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B Y T H E SAM E AU T H O R

R EL I G I ON V L TI ON
IN E O U

AN I NTRO D U CTI O N O H T T E H I S TO R Y
'

O R ELI I O N
F G

E O L U TI O N
V
P E R SO N A L I T Y

F . B . J E V O N S, L i tt D . .

M E TH U EN CO . LTD .

36 E SSE X STR EET W . C .

LO ND O N
P R E FACE

VE R YB O D Y believes in his own


existence and that he k n o ws some
thing about himself . What exactly he
knows about himself and ,
h is own per
so n a li t y , is another question . I t is an
interesting question ; and ,
the moment
a man tries to answer it he begins to be a
,

philosopher . But it is a di fcult question ,

and inasmuch as science contrives to get


,

on without answering or even raising it ,

he may be tempted to doubt whether his


own personality has any reality . E specially ,

will this doubt beco m e troublesome when ,

he discovers that psychology provides no


proof of the existence of the self and that ,
vi PE R SO NA LIT Y

some psychologists proceed to deny the


reality of personal identity . Probably ,

however he will feel that if he cannot


, ,

prove neither after all


, , ,
c an he doubt his ,

o w n existence and with that he may be


, ,

tempted to imagine that he can dismiss


t he question . But he cannot . T he same
doubts that are raised about his own per
so n ali t y and existence can be r aI se d about
the existence and persona lity of G od . If
personality is an unmeaning term ,
d e si g

nating nothing then there are no persons


, ,

human or divi ne . I f it has a meaning and ,

designates a re al ity of some kind then w e ,

ought at least to try to underst a nd what


w e mean by it and to form some con
,

ce p t i o n of what the reality is which is


designated by the term .

T he preceding words state in outline the


argument which is contained in the following
pages and which formed the matter of four
,
P RE F ACE vii
lectures gi v en last summer at O xford in
,

the Vacation T erm for Biblical S tudy .

I n C hapter I it is pointed out tha t physical


.

science and psychology can go their way


and do their work without assuming the
existence of pe r son a lity . I n C h a pter I I is.

an examination of arguments which a re


based on psyc h ology and are intended to
,

show that I am certain I do not exist th a t


personality is a mistaken inference ; and
that the only T hinker i s the passing Thought .

C ha pter I I I is a discussion of M B e rg so n

. . s

argument that there are changes but no ,


things which change , and the inference ,

to be drawn from it that there are changes


, ,

but no persons who change . I n C hapter IV .

it is maintained that persons are not in

d i v i d u als ,
in the sense of closed systems ,

but a re at o nce subj ects cognizant of


obj ects ,
and obj ects presented to other
subj ects that the principle of unity which
P ER SO NA L I T Y
holds persons toge ther ,
and the impulse

towards unity with one s neighbour and
,


one s G od is love
,
.

F . B .
J E VO NS

BI SHO P H AT F I E L D

s H ALL , D U R HAM
I st F e b r u ar y 19 13
C O NT E NT S

CHAPTE R I

P E R SO NAL IT Y AN D I M PE R SONAL I T Y

CHAPTE R I I

P S Y C HO LO G Y AN D P E R SO NAL I T Y

CHAPTE R I I I

P E R SO NAL I T Y AN D C HAN G E

CHAPTE R I V

P E R SO NAL I T Y AN D I ND I V IDU AL I T Y

I ND EX
P E R SO N AL IT Y

CHAPTE R I

P E R S O N AL IT Y AN D I M P E R S O N AL I T Y

P e r s o n al i t y ahy p o the s i s n o t r e q u ir e d e i the r b y P h ys i


c al S c i e nc e o r b y P s y c h o l o gy o r b y Pr e An i m i sm
-

I m p e r s o n al i t y ,howe ve r d e n i e s an d th e r e f o r e p e
, ,
r

s u pp o s e s P e r s o n a l i t y
,
.

T is possible to be quite certain about a


thing and quite wrong : to err i s human
,

and the whole human race may make the


same mistake for centuries before dis
covering the error F or countless cen
.

t ur i e s mankind wa s certain that the earth



was motionless : the L ord hath made
the round world s o sure that it cannot be ,


moved A nd yet it moves When the
. .

earth thus gives way beneath our feet


and at every step we take we thrust the
, ,

5 earth a way wh e r e sha l l we nd any


m
.
2 P E R SO NA LIT Y
ground of certainty ? A common mode
of expressing absolute certainty about a
thing is to say I am as certain of it as
,


I am of my own existence A nd it is
.

indisputable that most people are certain


of their own existence But it is also
.

indisputab l e that all people fo r long were



certain that the earth cannot be move d .

I f then for all their certainty they were


, ,

wrong about the earth it is apparently at


, ,

any rate possible that on the other point


,


also their own existence they may be
quite certain and yet quite wrong W e .

can understand now how natural and how


easy it was for man to d r aw the wrong
i nference from the apparent motion of the
sun T hen may not his certainty about
.

his own existence be an inference which


it is easy to draw which is rst dr a wn
,
,

precise l y because it is easiest drawn and ,

for that very reason is least likely to be


the correct inference P I f it took mankind
ages to draw the correct inference in the
one case little wonder that it has not yet
,

been co m mo nl y drawn in the other case .


I M P E R SO NA LIT Y 3

I f the movement of thought in the one


case was from error to tru t h may it not ,

in the other case be also in the same


direction P

I n the notion of self a recently pub


,

li sh e d philosophical work (E ngli sh T h ough t



f or E n gli s h T hi n k
,
e rs p.1 93 ) says we ,

have the sole presented type of substance ,

a something that continues unchanged


u nder a change of accidents But the
.

notion of the self a s something that con


t i n u e s unchanged is very like the notion
of the earth a s something that cannot
be move d . W e have had to give up the
notion that the earth i s the centre round
which the solar system revolves W e are .

s l owly parting with the notion that man


is the centre round which and for which
the universe exists T he geocentric notion
.

has gone and is carrying with it the


anthropocentric notion also T here is no .

xed unmoved unchanging centre such


, ,

as the earth was once supposed to be .

T he notion is illusory T o recognize that


.

the notion of persona lity the notion of


,
4 P E R SO NA LI T Y
the self as something which exists or
continues unchanged may be an il l usory
,

notion is doubtless as di fcult as to


,

reali z e that the earth is rotating on its


axis and revolving ro u nd the sun Yet .

the di f cul ty does not alter the fact The .

truth indeed is that some facts can be


, ,

explained j ust as satisfactorily on the


assumption that the s u n moves as they
can be on the assumption that the earth
moves A nd those facts were precisely
.

the facts which wer e most ob vious and


which therefore monopoli z ed the attention
of man for countless centuries T he facts
.

which were less obvious failed for that ,

very reason to arrest his attention But


, .
,

when his attention was arrested it became ,

evident eventually that when all the facts


and not merely the most obvious were
taken into account however great the
,

di fculty of realizing the motion of the


earth the difculties in the way of suppos
,

ing it motionless were innitely greater .

T hese di fculties however did not p resent


the m selves a t rst A t rst a nd for long
.
,
I M P E R SO NA LIT Y 5

afterwards the supposition that the earth


,

was xed and motionless and that the ,

su n it was that moved su fced as an ,

explanation of the facts that were observed .

I n the same way the supposition that


, ,

though the things around one change one ,


does not change oneself that one s S elf


or Persona l ity is something that con
,

t i nu e s unchanged under a change of


accidents is a supposition which is easily
made which i s made indeed without
,

thinking but which now in these later


,

days may seem incapable of sustaining


a ny longer the weight and burden of the

facts which science h a s accumulated upo n


it .

I n the l owest stage of development in


which we can directly observe hum a n
society we nd not on l y that man believes
,

or rather we should s ay acts on the



belief i n his own personality but also ,

that everywhere around him he nds a


personality not his own H e does things .

himse l f or
thinks he does and his ex
planation of the things that happen to
6 P E R SO NA L IT Y
him if he feels that they requ i re explana
,

tion is that they also are the doing of


,

some personal being or other H is notion .

is that he i s a personal power surrounded ,

by personal powers H e believes in agents


.
,

in personal agents and he h as as yet no , ,

conception of impersonal causes H e is .

in the stage of development known as


animism T he successive j ourneys of the
.

su n do not seem to him to be success i ons

merely H e mu st acco u nt for them ; and


.

the only account he can render i s that they


are the do i ng or the behaviour of a personal
power which is like himself in that it is
personal though as power it transcends
,

any power of his own .

I n this supposition of personal power he


nds a satisfactory explanation of the
unexpected and the unforeseen A nd .
,

with his very limited knowledge of natural


laws much is to him unforeseeab l e that
,

modern science predicts with a sense of


certainty E clipses and comets which con
.

rm our knowledge of the laws of nature


are ascribed by him to the arbitrary will
I M P E R SO NA L IT Y 7

of the personal agents whom he supposes


to produce them O n the other hand the
.
,

events in the ordinary trivial round of


,

human life which happen in the usual way


, ,

which are expected and which come off as


expected seem to require no explanation
,
.

T hey are regarded as quite natural A nd .

the progress of knowledge or at any rate ,

the advance of scientic knowledge con ,

sists precisely in wresting territory from the


domain of the unexpected and the u n fo r e
seen I t consists in ascertaining the con
.

d i t i o n s under which an event once u n fo r e


,

seeable and startling in it s occurrence ,

may be expected with assurance or even ,

be produced by man When the condi tions


.

which determine that the thunder shall


fol l ow the lightning are known there is ,

nothing more mysterious or unexpected in


the sequence than there is in the fact that
the electric bell rings when you press the

push Primitive man s supposition that
.

personal power was required to account for


h
t e th u nder the Psalmist s conviction

that the voice of thy th un der was in the


I M P E R SO NA LI T Y 9

progressed thus far is that it has set aside


the attem p t to nd amongst the obj ects of
nat ure either personality or personal power .

I t no lon g er seeks for either I ts aim is to


.

ascertain the laws of the c o existence and -

succession of the events that take place


aro u nd u s .

But the events that take p lace around u s


are not the only events which interest us .

What goes on within us i nterests us pro


fou n d ly . A nd what goes on within us may
b e studied as well a s What takes place
,

around us I t may be studied and it is


.

studied by Psychology T he obj ect of.

Psychology as a science must obvio u sly


, ,

be the same as tha t of all other sciences .

Their obj ect is to ascertain the laws of


nature I ts obj ect therefore is to ascertain
.

the laws of human nature The other .

sciences study the c o existence and succes


-

sion of the events that take place around


us T he science of Psychology stu di es the
.

c o existence and succession of the eve n ts


-

that take p l ace within us Psychology .


,

J ohn S tu art M ill te lls us is the science


,
IO P E R SO NA LI T Y
which is concerned with the uniformities of

succession the laws whether ultimate or
,


derivati v e according to which mental

states succeed one another Psychology .
,

therefore as thus dened deals with uni


, ,

for m i ti e s ; like all the other sciences it ,

sets aside arbitrary w i ll By the very .

meaning of the words what is arbitrary,


is no t uniform . I f mental st a tes succeed
one another in arbitrary fashion they ,

do not s u cceed one a nother uniformly .

A nd if there are no uniformities of suc ces


sion there can be no science of mental
,


states that i s there can be no psychology
,
.

But it I s u ndeniable that in similar circum


stances we have much the same feeli ngs ;
and when we have the same feelings we
act in much the same way as before Ob .

v i o u sly therefore there are uniformities of


, ,

s u ccession within us j ust as there are uni


,

for m i t i e s of succession in the events th a t


take place around us A nd if the latter .

can be studied and formulated with some


degree of correctness then the former can
,

also H uman nature as well as physical


.
I M P E R SO NA LIT Y 11

n a ture can be studied scientically .

S cience can deal with the one as well as



with the other o u the same terms and
conditions viz that arbitrary will i s ex
,
.
,

cluded and uniformity of succession is


,

admitted W hen however we have onc e


.

come to se e that uniformity of succession


must be admitted and the freedom of the ,

will be excluded in order that psych o logy


,

may take its proper place amongst the


sciences we S hall have little hesitation in
,

taking one further step I ndeed if p sy .


,

c h o lo gy i s to assume i t s full rank a s a

science we must take the one further step .

Physical science or the natural sciences


, ,

have as we have seen no use for the


, ,

notion entertained by pri mitive man and


,

by the Psalmist that persona l power i s,

required to account for thunder and light


ning . T he thunderer a ju p i te r ton ah s
, ,

is from the point of view of science wholly


superuous : there is no such person I f .

then psychology is to be really s c i e n t i c


if it is to be concerned solely with t he
uniformities of succession according to ,
12 P E R SO NA LIT Y
which mental states succeed one another
then j ust as a thunderer is s u peruous ,

so from the point of view of science a


thinker is superuous : there is no such
person M ental states or states of con
.
,

s c i o u sn e ss of course there must be if there


, , ,

is to be any psychology at all A nd those .

states of consciousness must not only suc


c e e d one another b ut must exhibit u ni
,

fo r m i t i e s of succession if psychology is to
,

be a science But beyond or behind the


.

u niformities of succession according to ,

which mental stat es succeed one another


it is as unnecessary for psychology to go ,

as it is for physical science to go beyond


or behind the uniformities of succession
which are to be observed in the occurre nce
of the events that take place around us .


I ndeed j ust as the hypothesis of
,
a

thunderer ,
a jup i ter ton ah s is for the
, ,

purposes of science either otiose or posi


,

t i v e ly misleading ,
so for the science of
psychology the hypothesis of a thinker
is either otiose or positively misleading
I f it implies and is conceded to imply
I M P E R S O NA LI T Y 13

nothing more th a n the fact admitted on ,

all hands that consciousnes s exists and


,

that states of consciousness exhibi t uni


fo r m i t i e s of succession then the hypo ,

thesis o f a thinker is otiose and


superuous No one denies the existence
.

of conscio u sness B ut the consciousness


.

which is thus admitted to exis t i s a s ,


H uxley termed it epiphenomenal
, It .

accompanies successive states of the brain ,

as the shadow of a train may accompany


the train as it travels But the shadow .

does not make the train move ; nor does



this epiphenomenal consciousness cause
the successive states of the brain : it simply
accompanies them .

I f on the other hand the hypothesis of


, ,

a thinker is found on consideration


to imp l y something more than that there
are tho u ghts or states o i consciousness .

exhibitin g uniformities of succession that ,

over and above or behind the changing


, ,
'

t h o u gh t s o r successive states of conscious


ness t here is
,
somethi ng that continues

u nch a nged a p ermanent S elf or person
, ,
I 4 P E R SO NA LIT Y
then we relapse into a position exactly
p aralle l to the su p position discarded by
physical science that over and above or
, ,


behind the thunder there is a thunderer
, , ,

who thunders when he chooses to do so


, ,

arbitrarily A t the present day however


.

we have given up the belief in a jup i ter


tomm s and if we have given u p the notion
,


of a thunderer we are it may be argued
, , ,

called upon in consistency to give up the


, ,


notion of a thinker .

T hus the events within us and the events


around us when studied from the same
,


p oint of view the scientic p oint of V iew
an d by the same method the scientic -


method point in the same direction and
t o the same conclusion A ll knowledge .
,

if it is really knowledge and not a misappre ,

h e n si o n of facts must be harmonious and


,

consistent : it must form a unity The .

unication of knowledge consists precisely


in discarding assumptions prematurely
made . S uch premature assumptions ,

accounting for some facts only must be ,

discarded i n favour of those which come


I M P ER SO NA L I T Y 15

later and which account for a much wider


range of facts Personality from this point
.
,

of view is an assumption which was early


,

m a de to account for all the events


,


e xternal and internal which arrested the
attention of man and ca l led for explanation .

It is an assumption which science has


steadily se t aside T he succession of
.

events without us can be explained by


science without resorting to that hypo
thesis T he succession o f e vents within
us can be exp l ained by science witho u t
resortin g to it I t is not an ai d but an
.
,

embarrass m ent to science I t does n o t


tend to the unication of knowledge but , ,

by introd u cing an unfathomable gap


between the personal and the impersona l ,

seems to make unication impossible .

Perhaps it may be felt to be strange that


a ll mankind at all stages of human develop
,

ment S ho u ld have resorted to this notion


,

of person ali ty a s the sole exp l anation of


al l events t hat take place around us and
within us and that yet t hi s notion of
,

personality should be a false exp l anation


I M P ER SO NA LIT Y 17

intellectual evolution of man h as been put


forward T he root idea of this pr e An i m -


i sm,
M r Clo d d says in Th e Tr ans a cti on s of
.

th e Th i r d Con gre ss o f th e Hi story of R e li gi on s ,


1 908 , is that of power everywhere power ,

vaguely apprehended but imm a nent and , ,

as yet unclothed with personal or super



natural attributes I n a pape r on Pre
.

A ni mistic R eligion which appeared in F olk


,

L or e in J une I go o M r M arett had earlier


,
.

argued that R eligious A we is towards


Powers and these are not nece ssarily spirits
,


or ghosts though they tend to become so
, .

A nd in the Ce n s u s of I n di a 1 901 S ir , ,

H erbert R isley tells us that in C hota N agpur


he has come across I nstances which lin ger
on as survivals of the impersonal stages of

early religion S ir H erbert s impression
.

is that what the j ungle p eople there really


do believe in is not a person at all in any
sense of the word but some sort of
,


power . M r Clo d d cites as indicative
.

of this pre animistic period


-
the M elan ,

esian and M aori belief in a power or inuence


called m an a to which no p ersonal q u alities
,

2
I 8 P ER SO NA LIT Y
are attributed and says that
,
with
this in broad and indenite conception
, ,

may be compared the k nlchi of the


A ustralian D ieri the agn d of the T orres
,

I sla nders the m an i tou of the A lgonkins


,

t l e wa k on da of the D akotans and the ai m ,


or ore n cla of the I roquois T h e Bantu .

m n ln ngn and the K a fr nn k n ln n k n ln have



no connection with the idea of pe rs onality ,

and he quotes M r H o lli s s suggestion that


.

in the e ngai of the M asai we may have


primitive and developed religious senti
ment where the personality of the deity
,

is hardly sep arated from striking natural


phenomena .

L et us now consider this pre animistic -

theory in its relation to the question of


Personality T he notion of Personality is
.

a notion which science as we h ave seen , ,

nds useless or worse than useless for its


purposes T h e uniformities of succession
.

which sci e nce is concerne d to ascertain and


establish whether they be uniformities in
,

the succession of the events that take place


aro u nd man or of those wh ich t a ke plac e
,
I M P E R SO NA L IT Y 19

within him c an be ascertained and estab


,

li sh e d without assuming the existence of

p ersons
. I ndeed if by persons
,
are meant
beings possessing free will and having the
-
,

power to act or not to a c t uniformly then ,

the notion of Personality is worse than


useless for the purposes of science F rom .

this point of view if science i s to be


,

accepted the notion of Personality must


,

be regarded as an erroneous notion I t .

must be regarded not a s a fact but a s a ,

false inference from the facts I t must be .

regarded not as a fact from the beginning


but a s a fallacy into which man stumbled .

I n the stage of h i s evolution known a s


animism we nd him fallen into the fallacy
,

of supposing that he is a person having to


do with other personalities human and ,

other than human T here must therefore


.

have been a previous stage prior to ,

animism in which as yet he had not


,

stumbled into this fallacy I n this p re .

animistic period man observed succession


,

in the events that took place around him ,

but he did not ascri b e those events to the


20 P E R SO NA LIT Y
action of any person he had not yet the

conception the fallacious conce p tion o f

a person at all in any sense of the


,


word . W hat he had we are told was
, ,

a vague conception of power unc l othed


,

with personal or s upernatural attri b utes .

W hen things hap p ened to man in this ,

stage of his evolution he did not regard


,

them as the doing of any person at all :


he ascribed them to some sort of po w er ,

to power vaguely conceived


F or the moment let us suppose that this
was s o and for the moment let u s not ask
,

for any proof that it was s o L et us ask


.
,

A nd what then The supposition enables


us to dismiss p ersonality I f ther e was a
.

stage in the evolution of man when he


simp ly had no t the vaguest conception
of personality he obviously could not use
,

the conception of personal power to account


for the occurrence of any event W hen .

therefore he wished to explain anything


that befell him he was in one res pe ct
, ,

and a very imp ortant respect like the ,

modern man of science : he did not make


I M P E R SO NA LIT Y 21

the mistake of asc ribing th e event to any


person or personality A nd s o far the ,

hy p othesis of a pre animistic period appears


-

to harmonize with the view that the


belief in personality is an inference a
false inference from the facts The hypo
.

thesis o i pre animism enables u s to po int


-

to a p eriod when it had as y e t never


entered the mind of man to draw that
inference T he teaching of science enables
.

us to se e tha t the inference when it



came to be drawn was a false inference .

Pre animistic man could not ascribe the


-

production of events to personal agency ,

for the very sufcient reason that he had


no conception of persons or personality .

B ut though pre animistic man on this


-

supposition was thus in agreement with


the most recent teachings of science he ,

was also on this su pposition from the


, ,

beginning absol utely wrong from the ,

scientic point of view on another matter


,
.

A ccording to the hypothesis though pre


,

animistic man had no conce p tion of a


person at all in any sense of the word
, ,
22 P E R SO NA LIT Y
he had a vague conception of power and ,

it was to power vaguely conceived that


, ,

he attributed the events which happened


around him or happened to him But .

science h as come to se t aside the c o n ce p


tion of power j ust as it h as se t aside the
,

conception of personality It s obj ect is


.

to ascertain a nd state uniformities of


succession ; and that it ca n do perfectly
well witho u t using the conception or ,

reverting to the hypothesis of power , .

S cience deals with the sequence of events


and endeavours to ascertain uniformities
of sequence W hether there is any power
.

which produces those se quences and uni


for m i t i e s is a question into which science
does not enter W hether there be such a
.

power or not does not in the least affect


t he fact that the s equences and uniformi
ties do actually obtain B ut as regards
.

pre animistic man the supposition is that


-

he did ascribe the occurrence of events


to some sort of power ; and from the
scientic point of view pre animistic man
-

was j ust as m u ch in error i n ascribing


I M P E R S O NA L IT Y 23

events to some sort of power as animis t ic ,

man was in asc ribing events to personal


power or persons I n resorting to the
.

supposition of power man went j ust as far


astray from the simple facts with which
scientic observation is concerned as he
did in resorting to the supposition of
persons or personal power .

Power then whether personal or i m


, ,

persona l i s a conception for which science


,

has no u se Power either personal or


.
,

impersonal i s an explanation of events to


,

which man has always had recourse .

O n the theory that animism is the earliest


stage in the intellectual evolution of man ,

personal power was that in which man


from the beginning sought the ex p lanation
of the events that befell him O n the .

theory of pre animism it was in power


-
,

power vaguely conceived some sort of ,

power that man rst sought the ex p lana


,
~

tion of the events that befell him N ow .


,

if the power to which on the pre animistic ,


-

theory man referred the events that befell


,

him was the p ower not of a person at all


, ,
I M P E R SO NA LIT Y 25

possibly enter the mind of a man unless he


had some sort of notion of personal power .

By universal consent man in the animistic



pe riod had a notion however vague and

however unsatisfactory o i personality
he explained every event that seemed to
him to require explanation by ascribing it

to the action of some personality either
a human p ersonality or some being which
resembled man I n being a personality ,

but which possessed more and other


powers than man O nly by slow degree s
.

did he come to attain to the idea of power


in the abstract apart from the person who
,


exercised it T he idea of things having
.
,

p ower to act was an idea which animistic


,

man did not possess .

T he argument advanced in support of


the theory of pre animism i s that because
-

man had no conceptio n or had not yet ,

realized the conception of things as i m ,

personal therefore he had no conc e ption


,

o f persons and did not know p ersons to be

p ersons N ow this argument wo u l d be


.

conclusive if it were true th a t p ersona l ity


,
26 P E R S O NA L IT Y
was a relative term if person and thing were
,

relative terms necessarily implying each


other in the same way that mother and

child are terms each of which necessarily


imp l ies the other and neither of which
can be understood without reference to

the other I f
. person were a term
which had no meaning when considered,


apart from things as mother would
,

be a term without signicatio n if we did



not k now the meaning of child then
,

indeed it would be undeniable that the



conception of person could not arise
or be understood before man had the con

c e t i o n of things B ut that i s not the
p .


case "

p erson is a term the meaning ,


of which involves no reference to things .

I t is perfectly possible to this day to


s u p p ose that persons and persons alone
exist that there is nothing and can be
,

nothing which is impersonal T he sup


position may be false i t may overlook
,

facts which are fatal to it A nd animistic


.

man may have overlooked those facts .

I f there a re such facts then it is part of


,
I M P E R SO NA L IT Y 27

the theory of animism that at that stage


of his intellectual development man did
overlook them T he theory of ani mism
.

i s that man did things (or supposed he


did ) and that he explained such things
,

as he undertook to explain by supposing


that they too were done by somebody .

W hatever the conception was that ani


mistic man framed of himself and his
fe l low men and of the way in which or the
-

power by which he and the y performed


actions that conception wa s the conception
,

of personality A nd the conception of


.


things having power to a c t had not yet
,

been entertained by him what we regard



as lifeless inanimate
,
things he r e ,

garde d a s living persons acting a s he did


, ,

and from motives similar to h i s when ,

they did act T he one and only explana


.

tion he could give or admit for anything


that required explanation wa s that some
body did i t T he only power he could or
.

did conceive of was personal power T hat .

lled the whole eld of h i s intellectual


vision .
28 P E R S O NA LIT Y
l

T hose u p holders therefore o f t h e th e ory


of p re animism who assert that the period
-


of animism was preceded by impersonal
stages of early religion commit themselves
to maintaining that man framed the c o n
cept of impersonal things before he formed
any concept of personality But this
.

position appears untenable .

O ther upholders of the pre animistic -

theory avoid the manifest error of suppos


ing that the concept of impersonal things
could exist prior to and independent of
the concept of persona lity They adopt.

a position which appears to be more in


harmony with the theory of evolution .

T hey assume that the two concepts of the


persona l and the i mpersonal were evolved
or di fferentiated out of some earlier concept ,

which was neither and which when di ffer ,

e n t i at e d
,
was differentiated into both .

This ear lier concept was vaguely conceived


it was neither the concept of persona l ity
nor the concep t of thing but was one in
,

whi ch both those concepts were he l d as it



w ere in so l ution to be precipitated a t
I M P E R SO NA LIT Y 29

som e later time in some w ay as yet u n


exp lained What man at this period on
.
,

this theory was aware of was power


, ,

neither personal nor imp ersonal but ,


power vaguely conceived power not ,

yet differentiated into personal power and



imp ersonal power power to which M r
, , .


Clo d d says no personal qualities are
,


attributed ,
and to which therefore we ,

m a y add no impersonal qualities could be


,

attributed I n a word at this period


.
,

man did not distinguish between p ersonal


and imp ersonal power between person ,

and thing But that i s precisely what is


.


meant b y animism I n the animistic
.

pe riod man did not distinguish between


person and thing A nd the reason why .

he did not differentiate between them is


that as yet he had not formed the idea
that things had power to act whereas he ,

knew that men did act I t is quite true .

that man at that time had not yet differ


e n t i at e d person a l po wer from impersonal

power But it is also true that he k new


.

he himself had power to act even though ,


3 0 P E R SO NA LIT Y
he had not yet formed the i dea that things

could act T he root idea o f animism i s
that things were done by man and done
to him and that in the one case as in the
other they were done by somebody b y
man himself or by some one who resembled
man in that he did things and did them
,

for a reason but differed from him in s o


,

far as he did things which it was beyond


man to do .

We may therefore set asi de that form


of the pre animistic theory whic h bases
-

itself on the assumption that originally


power was conceived as being neither
personal nor impersonal and that only ,

subsequently was it di fferentiated into the


personal and the impersonal T he division
of power into power which is pe rsonal and
,

po wer which is not I s an exhausti v e,

division there is no room for any third


,

kind power is either personal or it is not .

T he power M r Clo d d talks of as being


.


unclothed with p ersonal attri b utes is
S imply impersonal power A nd the pre .

animistic theory is only of philosophic


I M P E R S O NA LIT Y 3 1

value if understood to mean that primitive


, ,

unsophisticated man seeing facts as they


,

are saw only impersonal power wherever


,

he gazed T he theory may be said to be


.

of philosophic value because it accords


,

with the philosophy which teaches that


the uniformities of succession exhibi t ed ,

by matter in motion if they require power


,

to account for them are com p atible only


,

with th e assumption of impersonal power .

Then if the power which manifests itself


to us in uniformities of succession be
impersonal the theory of pre animism
,
-

shows that from the beginning man recog


niz e d the power a s impersonal I f in .

subsequent stages of h i s evolution he was


for a long time led astray by the attempt
to interpret that p ower as personal the ,

aberration was bound in the long run to


be corrected : that closer stu dy of
observed facts which we call science
, ,

necessarily reca lled him from such sp e c u


lative extravagances to the actual uni
fo r m i t i e s of succession which are simply
,

incomp atible with the idea that they


I M P E R SO NA L IT Y 33

is based sim p ly on an a ssumption : the


power may be equa ll y well assumed to be
p ersonal N ext if there be no personal
.
,

po wer in the universe then man indeed ,

cannot be a personality and his belief ,

that he is a p erson must be fallacious .

But inasmuch as it is a mere assumption


that there is no personal power and that
there ar e no persons in the universe there ,

is nothing but mere assumption to s e t


against man s be l ief in his own personality

.

There i s h owever one interesting p oin t


, ,

of resemblance or af nity which should


not be overlooked between the phi l osophic
,

theory which de ni es p ersonality and the


intellectual position of man in the animistic
stage A nimistic man found an explana
.

tion for every event which struck him a s


requiring explanation in the supposition
that it was the doing of some personal
being B ut events which happened to
.

him in t h e or d i n ary course of things in the


way in which they always had happened ,

and in which he took it for granted they


would ha p pen required no explanation at
,
34 P E R SO NA LIT Y
all . I t was startling une xpected occur
,

r e n c e s which alone called for explanation .

S o too to the modern man of science


, ,

events which happen in the usual way ,

that i s to s ay uniformities of succession


, ,

seem to require no explanation at all T he .


savage does not invoke even man in the
animistic stage did not invoke p ersonal -

p ower to account for the expected but only ,

for the unexpected A nimistic man does


.

not invoke impersonal power to account


for the expected he does not account for
it or think even of trying to account for it
,

he takes it for granted and as it comes .

N ow that is the interesting point of r e


semblance between these two schools of
thought ancient and modern the ordinary
,

uniformities of succession because they are


,

familiar and established call for no ex


,

planation or rather explanation consists


,

sim p ly in stating accurately the conditions


under which a given event wi ll take place .

W hy things should be so arranged that ,

given the conditions the event occurs is a


question which neither the m a n of sc i ence
I M P E R SO NA LI T Y 35

nor a nimistic m a n i nquires into F or each .

the fact the S imple fact su f ces I f the


, , .

philosopher like s to assume the existence


of i m p ersonal power to account for the
unifor m ity of succession he may do so as
, ,

far as the man of science is concer ned .

A nimistic man did not account for the


uniformity of successions by that or any
other assumption at all it never occurred
to him even to try to account for i t i t
never occurred to him that there was any
thing to account for A nd s o too modern
.
, ,

science aims on l y at establishing uni


fo r m i t i e s of succession not a t accounting
,

for them I f the expected hap p ens no


.
,

explanation is cal l e d for T he progress of


.

sc i ence consists in teaching us what we


may expect I t consists that i s to say in
.
, ,

steadily diminishing the unexpected But .

it was the unexpected and the start l ing


which animistic man explained by the
assump tion that some personal agent other
th a n human produced it T he progress of
.

scien ce therefore has consisted in ste a di ly


di minishing the occasions a nd the excuse ,
3 6 P E R SO NA LIT Y
for resort ing to the hypothesis of personal
agen cy to account for the events that take
place around u s S o successful has science
.

proved that it does not hesitate in ho l ding


that nature is absolutely and without ex
ce p t i o n uniform we may and as a m a tter
,

of fact we do know only some of the condi


,

tions which prevail around us a nd c o n se ,

quently we can only foresee some of the


consequences which will ensue But if .
,

nature is uniform then we m u st be l ieve


,

that the co nseq u ences which we do not


foresee are j ust as much as the c on se
,

q u e n c e s wh i ch we do fore s ee
, t h e outcome
of the pre existin g conditions T hat is to
-
.

s a y if n a ture is througho ut and without


,

exception uniform then theoretical l y every


,

event that happens I s foreseeable U n e x .

p e c t e d and startling events only show our


ignorance of the causes at work they do
not warrant us in resorting to the hypo
thesis of person al agency to account for

them But even so granting that the
.

course of nature i s thus absolute ly uniform ,

granting that the uniformity of nature


I M P ER SO NA LIT Y 37

were not an assumption but were a demon


,

st rat e d fact we shall being human still


, ,

ask Wh y
,
W e S hall still as k what there
is in that fact if it be a fact inconsi stent
, ,

with the belief that the uniformity of


nature is the expression of a will which
knows no sh a dow of turning T he i dea ,

indeed that the only evidence which c a n


,

be adduced for the e li e f in a divine wi ll


consists in suppo sed violations of the uni
formity of nature will have to be dropped ,

if the uniformity of nature is proved in


violable But then the very uniformity of
.

nature will harmoni z e with the conception


of a divine will which changes not .

O n the other hand we must bear in mind


,

that the conc e ption of the uniformity of


nature does not adapt itself very readily
to the theory of evolution T he essence of
.

the theory of evolution is that the state of


the universe at any moment is different from
any state that has ever been before or
wil l ever be again What is imp lied in the
.

very notio n of u nifor m ities of succession is


that what has once occu rr ed will under the ~
3 8 P ER SO NA LIT Y
same conditions occur again What is i m
.

plied i n the very notion of evolution is


that the same conditions never c a n recur .

T he course of nature exhibits not mono


tonous uniformity but continual change .


I f w e cannot foresee a nd we certainly

cannot foresee chan g es that a moment
may bring forth the reason may be j ust the
,

opposite of that al leged by the upholders


of the theory that nature is uniform T hey
.

hold that nature is uniform and that we


can only dimly trace the lines on which she
works but though our V i sI on I s unsteady ,

her lines nevertheless are xed But


.

possibly the actual truth may be that


neither the course of n a ture nor that of
human n a ture is pre determined A nd the
-
.

reason wh y we cannot foresee it may simply


be that it is not yet xed I t may be that
.

what is not y et cannot for that very reason


now be known .
CHAPTER II

P S Y C H O L O G Y AN D P E R S O N A L IT Y

H u me

s p o s i t i o n th a t m a i s n o thi n g bu t a c o lle c t i o n
,
n

o f di ff e r n t p e r c e p t i ns
e o and th a t c o ns e q u e n t l y I m
, , a

c e r t ai n I d o o t e x i s t W i lli a m J m e s a rgu m e n t ( I )
n a

th a t p e r s o n ali t y i s a i n f r e nc an d a m i s t ak n i n fe r
n e e , e

e nc e ; ( 2 ) th a t t h e o n l y t hi n k e r i s t h e p ass i n g th o ught .

Fany science can tell u s what Perso n


ality or the S elf is it should be the ,

science of Psychology A nd yet the science .

of Psychology tells us in the long run either


that there is no S elf no Persona l ity or ,

that the problem of Personality is one


which can no more be solved by the science
of p sychology than the question whether
there is a G od can be solved by science in
general I f then we assume that what
.

science cannot know cannot be knowledge ,

i f that is to say we deny the value of


, ,

metaphysi cs we sha l l hold th a t neither


,
-

39
P S Y CH OLO G Y 4 1

psychologists it seems that their science S O ,

far from leaving the problem open d e n ,

i t e ly decides it against the existence of


Personality T hose psychologists wh o dis
.

believe in metaphysics are especially con


cerned to rescue t h e problem of personality
from meta p hysical discussion and to ,

decide it if possible by psychology on


, ,

scientic grounds S pe aking generally we


.
,

may say that psychologists w ho decide or ,

interpret psychology as deciding against ,

Personality do nothing more than repeat


,

H ume s argument

H ume s argument in

.
,

the famous chapter on Personal I dentity in


his Tr e ati se on H nm an N atnre may be ,

summed up in a few short quotations H e .

says : T here are some ph i losophers who


imagine we are every moment intimately
conscious of what we call our S E LF that we
feel its existence and its continuance in
existence and are certain beyond the
, ,

evidence of a demonstration both of its ,

perfect identit y and simplicity Un .

luckily all these positive assertions ar e


contrary to that very experience which is
4 2 P E R SO NA LIT Y
pleaded for them nor have we any idea of
S e l f after the manner it is here explained
, .

F or my part when I enter most inti


,

mately into wha t I call myse lf I always ,

stumble on some particular p erception or


other of heat or cold light or S hade love
, ,

or hatred pain or pleasure I never can


,
.

catch myself at any time without a p ercep


tion and never can observe anything but
,

the perception . I f any one upon


serious and unprej udiced reection thinks
he has a di fferent notion of h i mself I must ,

confess I can no longer reason with him .

H e may perha p s p erceive something


, ,

simple and continued which he calls hi mse lf


though I am certain there is no such
principle in me But setting aside some
metaph y sicians of this kind I may venture
,

to a frm of the rest of mankind that they


a re nothing but a bundle or collection of
di fferent perceptions .

I t will be observed that H ume says :


W hen I enter most intimately into what
I call myse lf I always stumble on some
,


p a rticular perception or other and this ,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 43

mode of expression seems to imply that I


wh o enter into what I call myself am
di fferent from that into which I enter I f .

th a t is what i s meant as well as imp lied


, ,

then it is evident that the various percep


tions of heat or cold light or S hade love or
, ,

h a tre d p a in or pleasure are not the same


, ,

as I who have the various perceptions I .

am not any one of them they are all of ,

them things on which I stumble I am


, .

not a pain or a pleasure I am not any one


.

of the different perceptions which I have ,

nor am I a bundle or collection of di fferent


perceptions I f that is so if I am not a
.
,

perception or a pleasure or a p ain then , ,

of course I am not to be found i n the


,

bundle or collection of di fferent perceptions .

A nd H ume s argument seems to be that if


I am not to be found in the bundle I am ,

found not to exist at all W hen I enter


.


most intimately into what I call myself ,

I nd nothing but a bundle or collection



of different perceptions By myself
.

H ume evidently me ans as he says noth ,

i ng but a bundle or collection of different


44 P E R SO NA LIT Y
perceptions But when he says th a t
.

I stumble on some p articular perception


or other he seems to draw a distinction
,

between the subj ect of the verb stumble


and the obj ect I am the subj ect who
.

stumble on or enter on something and the


, ,

obj ect on which I stumble or into which ,

I enter i s spoken of by H ume indi fferently


,

as myself and as nothing but a bundle


,

or collection of di fferent perceptions N ow .


,

if we take the obj ect on which I stumble ,

or into which I enter to be a bundle of ,

perce p tions and nothing but a bundle of


,

perceptions then , I the subj ec t am


plainly di fferent from the perceptions which
I have A nd if I am not to be found in the
.

perceptions that i s simply because I who


, ,

have the perce p tions am not one of the


,

perceptions that I have T he inference


that I who have the perceptions do not
exist is obviously a false inference I t .

simply amounts to saying that because I


as everybody will agree am not o n e -w

of my perce p tions and am not o ne of


,

the obj ects which I perceive therefore ,


P S Y CH OLO G Y 43

I t h e s ubj ect who pe rceive do not


, , ,

e xi st .

But as already said H ume speaks of


, ,

that on which I stumble sometimes as being


a bundle of perceptions and sometimes as

being myself The question then arises
.

whether I who stumble am to be regarded



as identical with the self on which I
stu m ble or as di fferent from
, myself .

N ow as we h ave seen if we identify the


, ,

obj ect on which I stumble with H ume s


bun dl e of perceptions there is no ,

di fculty I am neither a sens ation nor a


bundle of sensations I am n o t a pleasure
or a p a in I am not heat or cold or l ight or ,

shade ; I am not any of the sensations


that I have or all of them N either
,
.

can any or all of them be myse l f N or .


,

when I stumble on some particular percep


tion or other do I enter into what I ca ll
,

myself T he subj ect which stumb l es on


.

something or other is not t h e obj ect on


which it stumbles B ut tho u gh this i s
.

ev i dently true it is evidently not what


H ume meant it is the diametrical opposite
4 6 P ER SO NA LI T Y
of the conclusion which he wished to dra w .

T he conclusion which he wished to establish


was that I am nothing but the percep
tions which I have H is words therefore
.
,

W hen I enter most intimate l y into wh a t



I call myself ought to be interpreted
,

according to the meaning which he himself


puts upon the terms which he employs .

By myself he declares that he me a ns


nothing but a bundle or collection of

d i fferent perceptions I f therefore the
.

term I as used by H ume is identic a l



with myself then his words
,
when I ,

enter most intimately into what I ca l l



myself mean when a bundle or c o lle c
,

tion of perceptions en ters i nto a bundle or


col l ection of perce p tions S uch words.
,

however have no meaning A nd i f they


,
.


had i f pleasure or p ain heat or cold light
, ,

or shade which according to H ume are


,


p erceptions cou l d perceive anything sti ll
,

the words would be irrelevant T hey .

would be irrelevant because the quest i on


in dispute is not about perceptions but ,

about my p erceptions a bout the percep


-
P S Y CH OLO G Y 47

tions which I have Perceptions whi ch .

nobody has S imply do not exist A nd .

as they do not exist they cannot explain


anything As they do n o t exist it is
.
,

impossible for H ume or any one else to


enter into them T he only perceptions I
.

can enter into are my own and the o nly


person who can enter into my sensations
is myself H ume says :
. I never can
catch myself at any time without a pe r

c e p ti on ,
but it would be at least as true
to s ay that I never c a n at any time catch
a perception without myse l f H ume how .
,

ever thinks that he can catch a percep


,

tion without himself That is obvious l y


.

erroneous : the only perceptions any one


can have are his own But without dwell
.

ing on that l et u s simply observe H ume s


,

position as he states it himself H is .

position is that I can catch perceptions ,

but can never catch myself therefore "

the perceptions exi st but I do not


, .

The re p ly is ob v ious if I do not exi st


I cannot catch perceptions or anything
else H ume cannot start his argument
.
P S Y CH OLO G Y 49

diction Yet it is on that S i mple self


.


contradiction that H ume s reduction of
the self to nothing but a bun dl e or

collection of different perceptions is
based .

L et us now turn to a modern psychologist ,

the late William J ames and let us take ,

the chapter in his P r i n ci p le s of P sy ch ology


which deals with T he C onsciousness of

S elf
. I n its widest possib l e sense he ,


says ,
a man s S elf is the s u m total of
all that we can call his not only his body ,

and his psychic powers but h i s clothes ,

and his house h i s wife and children his


, ,

ancestors and friends his reputation and ,

works his lands and horses and yacht


, ,


a nd bank account T his sentence occurs
.

on the rst page of the chapter a n d at ,


once marks J ames position a s akin to
H ume s A di fference there is H ume

. .

says the S elf i s nothing but di fferent


perceptions J ames includes much more
.

in deed he includes so much that even


a solipsist C ould hardly complain that it
did not include enough T he di fference .
5 9 P E R SO NA LI T Y
however i s not of importance to our present
argument What is of importance is the
.


resemblance J ames says A man s S elf
.
,

is the su m total of all that he can call his .

T hat is to s ay there are rst all the things


,

that can be ca lled his and next there is,


he who calls them h i s and the man s

S elf i s t h e su m tota l of the things that



can be called his But he the man is
.
, ,

j ust left out H e does not gure amongst


.

the sum total of all the things that can be


called his T he S elf i ncludes them indeed
.
,

but nds no room for him T hus from the


s tart J ames is in harmony in this matter

with H ume By .myself H ume tel ls
us he means nothing but a bundle or

collection of di fferent perceptions T he .

S elf accord i ng to H ume consists of the


, ,

perceptions and does not include the


percipient j us t as according to J ames a
,

man s self consists of all that can be called


his but does not include the owner


"

A ccording to J ames the s u m total of ,


all that a man can call h is constitutes
the E mpirical S elf or M e A nd when .
,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 5 1

J a mes a n a lyses the E mpirical S elf or M e ,

we nd its constituents to be (I ) the


Material S elf (2 ) the S ocial S elf (3 ) the
, ,

S piritual S elf T he material self is not


merely the body That i s only part of
.

the material self T he material self as


.
,

understood by J ames comprises father , ,

mother wife and children our home our


, , ,

property anything that i s saturated with


,


our labour T here are he says few , ,

men who would not feel personally anni


h i lat e d if a lifelong construction of their

hands or brains say an entomological
collection or an extensive work in manu

script were suddenl y swept away
N ext .

A man s social

there is the social S elf .

self is the reco g nition he gets from his


m a tes . A nd from this it fo llows that ,

proper l y speaking a man has as many ,

socia l selves as there are individuals who


recogni z e him and carry an image of him

in their mind Fi nally th e re is the
.
,

S pir itual S elf b v which J ames means ,


he says a man s inner or subj ective
,


being his psychic facu l ties or dis p ositions
, .
5 2 P E R SO NA LIT Y
I t is imp ortant therefore for a proper
, ,

comp rehension o f what J ames means by


the E mpirical S elf or M e to understand
,

that by the S piritual S elf J ames means


not the subj ect or person who has the
faculties or displays the disposi tions but ,

the faculties or dispositions taken by


themselves T hese psychic d ispositions ,

he says are the most enduring and


,


intimate part of the self T he other .

parts of the self according to J ames are


, ,

of course the M ateria l S elf and the S ocial


,

S elf already described F rom them the


,
.

S piritual S elf is quite distinguishable I t .

may be regarded in the abstract or in the


"

concrete R egarded in the abstract it is


.

but psychic faculties or dispositions I n .

consciousness as it actually presents


,


itself J ames sa v s
,
a plurality of such
,


faculties i s always to be found From .

these words it would seem then according, ,

to J ames that the faculties or disposition s


,

which make up tha t part of the E mpiric a l


S elf or M e designated the S piritual S elf are
found in conscio u sness as it actually pre
P S Y CH OLO G Y 53

se n t s A nd to bring out the fact


i t se lf

that the E mpirical S elf or M e i s an obj ect


observed and is not the subj ec t or the ,

person I that does the observing we


, , ,

have only when J ames speaks of con ,

s c i o u s n e ss a s actually presenting itself to ,

ask to whom does consciousness p resent


itself and by whom is a plurality of
,

faculti e s always found in consciousness ?

I f consciousness p resents itself it must ,

r e se n t i t se lf to some subj ect if a lurality


p p
of f a cu l ties is always found they must b e ,

found by some one T aking th e E mpirical .

S elf to b e as J ames describes it to be


, ,


the S elf of S e lves and granting it to ,

be as J ames denes it to be nothing but


, ,

psychic facu l ties or dis p ositions we sti ll , ,


when to l d tha t it actu a lly presents itself
,

must ask to whom P Thus far all that we


,

have g o t from J ames is that psychical


faculties or dispositions are presented .


I ndeed at this point of J ames argumen t
we nd that we have lost somet h ing t hat
we started with A t the beginning of his .

chapter J ames started with the wor d s


, ,
34 P ER SO N ALIT Y

a man s self is the s u m total of all that
he can ca ll h i s W e started that is to
.
,

s ay with what is important in a discussion


,

of personality vi z a personal pronoun


,
.

and a possessive pronoun But in this .

abstract way of dealing with conscious



ness the personal pronouns drop out and
a plurality of faculties alone is left .

This abstract way of dealing with the


S piritua l S elf indeed reduces the S piritu a l
S elf to something impersonal T his self .


of selves this central nucleus of the

S elf J ames tells u S i s fe l t b y whom he
, ,
-

does n o t s ay A nd this central active


.


self th i s self of selves he tells us
,
when
, ,

carefully examined i s found to consist


,

mainly of the collection of [certain] peculiar


motions in the head or between the head
and throat T he I nference from or rather
.
,

the plain meaning of these words is that ,

the S piritual S elf consists of certain peculiar


motions A nd if s o the S piritual S elf
.
,

seems certainly impersonal B ut these .

motions in the head or between the hea d


,

a n d neck which co nstitu te the S pir i tu a l


,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 55

S elf are fe l t A nd if felt they are felt


,
.
,

by some one and they are not the person


who feels them I f on the other hand
.
, ,

they are felt by nobody they are feelings ,


which are not felt that is to say they are ,

a self contradiction Be this however as


-
.

it may by the S piritual S elf J ames means


,

simply certain motions which are felt in


the head or between the head and neck .

H e does not mean the subj ect or person


who feels them .

T hus when J ames has completed his


analysis of the E mpirical S elf or M e and ,

has enumerated its constituents viz the , .


,

M aterial S elf the S ocial S e l f and the


, ,

S piritual S elf he has nowhere found in


,

them any subject or person H e h as .

found feelings but nowhere any person who


,


h as the feelings thoughts but nowhe re ,

any subj ect who thinks them S ince then .

the person or subj ect who think s and feels


i s mo t to be found in the E mpirical S e l f or
M e there remains only one quarter in
,

which we can look for it and that i s , ,

according to J ames the sense of personal


,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 57

self and a se l f of ye st erd a y] but thinks that ,


they are identical But the whole ques
.

tion at issue is begged when it is thus ,

assumed at the beginning that I do


not think and it i s begged without any

explanation yet surely some explanation
is required if we are expected to believe
,

that our thoughts can take place without


our thinking them .

The next step in the argument is to


represent the sense of our own personal
identity not a s something of which we are
,

directly aware but as a conclusion or


,

inference drawn T he sense of our p er


.

sonal identity J ames says is a conclusion


, ,

grounded either on the resemblance in a


fundamental respect or on the continuity ,

before the mind of the phenomena com


,

pared . T he sense of our personal identity ,

then is a conclusion and it is a conclusion


, ,

base d on the resemblance which certain


phenomena displ ay when compared to
gether C ertain
. phenomena certain

mental phenomena when compared to
gether display a resemblance and from ,
5 8 P E R SO NA LIT Y
that resemblance the conclusion of o ur
perso nal identity i s drawn F urther these
.
,


phenomena these mental phenomena are
continuous to the mind or dis p lay con
,


t i n u i t y before the mind and from this
continuity again the inference of our
p ersonal identity is drawn .

J ames therefore evidently holds that


we have no sense of our personal identity ,

if by sense i s meant that we are directly


aware or have i m mediate ap p rehension
, ,

of it O ur personal identity S imply is not


.

known to u S at all it i s a pure inference


and a mistaken inference T here are pheno
.

mena before the mind which exhibit


resemblance to one another and dis p lay
continuity ; and from these phenomena ,

with their continuity and resemb l ance to


one another a conclusion i s drawn T hen
,
.

we ask By whom or b v what is the inference


,

drawn 9 A pparently S ince the pheno


,

mena from which the inference is drawn


are before the mind it i s to the mind that
,

the phenomena are presented and it is by ,

the mind that the inference is dr a wn .


P S Y CH OLO G Y 59

J ames argument therefore cannot start
, ,

without postulati ng that there i s a mind ,

th a t phenomena are presented to it and ,

th a t it dr aws inferences from them that is ,

to sa v thinks thoughts about them I n


, .

other wor d s our personality is not a n


,

inference from our thoughts but a condition


withou t wh i ch there would be no thoughts .

J ames however imagines that our person


a l ity is an inference and that it is an
,

inference from the phenomena presented


to us I f it were an inference from the
.

phenomena if it were an inference at all


, ,

it would be a mistaken inference ; and


J ames wou l d be right But it is not an .

inference from the phenomena : it is the


subj ect to whom the p henomena are

presented T he word phenomenon in
.

itself imp li es a p erson to whom it i s


presented or appears : a thing which
ap p e f I r S to nobody is not a phenomenon

or ap p earance at al l T here can be no .

phenomena or ap p earances if there i s no


subj ec t to whom they can appear .

I f further proof be wa nted to Show that


60 P E R SO NA LIT Y
J ames does without knowing it postulate
, ,

a subj ect or p erson it can be found in his


,

own words T he sense of our perso n al


.


identity he says
,
is grounded on the
,


resemblance of the phenomena comp a red .

I f phenomena are compare d they must be


comp ared by somebody I t is evidently .

possible to overlook the fact that phenomen a


or appearances can only a p pear to some
body for J ames does overlook it But
,
.

even if we pass that by and Suppose that


phenomena c an j ust appear all by them ,

se l ves how can they possibly be compared


,

unless some one compares them 7



A sub
je c t or person is simp ly indis p ensab l e I f .

nobody makes comparisons no compari ,

sons will be made I f nobody draws .

inferences no i nference s will be drawn


,
.

I t is not h owever our personal i ty a l one ,

but our personal identity which J ames


seeks to explain away H e explains it .

aw a y rst by substituting resemblance for


identity and next by seeking for it in the
phenomena and not in the mi nd to wh i ch
the phenomena are presented and by
P S Y CH OLO G Y 61

which the phenomena are com pared B ut .


,

by the very meaning of the words re ,

semb l ance is not the same as identity .

T hings which resemb l e one another are


things which tho u gh they resemble one
,

another are di fferent I f they w ere not


,
.

di fferent they would not resemble one


,

another they would be identical W hen .


,

then J ames says that the sense of our


,

personal identity i s grounded on the


resemblance of the phenomena compared ,

an d argues that such resemblance is no


good ground for inferring identity the ,

reply i s that whether the phenomena


,

compared by the mind or person resemble


one another or not is an irrelevan t con
,

sideration W hat is asserted by the up


.

holders o f pe r sonal id e ntity is not that the


phenomena presented to the subj ect or
person are identical b ut that the subj ect
,

or person to whom they are presented and


by whom the y are com p ared 15 identica l

, .

Th e c as e is the same with th e continuity


of the phenomena A ccording to J a mes
.

there is a con t inuity i n the phenomena


62 P E R SO NA LIT Y
before the mind ; and from that continuity ,

according to J ames the false inference is


,

drawn that the person to whom the phen


,

ome n a are presented possesses identity


or is identically the same person throughout .

N ow if continuity in the phenomena were


,

the S ingle solitary premise given then ,

personal identity would have to be an


inference from it and then we should ha v e
to consider whether it was a legitimate
inference or as J ames m aI n t a i n s a false
, , ,

inference from it But it is not from con


.

t i n u i t y in the phenomena that J ames starts .

I t is continuity in the phenomen a before the


mind that he starts from as he says ,

himself A nd if there is continuity in the


.

phenomena before the mind or subj ect ,

there must be continuity in the mind or


subj ect to which the phenomena appe a r .


But once more the subj ect s identity in
continuity is not an inference from the
continuity of the phenomena presented
to the subj ect or p erson I t is not in the
.


phenomena presented th a t the subj ect s
identity is to be sought or can be found ,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 63

but o nl y in the subj ect to whom the pheno


mena are presented and by whom they are
comp ared When J a mes says that our
.

personal identity i s grounded on the


resemblance of the phenomena compared
he admits that continuous phenomena
are compared but if compared they must
be compared by some subj ect or person ;
and the subj ect or person who apprehends
and compares continuous phenomen a must
be there all the time and u nless it were the
same person or self who com pared them
they could not be compared at all .

T o J ames however it seems that my


, ,

personality and my personal identity are


inferences I f he regarded my personality
.


as an inference from my thoughts it ,

would be open to us to s ay that by ta lking



of my thoughts he sim p ly begged the

question for my thoughts imply me
, ,

and wi t h o u t
t me there could be no

thoughts of the kind called mine It .

is ther e fore of the essence of his argument


to assume th e existence of thoughts which

are not y ours or mine but are the

,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 65

to say , T his thought is t h e same thought


as it was y esterday and all we have to
,

inquire i s whether the thought i s ri gh t o r


wrong in sayi ng s o A nd the answer to


.

the inquiry i s plain no thought to day is -

identical with any of yesterday s thoughts

There may be a resemblance between them .

T here c an be no identity A nd J ames .

conc l udes therefore there c an be no


,

personal identity O f course no person


.
,

ality or personal identity can be inferred



from the premise T his thought i s the
,


same a s that if we begin b y sta ting that
,

thought does not imply any thinker or


person E vidently therefore J ames does
.

not start from the premise T his thought


,

is the s a me thought as it wa s yester



day .

T he premise he starts from is the one


he himself lays down in his own words ,

I ain the same self that I wa s yesterday


.

T hat is the thought from which he starts .

The thought may be wrong as J ames ,

intends to S how But right or wrong it


is there and we have got to start with it
, ,
66 P E R S O NA LIT Y
or else we cannot begin discussing it at
all Very good " then w e have to start
.
,

with the notions of self or personality


, , ,

and of personal identity T hey are not .

inferences drawn but premises given .

A nd they are p remises given by the


thought which according to J ames
, ,

assumes no person or thinker whatever .

T he very thought which according to



J ames assumes no thinker no I asserts , ,


personality declares that
,
I am and ,

goes on to declare I am the same person


,


that I was y esterday I t asserts that .

there is only one I to day and yesterday -


.

I t denies that there was one self yesterday ,

and that there is another self to day -


.

J ames however interprets the words


, , ,


I am the same self that I was yesterday ,


to imply that to day s self the present
-
,


se l f and yesterday s are di fferent selves
, , .

A nd he does s o ob v iously because h e ,


identies thought and se l f From .

this identication it follows that there are


many passing thoughts and therefore as
many transient selves H ence it is that .
P SY CH OLO G Y 67

he can s ay ,
T he only question for u s i s
as to what consciousness may mean when
it calls the present self the same with one

of the past selves which it has in mind .

T hat is to say the only question for us is


,

a s to what consciousness may mean when


it calls the present thought the same
with any p ast thought A nd to th a t
.


question as we have seen J ames answer
, ,

is that no present thought is the same


with any past though t though they may
,

have some resemblance to one another .

D i fferent thoughts cannot have identity ;


and if we admit that a thought which ,

implies no thinker or subj ect is as J ames


, ,

says a self then it will follow that there


, ,

are j ust as many transient selves as there


are transitory thoughts ; and that there
is no personal identity because no two
thoughts can be identical .

I f then with J ames we assume that the


given facts with which we have to start
, ,

are successive thoughts w ithout any


,

p erson who thinks them how


, are we to
explain the continuity of thought which
68 P ER SO NA LIT Y
J ames admits to e xist C ontinuity s eems
to presuppose the unity and identity the ,

personal unity and personal identity which ,

J ames is anxious to represent as an inference


and a mistaken inference C ommon sense .
-
,

as J ames does not hesitate to point out ,

would drive us to admit that there is a


self same and changeless princi p le
-
of
personal identity running through the
whole s tream of thought How then is .


J ames to explain and to explain away
what common sense thus demands 9 The
-

explanation is very S i m ple E ach .


thought J ames says
,
dies away and is
,

replaced by another T he other among


.
,

the things it knows knows its own pre


,

decessor and greets it saying Thou art


, , ,

mine and part of the same self with me


, .

E ach later thought knowing and includin g


,

thus the thoughts which went before is the ,


nal receptacle and appropriating them

is the nal owner o f all that they contain

and own E ach thought then is cognitive
.
, , ,

for it knows the thoughts that went before


and it is an agent exercising choice ap
, ,
P S Y CH OLO G Y 69

r
p pO ri at i n g some of the thoughts that went

before as i t s own and repudiating others ,
.

I n critici z ing this it may be well to begin


by c alling to mind that J ames h as previ
o u sl
y said that there are as many selves
as there are p assing thoughts T he .

only question for us is he said what , ,

consciousness me ans by calling the present



self the sam e with one of the past selves .

H e has expressly explained that these


many eeting transitory selves are not
,

for one moment to be confused with the


one personal identical self which meta
, , ,

physics and commo n sense agree in recog -

n i z i n g as a fact but which J ames regards


,

a s an inference and a mistaken infer e nce


, ,

from facts Yet now in the passage j ust, ,

quoted J ames represents each thought


,

as saying to its predecessor T hou art ,

part of the same se l f with me S urely .


,

it is clear that if each thought is part of


the same se l f no thought is more than
,

part of the self H ow then can . the


p assing thought be as J ames says that ,

it is the T hinker or self ? N o thought


,
7 9 P ER SO NA LIT Y
can be the self if each thought i s but part
,

of the self A nd if each thought is but


.

part of the self no thought is the self


, ,

and no thought is the thinker E ach .

thought dies away and is replaced by ,

another as J ames says but t h e p erson


, ,

who thinks is there all the time I ndeed .


,

when J ames speaks of each thought as


not only knowing the thoughts that went
before but as being an agent and exercising
,

choice he is simply personifying each


,

thought T he p assing T hou ght then


.
,

he says seems to be the T hinker


,
If .

so then the stream of thought which


,

p a sses through your mind is a stream


of se l ves or thinkers By personifying .

thoughts we do not get rid of personality ,


any more than the magician s apprentice ,

by breaking to pieces the broom stick -


,

got rid of the p ail of water it was fetching .

O n the contrary a l l the p ieces fetched


,

pails S o too the result of breaking up


.

the unity of the self is that we get a self


bewitched into a s many selves as there
are thoughts But this embarrassing result
.
P S Y CH OLO G Y 7 1

is a mere piece of magic which substitutes ,

passing thoughts in the pl a ce of the


identity of the thinker .

I t would seem to be quite plain that if ,

the passing thought is the Thinker then ,

there must be as many Thi nkers as there


are passing T houghts But it should be
.

noticed that J ames does not seem always to


hold to this for he says
,
O ur Thought ,

a co gnitive phenomenal event in time


is if it exist at all itself the only Thinker
, ,


which the facts require T hese words may
.

me a n that only one Thinker is required by


the facts and not as many thinkers as there
,

are p assing thoughts But to put such a


.

meaning on the words would be wholly i n



consistent with J ames description o i the
consciousness of self for which he claims
, ,

when summarizing it that it is ,


unen
cumbered with any hypothesis save that of
the existence of passing thoughts or states

of mind . The consciousness of self ,

he says,
involves a stream of thought ,

each part of which as I can (I ) remember


those which went before and (2) e m ph a
P S Y CH OLO G Y 73

di fferent from every other thinker or self


in the row His very rst words in sum
.
,


m ar i z i n g h i s argument are : T he con,

s c i o u s n e ss of self involves a stream of



thought T he stream of thought then is
.

what J ames starts from H e chooses to .

begin because he has to begin with the


, ,


stream of thought continuous and u m
broken I n h i s very next words indeed
.
, ,

he abandons it : T he consciousness of S elf



involves a stream of thought he says , ,

each part of which as I remembers


and appropriates those which went before .

Thus for the continuous line he substitutes


,

parts or dots for the stream of conscious


,

ness he substitutes disconnected drops .

N ay " more When we start as J ames


.
,

starts with the consciousness of S elf as


,

involving a stream of thought we start with ,

one S elf only continuous and indivisible


,
.


T hat S elf is the I But J ames divides the
.

stream into drops the line into dots con , ,

s c i o u sn e ss i nto separate thoughts ; and


then says each of those dots is a self there
are m a ny se l ves and not the one S elf from ,
74 P ER S O NA L I T Y
the consciousness o i which we original l y
started. Perha p s therefore it may be
suggested that though J ames starts by
speaking in h i s very rst words of a stream
of thought and the consciousness of S e l f ,

he did not himself understand those ex


pressions to imply that the S elf was one ,

or that there was any unity in the stream


of thought H ow could he when all the
.
,

t i me he was intending to argue that there


are as many selves as there are drops in
the stream of consciousness as many ,

thinkers as there are thoughts ? I f the


conclusion which from the beginning he
,

desired to reach was that there are many


,

successive selves and a p lurality of thinkers ,

then from the beginning also the p hrases



which he uses a stream of thought ,

and the consciousness of S elf must


have been meant to imply that there was
no unity in the stream of thought th at

each thought a s he says in a p assage
,

already quoted dies away and is re p laced


,


by another in ne that the stream is a
, ,

series of successive drops But it is i m .


P S Y CH O L O G Y 75

possible to maintain that J ames a t the


outset o f his argument denied unity to the
stream of thought as he does a t the con
,

c lu si o n
. O n the rst occasion when he
used the metaphor of the stream of con
s c i o u sn e s s he used it precisely because it

implied unity H e said we may speak of


.

either the entire stream of our personal


consciousness or the present segment
,

or section of that stream according as



we take a broader or a narrower view ,

but in either case each i s a unity after its



own peculiar kind I t i s therefore quite
.

clear that what J ames actually starts from


is the premise that the entire stream of our
personal consciousness i s a unity A nd it is .

equally clear that a river or any other stream


i s n o t made up of separate drops ; that a
continuous line is fundamental l y di fferent
from a row of dots ; and consequently that
the stream of thought i s not made u p of parts .

I n ne if our personal consciousness is a


,

stream of thought a unity and a whole


, , ,

then all that psychology or psychological


,

analysis can do is to attend to each of i ts


,
7 6 P E R SO NA LIT Y
various phases or parts separately But .

though the psychologist may attend to


them separately the fact that he attends
,

to them separately does not give them a n y


separate existence I f as the result of a
.
,

lifelong concentration of attention on the


p arts separately he forgets that the parts
,

are never and nowhere to be found save in


the whole the forgetfulness is very natural
, ,

b u t it is none the less erroneous I t was .

from the stream of consciousness we


started and to it we must return I t is
, .

useless to s ay by psychological analysis


,

we have re duced it to drops therefore it is ,

a scientic error to suppo se that there is or


ever was a stream I ndeed we may even
.
,

go farther W e may say that if the rst


.
,

thi ng the psychologist has to do is to


substitute a s it were a row of dots for the
continuous line which i s given to him in
the rst instance al l his conc l usions wil l be
,

separated from truth and actual fact by j ust


the di fference there is between a continuous
line and a row of dots C onclusions which
.

hold good of the row of dots may not be


P S Y CH OLO G Y 77

equall y true of the continuous line But .

that is no reason for denying the existence


of the C ontinu o us line I t may be that for.

the purposes of h i s science the psychologist


is bound to be gin by assuming a series of
thoughts each of which dies away and i s
,

replaced by anoth e r it may be that for


the purposes of h i s science it i s convenient
or necessary to assume that each thought
i s a thinker but if so these are scientic
, ,

assumptions T hey are not the facts with


.

which we start nor can C ommon sense be


,
-

expected to accept the conclusion that the



,
I the subj ect of consciousness i s not ,

one person or thinker but is a series of ,

thinkers and that at every moment each


,

thinker dies away and i s replaced by



another thinker M oments separate mo

ments are pure abstractions : time is con
t i n u o u s and unbroken A nd the momentary
.

thinker for that very reason if for no other


, , ,


is a pur e abstraction sc i e n t i c convenient
,

and even necessary for scientic pur


poses but to be found only in the domain
o f science not in the actual world of fact
,
.
CHAPTER III

P E R SO N A L IT Y AN D CHAN G E

B e r gso n

s rgu m e n t th a t c h an ge al o n e e x i s t s an d
a

r e q u i r e s n o s ub s tr a tu m o r s ub s t anc e H i s furth e r
a rgu m e n t s th a t we p e r c e i v e ou rse lve s th a t s ubje c t
,

a n d o b je c t a r e dis ti n gu i s h e d th a t c han ge i s fr e e will


-

Th e c on s e q u e n c e i f we are c h an ge the n c han ge i s


,

s e l f c o n s c i o u sn e ss a n d i m p l i e s p e r s o n a l i t y
-
.

HU S far we have made no reference to


the theory of evolution I n the rst .

chapter we accepted the theory of the


U niformity of N ature and of the univer ,

s ali t y throughout space and throughout


time of causes which uniformly recurred
, ,

and uniformly p roduced the same effects .

F rom t hat point of view the obj ect of


science wa s sim p ly to ascertain the working
of these uniform and monotonous laws of
N ature T hey may be properly terme d
.

monotono u s because on this scheme N ature


78
CHANGE 79

works with mechanic al regularity and no ,

variety : the only sound which reaches our


ears from the monotonous mechanism is
a u ni form regularl y repeated thud thud
, ,
-
.

From the point of view of the theory of


evolution however we get a very di fferent
, ,

conception of the universe the conception


we get is tha t the state of the universe at
any moment i s di fferent from i t s state at
any other moment that has ever been or
will ever be I t is indeed at all moments
.

and every moment the same u n iverse ,

otherwise there could be no change in it .

I f it changes it must be there to change


, .

U nless it were there all the time it could ,

not change because it would not be there


,


nothing would be there to change T here .

would be no changing universe There .

would be a succession of universes each ,

one of which would a t each moment die


away and be replaced by another In .

place of the continuous owing line of


,

evolution we should have a series of


,

dots each separated from the one that


,

preceded it by an unbridgeable u nfathom ,


CHANGE 81

universes H ow far the a nalogy between


.

the world and the individual may be


pressed is m a tter of doubt and speculation .

You are conscious both of your identity


through all changes and of the changes ,

through which you go The universe also .

is identical through all its chan g es But .

whether we can s ay that through all its ,

changes it i s identical with itself whether


, ,

that is we can s ay it is a S elf is another


, ,

question I f we do say so then we say


.
,

that in the w hole universe ther e is nothing



but personality to be found no impersonal

things or brute matter T he words in .

H im we live and move and have our


being will be literally true for us G od .

is a spirit and the ultimate reality is


,

spiritual and S piritual alone


,
.

I f then we take identit y to imply S elf


, ,

b y its very meaning and to mean identity


,

with S elf we cannot predicate identity


,

of the universe without thereby pre dicating


S elfhood I f change by its very meaning
.

implies something which or some one who , ,

changes the n change an d identity are


,

6
82 P E R SO NA L I T Y
terms neither of which can be understood
without reference to the other T he .

theory of evolution may direct itself


primarily or limit its attention wholly to
, ,

the changes which take place but it will ,

nevertheless postulate the reality of that


which ch a nges and therefore the identity
,

of that which changes You on the other


.
,

hand do not postulate you know your


, ,

own reality and identity You know it


from the inside so to s p eak A nd as you
, .

are p art of the universe you kno w part of


,

the universe from the inside and not ,


merely from the outside which is the
point of view from which the evolutionist
studies it A s it is from the outside that the
.

e v olutionist approaches it as it is with the


,

changes that he is concerned he may ,


very naturally if erroneously hold that
the changes which he studies are n o t
only real but the whole reality j ust as on
, ,

the other hand the student of metaphysics ,

in se a rch of reality sometimes falls into


,

the error of dismissing chang e as mere


appear a nce .
CHANGE 83

The vi ew th a t changes are not only real


but the whole of reality is se t forth by the
distinguished French phi l osopher M Berg , .

son as the key to the right understanding


,

both of the world and of the indi vidual .

A n analogy as already said there un


, ,

doubtedly is between the changes which


mark or make up your growth and
de v e l opment and those in which the
evo l ution of the universe consists I f the .

resemb l ance i s not merely seeming but


real if the changes of the one are in their
,

very nature of the same kind as the ch a nges


of the other then that which though it
, ,

changes retains its identity throughout


, ,

must be of the nature of personality But .

before we can draw this inferen ce we are


arrested by the argument s e t forth by
M Bergson that chan g es are not only re a l
.
,


but the whole of reality that ch an ge ,

indeed continuous C hange exists but noth


, ,

ing e l se .

E very change a nd ever y mo vement he ,

says is indivisib l e I move my hand in


,
.

one sweep from A to C I t is one mo v e


.
84 P ER SO NA LIT Y
ment and indivisible I might indeed .

stop half way at B and then go on to C


-
.

But in that case there would be the move


ment from A to B followed by the move
,

ment from B to C T here would be two .

movements ; and those two movements


are quite di fferent from the one mov e men t ,

with never a st 0p fro mA to C The space


,
.

traversed b y the hand may be the same ,

but the one movement from A to C is not


the same thing as the two movements ,

rst from A to B a nd then from B to C .

E very movement is one and indivisible .

M ovement or motion it will not be ,

doubted is real B u t what M Bergson


, .
, .

asks what of immobility or motionlessness


,

I f two trains are running side by side at


the same rate the passengers in the one
,

can converse and S hake hands with those


in the other relatively to each other the
two trains ar e motionless but nevertheless ,

they are mo v ing all the time S uppose .


,

however they stop


,
S till they are on the
earth and the earth is rotating on its axis
,

and revol ving round the sun N othing .


CHANGE 85

in the world is or can be motionless T here .

simp ly is nothing immobile or motionless .

M ovement M Bergson says is the one


.
,

reali ty : W hat we call immobility is a


certain state of things identical with or ,

analogous to that which occurs when two


,

trains travel at the same rate in the S ame


direction on parallel l ines : each of the
two trains then appears motionless to the

travellers seated in the other I mmobility
.

therefore according to M Bergson is mere


,
.
,

appearance it is the way in which the one


train appears to the passengers in the other .

A nd if we speak of it as a state we must


, ,

remember that the state i s only an appear


ance and not a reality : the state of the
one train ap p ears to the passengers in the
other to be a state of immobility but
there is no such state in rea l ity because ,


there is no such immobility the train i s
moving all the time .

What M Bergson has sai d of movement


.

is he maintains equally true of every


, ,

change E very real change he argues i s


.
, ,

an in di v i sible change j ust a s e v ery m ove


86 P E R SO NA LIT Y
ment has been shown t o be indivisible .

W e are apt indeed t o consider a change as


a series of successive stat es that is t o s ay , ,

t o consider it as divisible whereas it i s ,

indivisible and t o suppose that it can be


di vi ded int o stat es whereas a state is
,

only an appearance and is nothing real .

I f the contin u ous change which each one ,

of us calls myself is t o act on the con


,

t i n u ou s change which we call a thing ,

then these two changes must be relatively ,

t o each other in a S ituation analogous t o


,

that of the two trains already mentioned .


When the two changes that of the obj ect

and that of the subj e ct take place in
these particular conditions they produce , ,

he says that particula r appearance which


,

we call a state T he changes which are
.
,

real produce the appearance of a state ;


,

and he maintains i t is j ust revers i ng the


facts t o s ay that the appearance produces
t h e change or that the change wh i ch is
,

the reality is made up of a series of appear


an c e s or stat es .

I n f a ct accord i ng t o M Bergson
,
.
CHANGE 87

there are ch a nges but no things wh ich


,


change change requires no substratum or
substance T here are movements but not
.
,

therefore unchanging obj ects which mo v e


a mo v ement does not presuppose a moving

thing. M B ergson illustrates illuminat e s
.
,

his argument that movement and change


are realities in their own right capable ,

of standing by themselves and requiring


no substratum or substance on which t o
base themselves by an illustration from
,

the sense of hearing W hen we listen t o


.


the melody that s sweet l y playe d in tune ,

what is presented t o us i s a mo v ement ,

but in the movement there i s no thing


which moves there is change but there
,

is no thing which changes T he tune is .

the change and the change is the tune .

A nd the tune like every other movement


, ,

is indi visible D ivi de it make a pause


.
,

in the middl e of the phrase and you get ,

two phrases each of which is di fferent from


the u ndi vided phrase A whole i s by no
.

means the same thing as the parts int o


wh i ch it may be di vided I t is indivisible
. .
CHANGE 89

no rigid immutable substratum or s ub


,

stance ; and that there are no distinct


stat es which pass over it in the way that
actors pass o v er the stage There is .

S imply the continuous melody of our inner



life a melody which runs on indivisibl e ,

from the beginning t o the end of our


conscious existence T hat and noth i ng .
,

else is our personality


,
.

F urther M Bergson argues if our inner


,
.
,

life runs on thus with ne v er a break or a


st op because it is in its very inmost
, ,

nature movement and change and there


, ,

fore indivisible as is every movement and


,

change ; then the past cannot be divided


or cut off as it were by a knife from the
present T hen what i s the present
.
?


A ccordi ng t o M Bergson M y present.
, ,

this moment i s the phrase I am engaged


,

in pronouncing A nd it is so because I .
,

am pleased t o restrict the el d of my


attention t o that phrase A ttention may .


expand or contract I t may narrow .

itself down t o the phrase I am uttering ,

or i t may extend to the prev i ous phrase ,


g o P E R SO NA LIT Y
or to the one before that or as far back
,

as I will W hat is not attended t o what


.
,

is d ropped from att ention ceases t o be ,

present and i p so facto becomes past .

W e may note in passing that here M ,


.

Bergson appears t o distinguish between


attention and the phrase wh i ch i s att ended
t o and that this distinction occur s in the
continuous melody of our inner life T he .

melody may run on continuously like a


f u gue But as in a fugue there are more
.

parts than one s o in this cont i nuous


,

melody of our inner life there are two



parts the attention a s well as that which
i s atten d ed t o T here i s not only life but
.

attention t o life ; and theoretically at


,

any rat e such att ention might at any


,

moment embrace according t o M Bergson


,
.
,

the whole past history of the conscious


person S o that we seem t o ha v e the
.

conscious person his past hist ory and


, ,


his attention t o i t all comprised even ,

though lat ent and not at rst S ight obvious ,

i n th a t melody of our conscious life which


thus seems t o be not a simple a i r but a
CHANGE 9 1

fugue having parts T his seems t o be .

agai n implied when M Bergson speaking .


,

of the di f culty of fully understanding


the ch a nges which go on outside u s says ,

that t o deci de the point it woul d be
necessary for us t o be insi de the things in

the same way as we are insi de ourselves .

T he implication i s that the conscious


person of whom M B ergson speaks is on
.

the insi d e of the continuous melody of


our inner life attending t o its various
,


phrases now t o this or that now t o this ,

a nd that .

But t o resume and concl ude this brief


,

summary of M B e rg s o n s remarks on
.


personality remarks which a re scattered
here and there throughout his works and ,

which have not yet been focused by him .

H e recogni z es and adopts the words su b



j ect and obj ect By the subj ect
.

he explains that he means continuous


change the continuous melody of our
,

inner l ife and that he means nothing else


,

or other than the C hange By the ob .

j e c t or the u ni v erse a s obj ect he me a ns ,


CHANGE 93

thing which moves C hange there is but


.
,

nothing which changes and (the inference


,

seems t o be ) no one who changes L ife .

there is but no one it would seem who


,

lives .

A t the beginning of l Evoln ti on Cr atr i ce


M B ergson says :
. T he existence that
we are most assured of and that we know
,

the best is beyond dispute our own O f


,
.

all other obj ects we have notions which


may be deemed ext ernal and supercial ,

whereas we perceive ourselves from the



inside .W hat then he asks is the pre
, ,

cise meaning of the word exist P A nd


his answer is that to exist is t o change .

O ur own existence is change The exist


.

ence of all other obj ect s i s change I f .


then we are change a nd nothing else or
more how comes it that man imagine s
-

there are things which change and persons


,


who change nay " who not only change ,

but at the same time maintain their own


i dentity A s our notions of obj ect may
be d eemed external and supercial we ,

will not inquire whether there are things


94 P E R SO NA LIT Y
w hich C h a nge W e will conne oursel ves
.

t o the existence we are most assured of ,


and that we know the best our o w n I f .


we are change and nothing else or more
how comes it according t o M B ergson
,
.
,

that man imagines that there is a person ,



an I a self that th rough all the changes
, ,

and chances of this mort a l l ife maintains


its own i dentity
T he notion according
.
,

t o M Bergson the fallacious notion th a t
there is a self or M e is he argues the out , , ,

come of the mistaken i dea that there are


stat es T he truth is he says that when
.
, ,

the continuous change w hich each of us



calls myself mo v es so t o speak at the
,

same rat e and in the same direction as


,

the continuous cha nge which w e call a



thing there arises that particular appear
,

ance which we call a state T wo .

trains moving at the same rat e appear in


a stat e of immobility tho u gh both are ,

moving and neither is in a state of immo


b i lit y for there is no such state Si nce
, ,

both e x h yp oth e si are in motion B u t


, ,
.

one fallacy M B ergson says leads on to


,
.
,
CHANGE 95

a n other N o S ooner have w e substituted


.

the notion of st at e s a n d of states that


,
'

follow one another for t h e unbroken


, ,

continuous change that is the reality ,


than we nd it necessary t o re unit e what
we have sundered . M B ergson says
.

AS our att ention h as articially dis


t i ng ui sh e d and separat e d [these stat es ] it ,

is by an articial bond that it is oblige d


subsequently t o r e unit e them Gonse
-
.

quently it imagi nes a self or me amorphous ,

an d unchanging on which the psycho


,

logical states that i t has con v erted int o


independent entities may be threaded and
moved like the di fferent pearls of a
necklace it is simply bound t o imagine

a thread t o keep the pearls t ogether .

T his thread is concealed by the pe a rl s ,

that is t o say by the psycholo g ical states


,

it is that which underlies them the subj ect ,

or substratum But says M Bergson


.
,
.
,

in truth this substratum is not a reality


it is for our consciousness merely a Sign
inte n de d t o remind it perpetually of the
articial char a cter of the operation by
CHANGE 97

inference from my own attention A tten .

tion is a word which by its very meaning


implies not only an obj ect attended t o ,

but a subj ect that att ends to it I f no .

obj ect whatever is attended t o there can ,

be no att ention I f there i s no subj ect


.

which attends there c an be no att ention


, .

S till less c a n there b e any att ention if ,

there i s neither subj ect nor obj ect A nd .

M B ergson himself as we have seen


.
, ,

recognizes and adopts the t erms subj ect


an d obj ect I f therefore he postulat es
attention as a fact and a dmits both a ,

subj ect and an obj ect of attention how ,

can he maintain that the subj ect i s an



imaginary me which attends t o non
,

existent things ? I t seems clear that if


the subj ect and the obj ect of attention are
non exist ent then att ention is equally
-

imaginary A nd if attention i s imaginary


.

and non existent then M Bergson cannot


-

,
.

postulat e it as a fact .

But e v en if we put aside this obj ection ,

on the ground that it ca nnot seem t o M .

B ergson destructive of his position as it ,

7
9 8 P E R SO NA LIT Y
does t o us even if we agree t o st a rt from

an att ention in which there is neither
,

subj ect that attends nor obj ect attended t o ,

attention is a stat e A nd M Bergson . .

declares that there are no stat es T hat .

particular appearance which w e call a


st at e is merely an appearance and not a
reality A ttention therefore itself is noth
.

i ng real but only an appearance A nd


,
.

this c on clu sI on is strictly consistent with


the idea that the subj ect of attention is

an imaginary me and the obj ect a
,

non existent thing T he state the sub


-
.
,

j eci and the obj ect of attention are all


,

fallac i ous inferences T hey are all false


.

inferences from wh at M Bergson post u lates .

as the one ultimat e fact and reality


change continuous change
,
.

Perhaps however it may be felt and


, , ,

perhaps it may be the case that M Bergson ,


.
,

though he S peaks of att ention w oul d ,

decline t o allow that there can be any


st at e of att ention inasmuch as h e ,

expressly declares that stat es of any


kind are mere ct i ons H is position it .
,
CHANGE 99

may be arg u ed is that when the continu


,

ous change which each of us calls m y



self moves s o t o speak at the same
, ,

rat e an d in the same direction as the con


,

t i nu ou s change which we call a thing ,

there arises that part icular appearance



wh i c h we call a state the stat e of immo
'

bili f y A nd that stat e is only appearance


.
,

not fact because in fact or at any rat e


, , ,

on this hypothesis there is nothing but ,

change postulated N ow we can attend .


,

t o change we can watch a process taking


,

place and we who attend t o it are chang



i ng w e are growing ol der as it takes

place I f therefore by stat e we mean
.

what the word itself implies viz that a ,


.

st a te is something which s o long as it


continues i s the cessation or absence of
change then it is clear that atte ntion
, ,

implying as it d oes change both in that


whi ch attends and that which is attended
to is not a stat e but is change through
, ,

and thro u gh T here is w e may say the


.
, ,

train of mo v ing e v ents t o wh i ch we attend


and there is the train of attention which
CHANG E . Q

the opposite of change is j ust as v isible .

H ence he necessarily a frms the one


relation which is the only one he sees ;
,

a n d denies the other rela tion at which he ,

will not look H e afrms the reality of


.

the one relation and simply denies that


the other relation exists I f only he woul d
.

look out of the window on the other side


he would see that the relation between
the two t rains is as unchanging as the ,

relation between the train and the tele


g raph posts
-
is changing But he says .

N o " the relation between the train


and the t elegraph poles the hedges the
-
, ,

trees and the hills is one of change ; the


,

only relation possible between any two


things in the whole worl d is one of change
therefore if the relation bet w een the two
,

trains appears not t o be the relation of


ch a nge it can be only an appearance,
,

and not a real relation But yet .
,

earnestly and persist ently though M .

Bergson endea v ours t o exclude sameness


f rom the uni v erse or t o a dmit any rel at i on
,


save that of change he does not I ndeed
, ,
j P ERSO NA LIT Y

he cannot exclude it from his o w n arg u
ment . T o establish his o wn argument
he has to postulat e that the rat e at which
his two trains move is the same T he rate .

must be the same and unchanging or ,

else his whole argument breaks down .

S ameness and persistence in sameness are


the very foundation of the argument
whereby he seeks t o prove that the rela
tion of sameness is mere appearance and ,

that the one and only relation is that


of change I f it is impossible for two
.

trains t o mo v e at the same rate his argu ,

ment cannot b egin I f their rat e can


.

be for a time t he same and unchanging ,

his conclusion that change alone is possible


cannot be right But M Bergson assumes
.
,
.

that their rat e for a time can be the same


'

and unchanging T hen for that t i m e t h e y


.
, ,

a re relatively t o one another in the same


unchanging stat e and the stat e is
not a mere appearance but a relation j ust
,

as real as the relation of change itself .

But perha p s it will be said that th ough ,

the relation of the two trains remains um


CHANGE 103

changed s o long as they trave l at the same


rate nevertheless they are both moving
,


all the time that though the train of
,

continuous change which we call the


subj ect may travel as it were at the same
rate as the train of continuous change which
we call the obj ect and s o long the relation
,

between them remains unchanged still ,

the two trains of change are both moving


all the time and consequently M Bergson
,
.

is right after all in saying that everywhere


there is change But in the r st place so
.
, ,

long as the relation between the two trains


remains unchanged it is untrue to say that
,

there i s nothing but change in the world .

T hat is j ust as untrue as what we may



call the static view of the universe
that the real is the unchanging When M . .

Ber gson resolves existence into change and ,

says that to exist is to change he is simply


,

closing h i s eyes to half of the fact that has


to be taken into account T o say that to
.

exist is to change i s to utter only half of


the truth the other and equally important
h alf of the truth is that to exist is to persist
CHANGE 16 5

the changes that go on outside ourselves ,

it would be necessar y for u s to be on the


inside of things in the same way as we are

inside ourselves H e then invites us to
.

descend within ourselves he bids u s con


sider what we nd there ; and he tells us
we nd change continual change and
, ,

nothing else What he overlooks or will


.
,


not see is that it is we who nd the
,

change that i s continually going on there .

A nd if I nd ch a nge continually going on


there or elsewhere the n I must be there all
,

the time I f I were not there I could not ,

nd it If I nd it all the time then I m u st


.
,

be there all the time A nd the I th a t.

nds it there al l the time must be the same



I. U nless the same identical I were
there i t could no t be conscious that change
,

was con tinually going on T here could be .

no consciousness of change unless there


were something to contrast it with A nd .

what we contrast it with is precise l y our


own identity E ven the changes that go
.

on within us would not be changes for a s


unless we had something to m e asure th e m
1 06 P E R SO NA LIT Y
by and it is precisely by reference to o ur
,

personal identity that we do measure them .

I t is only by reference to something u n


changing that we can be conscious of
change .

W hen then in our desire to understand


, ,

what change as it occurs outside us


, ,


real l y is we fol l ow M B e rg so n s advice
, .
,

and look within ourselves we nd that ,

it involves a contrast with our personal


identity and that only by contrast with
,

identity can change have any meaning .

That this is the consequence which logically


and inevitably o w s from the premises is ,

c o n r m e d were conrmation necessary


by the fact that M Bergson p roceeds to .

deny the premises even though they were,

his own I t was he who origina l ly said


.
,

T he exis tence we know the best is our



own , and who in those words admitted
, ,


that we do exist admitted not only that
there is consciousness or attention but that ,

we are conscious and that we attend I t .

was he who said We perceive ourse lves


,

from the inside True " M Bergson


. .
CHANGE 1 07

proceeds to argue that our existence is a


false infere nce from the premises B ut our .

existe nce is not an inference from the p re



mises at a l l i t i s itself the p remise the

existence we know the best is our own .

W e don t infer it then We know i t and



.

th a t according to M Bergson himself


, . .


I f it be argued that M B e rg son s point is .

to S how that existence is change and not ,

that we do not exist then our reply has ,

already been given : change is a relati v e


term intelligible like every other relative
, ,

term only by reference to it s correlative


, ,

viz ,
identity .


But M B e r g so n s point seems to be th a t
.

we do not exist H e starts indeed by .

conceding that we perceive ours e lve s from


the inside that we are conscious and
that we attend But he only makes this
.

concession for the purpose of ultimately


S howing that i t is untrue Hi s u l timate .

obj ective from the start is to show that


every where there is change continual ,

change and he seems to imp l y th a t there


are no persons who chan g e j ust as a ccor d
CHAN GE 1 09

the existence that we are most assured


of and that we know the best is beyo n d
, ,

disp u te our own T hey are not inferences


.

from those premises but are contradictory


of them I f M Bergson admitted that
. .

we attend or that we change he ,


would admit and would be bound by the

admission that in addition to attention
there is the person who attends that over ,


and above o r if you will underlying
, ,

the change i s the subj ect who changes .

But that is precisely what M Bergson does .

not admit and therefore ca nnot b e bound


,

by H is position i s that there i s change


.
,


and that there is attention which i s in its

essence change but more or other than
attention there is nothing .

I t is of the greatest importance to realize


that this is M B e rg s o n s position for on it
.

is based his method of unifying the universe


and of comprehen ding evolution .


M B e rgso n s unication of the universe
.

consists in viewing every so ca l led thing -

and every so called p erson in it as S imp l y


-

cont i n u o u s ch a nge Wh at I c a ll myse l f


.
1 10 P E R SO NA LIT Y
I nd to be continuous change and nothing
more : when in his words
,
we perceive ,

ourse l ves from the inside we nd nothin g ,

but continual change and the change we


,

nd is ourselves we are but change ;



our inner l ife is a continuous melody ,

which runs on indivisib l e from the


,

beginning to the end of our conscious


existence . T o understand the changes
that go o n outside oursel v es it w ou l d be ,

necess a ry M Bergson says


,
. for us to be ,

o n the inside of things in the same way as



we are inside ou rselves But though this
.

would seem to be impossible the fact ,

remains according to M Bergson that


,
.
,

outside ourselves there are no things j ust ,

as inside ourselves there is no person but ,

only change Within and without there is


.

continuous change and nothing but change


,
.

A l l beings ar e change all being is change


,
.

Thus is the universe unied by M Bergson . .

B ut at the same time that it is thus



u ni ed i t is deperson a li z ed o r a t any rate
we are depersonali z ed B u t though we a re
.

de p erson a li z ed w e are not red u ced to


CHANGE 11 1

things because according to M Bergson


,
.
,

if there are no persons neither are there ,

things . There are neither things nor


.

persons : there is only conti nual change .

There is the continuous change which for ,

some reason that M Bergson never ex .


plains the subj ect calls
,
myself A nd .

there are other continuous C hanges which


I the subj ect call obj ect A nd when M
, , . .

Bergson thus admits or rather postulates


this di fference which he does not explain
-

between subj ect and obj ect it may be


-

supposed that after all he has not suc


ce e d e d in unifying his universe but on the ,

contrary has sundered it into two : the


change which i s subj ect cannot be the
change which is obj ect for they are two ,

chan g es ; neither can the subj ect be the



same as the obj ect for sameness
,
or

identity is as we have seen not a d


, ,

m i t t e d by M Bergson to exist in his uni


.

verse where change alone i s found But .

the chasm doe s not exist for M Bergson .


,

or is bridged over by him I f the change .

he postulates were merely change the g ap ,


CHANGE 1 13

change which is called self subj ect


or whether it is the change which is called
obj ect for the continual change the i n
, ,

cessant creation is in both cases free will


,
-

continually unfolding itself .

But we must not travel further than


M B e rgson s premises and denition s per
.

mit T he free will which he discovers


.
-

everywhere is not th e free will of a person -

if persons in M B e rgs o n s universe really


.

are as non exist ent as things A gain the


-
.
,

free will or the kin d of free will t o which


-
,
-

he limits himself strictly is one which fore ,

sees nothing for the S imple reason that


,

nothing which it p r Odu c e s can be foreseen .

N othing it produce s c an b e foreseen b e ,

cause everything which i t displays as i t



unfolds itself is absolutely new a new
creation H ist ory does not repeat itself
. .

T hat is why it cannot be foreseen An d ;

that is as tru e of the history which we call


the evolution of the universe as it is of the
history of a nation I f therefore nothing
.
, ,

of what M B e rg so n s kind of free will


.

-

displays as it unfol d s itse l f can be fore


, ,

8
1 14 P E R SO NA LI T Y
seen then nothing of what M B e rg s on s
,
.

kind of free will displays can be i n


-

t ended AS regards the future free will


.
,
-

as dened by M Bergson is blind I t


.
,
.

attends indeed t o the present and t o the


past T o the future it cannot att e nd for
.
,

the S imple reason that the future is non


existent and what does not exist cannot
,

be seen or foreseen AS therefore there is .


, ,

and can b e no beacon visible ahead by


which t o steer or for which t o make the ,

course of evolution is not a direct course


t o any point I t is not a course at all
. .

I t is not directed t o any point I t is not .

directed at all but as M Bergson says , ,


.
,

it is dispersive H e compares i ts cou rse t o


.

that of an explosive S hell red from a


mortar T he shell bursts and discharges
.

a multitude of other S hells each one of ,

which in i t s turn bursts and discharges


t more S hells a n d s o a d i n n i tu m T he
y e ,
.

rush of the shells from the mort ar i s in no


one direction but in a multitude of di r e c
,

tions none of which can be foreseen or


,

predicted for the action of free will is


,

CHAN GE 1 15

absolut ely imprevisible T he rush of life .

may start from some one point but it is ,

not directed t o any one point or goal or


purpose : it scatters wi dely and ever ,

more wi dely as it go e s .

T hus by means of the theory of e v olu


,

tion we reach a conclusion very di fferent


from that arrived at by those who assumed
that N ature is uniform and that there is a
,

uniform law of causation working with ,

the uniform regularity of a monotonous


mechanism T he essence of that view of
.

the universe is that N ature works with


monotonous regularity and no variety
what ever N ature is a whole and has
:

unity indeed on that vi ew but it is a ,

mechanical whole and from the unity of


,


its working there are no departures such

departures woul d be miracles variety there
can be none where uniformity alone is
,

possible T o this view of the universe


.


M B e rg s on s theory of evolution is dia
.

metrically opposed I n creati v e evolution


.

M B e rgson nds everywhere nothing but


.

v ariety T he essence of e v olution is c on


.
CHANGE 1 17

and free will does not comb i ne them or


-
, ,

admit that they can b e combined in a ,


unity still less in a personality O ur .

inner life he compares t o a melody and a ,

melody he declares t o be continual change .

But from this very comparison it is clear


that our inner life h as a unity of its own ,

j ust as every melody h as its unity I t i s .

one melody as being different from every


other melody and it i s one as being the
melody which it i s D oubtless in the.

melody there i s continual change ; but


unless it also had unity it woul d not be a
me l ody at all A nd to s ay that this
.

continual change di ffers from that con


t i n u al change is to regard each as one

A .

melody any melody i s a unity a unity


, ,


in change a unity of change but none
,

the less a unity i dentical with itself and


di fferent from every other tune W hen .

M Bergson speaks of the continual change


.


which each one of us calls myself he ,

adm i ts by his very words that each such


change each change cal led a self is thereby
,
-

distinguished from a l l other s u ch cont in


1 18 P E R SO NA LIT Y
uiti e s of change I t i s distinguished I ts
. .


unity is thereby admitted and also its
difference from all other selves U nless it
.

be one such continui ty of change it cannot


be distinguished from others T he change
.


which each of us calls myself coul d

not be called myself unless it were t o ,

begin with a unity di fferent an d d i s


,

t i n g u i sh ab le from all other such unities .

F urther the unity of change which is called


,

myself is called s o by somebody A nd .

there i s only one being in the whole worl d



who c a n call it myself . A nd I who call
the change myself must be there t o do
so . I am the unity in change and the ,

unity of change and I am conscious not


only of the c on t i n u l t y of change as M ,
.

Bergson says but also of its unity and of


, ,

the fact that it is not any other continuity



of change that I am not the continuity of

change t o w h ich you apply the term self .

Perhaps it will be felt that however ,

convincing the argument j ust advanced


may be found by those who believe t o begin
with in personality and who are satised
,
CHANGE 1 19

that they themselves ex i st it cannot ,

appeal t o those who hold with M Bergson ,


.
,

that the existence of persons or selves is


a matter which must be proved before it
can be accepted I n reply t o this we
.

might indeed well ask Proved t o whom P


,

an d by whom S urely the obj ection


itself assumes that there i s a person by
whom it can be proved and a person by
whom the proof can be accepted P But
let u s not insist on this reply L et u s .

consider the matter from the point of


V iew of M B e r g so n s own premises Hi s

. .

position is that everywhere there are


continuities of change O f those con
.

t i n u i t i e s of change there is one which i s



called indeed myself and which stands,

t o other continuities of change in the


relation of subj ect t o obj ect N ow if .
,

M B ergson a dmitt ed that the continuity


.

of change called myself were really a


self and a person that it constituted a
,

unity and possessed an i dentity he woul d ,

be faithless t o his own rst principles .

T he continuity of change which is called


CHANGE 12 1

explain why this one particular continuity


of change which we will call A i s me
, ,

and all the other continuities of change


are not me What is that difference b e
-
.

tween the particular continuity o f change


A and a l l the other continuities B C D
, , , , ,

etc which is implied by the t erm me


.
,

T o s ay that there i s no difference is vain .

T o admit that the di fference i s real is t o



admit that personality i s real t o admit

both that I am different from the
not me and that I am I
- a unity

, ,

and a personal unity i dentical wi th itself ,


.

L et us however look once again at M .


B e r g so n s position I t is that the con
.

t i n u o u s change which each of us c alls


,

myself i s indeed a continuity of change


but not a unity A bout the reality of.


wi l l free will and th e reality of con
-

sc i o u s n e s s he has no doubt or di fculty ;

each of them is change continuous change ,

and s o in neither i s there an v t h i n g r e


p gu n a n t to or inconsistent with that
conti nuity of change which alone he
postulates H e would not of co u rse deny
.
12 2 P ER SO NA L I T Y
that free will and consciousness go together
-
.

What he does deny apparently is that ,

when they go together there is in addition


,

to them or underlying them any such


, ,

third reality as p ersonalit y I f in criticism .

of this we take two continuities of change ,

A and B and s ay that each of them to be


, ,

compared and co ntrasted with the other ,

must be a unity and that unity a personal


,

unity his rep l y is that if we look i nto that


,

u nity we shall never nd anything more in it


than what he h as already pointed out vi z , .

free will and consciousness T he best answer


-
.

to M B e rg so n s argument is o ne that was


.

given long ago by a H indu philoso p her


in discussing p e rs on ali t v and which was
,

in substance as follows : T ake any unity


or whole break it u p into its constituent
,

parts point out that the parts exist but


,

that the whole does not and you have a ,


proof o f a sort that the p arts are real
and that the whole is not a rea l ity The .

H indu illustration of this process is :


T here is a chariot apparently a reality
,
.

But of what does it really consist O f the


CHANGE 12 3

body whee ls and pole They are the only


, ,
.

realities to be found in what each of us


calls a chariot There i s nothing e l se in
.

the chariot T hey are rea l but the chariot


.
,

is not I t is patently absurd to s ay th a t


.

in addition to the body whee l s and pole , , ,

there is a fourth thing called a chariot , .

There is no such thing I t i s simply a .

false inference a mistaken inference from


, ,

the facts I t i s an imaginary substratum


.
,

supposed to underlie the parts and hold


them to gether N ow we may venture to
.
,


suggest M B e rg so n s argument i s open to
,
.

exactly the same criticism as this demonstra


tion of the non existence and unrea lity -

of the chariot The starting point in the


.
.
-


one case is what each of u s calls myself ,

in the other what we call a chariot I f we .

look into the one we are told we shall , ,

nd nothing b ut pole wheels and body ; , ,

if we look into the other we are told we


S hall nd nothing but free will and con -

s c i o u s ne ss W e shall not nd any sub


.

stratum under lying the pole wheels and , ,

body ; and we shall not nd an y subj ect


CHAPTE R IV

P E R S O N A L I T Y AND I N D IV ID U ALIT Y

N 0 i n di vid u al , in
s ns e o f a c l s e d s y s t e m e x i s t s
th e e o ,

e i th e r for sc i e nc e o i n s o c i t y P r s o ns a n o t c l ose d
r e e re

s y s t e m s bu t a e s ubje c t s p r e s e n te d t o bje c t s an d obje c t s


r o ,

p r e s e n t e d t o th e r s ubj c t s T h p ri nc i p l
o e f u ni ty
e e o

wh i c h h o l d s p r s ns t o g e th e r i s l o v
e o a d l ve i s th e e ,
n o

m ai n sp ri n g o f l g i c o th e i m p u ls
,

t o wa r d s u n i t y

e

( B o s a n q u e t ) bu t t o wa r d s u n i t y wi th o e s n e i ghb o u r
, n

an d o n e s G o d

.

0one we may suppose will doubt or


, ,

deny that changes take place E very

one will admit that changes do take place


both within us and without u s O f the .

things of this world at least it may be , ,

truly Said that nothing abideth long in


one stay B u t though the occurrence of
.

change will be universally admitted there ,

ma y not be and indeed there is not the


, ,

same universal agreement as to the dir co


tion of change T here may be and there .
126 P E R SO NA LIT Y
is di ffere nce of O pinion as to whether
change is dispersive always or is in the
,

long run towards unity and coherence .

I f everything is constantly C hanging then ,

the direction of change must itself be


altering at every moment ; and in that
case if changes are in no one direction
, ,

they cannot be in the long run directed


towards unity and coherence .

H ow then are we to determine the


question whether change i s in the long
run towards unity and coherence or is
dispersive always
But perhaps the rst thing to ask is ,

D oes it matter how it is ans wered


Well of course i n some of the changes
, ,

that go on aro und us we are obviously


,

interested A nd we may be interested in


.

the changes that go on within us S ome .

of them may be of a kind and tendency


that we do not at all care about A nd .

from that point of V iew there is some


consolation in the reec tion that every
thing changes .

O n the other hand some of the changes


,
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 12 7

that take place in us or around us may be


of a kind or in a direction that we app rove ,

and which we could wi sh to be continued


as one does every time one sets oneself
once more to follow the path of righteous
ness There seems then to be some interest
.

in the question whether the direction of


change is itself alwa y s changing and
dispersive or whether it is in the long
,

run in some particular direction that we


approve of .

T hen if the question h as some interest


, ,

how ar e we to answer it W here are we to


look for an answer W ithi n us or without ?
O utside the process which takes place
,

is the process of evolution I t is admittedly


a process of change and at any rate as ,

re gards the evolution of living organisms ,

that process h as been one of di fferentiation


and dispersion .

F or instance from their common ancestor


,

the arch aeopteryx the innumerable species


,

of birds and of reptiles have widely diverge d .

M B e r g so n s S imile of the shell which



.
, ,

discharged from the mortar bursts into ,


I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 129

M Bergson is not prepared to go that


.

length N or does he feel compelled to go


.

so far by his own v iew that the rush of


evolution which is the movement of free
,

will is never towards unity and coherence


, ,

but is dis p ersive ever T he upward rush .

of evolution may indeed be compared to


that of a fountain of water which rises ,

and as it springs aloft diverges in i n n u m e r


able different directions But all the time .

the fountain plays and rises the drops of ,

water are falling gravitating uniformly


,

and directly towards the earth I n the .

upward rush and S oar you have the freedom


.

of the will ever changing and diverging ;


in the downward fall regular direct , , ,

monotonous and uniform you have the


, ,

v ery O pposite of freedom and diversity


you have the uniformity of nature the ,

regularity of cause and e ffect the regularity ,

of human nature that is to s ay custom and


,

habit from which the freedom of the will


,

h as died away S ome of us are settling


.

down into habits and have become the


creatures of custom T he u p ward rush .

9
13 0 P E R SO NA LIT Y
and soar of
life the
e lan de la

vi e has

died away our freedom gone F reedom i s .

change and how di fcult i s change for us


S uch is the contrast which M Bergson .

pictures between life which is continuous ,

change instinct with free will ever d iffer


, ,

e n t i at i n g di v erging dispersing and the


, , ,


uniformity whether of nature or of human

nature from which life a n d freedom have
disappeare d .

But the picture is not true F or the .

U niformity of N ature in the logical sense


of the te rm in the sense in which M ill held
,

it to constitute a l ogica l princip l e M , .

Bergson has substituted the U niformity of


N ature in the p o p ular and prima facie
sense disclaimed by logicians that the
, ,


future wil l resemble the past that the
procedure of nature is re g ular i s a mode of ,

repetition (Bosanquet I n di vi du ali ty an d


Valu e p ,
.whereas the L aw of U ni
formity in the l ogical sense of the term
, ,

means rationa l system such that all ,

changes and di fferences are relevant to one



another (i h p . .
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 13 1

AS a matter of fact and of observation


it is never found that the future exactly
resembles the past : nowhere in the
procedure of nature is the future a mere
repetition of the past T he U niformity of
.

N ature is not a mere mechanical process


of gravita tion a downward fall regular
, , ,

direct monotonous and uniform ; but a


, ,

rational system in which there are changes


,

and diffe rences and those changes and


,

di fferences rele v an t to one another I t .

i s only by taking the U niformity of N ature

in the popular and prima facie sense ,

disclaimed by logicians that M Bergson ,


.

is enabled to picture it as a movement


mechanical rather than rational as a ,

downward fall rather than a movement


upwards and onwards .

A nd a s M Bergson fai l s to s e e the


.

rational nature of the L aw of U niformity ,

S O he similarly misconceives the nature of

change and the freedom of the will J ust .

as he conceives the U niformity of N ature


to be a process marked by mechanical
unifor m ity and by exemption fro m ch a nge
I ND I V I D U AL I T Y 1 33

and change T he tr u th is th a t the U ni


.

formity of N ature is a rational system in ,

which there are changes and di fferences


relevant to one another ; and freedom of


the will so far from being pure change
, ,

ever more and more dispersive and diver


gent,

lies in the direction towards unit y
and coherence (Bosanquet p ,
.

T his chapter started from the admitted


fact that change takes place and from ,

the question whether the d irection of


change is itself always changing F or an .

answer to this question we may look either


within ourselves or without I f we look .

outside ourselves and observe the uniformity


of nature we nd not the dead monotony of
,

a mechanical system which is all that M ,


.

Bergson nds there but a rational system


,

in which all c hanges and differences a re


re l e v ant to one another T hat is to say .
,

there are changes a nd differen ces even ,

though the tendencies be towards uni ~

formity .T he tendencies towards uni


formity are indeed su fcient and su fciently ,

rel iable to enable man to cope to some


,
13 4 P E R SO NA LIT Y
extent with the future They are not .

suffi cient to overc o me his ignorance of


what a day may bring forth W e none of .

us know what may ha p pen to us in a day an ,

hour or even a minute H ow much less can


,
.

we pretend therefore to predict or to com


prehend the course of the universe as we look
out upon it and to decide whether its course
,

and direction is or is not always changing .

I t remains then to look within ourselves .

A nd we may with the more con dence


direct our gaze w ithin if we remember ,

that we are part of the universe ; and '

consequently when we look within our


selves we are looking into the universe
it may be into the very foundation and
reality of the universe I f as Plato says
.
, ,

G od holds the soul attached t o h i m by its


root then by descending into the depths


,

of the soul we may nd H im as surely there


as in the universe without ; and nding ,


H im we may be content with Plato
,

to dismiss the starry heavens .

Then let us look within to our inner


life But to the inner life of ourselves as
.
I N D I V ID UA LI T Y 13 5

persons or as individuals N ot as indi?



v i d u als
,
for if by individual we mean
somewhat absolutely self existent and cut -

off from everything e lse we mean what ,

does not exist AS Professor Pringle


.

Pattison says : I f a mere individual as ,

we are often told would be a being without


,

consciousness of its own limitations a


being therefore which could not know

itself as an individual then no S elf is a
mere individual W e may even s afely say
.

that the mere individual is a ction of



p hilosophic thought Professor Pringle
.


Pattison however goes on to say : I t is
none the less true that each self is a unique
existence which is perfectly i mp e r vi ou s
, ,

if I may so speak , to other selves i m


pervious in a fash i o n of which t h e i m p e n e t r a
b i li t y of mat ter is a faint analogue The .

self accordingly resists invasion ; in its


, ,

character of self it refuses to admit another



self within itself But it is j ust this
.

imp erviousness of which Professor Pringle


,

Pattison speaks this imp ermeability


, ,

which is implied by the term i ndivid u ality ,


I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 13 7

O n the p hysical side therefore there is no



individual in the sense of a closed
system having no relation to any other
,

indi v idual whatever O n the contrary all .

organi z ed beings are related and a kin -


.

W e are indeed apt to forget the re lation



ship ; and yet we cannot deny that he
prayeth well who loveth well both man and

bird and beast .

But leaving the physical side let us


, ,

inquire whether elsewhere we nd any

individual who is a closed system ,

absolutely cut o ff impervious i m p e r m e


, ,

able imp enetrable T here is none such


,
. .

I t is only by mutual c o operation as -


,

members of a system as members of one ,

another that we c an live together o r


, ,

can live at all N o man liveth to himself


.

alone I f he did or could so live then


.
, , ,

he would indeed be no member of a society


or system but himself a closed system
, ,

cut off from all others and impervious to ,

them I t is precisely this idea that each


.

of u S is thus individual which leads to the


notion the monstrous not i on that it is
, ,
13 8 P E R SO NA LIT Y
physical force which holds S oc i ety together .

S uch a notion would be alike monstrous


and absurd if it were applied not to p ersons
but to physical organisms I t would be .

patently absurd to say that it i s p hysical


force from the outside which holds the
, ,

parts of a physical organism together ,

and gives them their unity A physical .

organism is not a machine made by putting


this part and that together and welding ,

them together by force I t is from the .

beginning of its existence a unity A nd .

though from the beginning to the end of


its existence as a physical organism it is
a unity it is never at any time a closed
,

system T hroughout its history in order


.
,

S imply to live and go on living it must ,

draw upon i ts environment and take up ,

into i t s own unity that which is outside


itself An d that it could not do if it were
.

a closed system I f it were an


. indi

vidual ,
impervious and impermeable ,

it S imply could not go on living A nd .

this process whereby it maintains its


,

life and i t s unity i s no application of


,
I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 13 9

physical force from the outside I f then .

it is obviously and patently absurd to


sup pose that the unity of the physical
organism is the result of physical pressure ,

if it is not physical pressure which


creates or maintains the unity of the
physical organism how much more mon
,

strous is it to suppose that it i s physical


force which holds the members of a society
together or is the bond of union between
,

them ? I f the members of a society were


absolutely i mpervious and impermeable ,

if they were s o many closed systems so ,


many individuals in a word then
, ,

indeed only by physical force could the y


be driven together A nd that i s why
.


those who believe that we are i n div i
duals are obliged to have recourse to the
notion the futile notion that it i s physical
, ,

force which holds society together A .


society is not a mere aggregate of indi

v i d u als,
placed side by S ide any more ,

than a physical organism is a mere c olle c


tion of parts or members or limbs put side
by S ide J ust as a heap of cannon balls
.
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 141

each ot h er rising into love for one another


, .

I f we could not trust one another society ,

would fall at once to p ieces I t i s j ust .

so far as engagements made can be relied


o n that society holds together and that ,

life for each one of us i s made possible .

F or every necessary of life we are dependent


upon others who may be growing corn
, ,

planting tea rearing cattle in far distant


, ,
-

quarters of the globe E ngagements may


.

be broken and are broken ; nevertheless


,

we rely and rightly rely upon a man to


, ,

keep hi s word W e trust one another ;


.

and in the vast maj ority of cases our


condence proves well placed The mere .

existence of society proves that our trust


is j ustied : if it were not there would ,

be no society .

I t is true there are people whom we


nd we cannot trust whom there are ,

v ery few to trust S uch people are on


.


the way to becoming individuals closed ,

systems and are apt to be regarded as


,

t o nl y to be segregated susceptib l e only


,

to force and to compulsion from without .


142 P ER SO NA LIT Y
But tho u gh they are on the w a y to b e c o m

ing individuals though in each of them
,

the self is tending to pass into selshness ,

tho u gh it is j ust so far as the tendency


towards individualism towards selshness
, ,

prevails that society tends to go to pieces


, ,

still the process is never completely carried


out E ven among thieves there is honour
.

they hold together for the time and they


hold together precisely s o long and s o far
as they c a n trust one another T hat i s .

the only bond of union ca p able of holding


men together . A house divided against
itself cannot stand The bond of union
.

may be nothing more than trust but it is


o nl y a perfect bond provided it be love .

H e l iveth best who loveth best I t is in .

a word j ust so far as person s tend to



become individuals and se lsh to love

least that they become worst whil e he ,

li v eth best and has the greatest personality


who loveth best .

But no man however low he may fall


,

in the depths of selshness can become a ,


mere individual an absolutely closed
,
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 14 3

system ,
a unique existence perfectly i m

p ervious to other selves But though
.

no self can in actual life be thus cut off


from all other persons in philosophy it is
,


possible o r has been supposed possible
to imagine such a unique existence What .

we nd as a matter of fact in actual life


are persons bound together in dependence
on one another a dependence implying
,

trust at least a trust which sometimes


,

is and may always prove to be love We .


never anywh ere nd an ind ivi dua l
capable of solitary existence I f however
.

as philosophers we S imp l y se t facts aside


and start from the assumption that I ,

the individual have existence by myself


, ,

a unique existence impervious to other


selves then though in words
,
i n the
words impervious to other sel ves
we admit the possible existence of other
selves beyond our own we S hall nd that
,

we h a ve reduced the existence of other


se l ves to a p ossibility and an inference .

A nd when we have done that we shall


have it pointed out to us that the onl y
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 14 5

an individual O nly by contrast with


.

another not itself could it know itself to


, ,

be an individual ; and such contrast is


impossible if we begin by assuming that
,

one individual alone exists .

B y other philosophers who seek the ,

ground of all reality in a unique existence



impervious to other selves but who feel ,

the absurdity of seeking it in the human


i n dividual escape is sought in the c o n c e p
,

tion of the A bsolute that is in the uni


,


c at i o n of c on sciousness the huma n and

di v ine i n a Single self But here again ,

if the A bsolute i s thus S ingle and individual


at the start and in the p remises S ingle and ,

individual it must remain to the end and


in the conclusion I f in the conclusion
.

it appears to be divided into the divine


se lf and the human that mus t be mere
,

ap p earance and false appearance for the ,


term individual means S imply that -

which is i n di vi du um and cannot be divide d .

W e nd if we start from th e false idea



that perso ns are indivi du a l s so ,

many closed systems imper v ious imp e r


, ,

IO
14 6 P E R S O NA L IT Y
meable and impenetrable it matters not
, ,

whether we assume one or ma ny such .

I f many they remain closed systems i n


,

accessible to one another and isolated from


,

each other by their very nature and de


n i t i o n
. I f we assume but one then ,

beyond that one we c an never get whether ,

we adopt S olipsism or the theory of the


A bsolut e .

L et us therefore p ut aside the idea that



any self i s or can be individual W hat .

we nd as a matter of fact in actual life are


p ersons ,
not isolated from each other but
members of one another b ound t ogether ,

more or less imperfectly by the bond of


l ove Personality in this sense that is
.
, ,

personality as we actually know it is not ,

an idea which carries with it as part of its ,

meaning the denial of all se l ves or p e rsons


,

but one O n the contrary it implies that


.
,

I di stinguish my self from other selves ,

and recognize the existence both of them


and of myself I t implies that i s to say
.
, ,

that I am not only a subj ect to which


they are presented as obj ect but that ,
I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 147

I t oo am obj ect and that they are


subj ects t o whom I am presented .

A nd thereby it implies that both subj ects


and obj ects are embraced in a common
world which is one R eality
,
.

When M Bergson asserts that there is


.

movement but that there i s nothing whi ch


moves he i s making a n unmeaning and
,

impossible assertion which may lead t o ,

the denial of the existence of personal


identity I f everywhere there is change and
.

nothing but change then nowhere i s there


,

i dentity ; and if nowhere c an identity be


found t hen nowhere can any person exist
, ,

for a person having no i dentity i s not a


person at all T he complementary error
.


to M B e r gson s is that made by those
.

philosophers who regard change a s a mere


appearance an unreality T hey nd the
,
.


principle of all reality in i dentity the
identity of the O ne the A bsolute in which
, ,

they seek t o unify the divine subj ect and


the human But thus t o unify the divine
.

and human subj ect in the A bsolute i s to


destr oy the reality of both and in place of ,
I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 149

t o deny di fference in the case of the D ivine


,

personality and the human is S imply to ,

destroy religion A s Professor Pr i ngle


P a ttison says religion is the self sur
,
-

render o f the human will t o the divine .

O ur wills are ours t o make them T hine .


But this is a s e lf surrender which only self


-


only will c an make
,
A nd it is a sur
.

render which i s impossible i f there is no ,

real di fference between the D ivine per


s o n ali t y and the human if the one reality ,

is the identity of the A bsolute .

W e never as h as been said above nd


, ,

anywhere an
individu al capable of
solitary existence What we nd as a .

matter of fact in actual life are persons


bound together in dependence upon one
an other T his dependence has i t s meta
.

physical S ide and i t s moral S ide O n the .

metaphysi cal S ide it carries with it the fact


that every person is both subj ect cognizant ,

of others and obj ect of whom others are


,

cognizant T hat is t o s ay on the meta


.
,

physical side i t is fatal t o the the ory of


,

S olipsism O n the moral s ide this de


.
,
15 0 P ER SO NA LIT Y

p e n d e n on others imp lies trust and lo v e


c e .

T hat is t o s ay on the moral S ide it is as


,

incompatible with the theory of E got i sm ,

as on the metaphysical si de it i s i n c om
patible with S ol ipsism S olipsism i s the
.

theory that I alone exist E gotism is


.

that theory put into practice E gotism .

can indeed be practised without any formal


or conscious acknowledgment of the meta
physical theory o i S olipsism I t c an be
.

practised without any formal denia l of the


fact that there are other persons than
myself A ll that is necessary for its
.

practical working is the practical ignoring


of the existence of others A nd a merely
.

theoretical recognition of the existence of


my neighbour and my G od is in e ffect and
practice E gotism : their existence is not
and cannot be really recognized in any
way save by trust in them and love for
them T he only bond of union between
.


persons whether between human persons
or between the human person and the

D i v ine is lo v e I f human beings are
.

recogni z ed by me merely as means t o my


I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 15 1

own enj oyment or convenience if gods are ,

recognized merely as supernatural i n st r u


m ents for attaining my own desires they ,

are not so much conceived t o exist as mis


conceived AS a matter of fact it is i m
.
,

possible consistently and at all times for


any man t o treat all other beings human ,

and divine as merely means at his dis


,

posal and equally i mpossibl e for him t o


place no trust in them : there i s honour
even among thieves I gnored other beings
.
,

cannot be in actual life But if not treated


.

as means then they must be treated as being


,

selves or persons as much as myself that ,

is as being in themselves ends A nd it i s .

impossible to treat them as ends t o treat ,

them a s myself without love But if


,

they are to be treated by myself as ends ,

there must be self surrender on my part


-
.

I f their will is t o be done there must be,

self sac r i c e on my part But self sur


-
.
-

render t o a human will places the person t o


whom the surrender is made in the position
of a human being who treats others as
m erely means t o his own p u rposes or his
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 15 3

love him that is he may be obj ect of their


,


knowledge and love but he cannot be those

others who know a nd love him as subj ect
he is for e v er different from those subj ect s .

What th en is it possible for one subj ect t o


know of those others who though obj ect ,

t o him are subj ects to themselves and how


,

is such knowledge possible ? A dominat


ing personality forces i t s way everywhere ,

pervades everything I t s reality when we


.
,

are submitting t o it i s the last thing we can


,

d oubt Yet what do we know of it ? and


.

how ? W e know the person by h i s acts


and words for he may be sa i d to be what
,

h i s words and works are T hey are the .

obj ective side of him which is what is ,

known to us But as a subj ect he h as a


.

centre or focus of h i s own which never can


in truth be ours F rom it he sees his acts
.

and words as we cannot I t would be u n .


tru e as Mr Bosanquet says (I n di vi du ali ty
,
.


a n d Va lu e ,
xxxiv ) t o suppose that cir
,

c u m s t an ce s are in one mind or active


focus what they seem as seen from the out
S ide or as in any other mi n d or foc u s
,
.
15 4 P E R SO NA L IT Y
A nd the fact that he sees his acts and words
as we cannot far from suggesting that he
,

does not exist or h as no personality con ,

rms his exist ence and personality for that


,

is the focus or point of view from which


we are conscious of our own I t is in this
.

way that personality other than our own



whether human or divine is known t o us .

W e know G od by his manifestations as we ,

know human personalities by theirs But .

in the one c ase as in the other there is a


,

centre which never can in fact be ours A nd .

in neither case does this fact suggest doubt


as t o the reality for our own personality
,

is equally impenetrable to others and i t s


,

reality equally beyond possibil ity of doubt .

F rom the intellectual point of view ,

from the point of view of knowledge a ,

person is both the subj ect who knows others


and an obj ect of knowledge to others ,

and as subj ect he i s for ever di fferent


from others T hus as a centre or focus
.

of knowledge as a subj ect who knows


, ,

a person is for ever different from all



other persons we might even say i n acc e s
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 15 5

sible to them for only a s obj ect can he


,

be known never a s subj ect But every


,
.

person i s a subj ect and an obj ect of l o v e


as well as of knowledge A n d the ques .

tion naturally suggests itself whether from ,

the point of view of love there is or can be


the same di fference as there is from the
point of view of knowledge I n one sense .

-
and we must not disparage the I mport

ance of i t there is : unless there be two
subj ects or persons there can be no love .

N or can there be mutual love unless each ,

of the persons i s the obj ect of the other s

love But if we insist that from the point


.
,

of view of love two persons must be as ,

they are from the point of view of know


ledge not onl y different but inaccessib l e
, ,

then we are in fact denying the exist e nce


of love L ove is the bond of union between
.

two persons ; and the fact that it exists ,

however imperfectly is enough to S how


,

that it is impossible to speak of inaccessi


b ili t y where love exists T o s p eak of the
.

persons as inaccessible would be S imply


to rela p se i nto the error already pointed
,
I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 15 7

unity and reverence (the positive spirit of


"

non contradiction ) by which every frag


-

men t yearns towards the whole to which



it belongs (p .

Though we may seem to have wandered


far from it we have in fact been steadily
,

approaching an answer to the question


with which we started in this chapter ;
and M r B o san qu e t s words m ay make it
.

clear to us We started from the admitted


.

fact that change takes place and from the ,

question whether the direction of change


is itse lf always changing We l ooked .

without us on the C hanges going o n around


,

us,
and found in nature tendencies to
uniformity but we found no means of
,

deciding whether the course and di r e c


tion of change is or is not alway s changing .

Then we turned our gaze inwards to our ,

in ner life peradventure there we might


,

look into the very foundation and reality of


the universe But it was into the inner life
.

of ourselves as persons not as individuals


, ,


that we were br ought to look pers o ns
not cut o ff from one a nother b u t united , ,
15 8 P E R SO NA L IT Y
not by the mere fact of personality but ,

by the act wherein it reveals i tself and its


nature which is love B u t of love as it
, .

exists between human personalities the


most we can s ay is tha t it is in M r Bosan , .

q u e t s words the impulse , owards unit y .

A n impulse it i s and towards unity But , .

as between human persons the unity is


never reached O nly between the three .

Persons divine Persons who are o n e G od


, ,

only in the Trinity in U nity does it


exist The un i ty is G od and
. G od is ,

love the H oly S pirit proceeding from the


Father and the S on A s between human .

persons love is an impulse an d towards


, ,

unity But the unity is never attained


. .

Th e impulse is constantly thwarted and ,

i s thwarted by the presence in the human


personality of that which i s absent from

the D ivine b y the presence of evil E vi l .

it is which divides man from man and ,

which divides a m an against himself .


The evil self M r Bosanquet says (p
,
. .


is the adversary of unication of
experience and the v ehic l e of c o n t r a d i c
,
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 15 9

tion in the very heart of the self S elf .

contradiction is a fact experie nced no t


only in the domain of the intellect but in ,

the spiritual nature of each one of us who


h as occasion to say to himself M iserable ,


man " what I would that I do not ,
.

From that inconsistency and contradiction ,

whether in the intellectual or the spiritual


sphere when we are conscious of it we
, ,

strive more or less feebly to escape


, , .

A nd there i s only one direction in which


we can escape F rom inconsistenc y of
.

thought and the contradiction of our


spiritual nature escape can only be in the
,

direction of the unication of experience


after which th e intellect strives and of ,

the uni ty of love for which our spiritual


nature yearns I n both cases the impulse
.

is the same ; though in the one case we


are a pt to call it logic and in the other
love I t is the same impuls e in both
.

cases . I t is the strict and fundamental



truth that love is the mainspring of logic .

A nd the impulse of both is in the same



direction towards unity I f the change.
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 16 1

is that it strives t ow ards unity and c o


h e r e n c e t owards the coherence of l ogi c
,

and the unity of lo v e wh i ch is the main



spring o f logic A self M r Bosa n quet
.
,
.

says ,
ap p ears t o us as a s triving t owards

unity and coherence A n d a true self
.
,

h e says is something t o be made an d


,

won t o be held t ogether with pains and


,

labour not something given t o be enj oyed


,

( p
. T he
evil self is the a dversary
of unication of experience and the vehicle
of contradicti on in the very heart of the

self . I t is a truth known t o all from ,

personal experience that evil is that ,

contradiction in the very heart of the



self ,
whereby man i s divi de d against
himself an d whereby any society of men
,

is divi de d against itself s o that their


fellowship is endangered and even it may ,

be dest royed
,
A nd with our att ention
.

xed on that fact we m ay be tempted ,

not only t o say that the law of the striving


of the self is t o strive t owards unity but ,

t o be cont ent with saying that and not t o ,

inquire precisely as t o the nature of the


I I
16 2 P E R SO NA LIT Y
unity for which the m an strives who is
,

divi ded against himself I f we are cont ent .

t o leave the nature of this u n icat i On


undetermined and ambiguous it w ill be ,

open t o any one t o suppose that the uni


c at i o n of the self w hich is striven after
.

consists I n driving out the evil self which ,



is the adversary of the unication of

experience and s o converting the self
,

int o an in d ividu al wh o being i n di ,

vi du um i s n o longer divi ded against himself


,
.

But even if the unication of the self


int o an indivi dual

were possible i f ,

that is t o say the self coul d cease t o be a


,


person still the only resu l t attained by
,

the unication of the self int o an indi



vi dual woul d be that the individual
would be brought into unity with himself
-
not that he would be brought int o unity
with other human beings still less with ,

G od A nd in such a process of u n ication


.

there woul d be no need and no room even , ,

for love F or love carries us beyond the


.

narrow bounds of our own personality ,

whereas this proces s of unication is


I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 16 3

supposed to take place entirely within



them . I f then
, ,
by logic we understand

the supreme law of experience and if it ,

is the strict and fundamental truth that


love i s the mainspring of logic then there
,

i s no log ic in the supposition that u n i


cation i s t o be attaine d by bringing an
individual int o unity with himself and , ,

in that supposition love there i s none


,
.

S hall we then s ay that the law of the


striving of the self is t o strive towards unity
with others An d s h all we s ay that by
l


others we mean p ersons who are
human I f human personalities were the
only Personali ty known t o us then indeed
,

we S hould have t o hol d that the law of


the striving of the self is only t o strive
towards unity with other human selves ;
and we should have also t o hold that the
law was one incapable of fullm ent I m .

pervious and i m p e n e t ab le t o us other ,

persons certainly are not N or are we


.

perfectly inaccessible t o them Bu t our .

access t o them an d t o their love profoun dly


,

though at times i t mo v es us is not that


,
I N D I V ID UA LIT Y 16 5

either of which should su fce t o show that


such a picture is a mis representation of
the plain facts T he rst consi deration
.

i s that such a picture is absolutely i n c on


sistent with the fact that the self appears
t o us as a striving t owards unity and

coherence . F or in our moral struggles
, ,

victory consists in the expulsion of e v il


and the triumph of good not in striving
,

towards making them compatible with one


another ; they cannot be unied ; and no
coherence is possible between them
though we atter ourselves that our darling
sins are not so incompatible with goodness
that we must actually abandon them alt o
gether T he striving then t owards unity
.

and coherence cannot be a striving t o


make good and evil cohere together and
t o form them int o a unity T hat is the
.

rst consideration T he other considera


.

tion is that if we picture the division an d


incoherence of which we are conscious
within ourselves as a struggle between the
evil self and the t rue self then we are
,

bound to ask what it i s that i s thus d ivided ?


166 P ER SO NA LI T Y
I t is both untrue and useless t o say that
there is nothing that is t hus di v ided :

useless because if there is n othing t o be


,

divi ded there c an be no division ; untrue


, ,

because I know that I am divi ded
against myself I f therefo re it is alike
.

useless an d untrue t o s ay that there is


nothing in our moral struggles that is
divided against itself and incoherent with
itself then what we are presented with
,

from the beginning of our moral history is



unity an d coherence though an imper fect
coherence and an incomplet e unity A nd .

this unity an d coherence however i m ,


perfect and incompl et e is one self and ,

that self myself otherwise I have


no interest in it U ntil my personality
.

begins for me nothing exists When it


,
.


begins it i s there divi ded and incoherent
,

within itself doubtless but sti l l a person


,

ality and a self ; and a unity as is S hown ,

by the very fact that it i s capable of


division and i s divided
,
.

T here IS however much danger in allow


, ,

ing our attent i on t o be concentrated on


I N D I V ID UA L IT Y 16 7

the problem of the unity and coherence


of the self .T he danger is that of being
drawn unawares int o the morass of S olip
si sm ,
and of supposing that the only
problem is how I may attain unity and
coherence with myself I f I alone exist
.
,

that is indeed the o n ly problem I f how .


,

ever ,
I am not an individual in the

solipsist sense but a person


,
and if a s

a person I am for logic both subj ect
and obj ect ; and if for the love which ,

is the mainspring of logic I am also both


,


subj ect and obj ect : then personality
implies other personalities human an d ,

divine .T he unity and the coherence



after which a person strives th e ,

peace which passeth all understanding ,

is t o be gained only by that love which is



the impulse t owards unity with one s
neighbour and one s Go d
.
I ND E X

Ab s l ut t h 3 6 14 5 14 6
o e, e, 1 C nd iti ns
o o 8
C n tin uit y
, , , ,

47 I 48 49 3 I o 6 1 ff .

Ab s tr c t o ns 7 7
, , ,

a i of ch n a g e 1 2 0 ff .

f t h u ht
, ,

A cci d n t s 3 6 e o o g 6 7 if .

A g n t t h r t h an h u m a n 3 5 d u n it y
, , ,

e o e an , 1 17
ff
A g n s ti c i sm 4 0
.

p r ti n 3 7
, ,

o Co o -
e a o 1
C r ti n i nc ss n t
, ,

Ag d u 8 1 ea o e a 1 12
A n l ys i s 7 6
, ,

a
A n i m i sm 5 6 I 6 7 ff D t s 7 ff 7 9
,

, , , ,
2 . o 2 .
,

A n t hr p c n tri c n ti ns 3 4
o o e o o , ,

A pp r nc s 5 9 8
ea a 85 e ,
2, ,
E c l ip s s 6 e
E g ti sm
, ,

9 8 ff 45 1 o 5 0 1
A r ch pt ryx 2 7
.
, ,

ae o e 1 m p i r i c al S lf e 5 0, 5 2
A ss u m pti o ns pr m tur 4 u i 8
, ,

e a e, I B ga 1
pip h n m n l c nsc i u s
, ,

A tt n ti n 8 9 9 5 ff
e o . E e o e a o o
A ttri b ut e s p r so n l 3 0
, ,

e a , n ss 3 e 1
E rr r d trut h 3
, ,

o an
B in g i s ch an g E il
, ,

e 10 e 1 v 5 8 ff1
B rg s n
.
,

l uti on 8 3 7 3 8 7 8 8
, ,

e Mo 8 3 ff 12 7 ff
, .
, .
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G e ne r a lL it e r a t ure L ittl Q t e uar o Sha k es p e a re


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JU LY 19 1 3
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ME SSRS . MET HU EN S

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.

0 T H E ROMANC E OF NORTHU M
xt E d z t z on r 82
9
r. . .

LAN I ll
. . .
.

as 6d . d i D . ust r at e . Th rd E d z t z on .

d
B k f rd ( P t r) THO U GHTS ON B i d J m 800 .
7s . 6 . n et .

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.

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u st r a t e d d . lz i r d E d E i D m
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7 0 . 65 . u s tr a t e . S ev e n tlz d t i on . e

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l
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E d z t i on C r. 8220 6s O N AR E D I TI
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. .

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.

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.
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ON NOTHING AN K IN R E D SU B C
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3s . .

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on . .

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.

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. . . .

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THIS AN D THAT AN H E OTH R M


. .

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.
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C t z on r 8710 IS net
800
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Fea
. .

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.

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I ll
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MAR I E ANTO I N TTE


.

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E
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.

r ss . n e t
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u au . D D
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'

d di C . .
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s
T HE PY RE N E E S I ll
. . .

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B r ( R b r ) T H E P O MS . . e c on

D e my 800 6d n e t. u ns o e t E
d
E i ti o n
SONGS d d b A N D RE W L 7s
.
. . .
.

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tt ( W A P RI M E R OF H6dE W A C RA I G I E Wi P i
.

T th o r t ra t
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B I B L E if h d
. . . .

Wi d D m
.

. C F t i E i t i on 6 . r . 8210 . as . . E d t i on . e e y 800 . 9.
G E N E R A L L IT E R A T U R E
B or d e n FURT H E R STU I E S IN F A hH i ( C H ) h C Ol iMh S El LiL 5 Ai D i f t R \"
3

P RAY E R B OO K C
o o .

T HE 800 6s s t o ry o f t e E ng s o d er d ur
Ci i l W C lh
. r . . .

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D i
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,

J CT S CONN CT E WITH
.

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. .

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.

63 ne t
T HE B R I E th
.

I ll
.

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.

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'

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. . .

tr a t ad i S e co n d E d z t
C Fi t G d ( dw on . r 8m 63 z e raI E ar I
MAR K HA YY AM P i d
. . . .

CRIM E S O UR B AIN GRAN


.

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Fif h l E i i Wi

THE F r nt e

I E R AN D OTH E RS I ll
.

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8 00 6. :
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T H E CRIM E S OF T H E MARQUIS g
lI d i C a nu o uc t on y o ss 7
E
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D E BR N L L E R S AN
I VI OTH RS I D E
I ll
.

u st r a t e d Cr 8 00 63
T H E CRIM E S OF ALI P ASHA
.

A N F l x (
.

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P RINCI .

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OTH RS I l l E C 7
us tr a t e d
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M Y P E TS N wl l
. . . .

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I ll
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.

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A LL I N SO N . d C 0
W E LLINGTON
us t r a t e . r . 89 . 63 .

LE D D e e ds D of
C hi l R I ll
.

w a nd u st r a t e d

(F OUR I NSECT v a ry , e no n . .

D EL )
FRI N D S AN D FO S I l l
u nc an . 800 5 5 ne t
.
. . .

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Fr (J RO U N D T H E W
C r. m 8 . 6s .

a se r

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s on
ON A WH EL I ll d
.

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MARSHALS I ll d i C E t 800 61
.
i on . r . . .

d . us t r a t e d . S e c on

G t F M E MORI E
E d z t i on D e m; 800 125 6d ne t
(S i ) al o n ir
. . . . .

THE B LAC K P RINC E I ll d M Y LI E I ll d /i . u s t ra t e .


F .
r a nc s
us t r a t e
.

. T z rd E
S e cond d D E i dti on .
m e my Bo o .
7s 6 . . ne t .
De y 800 . xo r . 6d . n e t.

r
Du h a m ( T h e E a rl o f) . T HE E R P ORT b
Gi b i n s (H IN D USTR
ON CANA A W I D i th an n t r o d uc t o r y
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CA
N D E : I T O R I
.

o te . d e my 82 0 .
43 . 6 . ne t .
LIN S W i h M p d P l E . t a s an a ns

D tt ( W NOR OL K B ROA S dE i d i ti on R ev se D e my 800 6


TH
.
,
E F
.

D
u
I ll d S
us tr a t e
.

C . e c on d E d i t i on . r . 800 65 .
.

. THE I N
E NGLAN
U S T R I A L H S OR
Wi M p d D
D
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I T
.
5 a s an a

Eg t A SHORT HISTOR Y N di i
i n e te e n t h E
C t 8110
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on r
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. . .
35 .

B RITISH COLONIAL P OLIC Y E N G L I S H SOCIAL R E F O R M


.

O F .

T h i r d E d i t i on . D e m; 89 0 .
75 . 6d . ne t . S e co n d E d z ti on . Cr . 800 . as . 6d .

H r
E van s ( e rb e t CASTL S OF E Gi bb on M MOIR ( E d wa r d ) THE E
NGLAN WAL E S I ll LI E OF WAR D GI B
.

E D AN D us t r a t e d HT E F ED
D e my Bo o xz r 6 d . . . ne t .
. .

d G B I R K B EC K H ILL C
E d i te by . . r . 829

T H E D E CLIN AN FALL OF
x e te r ( Bi s h o p of ) R E GN U M D EI ROMANi M P IR E E i wi h d ted , E
E D

B L A d Mp J B t
.

pt
.
.

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E d z t i on . D e my 8710 .
75 . 6d . ne t . I l us t r a t e d I n S ev e n V o l u m e s . .

Bo o E ac h 1 03 6d n e t A ls o i n
l l M Y LITTL B O Y
. . . .

E wa d Ca r E Vol u m e s Cr 800 63 ca olz


( )
T l A L EXAN D ER T E I XE I RA
. . . . .
. .

ate d b y
M A TTO S I ll
ra ns DE

t u s t ra t e d F ea 8 00 5 5 Gl ov e r ( T T HE CO N FL I C
RE E LIGIONS IN ARL Y
. . . . .
.

T HE E R0
M P IR E F ou r t /t E d z t i on D e n:
SO P H Y OF T H GR E N
. .

d E S e c on d 6 n e t.

C 0
.

V IRGIL S d
. . .

E d i ti on d . r . 80 .
35 . 6 .
D . e c on E d i t i on . e my 89

lk
ou ( Ch l )
es H E ARMO U R E K ar e s T "
H E CHRISTIAN TRA ITION
T D
HIS CRAFT I ll ITS fV E RI ICATION ( h A
.

AN D . u s tra t e d . R oy a l F . T e n
d o. 2 as . ne t . t ur e or Cr . 8210 .
35 6d . . ne t .
6 M ET H U E N AN D C O M PA N Y L I M I T E D
Go d l eL Y RA RI OLA [ w f
y (A F V Po t H ll ( Ar h u ) t r THE LI F E
I ll
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t assa
Dem
.

NA P OL ON
. .

E d i ti ont d F ea 9210 25 6 E us t r a t e d
V RS S TO R R Second i
(

net
. . . . .
.

E E O DE E di t on . 6d
.
7s . . .

Fed )8 00 6d
l
2s

S E CON D S N G S F t 0 H ARWINISM
. . . .

TR I ea 821 6d y (
e ad e F D
MO RN SOCIALISM
. . . . .

S e c ond E
G l
os t
AT HOM g (Fr in
d
H B R E TONS
Se con E
a nce s
I llu s t ra t e
T E Cr .ne t
DE
8220 .
5 s. .
.

d E d i t i on
H t
. .
.

Cr 800 65 e n d e r son (M S ur ge ) GE
AU V RGN E AN D ITS P O P L E I ll M R ITH NO V LIST
. . .
. .

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Demy
t ra t e d n et
. 800 . 6d . .
. us
R ORM R Wi h P i
EF E . t a or t ra t
,

800
) CAM B RI D GE I l l
E d i t i on Cr . . .

G y (A h
ra rt d ur ust ra t e
Demy B H l y (W NGLISH L Y
. . .

o o. 7s 6d ne t en e E
CHAUC E R TO
. . .
.

PO E S e c on d E
Gr h m W I ND
.

a a e ( Ke n n e t h ) THE IN Cr 800 6d
I ll ne t
. . . . .

T H E W I L L O \VS u s t ra t e d S e v e n t /t
H i ll ( G g F r i ) O N E HUN
. .

E d i t ion Cr Bo o e or e an c s
MAST E RP I E C S OF SCUL P T
. . . .

E
G ran g ( Fr k )
er HISTORICAL SOCI I ll an d Demy d 800 m 6 ne t
Y A TE X T B OO K O F P OL IT I C S
us t r a t e
OLOG s.
. . . .

:
6d n e t
-

C r Boo Hi d (G L wi ) D A Y S IN CORN A .

n e s I
I ll C
. . . . . .

d hi d i u s tr a t e T E di t 800
Sh r p ) T H E GROWTH
. r on . r.
G w ( E d wi
re n a e
OF A P L AN E T I ll t t d C
.

H bh (L
.
H E TH E OR us r a e . r. 800 65 o ous e T
NOWL E G emy
. .

K D
.

G i m ( W H ll )
D E ms 6
(H
. 800 . .

r n d Mi hi a an nc n
T H E LIF E O RO B E RT B ROWNING H b
. .

I ll d Second d
u s tr a t e D emy m TRA ( JF

A N A PP L I C
INT
A T IO
E RNATI
N O F E i t i on 82
.

o so n .

ne t
.

DE E
. .

T HE O R Y C : CO
12 s . 6d . .

ne t r. 800 6d
H i g (K H E ALTH THRO U GH P RO B L E MS OF P O V E RT Y A N I
. . . .

a
I N TO T HE I N D U ST R I A L C O N D ITI O N 0
: N
D IET Se cond d
.

C 6 E i t z on Se a d
ne t POO R i h / i
. . r. .
33 . .

. C E g t z E d t i on r 89 0 2

P R O L E M O F
.

B
. . .

H l (J F A M O U S S E A FIG H TS
T HE H T E
a e
F R O M S A L AM I S TO S H I MA I ll M P LO Y E A I NQU I R Y AN E D N
m P O L I CY
.

d i } d TSU C u s tra t e E cc i F E
'

net z t z on .
-

zz
. .
o c . ;
S e con d C E d z t i on . r 800 . . .
25

OL RIC E S AN D WAG E S C
.

H ll
a H E ANCI E NT HI STOR Y G
T
P D, .

O F H N AR AST ROM T H
T E
d
E E F E
6 . net .

E A LI E ST TIM S TO T H E B ATTL E
R
SALAMIS I ll D emy 0 II d g ( M HOW E
TO EN -
o s on r s. [D
O L D CHIN E S P ORC E LAIN
O F d u s tr a t e 80
net E
. .
.

1 ss .
d d i Th i r d E it P os t 800
.
t r ate . on . . t

H anna y A SHORT HISTOR Y OF H l d i h ( Si T IN


T H RO Y AL NA VY V
E B OR E RLAN D
THE
I ll ol I 168 8
o c r .

D my
1 2 17
II D 1 8 80 19 00.
. . . .
,
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V
75
o l.
6d . .
.
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x689
d d D emy
1 8 x5 . e 800 . B ac
E z t z on .
,
800 . 6d .

H r T H E GOLFING SWING
H l w rt h ( W A H ST O o ds o R I
E NGLISH LAW
.
a e
et ne t I F ou r V0
.
n
D emy 00
.

Th i d rd E i t i on F a 8710 I s.
E a c/z x
8
. . . .

ne t
.

H p r ( Ch l
ar e H E AUTOCAR ar e s T
.

ROA D B OO K W i M p H ll T Y ROL th a s I n F ou r
Vo me d n et
AN D
-

d ( Cl i )
. .

o an ve
P E O P LE I ll d D emy
.
lu 0 c s. Cr 80 4 75 6 800
. . . .

u s t ra t e
.

S O U T H OF T H E T H AME S
I

V l I
. . .

o net

T H E B E LGIANS AT HOM E I ll
. . . .

N O R T H AN D S O U T H W A L E S ust
V ol
AN D WEST M I D L AN D S
II
D em n e t
.
. .

. )
"
800 . 10s . 6d . .

V ol E A ST A NG L I A A N D E A ST M
III H b gh ( L LOR E N ZO ID E
MAGNI IC NT AN D L O RENCE I
-

L AN D S or s ur
. .
. .

F E F
G OL D EN A GE I l l d Se cond
;
.

"
V l T N O R T H E NG L AN D A N D
IV
D emy
u s t ra te E
S O U T H O F S C O I L AN D
HE or
. .
o . .

800 I net.

WAT E RLOO A N ARR A T IV E AN D A


.
.

H i ( F k ) T H E WOM E N OF
:
ar r s ran Wi h P l Seco nd d I CISM t a n s. E i t i on
SHA K E S P E AR E Demy
. .

d . 800 .
75 . 6 . ne t . 8220 .
G E N E R A L L IT E R A T U R E
THE LIF E OF SAV ONAROLA I l l . us J e nk s
L l S II
AN O U
LOCAL GO RNM NTTLIN E OF
VE E
t rat e d Cr 800 5 s . ne t .
R R C K E NSO
.
. . .

E d z t z on e v i se d b y

r MANCHURIA I l l
. . . .

H os i e ( Al e xa n d e ) us
800 . as

A SHORT HISTOR Y OF E NG
. 6d . net .

Se cond E d i t
. .

tr a t e d . i on . D e n g/ 8:10 .
7s . 6d .

LAW F R O M T HE AR LI ES T T
: E IM
ne t .

T HE O F T HE YEAR
E ND 1 9 1 1. D em
H u d s on A SH E P H E R D S (W
6d ne t . .

LI I M P RE SSI O S O F S O U T HdWEILT
FE :
.

J M AXIMS rl
S H I RE O N S I ll
T HE
g m
N
e rni n h a ( Ch a es E d wa r d )
M RMA U K
.

D W Y i ust r a t e d h r di
ne t OF A D E
. .
.

t i on D e my 8 00 7s 6d E d z t z on
. . . . .
. Cr . 8710 .
SS .

Hu m p h r e y s ( J oh n P RO P ORTIONAL J e v on s ( F P E RSONALIT Y
R E P R E S E NTATION . Cr . 8 00 .
5 s. n e t .
800 . as . 6d
.

. n et .
.

Ht ( Ho r T HE N E W J oh n s t ( Si r H B RITISH
Ill
u ch i n s on on
FOR ST I ll
a ce
TRAL A RICA
.

E . u st r a t e d . F ou r t h E d zt z on . F . ust r ate d .

Cr 800 6c E d z t z on Cr 4t 0 1 8s net
T H E N GRO IN
. . . . .

T HE N EW W0
. . .

E
H tt ( E d w ar d T HE
) CITI ES OF I ll m
us tr a te d De y 8720 ne t

S P AIN I l l
. . .

u on .

Cr 800
. u str a t e d F ou r t h . E d i t i on .

lTIONS(
J u ia n L a d ) o f No w i c h y
REV
I V IN LO V
r .

CITI S OF U M B RI A I ll OF D E E E dit
. .

G RACE
.

T HE E . us t r a t e d .
W A R R A C K F ou r t h E d z t z o n .

C
F if t h E d i t i o n r 800 8270 3 9 6d
I ll
. . .

T H E CITI E S OF LOM B AR D Y
. . . .

. us
t (J h )
Ke a s o n T HE P O E MS E
tr a t e d
C 7 0
82
I d d N
. .
. r . .

i
FLOR NC AND NORTH E RN TUS
E E
with
S LI NC O UR T
n tro uc t o n
W
an y b ote s ,

CAN Y WITH G E NOA I ll E


.

i th a F ro n t is p i e
Ph
.

u st ra t e d T h i r d E d i t i on
o t o g ra v u r e . De
. .

S d e con C E d i t i on . r 800 . 6s .
6d ne t .
SI E NA AN D SOUTH RN TUSCAN Y
.

E
I ll K b l (J h ) CHRISTIAN Y
.

d S d
u s tr a t e C e con E d z t z on r. 800 e e o n THE
Wi h I N
. . . .

V E NIC E AN V E N E TIA I ll d D . us t ra t e .

L OC K I ll
t an n t ro d u c t i on a n d
u s t ra t e d
ote s

T hi r d E d z t i on
I
C 800
. . .
r . . s.

R O ME I ll d . d di i C us t r a t e . Th i r E t on . r .
Bo o . 6d .

6
827 0 . s.
p IMITA
K e m i s ( Th om a s a) T HE
COUNTR Y WAL K S A B OUT FLOR E NC E CHRIST L
.

OF F ro m th e ati n, W1
I ll I EAN F ARRAR I ll
. .

d d
u s t rat e d p . S e con E i t i on . F ca . 800 . n t r o d u c t io n b y D . us t
ne t T h i r d E d i t z on F ed} 800 6d
IN UN K NOWN T U SCAN Y Wi h N
. . . . .

b W I L LI AM H E Y OO D I ll
, t o re s
Ki p l i (R ud a d )
ng R y r B ARRAC K
S W u s tr a t e d e con d
B ALLA S
-
.

y . .

6d D r 14 t h T h ou s a n d
d
E D t i on e m y 800 ne t .
. .
i 7s
A B OO K O T H E W YE I ll
. . . .

f ou r t h E d z t zon Cr 800 OS A ls o
C
. . . .

d F . us tr a t e .
8720 lo t h , 6 11 n e t ; L e a t h e r , 5 s
S N S AS
. . .

D e wy 8210 6d ne t
THE EVE E 94 th Th o
. . .
.

T w e n ty r s t E d z t z on C r 8 00
Ib se nH ri k) B RAN A m i ( en D D ra at c F e at C
89 0 lo t h , 6d n et ; L e
. . .

P m l d b W ILLI AM W ILSO N
. . . . .

oe t ran s a t e y ne t
T H E FI V E NATIONS
, . .

F ou r t h E d i t z o n . Cr . 800 . 6d . h h .
7 8t T or
h d
E le v e n t E z t zon
C Al 8 00 r

C
so

I CHRISTIANf M Y STICISM
. . .

n ge (W 8710 lo t h , 6d ne t ; L e a th e r ,
D E ARTM E NTAL D ITTI E S
n

B L
.
.

p
.

a m t on Th z r d P T7
(T h e e c t u re s o .

E di t i on Cr 8210 ne t h d
T ir E d i t i on
C Al r 8 00
Cl h so
. . .
. . . .

800 . d
ot , L 6 . ne t ; ea th e r ,

I nne s A H ISTOR Y OF T H E
(A l Mary)
B RI ISH IN IN IA Wi h M p
.

L a m b ( Ch ar e s T HE and
T D t a nd
L T WOR K S
.
a s
Pl
.

F E E E d i t e d , W l t ll a n
C 829 0
N L UCA
.
a n s. r . .

du ctio n a nd
E NGLAN UN R H E TU D ORS o t e s, b y E V . .

D DE T N e w a n d R ev i s e d E d z t z o n i n S i x V o l
Wi M p
.

i th m a s. T h r d E d i t i on . De y 800 .
W i t h F r on t z sp i e c e F c aj 800 5 s
l
. . . .

6d n ot .
T h e v o u m e s a re
M I S CELLANE O U S P R O S E E LI
.

L A ST E SS A YS O F LI A
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In n e s ( Ma SCHOOLS OF P AINT T HE E
. .

IN G I ll C H IL D REN P L A YS AN D P
Il l.
. .

u s t ra t e d S e con d E d i t i on Cr F OR Iv
LETT R S
. . . . . .

5 s . ne t . w dan VI . E .
GE N E R A L L IT E R AT U R E
Hd lle Mo rl ( Au h o t r o f) . ST CATH E R t
Me h u e n ( EL M E NGLAN D S R
'

SI E NA TIM S D I S CU SS E D I N F O UR T EEN L
. . .

IN E OF AN D H ER E
I ll PdR O T C TI O N I S T N h E d i C

. E I T F RS
us t ra t e d . S e co n d E d i t i on . D e my 8 r/ o . E . znt it on .

6d ne t . .
3 . n et .

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THE F AN D
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MAR Y MAG D AL E N E A P L AY I N T HREE E VE
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A C TS T l d b A LEXAN D ER T r an s a te y E IX E I R A
: MILLAIS I ll
D e m y 800
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M A T T os . T h z r d E d i t z on F e a t 8 00 . . .
. . ne t .

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Mi lUN ( R RO MAANHISTOR
ne
DE
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ATH T l d A L EXA D ER E
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DE ra n s a t e by N Cr
T E I XE I RA DE M A TTOS 8 00
.
. .

F ou r t h E d z t i o n
f t (M
. .

F eat . 8vo .
3 s 6d . . net .
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P RUSSIA I ll
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A HISTOR Y O F E G YPT
Ma h a y ( J

Cr 800
. us t r a t e d . F ou r t h E e

UN R H E P TOL MAIC D Y NAST Y s


.

MARIA TH E R E SA I ll
. . .

DE T E
I ll
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us t r a t e d
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. .

us t r a t e r.
800 0 6d
.

10
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M i tl d ROMAN CANON LAW


a
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tt (R T H E THR SHOL D OF
. .

MON YS IS CAL ICTIONAR


.

M are
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F D ,
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THINGS THAT MATT R P P


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UN D ER IS
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d
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on a ue . D V

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5 3.

TIM S OF LUCIUS CAR Y S M h


. .

COUNT AL K LAN
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I ll d F (E H l l m) N LS D
, VI
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d
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. . .

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C

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A SAILOR S GARLAN S l d d TIM S
. ne t .

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a .

b E E d I te d y h e r S o n
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S e co n
d S C d e c ond E d i t i on
.

E d It e 800 6
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r 3s t i on D e my Sv o
. . . . . .

. 15 s net . .

net .

t(C F T E NN Y SON No r wa y (A NA P L S PA ST E :
Ma s e r m a n
P RE S EN T I l l
.

AS A R E LIGIOUS T E ACH E R
. .

us t ra t e d F ou r t h E
S e c on d
. .
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Cr 8m 65
E d z t on .i Cr 800 6s . . .

CON ITION 0 NGLAN


. . .

T H E
F o u r t h E d z t z on A
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Me d l (
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NGLI SH CO N S T U
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.

D e nny 829 0
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O xfo d r (M P r i c e ( le a n or
RI H L I E U I ll
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t i on
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D e my 800
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3 s 6d . . n et . . . r oe . . ne t .

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k W s H S I EN E OF P rPcOeL (ITI A L EA OS HORT
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Si r d in E OI N i G t d C
LE TO K N O W T H M
s .

PE O P S e c ond E d z t z on D e my 8o o . O E I llt
C
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R E L I G IO N AN D C O NS C I E N C E I N R oe ( F re d ) O LD OA K
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,

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2s.
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. r an s a t e ro t e MENT . D e my 800 .
5 s. net.

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tr a t e d . D e my 8 2 m . 10s . 6d . ne t .

a
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F L O W R S OF H
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PhLIel TsL E(RuB RhEV I A R S KF OIREST RITA VE D I E l N ,

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Swa n t o n ( E E L ) F U N G I AN D
AN I A L S I ll TO K N O W TH E M I ll
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. . d C . u st r a t e .

t i on F c ap 87m as 6d ne t

TO Y S ITH S OTH R AN I A L S BRITI S H P L AN T G A LL S C


. .
. . . .

MM M E M

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u s t ra t e d S i x t li E d t i on . F a x} 879 0 . . .
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d C 800 6 . s tr a t e . r . . s. S ym e s (J . T HE E C FR N H R
LU T IO N S e con d E d z t i o n Cr 8710
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TH E FO U R FO L IO S 6 ; 6 ; 66 4
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T b a or ( M r g r t TH E SA I N
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m pl
,

1 6 85 . ac s . ne t , or a co e t e se t , . u s t r at e d . l i r d E d z t z on .

1 2 12s . n e t 800 3 s 6d net.

TH E P O E M S OF IV I L L I AM S H A K E
. .
.

S PEA R E \V i h I d i dN Tay lor ( A


P H YS I C S . EME EL N TS OF M

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ra m, 10s. 6d
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S h e ll e y ( P er c y B y s h e ) TH E P O E M S T y l or ( M B r s.

OF PE R C Y B Y S S H E S H E LL EY W i h J APAN E SE G A R D E NS s
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Th o m as (E d wa r d ) M A U RI C E
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C r 8 0 S 79 S . n e t.

T E R L I N C K I ll
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S m i t h ( Ad a m ) TH E W EA L TH O F d S d E . us t r a t e . e con

NAT VIOlNSm E dDi md b8 0E DW I N CA N N A N C 80 .

te y
r. 0 .
5 s . n e t.

Th o m p s o n ( F r a nc i ) S E LEC
. .

Tw o u es e 71 a 1s . n e t .

P O E M S OF FR AN C I S T H O M I
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s .

S m i t h ( G F H er b r t ) G E M S TO NES Wi h B i p hi l N W
AN D TH E I R D I S TI N CTI V E C H AR AC M E N E LL W i h P
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. .

S n e ll ( F A BOO K OF E X M OOR Tll t ( e s on

I ll d C
u s t ra t e 80 6
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FOR
i
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M di m 6 0
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0
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T H E C U S TO M S OF O L D EN G L AN D
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di i i
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THE STRO NGHO LD O F H


,

l s tr a t e . r . 71 . s .

G O L F D O S AN D D O N T S
f d d ' e z um as . 6 . ne t.

F if h E d i i
.

t F p t
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on . ca . 1s . ne t .

St e e n o n ( R TH E L E TT E R S OF H
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F i/ t n E d i t z on . D e 7ny So o . 1 os . 6d .

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TO T H E M A R Q U ESA S AN D B E Y O N D
v s (M Tr i gg s ( H I n ig o) TO WN AN N PL
P A ST PR E S E N T A N D P O W
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15 s . n e t .
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s ne

L E TT E R S FRO M SA M O A 89
.

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A S OL I ER S I FES I TY Y Si r f d X
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12 s . 6d . ne t .

St orr (V er n o n D E VE L O P M EN T U nS er h i ll ( eNy n ) M Y l p
d Ev l ST I CI S IN
AN D D I I NE P U R P O SE
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t u dy in th e a t u re an d D e v e o m

ne t .
V . Cr . 8710 .
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ne t A ls o ap 800 1 3 . ne t 1 5 4 3 ne t .
R V OLT IN HIN USTAN (
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THE E D 18 5
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Ye a t s ( W A B OO K OF I
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V E E RS .
.

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WAR IN T H E U N IT E D STATE S
.

W it h I d c t i b y S P EN S E R
W IL K I N S O N Wi h M p d P l
( 86
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T fz i r a E d z t zon . D e m f Se e . 13 3 . 64 . ou t .

PART I I .
A S E L E CT I O N O F S E R IE S

An c i e n t Ci t i e s
G e n e ral E di to r , B . C . A . WI N D L E
Cr . 8 00 .
45 . 6d . n e z e ar /z v olu me

Wi th I llus tra t i ons by E . H NE W ,. a nd o th e r Ar ti sts


BR I TS O L. Alfr e d H a rv e y . E D I N R H M G W ll
BU G i i a ms o n
LN O N E M l p
. . . .

C AN T E R B U R Y J C C . . . o x. I C L . . a n se Sy m s on

C H EST E R B C A W i l nd e SHR E R A
WSB U Y T ud e n.

I N S A O Fit p t ick
. . . . . . .

D U BL . . . . z a r . W E L L G LA S T O N B U R Y
S an d . T S H 0]
. .

T he An t i qu a ry
s B ook s
G e n e r al E d i to r J , . C H AR L E S C O X

D e wy 8 710 .
75 . mi e a c lz v oi z cm e

h
Wi t N u m e ro us I llust ra ti o ns

A NC I EN T PA I N T E D G L A SS I N E NG L AN D T H E. D O ME S D A Y I NQUE ST T A d l p h B HE
Ph i lip N l e so n
,

E NG LI S H C H R H F URN IT URE
, . o us

J
.

A RCH OLO G Y A ND F A LS E A N TI Q U ITI E S d A H S c d E di


C U C

M
.

/E
an y ar v e t z on
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. . e on .

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u nro.

F m P h i t ic
.

BE L LS SEcNG L AN D T or C J J , HE . a n on . .

to h E dt f h e E gh t th Cn
.

t e
ro re s or

G g Cl ch
o i een e
R av e n . e ond E d z t i on .

BRA SS ES NG L AN D H b tW
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7 72e di o
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C E LTI C A R T P AGAN A ND C HR I S TI AN ou r z t z on .

i ll A ll E NG LIS H S EA LS
IN
T I ME S J . S E iti
. R om y e n. e co d d on . J H Bl m . . ar v e y oo .

C S TL S A ND W A LL D T O N S E NG LAN D W F O LK L A N H I STO R I CA L S
A E
AH E or o rna AS
-
CI
G L G mm
,

THE . . arve y . 5 1: . . o e .
I4 M E T II U E N AN D C O M PAN Y L I M I T E D
Th e An t qu ar y i
s B o o k s co n ti n ue d
G IL D S A N D CO M P AN I ES LO N DO N T OE HE P A R IS H L I FE I N M ED I V A L E
G g U wm
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, .

Abb t G t T d d
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M AN O R A N D M AN O R I A L R EC O R D S T II E
. .

N th lJ H Sc d d
.
P A R I S H R EG IST E R S E NG L AN D OE
J CC
,

a a ni e . one . e on E z t z on . ox

M E D I V A L H O S P IT A S OF E NG L AN D T
. . .

R h M
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Cl
L , HE .
R EMA I N S O F T HE P R E H I S T O R IC
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ot a ar y ay .
m e

C HURCH WA RDE N S A CC O UN TS J C
. . . . .

O LD

. . .
Ed o zt z n.

C ox .

E NG LI S H I N ST RUMEN TS O F M U SI C
R O M A N E I N B R IT A I N T J RA , HE . .

O LD
F W G lpi S c d Ed iti
.

R O MAN O BR ITI S H BU I L D I NG S A N D
-

. .

E G LI S H L I B R A R I E
a

J m H tt
n. e on on .
WOR KS J W d . . ar .

O
O
LD N

S ER VI CE B OO K S O F T HE E NG LI S H
S . a es u .

R O Y A L F O R ES T S OF E NG L A N D T ,
HE

CH R H
LD

Ch i t p h C ox .
V l h d OI C S WOI t
S H R I N E S B R I TIS H SA I N T S J C
U C r s o er an
H y Li l h l S c d E d o
. f
,
e nr tt e a es . e on z tz n . on . . .

T he Ar d e n S h a k es p eare .

D e my 87 m . 2s . 6d . n e t e ac h v olu m e

A n d i ti e on of S h ak e s p e ar e in S i g le P lays e a c e t e wi t a full I n tro d


n h di d h
T e x tu al N o te s ,
an d a C o m m e n t a r
y a t th e fo o t of th e a e
p g
A LL S WE LL T HA T E N D S W E LL

. M AC B E T H .

A N TO N Y A N D C L E OP A T R A S c d Ed i ti . e on o n. MEA S U E FO R M E A S U R E
R .

A Y s LI KE I
ou T . M ER C H A N T OF VEN I C E Sc , T HE e on d

CY M B E L I NE M ERR Y W I V E S OF W I N D SO R
.

.
, T HE .

C O ME D Y O F E RR O R S T , H E. M I D S U MM E R N I GH T S R EAM A

D , .

H AM L ET / m . T u
'
'
E d z / z on
'

. O T HE L LO .

JU LI U S C AE S AR . P ER I C L E S .

"
K I NG H ENR Y IV P . T . I . R O M E O AN D J U LI E T .

K I NG H E NR Y v . T AM I NG OF T H E S H R E W, T H E .

K I NG H ENR Y V I P I . T. T EM P E S T , T HE .

K I NG HE NR Y V I P I I . T . . T I M O N OF A T H E N S .

K I NG H ENR Y V I P III . T. . T IT U S A N D R O N I C U S .

K I NG L E A R . T R OILU S AN D C RE SSI D A .

K I NG R I C H A R D II . T w GE N T L E MEN O F V E R O N A
o T HE .

K I NG R I C HA R D III . T E L F T H N I GH T
W .

L I F E AN D D E A T H O F K I NG J O HN T , HE . V E N U S A N D AD O N I S .

L OV E S L A BO U R S L O ST

. WI N TE S TALE R

, T HE .

Cl a ss i c s of Ar t
E d i te d by DR .
J
. H . W . L A I NG
Wi t/z Wz a e R oy al 8 210
'

n u m e r ou s

T HE A R T O F T HE G REE K S H B W lt . . . a e rs . D O N A T F IL O M C ll
S CU L PTO R S O F T HE
. a ud r u t t we .

FLO R E N I I N E

T A R T OF T H E R O M AN S H B W lt
HE . . a e r s.

G E O RG E R O MN EY A t B Ch
.

ne t .
r h ur a
CH ARD I N H E A F t
. .

d . . . . urs . Izs . 6 . ne t . 12 s . 6d . ne t.
G E N E R AL L IT E R AT URE
Cla s si cs of Ar t co n t i n u e d
G H I R L AN D A I O G l d S D i S c on d SIR T H O MA S L A R NCE Si W
E d z t z on . 108
.

6d
e ra

.
. a v e s. e
A t g r m s ro n . 2 13 . net .
E . r

M I CHE L ANGE L O G ld S D i 6d T ITI AN Ch l R i ck tt ar e s e s 15 s ne t .

T I N TO R E TTO E l M ch Ph i llip
e ra a v e s. 1 2s .
. . .
. . .

ne t ve yn ar
.
.

R U B EN S Ed w d D ll n e t.
ne t .

T URNER S SKE T CH E S A ND D RA W I NG S
. ar i on. e ss .

R A P HA E L A P O pp

d . . . e . 1 2s . 6 ne t .
b g
Ei n er Sc d . 125 . 6d . n e t. e on E ds
RE M B R A N D T S E TC H I NG A M
S. . . H i nd . VE LA Q U E A d Z t d Z. . e B e r ue e. 103 . 6 .

T he Co m p l e e t S e r i es

.

F u lly I llu str ated . D e my 8 710

T HE C O M P L E T E A SSO C I A TIO N F OOTB A LL E R T HE C O M PLE T E M OT O R IS T F il


B .

ne
S .

t
E
E Hg ve rs a nd C . . u h e s D aw e s -
.

. 6d
1 23 . N w E iti .
(S t ne t. e d on
.

ev e n
s on

5 3 . .

C O M P T B IL LI A R D P LA Y E R l T C O M PL E T E M O UN T A I NEER
T HE
Ro b t e r s.
LE
105
E
6d ne t
. Ch a r es
AbHE
ra h a m . S c Ed iti 15 5 . ne t . e ond
.

C O M PLE T E O A S MA N R C L
. . .

T HE C O M PL E T E COO L i l i Wh itl i g K . an n .
T HE
10 d 6 ne t
R . . .

6d
7s . . ne t .
3 . . .

T C O M PLE T E C R I C K E T E R A l b t E T HE C O M P L E T E PH O TO GRA P HER


HE
KN I GH T d Sc d .
7s . 6 . ne t . e on
.

E d i t z on
er .

B l ay e y F t d
. 105 . 6d . ne t . ou r h E
.

C O M PL ET E
.

Ch l ich
T HE
S c d E ti
F O K HU N I E R . ar e s R
T CO M P L E T E R UG BY OO T B A LLER
HE F
dar 6dson. 1 2s . . ne t . e on di on .
N EWEA L AN D S YS T EM D G
Z a llo
,

C O M P LET E G H W J St d 0 Sc
. .

T HE V d O LP E R . ar r y ar on . . . ea . 1 5 . 6d . ne t . e o nd
6d
1 0s / d n e t. T lt z nt e e n t E z t z on
C O M PL E T E S H OT G
. . t .

T CO M P LET E H P E tc O C KE Y
T HE
l i d Ed t
. . T . T
E W it
HE
S c d
L AY E R us a e
~

k ll
B uc 6d ne t
.

e r i
h d E
. .

t
. .

e 55 ne e on z t z on
C O M P L E T E S I M M E R F S ch
. . . . .

T HE C O M P L E T E H O R S EM A N W S c h ar t
T HE W . a s

S c d E it i
. .
. .

n e t.
iD xo n . 6d e on d on . r oe . . ne t .

C O M PL ET E L A N TE NN I S P L A Y ER C O M PL E T E YACH T S M A N H
T
A W ll i M T
HE W HE B
t dE d l Sc d
. . .

. a6d T sd y e rs . 10s. . ne t . /z zr S mi h an . u Bou ay . e on


E d i t i on , R ev i se d . ne t .

T h e Co nn o i sse ur
s Li b rary
PVi t n u m e r ou s I llu st r a t i on s . PVi de R oy a l 8 vo . 25 5 . n e t e a cb v olu m

E NG L IS H F U RN IT U R E F S R b i o n so n . I VO R I E S Al f d M k ll re as e

M ti H d i
. . . . .

E NG LIS H C OL O URE D B OO K S JE W E LL ER Y H C d Sm i th '

lI or
E it
. ar n ar e .
. . .

E T CH I NG S S i F W d m
d
S c d E iti
i on .

. r . e o re e on d on .
M C il D p t
E U R OP EAN E N A ME L S
E ZZ O T I N I S .

H yr ave n or
H C
.

h
. e nr y . u n y ng
M I N I A T URE S D l H th . ud e y ea .

P O RCE L A I N E dw d D i ll
a rn e .

G L A SS E d w d D i ll . ar on.

I NE B O O K S A W P ll d
. ar on.

G o L D S M IT H SA ND S IL V ER S M IT H S W O R K F . . . o ar .

N l S c d Ed S EA L W lt G c
.

D w
e son a so n e on z t z on S a er de r ay Bi r h
W OO D S CU L PT U E A lf M k ll
.

I LL UM I N A T E D M A N U S CR IP T S A
.

H b t
.

S c d Ed iti
J er er R re d as e

d ti
. . . . . .

e on on . E z on .
G E N E R AL L IT E R AT URE