DEADLY EDUCATION: EVALUATING WHICH UNIVERSITIES ARE ATTRACTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS

CYNTHIA J. LEE

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA MAY 2009

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA

DEADLY EDUCATION: EVALUATING WHICH UNIVERSITIES ARE ATTRACTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

Submitted By: CYNTHIA J. LEE

Certificate of Approval:

___________________________________ Kristan J. Wheaton Associate Professor Department of Intelligence Studies

___________________________________ Dawn Wozneak Administrator of Grants/Instructor Department of Intelligence Studies

___________________________________ Phillip J. Belfiore Vice President Office of Academic Affairs May 2009

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Deadly Education: Evaluating Which Universities Are Attractive to International Terrorists By Cynthia J. Lee Master of Science in Applied Intelligence Mercyhurst College, 2009 Professor Kristan Wheaton, Chair

It is increasingly evident that terrorists are likely to consider developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction. To do such things, it is necessary to acquire a skill set reflecting advanced scientific or engineering training, which may be obtained at a university or college. By examining the criteria that terrorists might use to select a university for specific degree offerings, a multi-criteria decision-making matrix can be used to determine which universities are most likely to attract terrorists on the basis of course availability, advanced degree levels, and specific research opportunities. Universities can be further examined by studying the international student population in science/engineering disciplines. This project is a case study of such an analysis that examines colleges and universities in Germany to determine which universities are most attractive to international terrorists seeking to learn the skills necessary to develop or employ chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ABSTRACT«««««««««««««««««««««««««««« TABLE OF CONTENTS««««««««««««««««««««««« LIST OF TABLES«««««««««««««««««««««««««.. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION««««««««««««««««... LITERATURE REVIEW«««««««««««««« PROCEDURES««««««««««««««««.. RESULTS«««««««««««««««««««« CONCLUSIONS««««««««««««««««« BIBLIOGRAPHY«««««««««««««««««................................... APPENDICES««««««««««««««««««««««««««.... Appendix A««««««««««««««««««« Appendix B«««««««««««««««««««.. Appendix C«««««««««««««««««««.. 1 4 44 55 64 73 83 84 93 96 iii iv v

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LIST OF TABLES

Page Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Physics Curriculum Score Criteria Chemistry Curriculum Score Criteria Biology Curriculum Score Criteria Engineering/Mathematics Curriculum Score Criteria University Course Evaluations Top 15 University Statistics for Science/Engineering Programs and International Student Populations Number of International Students Enrolled in Science/Engineering/Mathematics at Top Universities 51 51 51 51 56 58

Table 4.3

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Table 4.4 Table A.B.1 Table A.C.1

Final University Ranking with Academic/Anonymity Coefficient 62 University Subject Population Data Germany: Stock of Foreign Population by Select Country of Nationality 93 96

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LIST OF FIGURES

Page Figure 2.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making Sample Matrix 41

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1 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Terrorist groups who are interested in using unconventional means of destruction, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, require individuals with technical training in the sciences. The best means of acquiring such training is at the university level, particularly at research-oriented universities with access to high-quality laboratories and opportunities for independent student research projects. It is highly likely that certain universities, even if they are similar in size, scope and opportunities, will be more likely than others to attract students interested in using technical skills to aid a terrorist organization. All colleges and universities are not created the same, and certain universities offer more opportunities in different areas, offering a unique skill set that is more attractive to certain groups of students than others. Due to discrepancies in coursework, laboratories, and available equipment, different schools are likely to be more or less attractive to terrorists seeking a technical education to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that there can be terrorists at every school seeking such skills. There is a natural narrowing that takes place, drawing such ill-minded individuals to certain institutions. Knowing which colleges and universities are most likely to attract a terrorist is beneficial to not only law enforcement and intelligence professionals seeking to prevent terrorism, but also to academics and educators interested in keeping such potentially deadly knowledge out of dangerous hands. For the purposes of this study, the focus will be on international terrorists that consider an outside country for education purposes.

2 To examine this method, Germany will be used as a test case to evaluate this approach. Germany has a number of schools offering training and research opportunities in scientific disciplines. It has also been linked to international terrorist activity, with the most notorious being the al Qaeda Hamburg cell associated with the 9/11 attacks on the US.1 If there are still al Qaeda operatives or other international terrorists, living in Germany, they could be attending German universities and could even be studying to be scientists, possibly with the intent to later use those skills to help develop unconventional weapons for terrorist purposes. The purpose of this study, generally, is to determine if a methodical approach based on available evidence and logical assumptions, can identify universities most likely to be attractive to international terrorists trying to learn the skills necessary to develop or use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Specifically, I intend to look at the

universities that exist in Germany, the test case subject. It is important to note that the results will not indicate whether or not these German schools contain terrorists, whether international or home-grown. The results will indicate whether or not these schools are attractive to terrorists seeking a technological education to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The same methodology could be applied to any country, or any group of universities, to determine which schools would be the most attractive, or unattractive schools to terrorists seeking a technological education to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The study will look at mid-level universities that offer a good-quality education, while avoiding the high-profile activity and attention associated with a top-tier school.
1

Jennie Brookman Frankfurt, ³Terrorist hunt hits campuses,´ Times Higher Education, (October 5, 2001), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=165151&sectioncode=26.

3 The research will take into account the courses, technology, and materials available at the institution, as well as the research opportunities and faculty research interests. The study will examine universities and degree programs for international student populations. The intersections of curriculums likely to provide the skill set necessary to develop unconventional weapons with schools or programs that foster an environment attractive to international terrorists, represent the greatest possibility for international terrorist groups acquiring skills to make and/or use unconventional weapons.

Limitations of the Study There are limitations to this study. One limitation is the nature of the research itself. The research will be largely qualitative, and the most useful resources for While anecdotal evidence

gathering information will be the internet and books.

reflecting historical instances of international terrorism may be interesting, it is not useful to this examination. Terrorist groups with a serious desire to cause harm through

clandestine attacks will not advertise the specific details of their plans. They will factor in the element of surprise, which can cause an attack to be all the more deadly. In addition, those groups will not likely do much to publicize the location of group meetings or identities of group members. Therefore, it may be difficult to identify some or all of the locations of known or unknown terrorist groups. Therefore, identifying the most likely locations of international terrorists requires relying on international population data, which is limited.

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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW When looking at the ways to prevent terrorism as a whole, there are different ways to approach this topic. Some may want to prevent terrorism by eliminating

terrorists and preventing them from recruiting new members. Some may think that the best way to prevent terrorism is to keep material, whether communication technology, explosives, or existing weapons, out of the grasp of the people most likely to cause harm. Another route would be preventing an attack, such as by securing nuclear facilities, or scanning and searching bags at airports and athletic events. The purpose of this report will be to look for ways of preventing international terrorists from gaining a critical scientific education at a university, with Germany used as a test case. On 9/11, the hijackers used primitive weapons to fight for control of the cockpit. However, they also had some flight training, learned at US flight schools, which was apparently enough to guide the aircraft.2 By predicting that a terrorist would

consider attending flight school in the US to someday hijack an airplane, investigators could have developed a watch list and monitored who attended such schools. Al Qaeda¶s 9/11 hijackings may have been prevented if anyone exploited and investigated the eventual conspirators¶ conspicuous behavior at flight schools.3 Likewise, by assuming that a terrorist would need advanced scientific training to develop a dangerous unconventional weapon, such as a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon, it is useful to look at universities where such skills are taught and to develop a watch list that includes universities that may attract terrorists.

2

UE, comment on The 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, comment posted March 14, 2008, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/ (accessed January 26, 2009). 3 Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 8.

5 For this study, the multi-criteria decision making methodology will be used to examine the decision making process of a potential terrorist student. The main goal will be to look at possible intersections of readily available education in a technical discipline, such as science and engineering, with known, or even likely geographic regions of possible international terrorist groups that may pose a national security threat to the US. Multi-criterion decision making (MCDM) will be used to analyze the matrix, accounting for the technical training available in physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics and engineering. Finally, international populations at the universities will be considered. This research can offer a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in national security. Facts have linked known terrorists to Europe, and particularly Germany. German legislature has, in the past, supported religious freedom to the extent that extremist group members flocked to Germany.4 With regard to the hijackers who

carried out the 9/11 attacks in the US, the New York Times called Germany the ³haven of choice.´5 This study will examine whether or not Germany¶s universities are likely to attract international terrorists for the purpose of acquiring skills to build weapons of mass destruction. There are several considerations and assumptions that are useful to take into account when examining this topic. First, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are difficult to make, and a widespread attack using such devices would be technologically challenging.6 Therefore, anyone attempting to make such a weapon would require

4

Sam Francis, ³Mass Immigration Creates Terrorist Haven in Europe,´ (October 18, 2001), http://www.vdare.com/francis/terrorist_haven.htm. 5 Ibid. 6 William J. Broad, Stephen Engelberg, and James Glanz, ³A Nation Challenged: The Threats; Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear,´ The New York Times, (November 1, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/us/a-nation-challenged-the-threats-assessing-risks-chemical-

6 advanced training in a technical discipline. In addition, the assumption is that the

necessary advanced training, or at least the preliminary advanced training, is accessible at the university level.

Europe: An International Mix Europe, by its very nature, allows for a blended mix of cultures and nationalities. This is particularly evident in the college and university atmosphere, as students representing a multitude of nationalities come together to form student populations with striking international flair. European universities attract students not only from

throughout Europe, but also from Asia, Africa, and the Americas. In Germany, the influx of international students is apparent. During the

2000/2001 school year, German universities had 187,027 registered foreign students, and only one third of those had graduated from German high schools.7 By 2005, the number of international students studying in Germany jumped again to 259,797 students.8 These foreign students come to Germany, temporarily, to study. What is striking about

Germany is that the number of international students studying in Germany increased by 21.1% between 1997/1998 and 2000/2001, and that the increase in students from EU countries accounted for only 2.1%, leaving the rest of the new influx of international

biological-evennuclear.html?n=Top/News/Health/Diseases,%20Conditions,%20and%20Health%20Topics/Smallpox&pag ewanted=all. 7 Christiane Kuptsch, ³Foreign Students in Europe: Between Red Carpet and Red Card,´ (September 18, 2003), http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:0ItpDbtw8G0J:www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/kup tsch.pdf+foreign+students+in+europe&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 8 Susan Robertson, ³Europe Challenges US for Foreign Students by Adding More English Courses,´ Global Higher Ed, http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/europe-challenges-us-forforeign-students-by-adding-more-english-courses/.

7 students traveling to Germany from Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, and Asia.9 Other European countries have also seen an increase in the number of foreign students, especially those from developing countries. However, it is no surprise that Germany has experienced such an

internationalization at the university level. During the 1990s, Germany initiated a plan to attract foreign students, specifically promoting Germany as a center for science and education.10 Also, European universities, including those in Germany, now offer more courses in the English language as a means to stay competitive and attract students who may have otherwise considered attending universities in the US.11

Terrorists and College Campuses Movements on college campuses, where there is a greater likelihood of fostering a great mix of ideas, backgrounds, and interests, can be particularly powerful. Supporters of any movement have a large pool of students who are open to new ideas and can be fairly easily persuaded to try out a new movement or organization. In addition,

international students who are new to the country and university may wish to seek out companionship from other students who share the same nationality and background for familiarity.

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Christiane Kuptsch, ³Foreign Students in Europe: Between Red Carpet and Red Card,´ (September 18, 2003), http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:0ItpDbtw8G0J:www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/kup tsch.pdf+foreign+students+in+europe&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 10 Christiane Kuptsch, ³Foreign Students in Europe: Between Red Carpet and Red Card,´ (September 18, 2003), http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:0ItpDbtw8G0J:www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/kup tsch.pdf+foreign+students+in+europe&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 11 Susan Robertson, ³Europe Challenges US for Foreign Students by Adding More English Courses,´ Global Higher Ed, http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/europe-challenges-us-forforeign-students-by-adding-more-english-courses/.

8 In 2007, Rebecca Miller, an FBI intelligence analyst, spoke at the National Council of State Directors of Community Colleges summer conference and addressed issues concerning international terrorism on US college campuses.12 According to

Miller, US colleges and universities, along with those from other countries, must continually deal with the possibility that domestic or international terrorist groups could recruit on campus.13 She also pointed out that in the US, there has been evidence of international terrorists enrolled in English as a second language (ESL) programs, which likely suggests an effort to further grasp the language as a means to blend in.14 Also, if a potential international terrorist is taking classes to refine English language skills, it could be a sign that he or she is considering applying for advanced courses that are offered in English. Advanced courses, including those in science and engineering, are now offered in more European countries as a means to entice students who may have otherwise considered schools in the US.15 In the US, the Virginia Tech massacre demonstrated how an unstable individual with intent to kill remained under the radar of authorities and was able to carry out a shooting rampage. While the shooter did not utilize weapons of mass destruction, and did not need an advanced scientific degree to carry out his acts of violence the case provides evidence that college campuses, especially schools with greater opportunity for
12

Carisa Chappell, ³Colleges Especially Vulnerable to Crime, Terrorism,´ Community College Times, (August 16, 2007). http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?TopicId=18&ArticleId=453. 13 Carisa Chappell, ³Colleges Especially Vulnerable to Crime, Terrorism,´ Community College Times, (August 16, 2007). http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?TopicId=18&ArticleId=453. 14 Carisa Chappell, ³Colleges Especially Vulnerable to Crime, Terrorism,´ Community College Times, (August 16, 2007). http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?TopicId=18&ArticleId=453. 15 Susan Robertson, ³Europe Challenges US for Foreign Students by Adding More English Courses,´ Global Higher Ed, http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/europe-challenges-us-forforeign-students-by-adding-more-english-courses/.

9 off-campus living and commuting, often offer an open environment that allows students to go about in relative anonymity. Professor and student suspicion surrounding the Virginia Tech perpetrator did not surface until after the shootings.16 This university environment, where suspicious activity can be ignored, allows for anonymity that could attract international terrorists seeking to stay under the radar.

Islamic Extremism on College Campuses There is evidence that indicates that Islamic extremists encourage recruitment efforts on college campuses, taking advantage of large pools of young adults who are likely to be more open to experimenting with new religious experiences. In 1979,

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat showed support for Islamists, and Egyptian universities experienced an Islamic Jihad emergence, along with increased activity within other Muslim groups on campuses.17 In 1981, Ayman al-Zawahiri established recruiting efforts on campus at Asiut University, and he eventually became an Osama bin Laden associate.18 Ayman al-Zawahiri was one of about 40 members in the radical group AlGama¶a al-Islamiyya, and he reportedly gave campus tours and boasted that the Islamist movement, ³found its greatest recruiting success in the university¶s two most elite facilities²the medical and engineering schools.´19 Also in 1981, the Muslim groups that

Carisa Chappell, ³Colleges Especially Vulnerable to Crime, Terrorism,´ Community College Times, (August 16, 2007). http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?TopicId=18&ArticleId=453. 17 Mamoun Fandy, ³Middle East Terrorists with µGlobal Reach¶: From Hizballah to Egyptian Islamic Jihad,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 101. 18 Mamoun Fandy, ³Middle East Terrorists with µGlobal Reach¶: From Hizballah to Egyptian Islamic Jihad,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 101. 19 David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 4.

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10 first gathered strength on Egyptian college campuses produced Sadat¶s assassin. This is an example of how a relaxed attitude towards certain groups with potentially harmful ideas essentially opened the flood gates, allowing terrorism to establish a presence in Egypt. Following the March 2004 Madrid bombings, The Sunday Times in Britain revealed information from a leaked British intelligence dossier, writing that Islamic ³extremists are known to target schools and colleges where young people may be very inquisitive but less challenging and more susceptible to extremist

reasoning/arguments.´20 In ³Engineers of Jihad,´ Gambetta and Hertog also revealed that ³Jemaah Islamiyah has actively recruited in leading technical institutes, including the University of Technology of Malaysia, Universitas Semerang, and Bandung Institute of Technology.´21 This evidence emphasizes that college campuses are, in general, an ideal location for recruiting for terrorist movements.

Terrorists at German Universities As in many places of the world, Germany has a history of terrorism that includes involvement on college and university campuses. Germany¶s college and university terrorist associations and activities have included both domestic and international terrorist groups, as well as domestic terrorist groups that have branched out to associate with international organizations.

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21

Robert Winnet and David Leppard, ³Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda¶s British Recruits,´ The Sunday Times, July 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 43.

11 German universities experienced a rush of student-led movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Some students, primarily those with Marxist connections, disrupted classes and damaged property as a means to speak out against capitalism.22 Though most student protests disintegrated, some radical groups did carry out more dangerous terrorist acts, such as fire-bombing department stores and attacking US military installations.23 A terrorist group known as the Red Army Faction (RAF) grew out of the radical student movement in Germany and was a brutal group that sought to bring down imperialism, carrying out kidnappings and airline hijackings.24 Despite the capture of the group¶s leaders, the organization still managed to carry out terrorist plots through its support from international terrorist groups.25 There are also specific examples of Islamic extremism activity on German university campuses. At least three of the 19 al Qaeda operative involved with the 9/11 attacks lived in Hamburg, Germany, two of which studied at German universities, and investigators believe that Hamburg was also home to at least four senior al Qaeda members.26 Ziad Samir Jarrah, the hijacker who piloted United Airlines flight 93, studied aerospace engineering at the University of Applied Sciences in Hamburg, Germany.27 Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Marwan Yousef al-Shehhi, the hijacker who took control of

³The Student Movement and Terrorism in Germany,´ German Culture, http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_student_movement_terrorism.htm. 23 ³Student Movement and Terrorism in Germany, The.´ German Culture, http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_student_movement_terrorism.htm. 24 ³Who were the Baader-Meinhof gang?´ BBC News. (February 12, 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6314559.stm. 25 ³Student Movement and Terrorism in Germany, The.´ German Culture, http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_student_movement_terrorism.htm. 26 Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 95. 27 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, The, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/.

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12 United Airlines flight 175, traveled to various countries, living in Germany for a few years, studying at a language institute in Bonn, Germany.28

Terrorism in Europe Europe has a wide variety of terrorist groups, and some groups have a tendency to cling to different areas and support varying causes. However, all terrorist groups seek to intimidate and/or cause destruction to bring attention to a cause, and generally inflict fear. Organizations include groups such as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Revolutionary People¶s Struggle (ELA), Revolutionary People¶s Liberation Party.29 ETA, which operates mainly in Spain and France, has carried out assassinations and sophisticated bombings during its quest to create an independent homeland region.30 While these terrorist groups have managed to instill fear and cause hardship in Europe, Middle Eastern Islamic extremists have attracted the worldwide terrorist spotlight in recent years. During recent years, Middle Easterners have flocked to Europe in unprecedented numbers.31 This is due to a number of factors, including more relaxed immigration and travel laws. With a greater population of individuals of Middle Eastern descent comes a greater tendency for a higher Muslim population. The more relaxed immigration and travel abilities in Europe also inadvertently encouraged a greater population of extremists

UE, comment on The 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, comment posted March 14, 2008, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/ (accessed January 26, 2009). 29 US Department of State, ³Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations,´ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm. 30 Office of the Secretary of State. ³Background Information on Terrorist Groups.´ http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/backg.html. 31 Sam Francis, ³Mass Immigration Creates Terrorist Haven in Europe,´ (October 18, 2001), http://www.vdare.com/francis/terrorist_haven.htm.

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13 and mujahideens within those Muslim populations, who certainly do not represent European culture. Lorenzo Vidino wrote that, ³Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development,´ noting that Muslim Brotherhood members who migrated to Europe, along with their descendents, have managed to establish a presence throughout Europe.32 The influx of Islamic extremists to Europe also brings with it the opportunity for Islamic recruitment of non-extremist Muslims or Europeans for terrorist activity. Though it is difficult to determine exactly how many Muslims are in the European countries, estimates indicate that, ³between 15 and 20 million Muslims now call Europe home and make up four to five percent of its total population«France has the largest proportion of Muslims (seven to ten percent of its total population), followed by the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Given

continued immigration and fertility rates, the National Intelligence Council projects that Europe¶s Muslim population will double by 2025.´33

Islamic Extremism According to Mary Habeck, the nineteen men who attacked the US on 9/11, and other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, who continue to seek destruction of the US, make up a radical faction of Islam, jihadi or jihadist.34 These extremists have a commitment to the violent overthrow of the current international community in favor of

32

Lorenzo Vidino, ³The Muslim Brotherhoods¶ Conquest of Europe,´ The Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005, vol. XXII, n. 1, http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brotherhoods-conquest-of-europe. 33 Robert S. Leiken, ³Europe¶s Angry Muslims,´ Foreign Affairs (2005): 120. 34 Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 4.

14 an Islamic state.35 All nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Arabs, and fifteen of those men were from Saudi Arabia.36 All nineteen were middle-class, well-educated men with a potential for a bright future, as ten had either enrolled in or attended school at the university level.37 They chose to act as hijackers not out of necessity, but because they chose to deal with community problems by killing Americans.38 This powerful mindset, exemplifying the determination and desire to rise above the rest of the world, is what makes up the Islamic extremist mentality. Islamic extremists are, however, just one example of the kinds of terrorists who might seek to use weapons of mass destruction, and they will be considered in this examination, along with other possible international terrorist groups. Terrorist groups without supporting patrons, such as al-Qaeda and the other Islamic extremists, are particularly dangerous, as they are not accountable to specific states, such as Hizballah or Hamas are, so there are no states that could be held accountable by other states for supporting terrorism.39

Islamic Extremism in Germany Prior to 9/11, Germany was a quite attractive location for militant Islamic groups. Germany lacked laws banning foreign terrorists from working and had liberal immigration and asylum laws, so a person could easily claim to be attending a German

Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 4. Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 5. 37 UE, comment on The 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, comment posted March 14, 2008, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/ (accessed January 26, 2009). 38 Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 6. 39 Mamoun Fandy, ³Middle East Terrorists with µGlobal Reach¶: From Hizballah to Egyptian Islamic Jihad,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 103.
36

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15 university without even paying for to going to school. Also, after the Holocaust,

Germany established a relaxed policy towards religious affiliations.40 Therefore, Germany attracted approximately 3 million Muslims by the late 1990s, many of which relocated from France.41 Al Qaeda¶s Hamburg cell prepared for the 9/11 hijackings in a Hamburg, Germany apartment. The cell included Mohamed Atta and Mounir al-Motassadeq.

Mohamed Atta was the lead hijacker of the first jetliner to slam into the World Trade Center.42 Prior to living in Germany, he studied English and German in Cairo.43 Mounir al-Motassadeq, an Algerian national living in Hamburg, was accused of being the ³financial officer´ behind the 9/11 hijackings.44 They likely selecting Hamburg as an ideal base due to its ethnic diversity. Hamburg has approximately 130,000 Muslims, comprising 8% of the city¶s population, whereas Muslims make up 4% of the overall German population. Also, the Hamburg Technical University has a large foreign student population, so the al Qaeda operatives were likely able to blend in easily as international college students.45 Numerous other Islamic extremists have been linked to Germany. Mohamedou Ould Slahi lived in Germany in the 1990s prior to heading to Canada. In 1999, he relayed a message from bin Laden, aiding in planning the thwarted attack on the Los Angeles International Airport.46

Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 99. Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 99. 42 Mitchell Young, ed., The War on Terrorism (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003), 165. 43 UE, comment on The 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, comment posted March 15, 2008, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/ (accessed January 26, 2009). 44 Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 100. 45 Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 96. 46 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 181.
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16 On September 5, 2007, officials thwarted an alleged attack targeting Americans and US installations in Germany.47 The group had liquid explosives equivalent to 550 kg of TNT, and were planning car bomb attacks.48 One of the three men, a German convert, Fritz Martin Gelowicz, allegedly the leader of the Islamic Jihad Union terror cell, enrolled in 2003 at the University of Applied Sciences in Ulm for an engineering degree.49

Screening for International Terrorists in Germany Following the 9/11 attacks, Germany established a more aggressive stance, outlawing joining or aiding terrorists, granting the government the ability to outlaw religious organizations believed to encourage terrorism. Germany¶s ³Second

Counterterrorism Packet´ in 2002 gave the government greater ability to monitor terrorist suspects¶ activities and also made way for advanced technology to better monitor immigration. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, a profiling system identified 10,000 ³suspicious students´ in Hamburg alone, clearly pointing to the need for further investigation.50 In this specific example of Hamburg¶s efforts to profile students, it is evident that the goal was to quickly determine all of the individuals who were likely to be a threat. However, those 10,000 students were likely selected largely due to race or nationality. Common sense would suggest that not all 10,000 students pose an actual threat. In
47

David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 81. 48 James Joyner, ³German Terrorist Plot Foiled,´ Outside the Beltway, (2007), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/german_terrorist_plot_foiled/. 49 David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 81. 50 Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 99.

17 addition, from a logistics standpoint, it would be extremely costly and time-consuming to carry out individual background checks on or conduct interviews with all 10,000 students. However, some students might pose a more significant threat than others, and a methodology to narrow the list down to a smaller number of highly suspicious individuals would make the task of filtering for potential terrorists far easier. If law enforcement could narrow that list of 10,000 students down to a much more manageable list of suspicious students, the investigation would likely be more efficient and effective. There might be a very reasonably means to narrow the list of students based on readily available data. A more nuanced approach, rather than just grouping students based on nationality, could yield more promising results. For instance, it is likely that the list of students includes students from many universities, representing a variety of degree programs. Due to these factors, not all students should be treated equally. For instance, a student studying literature at a very small university is not likely to have the same educational or career aspirations as a student pursuing a doctoral degree in chemistry at a larger, research-oriented university. Therefore, a methodology to determine which

universities support the educational needs of a potential terrorist seeking the skills to build nuclear weapons would be very helpful in narrowing the list of students that could provide an immediate threat as international terrorists with deadly capabilities.

18 Terrorists and Unconventional Weapons There is fear that terrorists could utilize unconventional weapons to cause more destruction than ever before. ³Acquiring nuclear weapons«is a religious duty.´ ± Osama bin Laden, 1999.51 While bin Laden¶s al Qaeda operatives demonstrated during the 9/11 attacks that terrorists do not need an unconventional weapon to carry out a tragedy, there is reason to believe that some may someday try to use such weapons. 52 The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that terrorists had both the desire and ability to cause destruction and this further expanded fears that terrorists may resort to more unconventional weapons, such as biological or nuclear weapons, or dispersing radioactive material.53 For the purpose of this study, the assumption will be that terrorists are looking to acquire the knowledge to construct weapons of mass destruction. Research indicates that, while difficult, terrorists could acquire nuclear materials or even complete weapons. Caravelli, who wrote Nuclear Insecurity, worked on President Clinton¶s White House National Security Council Staff from 1996-2000, dealing with US nuclear material security policies, as well as the US Department of Energy¶s largest international nuclear security program. According to Caravelli, there is a strong danger of terrorists acquiring nuclear material or weapons. His thoughts echo those of George Tenet in this comment: We have learned that it is not beyond the realm of possibility for a terrorist group to obtain nuclear weapons. I have often wondered why this is such a hard reality for so many people to accept « nuclear terrorism remains now a terrifying possibility and extraordinarily hard to stop « the terrorists are endlessly patient « one mushroom cloud would change history. My deepest fear is that this is exactly

Jack Caravelli, Nuclear Insecurity (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 1. Judith Miller, ³Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 121. 53 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 199.
52

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19 what they intend.54

Nuclear Weapons In this study, it is useful to determine the feasibility that terrorists would consider developing nuclear weapons, whether or not they would be able to develop such weapons, and how they would acquire the material for such weapons. In 2004, Senator Joseph Biden reported on an experiment carried out by national laboratories to determine the feasibility of terrorists constructing a nuclear weapon, saying, I gathered the heads of all the national laboratories and asked them a simple question. I said, µI would like you to go back to your laboratory and try to assume for a moment you are a relatively informed terrorist group with access to some nuclear scientists. Could you build, off the shelf, a nuclear device? Not a dirty bomb, but something that would start a nuclear reaction ± an atomic bomb.¶ They came back several months later and said, µWe built one.´ They put it in a room and explained how² literally, off the shelf, without doing anything illegal²they actually constructed the device.55 This example of Senator Biden¶s national laboratory experiment demonstrated that if the right, educated intellectuals, have the time, material, and drive, it is possible to construct a nuclear device. That creates another obstacle for authorities trying to protect people and prevent nuclear terrorism. In On Nuclear Terrorism, Levi asserts that nuclear

terrorism is complex in that there are so many aspects, so it is difficult to effectively develop a system for combating nuclear terrorism.56

54

George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 27980. 55 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 75. 56 Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 5.

20 No naturally occurring material can be used to make a nuclear bomb without first undergoing the extensive enrichment process.57 Access to stockpiles of enriched uranium or plutonium offers a helpful gateway to producing a nuclear weapon. Bombs that terrorists manufacture themselves are known as Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs), and are most likely made using stolen materials.58 In 2005, the majority of a group of leading experts identified that terrorists are more likely to manufacture a nuclear weapon than acquire one.59 There are some indications that at least certain groups do have the desire for nuclear weapons. In a 1998 Time interview, Osama bin Laden said, ³Acquiring nuclear weapons for the defense of Moslems is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank Allah for enabling me to do so.´60 Despite the fact that evidence suggests that certain terrorists are likely to desire nuclear weapons, they face obstacles. James S. Gilmore III, former governor of Virginia and chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, said, ³There is no doubt that the idea of nuclear weapons may appeal to terrorists«Yet, the obstacles to the acquisition or fabrication of nuclear weapons by terrorists remain formidable.´61 According to Thomas Schelling, a professor of national security and nuclear strategy, developing a nuclear weapon is not a trivial task, and would require a large group of highly skilled people

Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 15. Ibid., 26. 59 Richard Lugar, The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, lugar.senate.gov (accessed March 11, 2009), 17. 60 Walid Phares, Future Jihad Terrorist Strategies Against America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 243. 61 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 22.
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21 working for a long time.62 Terrorists have an advantage in that they can maintain

networks by privately communicating using encryption technology, and freely traveling, seeking refuge in countries that essentially serve as a sanctuary.63 However, they must find ways to acquire skill sets and materials that are not easily obtained. It is useful to glance back to historical examples of terrorist groups and weapon development. In the 1960s, the concept of international terrorism began to surface, but early terrorists had few skills, struggling with dynamite to make little bombs. Nonetheless, early fears about nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists began to emerge, even though evidence would indicate that such individuals would lack the skill set necessary to develop a complex nuclear weapon.64 In 1964, in an attempt to show that terrorists would not need to organize another Manhattan Project to construct a nuclear bomb, officials at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, in California, recruited a few young postdoctoral physicists to see if they could build a weapon. With no access to classified information, in twenty-eight months, they submitted a design that weapons designers determined could work.65 In the wake of increasing international terrorism, a group formed in 1986 to more closely examine the nuclear terrorist threat.66 The Nuclear Control Institute, a research center focusing on preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism, teamed up with the State University of New York. The task force included a variety of both government and

Ibid., 299. Leon Fuerth, ³Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 129. 64 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 39. 65 Ibid., 40. 66 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 52.
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22 private sector scientists and representatives.67 For one part of the project, they recruited the help of five scientists with nuclear weapons experience at Los Alamos Laboratory, who concluded that, ³terrorists could build a crude nuclear device using either weaponsgrade material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium-239) or material used in research or commercial reactors (including highly enriched uranium or plutonium). But it would by no means be easy either to acquire the greater quantities of material needed or to fabricate the weapon.´68 They also concluded that it was unrealistic to assume that ³one bright lunatic´ could provide the technological knowledge and skill to develop a nuclear weapon, but rather constructing such a bomb would require, at the very least, a team with specialists in physics, nuclear material, metallurgy, and explosives. They would also need special equipment.69 There is also the possibility that experienced scientists will turn from worthwhile research and give those skills, or possibly material, to terrorists for the right price, or just because they want to. There are several examples of well-recognized members of the scientific community allegedly having dangerous connections with terrorist groups. Rifaat Hussain, chairman of Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, spoke of Dr. Sultan Mahmood, former Director General of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, who was suspected of having connections with the Taliban, saying, ³Mahmood was one of the nuclear hawks. People say that he was a very capable scientist and a very capable engineer, but he had this totally crazy mind-set.´70

Ibid. Ibid., 53. 69 Ibid. 70 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 105.
68

67

23 Another example is that of the notorious Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who stole blueprints for obtaining highly enriched uranium through centrifuge technology from Urenco, a top-secret uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands, where he worked as a technician. By trade and training, he was a metallurgist, not a nuclear scientist, and lacked the ability to implement the design and to actualize the enrichment.71 Khan received a PhD in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium in 1974, and accepted a position with the Physical Research Laboratory in the Netherlands, a subcontractor for the Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (Urenco). Khan used the classified blueprints he stole and took them to Pakistan to help his homeland become a nuclear power.72 From these examples, the research indicates that a scientist could easily use his knowledge and technical skills to aid terrorists for ill purposes, and an individual with enough power and access to nuclear material would likely be able to supply necessary equipment and materials to aid such terrorists. Another mechanism that terrorist groups could theoretically use to obtain nuclear material to construct a weapon would be to acquire it by stealing, or purchasing from a nation. The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University reported in 2002 that more than forty kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been reported missing from Russia and 50 other countries, including Romania, India, Germany, and the Congo, and that the actual amount of missing HEU is ten times that amount.73 Regarding the actual amount of missing HEU and plutonium, Bill Keller writes, ³No doubt enough nuclear material to built twenty nukes was lost in the transition

Ibid., 106. Ibid., 124. 73 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 91.
72

71

24 from the Soviet Union to Russia.´74 If that material is truly unaccounted for, it could likely be within reach of a terrorist group, or someone that a terrorist group might be able to persuade to hand over the material. Given that scenario, that the terrorist group already has access to the material, all that would be needed is a person or group with the ability to construct the weapon. This would be likely to drive a terrorist organization to encourage members to obtain science and engineering training (likely through a university) or to recruit directly from a university well-known for offering a competitive scientific education. For Islamic extremists, a major religious doctrine is sacrificing for the other life, which, in the case of a suicide bomber, can mean sacrificing one¶s own life, as they do not fear death.75 According to Phares, Islamic extremists do have the will to use nuclear weapons. He points to the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks. In 1993, Ramzi Yousef and Sheik Omar abdul Rahman hoped to kill tens of thousands, the ³equivalent of a nuclear detonation.´76 In 2001, bin Laden expected tens of thousands to die as well.77 By Phares¶ analysis, if the Islamic extremists expected such high death tolls, they would be unlikely to balk at the opportunity to use a nuclear weapon. Jenkins called al Qaeda, ³the world¶s first terrorist nuclear power without, insofar as we know, possessing a single nuclear weapon.´78 According to Jenkins, al Qaeda is ³certainly the first terrorist group to have a nuclear policy,´ and has been seeking nuclear weapons since the mid-1990s.79
74 75

Al Qaeda¶s continued interest in nuclear weapons,

Ibid. Walid Phares, Future Jihad Terrorist Strategies Against America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 243-244. 76 Ibid., 244. 77 Ibid. 78 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 241. 79 Ibid.

25 coupled with its success in carrying out the 9/11 attacks, and its top leaders still at large, have combined to cause a great deal of fear, whether or not any al Qaeda member actually even has a nuclear weapon.80 According to Paul Williams, two British agents, of Arab descent, submersed themselves in Islamic customs and became involved with a radical mosque in London, gaining access to al Qaeda science laboratories and learned that al Qaeda was doing a great deal of research and developing a radiological device. 81 Those agents revealed their findings to Eliza Manningham-Butler, who was in charge of MI5, Britain¶s Security Service, who leaked the news and told an audience in London that, We are faced with the realistic possibility of a form of an unconventional attack that could include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] weapons. We know renegade scientists have cooperated with al Qaeda and provided them with the knowledge they need to develop these weapons. It is only a matter of time before a crude version of a CBRN is launched on a Western city and it is only a matter of time before the crude weapon becomes more sophisticated.82

Biological and Chemical Weapons Research indicates that a nuclear weapon would offer the greatest widespread means of destruction in the hands of terrorists. However, such weapons require a

significant amount of effort to produce, which may be enough to deter groups and persuade them to look for other means of destruction. Biological and chemical weapons are likely easier to develop, though terrorists would need to deal with the distribution, and even a successful attack would not likely be as destructive as a nuclear attack. Martin Rees fleshed out this idea in a 2006 Guardian article:
Ibid., 242. Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 94. 82 Ibid., 95.
81 80

26 We are collectively endangering our planet, but there is a potential threat from individuals too. "Bio" and "cyber" expertise will be accessible to millions. It does not require large, special-purpose facilities as do nuclear weapons. Even a single person will have the capability to cause widespread disruption through error or terror. There will always be disaffected loners, and the "leverage" each can exert is ever-growing. It would be hard to eliminate such risks, even with very intrusive surveillance. The global village will have its global village idiots.83

Rees¶s concern touches on the subject of the dual-use issue, which will be discussed in the next section. It also demonstrates, to some extent, how difficult it can be to combat such means of terrorism. Chemical weapons are, by definition, relatively inexpensively produced weapons that inflict damage through the toxic properties of the chemicals.84 Any country or

organization with a chemical industry has the capability to manufacture toxic chemicals, and there are thousands of chemicals that could technically be used in chemical weapons.85 According to the Federation of American Scientists, civilian populations are poorly prepared for chemical attacks, so a successful release of chemical agents is likely to produce severe results.86 Also, biological weapons ³deliver toxins and

microorganisms, such as viruses and bacteria, so as to deliberately inflict disease among people, animals, and agriculture.´87 In the biological weapons category, anthrax and smallpox are the most viable agents.88 Anthrax, in particular, has a long storage life.89

Martin Rees, ³Dark Materials,´ Guardian, June 10, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jun/10/science.comment. 84 ³Chemical Weapons Technology.´ Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec04.pdf (accessed January 20, 2009), II-4-1. 85 Ibid., II-4-11. 86 Ibid., II-4-5. 87 ³Introduction to Biological Weapons,´ Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/resource/introtobw.html. 88 Leon Fuerth, ³Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 126.

83

27 Prior to 1945, a number of individual states carried out research with biological weapons. Bacteriology¶s ³Golden Age´ took place at the end of the nineteenth century, as scientists made great leaps in understanding infectious diseases, and some countries developed an interest in this research for military applications. In World War I, Germany initiated efforts to attack military draft animals with diseases such as anthrax and glanders.90 Following World War I, fear that the next military conflict would involve a great deal more use of chemical and biological weapons spurred countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the US, to develop more biological weapons as a deterrent.91 Therefore, most nations entered World War II with at least some initial exposure to biological weapons development. However, the UK was the only country from Europe or North America to mass produce a usable biological weapon during the war. The UK produced unsophisticated cattle cakes with anthrax spores to use if the Germans used unconventional weapons against the Allies, but they were not necessary.92 However, in Asia, Japan used biological and chemical weapons against the Chinese, and killed as many as hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops and civilians.93 The 1925 signing of the Geneva Protocol banned biological and chemical weapons in warfare.94 According to Balmer, a great deal of secrecy has succeeded in concealing past biological warfare research and that state and sub-state sponsored research programs have been covered in complete secrecy. For example, in the former Soviet Union, entire cities
89 90

Ibid. Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 3. 91 Ibid., 4. 92 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 4. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid.

28 might be hidden, not revealed on maps, so as not to leak any information regarding military research activities.95 Also, twentieth-century state-sponsored warfare research programs have been recorded in many countries, including Germany.96 In 1981, the South African minister of defense, General Magnus Malan, authorized a secret chemical and biological weapons program, codenamed Project Coast, a military operation, for the South African Defense Force.97 The Roodeplaat Research Laboratory (RRL) was home to chemical agent testing.98 The South African President F. W. De Klerk vaguely described the biological weapons program in a briefing, revealing few details as he said, ³The aim of Project Coast is that of covert research and development of chemical and biological weapons and the establishment of production technology in the sensitive and critical areas of chemical and biological warfare to provide the South African security forces with a chemical and biological weapons capacity following the chemical and biological weapons philosophy and strategy.´99 After some years of various research, development, and testing, RRl underwent privatization in 1991, with its scientists heading in various directions.100 Allegedly, during the closing-down phase, biological weapon-related technical reports underwent unauthorized scanning and saving.101 During the same time period, South Africa was

Brian Balmer, ³How Does Secrecy Work? Keeping and Disclosing Secrets in the History of the UK Biological Warfare Programme,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 174. 96 Ibid. 97 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 192. 98 ³Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.´ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1847.pdf 99 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 195. 100 Ibid., 206. 101 Ibid., 207.

95

29 experiencing waves of political and social difficulties as it transitioned to democracy.102 According to Dr. Daan Goosen, the first managing director of RRL, in the wake of the RRL closing, there was little managerial oversight, and that scientists took the liberty to keep cultures, that may have been related to biological weapons research, for future research.103 Whether or not there was a real threat from the poorly-managed closure of the laboratory, the RRL example does indicate that a country may struggle when closing down a biological weapons program, and that it is likely that samples or reports could be stolen or sold without record.104 Nations are not the only possibly dangerous entity to explore chemical or biological weapons. According to Wheelis and Sugishima, terrorist groups have

expressed interest in chemical and biological weapons, but the biggest obstacle to those groups actually obtaining and using such means of destruction is lack of expertise and training.105 However, there is limited historical evidence of terrorist groups actually using them. The assumption is that the terrorist groups would need to overcome not only a high degree of technical training, but also attaining the necessary raw materials.106 According to Wheelis and Sugishima, bioterrorism has four elements: ³(1) the deliberate use, or the threat of use, of biological agents or toxins (2) by individuals or groups (but not states) (3) against nonmilitary targets (such as civilians or agricultural targets) (4) to achieve a political, ideological, or religious goal.´107 While there have only been two

Ibid., 212. Ibid., 207. 104 Ibid., 212. 105 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 285. 106 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 284. 107 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 284.
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30 confirmed attempts to use biological weapons as a tool for targeting humans, there have also been cases of biocriminality (biological weapons used for goals such as profit), hoaxes involving biological attacks, and allegations of biological weapon use against plants and animals.108 In al Qaeda¶s 5,000 page ³Encyclopedia of Jihad,´ the eleventh volume focuses on constructing chemical and biological weapons.109 According to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, a manual describing how to construct an alMubtakkar, a device to disperse hydrogen cyanide, surfaced on various al Qaeda websites since 2005, and the device was similar to the one intended for use in the aborted 2003 New York City subway attack.110 According to the report, most operational al Qaeda manuals get reposted to as many sites as possibly to maximize exposure in the jihadi community, so it is likely that the instructions were proliferated extensively.111 According to Wheelis and Sugishima, there have been hints that al Qaeda has shown interest in developing anthrax as a biological weapon, but no evidence indicates whether or not any group members has the required expertise or materials, but some accounts suggest that some individuals associated with al Qaeda have attempted to accumulate ricin, a potent toxin found naturally in castor beans, so it is relatively simple to manufacture.112

Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 285. 109 Audrey Kurth Cronin, ³Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context.´ (March 28, 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf. 110 Sammy Salama, ³Special Report: Manual for Producing Chemical Weapon to Be Used in New York Subway Plot Available on Al Qaeda Websites Since Late 2005.´ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (July 20, 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/salama_060720.htm. 111 Ibid. 112 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 301.

108

31 According to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, there have been numerous accounts of ricin used or possessed, possibly for terrorism uses, since the 1970s.113 Ricin, which does have limited medical applications, would require large quantities to be a successful mass terrorism tool. However, a small amount of 500 micrograms can kill a human, so small quantities are enough to make people fall ill, as was the case with the man in February 2008, who became ill in his Las Vegas hotel room.114 The instances of terrorist use of biological weapons against humans include the 1984 outbreak of restaurant-acquired salmonellosis in The Dalles, Oregon, carried out by the religious commune associated with the East Indian guru Bagwan (³enlightened one´) Shree Rajneesh.115 In that instance, a registered nurse obtained Salmonella and used a small team of fewer than twelve people to cultivate and disseminate the cultures, using only ordinary laboratory materials.116 Another example of the use of bioterrorism against humans was the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult¶s attacks between 1990-1995.117 Using a well-educated microbiologist and a fairly sophisticated laboratory, the cult members isolated botulinum toxin, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), and sarin.118 In the 1995 chemical attack on the

Raymond Zilinskas, Jonathan B. Tucker, and Burke Zimmerman, ³Previous Incidents Involving the Use/Possession of Ricin,´ http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/080229_ricin.pdf. 114 Kevin Bohn, ³Police: Man in critical condition after exposure to ricin,´ CNN, (February 29, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/02/29/ricin.hotel/index.html. 115 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 290. 116 Ibid., 291. 117 Audrey Kurth Cronin, ³Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context.´ (March 28, 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf. 118 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 298.

113

32 Tokyo subway, sarin, a nerve agent, killed twelve people, and injured 5,000.119 More would have likely been killed if the terrorists had been more prepared. The group experienced failures with dissemination, spore concentration, and workable agent formulations on several occasions, and was eventually caught and charged with serious crimes.120 The failures were likely mostly associated with little expertise, despite the fact that the group did have a rather highly educated population and spent approximately 20 million USD on preparation work.121 The threat of biological weapons attacks attracts international attention. Concerns about terrorists having access to biological weapons became a prominent issue in the early 1990s, especially as the lethality per terrorist attack increased, likely as a result of terrorists having greater access to information and a greater capability to develop chemical and biological weapons.122 Anthrax letter attacks in 2001 heightened fear and intelligence suggested interest in biological weapons among international terrorist organizations, which particularly was sound for alarm in the US.123 Benevolence

International Foundation (BIF), a so-called Islamic charity, served to transfer funds to al Qaeda cells throughout the world.124 BIF also allegedly became involved in the

Leon Fuerth, ³Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,´ in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 125. 120 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 299. 121 Ibid., 303. 122 Audrey Kurth Cronin, ³Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context.´ (March 28, 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf. 123 Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 1. 124 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 42.

119

33 development of weapons of mass destruction, including smallpox as an instrument of terror.125

Scientific Knowledge in Terrorist Hands When considering the presence of terrorism in the world and the desire of terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction, there is reason for concern from a security standpoint. History has pointed out that terrorists have the desire and ability to cause harm, and they also have the ability to stealthily live and educate themselves without raising much, if any, suspicion. However, cases such as the Aum Shinrikyo chemical attacks, reveal how terrorists¶ deadly intentions can be limited by technological abilities.126 There is a growing concern that terrorist groups may have more access to scientific knowledge and abilities. With that knowledge comes greater risk for potential targets, as terrorist groups could have a greater technical aptitude allowing them to carry out terrorist acts with greater precision and damage. With increasing educational opportunities, including those related to the hard sciences, and an increasing prevalence of international students attending European universities, terrorists could find themselves with greater opportunities to achieve technical educations than ever before. According to Kreuger, literature suggests that most terrorist organizations are composed of intellectual and economic elites.127 These individuals, if they experience a greater desire to develop and deploy weapons of mass

125

126

Ibid. Audrey Kurth Cronin, ³Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context.´ (March 28, 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf. 127 Alan Kreuger, What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 44.

34 destruction, could use their intellectual prowess to seek out advanced scientific capabilities. And, as schools push for diversity, a greater international student population allows greater opportunities for international terrorists to blend in, and acquire skills and knowledge with a certain degree of anonymity.

Scientific Presence in Islamic Extremism While a more diverse international environment at a European university could allow any international terrorist a greater opportunity to blend in with the campus population, and take advantage of acquiring scientific skills, evidence suggests that there is a particular tendency for Islamic extremist group members to be scientists and engineers.128 Numerous high-profile al Qaeda members have carried engineering titles, and some evidence points to extremist sects heightening recruiting efforts on technology campuses. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) case officer, wrote Understanding Terror Networks and included studies on education and occupation of al Qaeda members.129 His results showed that nearly 35% had received some college education, and nearly 45% were from a skilled profession.130 Research has even indicated that Osama bin Laden studied economics, physics, and engineering at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah.131 In ³Engineers of Jihad,´ Gambetta and Hertog examined the prevalence of engineering, medicine, and science graduates in terrorist organizations, finding that such

David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 43. 129 Alan Kreuger, What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 39. 130 Alan Kreuger, What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 44. 131 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 23.

128

35 individuals are over-represented in Islamist movements in the Muslim world, but not among extremist Islamic groups that emerged in Western countries.132 They also point out that specifically engineers are ³strongly over-represented´ in violent sects within Islamic movements in both the Muslim world and Western countries.133 Gambetta and Hertog¶s main goal was to systematically explain why there is a link between radical Islam and science and engineering.134 Gambetta and Hertog had some difficulty in researching this topic, as they could not find educational or occupational information for all of the desired populations, so they only examined subjects for which they could find information. Among their findings, Gambetta and Hertog concluded that Western-based Islamic extremists tend to come from a lower class background than Middle Eastern Islamic extremists, so they are less educated, but still show a high proportion of engineers.135 Gambetta and Hertog also examined the presence of engineers among nonIslamic extremists, to determine if engineers, in general, are linked to extremism, and found that left-wing extremists included virtually no engineers, and that right-wing extremists did contain some engineers.136 For example, Dick Butler, Aryan Nation

founder, and Wilhelm Schmitt, the leader of a militant anti-government group, both worked as engineers.137 When Gambetta and Hertog considered that engineers are selected by radical Islam groups due to technical skills, they found that technical skills do appear to bring
132

David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 2. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid., 6. 135 Ibid., 24. 136 Ibid., 30. 137 Ibid.

36 high levels of value and honor to the individual in some groups. Hamas websites use ³engineer´ as an honorable title.138 Gambetta and Hertog also concluded that outside of violent Islamist groups, the only other case of prominent engineer trends lies within extreme right-wing movements, especially in the US and Germany, which is particularly interesting because members of such movements tend to have lower education.139 Furthermore, the leaked British dossier that revealed that Islamic extremists were recruiting on college campuses also indicated that the recruiters were specifically targeting students with ³technical and professional qualifications, particularly engineering and IT degrees.´140 Mamdouh Mahmud Salim ± aka Abu Hajer ± electrical engineer from Iraq described as bin Laden¶s ³best friend.´141 In Sudan, Salim operated bin Laden¶s Al Hajira Company, and he had a permit to import explosives for demolition and construction.142 He also allegedly became the point man for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and began to comb the world for off-the-shelf nuclear weapons and highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in the production of atomic bombs.143 According to Levi, terrorist groups acquire particular capabilities through different approaches, learning from both within the group, and from outside avenues.144 As a group turns to greater outside interaction (through universities or technical training centers), there is a greater chance of acquiring the necessary skills to carry out a

Ibid., 40. Ibid., 78. 140 Robert Winnet and David Leppard, ³Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda¶s British Recruits,´ The Sunday Times, July 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece 141 Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 29. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 147.
139

138

37 successful plot, but also a greater risk of involving less-trusted individuals, and therefore a greater chance of being caught.145 In the case of the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda used both high-ranking, loyal members, training them as pilots, as well as newer recruits, training them at American flight schools, and also used another new recruit who already had training as a pilot.146 Also, three of the four 9/11 pilots were engineers by education or trade, showing that they were well-educated with technical capabilities.147

The Dual-use Issue The dual-use issue reflects concern that scientific advancement may be hindered by individuals abusing science to cause harm. ³The life sciences could become the death sciences.´148 This statement reflects the conflict in science research and development. Further laboratory work in anything from pathology and pharmacology to genetics can offer a great potential to improve the quality of life and duration of life, eradicate disease, and make it easier and less expensive to keep people healthier. However, if certain knowledge or tools are misused, whether by accident or with intent do cause harm, a deadly rash of destruction may result. Concern over legitimate research being abused and used for terrorist purposes is concern over dual use research.149 This is not a new issue, as the concern over how to

Ibid., 47. Ibid., 49. 147 David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, ³Engineers of Jihad´ (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 40. 148 Ronald Atlas and Margaret Somerville, ³Life Sciences or Death Sciences: Tipping the Balance Towards Life with Ethics, Codes, and Laws,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 19. 149 Ronald Atlas and Margaret Somerville, ³Life Sciences or Death Sciences: Tipping the Balance Towards Life with Ethics, Codes, and Laws,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 17.
146

145

38 protect scientific research has been apparent since the inception of modern science.150 In 1626, Sir Francis Bacon wrote, ³And this we do also: we have consultations, which of the inventions and experiences which we have discovered shall be published, and which not; and take all an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret; though some of those we do reveal sometime to the State, and some not.´ This shows that for hundreds of years, scientists have realized the need for responsibility to prevent the abuse of scientific advancements for the purpose of doing harm.151 In 2005, the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues, a global network of science academies, stated, ³In recent decades, scientific research has created new and unexpected knowledge and technologies that offer unprecedented opportunities to improve human and animal health and environmental conditions. But some science and technology can be used for destructive purposes, as well as for constructive purposes. Scientists have a special responsibility when it comes to problems of µdual use¶ and the misuse of science and technology.´152 The National Institutes of Health established the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) as a US initiative to encourage important research objectives while monitoring national security concerns, and it aims to reach out to the international community, encouraging other nations to adopt similar oversight initiatives.153 In 2004, Malcolm Dando, from the University of Bradford, UK, and Brian Rappert, from the Department of Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Exeter,
Ronald Atlas and Margaret Somerville, ³Life Sciences or Death Sciences: Tipping the Balance Towards Life with Ethics, Codes, and Laws,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 18. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid., 19. 153 Ronald Atlas and Margaret Somerville, ³Life Sciences or Death Sciences: Tipping the Balance Towards Life with Ethics, Codes, and Laws,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 21.
150

39 UK, came up with a question-and-answer, interactive seminar idea to promote communication between scientists, to talk about dual-use issues without threatening the research these scientists carried out.154 While these seminars began in the UK, by 2007, there were similar seminars set up in six countries, with one seminar in Germany.155 According to Abigail Salyers, who served as president of the American Society of Microbiology from 2001-2002, despite the fact that although bioterrorism is frightening, scientific research should not be censored. She asserted that the free exchange of For example, methodology

information is important to the scientific community.

sections in publications could grant terrorists necessary information to formulate certain materials, but deleting those sections would hurt other researchers looking to replicate results.156 According to Rappert, Germany is one country that has addressed the need for scientists to fully understand safety procedures related to research, that, when given to the wrong individuals, can have potentially deadly results, and understand that certain research carries with it a very challenging ethical dilemma.157

Multi-Criterion Decision Making To examine the test case universities, those located in Germany, multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) appeared to represent the best approach. MCDM is useful because it allows subjects of interest to be evaluated and compared based on a set of
154

Brian Rappert, ³Education for the Life Sciences: Choices and Challenges,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 59. 155 Ibid., 61. 156 Abigail Salyers, ³Scientific Research and Publication Should Not Be Restricted,´ in Fighting Bioterrorism, ed. Lisa Young (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004), 112-113. 157 Brian Rappert, ³Education for the Life Sciences: Choices and Challenges,´ in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 53.

40 criteria.158 For each criterion, the subject is evaluated accordingly. The score, or

evaluation that the subject receives regarding each criterion, is tabulated in a decision matrix or table that also shows that subject¶s evaluation regarding the other criteria. For example, in Figure 2.1, Options A, B, and C are evaluated based on Criteria X, Y, and Z. A value is assigned to each option and the values are totaled at the right of the matrix. If A, B, and C are universities, and they are being evaluated for prestige, student research opportunities, and job placement, with a 9 being the best-possible total score, University B would be the best overall university, with a total score of 7.

158

Information for Decision-Making for Sustainable Development for Caribbean Small Island Developing States. ³Multi-Criteria/Dimensions in Decision Making.´ http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/idsd/methodologies/criteria.htm

41 Figure 2.1: Multi-Criteria Decision Making Sample Matrix Criteria A B C X 1 2 3 Y 2 3 1 Z 3 2 1 6 7 5

Options

This would be a useful tool for evaluating universities, because MCDM allows you to factor in multiple criterion, and terrorists are likely to consider a number of factors when searching for a university. It is necessary to develop a set of criteria that terrorists are likely to consider when searching for a university, and develop a methodology for evaluating universities for those criteria. In this instance, previous analyses completed using MCDM offered worthwhile examples for how this analysis should be carried out. Kiker et al., examined the

possibilities and provided recommendations for applying techniques related to multicriteria decision analysis to examine decision making in environmental projects.159 They chose to examine MCDM as a decision-making tool in this case, because environmental projects often deal with a variety of factors, some of which can not be easily evaluated due to ethical and moral principles associated with environmental concerns. This is similar to concerns associated with evaluating universities in this study. The purpose is not to flag certain universities as having high risk for attracting terrorists; the purpose is to examine what factors associated with universities are likely to be most

159

Gregory A. Kiker, et al., ³Application of Multicriteria Decision Analysis in Environmnetal Decision Making,´ Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 1, no. 2 (2005), http://www.allenpress.com/pdf/ieam-01-02_95_108.pdf.

42 attractive to terrorists. MCDM offers a medium through which one can evaluate

universities to show the likelihood that terrorists will consider studying at those universities to gain the knowledge to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

Literature Conclusion Based on the examined literature, there are gaps in the research offering worthwhile studies. The research indicated that nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons are a real threat in the hands of rogue international terrorist groups, and historical evidence indicates that groups are likely to try to use any of these weapons in the future. Research also indicated that individuals with science and engineering

backgrounds could be highly desirable to terrorist groups interested in developing weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction require advanced

technological skill and equipment, and the most likely cause for failed chemical or biological attacks in the past is inadequate preparation. The research suggested that terrorist groups, in general, are likely to consider manufacturing unconventional weapons, and to do so, they are likely to recruit members with science and/or engineering skills. The purpose of this report is not to suggest that Germany would likely be a top location for recruiting efforts. The purpose of this report is to suggest that international terrorists are likely to consider obtaining university-level training to develop weapons, and that it is possible to determine which universities are most likely to attract terrorists. Germany was selected as a test case for several reasons. It has a fairly deep pool of educational institutions offering science and technology disciplines, a high

43 international student population, and continues to attract foreign students in growing numbers to study in Germany.160 Also, Germany received attention when it was

discovered that some of the 9/11 hijackers attended German universities; therefore, Germany is likely to be a good test case. The first hypothesis for this study is that a multi-criteria decision making model can be developed to examine universities and determine which universities will be most likely to be attractive to international terrorists seeking a technical education to construct weapons of mass destruction. The second hypothesis is that this methodology can be applied to Germany, as a test case, to show that certain German universities are more likely than others to be attractive to international terrorists seeking a technical education to build weapons of mass destruction.

160

³Germany Attracts Foreign Students,´ Young Germany, (November 21, 2006), http://www.young-germany.de/university-education/university-education/article/e7ef5198b1/germanyattracts-foreign-students.html.

44 CHAPTER III. PROCEDURES

This study incorporated a combination of qualitative and quantitative research strategies. I relied on open-source information to both establish the need for this

research, and to examine universities for the Germany test case, but utilized multi-criteria decision-making to analyze and compare the results. The internet was the most useful source for information concerning German universities, as the internet contains general information concerning the schools, as well as some information concerning course schedules, curriculum, research projects, and laboratories. The internet was also the primary source for information considering

international populations in Germany. Great care was taken to validate data and extract information from trustworthy sources. In this study, the role of the researcher was to collect data, organize information, and draw conclusions based on the material available. The first step to begin this study was to compile a list of universities for evaluation. I selected Germany as a test case due to its academic opportunities, large international student population, and associations with terrorist cells, as described in the literature review. With its wide array of universities and deep scientific academia

offerings, combined with Germany¶s historical evidence of terrorist activity, Germany is likely to be a worthwhile model for a test case for this study. To develop a list of schools to examine, I made several assumptions. The first was that a potential international terrorist would be unlikely to seek out an education from a very high-profile, world-renowned university. A high-profile university is more

45 likely to attract attention, especially from the media, and potential terrorists are likely to want to stay under the radar. It also seems logical that a potential terrorist interested in gaining the necessary skills to construct weapons of mass destruction, would select a university based on the school¶s academic offerings rather than prestige. Therefore, it is more important for a school to have adequate academic opportunities than for a school to be highly ranked or carry a great deal of clout in academia. Also, an international terrorist would be unlikely to seriously pursue a high level university because attending such an institution would require additional effort to get in. There would be a more demanding application process, possibly with interviews and extra fees associated with the applying. Also, an international terrorist with a specific educational goal would not be concerned with bragging rights associated with getting accepted to or attending a prestigious university. Furthermore, a more prestigious university is likely to cost more to attend, and an international terrorist would likely want to avoid paying extra to obtain an education. I also made the assumption that an international terrorist would also be unlikely to attend a very low-ranked school. First of all, a low-ranked school is likely to have a rather small student population. It would be more difficult for an international, terroristminded student to blend in with a small student population. Also, smaller schools tend to focus more on education rather than on research, so professors are more likely to pay closer attention to students. A terrorist-minded student would not want to stand out at a smaller institution and would not want professors to suspect that he or she is up to anything other than obtaining a legitimate education.

46 Furthermore, smaller schools are less likely to have advanced programs necessary to provide certain skills necessary to construct weapons of mass destruction. For

example, Mercyhurst College lacks upper-level, specialized chemistry and physics courses, while Germany¶s Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz has an Institute of Nuclear Chemistry and carries out specialized research with a nuclear research reactor.161 It is unlikely that an international terrorist interested in constructing weapons of mass destruction would consider such a university, simply because the advanced training is unlikely to be available. A middle-range school is still likely to offer a good education, opportunity for advanced coursework, laboratories, and research. In addition, there is likely to be a student body population that is diverse enough to allow international terrorist-minded students to blend in, without attracting attention from professors or authorities. The first step to find a suitable list of universities to examine was to find a list of German universities. There are several ways to evaluate German universities. The Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD), or German Academic Exchange Service, in conjunction with the Centre for Higher Education Development (CHE) releases detailed rankings of German Universities. Research into the DAAD and CHE revealed that these institutions are likely to be the most reputable and thorough system for ranking German institutions, so that data was used to evaluate these universities. The German language version of this ranking is published annually by ³DIE ZEIT,´ in a special edition version of the weekly news magazine. The CHE/DIE ZEIT ranking boasts the most comprehensive ranking system,
161

³Physicists at Mainz University Generate Ultracold Neutrons at the TRIGA Reactor.´ Science Centric. (December 29, 2008), http://www.sciencecentric.com/news/article.php?q=08122908physicists-at-mainz-university-generate-ultracold-neutrons-at-the-triga-reactor.

47 collecting data from 290 German universities and surveys from more than 300,000 students and 31,000 professors.162 The purpose of publishing the ranking in the English language was to offer international students an opportunity to gain a thorough understanding of German university offerings.163 This is particularly useful for this study, because potential

international terrorists could be looking for a university in Germany to acquire skills to aid in terrorist acts implementing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Any student researching German schools using the internet is likely to come across this ranking, and possibly pick a school based largely on the information provided in this ranking. So, it is very applicable for the purposes of this study. As a result of reading about the rankings and universities described on the DAAD website, I learned that German higher education institutions can be described several ways. Germany has 167 Fachhochschulen (FHs), which are universities of applied

sciences. These schools are designed to give a great deal of practical experience to students, and have close ties to real, working world applications. With the help of required internships, programs at these schools have the potential to better prepare students for the working world, in fields such as technology, engineering, management, and design. These programs seem to be similar to programs offered in the US at

technical schools or trade schools, where students learn skills for a particular job, whereas students who attend universities earn a degree that can, in most cases, be applied to a diverse variety of potential jobs. The degrees awarded at such schools are equivalent

162

German Academic Exchange Service. ³What¶s so special about the CHE / DIE ZEIT university ranking?´ http://www.daad.de/deutschland/hochschulen/hochschulranking/06544.en.html. 163 Ibid.

48 to Bachelor¶s and Master¶s degrees at traditional universities, but universities of applied sciences do not award doctoral degrees, as traditional universities do. For the purpose of this project, I used the following methodology to create a list of schools. From the DAAD university ranking portal, German universities were selected to be ranked according to subject. From there, I selected the broad field of Mechanical-, Process-, and Chemical Engineering. This field appeared to represent a careful

consideration of schools with technological opportunities for engineering education. Next, the Ranking Overview for studies at universities was selected. I selected

universities, as opposed to universities of applied sciences, because I made the assumption that terrorist-minded students would be more likely to consider universities in Germany. A terrorist would be more likely to select a university over a university of applied sciences, because the terrorist¶s goal is to learn as much as possible to use those skills for destruction. There would not be much sense in attending a university of applied science to learn skills to carry out a job, and possibly miss out on some of the independent research opportunities available at a regular university. From this 2007 DAAD list of universities, all of the schools that received a middle group (improved, decline, or neither) rating for the ³overall study situation´ category were considered. This yielded a list of 15 schools. This same process was carried out for the Chemistry subject field for schools falling under the University category, last updated in 2006. Chemistry was selected over fields such as physics and biology, because chemistry seemed to be a good starting base, as it often incorporates a variety of classes from physics and biology, as well as chemistry. Most chemistry programs require students to take courses in physics,

49 mathematics, and biology. Those other science programs are likely to be near a similar level as the chemistry programs. From the DAAD evaluation, there were 31 Universities categorized as middle group for the overall study situation. Some schools appeared twice on the combined list, as they fell into the middle-tier category for both engineering and chemistry. Once I eliminated the duplicates (those schools that made the middle tier list for both engineering and chemistry), I had a list of 40 schools. This left a list of 40 schools classified as middle-tier universities in Germany. I screened each university¶s website, and found that 39 had at least some Englishtranslation to help me overcome the language barrier. In most cases, I also found it necessary to utilize Google translator to translate certain web pages to more fully understand the workings of the universities. For the one school that had no English translation available, I relied solely on the Google translate function to gather data. I then evaluated each of these 40 universities with a more quantitative approach, using multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) to determine whether or not they have any indicators that would make them particularly attractive to terrorists seeking an education to construct weapons of mass destruction. I decided to evaluate each university based on its opportunities for 1) physics education/research opportunities, 2) chemical education/research opportunities, 3) biological education/research opportunities, and 4) engineering/mathematics

education/research opportunities. The assumption here is that some schools may offer particular courses or laboratories in, for example, nuclear physics, that would be most useful for a terrorist seeking skills to build a nuclear bomb. Therefore, some schools are

50 more likely to offer a very good physics education, with fewer opportunities for biological classes and laboratories. Also, some schools are likely to have greater

opportunities for research in particular fields than other schools. If a particular program has significant chemical education opportunities, and ample research possibilities, it is likely that students with a high level of chemical understanding will have opportunities for personal time in laboratories conducting research. If they have ulterior motives, those students may take advantage of that time to experiment with chemicals and technologies to see if they can develop a chemical weapon. When evaluating course offerings at a university, I used a scale of 1-5 for each category. Each university is assumed, initially, to be a 3. This score was lowered to a 2 or 1, or raised to a 4 or 5, if the university has significant shortfalls or opportunities that make it less, or more likely, respectively, to give a terrorist an education to manipulate science to cause harm. To develop a more systematic approach to evaluate universities, I developed a set of indicators, shown in Tables 3.1-3.4, to help categorize schools in the physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering/mathematics disciplines.

51 Table 3.1: Physics Curriculum Score Criteria Criteria No physics bachelor degree available; classes possible Physics bachelor degree available Physics master degree available Bachelor/Master programs in atomic physics, or other specialized physics course Physics doctoral degree available, or nuclear engineering degree, or specialized physics research, including work with hadron colliders Table 3.2: Chemistry Curriculum Score Criteria Criteria No chemistry bachelor degree available; classes possible Chemistry/biochemistry bachelor degree available Chemistry/biochemistry master degree available Materials science/nanotechnology master degree available, or pharmacy/pharmacology programs Chemistry/biochemistry doctoral degree available Table 3.3: Biology Curriculum Score Criteria Criteria No biology bachelor degree available; classes possible Biology or biotechnology bachelor degree available Biology or biotechnology master degree available Bioengineering or biomedical engineering master degree available, or medical degree Biology (or related field) doctoral degree available Table 3.4: Engineering/Mathematics Curriculum Score Criteria Criteria No math/engineering bachelor degree; classes possible Either math or engineering bachelor degree available Either math or engineering master degree available Both math and engineering master degrees available PhD courses in math or engineering available

Score 1 2 3 4 5

Score 1 2 3 4 5

Score 1 2 3 4 5

Score 1 2 3 4 5

Once a school had a score for each category, the scores were totaled in the matrix. Based on the curriculum scores, schools with higher scores (totals of 15-20) represent the greatest likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons, schools with moderate scores (6-14) represent a

52 moderate likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons, while schools with lower scores (1-5) represent the least likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons. Finally, I needed to evaluate the university¶s student population for international students. Specifically, I needed to determine the international student population within science, math, and engineering departments at each educational institution. If this data had been readily available, the process would have been simplified. However, I had to use the limited available data to calculate a representative value to reflect the approximate international student populations within the science/eng./math disciplines at each institution to allow for comparison between universities. First, I made the assumption that an international terrorist would desire a school where he or she was less likely to cause suspicion. The most logical approach to avoid this would be to select a school where it is easier to blend in. It would be easiest for an international student to achieve anonymity at an institution with a high international student population, especially in the department where he or she would be studying. For example, an international terrorist would be less likely to arouse suspicions in a nuclear physics department if there are already a high number of international students. Using the DAAD¶s extensive website, I was able to gather some data concerning the students enrolled in the science and engineering curriculums. The DAAD website included information about most universities, including the number of students and proportion of international students in specific departments. I recorded the total number of students at the institution, as well as the percentages of the student populations that

53 were enrolled in the science and engineering disciplines. This data is recorded in

Appendix B. By multiplying the total student population by the percentages given, I was able to determine the number of students, from each university, that were enrolled in science or engineering-related courses, to get the Science/Eng./Math population. This data is recorded in Table 4.2. Next, I wanted to determine the number of international students within the Science/Eng./Math population at each institution. The DAAD website gave data for some programs available at each university. For each science/engineering-related

program for which data was available, I recorded the number of students enrolled, and the percentage of international students. This data is also recorded in Appendix B. By multiplying the number of students enrolled in a given program by the percentage of international students, I was able to calculate the number of international students in a given program. I repeated this for every science/engineering/mathematics program at a given school, until I found the total number of international students from those departments. I then found the total number of students from those departments. Finally, I divided the number of international students enrolled in

science/engineering/mathematics programs by the total number of students in those programs, and found an overall percentage of international students in the science/engineering/mathematics division of each school. Lastly, I multiplied the overall percentage of international students enrolled in science, mathematics, and engineering disciplines, by the total number of students enrolled in science, mathematics, and engineering disciplines to determine the number of international students enrolled in these programs at each of the top 15 universities.

54 The final step to analyze the data was to assign a ranking to the top 15 universities based on the quality of the available programs (from the course evaluation score) and the level of presumed anonymity (using the number of international students enrolled in science/engineering/mathematics programs). The school with the highest course

evaluation was ranked ³1,´ and the school with the next highest course evaluation was ranked ³2,´ and the rest of the universities were numbered, in order, accordingly. Due to the fact that some of the schools had equal course evaluation scores, those schools received the same ordinal ranking. For instance, five schools received a total course evaluation of 16, so they each were ranked 3 in the final matrix, as they tied for having the third-highest course evaluation total. Then, the 15 schools were ranked according to the number of international students enrolled in science/engineering/mathematics programs, with the school with the highest number receiving a 1. The schools were grouped according to the approximated international student population, as some had similar numbers of students, and then schools in groups (where populations only differed by about 150 students or fewer) all received the same value for the population ranking. Finally, each of the top 15 schools received two values. Since a school¶s program quality was the initial determining factor that would make a school attractive to an international terrorist, the program quality ranking was weighted twice as heavily as the approximated international student ranking. The weighted values were averaged in the matrix, yielding an Academic/Anonymity Coefficient, and the universities were reranked according to this coefficient. The universities with lower Academic/Anonymity Coefficients reflect universities with high quality academic programs combined with the greatest opportunity for international students to achieve a level of presumed anonymity.

55 CHAPTER IV. RESULTS

The German universities were first evaluated based on available courses at the institutions. Each institution was evaluated based on available physics, chemistry, The criteria described in the

biology, and engineering/mathematics-related degrees.

methodology was used to assign a score to each university for each subject, and then a total score for available courses was obtained. This course total represents a broad overview of the level for science/math/engineering offerings at the university. University data was obtained from university websites, as shown in Appendix A. This information was used to determine the course evaluations shown in Table 4.1.

56 Table 4.1: University Course Evaluations
University Leibniz University of Hannover Munich Technical University Rostock University Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University Bayreuth University University of Erlangen-Nürnberg University of Frankfurt University of Siegen Berlin Technical University Dortmund Technical University Ilmenau Technical University Heinrich-Heine University Karlsruhe University Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Ulm University Braunschweig Technical University Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel University of Münster Saarland University University of Würzburg RWTH Aachen University Ruhr University Bochum Bremen University University of Hamburg Konstanz University University of Oldenburg Chemnitz University of Technology University of Freiburg University of Potsdam Stuttgard University University of Wuppertal Freie Universität Berlin University of Duisburg-Essen (Duisburg campus) University of Duisburg-Essen (Essen campus) Paderborn University University of Tübingen Brandenburg University of Technology Dresden Technical University Bundeswehr Munich University Hamburg University of Technology Physics 5 5 5 3 4 3 5 5 3 1 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 Chemistry 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 1 2 1 1 Biology 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 2 2 3 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 1 Eng./Math 5 4 3 4 4 5 1 5 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 5 4 2 4 3 4 1 4 2 4 3 Course total 20 18 18 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 10 9 8 7 6

57 Of the examined universities, there were fifteen schools with course evaluation totals of 15-20, indicating that a terrorist considering attending an institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons is highly likely to consider attending one of those fifteen schools, on the basis of academic offerings. Leibniz University of Hannover
had a total course evaluation of 20, the highest possible, indicating that Leibniz University of Hannover had the greatest diversity and depth of high-level scientific degrees. Munich Technical University and Oostock University had total course evaluations of 18. Ludwig-Maximilians Universität Munich, Bayreuth University, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, University of Frankfurt, and University of Siegen had total course evaluations of 16. Finally, Berlin Technical University, Dortmund Technical University, Ilmenau Technical University, Heinrich-Heine University, Karlsruhe University, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, and Ulm University had total course evaluations of 15. The other 25 universities had total course evaluation scores of between 6 and 14, so they all fell within the spectrum of a moderate likelihood that a terrorist

would consider attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons, and there were no universities with a low likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons. These fifteen top universities were considered equivalent as far as academic offerings in science/engineering/mathematics, and were re-ordered to determine likelihood of an international terrorist selecting one on the basis of ability for international students to blend in. Table 4.2 shows, for each of the top 15 universities, the total

science/engineering/math populations, the science/engineering/math international student populations, and the science/eng./math international student populations, arranged by the percentage of international students enrolled in science/engineering/math disciplines.

58

Table 4.2: Top 15 University Statistics for Science/Engineering/Mathematics Programs
Total Science/Eng./Math Student Population Percentage (%) of International Students in Science/Eng./Math Science/Eng./Math International Student Population

University University of Siegen Dortmund Technical University Munich Technical University Berlin Technical University Karlsruhe University Leibniz University of Hannover Ilmenau Technical University University of Erlangen-Nürnberg Heinrich-Heine University Ulm University LudwigMaximilians Munich University University of Frankfurt Rostock University Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Bayreuth University

4,129 11,213 16,647 14,505 14,020
9,493

41.49 17.32

1,713 1,942 2,740

16.46 2,193 15.12 2,089 14.9 1,401 14.76 552 12.45 1,002 8.97 670 8.89 8.75 576

4,437 11,173 7,537 6,579

14,136 10,252 6,475 10,618 3,328

8.29 8.28 4.95 4.53 2.29

1,172 849 320.5 481 76

This data shows that there is a discrepancy in international student populations and that some universities set themselves apart because they offer environments that enable international students to blend in more easily. According to these calculations, the University of Siegen has a surprising science/engineering/mathematics population

59 demographics, as international students comprise 41.49% of those departments for which data was available. Dortmund Technical University, Munich Technical University,

Berlin Technical University, Karlsruhe University, Leibniz University of Hannover, and Ilmenau Technical University fall into the tier below, each having between 12% and 18% of the science/engineering departments comprised of international students. University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Heinrich-Heine University, Ulm University, Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University, and University of Frankfurt all have very similar international student population percentages, with the science/engineering departments each having between 8-9% international students. Rostock University and Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz had slightly lowered international student compositions, with international students making up 4.95% and 4.53%, respectively, of the science/engineering students. Bayreuth University had the lowest international representation amongst

science/engineering students, with international students comprising only 2.29% of the science/engineering students. Table 4.3 shows the top 15 universities, rank ordered by the number of international students enrolled in science/eng./math.

60 Table 4.3: Number of International Students Enrolled in Science/Engineering/Mathematics at Top Universities
University Munich Technical University Berlin Technical University Karlsruhe University Dortmund Technical University University of Siegen Leibniz University of Hannover Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University University of Erlangen-Nürnberg University of Frankfurt Heinrich-Heine University Ulm University Ilmenau Technical University Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Rostock University Bayreuth University Number of International Students Enrolled in Science/Eng./Math

2,740 2,193 2,089 1,942 1,713 1,401 1,172 1,002 849 670 576 552 481 320.5 76

Based on the available data, Munich Technical University had the greatest number of international students enrolled in science/eng./math, followed by Berlin Technical University and Karlsruhe University, all of which had over 2,000 international students in those departments. Dortmund Technical University had the next highest number of such students, with 1,942 international students, following by the University of Siegen with 1,713 international students, Leibniz University of Hannover with 1,401 international students, Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich with 1,172 international students, and the University of Erlangen- Nürnberg with 1,002 international students. The remaining seven universities each had fewer than 1,000 international students enrolled in science/eng./math disciplines. Despite the fact that the science/eng./math departments at the University of Siegen offered a much higher percentage of international students, the University of

61 Siegen is only ranked fifth based on the actual number of international students. For an international terrorist attempting to blend in to a science/eng./math department at a German university, the University of Siegen would likely be attractive. However,

statistically, since there are more international students at Munich Technical University, Berlin Technical University, Karlsruhe, and Dortmund Technical University, there are more likely to be international terrorists at those institutions which have larger pools of international students. For the final evaluation of universities, the top 15 schools were assigned ordinal numbers to rank them according to program quality and the level of presumed anonymity for international students. Each numerical ranking also reflects schools that have been grouped according to program quality and presumed level of anonymity, so some schools do share the same ranking. The program quality ranking was weighted twice to reflect its greater importance in the overall ranking, and then these values were used to calculate the Academic/Anonymity Coefficient. The universities are shown ranked, according to this coefficient, in Table 4.4.

62 Table 4.4: Final University Ranking with Academic/Anonymity Coefficient Program Level of Presumed Academic/Anonymity University Quality Anonymity Coefficient Leibniz University of Hannover 1 2 2 Munich Technical University 2 1 2.5 Berlin Technical University 4 2 5 University of Siegen 3 4 5 Karlsruhe University 4 3 5.5 Ludwig-Maximilians Munich 3 6 6 University Dortmund Technical University 4 5 6.5 University of Erlangen-Nürnberg 3 7 6.5 Rostock University 2 9 6.5 University of Frankfurt 3 8 7 Heinrich-Heine University 4 9 8.5 Ulm University 4 9 8.5 Ilmenau Technical University 4 9 8.5 Bayreuth University 3 11 8.5 Johannes Gutenberg University 4 10 9 Mainz

It is reasonable to divide the universities, according to Academic/Anonymity Coefficients, into three tiers. Two universities have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 2 and 2.5, eight universities have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 5 and 7, and five universities have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 8.5 and 9. Leibniz University of Hannover and Munich Technical University have

Academic/Anonymity Coefficients of 2 and 2.5, respectively, so they make up the first tier of universities, and can be considered roughly equivalent in terms of program quality and the level of presumed anonymity for international students. Therefore, they are roughly equivalent in ability to be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. Berlin Technical University, University of Siegen, Karlsruhe University, Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University, Dortmund

63 Technical University, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Rostock University, and University of Frankfurt, have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 5 and 7, make up the second tier of universities, and should be considered roughly equivalent in ability to be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. However, this second tier of universities is likely to be slightly less attractive than the first tier of universities to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. Finally, Heinrich-Heine University, Ulm University,

Ilmenau Technical University, Bayreuth University, and Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 8.5 and 9, make up the third tier of universities, and should be considered roughly equivalent in ability to be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, this third tier of universities is likely to be slightly less attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction than the first and second tier universities.

64 CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS The purpose of the study was to determine a method for examining colleges and universities and designating which schools would have the greatest likelihood of attracting international terrorists interested in acquiring the skills necessary to develop unconventional weapons of mass destruction. German colleges and universities were used as part of a test case to examine this methodology. By applying the outlined steps to evaluate the universities, it was evident that a natural narrowing occurred, and that certain universities are more likely than others to theoretically be attractive to terrorists seeking skills in the hard sciences. Within the German test-case, it was found that Leibniz University of Hannover and Munich Technical University made up the first tier of universities, Berlin Technical University, University of Siegen, Karlsruhe University, Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University, Dortmund Technical University, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Rostock University, and University of Frankfurt made up the second tier of universities, and Heinrich-Heine University, Ulm University, Ilmenau Technical University, Bayreuth University, and Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz made up the third tier of universities, grouped according to Academic/Anonymity Coefficients. The universities in each tier can be considered roughly equivalent in terms of program quality and the level of presumed anonymity for international students, and are, therefore, roughly equivalent in ability to be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. The first hypothesis for this study was satisfied, because a multi-criteria decision making model was developed to examine universities and determine which universities

65 will be most likely to attract international terrorists seeking a technical education to construct weapons of mass destruction. The model followed logical assumptions, and considered that an international student seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction would be most interested in achieving a high quality education at an institution with a significant international student population to allow a level of presumed anonymity. The international student population did take all international students into account, and did not differentiate between international students whose country of origin may make them more or less likely to partake in terrorist activity. While it is difficult to prove whether or not the quality of education and ease of anonymity are likely to be the only factors international terrorists may consider when selecting a university, these factors are very likely to be important. The quality of the education is important to an international terrorist, because constructing weapons of mass destruction can require a high degree of skill level that may not be obtained at every institution. Also, the ease with which an international terrorist can blend in with the student population plays a significant role in whether or not that individual¶s activity arouses suspicion on campus, and whether or not foul play or intentions are found out. The second hypothesis was satisfied, as the methodology was applied to Germany, as a test case, to show that certain German universities are more likely than others to attract international terrorists seeking a technical education to build weapons of mass destruction. There was a natural narrowing that occurred, and of the 40 original universities, 15 made the top group of schools for consideration. Those 15 were analyzed through a MCDM matrix, and grouped into three tiers of universities. While the

universities within each of the top tiers were considered roughly equivalent, this

66 methodology did prove that the list of original universities could be narrowed, producing a more manageable, prioritized list of universities for law enforcement to focus on.

Implications for Intelligence Theory There are possible implications of this study for intelligence theory. From a national security standpoint, as well as a global security standpoint, data points to the fact that terrorists are likely to consider unconventional weapons that are capable of mass destruction. Individuals interested in such weapons must find some way to acquire the necessary knowledge to construct and deploy them, and a logical means is through attending a college or university. Members of the intelligence community should be aware that this is a potential threat, and that certain universities are going to attract more terrorists than others. When applied to any set of universities, this methodology can be used to determine which universities are most attractive to international terrorists interested in skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. When they have the ³watch list´ of potential universities for attracting such individuals, the details to determine the extent of the threat are knowable to local police. Local law enforcement or university officials will have the details needed to determine who, if anyone, has the greatest potential for being an international terrorist. While it may be more difficult to pinpoint universities that are more attractive to ³homegrown´ terrorists, this study reveals that there is data available to narrow the list of possible universities that may attract international terrorists. While this data should not create alarm for the universities that are on the lists, this should be a wake-up call to

67 analysts that certain universities, as a result of educational offerings and demographics, present a more attractive environment for opportunistic international terrorists with aspirations of mass destruction. Certain universities may opt for implementing a more rigorous background-check process to screen university applicants as an attempt to discourage students with potentially dangerous histories or associations. In addition, care must be taken to not offend a potential student based on nationality. If a university becomes more aware of its potential attraction for international terrorists, this will help influence professors, researchers, and university employees, especially from certain departments, such as laboratory areas, to be especially aware of any suspicious activity and be alert to report to authorities. If a threat goes unreported because it is not taken seriously, the threat could escalate and develop into something more dangerous. It is very important to note that the nature of this profiling also carries dangers. The odds are still very much against any one individual being a terrorist. Country of origin does not automatically designate a person as a terrorist, and a great deal of care must be taken to consider all factors before labeling an individual as a terrorist. This issue is an important reminder in the wake of the backlash associated with the Virginia Fusion Center¶s 2009 assessment of the terrorist threat in Virginia. The document, issued by the Virginia Fusion Center, indicated that there is a ³significant´ potential for Virginia to be targeted by terrorists due to ³the presence of extremists, evidence of trends linked to terrorism, and the abundance of potential targets.´164 The document received a great deal of criticism, particularly as a result of implying racism within the document, as well as
164

Virginia Fusion Center, 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment, (March 2009), http://www.infowars.com/media/vafusioncenterterrorassessment.pdf .

68 referring to Virginia colleges and universities as ³nodes for radicalization.´165 The report identified a number of colleges and universities as having historical links or associations with certain organizations, such as anarchist extremists, therefore setting those universities apart as being dangerous places. This specific designation of certain

universities as dangerous places proved to be in poor taste, aiding to the criticism associated with the Virginia Fusion Center¶s report. Finally, while the methodology does produce a narrowed search field to scout for the most likely international terrorists, international terrorists could still be located outside of that narrowed field. Therefore, it is important to be aware that international terrorists could actually be at universities where you would be less likely to expect them. It is still vital that law enforcement and national security officers keep an open mind and a willingness to consider that international terrorists could come from diverse locations, and it is important to not miss clues that may signal international terrorists¶ whereabouts.

Thoughts for Future Studies There are some opportunities for further research and study related to the work found in this study. Despite the fact that this test case involves Germany, the same approach and methodology could theoretically be applied to any country or group of universities. First, determine the middle tier of universities, using whatever methodology is available (in this test case, Germany had its own ranking system through the DAAD), then examine the available courses and research available to give each school a
165

Anthony L. Kimery, ³Virginia Fusion Center Report Draws Misdirected Fire, Backers Say,´ (April 9, 2009), http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/8013/149/.

69 curriculum score using the methodology from this study. Then, determine the percentage of international students in science/engineering/mathematics and the number of international students in science/engineering/mathematics. A higher percentage of international students produces an environment more conducive to allowing potential international terrorists to blend in, and a higher number of international students provides a greater probability that international terrorists could be in the student population. I think it would be extremely useful, from a national security standpoint, to examine universities in Saudi Arabia, as four of the 9/11 hijackers attended Saudi Arabian universities.166 It would also be useful to examine cities, colleges, and universities for historical evidence of international terrorist activity. However, that would present a more anecdotal approach, and, for the purposes of this study, and to allow the application of this methodology to other geographic regions, it seemed more reasonable to use a quantitative element to score and rate universities. It may also be useful to consider the international population of the city where a university is located. Certain cities may be more likely to attract international students from particular countries if those cities have an established history of harboring certain ethnicities or international communities. Also, a large city with a high international population offers greater opportunity for any international person to blend in, but for a student, the university environment is likely to be the most important factor for enabling anonymity, so it is likely to be more important to have a high international population on campus, and less important that the city has a high international population.

166

19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, The, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/.

70 Since the number of international students enrolled in science/engineering classes takes all international students into consideration, it does not fully account for the international students most likely to act as terrorists. The number of international

students includes all international students, as data could not be obtained to differentiate between other European students, and international students from more geographically remote areas. Under the assumption that an international student is most likely to carry out terrorist activities as a result of his or her upbringing, environment, ancestry, or familial ties associated with his or her native land, an international student¶s likelihood of terrorist involvement is directly linked to country of origin. To determine how likely international populations are to produce terrorists, it is important to determine where those populations are from. One method to do this is to start with a published list of countries that are categorized as states that sponsor terrorism. The US Department of State publishes a list of countries that meet this profile. According to the State Department website, the Secretary of State designates countries as state sponsors of terrorism if they have ³repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.´167 Currently, the

website designates Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. 168 Data could not be found to reflect where immigrants from Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria reside in Germany. Such data would be ideal to pinpoint the locations most susceptible to international terrorism due to concentrations of immigrants from state sponsors of terrorism.

US Department of State, ³State Sponsors of Terrorism,´ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm. 168 Ibid.

167

71 Data was obtained from the Migration Policy Institute¶s Data Hub to determine the countries of origin of the foreign population in Germany. The data shown in

Appendix C reflects 2007 data.169 Data was obtained that reflected the populations of Iranians and Syrians residing in Germany, but no data was available for Cubans or Sudanese residing in Germany. According to the available data for 2007, 56,178

immigrants from Iran live in Germany, and 28,161 immigrants from Syria live in Germany. The data also reveals that in 2007, there were 6,744,879 people comprising Therefore, those 84,339

the foreign population in Germany from all countries.

individuals whose country of origin is considered a US State Department state sponsor of terrorism, with the known data available, comprise 1.2504% of the total foreign population residing in Germany.

169

Migration Policy Institute, ³Country and Comparative Data,´ http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub/countrydata/data.cfm .

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78 ³Physicists at Mainz University Generate Ultracold Neutrons at the TRIGA Reactor.´ Science Centric. (December 29, 2008), http://www.sciencecentric.com/news/article.php?q=08122908-physicists-atmainz-university-generate-ultracold-neutrons-at-the-triga-reactor. ³Protests and discussion event on 30 August 2008 in Siegen (Germany).´ Mideast Freedom Forum Berlin. (accessed April 20, 2009), http://www.mideastfreedomforum.org/node/78. Rappert, Brian. ³Education for the Life Sciences: Choices and Challenges.´ In A Web of Prevention, edited by Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, 51-63. London: Earthscan, 2007. Rees, Martin. ³Dark Materials.´ Guardian, June 10, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jun/10/science.comment. Robertson, Ann. Terrorism and Global Security. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007. Robertson, Susan. ³Europe Challenges US for Foreign Students by Adding More English Courses.´ Global Higher Ed. http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/europe-challenges-us-forforeign-students-by-adding-more-english-courses/. (accessed May 9, 2009). ³Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.´ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1847.pdf (accessed March 28, 2008). Salama, Sammy. ³Special Report: Manual for Producing Chemical Weapon to Be Used in New York Subway Plot Available on Al Qaeda Websites Since Late 2005.´ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (July 20, 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/salama_060720.htm. Satloff, Robert B., ed. War on Terror The Middle East Dimension. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002. Salyers, Abigail. ³Scientific Research and Publication Should Not Be Restricted.´ In Fighting Bioterrorism, edited by Lisa Yount, 112-113. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004. Schwabe, Alexander. ³Friendly, Unremarkable and Pious.´ Spiegel Online. (August 21, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,druck-432746,00.html. ³Search for Suspects Continues After Averted Terror Attacks.´ DW-WORLD, (September 5, 2007), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2765971,00.html. Stark, Holger. ³Suspect in German Bomb Plot Tells His Story.´ Spiegel Online.

79 (November 15, 2007) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,517609,00.html. Steinberg, Guido. ³The Threat of Jihadist Terrorism in Germany.´ Real Institute Elcano. (June 11, 2008) http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLO BAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI142-2008. ³Student Movement and Terrorism in Germany, The.´ German Culture, http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_student_movement_terroris m.htm. ³Ted Kaczynski ± The Education of a Genius.´ http://law.jrank.org/pages/12223/Kaczynski-Ted-education-genius.html (accessed March 27, 2009). Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. ³Terrorists threaten to attack Germany.´ Middle East Times, (January 28, 2009), http://www.metimes.com/Security/2009/01/28/terrorists_threaten_to_attack_germ any/747b/. ³Terrorists Used Germany as Base.´ NewsMax.com Wires, (October 24, 2001), http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/23/153926.shtml. ³Thousands Attend Opening of New Mosque in Germany.´ DW-WORLD. (October 26, 2008). http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3741549,00.html. ³Three Islamist Terror Suspects Arrested in Germany.´ Spiegel Online. (September 5, 2007), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,503959,00.html. Tucker, Jonathan B. ³Bioweapons from Russia: Stemming the Flow.´ Issues in Science and Technology, (2007), http://www.issues.org/15.3/p_tucker.htm. US Department of State. ³Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations.´ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm (accessed March 27, 2009). US Department of State. ³State Sponsors of Terrorism.´ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (accessed April 22, 2009). Vidino, Lorenzo. ³The Muslim Brotherhoods¶ Conquest of Europe.´ The Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005, vol. XXII, n. 1, http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brotherhoods-conquest-of-europe (accessed March 28, 2009). Vermaat, Emerson. ³Hizb ut-Tahrir - A Dangerous Terrorist Organization - On The Rise

80 In Europe.´ Pipe Line News. (February 19, 2008). http://www.pipelinenews.org/2008/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-A-Dangerous-TerroristOrganization-On.html. Virginia Fusion Center. 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment. (March 2009). http://www.infowars.com/media/vafusioncenterterrorassessment.pdf (accessed May 18, 2009). Wheelis, Mark, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed. Deadly Cultures. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006. Whiteman, Dominic. ³Ban Tablighi Jamaat?´ Westminster Journal. (September 15, 2008) http://westminsterjournal.com/content/view/199/30/. ³Who were the Baader-Meinhof gang?´ BBC News. (February 12, 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6314559.stm. Williams, Paul L. The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007. Winnet, Robert, and David Leppard. ³Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda¶s British Recruits.´ The Sunday Times, July 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece (accessed March 20 2009). Young, Mitchell, ed. The War on Terrorism. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003. Yount, Lisa, ed. Fighting Bioterrorism. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004. Zilinskas, Raymond , Jonathan B. Tucker, and Burke Zimmerman. ³Previous Incidents Involving the Use/Possession of Ricin.´ http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/080229_ricin.pdf (accessed March 27, 2009). ³3 Arrested for Planning Attacks on Frankfurt Airport, US Base.´ KATU.com. (accessed April 20, 2009), http://www.katu.com/internal?st=print&id=9581802&path=/news/national. 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, The. http://the19kids.blogspot.com/.

81

82 APPENDICES:

83 Appendix A: Aachen University Website: http://www.rwth-aachen.de/go/id/bdz/ Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, materials science Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology, biotechnology/molecular biotechnology; Master¶s in biomedical engineering, biotechnology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, materials engineering; Master¶s in materials engineering Bayreuth University Website: http://www.uni-bayreuth.de/ Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics, technical physics, biophysics; Master¶s in physics, biological physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in biochemistry, chemistry, polymer and colloid chemistry; Master¶s in biochemistry and molecular biology, materials chemistry and catalysis, natural and chemical substance, polymer science, energy science and technology, materials science and engineering Biology: Bachelor¶s in bioinformatics, biology, biophysics; Master¶s in bioinformatics, biodiversity and ecology, biological physics, biotechnology and process engineering, molecular ecology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, technomathematics; Master¶s in Automotive Engineering Components and Mechatronics, engineering computer science Berlin Technical University: Website: http://www.tu-berlin.de/menue/home/parameter/en/ Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics; Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, materials science; Master¶s in chemistry, polymer science, materials science Biology: Bachelor¶s in biotechnology; Master¶s in biomedical engineering Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, technological mathematics; Master¶s in mechanical engineering Brandenburg University of Technology Website: http://www.tu-cottbus.de/btu/en.html Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics, Master¶s in physics Chemistry: N/A Biology: Bachelor¶s in Biogenic raw materials technologies, Master¶s in Biomedical equipment, energy from biomass and waste Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, electrical engineering, Master¶s in applied mathematics, power engineering, mechanical engineering, process engineering and plant design

84 Braunschweig Technical University Website: http://www.tu-braunschweig.de/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, materials science, pharmacy; Master¶s in chemistry; PhD in chemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology, biotechnology, bioengineering; Master¶s in biology, biotechnology, bioengineering Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mechatronics, mathematics; Master¶s in electrical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics Bremen University Website: http://www.uni-bremen.de/index_en.html Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics; Master¶s in physics, environmental physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry; Master¶s in biochemistry; Graduate work in chemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in molecular biology, medical biometry/biostatistics, neurosciences Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, mechanical engineering, technomathematics Bundeswehr Munich University Website: http://www.unibw-muenchen.de/startseite/index-en.html Physics: N/A Chemistry: N/A Biology: N/A Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in electrical engineering and information technology, aerospace engineering, mathematical engineering, mechanical engineering Chemnitz University of Technology Website: http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/en/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry; Master¶s in chemistry, micro and nanosystems Biology: N/A Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, mechanical engineering, microtechnology, electrical engineering; Master¶s in unique mechanical engineering and computer science-related fields Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel Website: http://www.uni-kiel.de/index-e.shtml Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in biochemistry, chemistry, materials science; Research funding priorities include research in nanoscience/surface research Biology: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in biology; Graduate work in medicine, dentistry

85 Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in electrical and information engineering, mathematics Dortmund Technical University Website: http://www.tu-dortmund.de/uni/International/index.html Physics: N/A Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, chemical biology; Master¶s in chemistry, chemical biology; PhD in chemistry, chemical biology Biology: Bachelor¶s in bioengineering; Master¶s in bioengineering; PhD in biology, bioengineering; specializes in chemical biology and biotechnology research Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering; Master¶s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering; PhD in chemical engineering, electrical engineering Dresden Technical University Website: http://tu-dresden.de/index_html/newsboard_view?cl=en Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, Diplomas in materials science; specialized research in materials science, biomaterials and nanotechnology Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology, molecular biotechnology; specialized research in regenerative medicine and molecular bioengineering Mathematics/Engineering: Diplomas in chemical engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics University of Duisburg-Essen (Duisburg campus) Website: http://www.uni-duisburg-essen.de/en/index.php Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in metallurgy and metal forming, nano engineering Biology: N/A Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in Electrical and electronic engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, techno mathematics University of Duisburg-Essen (Essen campus) Website: http://www.uni-duisburg-essen.de/en/index.php Physics: N/A Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry, Master¶s in pharmaceutical medicine; specialized research in Fundamentals and Applications of Nanotechnologies Biology: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in medical biology; Graduate work in medicine, specialized research in Genetical Medicine and Medical Biology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics

86 University of Erlangen-Nürnberg Website: http://www.uni-erlangen.org/ Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics; Center for medical physics and technology Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemical and bioengineering, chemistry; Master¶s in advanced materials and processes, chemical and bioengineering, materials science and engineering, molecular medicine Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology, molecular medicine; Master¶s in biology; Graduate work in dentistry, medicine Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, life science engineering, materials science and engineering, mathematics, mechanical engineering, mechatronics; Master¶s in advanced optical technologies, electrical engineering, life science engineering, mechanical engineering, mechatronics; PhD in engineering University of Frankfurt Website: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/english/index.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry; graduate work in pharmacy Biology: Graduate work in medicine Mathematics/Engineering: N/A University of Freiburg Website: http://www.uni-freiburg.de/index_en.php Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics; Specialized research with Hadron colliders Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, Microtechnology; Master¶s in Crystalline Materials, Microtechnology Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in bioinformatics and systems biology; Graduate work in medicine Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics Freie Universität Berlin Website: http://www.fu-berlin.de/en/index.html Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in biochemistry, chemistry, pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s in bioinformatics, Institute of Biology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics University of Hamburg Website: http://www.uni-hamburg.de/index_e.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, nano science and technology; Graduate work in pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology, molecular life sciences; master¶s in biology; graduate work in medicine, dentistry Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics

87 Hamburg University of Technology Website: http://www.tu-harburg.de/index_e.html Physics: N/A Chemistry: N/A Biology: N/A Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in general engineering science, bioprocess engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mechatronics, process (chemical engineering), some PhD research available Heinrich-Heine University Website: http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in medical physics, physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry, biochemistry, chemical industry; Graduate work in pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in biology; graduate work in medicine; specialized research in biotechnology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics Ilmenau Technical University Website: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/uni/1+M54099f70862.0.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in technical physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in materials science, micro- and nanotechnologies Biology: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in biomedical engineering Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in electrical power and control engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics, optronics; specialized research in nanoengineering, precision engineering and precision metrology Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Website: http://www.uni-mainz.de/eng/ Physics: Specialized research with the Max Planck Institute for polymer research Chemistry: Diplomas available in chemistry, biomedical chemistry; Graduate work in pharmacology Biology: Bachelor¶s in molecular biology; Master¶s in biomedicine; Graduate work in pharmacology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics Karlsruhe University Website: http://www.uni-karlsruhe.de/index_en.php Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s, Master¶s, and PhD in chemistry Biology: Master¶s in bioengineering Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, mathematics, mechanical engineering; Master¶s in electrical engineering

88 Konstanz University Website: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/index.php?lang=en Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry, molecular materials science Biology: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in biological sciences Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics Leibniz University of Hannover Website: http://www.uni-hannover.de/en/index.php Physics: Bachelor¶s, Master¶s, and PhD in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in biochemistry, chemistry; Master¶s in biochemistry, chemistry, materials chemistry and nanochemistry, medicinal and natural product chemistry, nanotechnology; PhD in chemistry, materials chemistry and nanochemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in biology; PhD in biology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics; Master¶s in mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics, optical technologies; PhD in mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics, optical technologies Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University Website: http://www.en.uni-muenchen.de/index.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, biochemistry, pharmaceutical sciences, Master¶s in advanced materials science (English course), biochemistry(English course), chemistry, pharmaceutical sciences, Graduate work in Pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s in bioinformatics, biology, Master¶s in bioinformatics, PhD in Neurosciences (English course), Nano-bio-technology (English course), Graduate work in veterinary medicine, dentistry, medicine Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, Master¶s in mathematics, software engineering Munich Technical University Website: http://portal.mytum.de/welcome/document_view? Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics, nuclear engineering; Master¶s in engineering physics; Research available in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in biochemistry, chemistry; Master¶s in advanced materials science, biochemistry, chemistry; Research available in chemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in bioinformatics, biology, molecular biotechnology; Master¶s in bioinformatics, biology, biomedical computing Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering, energy and process technology, engineering in life science, mathematics, mechanical engineering, mechatronics, medical engineering; Master¶s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering, mathematics, mathematics in science and engineering, mechanical engineering, mechatronics, medical engineering, microelectronics, microwave engineering, nuclear engineering; Research available in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering

89 University of Münster Website: http://www.uni-muenster.de/en/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics; specialized research in physics (focus on geophysics, nanophysics, nonlinear physics, particle physics, and didactics) Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry; Master¶s in chemistry, chemical industry, pharmaceutical sciences; Graduate work in pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in biology, biotechnology, molecular biomedicine; Graduate work in medicine Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics University of Oldenburg Website: http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/en/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics, engineering physics; Specialized research in radiation conversion and semiconductor physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in biology, microbiology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics Paderborn University Website: http://www.uni-paderborn.de/en/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry Biology: N/A Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, technomathematics; Master¶s in Applied mechatronics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, technomathematics; Research is primarily engineering-based University of Potsdam Website: http://www.uni-potsdam.de/english/ Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, life sciences; Master¶s in biochemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in bioinformatics, biotechnology, medical technology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics Rostock University Website: http://www.uni-rostock.de/ Physics: PhD in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s, Master¶s, and PhD in chemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biological science, biomedical technology, medical biotechnology; Master¶s in biomedical technology; Graduate work in medicine; PhD in biology and technology of new materials Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, mathematics, mechanical engineering; Master¶s in electrical engineering

90 Ruhr University Bochum Website: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/international/index_en.html Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry, biochemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in biology; Graduate work in medicine Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics Saarland University Website: http://www.uni-saarland.de/en Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, materials science and engineering, microtechnology and nanostructures; Master¶s in advanced materials science and engineering; Graduate work in pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology; Master¶s in bioinformatics, biotechnology; Graduate work in medicine, dentistry Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in mathematics, mechatronics; Master¶s in applied mathematics University of Siegen Website: http://www.uni-siegen.de/aaa/letsgotosiegen/index.html.en?lang=en Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s and PhD in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s and PhD in chemistry Biology: N/A Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in Mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, mechatronics, mathematics; PhD in mechatronics, mathematics Stuttgard University Website: http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/index.en.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry and materials science Biology: Bachelor¶s in technical biology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in aerospace engineering, electrical engineering, engineering cybernetics, mechatronics, mechanical engineering, mathematics; Master¶s in electrical engineering; PhD in advanced manufacturing engineering, advanced solid state science University of Tübingen Website: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/qvr/e-30/m30-01.html Physics: N/A Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in biochemistry; Graduate work in pharmacy Biology: Bachelor¶s in molecular medicine, biology, bioinformatics; Master¶s in neuroscience and behavioral science, cellular and molecular neuroscience, bioinformatics; Graduate work in medicine Mathematics/Engineering: N/A

91 Ulm University Website: http://www.uni-ulm.de/en/university-news.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry, biochemistry; Master¶s in biochemistry, chemistry, advanced materials (in English) Biology: Bachelor¶s in molecular medicine, biology; Master¶s in molecular medicine, biology; Graduate work in medicine; PhD in molecular medicine Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, mathematics, mathematical biometry; Master¶s in electrical engineering, mathematics University of Würzburg Website: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/en/home/ Physics: Bachelor¶s in physics, mathematical physics; Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s in chemistry; Master¶s in chemistry, technology of functional materials, nanostructure technology Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology, biomedical; Master¶s in biomedical; Graduate work in medicine; Research focus on biomedical technology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in mathematics University of Wuppertal Website: http://www.uni-wuppertal.de/index-en.html Physics: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in physics Chemistry: Bachelor¶s and Master¶s in chemistry Biology: Bachelor¶s in biology Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor¶s in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics; Master¶s in electrical engineering, mathematics

92 Appendix B: Table A.B.1: University Subject Population Data
Total Number of Students Percentage International Students in Science/Math/Engineering Programs Biochemistry: 228 - 5%; Biology: 35 11%; chemistry: 446 - 15%; Chemical Analysis: 15 - 87%; Electrical engineering: 69 - 58%; Mechatronics: 73 - 14%; Electrical engineering (masters): 114 - 86%; Mechatronics (Masters): 15 80%; mathematics: 284- 19%; mechanical engineering: 1223 - 11%; math/natural science 21%; Physics: 325 - 12%; Technical Physics: engineering science: 23% 88 - 16% Electrical engineering: 1239 - 38%; EE (masters) 88 - 76%; medicine: 1337 - 4%; Biochemistry: 97 - 3%; Biochemistry masters - 54 - 2%; chemistry: 61 - 12%; chemistry (masters) 20 - 20%; math: 262 - 8%; technomath: 141 - 5%; math (masters) 3 - 67%; aeronautical and aerospace engineering: 528 - 12%; ME medicine: 8%; math/natural 82 - 13%; ME masters 44 - 64%; physics sciences: 26%; engineering 676 - 2%; engineering physics: 32 - 12%; engineering physics (masters) 19 - 79% science: 42% Biology: 528 - 1%; chemistry: 170 - 6%; dentistry: 122 - 7%; EE: 202 - 9%; math: medicine: 12%; math/natural sciences: 21%; 113 - 16%; technomath: 23 - 0%; physics 163- 2%; physics (masters) : 2 - 100% engineering science: 13% chemistry and biochem: 322 - 4%; biochem (masters): 5 - 0%; biology: 815 3%; chemistry (masters): 33 - 0%; medicine 12%; dentistry: 599 - 11%; math: 344 - 15%; mathematics/natural math (masters): 23 - 83%; pharmaceutical sciences 20% sciences: 27 - 4%; pharmacy: 675 - 9% Physics: 154: 3% int; Materials science: Math/natural science: 28%; 121-2% int; environment & medicine: 2%; engingeering bioengineering science: 253 - 2% int; science: 6% biochem: 41 - N/A; chemistry: 45 - N/A Chemistry: 266 - 5%; Molecular science: 102 - 0%; Molecular science (Masters): 21 - 0%; Electrical engineering: 526 15%;Mechatronics: 458 - 6%; medicine: 11%, Mathematics: 208 - 11%; math/natural science: Technomathematics: 70 - 6%; Materials 20%;engineering science: science: 261: 3%; mechanical engineering 12% (masters): 92- 62%; Materials science Percentage of Students in Science/Math/Engineering Departments

University

Leibniz University of Hannover

21575

Munich Technical University

21904

Rostock University

14076

LudwigMaximilians Munich University

44174

Bayreuth University

9245

University of ErlangenNürnberg

25983

93
(masters): 24 - 38%; Physics: 387 - 2% Pharmacy: 298 - 5% Biochemistry: 179 - 6%; Bioinformatics: 108 - 68%; Dentistry: 513 - 8%; Mathematics: 1537 - 5%; Pharmacy: 665 - 7% Biology: 43 - 2%; chemistry: 55 - 18%; chemistry (masters): 67 - 96%; mechatronics: 92 - 97%; math: 64 - 12%; math (masters) 2 - 100%; ME: 180 - 6%; mechatronics (masters): 92 - 97%; physics: 51 - 8%; physics (masters): 106 32% Chemistry: 484; 15% int, Electrical engineering: 60- 32% int; Electrical Engineering (Masters): 35 - 71% int; mathematics: 531 - 13% int; Technical mathematics: 621 - 20%; Physics: 786 9% int Chemical biology: 207 - 2% int; Chemistry (Masters): 7 - 29%; Chemical biology (Masters): 211 - 6%; Automation and robotics (Masters): 95 - 96%; Mathematics: 274 - 5%; Chemical engineering (Masters): 59 - 97%; Physics: 357 - 8% electrical engineering: 75 - 12%; Biomedical engineering: 61 - 13%; Biochemistry: 56 - 7%; Biology: 1029 5%; Chemistry: 382 - 15%; Industrial chemistry: 183 - 7%; Dentistry: 300 - 9%; Math: 318 - 15%; math ( masters): 9 56%; pharmacy: 585 - 8%; physics: 41 15% Biology: 299 - 3%; chemistry: 450- 12%; EE: 276 - 28%;EE(masters): 82 - 94%; math 237 - 10%; technomath: 123 - 3%; ME: 2291 - 17%; Physics: 834 - 6% Biology: 1187 - 2%; molec bio: 84 - 0%; biomedicine (masters): 17 - 12%; chemistry: 627 - 4%; biomedical chemistry: 443 - 2%; dentistry: 629 14%; math: 81 - 5%; pharmacy: 481 5%; physics: 599 - 2% biochem: 64 - 2%; biochem (masters): 4 0%; biology: 343 - 2%; chemistry: 214 4%; industrial chemistry: 79 - 10%; dentistry: 286 - 11%; math: 139 - 5%; physics: 247 - 6%; advanced materials

University of Frankfurt

34174

medicine: 10%, mathematics/natural science: 20%,

University of Siegen

12512

math/natural science : 18%; engineering science:15%

Berlin Technical University

27367

Math/natural science: 23%; Engineering science: 30%

Dortmund Technical University Ilmenau Technical University

21,564

Math/natural science: 28%; engineering science: 24% math/natural sciences:18; engineering sciences: 49%

6623

HeinrichHeine University

17946

Medicine: 17%; Mathematics, natural science: 25%

Karlsruhe University

17975

math/natural sciences: 38%; engineering science: 40%

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

34252

medicine: 10%; math/natural sciences: 21%

Ulm University

7074

medicine: 38%; math/natural sciences: 48%; engineering science: 7%

94
(English language masters course): 42 100%; medicine: 2080 - 9%; molecular medicine: 35 - 6%

95 Appendix C: Foreign Population Data Table A.C.1: Germany: Stock of Foreign Population by Select Country of Nationality
Region/Sub-region/Country of Citizenship All countries Africa Eastern Africa Ethiopia Central Africa Cameroon Congo, Democratic Republic Northern Africa Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Southern Africa South Africa Western Africa Ghana Nigeria Togo Americas Northern America United States Central America and the Caribbean South America Argentina Brazil Chile Asia Eastern and Central Asia Afghanistan China Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Republic Taiwan South-east Asia India Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Viet Nam 2007 6,744,879 269,937 34,365 10,293 31,156 14,650 11,150 119,079 13,217 11,217 67,989 23,228 16,208 4,863 68,352 20,392 16,747 11,454 215,666 113,252 99,891 29,934 72,453 4,634 31,461 5,959 2,527,242 268,119 49,808 78,096 30,230 55,393 23,595 4,676 284,811 42,495 11,233 28,999 19,246 29,977 53,952 83,333

96
Western Asia Armenia Azerbaijan Cyprus Georgia Iraq Iran Israel Jordan Lebanon Turkey Syria Europe Albania Austria Belarus Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Malta Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Serbia Serbia and Montenegro (former) Slovakia Slovenia Spain 1,971,429 9,727 14,586 875 13,627 72,597 56,178 9,742 7,840 38,613 1,713,551 28,161 3,662,186 10,009 175,875 18,266 22,559 158,158 46,818 225,309 34,266 18,658 4,065 13,394 106,549 294,891 56,165 1,224 10,059 528,318 9,806 19,833 9,796 62,474 410 12,365 2,632 128,192 6,357 384,808 114,552 84,584 187,835 91,525 236,451 24,458 20,971 106,301

97
Sweden Switzerland Ukraine United Kingdom Australia and Oceania Australia Stateless or not reported Stateless Unknown and data missing 17,126 37,291 126,960 97,070 11,116 8,786 58,732 13,310 45,422

SOURCE: Central Register of Foreigners

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