceased
cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or husband, Benjamin Salazar.
administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing RTC: RULED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS. (AFTER
the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased. PROTRACTED PROCEEDINGS)

o After protracted proceedings in the agrarian court and then


G.R. No. 121510 November 23, 1995 the Regional Trial Court spanning from 1970 to 1993, the
trial court rendered its joint decision in favor of private
FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, petitioner, respondents.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA An appeal therefrom was interposed in the name of petitioner's
NEPOMUCENO, respondents. deceased husband on the ground that private respondents herein
failed to satisfy the requirements pertaining to personal cultivation
and conversion of the landholdings into non-agricultural uses.

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CA: AFFIRMED RTCS RULING. The exception would be that formal substitution of heirs is not
o The Court of Appeals rejected such contention upon necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared,
finding that the record was replete with evidence justifying participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of
private respondents' assertion of their right of cultivation deceased defendant.
and conversion of their landholdings. Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the
substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the
Almost a year after the termination of that appeal, the same trial purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process
court decision subject thereof was once again assailed before the requirements.
Court of Appeals through a petition for annulment of judgment. o The original party having died, he could not continue to
CA: PETITIONER: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF RTC. defend himself in court despite the fact that the action
GROUND: NO SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS DESPITE survived him.
DEFENDANTS DEATH. o For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be
o Herein petitioner assailed the same trial court decision as substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is
having been rendered by a court that did not have the one who would be affected by the judgment.
jurisdiction over her and the other heirs of her deceased o It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs.
husband because notwithstanding the fact that her o In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes.
husband had already died on October 3, 1991, the trial o Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the
court still proceeded to render its decision on August 23, defense for the deceased.
1993 without effecting the substitution of heirs in o Substitution is important because such opportunity to
accordance with Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court defend is a requirement to comply with due process.
thereby depriving her of her day in court. o Such substitution consists of making the proper changes
CA: AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION. in the caption of the case which may be called the formal
GROUND: DID NOT ASSERT FRAUD OR COLLUSION IN THE aspect of it.
PETITION. o Such substitution also includes the process of letting the
substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment
M.R. DENIED.
in the case and that they should therefore actively
Hence this petition.
participate in the defense of the deceased.
o This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the
ISSUE: Whether the RTCs decision in the ejectment case is null and void heart of the procedural rule because this substantive
due to failure to effect the substitution of heirs in lieu of the aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to
defendant who died during the pendency of the case. the purpose of the rule.
o It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive
HELD: NO. aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal
aspect may be considered substantial compliance.
The petition is bereft of merit. o Such is the situation in the case at bench because the
The general rule is that formal substitution of heirs must be only inference that could be deduced from the following
effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in
the defense of the deceased after his death:

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1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the While it is true that a decision in an action for ejectment is
deceased. It would be absurd to think that the lawyer enforceable not only against the defendant himself but also against
would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying members of his family, his relatives, and his privies who derived
him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the their right of possession from the defendant and his successors-in-
litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two interest, it had been established that petitioner had, by her own
more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or acts, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said She is now estopped to deny that she had been heard in
counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware defense of her deceased husband in the proceedings therein.
of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel As such, this petition evidently has no leg to stand on.
until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was
rendered; Bonifacio v. Dizon (1989)

2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the


petitioner in the instant case, even testified in the court
and declared that her husband is already deceased. She INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI INVOLVING PURE QUESTION OF
knew therefore that there was a litigation against her LAW
husband and that somehow her interest and those of her
FACTS:
children were involved;
- 1968, OLIMPIO BONIFACIO (decedent) filed before the Court of
3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only Agrarian Relations a case for ejectment against private respondent
after the appeal was decided against the defendant on Pastora SAN MIGUEL
April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the o It was Bonifacios two hectare agricultural land in Marilao,
decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence Bulacan.
to petitioner's manifestation that she was not aware that o The ground was personal cultivation under the Agricultural
an appeal had been made); Land Reform Code
- 1970, Judge Serapio granted OLIMPIO to eject SAN MIGUEL
4. The Supreme Court has already established that o SAN MIGUEL was asked to vacate the property and
there is such a thing as jurisdiction by estoppel. This deliver possession to OLIMPIO
principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction - SAN MIGUEL appealed, and the CA affirmed the lower courts
over the subject matter was being questioned. In the decision
instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs o SAN MIGUEL counterclaimed OLIMPIO to pay her P1,376
is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired - SAN MIGUEL then sought relief before the SC
by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject o During her petition on Aug 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio
matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by passed away
the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein No notice of death was given to the Court
petitioner appear; No order for substitution of his heir was made
- July 31, 1985 the SC denied SAN MIGUELs petition for lack of
merit, and affirmed the CA decision

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- ROSALINA BONIFACIO and the children (other heirs) moved for b. The problem is the term personal cultivation of RA 3844:
the execution of the decision of CAR Agricultural Land Reform Code. It gave the impression
o This was filed before the RTC of Bulacan. that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed
o A write of execution was issued on Feb 1986, and on Mar only when the landowner-lessor opted to cultivate the
1986, the Deputy Sheriff reported that SAN MIGUEL landholding
refused to vacate the portion she occupied (her house) i. That the right of cultivation pertained
But he was able to delivered the subject matter to EXCLUSIVELY to the landowner-lessor and
ROSALINA therefore, his personal right *THIS IS SOOOO
o SAN MIGUEL moved to quash the writ of execusion WRONG sabi ng Court, it is a misconception
o The BONIFACIOs countered with a writ of demolition and 1. Sec 36 of the RA states, Sec. 36.
an order declaring SAN MIGUEL in contempt of court for Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
re-entering the subject land Notwithstanding any agreement as to
- Judge Dizon ordered that the implementation of the writ of the period or future surrender of the
execution based on the CAR decision was null and void land, an agricultural lessee shall
o The motion for Demolition was also denied, as well as the continue in the enjoyment and
petition for contempt. possession of his landholding except
- BONIFACIOs contend that Judge Dizon GADLJ in ruling that the when his dispossession has been
CAR case cannot be executed because it was a purely personal authorized by the Court in a judgment
action, therefore, the BONIFACIO heirs could not have inherited the that is final and executory if after due
favorable ruling. hearing it is shown that:
- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a
o DIZON it is not an ordinary ejectment case, but an member of the immediate family will
ejectment of an agricultural lessee personally cultivate the landholding or
The action is personal to OLIMPIO, as thus, it will convert the landholding, if suitably
died with him located, into residential, factory,
The non-substitution of OLIMPIOs heirs hospital or school site or other useful
rendered the proceedings after OLIMPIOs death non-agricultural purposes . . . .
NULL AND VOID
ISSUE: Whether or not the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent is c. Under the provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee is
inherited by the compulsory heirs? not only the right of the landowner-lessor BUT ALSO
WHEN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY desires so
HELD: YES i. THEREFORE, how can it be personal when the
law allows an immediate family member to eject
1. Judge Dizon is correct in saying that the case is not an ordinary an agricultural lessee
ejectment case, it is an agrarian case. ii. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground
a. HOWEVER, even if public policy is involved, the for ejectment was not a right exclusive and
GENERAL RULE that an ejectment case survives the personal to the landowner-lessor.
death of a party 2. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's
immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-

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lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) till the land, so why cant the immediate family members of the lessor eject
allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In them? PARITY lang.
this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who
cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm The Heirs of Vda. De Haberer vs. CA (1981)
household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in
"personal cultivation." PETITION FOR REVIEW BY WAY OF APPEAL FROM RESOLUTIONS OF
3. Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but THE CA, DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE LATE FLORENTINA VDA DE
the immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor HABERER (Hehe! Haberber!)
as well.
a. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR
FACTS:
Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely personal right of
the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was
transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in- FLORENTINA VDA DE HABERER filed complaints (ergo, 2 cases)
interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the for recovery of possession of the parcel of land situated in
judgment in CAR Case Mandaluyong, she was the duly registered owner. She filed the
4. ON THE DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY to inform the court of his case before the CFI Rizal
clients death o She alleged that the private respondents entered and built
a. In case of a partys death, the court, if the action survives houses
shall then order upon proper notice the legal May 26, 1971 The CFI dismissed all complaints
representatives of the deceased to appear and to be On the motion of FLORENTINA the cases were reopened and
substituted within a period of 30 days or the time granted retied due to newly discovered evidence
by court. o September 15, 1972 The CFI still issued an order reviving
b. The case was compared to the case of FLORENDO vs. its previous decision (dismissing all complaints)
COLOMA (almost the same facts) The 1972 decision was appealed to the CA
i. But the line of reasoning in the FLORENDO CASE is o The cases were erroneously dismissed in the lower court,
1. Petitioners challenged the CA decision after the death for being allegedly filed out of time.
of the plaintiff Since no legal representative Jan 1975, the SC rendered its judgment setting aside the CAs
substituted CA lost jurisdiction therefore, dismissal on appeal and ordered the reinstatement of the case for
proceedings null the proper disposition on the merits.
2. But then? The Lawyer failed to inform the court of the o Because the appeal was perfected in time
plaintiffs death THEREFORE, the supervening The cases were remanded to the CA
death of the plaintiff DID NOT EXTINGUISH her civil o FLORENTINA was required to file a printed brief within 45
personality decision valid days from her receipt of notice
REMEMBER in this case, the Court said, even if there was no notice of o 3 days before the period was to expire, June 18, 1975,
death, the action is NOT PERSONAL because the substantive law FLORENTINAs counsel requested for an extension of
allows immediate family members of the Landowner-lessor to eject an time to file
agricultural lessee. The lessees immediate family members are allowed to The request was granted, they were given a 90
day extension

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June 1975, the private respondent appellants brief and/or a resolution suspending the
opposed the extension by filing a running of the period.
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Nov 24, 1975 the CA DENIED the request for extension and
Extension of Time to File Brief dismissed the appeal
THEN, FLORENTINA DIES on MAY 26, 1975 o The appellant had 195 days to file the brief
o Her counsel gave the CA notice of her death on June 28, Dec 8, 1975, FLORENTINAs counsel filed a MR explaining why
1975. they made requests for extension/suspension
Her counsel also asked to suspending the o Due to the uncertainty that their services may no longer be
running of the period to file appellants brief retained by the heirs or legal representatives of their
pending the appointment of an executor of her deceased client BUT felt that they had the right to
Estate in the CFI QC preserve the right of such heirs pursuant to R 3, S 17 of
There was already a petition for the probate of the Rules of Court, pending the settlement of
her will (meaning, the will was submitted in court, FLORENTINAs estate
and the court has to determine if it is a valid will.) o The printed brief for the appellant, wasnt printed for
Guys, when a person dies, her Estate professional ethical considerations pending the courts
(has a personality), an executor is resolution
someone that is named in her will to o They also submitted 2 separate orders issued by
execute what is stipulated in her will. If The Court of Agrarian Relations
the person assigned to execute is a girl CFI Guimba, Nueva Ecija
shes called an EXECUTRIX THESE orders granted the deceaseds counsels
o If you get to read prayer to hold in abeyance further proceedings
ADMINISTRATOR/ADMINIST therein pending the appointment of an
RATIX, court appointed yun, administrator
not named in the will. CA denied the reconsideration stating that, litigants have no right
Respondents then contend that the lawyers of the deceased NO to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of
LONGER HAD ANY LEGAL STANDING and could no longer act in course
her behalf because the client-attorney relationship has been o BUT the COURT (SC) says that the CA erred in applying
severed (because FLORENTINAs dead) the principle and summarily denying reconsideration
The motion FLORENTINAs counsel gave on June 28, 1975 o NOTE: The attorney would thereafter have no further
remained UNACTED and the original extension granted was about power or authority to appear or take any further action in
to expire. the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and
o Sept 18 1975, her counsel filed a motion asking to an take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's
extension of 60 days and/or resolution suspending the rights in the case.
running of the period.
o CA had remained silent ISSUE: Whether or not the client-attorney relationship was terminated by the
o Nov 14, 1975, not certain whether the heirs would retain death of FLORENTINA (deceased-client)?
the counsel, they filed another extension of time to file
HELD: NO.

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1. The deceaseds counsel properly informed the court of the case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every
death of FLORENTINA opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial
a. The sought suspension of the proceedings and period for injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse
filing appellants brief PENDING THE APPOINTMENT of parties principally, since they are in actual possession of
the executor of the deceaseds estate before CFI QC the disputed land.
2. S 17, Rule 3 sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death b. The better and certainly the more prudent course of action
of the parties in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and
a. After the notice of a partys death and the claim is not decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on
extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal technicalities, especially where no substantial prejudice is
representative of the deceased to appear within 30 days caused to the adverse party.
or the time granted. 7. The dismissal of an appeal based on the appellant's failure to file
3. Since there was no administrator of the estate, the suspension of brief is based on a power granted to respondent Court of Appeals
the running of the period within which to file appellants brief was and not on a specific and mandatory duty imposed upon it by the
well-taken. Rules.
a. THE CA should have set a period for the substitution of a. Since it is not MANDATORY
the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs i. failure of an appellant to file his brief within the
i. IF the CA ruled this way, then the representative time prescribed does not have the effect of
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the dismissing the appeal automatically
interest of the deceased ii. the Court of Appeals has the discretion to dismiss
1. BUT THEY DIDNT, the CA gravely or not to dismiss appellant's appeal, which
erred in not following the rule! discretion must be a sound one to be exercised
4. When a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or the play having in mind the circumstances obtaining
heirs of the deceased in each case
a. SINCE NO SUBSTITUTION TOOK PLACE, the trial by the b. prima facie meritorious case which should be properly
court are NULL and VOID determined on the merits and "the element of rigidity
i. Because the court did not properly acquire should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal cover the matter"
representatives or heirs. 8. On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted with their Manifestation the
5. The Original 45-day period should have been automatically written authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by
suspended until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant instituted heirs and/or legal representatives of the testate
by her executor or administrator or her heirs. estate of the deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
6. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant granting said counsels full authority to file and prosecute the
is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his case and any other incidental cases for and in their behalf,
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor a. Such manifestation and authority may be deemed the
or property on technicalities formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact
a. A liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to they appear as petitioners in the title of the case at bar.
the Rules, is justified not only because appellant (in this

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9. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and respondent court's Alice died in 1955, leaving the 50 shares to her husband,
resolutions of November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 are set John Young, Sr
aside. RTC of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her
a. The cases are remanded to the CA for further proceedings children, herein [respondents]
and proper determination of the appeal on merits Five days later (25 September) children reached the age
10. SIDE NOTE: counsel for respondents Felipe C. Navarro be of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan Realty
disbarred for "gross misconduct and/or malpractice" to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the
stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof,
Super complicatedpero I think the last issue yong related sa new stock certificates in the names of [herein
discussion natin respondents].
Respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the
RGINIA O. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, MAE GOCHAN-EFANN, right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders
LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN JR., DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN, by the Articles of Incorporation.
FELIX O. GOCHAN III, MERCEDES R. GOCHAN, ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the [respondents]
ANGELINA R. GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MARIA MERCED R. GOCHAN, [respondents] Cecilia GochanUy and Miguel Uyfiled a
CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR., MARION R. GOCHAN, MACTAN REALTY complaintwith the SEC forissuance of shares of stock to the
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. RICHARD G. YOUNG, DAVID G. of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of
YOUNG, JANE G. YOUNG-LLABAN, JOHN D. YOUNG JR., MARY G. officers and directors and damages against respondents the
YOUNG-HSU and ALEXANDER THOMAS G. YOUNG as heirs of Alice heirs of Alice. A Notice of LisPendens was annotated on real
Gochan; the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOHN D. YOUNG SR.; and properties of the corporation
CECILIA GOCHAN-UY and MIGUEL C. UY, for themselves and on Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:
behalf and for the benefit of FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY (1) the SEC ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the
CORPORATION, respondents. action; (2) the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-in-
interest and ha[d] no capacity to sue; and (3)
[respondents] causes of action [were] barred by the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Statute of Limitations-granted
Petitioners filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of
FACTS: LisPendens-granted
Respondents filed MR-denied
Gochan Realty, for brevity was registered with the SEC with Felix Res appealed to the SEC en banc denied saying that it
Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy Go Tiong, Pedro Gochan, was filed 97 days late, beyond the 30-day period for
TomasaGochan, Esteban Gochan and CrispoGochan as its appealsand that motion for reconsideration did not
incorporators. interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion
Felix Gochan Sr.s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein was pro-forma.
respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Respondnet went to CA-ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over
Realty from the former. the case as far as the heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned,
because they were not yet stockholders of the corporation. On the

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other hand, it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia action dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of
GochanUy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held that the intestate Alice.
Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party.
Hence petitioner filed petition was filed in SC Petitioners further claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. was not
properly represented. They claim that when the estate is under
RULING: administration, suits for the recovery or protection of the property or
rights of the deceased may be brought only by the administrator or
Personality of the Spouses Uy to File a Suit Before the executor as approved by the court
SECIssue:
SC: Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which is cited by petitioner in
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by support of their position, reads:
the allegations in the complaint. For purposes of resolving a motion to
dismiss, Cecilia Uys averment in the Complaint -- that the purchase of her Sec. 3.Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
stocks by the corporation was null and void ab initio is deemed admitted. prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect either against or in capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
favor of anyone; it cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
which it refers.Thus, Cecilia remains a stockholder of the corporation in view an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Although she was no longer registered authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for
as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
stockholder of Felix Gochan& Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as principal.
between said parties.
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with
Capacity of the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. Issue: administrators, states:
(CIV.PRO related take note of this for discussion)
Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which
Petitioners contend that the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is survive. - For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
not an indispensable party, as there is no showing that it stands to deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of
be benefited or injured by any court judgment. the deceased, actions for causes which survive.

SC: One of the causes of action stated in the Complaint filed with the SEC The Rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
refers to the registration, in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
Young, of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable
Young Sr. Since all the shares that belonged to Alice are still in his name, to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
no final determination can be had without his estate being impleaded in the categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the
suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator
has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait

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for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights
and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the In a case entitled Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator Gasing
rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. was ordered to pay Sereno P43,606.47 for illegally dismissing the latter. LA
issued an Alias Writ of Execution directing Lavarez, Sheriff II of the NLRC to
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba levied a
action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to Fuso Truck in the possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was
unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder.
interests of the decedent, this Court recognized the heirs as proper
representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an RTC Davao del Sur
administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the Faustino Castaeda, filed a Complaint for recovery of motor
heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente
not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no lite against petitioner, Sereno, the Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao
administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the City
Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the Respondent alleged that:
heirs of John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered
before the SEC. owner of the truck
(2) Gasing merely rented the truck from her;
Therefore, in view of the effectivity of RA 8799the case should be (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the
remanded to the proper regional trial court, not to the Securities and truck because he was, at the time of the "taking," in
Exchange Commission. possession of the same; and
(4) since neither she nor her husband were parties to the
G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009 labor case between Sereno and Gasing, she should not
be made to answer for the judgment award, much less be
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA, Petitioner, deprived of the truck as a consequence of the levy in
vs. execution.
FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO
CASTAEDA, Respondents. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that:
(1) respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real
Facts: interests over the property subject of the instant complaint;
(2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that
1 the respondent has cause of action;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
2 (3) the allegations in the complaint do not contain sufficient
injunction assailing the Order dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
cause of action as against him; and
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No. 3488.

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(4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration DENIED
and Bond that would entitle the respondent to the delivery of SC rule 45
the tuck pendente lite. Petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the present
petition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed were
NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of resolved by the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. jurisprudence.

Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Third- SUB ISSUE: WON petitioner correctly availed of the mode of appeal under
Party Complaint. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
that the complaint does not state a cause of action. NO.

Motion to dismiss DENIED


The subject of the present petition is an Order of the RTC, which denied
petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, for lack of merit.
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the
following grounds:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants (the An Order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory. Under Section 1(c),
Sheriff could not serve a copy of the summons to Sereno, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable.
together with a copy of the complaint, because he was
already dead.); and BUT, the SC deemed it best to rule on the issues, not only for the benefit of
(2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of the bench and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the
legal personality to sue. case. Resultantly, SCs relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted.
Respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005.
SUB ISSUE : WON RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all
RTC (continuation) the defendants and that the same should be filed against his estate since
Respondent filed an Opposition (to the Omnibus Motion to Sereno (principal defendant) died before summons was served on him
Dismiss), contending that the failure to serve summons upon
Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint, because the NO.
other defendants have already submitted their respective
responsive pleadings. Moreover, respondent's death did not Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff,
render functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in- his deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy
fact, Faustino Castaeda, had long testified on the complaint thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. On the other hand,
on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint. against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss DENIED

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The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a (1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest
defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now thereon,
impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can
petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and
of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve
summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a
the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have property.
been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have
long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other
In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his
defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible
client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative.
defenses and objections personal to them in their respective motions to
dismiss and their subsequent answers.
The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the
defendants herein does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering
that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC, were validly served with summons and jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution
the case with respect to the answering defendants may still proceed was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to
independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in
previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his
Court. estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the
right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the
therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when
same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the
the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir,
case with respect to the three (3) other accused will proceed.
that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
therein.
CIVPRO ISSUE: WON case should be dismissed since respondent's
attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, has no more legal personality to sue
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make
on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during the
any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had
pendency of the case before the RTC.
actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any
proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or
NO. any one who succeeded her.

When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the The proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 dismissal of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff. The
of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his
against the decedent's representatives as follows: duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is

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effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered After investigation, the Committee found respondents liable for
thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court's insubordination, non-performance of duties and absences without official
jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. leaves (AWOL).

SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies Petitioner issued an order suspending respondents from their respective
pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the positions for two months.
heirs will still continue to engage the services of the Attorney-in-fact is
another matter, which lies within the sole discretion of the heirs. The CSC
Petition is DENIED. Respondents then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
contending that their right to due process has been violated. During the
G.R. Nos. 161166-67 February 03, 2005 pendency of respondents appeal, petitioner issued an order dropping them
MAYOR RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG, petitioner, from the roll of employees by reason of their unauthorized absences. Again,
vs. they appealed to the CSC.
MICHAEL C. TONGNAWA and ANTONIO GAMMOD, respondents.
DECISION CSC issued a Resolution affirming petitioners order suspending
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: respondents from the service for two months. They moved for
reconsideration but were denied by the CSC, prompting them to file with the
Facts Court of Appeals a petition for review.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the joint Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals Meanwhile, the CSC issued another Resolution affirming petitioners order
dropping respondents from the roll. When their motion for reconsideration
Petitioner was formerly the mayor of the municipality of Tanudan, Province was denied by the CSC, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a
of Kalinga. Michael Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the petition for review.
municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator,
respectively, of the said municipality. CA
The Court of Appeals, in its joint Decision, granted respondents petitions for
Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent respondents a review, reversing the CSC challenged Resolutions and reinstating them to
memorandum ordering them to explain within 72 hours why they should not their respective positions and ordering the payment of their corresponding
be administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public servants and back wages.
failure to perform their duties. Respondents submitted to petitioner their
respective explanations. Petitioner filed a joint motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner issued an Executive order creating a Municipal Grievance
Committee to investigate the charges against respondents. Guilbert Hence, the instant petition.
Dangpason, then the vice-mayor of Tanudan, was designated Chairman.
In their joint comment, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
personality to file the instant petition because he had ceased to be the

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municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga; and that the CSC, being the adversely affect its integrity. Significantly, it has not challenged the assailed
aggrieved party, is the proper party to file this petition. Decision.

Issue Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with this Court the instant
Who may appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals? petition assailing the Appellate Court Decision, was no longer the mayor of
Tanudan.

Ruling Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
In resolving the issue, the concept of "real party in interest" becomes relevant, thus:
relevant.
"Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity
provides: and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against
"SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue
the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto,
benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and
The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest accorded an opportunity to be heard." (underscoring ours)
or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, Interpreting the above rule, in Miranda vs. Carreon, Heirs of Mayor
or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest Nemencio Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, and Roque, et al. vs. Delgado, et al.,
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an we held that where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the
action. appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his
successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to
We hold that the CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed.
in this case and, therefore, can contest the assailed joint Decision of the
Court of Appeals before us. Records show that upon petitioners cessation from public office, his
The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of the successor did not file any manifestation to the effect that he is continuing
Court of Appeals because it has been mandated by the Constitution to and maintaining this appeal.
preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. Thus, any We thus agree with the respondents that petitioner has lost his legal
transgression by herein respondents of the CSC rules and regulations will personality to interpose the instant petition.

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G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006 De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions
were paid by him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners, stock increase and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock
vs. increase or a total of P336,375. Thus, on March 31, 1992, de
HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, Guzman sent a demand letter to the spouses Carandang] for the
VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA payment of said total amount.
and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents. The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount, contending
that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio
RULING: THE RTC DECISION IS VALID DESPITE THE FAILURE TO Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for
COMPLY WITH SECTION 16, RULE 3 OF THE ROC, the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration
BECAUSE OF THE EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE HEIRS OF for Arcadio Carandangs technical expertise, his newly
PLAINTIFF OVER THEIR PERSONS AND THE CASE WAS purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION 7 MONTHS BEFORE radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness
PLAINTIFFS DEATH. on their part.
RTC: DE GUZMAN: RECOVERY OF SUM OF MONEY WITH
Facts: DAMAGES.
RULED IN FAVOR OF DE GUZMAN.
o On June 5, 1992, de Guzman filed his complaint, seeking
to recover the P336,375 together with damages.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals


CA: AFFIRMED THE RTC DECISION.
Decision and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision
o Spouses Carandang appealed to the CA.
rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter
M.R. DENIED.
referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan
to Quirino A. de Guzman. SC: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether the decision of the RTC is void for failing to comply
Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders
with section 6, Rule 3 of the ROC.
as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System
(MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty
six percent (46%) respectively. HELD: NO.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased,
from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC,
subscribed by the spouses Carandang. having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void
Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its capital for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, the spouses Carandang yet which provides:
again subscribed to the increase.
They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock. SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of

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his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the o Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or appearance or a failure to object.
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground IN THE CASE AT BAR, not only do the heirs of de Guzman
for disciplinary action. interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the jurisdiction.
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or o In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but
minor heirs. express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or the Court of Appeals and in this Court).
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of o The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being
thirty (30) days from notice. bound by the Decision of the RTC.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased o Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to
party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear In People v. Florendo, where we likewise held that the
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring proceedings that took place after the death of the party are void, we
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be gave another reason for such nullity: "the attorneys for the offended
recovered as costs. party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death
In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal of the latter, the principal x x x."
representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal Nevertheless, IN THE CASE AT BAR, the case had already been
representative appeared in court to be substituted for the submitted for decision before the RTC on 4 June 1998, several
deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the months before the passing away of de Guzman on 19 February
appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, including 1999.
appellant, ever asked to be substituted for the deceased. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de
o As a result, no valid substitution was effected, Guzmans counsel were conducted before the promulgation of the
consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over RTC Decision.
appellant for the purpose of making her a party to the case Consequently, de Guzmans counsel cannot be said to have no
and making the decision binding upon her, either authority to appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the
personally or as a representative of the estate of her death of de Guzman.
deceased mother. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the
HOWEVER, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their
conferred by law and is not subject to the discretion of the parties, persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of
jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance
waived either expressly or impliedly. of de Guzmans counsel.

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Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988.
SUB-ISSUE: Whether the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of
state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations.
allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party- Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan
plaintiff. or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned
during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal
HELD: NO. property.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de
SPS. CARANDANGS CONTENTION: Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof.
o Since three of the four checks used to pay their stock In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties
subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de in interest.
Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
party. jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
o Being such, the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to action, for the recovery of co-owned properties.
join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner
dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is not brought in who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is
the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion an indispensable party thereto.
to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
states no cause of action." They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
SC disagrees with the contention of the sps. Carandangs. accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
de Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action
their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses
Family Code the husband alone may institute an action for the Carandang.
recovery or protection of the spouses conjugal property. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and
Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party
and "indispensable party." thereto.
o A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the Rule 3, Sec 18 to 22
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
o On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in Romualdez v Tiglao GR 51151, July 1981
interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one Facts: Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of
who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. Included in
party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of
already parties, or for a complete determination or the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The TC rendered a
settlement of the claim subject of the action.

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decision in favour of the plaintiffs. The judgment was not satisfied o General manager and board chairman was Maximo M.
notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. Paz G. Romualdez, et al. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were
filed Civil Case members of the Board; defendant Leonor Moll.
14424 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and his NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra
sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted. It should be stated trading activities. An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter
that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and NACOCO from fulfilling these contracts. Nature supervened. Four
her estate was being settled. The administratrix of Tiglaos estate questioned devastating typhoons visited the Philippines. Coconut trees
the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit to revive judgment. CA ruled throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Copra
for the revival of judgment. production decreased. Prices spiralled. Warehouses were
destroyed. Cash requirements doubled. When it became clear that
Issue: W/N he Estate of Tiglao can be liable? the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the
board for approval
Held: Yes. This argument is simply answered thus: the original judgment has Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation apprised the board of
become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. the impending heavy losses. No action was taken on the contracts.
(Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented Then, President Roxas made a statement that the NACOCO head
against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is did his best to avert the losses, emphasized that government
precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is concerns faced the same risks that confronted private companies,
not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in that NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw was to
the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums remain in his post. The buyers threatened damage suits. Some of
therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate. the claims were settled, but one buyer, Louis Dreyfus & Go.
(Overseas) Ltd., did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of
20 SCRA 1967 Manila, upon claims as follows: For the undelivered copra. All
The Board of Liquidators settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52. NACOCO seeks to recover
vs the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board
Heirs of Maximo Kalaw chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro
Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under
FACTS: Article 1902 of the old Civil Code and defendant board members,
including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was approved the contracts. During the pendency of the case, Kalaw
chartered as a non-profit governmental organization avowedly for died.
the protection, preservation and development of the coconut
industry in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether the action is enforceable against the heirs of Kalaw?
NACOCO's charter was amended by RA 5 (yes, ganito na katanda
ang kasong ito) to grant that corporation the express power "to buy, RULING:
sell, barter, export, and in any other manner deal in, coconut,
copra, and desiccated coconut, as well as their by-products, and to Yes. The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw for
act as agent, broker or commission merchant of the producers, having entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the
dealers or merchants" thereof. board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; and is against

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Kalaw and the other directors for having subsequently approved the said heirs filed MD- granted on the ground that the legal
contracts in bad faith and/or breach of trust." Clearly then, the present case representative, and not the heirs, should have been made
is not a mere action for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for
from contract. The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the action is recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings
embraced in suits filed "to recover damages for an injury to person or should be initiated and the claim filed therein
property, real or personal", which survive. Action against the Kalaw heirs MR-denied, Hence to SC.
and, for the matter, against the Estate of Casimiro Garcia survives.

G.R. No. L-18107 August 30, 1962 RULING: Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a
decedent's executors or administrators:(1) actions to recover real and
MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS, personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
plaintiffs-appellants, (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The
vs. present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that
HERMOGENES LLEMOS, deceased defendant substituted by his "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends
representatives, to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs.
PERPETUA YERRO-LLEMOS, HERMENEGILDO LLEMOS, FELINO Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R., 1395). To maliciously cause a
LLEMOS and AMADO LLEMOS, defendants-appellees. party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly
injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta, L-4369, Aug. 31, 1953).
FACTS:
However, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences,
Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. CFI-granted. Appeal was
Aguas jointly filed an action in the CFI-Samar to recover damages dismissed.
from Hermogenes Llemos
Alledging that Llemos had served them by registered mail Rule 4 Venue
with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with
notice that the same would be submitted to the said court G.R. No. 156187 November 11, 2004
of Samar
that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner,
proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila
vs.
accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN,
such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos
FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD
maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs'
MARTIN, respondents.
expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing
Facts:
them mental anguish and undue embarrassment
Llemo died before he filed his answer so plaintiffs
amended their complaint to include the heirs of the Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of several
deceased-granted businesses under the name of Noahs Ark.

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Petitioners applied for a P900,000,000 Omnibus Line accommodation ISSUE: WON petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage
(secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land) with respondent is a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue.
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)) Pesos and was favorably acted
upon by the latter. SC via petitiones petition for review on certiorari.

The approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as
subsequently cancelled by UCPB. provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or
Go demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs covered by Real condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for
Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same. real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts --
the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
RTC Mandaluyong City property or any part thereof lies.
Respondent UCPB filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
mortgage. enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000. property. The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the
regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff
RTC Pasig City or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in
damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of Section 2 of Rule 4.
preliminary injunction, against respondent bank and its officers
Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss based on different The cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition,
grounds including: is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a
2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue; real property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is
petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction - necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real
GRANTED. action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place
the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000, where the subject property lies.
was enjoined. (see last bullet RTC Mandaluyong)
UCPBs motion to dismiss- DENIED No. L-44351. May 18, 1978.
UCPBs MFR DENIED HOECHST PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. FRAN-CISCO TORRES and
the Honorable PROCORO J. DONATO, Judge of the Court of First
CA Instance of Isabela, respondents.
UCPB filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65)
directed the trial court to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Facts
Petitioners MFR DENIED
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

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only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare respondent court without by agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion
authority to take cognizance of private respondents action for Breach of of the court.
Contract with Preliminary Injunction and to enjoin said court from further
taking any action in said case upon the ground of improper laying of the The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioners
venue. action was filed It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated
that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any
CFI action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal.

Private respondent, Francisco Torres, filed with respondent Court of First Change or transfer of venue from that fixed in the rules may be effected
Instance of Isabela upon written agreement of the parties not only before the actual filing of the
A complaint alleging breach of a distributorship contract on the part action but even after the same has been filed.
of petitioner, Hoechst Philippines, Inc.
The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is
The contract provides that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is
this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the competent only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue
courts of the Province of Rizal. by agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion
Venue has been improperly laid in respondent court. of the court.

Respondents Argue: The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioners
The word shall in the stipulation in question should be construed action was filed. It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated
to be merely permissive and not mandatory. that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any
The stipulation as to venue was meant to apply only to suits to be action shall he in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal. No further
filed by petitioner. stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both parties agreed that
It is maintained that there are no words in the contract expressly any action by either of them would be filed only in the competent courts of
restricting the venue to the courts of Rizal. Rizal province exclusively.
It is urged that to give effect to the stipulation in controversy is to
serve the convenience and the purpose of the petitioner only. Indeed, there may be instances when an agreement as to venue may be so
oppressive as to effectively deny to the party concerned access to the courts
Its effect is to discourage, to deter, to render expensive and
by reason of poverty. In such an eventuality and depending on the peculiar
uneconomical the filing of suits by small-time company distributors
circumstances of the case, the Court may declare the agreement as to
against the petitioner.
venue to be in effect contrary to public policy,despite that in general,
changes and transfers of venue by written agreement of the parties is
Ruling
allowablewhenever it is shown that a stipulation as to venue works
injustice by practically denying to the party concerned a fair opportunity to
The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written
file suit in the place designated by the rules.
agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is
not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is

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Petition granted. I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise
G.R. No. 106920 December 10, 1993 out of this promissory note.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, o As security for the re-payment by respondent Circle of the
vs. sums loaned by petitioner Bank, eight (8) individuals, who
HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN, Judge of Regional Trial Court of were impleaded as defendants in the complaint executed
Makati, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 146; CIRCLE a Continuing Surety Agreement and undertook to pay
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, AVELINO E. DEATO, JR., MIGUEL F. jointly and severally respondent Circle's obligations.
VIOLAGO, BENJAMIN F. SANTIAGO, SOCORRO R. GOMEZ, NERISSA o Only five (5) out of eight (8) individual obligors are
T. GLORIA, FILEMON C. MARQUEZ, DOMINGO SANTIAGO AND respondents in present case.
HILARIO P. LOPEZ, respondents. o On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations
under the promissory notes.
RULING: THE STIPULATION AS TO THE VENUE OF ACTION MUST o Petitioner Bank demanded payment from the eight (8)
CLEARLY INDICATE THROUGH QUALIFYING AND individual sureties conformably with their promises
RESTRICTIVE WORDS THAT THE PARTIES DELIBERATELY contained in the Continuing Surety Agreement; the
INTENDED TO EXCLUDE CAUSES OF ACTIONS FROM THE individual obligors, however, also failed to pay.
OPERATION OF THE ORDINARY PERMISSIVE RULES ON
VENUE TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY OTHER COURT. PETITIONER: ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT.
Facts: ALLEGATION: CIRLCE BECAME INSOLVENT AND PLACED
UNDER RECEIVERSHIP BY CB.
o Petitioner moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary
Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a
attachment, alleging that respondent Circle had become
commercial banking corporation with principal office at Makati,
insolvent and had been placed under receivership by the
Metro Manila.
Central Bank.
RTC MAKATI: PETITIONER: COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY
RTC: GRANTED THE MOTION.
o Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a
o The trial judge granted the motion and issued a writ of
sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, at
preliminary attachment.
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
o Bank alleges that respondent Circle Financial Co.
(hereafter "Circle"), sometime in 1983 and 1984, through The sheriff's return indicated, however, that no properties
its representatives, obtained several loans aggregating belonging to the respondent Circle and the individual obligors
P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. could be found.
o Respondent Circle, for value received, delivered to RESPONDENT: MOTION TO DISMISS.
petitioner Bank four (4) promissory notes, each of GROUND: VENUE OF ACTION IMPROPERLY LAID,
which contained the stipulation that: AGREEMENT WAS IN VALENZUELA ONLY.
o A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle
and the five [5] individual sureties served with summons)

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and averred that the venue of the action was improperly HELD: NO. THE AGREEMENT WAS PERMISSIVE.
laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions
arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement,
Manila, only. may change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to
o Respondents called the trial court's attention to the another.
stipulation contained in the promissory note, quoted in The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the
limine. parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where
such words are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the
RTC: GRANTED MOTION, CASE DISMISSED. will of the contracting parties.
M.R DENIED. A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation "I/We hereby
HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: legal action which may arise out of this promissory note" shows
o The stipulation contained in the promissory notes is that the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in
merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily.
the tribunals to which the parties may resort. The plain or ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of,
o Petitioner thus insists that the venue stipulation set out in or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there is not the slightest
the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts.
actions arising out of those notes to the courts of Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably
Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the other courts received judicial approval and the Court have declared that either of
recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court
under the Rules of Court. named in the stipulation.
o Thus, venue was properly laid by petitioner Bank in the o The stipulation here does not purport to deprive either
place where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, party of it right to elect, or option to have resort to, another
Metropolitan Manila. competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, should such party choose to
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: initiate a suit.
The stipulation here merely operated to confer or confirm a right
o Aver that the words used in the stipulation here involved upon a party to elect recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or,
are clear and unambiguous. alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals envisaged by
o A promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a specific court, the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and
without an express reservation of the right to resort to one Bulacan.
or more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be
Rules of Court, is an agreement definitely fixing the distinguished from stipulations which purport to require or compel
permissible venue in only one place, i.e., Valenzuela, to the parties to lay venue of an action in a specified place, and in that
the exclusion of other competent courts. particular place only.
o The latter type of venue stipulation must clearly indicate,
through QUALIFYING and RESTRICTIVE words, that
ISSUE: Whether the agreement as to the venue of action was EXCLUSIVE.
the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or

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actions from the operation of the ordinary permissive rules Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against respondents because the
on venue, and that they intended contractually to respondents action was unwarranted, unjustified, malicious, abusive and
designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other capricious.
court also competent and accessible to the parties under Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the venue of the
the ordinary rules on the venue of actions. Stipulations of action had been improperly laid in the RTC of Makati.
this exclusionary nature may, under certain
circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss by alleging that their cause of
contrary to public policy and, accordingly, not judicially action is not based on the lease contract and, therefore, the case is not
enforceable. covered by the stipulation as to venue. Instead it is governed by the general
3
rule as to venue stated in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). They also alleged that even
In the case at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., assuming that the stipulation is applicable, it does not operate to limit the
"must," "only" or "exclusively") were employed which could yield an venue to Pasay City but merely provides for an additional forum.
intent on the part of the parties mandatorily to restrict the venue of
actions arising out of the promissory notes to the courts of The trial court dismissed petitioners' action on the ground of improper venue.
Valenzuela only. MR was likewise denied.
The case is remanded to the RTC.
Hence this petition
GESMUNDO vs.JRB REALTY CORPORATION
Issue: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati.
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (Branch 148), dismissing on the ground of improper venue a Held: No. It was improperly laid.
complaint which the spouses Virgilio B. Gesmundo and Edna C. Gesmundo
2
filed against the JRB Realty Corporation and Jaime R. Blanco. We have in the past held stipulations limiting venue as valid and binding on
4
the contracting parties, based on Rule 4, sec. 3 which provides:
Facts:
Petitioner Virgilio B. Gesmundo, as lessee, and respondent JRB Realty Venue by agreement. By written agreement of the parties, the venue of
Corporation, represented by its president, respondent Jaime R. Blanco, as an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.
lessor, entered into a lease contract covering Room 116, Blanco Suites, at
246 Villaruel St., Pasay City, the parties stipulating that the venue for all In the case at bar, it is clear from the parties' contract that the venue of any
suits will be the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City.Petitioner action which they might bring are the courts of competent jurisdiction in
received a letter terminating their lease. Respondent Blanco told petitioner Pasay City.The language used leaves no room for interpretation. This
Gesmundo that the Corporation where Gesmundo works did not pay him his means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in
retainer fees and that he did not want petitioner in any of his apartment units. Rule 4, sec. 2(b).
Petitioner asked for reconsideration but was ignored, and instead was forced
to vacate the leased premises. Petitioner leased another apartment. This case is different from Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, where in
Polytrade there was an absence of any qualifying or restrictive words, while
Procedural Facts: in this case the word all suits plainly restricted the venue.

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The stipulation in this case is similar to that involved in Hoechst Philippines, Thus, venue was properly laid in Manila. A motion for
Inc. v. Torres. reconsideration of said order was likewise denied.
[G.R. No. 158138. April 12, 2005]
On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents' alleged debt was based
PHILIPPINE BANK OF, COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner,
on the Promissory Note. The parties' Surety Agreement, though
vs.
ELENA LIM, RAMON CALDERON, and TRI-ORO INTERNATIONAL silent as to venue, was an accessory contract.
TRADING & MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondents. ISSUE:

Whether the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on


venue stipulated in the PN?
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Philippine Bank of Communications filed a complaint against


Respondents Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon and Tri-Oro International RULING:
Trading & Manufacturing Corporation (Tri-Oro) with the Regional Yes. The cases pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to Makati
Trial Court of for the collection of a deficiency amounting to City as the proper venue.
P4,014,297.23 exclusive of interest.
In enforcing a surety contract, the 'complementary-contracts-construed-
Petitioner alleged therein that [respondents] obtained a loan from it together doctrine finds application. According to this principle, an accessory
and executed a continuing surety agreement dated November 16, contract must be read in its entirety and together with the principal
1995 in favor of [petitioner]. agreement.
Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon respondent's The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case. Incapable of
request, the most recent being evidenced by a Promissory Note standing by itself, the SA can be enforced only in conjunction with the PN.
Renewal in the amount of P3,000,000.00. It was expressly
stipulated that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of Petitioner approved the loan covered by the PN, partly because of the SA
said promissory note shall be Makati City, 'to the exclusion of all that assured the payment of the principal obligation. It makes no sense to
other courts' argue that the parties to the SA were not bound by the stipulations in the PN.
Respondents allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity.
Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by By inserting the provision that Makati City would be 'the venue for any legal
respondents valued at P1,081,600.00 leaving a deficiency balance action that may arise out of the Promissory Note, petitioner also restricted
of P4,014,297.23 as of August 31, 1999. the venue of actions against the sureties. The legal action against the
sureties arose not only from the SA, but also from the PN.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.
Young Auto Supply vs. CA, 223 SCRA 670
The trial court denied said motion asseverating that petitioner had
separate causes of action arising from the promissory note and the
continuing surety agreement. FACTS:

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Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio But without waiting for the resolution of the motion, he filed a
Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy, sold all of petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals- order dismissal
their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development on the ground of improper venue
Corporation (CMDC) to Roxas.(8M price payable 4M-Dp,4M- MR-denied, Hence they went to SC
4postdated check)
After the execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of the RULLING:
four markets of CMDC. However, the vendors held on to the stock CA erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu
certificates of CMDC as security pending full payment of the City, they relied on the address of YASCO, as appearing in the Deed of
balance of the purchase price. Sale dated October 28, 1987, which is "No. 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay
down-payment, was honored by the drawee bank but the four other City." This was the same address written in YASCO's letters and several
checks representing the balance were dishonored commercial documents in the possession of Roxas. In the Regional
Roxas sold one of the markets to a third party. Out of the proceeds Trial Courts, all personal actions are commenced and tried in the
of the sale, YASCO received P600,000.00, leaving a balance of province or city where the defendant or any of the defendants
P3,400,000.00 resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title to plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff [Sec. 2(b) Rule 4,
the proceeds of the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia. Revised Rules of Court].
YASCO and GARCIA filed a complaint against Roxas in the
RTC- Cebu City, praying that Roxas be ordered to pay There are two plaintiffs in the case at bench: a natural person and a
petitioners the sum of P3,400,00.00 or that full control of the domestic corporation. Both plaintiffs aver in their complaint that they are
three markets be turned over to YASCO and Garcia and residents of Cebu City, thus:1.1. Plaintiff Young Auto Supply Co., Inc.,
prayed for the forfeiture of the partial payment . ("YASCO") is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
ROXAS failed to file answer and he was declared in Philippine laws with principal place of business at M. J. Cuenco Avenue,
default but was later lifted by court Cebu City. It also has a branch office at 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City,
Metro Manila.
ROXAS filed MD on the grounds that: The complaint
did not state a cause of action due to non-joinder of
Plaintiff Nemesio Garcia is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and with
indispensable parties;The claim or demand set forth
business address at Young Auto Supply Co., Inc., M. J. Cuenco Avenue,
in the complaint had been waived, abandoned or
Cebu City. . .
otherwise extinguished; and The venue was
improperly laid- Denied
RoXas filed another motion for extension of time to The Article of Incorporation of YASCO (SEC Reg. No. 22083) states:THIRD
submit his answer and MR -denied for being pro- That the place where the principal office of the corporation is to be
forma and Roxas was again declared in default, on established or located is at Cebu City, Philippines (as amended on
the ground that his motion for reconsideration did not December 20, 1980 and further amended on December 20, 1984) (Rollo, p.
toll the running of the period to file his answer. 273).
Roxas filed an unverified Motion to Lift the Order of
Default which was not accompanied with the required A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is
affidavit or merit. applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is

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located as stated in the articles of incorporation. The Corporation Code 1st dishonor Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit
precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in
the "place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located which April 2000.
must be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14 [3]). The purpose of this requirement 2nd dishonor occurred when Saludo used his principal credit
is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan
it to be ambulatory. while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi
If it was Roxas who sued YASCO in Pasay City and the latter questioned the Tanaka
venue on the ground that its principal place of business was in Cebu City, The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified
Roxas could argue that YASCO was in estoppel because it misled Roxas to as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending
believe that Pasay City was its principal place of business. But this is not the petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance
case before us.With the finding that the residence of YASCO for purposes of covering the period of March 2000. Subsequently, his credit card
venue is in Cebu City, where its principal place of business is located, it and its supplementary cards were cancelled by respondents on
becomes unnecessary to decide whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu July 20, 2000.
City and whether Roxas was in estoppel from questioning the choice of Respondent raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
Cebu City as the venue. action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006 venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a
resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not
residents of Southern Leyte and that Saludo was not a resident
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate,
vs.
which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and
and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City.
DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.
To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner
Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a
Facts: lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint a quo.
RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte Respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative
American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers. Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
The complaint alleged that Saludo "is a member of the House of Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Improper Venue.
Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, AMEX "is a engaged in He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in
providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that
office at Makati City." he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take
dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress,
supplementary card issued to his daughter. he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the

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Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He SC
was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines- The petition is meritorious. Saludo was a resident of Southern
Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued holding the venue was properly laid
at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents
office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed
event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
one's residence.
TC denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
improperly laid. commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
Respondents MFR DENIED plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
CA where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
grave abuse of discretion In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as
TRO was issued which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts
quo from conducting further proceedings of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
CA ruled that venue was improperly laid temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said absent, one has the intention of returning.
rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff
This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October,
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or
1954 that -
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his
with continuity and consistency place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
Petitioners MFR DENIED residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper


venue

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"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Luis (Felicisimo). During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six
or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus: children,Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son.
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or Divorce in the United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody.
plaintiff.' Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, before the
Minister of the United Presbyterian in Los Angeles, California. He
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San the time of their marriage up to his death.
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after
the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of RTC
an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is
entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed a petition for
to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
304-305.) Respondent alleged that:
She is the widow of Felicisimo;
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.* That the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse,
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage;
That the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007.* valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
Facts failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals. place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the Decision of the the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134; and its Resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San the dismissal of the petition. The trial court issued an Order denying the two

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motions to dismiss. Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed her
opposition thereto. She submitted: The trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
Documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house petition. Edgar manifested that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers.
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid resident of the Province of Laguna.
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City.
Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed Respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code void ab initio.
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage with Felicisimo marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
This would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
Family Code. Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to children.
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge
The trial court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration. It Arcangel but said motions were denied.
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. CA

The motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic because Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. the orders of the trial court.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan. Edgar also filed a were denied by the Court of Appeals. Edgar appealed to this Court via the
motion for reconsideration from the Order denying their motion for instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it motion to adopt the said petition which was granted.
was based.
SC

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Petitioner's Arguments: It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing
Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
administration was improperly laid: domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
Because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
Cruz, Laguna. distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, residence is and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
time. actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
Respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous one place and domicile in another.
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
Paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
administration. property.
She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart
Issue Center and Chinese General Hospital indicating the address of Felicisimo at
Whether venue was properly laid. Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased
Ruling in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc.
Letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
The petition lacks merit. children to him at his Alabang address, and
The deceaseds calling cards stating that his home/city address is
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of at Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the
case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
determining the residenceas contradistinguished from domicileof the Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
(Emphasis supplied) filed in the Regional

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Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both
subject petition was filed in December. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares.
Makati City. Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband, Gregorio
Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
reinstating and affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied RTC BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE:
petitioners motion to dismiss and its Order which dismissed petitioners PETITIONER: 2 COMPLAINTS FOR CONVEYANCE OF SHARES
motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to OF STOCK, ACCOUNTING AND RECEIVERSHIP OF UEC
the trial court for further proceedings. SHARES AND RECOVERY OF 65% OF FEMII SHARES.
o In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC
SO ORDERED. two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock,
accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO).
G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008 o The first, covered the UEC shares and named Benedicto,
his daughter, and at least 20 other individuals as
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G. RESLIN, defendants.
and JOSE G. RESLIN, petitioners, o The second, sought the recovery to the extent of 65% of
vs. FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other defendants
COURT OF APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA named therein.
BENEDICTO-PAULINO, respondents.

ST
RESPONDENT FRANCISCA: MOTION TO DISMISS THE 1
RULING: CO-PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT PRINCIPAL PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT.
CASE, VENUE OF ACTION MUST BE WHERE THE GROUND: IMPROPER VENUE.
PRINCIPAL PLAINTIFF RESIDES. o Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto's
st
daughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss the 1 complaint,
followed later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss.
Facts:

ND
RESPONDENT BENEDICTO: MOTION TO DISMISS THE 2
COMPLAINT.
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto,
GROUND: IMPROPER VENUE.
now deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto Group) nd
o Benedicto, on the other hand, moved to dismiss 2
organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and
complaint, adopting in toto the five (5) grounds raised by
Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively.
Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss. Among
these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate

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dispute over which the Securities and Exchange PETITIONER: M.R. and MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED
Commission, not the RTC, has jurisdiction; (2) venue was COMPLAINT.
improperly laid; and (3) the complaint failed to state a GROUND: ADDED ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS; PETITIONERS
cause of action, as there was no allegation therein that TRUSTEES, FROM ILOCOS NORTE.
plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted o Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene
the trust created in her favor. filed on July 17, 2000 a Motion (to Admit Amended
To the motions to dismiss, Irene filed a Consolidated Opposition, Complaint), attaching therewith a copy of the Amended
which Benedicto and Francisca countered with a Joint Reply to Complaint dated July 14, 2000 in which the names of
Opposition. Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin
Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were consolidated. appeared as additional plaintiffs.
BENEDICTO AND FRANCISCA: PETITIONER DOES NOT o As stated in the amended complaint, the added plaintiffs,
RESIDE IN BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE. all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees.
o During the preliminary proceedings on their motions to
dismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering RTC: DENIED PETITIONERS M.R. BUT GRANTED MOTION TO
their contentions on improper venue, presented the Joint ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Affidavit of household staff at the Marcos' Mansion in Brgy. GROUNDS: CURED THE DEFECT OF IMPROPER VENUE.
Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain o RTC dictated in open court an order denying Irene's
residence in said place as she in fact only visited the motion for reconsideration aforementioned, but deferred
mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in action on her motion to admit amended complaint and the
the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at opposition thereto.
her husband's house in Makati City. o The RTC predicated its order on the following premises:

PETITIONER: COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE ISSUED ON (1) Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
11/07/99 IN CURIMAO, ILOCOS NORTE. Irene may opt to file, as a matter of right, an amended
o Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene complaint.
presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC)
issued on "11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support (2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was
her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte. a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended
In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and was complaint setting out the same cause of action cured the
substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca. defect of improper venue.
RTC: DISMISSED BOTH COMPLAINTS.
GROUND: PETITIONER DID NOT ACTUALLY RESIDE IN
(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4
ILOCOS NORTE, VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID.
allow the filing of the amended complaint in question in
o On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints, the place of residence of any of Irene's co-plaintiffs.
stating that these partly constituted "real action," and that
Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore,
M.R. DENIED.
venue was improperly laid.

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GROUND: PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO AMEND HER Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal
COMPLAINTS BEFORE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING HAS actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff
BEEN FILED. and his witnesses.
CA: RESPONDENTS: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised
CA: ISSUED TRO AND WPI ENJOINING RTC FROM seasonably, else it is deemed waived.
PROCEEDING WITH THE COMPLAINTS. o Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to
CA: SET ASIDE RTC ORDERS AND DISMISSING THE dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the
COMPLAINTS. same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have
o Respondents went to the CA via a petition for certiorari, waived his right to object to improper venue.
seeking to nullify the RTC orders.
M.R. DENIED. In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the
o Irene and her new trustees' motion for reconsideration of earliest time possible, meaning "within the time for but before filing
the assailed decision was denied through the equally the answer to the complaint," the matter of improper venue.
assailed June 20, 2002 CA Resolution. o They would thereafter reiterate and pursue their objection
on venue, first, in their answer to the amended
Hence, this petition for review before the SC. complaints and then in their petition for certiorari
before the CA.
ISSUES: o Any suggestion, therefore, that Francisca and Benedicto
or his substitutes abandoned along the way improper
venue as ground to defeat Irene's claim before the RTC
1. Whether respondents waive improper venue.
has to be rejected.

HELD: NO.
2. Venue was improperly laid.

2. Whether the venue in this case was improperly laid.


a. Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions.

HELD: YES.
It is the posture of respondents that the venue was in this case
improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a real action
1. Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue.
involving real properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTC in Batac.
Petitioners maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively This contention is not well-taken.
precluded from raising the matter of improper venue by their In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of
o To petitioners, these pleadings, taken together, signify a damages.
waiver of private respondents' initial objection to improper Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or
venue. possession of real property, or interest therein. In accordance with
This contention is without basis and, at best, tenuous. the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be

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the proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area SC points out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of
The venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed.
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb, in the
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident confines of this case, the factual determination of the trial court and
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. the premises holding it together.
In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt
his Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.
Irene's purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the
of the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene's favor the Rules of Court adverts to as the place "where the plaintiff or any of
necessary conveying deed over the said 65% shareholdings. the principal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended
In other words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust complaint.
arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued sometime in June 2000
o The fact that FEMII's assets include real properties in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her address as
does not materially change the nature of the action, Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment.
for the ownership interest of a stockholder over o Let alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic
corporate assets is only inchoate as the corporation, residence certificate practically anytime in any Bureau
as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. of Internal Revenue or treasurer's office and dictate
o It is only upon the liquidation of the corporation that the whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene
stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their procured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the her motion for reconsideration following the RTC's
corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their pronouncement against her being a resident of Batac.
stockownership.
c. Co-plaintiffs are not principal parties.
The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit
against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos
Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte
to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. is where the principal parties reside.
They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the
properties instead of against persons. status of Irene's co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule
o SC particularly notes that possession or title to the real 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4, which pertinently provide as
properties of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed, albeit follows:
part of the assets of the corporation happens to be real
properties.
Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
b. Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of
Rule 4

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SEC. 2. Parties in interest. -- A real party in interest is the party who Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue.
by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or o According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, "the word
defended in the name of the real party in interest. 'principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure rule]
in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. -- Where the action is allowed residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue."
to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone o Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and the purpose of
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the Rule would, to borrow from Justice Regalado, "be
the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a the action since the latter would not have the degree of
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law interest in the subject of the action which would warrant
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit and entail the desirably active participation expected of
of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the litigants in a case."
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal. Before the RTC in Batac, in the 2 Civil Cases, Irene stands
undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest.
Rule 4 Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be
VENUE OF ACTIONS commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. -- All other actions may be As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal Withal, that court was an improper venue for her conveyance
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant action.
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. The Court can concede that Irene's three co-plaintiffs are all
residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest o But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one
plaintiff is Irene. of the three can be considered as principal party-
As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be plaintiffs in the 2 Civil Cases, included as they were in
benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. the amended complaint as trustees of the principal
It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. plaintiff.
Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as o As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of
co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new designated Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of
trustees. the beneficiary who must be included in the title of the
As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest.
Irene. o In the final analysis, the residences of Irene's co-
plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the
venue of the subject suit.

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o This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed
that Irene herself initiated and was actively by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 1 and 2 thereof
prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, clearly state:
assigns, or associates, virtually rendering the
impleading of the trustees unnecessary. Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in
or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for
d. Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action. the payment of money of the fulfillment of any other obligation, the
provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in
which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not
Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park,
provision for the same is made in the power.
Makati City.
o She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos
Section 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the
Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have
province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place
several residences, if such were the established fact.
within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of
stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal
building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is
situated.

SPS. OCHOA v CHINA BANKING CORP


The case at bar involves petitioners mortgaged real property located in
Paranaque City over which respondent bank was granted a special
Facts: For resolution is petitioners motion for reconsideration of our
power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section
resolution denying their petition for review on certiorari for failing to
2, the sale can only be made in Paranaque City.
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and
sanctioned by Section 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply
Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated
to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank
exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners complaint
because the provision of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an
for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the
extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, but not on respondent banks
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with
With respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No.
the same court.
3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly
with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the
Issue: Whether venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners
general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
complaint but not on respondent banks
Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant
Held: We disagree.
only to actions arising frm or related to the mortgage, such as
petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and
Damages.

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(3) there was still a necessity for the MTC to issue an order
Motion for reconsideration DENIED. following the close of the pre-trial conference

Rule 5 Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts ISSUE: Whether CAs decision to remand the case to the MTC was proper

224 SCRA 557 (1993) RULING:


BAYUBAY
VS Yes, it was proper. The Court was merely enforcing the mandatory
CA provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

FACTS: The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take into
Proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for ejectment filed account the pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary
by petitioner Bayubay in the MTC of Los Baos, Laguna on the Procedure that require the immediate issuance by the Municipal
ground of expiration of lease. Trial Court of an order which clearly and distinctly sets forth
In his answer, private respondent argued that it had the option to the issues of the case and the other matters taken up during
renew the term of the lease contract under such conditions as may the preliminary conference.
be agreed upon by the parties and set up the defense of estoppel. The order is an important part of the summary procedure because it
MTC rendered a decision holding that the contract of lease had is its receipt by the parties that begins the ten-day period to submit
expired because no extension had been agreed upon by the parties the affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec. 7, which reads
as required by the agreement. as follows:
Private respondent appealed to the RTC of Calamba, Laguna on Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10) days
the ground that "the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses
the parties to submit their respective position papers and and other evidences on the factual issues defined therein,
affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of together with a brief statement of their petitions setting
which, defendant's right to due process was violated." forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
RTC affirmed the appealed decision. However, it was reversed by There was no order issued to that effect nor was there any
the CA, which ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for indication of when the position papers were to be submitted for the
further proceedings. purpose of discussing the factual questioning raised.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that: Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
(1) the failure of the MTC to give the private respondent the administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in
opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose
constituted a denial of due process; that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each
(2) the questions raised were not only questions of law because other. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is
the answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
improvements allegedly made by the lessee on the premises, and rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
damages; and

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Lucas vs. Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226, Jan. 31, 2000 "SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.
FACTS: (c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening
of trial.
Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in
Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment". J later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective
November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that
which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court
Lucas was the defendant in Ejectment case, alleged
after trial on the merits of the case. Here, the order of dismissal issued by
that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order granting
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary
the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the her
conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case.
previous order which dismissed the case for failure of
Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited
plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary
pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on
Conference.
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of
Lucas averred that it is elementary, under Section 19
discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to
(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that MR is
the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. Esmsc
prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the
rule, granted. She added that, notwithstanding the
fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in [G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002]
open court that the case is governed by the Rules on TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR
Summary Procedure,the judge ordered the revival of and TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents.
the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to
cause an injury to complainant.
JUDGE FABROS admitted that she granted the
FACTS:
motion for reconsideration even if the same is a
prohibited motion in an ejectment case in the interest
of justice. MTCC
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for
that respondent judge be fined in the amount of forcible entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that
P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land belonging to
the said spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials.
Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer
RULLING: As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
which the MTCC denied - being proscribed under the Rule on
under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of
hearing.

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Petitioner filed an answer -disregarded having been filed beyond CA
the ten-day reglementary period. Lot referred to in the present controversy was different from that
Petitoners motion to dismiss - denied as being contrary to the involved in the anti-squatting case.
Rule on Summary Procedure. It ruled that MTCC had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in
Ordered petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay rejecting petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court
rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit. reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership
of the property merely to determine possession -- an action that did
not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.
RTC
The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge.
Petitioners MFR - GRANTED only insofar as to determine the ISSUE: WON CA gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to
location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court Dismiss was a prohibited pleading
will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot
different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-
Squatting. In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any SC - Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court The Petition is meritorious.
might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution
would be issued.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar
is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such
process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City. period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse
of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file
Petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
move the deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer concerned ownership as well as possession.
could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week (*take
note) On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action
Respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed
ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar
disposal. may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through
a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for
more than one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not
before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their
cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the
MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

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A courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A
A motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of
matter is NOT a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of
the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer
has been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino:

The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. The speedy
not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be
resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and
expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an
the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed
which possession of the premises is already illegal from the start. For out that MAGDATOs defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even
this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on
motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such
trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.
failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary
period. However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue
nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural
of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited
technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to
pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure Because the Complaint for
override substantial justice.
forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on
Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated Summary Procedure was applicable.
the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002.*
motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991
FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge EDUARDO U.
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on
JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Alcala, Pangasinan,
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an
respondent.
exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings:

Facts
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Bias and Partiality, Abuse of Discretion and Neglect of Duty.
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the
complaint or information except on the ground Complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry against a certain Lorenzo L.
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being
or failure to comply with the preceding section; insufficient in some material allegations, so she filed a corrected complaint.

xxx xxx x x x Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing
that the new allegations in the complaint are false. After the period to answer

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lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Defendant opposed the motion. Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of
the building and even started with a new one.
Defendants motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge
on the ground that it was filed in the same proceedings and the
Based on the foregoing, complainant accused respondent Judge of Neglect filing fee was not paid.
of Duty anchored on the following grounds: The court motu proprio docketed the complaint for contempt as
Civil Case No. 744
Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike the required docket and other fees were paid by defendant.
Out. Inspite thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its On same date, the court issued an Order furnishing anew the
filing, thus defeating the summary nature of the case; defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge.
The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings These, complainant claims, cured the defect cited by
of fact because no hearing was conducted relative thereon; defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss.
Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the Respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the
defendant in his Order granting the motion to strike out when he pointed out prejudice of herein complainant.
x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant asserts that the same is to be In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint he said:
expected because the defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainants counsel in the forcible
being rectified in the later one; entry case, of having a penchant for filing administrative cases
Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, against him instead of appealing decisions before the proper court.
unacted upon. None of the charges had any factual or legal bases.
His Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost
Defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the good faith, honesty and sound discretion.
construction of a one-storey building on the subject land.
The OCAs Recommendation
To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application for Preliminary
Injunction. Acting thereon, respondent Judge issued a Temporary After investigation of this case, the OCA found that:
Restraining Order and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date, Respondent failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
complainant was able to present evidence in support of her application while he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a
defendant chose not to present controverting evidence and to just submit a common procedure in municipal courts.
memorandum. Accordingly, it recommended that respondent be FINED in the
amount of P10,000.00 and warned that the commission of a similar
On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO, complainant filed an Extremely infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. Defendant
filed his memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has Ruling
not ruled on her application on preliminary injunction.
We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note

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that this is respondents second infraction. Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that prevent them
from deciding cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional
The Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely to achieve an time from this Court.
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to observe the Respondent has failed to do so. He ought to know that the speedy
period within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy.
administrative sanctions. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and His inaction for almost three years on complainants Motion for
expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension. Summary Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of
summary proceedingsto promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant determination of cases.
provisions on ejectment. He has evidently been remiss in resolving the By tarrying too long in deciding this forcible entry case, he failed to
forcible entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. live up to the mandate of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain
judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of professional competence.
the Complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the
defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross
service of the summons. ignorance of the law and is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos
Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment, (P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar offenses
even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the will be dealt with even more severely.
reglementary period. SO ORDERED.
under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render
his decision within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 September 26, 2005
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them.
This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for DR. JOSE S. LUNA, Complainants,
Summary Judgment, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rules on vs.
Summary Procedure. JUDGE EDUARDO H. MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial Court, Buenavista,
Marinduque, Respondent.
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious
degree of incompetence. When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not
RULING: RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BELATED
to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A member of the
ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN
bench must be constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments,
FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THE SERVICE OF
bearing in mind that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable
SUMMONS.
to the correct dispensation of justice.

Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in resolving the FACTS:
incidents, it was not intentional but merely brought about by pressure from
work. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT
JUDGE FOR VIOLATION OF RRSP.
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondents sala, though MTC BUENAVISTA MARINDUQUE: PETITIONER: UNLAWFUL
unfortunate, cannot excuse him from due observance of the rules. DETAINER.

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o In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
detainer, against Florencio Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa (the BELATED ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS.
defendants) with the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista,
Marinduque presided by respondent. HELD: YES.
o The defendants filed an unverified answer to the
complaint, seven (7) days beyond the reglementary period
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and
of ten (10) days from the service of the summons on them.
confidence in the judiciary.
PETITIONER: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT.
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
GROUND: SECTION 6 OF RRSP.
Such a requirement is especially demanded in forcible entry and
DENIED. unlawful detainer cases.
M.R. ALSO DENIED. For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve perturbation
o Dr. Lunas counsel filed a Motion for Judgment, invoking of social order, which must be restored as promptly as possible,
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, to such that technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
which motion the defendants did not file any opposition. unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided.
o By Order of August 28, 2003 respondent denied the
That explains why the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which
motion.
governs ejectment, among other cases, lays down procedural
safeguards to guarantee expediency and speedy resolution.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint against
respondent, Dr. Luna asserting that as the defendants answer was Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide:
unverified and belatedly filed, respondent should have motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered judgment as
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
the plaintiff. xxx
In his Comment respondent explains that his admission of the
defendants unverified, belatedly filed answer was premised on "the
spirit of justice and fair play, which underlie[s] every court litigation Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer
and serves as the bedrock to preserve the trust and faith of parties the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu
litigants in the judicial system;" proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
That the admission was proper because the delay was negligible, it
prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion
involving only four (4) days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were non-
reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being
working holidays (per presidential proclamation in connection with
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the
the Independence Day celebration);
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or
That the defendants might have believed that the period to file
more defendants.
answer was 15 days, which is the usual or common period to file an
answer; and that the delay was also excusable as defendants acted
pro se, without the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory. The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory
character.

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Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the After summons and a copy of the complaint were served,
nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the Macalinao failed to file her answer. BPI moved for a judgment
adjudication of the suits covered thereby. pursuant to Sec6 of the Rules of Summary Procedures.
To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory MTC ruled in favor of BPI ordering Macalinao to pay P141,518.34
maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. plus 2% per month penalty from Jan. 5, 2004.
In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the Macalinao appealed before the RTC. RTC affirmed the decision in
above-said Rule. toto.
Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is She then filed a petition for review with the CA. CA affirmed but
not a free commodity that may be availed of in all instances under with modification, reducing the amount to P126,706.70 plus 3%
the cloak of rendering justice. penalty charge from Jan. 5,2004. She filed a MR, but was denied.
Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules applies only Macalinao filed the instant case, arguing that the CA erred in using
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. the P94,843.70 as basis of the recomputation and should have
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is dismissed the case for failure of BPI to prove the exact amount of
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with her obligation.
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy Issues:
administration of justice. W/N the interest and penalty charges of 3% per month were unconscionable
and iniquitous.
W/N the complaint should be dismissed or remand it to the lower court for
failure of respondent to prove the exact amount of the obligation.

Held:
Macalinao v BPI
Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private respondent Jaime
Facts: Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however, irrelevant to the resolution
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the of the issue in this case since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of
decision of CA denying Macalinaos MR an action without regard to their residence.
Macalinao was an approved cardholder of BPI Mastercard, and as
such made some purchases through the use of the said card. Petitioners claim that their cause of action is not based on the lease contract
because it seeks neither its implementation nor its the cancellation.
She subsequently received a letter from BPI demanding payment of
P141,518.34 including the 3% interest per month and an additional Petitioners' action is for alleged breach of the lease contract which, it is
11
penalty of 3% per month for a delay in payment under the terms contended, was terminated to spite them. Petitioners view this act of
respondents as an abuse of right under arts. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
governing its issuance.
Code, warranting an award of damages. Their cause of action is ultimately
The BPI filed a complaint for sum of money with MTC Makati for
anchored on their right under the lease contract and, therefore, they cannot
failure to settle its obligation and prayed for payment of
avoid the limitation as to the venue in that contract.
P154,608.78 inclusive of 3.25% finance charges and 6% late
payment charges plus 25% attorneys fees.
The contention of the petitioner that the dismissal of their case based on
improper venue is a mere technicality and should not be sustained was

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without merit, where the court said that procedural rules are required to be o Petitioners filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss the
followed except only for the most persuasive reasons. Therefore, Petitioners appeal of respondents, on the ground that the order was
must abide by their agreement. not yet final and that it is not appealable. DENIED. MR
was also denied.
PETITION DENIED Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion on denying their motion to
Azucena Go and Regena Gloria Siong dismiss the appeal. (Kasi yung respondents nag file ng motion to
vs. appeal dun sa pag suspend ng ejectment case.)
Court of Appeals and Star Group Resources and Development Inc. Respondent filed with the RTC a motion to resume proceedings in
the ejectment case.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside and reverse the o RTC granted this motion and directed the remand of the
consolidated decision of the CA, which disallowed the suspension of the records of the case to the MTCC.
ejectment proceedings. o Petitioners filed MR and Clarification. DENIED.
Petitioners filed a petition for review in the CA. Alleged therein was
(An appeal was entertained by the RTC and CA despite the fact that it is not the issue that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
allowed by the Rules of Court and Summary Procedure. In the defense of granted the motion to resume proceedings in the MTCC. (Badtrip
the RTC and CA, there was a procedural void wherein walang magiging yung petitioners kasi natuloy yung ejectment case, diba nga sila
remedy si respondent at baka tumagal ng tumagal ang kaso niya. Sabi ni yung nagpatawag ng suspension nun?)
SC, sige okay lang, because if strict compliance with rules will result in o CA issued a TRO, enjoining RTC from further proceeding
injustice then the rules may be relaxed. Kawawa naman kasi si respondent with the case. After the TRO lapsed, the RTC remanded
kapag suspended yung case niya tapos di niya alam kung kalian matutuloy the records to the MTCC.
ito.) Petitioners filed a motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings,
with the MTCC. DENIED. MR also DENIED.
FACTS: (Malabo itong kaso na ito, Im trying my best to deliver the best Petitioners filed a motion for an injunction and ordered respondents
digest possible) to refrain from continuing the ejectment case in the MTCC until the
Respondent filed with the MTCC of Iloilo an ejectment case against specific performance case has been disposed of. (MTCC =
the petitioners. Ejectment Case; RTC = Specific Performance)
o Upon motion of the petitioners, Court issued an order Court of Appeals: Recognizing that there is a procedural void in
holding in abeyance the preliminary conference of the the Rules on Summary Procedure, CA sustained the
ejectment case until after the case for specific correctness of an appeal as a remedy to challenge the
performance, involving the same parties shall be suspension of the Ejectment Suit by the MTCC.
decided upon by the RTC of Iloilo. In short, the case for o Purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to
Ejectment will be indefinitely be suspended. (Before achieve expeditious and inexpensive determination of
the ejectment case kasi, there was a specific performance cases with regard to technical rules.
case filed by the same parties, ito naman sa RTC, yung o The prohibition against petitions for certiorari involving
ejectment sa MTCC.) interlocutory orders was included to forestall useless
o An appeal was filed by respondents questioning the petitions and to avoid delays.
order of the court. The appeal was assigned to the RTC.

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o The inaction on the MTCCs order of suspension due to Under an extraordinary circumstance of having to suffer a procedural void,
the procedural void will defeat rather than promote the the court is forced to provide a remedy consistent with the objective of
speedy disposition of cases. speedy resolution of cases.
While technicalities have their uses, resort to
them should not be encouraged when they serve As held by the CA, the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to
only to impere the speedy and just resolution of achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without
the case. regard to technical rules. In this case, however respondent challenged the
Petitioners elevated the case to the SC. MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit to avoid mischief that may emanate
therefrom.
ISSUE:
SC hold that in situation where summary proceeding is indefinitely
Whether the CA erred in allowing the appeal of an interlocutory suspended, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be
order? allowed. Respondents, herein, filed an appeal questioning the interlocutory
order. This move of the respondents was upheld by the CA and RTC to fill a
RULING: procedural void. SC affirms this ruling. The said appeal should be treated
as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The court said that whenever a procedural void exists, no remedy is
In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA noted that there was a sanctioned by law. The court is empowered to promulgate rules according to
procedural void in the summary proceedings in the MTCC. Section 5, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution, categorically rules of procedure.
(Respondent will not have a remedy based from the procedural rules.) The courts are even onligated to suspend the operation of the rules when a
rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice that it frustrates rather than
(Summary ng facts na napakalabo) MTCC suspended the preliminary
promote substantial justice. The power of the court to suspend its own rules
conference of the Ejectment suit, upon motion of the petitioners, until the
or to except a particular case from their operations whenever the purposes
termination of the pending Specific Performance suit involving the same
of justice require it, cannot be questioned.
parties. Respondents appealed to the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it was an interlocutory order and not
subject to an appeal.

Court said, the order that was subjected to the appeal was interlocutory,
Rule 6 Kinds of Pleadings
because it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
done by the trial court on the merits of the case. It is obvious that an
Buncayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Property, G.R. No. 170483, Apr. 19, 2010
interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. The proper remedy is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating
FACTS:
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the
Clearly private respondent cannot appeal the order. But neither can it file a two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the
petition for certiorari, because the ejectment suit falls under the Revised foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia
Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g), which considers petitions for Hotel started its construction in the area and later formed
certiorari as a prohibited pleading.

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themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim1 in favor
Association, Inc. (DSierto) of respondent.
6 parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) where the resort
situated were transferred to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704 before the RTC- Laoag against respondent alleging that his son
Petitioner and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) not binding upon him. The issue raised by petitioner was his claim
and was granted a provisional permit. for damages while respondents issue was only his claim for
Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation possession of the property occupied by petitioner and damages.
(respondent) filed a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting
the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by
RTC Dismissed the claim of plaintiff for and granted the
DSierto members.
counterclaim of the defendant for recovery of possession
DENR Regional Executive Director denied the foreshore lease of the lot occupied by the plaintiff.
applications of the DSierto members, including petitioner, on
Pet went on appeal to CA-affirmed RTC, Hence, petition
the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within the
was filed in SC.
titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory?
The DSierto members appealed the denial of their applications-
DENR Secretary denied the appeal on the ground that the area
applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on RULLING:
the final verification plan.
Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager invited the A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any
DSierto to discuss common details beneficial to all parties relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
concerned. Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos), wife of Governor which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected,
Bongbong Marcos, was asked by Fort Ilocandia hotel officials with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
to mediate over the conflict among the parties. Atty. Marcos the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within
offered P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the
consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
that they would vacate the area identified as respondents jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer
property. A DSierto member made a counter-offer of to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is
P400,000, to which the other DSierto members agreed. permissive.

Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who


attended the meeting, manifested that he still had to consult his
parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure exerted
by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the

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The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to
characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim. The Court further prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a
ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before
the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of this Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of
time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve docket fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory
the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial court in relation to the
same basic controversy between the parties. second counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice to a
separate action which respondent may file against petitioner.
The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive are as follows: Therefore, SC DISMISS respondents permissive counterclaim without
prejudice to filing a separate action against petitioner.
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
the counterclaim largely the same? G.R. Nos. 158090 October 4, 2010
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim, absent the compulsory rule? GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or vs.
refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by his daughter,
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim JOCELYN G. CABALLERO,Respondents.
and the counterclaim?
FACTS:
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory. In this case, Respondent filed three On March 7, 1968, Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) and his
counterclaims. The first was for recovery of the P400,000 given to Manuel, wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner GSIS in the amount
Jr.; the second was for recovery of possession of the subject property; and of P20,000.00. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real estate
the third was for damages. The first counterclaim was rendered moot with mortgage on the same date, mortgaging a residential lot situated at Rizal
the issuance of the 6 November 2003 Order confirming the agreement of the Street, Mlang, Cotabato as security.
parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
and to return the P400,000 to respondent. Respondent waived and
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, the
renounced the third counterclaim for damages. The only counterclaim that
subject property was foreclosed, and was sold at a public auction where the
remained was for the recovery of possession of the subject property.
petitioner was the only bidder.
While this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy
between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set up in
the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondents second For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the designated
counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a
Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a compulsory new TCT was issued in the name of petitioner.
counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of the main
case.

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On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public counterclaim which required the payment by gsis of docket fees before
bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando's daughter, Jocelyn the trial court can acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim.
Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00 but since CMTC
was the highest bidder (P450,000) it was awarded the subject property. A An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of Party was filed by the
new TCT was issued in the name of CMTC. surviving heirs of Fernando, who died on February 12, 2002.

RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato SC - petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45


Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact,
Jocelyn Caballero filed a case against CMTC, the GSIS and its The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA's Decision insofar as it
responsible officers. deleted the trial court's award of P249,800.00 in its favor representing
Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC.
of the bidding.
Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim
Defenses and Counterclaim. The GSIS alleged that Fernando lost for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a
his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against
property; however, he did not avail of such option compelling the petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No.
GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as mandated by 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's
law. counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket
In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that Fernando owed petitioner fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals, including
additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and the
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has
additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
devised the following tests:
representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita
Ang Hao from January 1973 to February 1988.
TC dismissed the complaint and granted petitioner's counterclaim; (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
MFR denied counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims,
CA absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
affirmed RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? and
ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
favor of petitioner, be deleted. counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
Petitioner filed MFR - denied that the counterclaim is compulsory

Petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals


ISSUE: WON CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS' collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed
counterclaim, among others, of p249,800.00 representing rentals collected by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale
by private respondent from CMRC is in the nature of a permissive

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and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the In said case, the Court ruled that:
recovery of rentals.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
of the property in its favor. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire necessarily fails.
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important
Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire institutional safeguard of the Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess
by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of
these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only
the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same, considering constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise
petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees. an essential element of the Court's fiscal independence.

In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government No. L-28466. March 27, 1971.
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that
the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. ALBERTO T. REYES, SATURNINO LIWANAG AND LORENZO
8291, which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
of all kinds," CANNOT operate to exempt it from the payment of legal TEODORO KALAW, JR. respondents.
fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
Facts
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the
Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Appeal by petitioners-plaintiffs from the decision of the Court of Appeals
Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Plaintiffs-appellants are lessees of defendants premises located in Manila,
where they also conduct their respective businesses. The lease was oral

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and on a month-to-month basis. Plaintiffs have been occupying the premises modification that plaintiffs should also pay to defendant Kalaw the sum of
for a period of from 10 to 15 years as of the filing of the complaint. P50,000.00 as temperate damages.

Defendant started sending out to each of said plaintiffs notices to Ruling


vacate the premises to give way for the demolition of the old
building occupied by them and the eventual construction of a new We must call attention to the fact that the rules, which have the force of law,
one. provide the manner and occasion when issues are to be raised for
Each of the said notices gave plaintiffs a period of time within which adjudication. If the rules were to be ignored and We permit litigants to raise
to move out. issues without order and regulation, confusion would arise. This would
The last notice gave said plaintiffs 24 hours within which to vacate certainly happen were we to allow the issues the defendant raised in his
the premises. answer in the Court of First Instance. The defendant-appellant is not
precluded from raising his counterclaim in a separate action if he decides to
do so. But in view of the fact that the trial in the Court of First Instance in an
Defendant started the demolition of the roofing and upper sidings of the appeal is merely a trial de novo, We are constrained to dismiss the
building and also the fencing thereof, although the demolition of the back counterclaims in pursuance of the dictates and mandate of the rules.
portion actually started earlier. (Emphasis supplied)

City Court While said damages arose out of, or are necessarily connected with, the
same transaction or occurrence which was the wrongful withholding of
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible entry with the City Court against possession, they are not a compulsory counterclaim because they exceed
defendant, praying, among others, for a writ of preliminary injunction (which the jurisdiction of the inferior court.
was granted) and damages.
Decision affirmed with modification
The defendant counterclaimed for ejectment and damages for alleged loss
of the use and occupation of his premises. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The City Court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Presiding Judge of Branch IX, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Defendants counterclaim for want of merit is hereby dismissed. Judicial Region, C.F. SHARP, INC. and FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING
& INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents
CFI
RULING: PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM WAS COMPULSORY,
Defendant appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of First Instance. In
THEREFORE THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT
a decision, later amended, the said Court dismissed the complaint and all
ITS OBJECTION ALSO DISMISSES THE COUNTERCLAIM,
claims and counterclaims, among others.
BEING AN ANCILLIARY ACTION.
CA
FACTS:
Both, parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered its RTC MANILA: SHARP: PROHIBITION WITH WPI.
decision, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance, with the sole

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o On February 10, 1988, Sharp, Inc., the herein private o Judge dismissed the complaint as well as the
respondent filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for counterclaim.
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of ICTSI: M.R. INSOFAR AS IT DISMISSED ITS COUNTERCLAIM.
Transportation and Communications, the Philippine Ports o CCTSI filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
Authority (PPA), E. Razon, Inc., and the International insofar as it dismissed its counterclaim.
Container Terminal Services Inc., the herein petitioner. o Meanwhile, it gave notice to the First Integrated Bonding
o The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43616 and Insurance Co., Inc. that it was claiming damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. against Sharp for the revoked injunction.
RTC: GRANTED WPI. M.R. DENIED.
o On March 7, 1988, the trial court issued a writ of o The trial court declared in part:
preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a bond
issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. in the x x x indeed a compulsory counterclaim
sum of P10,000,000.00. by the nature of its nomenclature arises
PETITIONER: ANSWER WITH A COMPULSORY out of or is so intertwined with the
COUNTERCLAIM. transaction or occurrence that is the
o On that same day, the petitioner filed an answer with a subject matter of the complaint so that by
compulsory counterclaim against Sharp (PLS. TAKE the dismissal of the latter, the same has
NOTE) for its unfounded and frivolous action. to be discarded, specially since the
o The petitioner claimed that as a consequence of the complaint was dismissed without any
complaint and the writ of preliminary injunction, it had trial.
suffered injuries which if monetized (would) amount to CA: AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION IN DISMISSING THE
more than P100,000,000.00. COUNTERCLAIM.
SC: NULLIFIED WPI. o The dismissal of the counterclaim was appealed to the
o On March 17, 1988, the writ of preliminary injunction was respondent court, which upheld the lower court on the
nullified by this Court in G.R. No. 82218. following justifications:
o We held that Sharp was not a proper party to stop the 1. Compulsory counterclaims for actual damages are not
negotiation and awarding of the contract for the the claims recoverable against the bond.
development, management and operation of the 2. Petitioners manifestation adopting Philippine Ports
Container Terminal at the Port of Manila. Authoritys motion to dismiss did not contain any
PPA: MOTION TO DISMISS SHARPS COMPLAINT. reservation. Hence, Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
o On March 25, 1988, the PPA, taking its cue from this Court will not apply. The counterclaim for damages
decision, filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint on being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee has
the above-stated grounds. been paid, was correctly dismissed.
This motion was adopted by petitioner CCTSI in a 3. Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court specifically
manifestation. provides that such damages (recoverable against the
RTC: DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS bond) may be awarded only upon application and after
COUNTERCLAIM. proper hearing, and shall be included in the final
judgment. The application must be filed before the trial x

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x x, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his HELD: YES.
surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his The counterclaim for damages alleged that the delay in the award
right to damages and the amount thereof. The of the MICT contract caused by Sharps complaint and writ of
application contemplated in Sec. 20 is distinct and preliminary injunction jeopardized the petitioners timetable to attain
separate from the compulsory counterclaim asserted in the projected volumes in its winning bid and, as well, caused it to
the answer. incur litigation expenses, including attorneys fees.
4. The filing in court of a claim against the injunction bond, We have consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory
with copy thereof being furnished the surety, was not where:
sufficient notice to the latter of an application against it 1. it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
under this bond. transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
SC: ICTSI: PETITION FOR REVIEW. opposing partys claim;
o The petitioner contends that the respondent court erred 2. it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
in sustaining the said order because: parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
1. Dismissal of the complaint upon 3. the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
defendants motion did not Tested by these requirements, the petitioners counterclaim
necessarily entail dismissal of was clearly compulsory.
defendants compulsory The petitioner itself so denominated it.
counterclaim. There is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it
2. A claim for damages arising from a would also refute the cause of action alleged in the private
wrongfully obtained injunction may be respondents complaint; in other words, the counterclaim would
made in a counterclaim. succeed only if the complaint did not.
3. There is no rule requiring a particular o It is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it
form of notice to the surety of could not remain pending for independent adjudication,
petitioners claim against the injunction that is, without adjudication by the court of the complaint
bond. itself on which the counterclaim was based.
For its part, the private respondent argues that the dismissal of Rule 17, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
the compulsory counterclaim should be sustained because:
1. The dismissal of the complaint upon petitioners motion Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court.
necessarily entailed the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be
2. The compulsory counterclaim raised by petitioner in its dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon
answer did not partake of the nature of a claim for damages such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper. If a counterclaim
against the injunction bond. has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
3. The notice given by the petitioner to the surety was fatally plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defective and did not comply with the requirements of the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
Rules of Court. independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COUNTERCLAIM WAS CORRECTLY order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
DISMISSED BY THE LOWER COURT.

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The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself joined the assuming this would still be possible. It did neither of these. The petitioner
PPA in moving for the dismissal of the complaint; or put now claims that there is no law requiring that reservation, but there is no law
passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private presuming it either.
respondents complaint.
Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined
with the complaint that it could not remain pending The petitioner cannot simply say now that it intended all the time to
for independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of preserve its counterclaim when it knew that under Rule 17, Sec. 2 if
the complaint which had provoked the counter-claim in the first a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
place. service upon him of a motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
o As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on dismissed against the defendants objection unless the
the petitioners own motion) operated to also dismiss counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by
the counterclaim questioning that complaint. the Court.
The counterclaim was not permissive.
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE o A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of
WRONGFUL ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION nor is it necessarily connected with the subject matter
CAN BE MADE IN THE FORM OF A COUNTERCLAIM. of the opposing partys claim.
HELD: YES. o It is not barred even if not set up in the action.

As held in Raymundo vs. Carpio: The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
It would seem that the proper practice to be followed in cases Most importantly, it had no independent existence, being merely
where it is desired to obtain damages by reason of the wrongful issuance of ancillary to the main action.
an attachment in favor of plaintiff that an issue would be tendered on the The petitioner knew all this and did not object to the dismissal of the
subject by the defendant in his answer in the main case. Such a tender complaint. On the contrary, it actually moved to dismiss that main
would present the question squarely in that court, and the parties having action, and in so doing also moved, in effect, for the dismissal of its
offered their evidence on the subject, the trial court could dispose of it along counterclaim.
with the principal action. It is not necessary that the defendant wait until it is
determined by a final decision in the main action that the plaintiff is not Metals Engineering v.CA
entitled to recover in order to present the question of his right to damages.
All questions which are material to the main action or which are incidental Petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the CA dismissing the
thereto but depending thereon should be presented and litigated at the same special civil action for certiorari and prohibition against the petitioner
time with the main action, so as to avoid the necessity of subsequent corporation.
litigation and consequent loss of time and money. However, there is no
glossing away the fact that it was the petitioner itself that caused the Facts:
dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not object to, but actually An action for the annulment of Agreement to Sell was filed by petitioner
moved for, the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioner cannot undo that corporation Metals Engineering against Jose Plaridel before the RTC. It
act. If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have objected to the was the petitioners contention that said contract was defective for having
dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it,

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no meeting of the minds between the parties as to its terms and payment Held: Yes.
thus said contract is unenforceable.
Despite the fact that the said contract is not perfected, defendant Plaridel A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action
prematurely executed the contract which caused the lots subject of the but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or
agreement to be sold to the public through an advertisement published in occurrence giving rise to it.
Manila Bulletin.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit
Subsequently, the Plaintiff tendered a check representing the full refund of and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it arises out of
the earnest money previously delivered by the defendant infavor of the or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
plaintiff inorder to rescind the imperfect contract. Defendant refused to subject matter of the complaint.
accept the same thus continued with his transaction which caused damages
to the petitioner corporation. It follows that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main
Defendant/Repondent in his Answer with Counterclaim alleging a action of the case and dismisses the same, then the compulsory
compulsory counter claim that due to the non fulfillment of the petitioner, counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be
defendant had to incur losses and tarnished reputation. dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the
counterclaim.
TC upon the defendants motion dismissed the case due to lack of
jurisdiction for non payment of docket fee.
Defendant then filed a Motion to set the case for the presentation of 184 SCRA 374 (1990)
evidence in support of his counter claim. Petitioner on the other hand COJUANGCO
moved that the same be dismissed on the ground that the principal action vs.
has been dismissed. VILLEGAS

TC denied the petitioners MR. Petition for certiorari and prohibition against the order of a co-equal court
(yep, shit happens.)
Petitioner went to the CA to file a special civil action, certiorari and
prohibition. FACTS:

CA dismissed the said special civil action, stating that since the order is Cojuangco filed an ejectment case against Villegas before the
merely interlocutory in nature and that at most it is merely an error of MTC. TC dismissed the case on the ground that Villegas and her
judgment, it cannot be corrected by certiorari. predecessors had been in actual possession of the disputed lot for
more than 60 years. Thus Villegas asserted an adverse claim of
Thus this case. ownership and transformed the suit into an accion publiciana which
is within the jurisdiction of RTC.
Issue: On appeal with the CFI(RTC) it reversed the decision of the MTC
W/N the compulsory counter claim filed by the defendant Plaridel will be and ordered Villegas to surrender the lot to Cojuangco.
dismissed upon the dismissal of the principal action filed by the Petitioner? On appeal to CA and SC both upheld Cojuangcos right of
possession.

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A writ of execution was filed by Cojuangco before the RTC. Villegas FACTS:
did not oppose but asked for a grace period to remove her personal
properties and improvements. Before the lapse of the grace period, RTC -BULACAN
Villegas filed a separate civil action against Cojuangco and the
provincial sheriff for specific performance with TRO and preliminary ESTHERLITA CRUZ-AGANA filed a Complaint for annulment of
injunction from enforcing the demolition order the case was raffled title with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against B.
before the RTC which enjoined Conjuangco and the sheriff from SERRANO ENTERPRISES, INC.LAGMAN(judge ng RTC)
enforcing the demolition order.

ISSUE: Whether Villegas separate civil action case for recovery of She claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz,
improvements in RTC Branch XVII is proper despite the ejectment case she is the sole owner of a lot covered by TCT.
previously filed by Cojuangco against the former. This lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who
later on transferred the lot to respondent.
RULING: Respondent filed its Answer with compulsory
counterclaim.
No. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the AGANA moved to dismiss respondents counterclaim for
land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it is inter-woven with lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping- DENIED trial
the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been court reasoned that respondents counterclaim is
presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not compulsory and therefore excluded from the coverage of
raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
subsequent litigation. The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to Petitioner filedMRinvoking the mandatory nature of a
enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. certificate of non-forum shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94- granted and dismiss the
Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim counterclaim
provides the answer. It states: Respondent filed MR arguing that Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims
Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that following the ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital
she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, the alternative v. Surla- granted and reversed itself and recalled its
claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least Order dismissing respondents counterclaim.
as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the buildings and
improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land. Petitioner went to SUPREME Court through Rule 65 . His
contention was the Courts rulings in Santo Tomas and Ponciano
The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case are contrary to the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 04-94
constitutes res judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior and other procedural laws.
judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also
such other matters as could have been raised but were not. ISSUE: Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. If
it is a permissive counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum
Agana vs. Lagman, G.R. No. 139018, April 11, 2005

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shopping is fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the lack of a certificate over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the
of non-forum shopping is immaterial. future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive.
SC RULLING: Petitioner is mistaken.!!!!!!!(galitlngsc?!!)The Constitution
expressly bestows on this Court the power to promulgate rules concerning Respondents counterclaim as set up in its answer states:3. That because
the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.Procedural matters are of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts of the plaintiff, herein
within the sole jurisdiction of this Court to prescribe. Administrative Circular defendant has suffered and continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of
No. 04-94 is an issuance of this Court. It covers a matter of procedure. at least P400,000,000.00 which the law, equity, and justice require that to be
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not an enactment of the paid by the plaintiff and further to reimburse the attorneys fees of
Legislature. This Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret, amend or P2,000,000.00;
revise the rules it promulgates, as long as the rules do not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. This is precisely the purpose of It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from
Santo Tomas as far as Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is concerned. the filing of plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the
main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The
In Santo TomasSC clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 counterclaim will require a re-litigation of the same evidence if the
with respect to counterclaims. The Court pointed out that this circular is counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a separate action. Even petitioner
intended primarily to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient recognizes that respondents counterclaim is compulsory. A compulsory
application of a party asserting a claim for relief. counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a
compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
In Ponciano v. Judge Parentela, Jr. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does
not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies to initiatory and
similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an
initiatory or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiffs
complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995
counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise,
respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an vs.
initiatory pleading which is the complaint. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, respondents.

In this casePetitioners counsel fails or simply refuses to accept Facts:


the distinction between a permissive counterclaim and a compulsory
counterclaim. This distinction was the basis for the ruling in Santo Tomas
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed
and Ponciano. .A compulsory counterclaim isany claim for money or
contract with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period
other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
covering April 16, 1980, to April 15, 1981. As part of Aramco's policy, its
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs
claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50
complaintIt is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of
kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. On April 1980,
the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties

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Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, CA-all parties appealed
with a 50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco SIA's appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees, which
reimbursed said amount. dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court.
The Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA satisfied the
In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees judgment totaling P802,435.34.
being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against
his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he SIA because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the
indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, non-renewal of his contract with Aramco, and not the alleged
SIA's manager notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification tampering of his excess bagged ticket
requested because their records showed that only three kilograms were SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is WON it
entered as excess and accordingly charged. After 4 months, SIA issued the was entitled to reimbursement from PAL
certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its granted PAL's appeal and absolved it from any liability to SIA.
investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer,
threatened it with a lawsuit. On April 14, 1981, Aramco gave Rayos his
travel documents without a return visa. His employment contract was SC - petition for review
not renewed. SIA argues that PAL cannot validly assail for the first time on
appeal the trial court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's
On August 5, 1981, the spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower
for the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco, sued it for court. It added that the appellate court should have restricted its
damages. SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL, as this
tampering was committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against
(PAL). It then filed a third-party complaint against PAL. PAL, in turn, PAL.
countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage;
that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; ISSUE: WON SIA is it was entitled to reimbursement from PAL
and that if any tampering was made, it was done by SIA's personnel.
YES.
RTC
Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Singapore The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone squarely
Airlines Limited, sentencing the latter to pay the former judgment applies to the case at bench. the Court stated:
totaling P802,435.34.
The defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed. The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby
ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party a "third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or
defendant PAL is ordered to pay defendant and third-party deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the
plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the plaintiffs. case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-
party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a
TC concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was tampered with right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
by the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim.
cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' contract with Aramco.

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It must be noted that in the proceedings below, PAL disclaimed any liability PAL is NOT solely liable for the satisfaction of the judgment. While the trial
to the Rayoses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. On court found, and this has not been adequately rebutted by PAL, that the
appeal, however, PAL changed its theory and averred that the spouses proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with
Rayos had no valid claim against SIA on the around that the non-renewal of Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by PAL's personnel,
Sancho's contract with Aramco was his unsatisfactory performance rather it failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was SIA's
than the alleged tampering of his excess baggage ticket. In response to delayed (4 months after request) transmittal of the certification needed
PAL's appeal, SIA argued that it was improper for PAL to question SIA's by Rayos to prove his innocence to his employer.
liability to the plaintiff, since this was no longer an issue on account of the
finality and, in fact, satisfaction of the judgment. Rule 7 Parts of a Pleading

There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in No. L-31822. July 31, 1972.
his answer the defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original
defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim. There are, however, JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner, vs. CATALINO DELA VIC-TORIA
special circumstances present in this case which preclude third-party and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents.
defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle.
Facts

One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of PETITION TO REVIEW the orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
action, that is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA investigated the
matter and discovered that tampering was, indeed, committed, not by Petition to review the following orders of the Court of First Instance of
its personnel but by PAL's. This became its defense as well as its main Davao, denying defendant-petitioners motion to dismiss.
cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against PAL. For its part,
PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim CFI
against it or against SIA. (SEE RULE 6 sec 13 I BELIEVE it is the rule
involved but it was NOT exactly mentioned in the case) This could be Plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the
done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the third-party Court of First Instance of Davao, for quieting of title and recovery of
complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the main possession with damages.
complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to
SIA's complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to City Court
deny any liability which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal
Plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with
in a complete turn around of theory that PAL raised the issue of no
the City Court of Davao City for forcible entry over the same parcel of land.
valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. This simply cannot be allowed.
Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order
defendant-petitioner
While the third-party defendant; would benefit from a victory by the
third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this is true only when the third- to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the
party plaintiff and third-party defendant have non-contradictory former, and
defenses. Here, the defendant and third-party defendant had no common ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of f 500.00 a
defense against the plaintiffs' complaint, and they were even blaming each month as rental and the same to begin from the later part of March,
other for the fiasco. 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs,

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and It is pointed out in the first assigned error that since the verification in the
the amount of P500.00 as attorneys fees. ... * complaint for forcible entry does not comply with Section 6, Rule 7, of the
Revised Rules of Court, the complaint is void; hence, the City Court, and
subsequently the court a quo, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.
In a motion to dismiss defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of Civil Case No. 6005; but Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides: xxxxx.
the City Court, in its order for the reason that there is no identity of rights Verification.A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the
asserted and relief prayed for and for the further reason that it does not person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof
appear that any judgment which would be rendered on the other action will are true of his own knowledge.
amount to res judicata in the herein case. The same court order set the case
for hearing. Verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief shall be deemed insufficient.
Defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to
the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs- Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred
respondents evidence for the following day. to the allegations in the complaint as having been read by him. However,
while he stated that they are true and correct, he omitted to state that said
The same court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is
logically inferable since affiant was a party and it does not appear that he
Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid was verifying upon information and belief. If petitioner entertained doubt
order denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and also about the true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be
the decision. However, his motion was denied in the City Court order. made more definite.

CFI

Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. In a motion, Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that
defendant-petitioner reiterated his arguments for the dismissal of the insufficiency would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole
complaint for forcible entry as stated in his earlier motion in the City Court. In proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several
the meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but
the immediate execution of the City Court decision. The court a quo denied merely formal.
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the
immediate execution of the City Court judgment. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
SC loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the
dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that the lower court same are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-petitioner.

Did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the G.R. No. 186045 February 2, 2011
verification of the corresponding complaint being void;

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MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, were acquired by the NAC through a negotiated sale were
vs. Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A.
Heirs of ESTANISLAO MIOZA, namely: The Heirs of FILOMENO T. Leila claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, specifically,
MIOZA, represented by LAUREANO M. MIOZA; The Heirs of PEDRO Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago executed a Deed of Sale on
T. MIOZA; and The HEIRS of FLORENCIA T. MIOZA, represented by February 15, 1950 conveying the subject lots to the NAC on the
ANTONIO M. URBIZTONDO, Respondents. assurance made by the latter that they (Leilas predecessors-in-
interest) can buy the properties back if the lots are no longer
RULING: INTERVENORS IN THEIR M.R., APPENDED A COMPLAINT-IN- needed.
INTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND o Consequently, they sold the subject lots to the NAC.
CERT. OF NON-FORUM-SHOPPING, THE REQUIREMENT OF o However, the expansion project did not push through.
THE RULE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH. o More than forty years after the sale, plaintiffs informed the
NACs successor-in-interest, the Mactan-Cebu
IN GENERAL, AN INDEPENDENT CONTROVERSY CANNOT BE International Airport Authority (MCIAA), that they were
INJECTED INTO A SUIT BY INTERVENTION, SUCH exercising the buy-back option of the agreement, but the
INTERVENTION WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WHERE IT WOULD MCIAA refused to allow the repurchase on the ground that
ENLARGE THE ISSUES IN THE ACTION AND EXPAND THE the sale was in fact unconditional.
SCOPE OF THE REMEDIES.
The MCIAA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
FACTS: an Answer with Counterclaim.
RTC: INTERVENORS: COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION.
o On November 16, 1999, before the MCIAA could present
RTC: LEILA: RECONVEYANCE, CANCELLATION OF TITLE,
evidence in support of its case, a Motion for Intervention,
ISSUANCE OF NEW TITLE AND DAMAGES.
with an attached Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed
On July 6, 1998, a Complaint for Reconveyance, Cancellation of
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, by the
Defendants Title, Issuance of New Title to Plaintiffs and Damages
heirs of Filomeno T. Mioza, represented by Laureano M.
was filed by Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) for herself and on behalf
Mioza; the heirs of Pedro T, Mioza, represented by
of the other heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza.
Leoncio J. Mioza; and the Heirs of Florencia T. Mioza,
o The complaint alleged that Leilas late great grandfather,
represented by Antonio M. Urbiztondo (Intervenors), who
Estanislao Mioza, was the registered owner of Cadastral
claimed to be the true, legal, and legitimate heirs of the
Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A, located at Banilad Estate, Cebu
late Estanislao Mioza.
City.
o The intervenors alleged in their complaint:
o That the late Estanislao Mioza had three children,
namely, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, all surnamed
Mioza. (1) that the plaintiffs in the main case are not related to
o In the late 1940s, the National Airports Corporation (NAC) the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and
embarked in an expansion project of the Lahug Airport. Inocencia Togono whose true and legitimate
o For said purpose, the NAC acquired several properties children were: Filomeno, Pedro, and Florencia,
which surrounded the airport either through negotiated all surnamed Mioza;
sale or through expropriation. Among the properties that

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(2) that, on January 21, 1958, Adriana, Patricio, and Title Nos. RT-6101 (T-10534) and RT-6102 (T-10026) to
Santiago, executed, in fraud of the intervenors, be the true and valid torrens titles to Lots 986 and 991-[A].
an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia f. Condemning plaintiffs Leila M. Hermosisima and Constancio
Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the Mioza to pay intervenors, moral and exemplary damages.
estate of the deceased spouses; and
RTC: DENIED MOTION FOR INTERVENTION.
(3) that, on February 15, 1958, the same Adriana, o On February 18, 2000, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
Patricio, and Santiago, fraudulently, deceitfully, issued an Order denying the Motion for Intervention.
and in bad faith, sold Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A to GROUNDS: 1. OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS WAS MERELY
the NAC. COLLATERAL.

o The intervenors thus prayed for the following reliefs: 2. SHOULD BE ASSERTED IN A SEPARATE
PROCEEDING.
a. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, legal and legitimate
heirs of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia 3. IF GRANTED, WOULD UNDULY DELAY THE
Togono; PROCEEDINGS.

b. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, rightful and registered 4. COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION NOT VERIFIED
owners of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate; DOES NOT CONTAIN CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING.
c. Declaring the Extrajudicial Settlement executed on January 21,
1958 by the late Adriana Mioza and the late Patricio Mioza o In denying the motion, the trial court opined that the
and the late Santiago Mioza that they are the only heirs of the ownership of the subject lots was merely a collateral issue
late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, who in the action.
died intestate and without any debts or obligations and o The principal issue to be resolved was whether or not the
adjudicating among themselves the estate of the deceased x x x heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza whoever they may be
as void ab initio; have a right to repurchase the said lots from the MCIAA.
o Consequently, the rights being claimed by the intervenors
d. Declaring the sale of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar should be asserted in and would be fully protected by a
Lands Estate executed by the late Adriana Mioza, the late separate proceeding.
Patricio Mioza and the late Santiago Mioza in favor of the o Moreover, if the motion was granted, it would unduly delay
National Airport Corporation on February 15, 1958 as void ab the proceedings in the instant case.
initio; o Finally, the complaint-in-intervention was flawed,
considering that it was not verified and does not
e. Ordering the cancellation of TCTs for Lots 986 and 991-A in the contain the requisite certification of non-forum
name of the MIAA and restoring Transfer Certificate of shopping.

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INTERVENORS: M.R., ATTACHED A COMPLAINT-IN- would make the proceedings unnecessarily complicated
INTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND and change the nature of the proceedings.
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING. o Furthermore, contrary to the requirements for the
o The intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to allowance of a motion for intervention, their legal interest
which was attached a Complaint-in-Intervention with the in the subject properties appear to be merely contingent or
required Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum expectant and not of direct or immediate character.
Shopping. o Petitioner also posits that the intervenors rights can be
better protected in another proceeding.
M.R. DENIED. o The complaint-in-intervention was not verified by all
Aggrieved, the intervenors sought recourse before the CA. the interested parties or all the heirs of Filomeno
Mioza, which still warrants its dismissal.
CA: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE RTCS ORDERS.
GROUND: M.R. APPENDED WITH A COMPLAINT-IN-
INTERVENTION CONTAINING THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION ISSUE: WHETHER THE RULES ON VERIFICATION AND
AND CERT. OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AMOUNTED TO CERTIFICATION OF NON FORUM-SHOPPING WERE COMPLIED WITH.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.
o In ruling for the intervenors, the CA ratiocinated that the HELD: YES. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.
determination of the true heirs of the late Estanislao
Mioza is not only a collateral, but the focal issue of the At the outset, on the procedural aspect, contrary to petitioners
case, for if the intervenors can prove that they are indeed contention, the initial lack of the complaint-in-intervention of the
the true heirs of Estanislao Mioza, there would be no requisite verification and certification on non-forum shopping was
more need to determine whether the right to buy back the cured when the intervenors, in their motion for reconsideration of
subject lots exists or not as the MCIAA would not have the order denying the motion to intervene, appended a complaint-
acquired rights to the subject lots in the first place. in-intervention containing the required verification and
o In addition, to grant the motion for intervention would avoid certificate of non-forum shopping.
multiplicity of suits. In the case of Altres v. Empleo, the Court clarified, among other
o As to the lack of verification and certification on non-forum things, that as to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
shopping, the CA opined that the filing of the motion for defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
reconsideration with an appended complaint-in- defective.
intervention containing the required verification and The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the
certificate of non-forum shopping amounted to pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
substantial compliance of the Rules. compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.
M.R. DENIED. Further, a verification is deemed substantially complied with when
Hence, this PETITION FOR REVIEW. one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
o Petitioner argues that to allow the intervenors to intervene allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
in the proceedings before the trial court would not only when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
unduly prolong and delay the resolution of the case, it or are true and correct.

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Moreover, as to the certification against forum shopping, non- Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court states:
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rules on the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
circumstances or compelling reasons." other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
Also, the certification against forum shopping must be signed thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has:
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule.
1. a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
Thus, considering that the intervenors in their motion for
reconsideration, appended a complaint-in-intervention with the
2. or in the success of any of the parties;
required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, the
requirement of the Rule was substantially complied with.
3. or an interest against the parties;
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION SHOULD
BE ADMITTED. 4. or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or
an officer thereof.
HELD: NO.

Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether or not the
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors
him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a
affected by such proceedings.
separate proceeding.
It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff
legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono and
in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima.
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
o True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid
something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by
claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest
which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between
in the matter in litigation.
others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original
o Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest
party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes
contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material,
a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by
him to be affected by such proceedings.

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direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be
expectant. intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit.
o It must be of such direct and immediate character that the Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the
operation and effect of the judgment. machinery of the trial.
o Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the
allowed to intervene, proceedings would become effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. action.
To be sure, not only will the intervenors rights be fully protected in
Moreover, the intervenors contentions that Leilas predecessors-in- a separate proceeding, it would best determine the rights of the
interest executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an extra judicial parties in relation to the subject properties and the issue of who the
settlement of the estate of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, would
Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of be laid to rest.
the deceased spouses, and that subsequently, her predecessors- Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for
in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots to the intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
of the proceedings. It is not an absolute right.
In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be
Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono are, the parties would shown.
also present additional evidence in support of this new allegation of The procedure to secure the right to intervene is to a great extent
fraud, deceit, and bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention can, as a rule, be
of ownership, authenticity of certificates of titles, and regularity in secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable
their acquisition. provision.
o Verily, this would definitely cause unjust delay in the
adjudication of the rights claimed by the original Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v Santos, et al.
parties, which primarily hinges only on the issue of Respondents were hired by the petitioner as aluminum products
whether or not the heirs represented by Leila have a right manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. Of Taiwan under
to repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA. a 1 year employment with a monthly salary of $14,800

Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent The respondents were deployed and able to work for Ensure but
controversy between the original parties and the intervenors. were repatriated before the expiration of their contracts.
In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC against Sameer
suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed (petitioner)
where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the

rd
scope of the remedies. Sameer filed a 3 party complaint against ASBT International
It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors Management Service, Inc (ASBT). Sameer claimed that ASBT
case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from should be liable because Sameers accreditation was transferred to
them

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W/N the pleadings were validly signed
Dec 29 1999 Labor Arbiter rendered the decision against Sameer W/N ASBT violated the prohibition against forum shopping

Sameer appealed to the NLRC alleging that the LA committed GAD HELD:
in failing to decide the third-party complaint and insisted that it SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed
should have been absolved of any and all liabilities agains by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
st
respondent workers. address which should not be a post office box. (1 paragraph. Di ko
na sinama yung other 2)
July 24, 2001 NLRC: absolved Sameer from liabilities in view of
the transfer of accreditation to ASBT and ordered the latter to pay Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the
the respondent workers. party to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this
case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion
ASBT moved for reconsideration. NLRC denied it for lack of merit for reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate
president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBTs
ASBT elevated the case to the CA via PfC under rule 65. Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this
case. Therefore, the said pleadings
CA denied due course and dismissed ASBTs petition because the
attached verification and certification of non-forum shopping was Sameer also submits that ASBT violated the prohibition against
signed by Mildred Santos as president of ASBT without proof of forum shopping.
authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings

ASBT filed an MR and submitted the necessary board resolution It claims that the transfer of CA-G.R. SP No. 65068 from the Seventh
authorizing Mildred Santos to represent ASBT. Motion was granted Division of the Court of Appealswhich initially denied due course and
and the petition was reinstated. dismissed the petition then reinstated the same (upon proof that Mildred R.
Santos as duly authorized) in the Former Fourth Division, which gave due
CA ruled in favor of ASBT and ordered Sameer to pay the course to and granted the petitionwas actually an act of forum shopping.
respondent workers Sameer posits that the grant
o of ASBTs July 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration by the
Sameer moved to reconsider but was denied. Hence, here we Seventh Division, which reinstated the dismissed petition,
goooooo! in effect gave rise to a new petition.

Sameer contends that since the petition and the motion for Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an
reconsideration was signed by Mildred Santos as corporate adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of
president, and since shes not a member of the bar, the petition and seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
the MR should be considered as unsigned pleadings pursuant to forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for
Rule 7, Sec 3. certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
ISSUES: one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

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o There is forum shopping where the elements of litis cancelling ... their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street
pendentia are present, namely: vendors) and threatening the physical demolition of their respective
(a) there is identity of parties, or at least such business stalls in the places specified in such licenses or permits.
parties as represent the same interest in both Petitioners claim to be five of about 130 "licensed and duly
actions; authorized vendors of ... religious articles, medicine herbs and
(b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief plants around the Quiapo Church, ... Manila," bringing suit 'for
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves."
set of facts; and They allege that their licenses "were revoked or cancelled (by
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is respondent Mayor) for reasons unknown to them which is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws,"
case, regardless of which party is successful, written notice of such cancellation having been served on them on
would amount to res judicata in the other. or about May 30 (actually May 3), 1986; respondent Mayor "had
o It expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with given (them) an ultimatum of 7:00 up to 12:00 o'clock in the
and abuses court processes, degrades the administration afternoon" (of August 5, 1986) to vacate the premises where their
of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and respective stalls are situated or suffer physical demolition thereof.
deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a The petition must be given short shrift
ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also Petition should be abated for the ground of lis pendens
constitute direct contempt It appears that on July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 8636563, a special
There was no forum shopping. The MR filed praying for civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Acting
reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing the petition Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. It was filed by Samahang
on the technical ground of lack of proof of authority by Santos to Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc." (hereafter,
bind the corporation was just a motion for reconsideration. Sameer simply "Samahan") composed, according to the petition, of "some
cannot insist that it be treated as a new petition to make it fit the 300 individual owners and operators of separate business stalls ...
definition of forum shopping to evade liability. mostly at the periphery immediately 0beyond the fence of the
Quiapo Church."
G.R. No. 75349. October 13, 1986. The president of the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press
Buan vs. Lopez Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo. Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo
are two of the five petitioners in the case at bar, described in the
FACTS: petition before this Court as suing "for themselves and all others
similarly situated as themselves": i.e., vendors "around the Quiapo
(Im sorry guys kung magulo, ang labo talaga ng facts, Ilan beses ko na siya Church." The three other petitioners also appear to be Samahan
nabasa. Sobrang frustrated ako ditto. Sana maintindihan niyo pa rin.) members.
The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts
On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in this Court a special civil as those in the case at bar. That they were vendors who had been
action for prohibition to the end that respondent Gemiliano C. religiously paying the license and permit fees but have been given
Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila, be "perpetually a written notice advising them of the cancellation of their permits
prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously revoking or and their possible relocation to another site.

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There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to
Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at least such parties as give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant
represent the same interests in both actions, as well as Identity of or lis pendens. That same Identity puts into operation the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the sanction of twin dismissals just mentioned. The application of
same facts, and the Identity on the two preceding particulars is this sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement of the
such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will regardless controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action reconsideration of or to appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial
under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on July 15, 1986,
pendant. which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear
The two cases (One with the RTC and the other with the SC) were persuasive.
dismissed for forum shopping The case was also dismissed because of the permits and licenses
o Forum Shopping: The acts of petitioners constitute a of the vendors all eventually expired thus making the case moot
clear case of forum shopping, an act of malpractice that is and academic.
proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends Sto. Tomas University vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998)
to degrade the administration of justice. The rule has been
formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and FACTS:
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary RTC-QC
Reorganization Act, specifically with the grant in Section 9 SPOUSES SURLA filed a complaint for damages
of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original jurisdiction to the against petitioner Santo Tomas University Hospital
Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of mandamus, predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son,
prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or processes, whether Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said hospital
or not in aid Of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the cited for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen
Rule provides that no such petition may be filed in the from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the
Intermediate Appellate Court 'if another similar petition child
has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court' Petitioner hospital filed its Answer with "Compulsory
and vice-versa. The Rule orders that "A violation of the Counterclaim" asserting that respondents still owed to it
rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for
cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without Emmanuel's confinement at the hospital and making a
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the claim for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's
counsel or party concerned." The rule applies with equal fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious
force where the party having filed an action in the suit filed against it.
Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition Petitioner received respondents' Reply to Counterclaim
and a restraining order or injunction in the regional trial which sought, inter alia, the dismissal of petitioner's
court (or vice-versa). counterclaim for its non-compliance with Supreme Court
there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a
Identity as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party

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complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
shopping. sworn certification contemplated here have been filed.
RTC dismissed petitioner's counterclaim.
Pet. MR-denied The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to
CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
Dismissed the petition and held: dismissal of the counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth, etc.) party
counterclaim, being a final order, petitioner's remedy was complaint or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
to appeal therefrom and, such appeal being then application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
available, the special civil action of certiorari had been
improperly filed. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to
Hence Pet went to SC curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is
an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered
ISSUE: Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be
in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
non-forum shopping
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
RULLLING:
court would make a favorable disposition.The language of the circular
distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide:
pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.

1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party The rationale of the circular is to sustain the view that the circular in question
seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its
other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving
original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent
the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not resolution except by the court where the main case pends. The proviso in
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best not be curable by mere amendment . . . but shall be cause for the
of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending dismissal of the case without prejudice," being predicated on the
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other applicability of the need for a certification against forum shopping,
tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set
proceeding which is either pending or may have been up.
terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so-
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, called "counterclaim" of petitioner really consists of two segregative parts:
the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents' son, Emmanuel Surla, in
undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom the total amount of P82,032.10; and (2) for damages, moral and

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exemplary, plus attorney's fees by reason of the alleged malicious and and that accordingly, the appropriate Information be filed with the
unfounded suit filed against it. It is the second, not the first, claim that the Sandiganbayan.
Court here refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with prayer to defer
covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94. arraignment and pre-trial
alleging that they recognize the salary increases of the health
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in that the claim for personnel as a mandatory statutory obligation but the salary
moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees in Civil Case No. Q-95- increases could not be implemented because of lack of funds
25977 of petitioner is ordered reinstated. and the municipality had incurred overdrafts and not due to any
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
G.R. No. 139396 August 15, 2000 negligence on their part.
Special Prosecution Officer I Ongpauco-Cortel recommended the
EFREN O. LOQUIAS, ANTONIO V. DIN, JR., ANGELITO L. MARTINEZ II, dismissal of the case
LOVELYN J. BIADOR, GREGORIO FACIOL, JR., petitioners, Petitioners filed MFR of the Resolution of the Office of the
vs. Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 29, 1998 alleging that there is
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, and DR. JOSE PEPITO H. DALOGDOG, no probable cause in holding that they violated Section 3 (e) of the
DR. AURORA BEATRIZ A. ROMANO, MA. TERESITA C. ABASTAR, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
JESSICA S. ALLAN, MA. TERESA ANIVERSARIO, respondents. Special Prosecution Officer I Ongpauco-Cortel recommended the
dismissal of the case was disapproved by Ombudsman Desierto
Petitioners allege that the order disapproving the dismissal of
Facts:
the case constitutes a denial of their motion for reconsideration.

Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao


SC petitioners filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65
private respondents (officers of the Association of Municipal Health
Office Personnel of Zamboanga del Sur who instituted the said
complaint in behalf of the 490 members of the said Association)
charged herein petitioners (members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the said municipality) with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners at SC under rule
their alleged failure to give the salary increases and benefits 65 complies with Section 5, Rule 7
provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers (R.A. 7305) and Local Budget Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, NO
60 and 64 for the health personnel of the local government of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. In its Comment the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General,
On the Resolution dated June 29, 1998 (Take note) Investigation alleges that the petition does not comply with Section 5, Rule 7 as the
Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. of the Office of the Ombudsman- Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping were signed
Mindanao found "probable cause to conclude that the crime of only by petitioner Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and there
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 has been committed by is no showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his co-petitioners
respondents Mayor, Vice-Mayor, members of the Sangguniang to represent them in this case; that the petition raise factual issues; and
Bayan and Budget Officer of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur" that the municipality had sufficient funds to grant the statutory salary
increases and benefits.

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In their Reply, petitioners contend that there was substantial compliance the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition2 under Rule 65 and denied the
with Section 5, Rule 7 notwithstanding the fact that only one of the corresponding motion for reconsideration, respectively.
petitioners signed the verification and certification on forum shopping;
and that the petition does not call for an examination of the probative value Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a
of the evidence presented. parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda
Docena.
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by
The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation
Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with
since time immemorial.
the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7
expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case.
certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the In a Decision, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the
same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San intervenor Abuda.
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification.1wphi1 There is no On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter court and ordered the petitioners:
and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner to vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff-appellant
Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the [private respondent Casiano Hombria], excluding the portion
same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial which the petitioners reclaimed from the sea and forms part of
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the the shore, as shown in the Commissioners Report, and
rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping to pay the plaintiff-appellant the agreed rental of P1.00 per
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. year from the date of the filing of the Complaint until they shall
Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the have actually vacated the premises.
certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.
harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above
decision which has already become final and executory.
The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The motion was granted by the public respondent judge, and a Writ
G.R. No. 140153. March 28, 2001.* of Execution was issued therefor.
public respondent sheriff subsequently filed a Manifestation
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, petitioners, vs. HON.
requesting that he be clarified in the determination of that particular
RICARDO P. LAPESURA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
portion which is sought to be excluded prior to the delivery of the
RTC, Branch III, Guian, Eastern Samar; RUFINO M. GARADO, Sheriff IV;
land adjudged in favor of plaintiff Casiano Hombria in view of the
and CASIANO HOMBRIA, respondents.
defects in the Commissioners Report and the Sketches attached
Facts thereto.
After requiring the parties to file their Comment on the sheriffs
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Manifestation, the public respondent judge, held
that x x x no attempt should be made to alter or modify the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court decision of the Court of Appeals.
seeking the nullification of the Court of Appeals Resolutions which dismissed

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What should be delivered therefore to the plaintiff x x x is that 1999.17
portion leased by the defendant-appellees from the plaintiff- Hence this petition.
appellant excluding the portion that the defendant-appellee
Issue
have reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore as
shown in the commissioners report x x x.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
Pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff issued an alias Writ
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
of Demolition.
Ruling
The petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of
Writ of Demolition. The petition is meritorious.

This motion was denied by the public respondent judge in an Order The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon the following
a copy of which was received by the petitioners on December 29, grounds, viz.:
1998.
Public respondent judge, in open court, granted the petitioners until the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Sec.
January 13, 1999 to file a Motion for Reconsideration. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
petitioners moved for an extension of the period to file a motion for the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only
reconsideration one of the petitioners.
The motion was finally filed by the petitioners, but was denied by It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping
the trial court in an Order should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the
A copy of the Order was received by the petitioners signing by only one of them is insufficient. In the case of Efren Loquias, et al.
CA vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. we held that the signing of the
Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping by only one of the
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the petitioners constitutes a defect in the petition. The attestation contained in
Court of Appeals: the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-
in issuing the Orders, and petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current
of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of Demolition. petition. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the
grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of Non-
provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be
Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There are only
September 1, 1998, and two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife. Their residence
that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was is the subject property alleged to be conjugal in the instant verified petition.
signed by only one of the petitioners The Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed only by the husband who
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 9,

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certified, inter alia, that he and his wife have not commenced any other interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
action or proceeding involving the same issues raised in the petition in any legitimate objective.
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; that to the best of their knowledge no
such action is pending therein; and that he and his wife undertake to inform WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
the Court within five (5) days from notice of any similar action or proceeding Court of Appeals Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is
which may have been filed. REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

The property subject of the original action for recovery is conjugal. Whether SO ORDERED.
it is conjugal under the New Civil Code or the Family Code, a fact that
cannot be determined from the records before us, it is believed that the G.R. No. 150865 June 30, 2006
certificate on non-forum shopping filed in the Court of Appeals constitutes
sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. ART FUENTEBELLA, Park-in-Charge, and ROLLING HILLS MEMORIAL
PARK, INC., Petitioners,
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal vs.
partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled DARLICA CASTRO, Respondent.
as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend
the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife.
RULING: A CERTIFICATION WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED WITHOUT THE
Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-
PROPER AUTHORIZATION IS DEFECTIVE AND CONSTITUTES
forum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory
A VALID CAUSE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.
administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits
to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband EXCEPTION TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF ONE
alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping OF THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE CERITIFICATION:
to be attached to the petition.
o Petitioners must comply with two conditions:
It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the 1. petitioners must show justifiable cause for their failure to
writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of personally sign the certification; and,
Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. 2. they must also be able to prove that the outright
dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification in his
administration of justice. In the present case, we find that
behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to
petitioners failed to prove the presence of these
have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action
conditions.
or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices
and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.
FACTS:
It bears stressing that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be

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The controversy primarily involves the application of Rule 7, because the amount of damages claimed is more than
Section 5 of the Rules of Court relating to the signature appearing P200,000.
on the certificate of non-forum shopping, and the submission of a o Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the
false certification. complaint, which was granted by the MTCC.
Respondent Darlica Castro is the widow of the late Freddie Castro
who died in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. RTC NEGROS OCCIDENTAL: RESPONDENT: DAMAGES.
o Respondent engaged the funeral services of petitioner o Afterwards, respondent filed a similar complaint with the
Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. in Bacolod City for the RTC of Negros Occidental.
interment of the remains of her husband. o Attached in the complaint was the Verification and
o During the burial, when the casket of her deceased Certification against Forum Shopping required under
husband was about to be lowered into the vault, it was Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, stating:
discovered that the dimensions of the vault did not
correspond to the measurements of the casket. That I further certify that I have not commenced any other action or
o As a result, the casket was lifted and placed under the proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of
heat of the sun for about one hour in front of all the Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of my knowledge,
mourners while the vault was being prepared. no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of
o To make matters worse, the employees of petitioner Appeals, or other tribunal or agency, and that if I should thereafter learn that
corporation measured the casket by using a spade. a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I shall
Insulted by the events that transpired at the funeral, respondent, undertake to report that fact within five (5) days to this Honorable Court.
through counsel, wrote to the management of petitioner corporation
demanding an explanation for its negligence, but the latter did not PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS.
respond nor attempt to apologize to the former. GROUND: CERT. IS FALSE, RESPONDENT FILED AN
MTCC: RESPONDENT: DAMAGES. IDENTICAL COMPLAINT WITH THE MTCC.
PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. o Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
GROUND: NO JURISDICTION, AMOUNT OF DAMAGES certification is false because respondent had previously
CLAIMED IS MORE THAN P200K. filed an identical complaint with the MTCC.
RESPONDENT: MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPLAINT.
GRANTED. DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS.
o Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages GROUND: REQUIRMENT NOT TO BE INTERPRETED TOO
against the corporation and its Park-in-Charge Art LITERALLY.
Fuentebella, jointly and solidarily, before the Municipal o The trial court issued the questioned order denying the
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City asking for motion to dismiss for lack of merit, to wit:
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation costs.
x x x, while the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping is
o Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
mandatory, nonetheless, the requirement is not to be interpreted too literally
MTCC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case

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and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum Monico A. Puentevella, Jr., Corporate Secretary of
shopping. petitioner corporation, affirming therein the authority of
Lourdes A. Pomperada to file the aforementioned petition.
PETITIONER: M.R. (ALSO TAKE NOTE OF THIS.)
DENIED. HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW.
o A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners
arguing that the motion to dismiss was not based on the ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER HAS COMPLIED WITH THE RULES ON
ground that respondent had filed two similar actions at the VERIFICATION AND CERITIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
same time but rather on the submission by the latter of a
false certification. The trial court denied said motion in its HELD: NO.
order, dated July 9, 2001, stating:
It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification
As can be readily seen from the said provision, the sanction against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the other
provided by the said rule on the submission of a false certification is not petitioners has the authority to do the same.
dismissal of the case but [the same] will be considered as an indirect
contempt of Court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
criminal action that may be filed against the party concerned.

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party


CA: PETITIONER: CERTIORARI WITH WPI AND/OR TRO. shall specify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting
DISMISSED. a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
o Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
order. The petition, however, was dismissed by the Court or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
of Appeals in its resolution issued on September 27, 2001, action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
thus: claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and, (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
A perusal of the records discloses that the verification and the or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
certification against forum shopping was signed by a certain Lourdes court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Pomperada without any showing or indication that she is duly
authorized by the petitioners to sign for and in their behalf. (NOTE: Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
THIS CONCERNS THE PETITIONERS VERIFICATION AND CERT. OF curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
NON-FORUM SHOPPING NOT OF RESPONDENT ANYMORE.) initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
M.R. DENIED. and after hearing.
o A motion for reconsideration of the above resolution was The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
filed by petitioner Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
attaching thereto a Secretarys Certificate signed by

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contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Court of Appeals accordingly
administrative and criminal actions. dismissed the petition for lack of proper authorization of the one
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and signing it on behalf of petitioners.
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for o Lourdes Pomperada, the Administrative Manager of
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct petitioner corporation, who signed the verification and
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. certificate on non-forum shopping, initially failed to submit
The above provision mandates that the petitioner or the principal a secretarys certificate or a board resolution confirming
party must execute the certification against forum shopping. her authority to sign for the corporation, and a special
The reason for this is that the principal party has actual power of attorney to sign on behalf of co-petitioner Art
knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed Fuentebella, who was sued jointly and solidarily with
involving the same case or substantially the same issues. the corporation in his capacity as officer of the latter.
o If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the
petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires that the petitioner
duly authorized. shall sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.
o In the case of corporations, the physical act of signing
This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by
persons as Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason
7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot do the task
and juridical persons. themselves.
o Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification o However, in the case of natural persons, the Rule
against forum shopping should be signed by its duly requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of
authorized director or representative. non-forum shopping.
o This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, o The reason for such a requirement is that the petitioner
where the Court held that if the real party-in-interest is a himself, or in [the] case of a corporation, its duly
corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the authorized representative, knows better than anyone else
certification against forum shopping so long as he has whether a separate case has been filed or pending which
been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of involves substantially the same issues.
directors. EXCEPTION TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR FAILURE
Likewise, where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE
only one of them executes the certification, absent a showing that CERITIFICATION:
he was so authorized by the others. o Petitioners must comply with two conditions:
That certification requires personal knowledge and it cannot be
presumed that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the first, petitioners must show justifiable cause for their
same or similar actions filed or pending. failure to personally sign the certification; and,
Hence, a certification which had been signed without the
proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause second, they must also be able to prove that the outright
for the dismissal of the petition. dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
administration of justice. In the present case, we find that

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petitioners failed to prove the presence of these On December 27, 1996, petitioner filed with the (BIR) a claim for tax
conditions. refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted
to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER RSPONDENTS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THAT accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.
A SIMILAR CASE WAS EARLIER FILED BUT WAS LATER
WITHDRAWN FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CONSTITUTED Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals
FALSE CERTIFICATION. On April 26, 2000, the CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
review for lack of merit.
HELD : NO. pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA 7432, the 20% sales discounts petitioner extended
to qualified senior citizens in 1995 should be treated as tax credit and not as
deductions from the gross sales as erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94.
An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any
event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
the present case, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
On August 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils
petition on procedural grounds.
sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present.
The CA held that the person who signed the verification and certification of
Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of
submission of a false certification shall constitute indirect contempt petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and directors to do so.
criminal sanctions.
This is in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES:
Whether the President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification
Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal and certification against forum shopping, without need of a board
Revenue resolution.(In sufficient compliance with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Facts:
Whether the CTA committed reversible error in denying and dismissing
Petitioner, a corporation, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and petitioners action for refund or tax credit.
other pharmaceutical products. It operates two drugstores, one in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the other in Roxas, Isabela, under the name HELD: that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
and style of Mercury Drug. verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3)
In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and
treated the 20% sales discounts granted to qualified senior citizens in (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
1995 as deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive at the net
sales, instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of GR: 154704 June 1, 2011
RA 7432.

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NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA act for the rest. In the case at bar, there was no showing
FORMOSO-PESCADOR, ROGER FORMOSO, MARY JANE FORMOSO, that he was authorized. Certification of non-forum
BERNARD FORMOSO, and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners, shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who
executed it. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for
vs. failure to personally sign the certification.
o MR = DENIED
PNB, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO (NAKU!
Supreme Court: Petitioners argued that they have substantially
MAHIRAP MAGING LAWYER ITO!),AND ROBERTO NAVARRO,
complied with the requirements on verification and certification of
Respondents. non-forum shopping. Petitioners are of the view that the rule on the
verification and certification should be liberally construed, since
This is a petition assailing the decision of the CA which dismissed
only questions of law are raised in a petition for certiorari and no
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners on the ground that the verification
factual issues that require personal knowledge of the petitioners.
and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the
o PNB countered that the mandatory rule on certification
petitioners.
against forum shopping requires that all of the 6
FACTS: petitioners must sign.
Malcaba was not a party or signatory to the
Petitioner Nellie and her 5 children executed a SPA in favor of contract of loan between PNB and Nellie. Neither
Malcaba, authorizing him to secure all papers and documents and was there evidence that Malcaba was a co-
owners copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to a loan owner.
with REM from PNB.
RULING:
Nellie and her family sold the property to Malcaba. So Malcaba
went to PNB to fully pay the obligation. PNB refused. (insert evil
Petition lack merit! Hmp!
music)
Petitioners filed a complaint for Specific Performance in the RTC of Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as
Vigan, praying PNB be ordered to accept the payment. matter of right. The party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the
o RTC favored the petitioners, however their prayer for rules laid down by law. A PfC is availed of when any tribunal has acted with
damages was denied. grave abuse of discretion. A petition shall be accompanied by, among
o PNB = MR = DENIED. others, a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It shall contain names
o Petitioners filed a petition for Relief from Judgment and addresses of all the parties. The petitioner shall also submit a sworn
questioning the RTC decision their evidence does not certification that he has not commenced any other action involving the same
warrant an award for damages. DENIED. issues in the SC or CA.
o Petitioners = MR = DENIED.
Court of Appeals: Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari. Failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements shall be sufficient
DISMISSED. ground for dismissal of the petition.
o Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
signed by only one of the many petitioners. All petitioners Acceptance of a PfC is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
must be signatories to the certification of non-forum Although the court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a PfC, it
shopping, unless the one who signed was empowered to does so only when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion

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and when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Courts alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
or SC Circulars. correct.

In the case at bench the petitioners claim they have complied with the 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
requirements on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
court disagrees! curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be reasons."
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form
the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non- 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
and certification against forum shopping: reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective In the PfC in the CA there were 7 petitioners but only Malacaba signed.
certification against forum shopping. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to
sign for them. There was no special power of attorney shown by the
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The review on certiorari.
Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with The certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the
the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of
may be served thereby. them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters

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the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the between petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito
same as similar to the current petition. Daffon, on the other hand.

Petitioner filed a MD on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the


The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is
subject matter of the case; (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of
fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and
action; and (3) waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation.
thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
She argued that the trial court cannot take cognizance of the action for
Rule 8 Manner of making allegations in Pleadings partition considering her claim of absolute ownership over the properties;
and that respondents themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the
CONCEPCION V. VDA. DE DAFFON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE co-ownership. Anent the third ground, petitioner alleged that Joselito Daffon
COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA. DE DAFFON, filed a complaint against Milagros Marin, who was likewise married to
.
AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA Amado Daffon, for recovery of a parcel of land in Mandaluyong In said
DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE complaint, respondent Lourdes Osmea Vda. de Daffon allegedly admitted
DAFFON, respondents. that the land sought was the only property of the late Amado Daffon.

FACTS: RTC denied MD. MR was filed by Petitioner-denied

Petitioner went to CA via certiorari-dismissed, MR-denied, hence he went to


Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late Amado Daffon, with
SC
whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes
Osmea, and they bore six children, namely, Aileen, Joselito Jr., Ana ISSUE: WON a complaint fails to state a cause of action?NO
Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette.
RULLING: It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a
Amado passed away followed by His son, Joselito, complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the statements in the
complaint may be properly considered. Moreover, a defendant who moves to
RTC- Davao
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically
Respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon, together with her six minor admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in
children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner Concepcion a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
Villamor Vda. de Daffon facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to
Respondents alleged that Amado left several real and personal properties the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences
which formed part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at least one half of Amados estate, sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties. However, the said not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the
properties were never partitioned between petitioner and Joselito. After defendants.
Joselitos death, petitioners behavior towards respondents, her daughter-in-
law and grandchildren, changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all IN THE CASE AT BAR: the complaint sufficiently alleged that
the properties and deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) was married to Amado Quiros Daffon and
[11]
prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado Daffon and petitioner be that they begot an only son in Joselito Daffon. The complaint further
partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned alleged that Joselito Daffon later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes

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Osmea and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) REYES, petitioners,
children who are now plaintiffs with their mother. vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN, in his capacity as Presiding
SC: Such allegation was sufficient that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate
Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance, City of Zamboanga,
son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs DALMACIO RAMOS, and JUANITO CAMACHO, respondents.
(i.e.,respondents herein) were likewise legitimate heirs of Joselito
Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments, there was, therefore, no
Facts:
need to inquire whether respondent minor children were duly acknowledged
by the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the said
children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters which petitioner may RTC
raise as a defense in her answer and threshed out by the court during a full-
blown trial. The petitioners filed a case for recovery of hereditary rights against
the respondents alleging that their shares in the inheritance left by
In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to specifically their mother were NEVER sold, transferred or disposed to others
allege respondents claim of co-ownership of the properties. The complaint persons nor to their brother Dionisio Toribio.
needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their
claim. In their answer, the defendants-respondents alleged that the shares
of plaintiffs-petitioners had likewise been sold to Dionisio Toribio,
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise
their brother, who, in turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and
statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale from petitioners to Dionisio and
plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
the sale from Dionisio to the respondents were evidenced by
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A
deeds of sale, xerox copies of which were appended to and
complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable
made an integral part of the respondents' partition agreement
elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
between the respondents and also a xerox copy of the
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
respondents' transfer certificates of title.
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
Petitioners - filed a constancia with a motion for reconsideration -
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
[14] DENIED
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Petitioners contend that the documents submitted by the
THUS, The allegations contained therein are sufficient to establish respondents were merely evidentiary in nature, not a cause of
respondents right to the estate of Amado Daffon. By stating their action or defense, the due execution and genuineness of
relationship to the deceased, they established their line of succession as the which they had to prove. They alleged that the subject of
basis for their claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from litigation was the hereditary shares of plaintiffs-petitioners, not
the moment of death of the decedent. any document. They stated that the defense consisting mainly
of transfer certificates of titles in the respondents' names
G.R. No. L-57821 January 17, 1985 originating from the sale from petitioners to Dionisio and from
the latter to the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature.
They argued that a simple specific denial without oath is
SEGUNDINO TORIBIO, EUSEBIA TORIBIO, and the HEIRS OF
sufficient.
OLEGARIO TORIBIO, represented by his widow, ADELA DE LOS

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MOR denied between the co-heirs is also elemental to the defense of the
documents attached to the respondents' answer and made respondents. The first deeds of sale (from petitioners to their brother), to
an integral part thereof were declared to be the very which the respondents were not parties but which they seek to enforce
foundation or basis of the respondents' defense and not against the parties are also actionable documents.
merely evidentiary in nature.
CIVPRO ISSUE: WON Section 7 and 8, Rule 8 applies in the case
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
HELD: YES.
SUBISSUE: WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in
favor of their brother Dionisio Toribio and appended to the respondents' The petitioners further alleged that this case falls under the exception to
answer are merely evidentiary in nature or the very foundation of their Section 8, Rule 8 which provides:
defense which must be denied under oath by the petitioner?
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document.
HELD: The deeds of sale are actionable documents hence, the very Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
foundation of their defense. instrument or document, the substance of such instrument
or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
Jurisprudence has centered mainly on a discussion of actionable documents original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading
as basis of a plaintiff's cause of action. Little has been said of actionable as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
documents being the foundation of a defense. The Rule, however, covers pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in
both an action or a defense based on documents. the pleading.

The respondents anchor their defense on the deeds of sale by virtue of SECTION 8. How to contest genuineness of such
which the hereditary rights of all the petitioners over the disputed lot were documents. When an action or defense is founded
sold, transferred, and conveyed in favor of their brother, Dionisio Toribio, upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
who in turn sold the same to herein respondents. The deed of sale executed corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is an essential and section, the genuineness and due execution of the
indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
had never disposed of their property. party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does
The deed of sale executed by Dionisio Toribio in favor of the respondents, not apply when the adverse party does not appear to
by itself, would be insufficient to establish a defense against the petitioners' be a party to the instrument.
claims. If the petitioners deny that they ever sold their shares in the inherited
lot to their brother Dionisio, a failure to prove the sale would be decisive. For The petitioners are themselves parties to the deeds of sale which are sought
if it can be shown that no conveyance of the property was executed by the to be enforced against them. The complaint was filed by the petitioners.
petitioners, then Dionisio Toribio had no right to convey what did not belong They filed suit to recover their hereditary properties. The new owners
to him. The respondents could acquire only the rights that Dionisio had over introduced deeds of sale as their main defense. In other words, the
the disputed property. The genuineness and due execution of the deed

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petitioners brought the issue upon themselves. They should meet it WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated July 20, 1981 is
properly according to the Rules of Court. hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court which took
over the cases of the respondent court is ordered to receive the petitioners'
Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8, therefore, apply. The proper procedure was for evidence regarding the genuineness and due execution of the disputed
the petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and deeds of sale.
due execution of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what
they claim to be the facts. However, the oversight or negligence of G.R. No. 13300 September 29, 1919
petitioners' counsel in not properly drafting a reply to the answer and an
answer to the counter claim is not necessarily fatal to their cause. BASILIA BOUGH and GUSTAVUS BOUGH, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
The facts of the case and equitable considerations constrain us to MATILDE CANTIVEROS and PRESBITERA HANOPOL, defendants-
grant the petition and to set aside the questioned order of the appellees.
respondent court.
Facts

As stated earlier, the reason for the rule is to enable the adverse party to CFI
know beforehand whether he will have to meet the issue of genuineness or
due execution of the document during trial. While mandatory, the rule is a This action was begun in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, pursuant to a
discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, complaint by means of which the plaintiffs Basilia Bough and Gustavus
and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation Bough sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered
should be one which assist the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, by the deed of sale quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant
and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues. Matilde Cantiveros to pay the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds pesos by
way of damages, and to pay the costs.
The petitioners' counsel was obviously lulled into complacency by two
factors. First, the plaintiffs, now petitioners, had already stated under oath Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense,
that they never sold, transferred, or disposed of their shares in the not sworn to, in which she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the
inheritance to others. Second, the usual procedure is for a defendant (NOT contract of sale theretofore made between herself and Basilia Bough null.
the plaintiff) to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
The plaintiffs, thereupon, denied under oath the genuineness and due
execution of documents set forth in and annexed to the complaint.
execution of the so-called donation intervivos set forth in the answer.
Somehow, it skipped counsel's attention that the rule refers to either
Presbitera Hanopol was permitted to intervene as a defendant.
an action or a defense based upon a written instrument or document. It
applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the Honorable W. E. McMahon, judge
of first instance, in favor of the defendants, declaring the deed of sale,
An interpretation of a rule of procedure which would not deny to the Exhibit A, fictitious, null, and without effect, and absolving the defendants
petitioners their rights to their inheritance is warranted by the circumstances from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs.
of this case.
It is from this judgment through the ordinary means of perfection of a bill of
exceptions that the case is brought to this court for decision.

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Ruling in issue, by denial under oath, the due execution of the instrument, as
required in section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, operates as an
The first assignment of error reads: "The lower Court erred in permitting the admission of the authority of the officer to execute the contract, since the
defendants to present evidence, over the objections of the plaintiff, tending authority of the officer to bind the company is essential to the due execution
to impugn the genuineness and due execution of the document, Exhibit A, of its contract. (Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez [1918], 38 Phil.,
and in admitting them to show the circumstances under which it was 634.) But the failure of the party to file an affidavit denying the genuineness
executed. and due execution of the document does not estop him from controverting it
by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations,
It is undeniable that this was an action brought upon a written instrument, estoppel, and want of consideration. As section 285 of our Code of Civil
and that the complaint contained a copy of the instrument, but that its Procedure permits a writing to be impeached because of its illegality or
genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied under oath in fraud, such a defense would not be barred by the provisions of section 103.
the answer. Is this fatal to the defense? (Moore vs. Copp [1897], 119 Cal., 429 Brooks vs. Johnson [1898], 122 Cal.,
569; Hibberd vs. Rohde and McMillian [1915], 32 Phil., 476.)
Section 103 of the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure provides:
We hold that although the defendants did not deny the genuineness and due
When an action is brought upon a written instrument and the
execution of the contract of sale of December 9, 1913, under oath, yet the
complaint contains or has annexed a copy of such
defendants could properly set up the defenses of fraud and want of
instrument, the genuineness and due execution of the
consideration.
instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically
denied under oath in the answer; and when the defense to Hibberd vs. Rohde
an action, or a counterclaim stated in an answer, is founded
upon a written instrument and the copy thereof is contained G.R. No. L-8418, December 09, 1915
in or annexed to the answer, the genuineness and due
execution of such instrument shall be deemed admitted, RULING: FAILURE TO FILE A VERIFIED SPECIFIC DENIAL OF THE
unless specifically denied under oath by the plaintiff in his GENUINESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE
pleadings. GIVES THE PLAINTIFF A PRIMA FACIE CASE WHICH
DISPENSES WITH THE NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE OF ITS DUE
This section is derived from sections 448 and 449 of the Code of Civil EXECUTION
Procedure of California, and is to be found in varying form in the statutes of
practically all the states of the American Union. The meaning of this portion HOWEVER IT CANNOT PRECLUDE A DEFENDANT FROM
of the Code, and the intention of the Legislature in enacting it, are easily INTRODUCING ANY DEFENSE ON THE MERITS WHICH DOES
found. The law says that the genuineness and due execution of a written NOT CONTRADICT THE EXECUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT
instrument properly pleaded shall be deemed admitted unless the plaintiff or INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE.
defendant, as the case may be, shall specifically deny the same under oath.
When the law makes use of the phrase "genuineness and due execution of Facts:
the instrument" it means nothing more than that the instrument is not
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. D.J. McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock
As an example, where the name of a corporation is signed to the document of merchandise valued at P1,200 from Brand & Hibberd.
which is the basis of an action, the failure of the defendant corporation to put Later Brand & Hibberd filed a complaint of estafa against McMillian.

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The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney and the documents was delivered; and that any formal requisites
undertook McMillian's defense in the estafa case. required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
Rohde testified that he was well acquainted with the nature of the stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
transaction between the firm of Brand & Hibberd and McMillian. Hence, such defense as that the signature is a forgery; or that it
Later on Rohde agreed to sign the following note if Brand & was unauthorized, as in the case of an agent signing for his
Hibberd would withdraw the estafa complaint: principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership, or of a
corporation; or that, in the case of the latter, that the corporation
Baguio, Benget, April 27th, 1911 was not authorized under its charter to sign the instrument; or that
the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity
For value received, we the undersigned parties, jointly and than that alleged in the pleading setting it out; or that it was never
severally agree to pay to thefirm of Brand & Hibberd, of the city of delivered are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and
Baguio, P.J., twelve hundred pesos Philippine currency in monthly due execution.
installments of one hundred pesos per month, beginning with the The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory
first day of June 1911. note a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which
dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles
W.M.J. Rohde him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of
D.J. McMillian new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant.
The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a
Rohde did this because he did not want his client to remain in prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a
confinement pending his trial in the Courts of First Instance. defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which
However the CFI found as a fact that the consideration of the note does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced
was the compromise of a public offense. in evidence.
Now because Rohde has not entered a verified specific denial To so interpret section 103 as to prohibit such a defense as
of the genuiness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff illegality of consideration, which is clearly a defense of new matter,
claims that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut would pro tanto repeal the second paragraph of section 94, which
off. permits a defendant to answer by A statement of any new matter
constituting a defense or counterclaim.
Issue: Whether Rohde was barred from questioning the legality of the note Likewise, section 285 provides that the terms of a writing may be
due to not having verified specific denial of the genuiness and due impeached by reason of its illegality or fraud. SC does not
execution of the note. understand that such defenses are barred by the provisions of
section 103.
Held: No. SC accordingly holds that the special defense interposed by the
defendant of illegality of consideration is not barred by his failure
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an to enter a verified denial of the genuineness and due execution of
instrument is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits the note set out in the complaint.
that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures PERFECTO JABALDE, plaintiff-appellant,
exactly as set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it; that

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vs. G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellee.
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Facts: vs.
MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, Respondents.
- Plaintiff-appellant deposited a sum of money with defendant-
appellee Philippine National Bank (PNB)
FACTS:
- Plaintiff filed this complaint, seeking the recovery of said amount
(P10,000. First P5,000 Phil currency; Second 5000 Phil - Manuel and Martha David were spouses who owned lots registered
currency and Japanese military notes) in the latter's name. The spouses separated de facto

o Basis: a passbook - Manuel discovered that Martha had sold the property to petitioner
Titan Construction Corp. for P1.5M through a Deed of Sale
- Defendant filed an answer which was not under oath and admitting
the making of the foregoing deposits, but denying the dates - Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and
indicated in the passbook, reconveyance against petitioner Titan Construction before the RTC-
QC
o PNB alleged that there were discrepancies in said
passbook, likely due to tampering on the part of plaintiff o The ground was, the sale executed by Martha in favor of
titan was made without his knowledge/consent
Issue: W/N defendant PNB's failure to deny under oath the entries in the
passbook as 'copied' in the complaint constitutes an admission of the - Titans counterclaim stated that it was a buyer in good faith and for
genuineness and due execution of the document value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
signed by Manuel which authorized Maria to dispose of the property
Held: NO on behalf of the spouses

- General rule: such failure is tantamount to such an admission o Titan prayed for the dismissal of the complaint

- But this rule is inapplicable in the case at bar because the plaintiff - RTC: declared the deed of sale void ab initio
submitted evidence indicating what was allegedly the dates of
deposit, but did not raise an objection when witnesses testified o The SPA authorizing Maria to dispose of the property was
on different dates of deposit void ab initio

- By this omission, the plaintiff waived the defendant's failure to deny - CA: affirmed the lower court's decision
under oath the genuineness and execution of the passbook entries
o MfR denied
- Hence, PNB may interpose a defense assailing the genuineness
- Hence the instant PfRC R45
and due execution of the passbook entries

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o Titan contended that the lower court erred in declaring the FACTS:
SPA (and in turn, the deed of sale) void ab initio
lots Nos. 1226 and 1182 of the Cadastral Survey had
Ground: Rule 8, which states that when an been sold by C. N. Hodges to Vicente M. Layson.In order that he could use
action/defense is based on a written instrument said lots as security for a loan he intended to apply from a bank, Layson
or document, the genuineness and due execution persuaded Hodges to execute in his (Layson's) favor a deed of absolute sale
thereof is deemed admitted unless the adverse over the properties, with the understanding that he would put up a surety
party specifically denies them under oath bond to guarantee the payment of said balance. Layson executed, in favor of
Hodges, a promissory and indicated there in the principal and interest and
Manuel filed a reply alleging that the SPA was a and the sum of P1,551.60, for attorney's fees and costs in case of default in
forgery, but the same was not made under oath the payment of the principal or interest of said note. To guarantee the same
the Central Surety and Insurance Company (petitioner) through the
Therefore, Manuel cannot assail the genuineness manager ( MRS.MESA)of its executed in favor of Hodges the surety bond .
and due execution of the SPA
Layson defaulted in the discharge of his obligation,
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the deed of sale as void Hodges demanded payment from the petitioner but Layon failed to settle it.
ab initio
CFI-ILOIOLO
RULING: Hodges file recovery jointly and severally the sum against Layson
and petitioner

In his answer to the complaint, Layson admitted the formal


NO!!! allegations and denied the other allegations. While petitioner was
declared in default.
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of
attorney is a forgery was not made under oath. However, the complaint, CFI-ruled in favor of HODGE
which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the subject
Petitioner filled a MR and a motion for relief under Rule 38-CFI set
property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his
aside decision against the petitioner and admitted its answer.
knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is
nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his ANSWER OF PETITIONER :petitioner disclaimed liability under
consent thereto. the surety bond in question, upon the ground (a) that the same is
null and void, it having been issued by Mrs. Rosita Mesa after her
While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must
authority therefor had been withdrawn (b) that even under her
be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a
original authority Mrs. Mesa could not issue surety bonds in
denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should be one which assists excess of P8,000.00 without the approval of petitioner's main
the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just office which was not given to the surety bond in favor of Hodges;
determination of the disputed issues.
and (c) that the present action is barred by the provision in the
surety bond to the effect that all claims and actions thereon should
CENTRAL SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
C. N. HODGES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

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be filed within three (3) months from the date of its expiration on G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005
January 23, 1955.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION
CFI-ruled for Pet. HODGES went to CA-ruled for HODGES hence
(SOLIDBANK), Petitioners,
petitioner went to SC
vs.
PET contention: they assails the finding of the Court of Appeals to DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES, AND
the effect that the petitioner is liable for the full amount of surety SPOUSE, Respondents.
bond 17,826.08 despite the fact that it exceeded the sum of
P8,000.00 and hence, required, for its validity and binding effect Facts:
as against petitioner herein, the express approval and
confirmation of its Manila office, which were not secured in view 2
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
of petitioner's failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, "The Consolidated Bank & Trust
execution of said bond, copy of which was attached to the Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O.
complaint Morales and Spouse" promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners
RULLING: motion for reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the order
dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27,
Section 8 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court: When an action or defense is Manila.
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the In a promissory note, respondent Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies petitioner for the P1M granted to them by the latter. Respondent defaulted
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision and failed to pay.
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original RTC
instrument is refused. Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for recovery of
sum of money against respondents, impleading the spouse of
IN THIS CASE: The parties acted in complete disregard of or wholly respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to
overlooked the rule above-quoted. Hodges had neither objected to the bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
evidence introduced by petitioner herein in order to prove that Mrs. Mesa Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in
had no authority to issue a surety bond, much less one in excess of Default
P8,000.00, and took no exception to the admission of said evidence. opposed by the defendants upon the ground that they were
never served with copies of the summons and of petitioners
Hence, Hodges must be deemed to have waived the benefits of said rule complaint.
and petitioner was held liable only for the sum of P8,000.00 and not the Respondent corporation filed a manifestation attaching `its answer
entire amount. to petitioners complaint which states the following:

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TC - denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged
and admitted their respective answers indebtedness.
Respondents filed their respective defenses independently TC dismissed the case
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its CA affirmed TC MFR denied
sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of
its Collection Department.
Petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred when it upheld the exclusion of exhibit E,
original copy of Exhibit "A" (the promissory note) could no the second original copy of the promissory note, despite the fact that the
longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of original of exhibit A (xerox copy of the duplicate original of the promissory
the duplicate original of the promissory note which was note) was actually in the possession of private respondents, thus warranting
identified and marked as Exhibit "E." the admission of secondary evidence.
TC initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted
respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective HELD: YES.
answers to conform with this new evidence.
Respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for
Respondents were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the
reconsideration of the trial courts order admitting into evidence
genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, thus:
petitioners Exhibit "E." Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit
"E" should not have been admitted as it was immaterial,
irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the
Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit "E" was not properly answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied
identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the generally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due
preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was execution of the promissory note and by way of special and
Exhibit "E." Further, as there were markings in Exhibit "A" which affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never
were not contained in Exhibit "E," the latter could not possibly be signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his
considered an original copy of Exhibit "A." Lastly, respondent personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover, what appears in the
corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but
the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit "E" was not the they deny generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It
original of Exhibit "A" which was the foundation of the complaint would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the
and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer. requirement of the law for specific denial.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to
reconsider order admitting as evidence Exhibit "E insisting that the The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were
NOT established as far as he was concerned. SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is
TC - granted respondents motions for reconsideration with regard founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
to the admission of Exhibit "E. corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
Petitioners MFR denied genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them
ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E," petitioner no and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an

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oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to RICARDO MASONGSONG, Respondent.
the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused. Facts

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and of the


Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
26 Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The Decision dismissed
contemplated by law. In the early case ofSongco vs. Sellner, the Court
Nestorio Memitas (Memita) appeal and affirmed the Decision of Branch 50
expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental (trial court), while the
actionable document, viz.:
Resolution denied Memitas motion for reconsideration.

. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he Masongsong, under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the
did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.s Magnolia chicken products.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day payment
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any credit to Memitas Vicor Store in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City.
issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such
a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution Masongsong filed a complaint before the trial court and alleged that from
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not Memitas credit on goods purchased already reached the amount of
27
affecting either. P603,520.50. Masongsong made several demands upon Memita to pay
before Masongsong filed the complaint. Masongsong even sent a demand
TC and CA erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny letter to Memita, but did not receive any reply.
the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by
the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, Aside from payment, Masongsong also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory attachment against Memita.
note and recognized their obligation to petitioner. (sec 11 Rule 8)
The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against Memita,
taking into account the following:
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny
specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, The allegations of the verified complaint;
there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the The testimonies of Masongsong and Joel Go, his sales person; and
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to Masongsongs bond.
the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently
established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that
petitioner failed to present the original of said note. According to the sheriffs return of service, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
notice of levy on attachment to the Registrar of the Land Transportation
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Office and a notice of embargo to the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.
Pesos to petitioner.

NESTORIO MEMITA, Petitioner, - versus -

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In his answer, Memita did not deny that he purchased goods on credit from
Masongsong. Memita further stated that his refusal to pay was based on the
following grounds: It is quite obvious that the best evidence of the transaction between
[Masongsong] and [Memita] is the Sales Invoice for this document reflects
Questionable deliveries; the particulars of the transaction between the parties for a specific day. In
Short deliveries and discrepancies; and this document, [Memita] acknowledges receipt of the deliveries made by
Possible manipulation of delivery receipts. [Masongong].

Atty. Sabornay manifested that Memitas settlement offer was not


Trial Court acceptable to Masongsong. The trial court thus denied the motion
for postponement and deemed the case submitted for decision.
Trial proceeded soon thereafter. The trial court found that: The evidence Atty. Zamora filed a motion for reconsideration of the 22 January
ineluctably show that the transaction between [Masongsong] and [Memita] is 1998 order.
documented by the Sales Invoices annexed as Annexes A to TTT of the The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Portions of the
Complaint. trial courts order read:
In his Motion for [R]econsideration, [Memitas] counsel failed to
The Sales Invoices were attached as annexes to the Complaint and justify his failure to appear in the hearing.
their genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted for The trial court ruled that Masongsong was entitled to the reliefs
failure of [Memita] to deny them under oath. prayed for in his Complaint.
Defendant failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which
substantiates his claim of short deliveries or questionable
deliveries. Appellate Court
As [Masongsong] declared, [Memita] belatedly raised the issue of
short deliveries and discrepancies after he failed to pay and The appellate court did not agree with Memita. It upheld the trial courts
demands were made on him to pay. decision intoto.

The appellate court identified two issues for its resolution:


To bolster his claim of short deliveries and discrepancies, [Memita]
attempted to show to the Court that there were other documents, namely: Whether Memita was deprived of his right to due process when the
trial court denied his motion for postponement; and
the Load Order Manifest and the Issue Form wherein the actual Whether the trial court erred in admitting the sales invoices
deliveries to the defendant are reflected. submitted by Masongsong.
In so far as the Issue Form is concerned, this document reflects the
quantity of goods obtained by [Masongsong] from San Miguel
Foods for delivery to [Masongsongs] customers. In resolving the first issue, the appellate court reiterated Masongsongs
argument that the trial court committed no error in denying Memitas motion
The Issue Form does not at all show the quantity of goods
to postpone the hearing. The appellate court emphasized that due process
delivered to each particular customer of [Masongsong].
demands proper obedience to procedural rules. As to the second issue, the
The Load Order Manifest is [Masongsongs] own document which
appellate court pointed out that Memita f