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Tuesday,

November 12, 2002

Part II

Nuclear Regulatory
Commission

Biweekly Notice; Applications and


Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards
Considerations; Notice

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68728 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

NUCLEAR REGULATORY However, should circumstances change Agencywide Documents Access and
COMMISSION during the notice period such that Management System’s (ADAMS) Public
failure to act in a timely way would Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
Biweekly Notice; Applications and result, for example, in derating or at the NRC Web site, http://
Amendments to Facility Operating shutdown of the facility, the www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
Licenses Involving No Significant Commission may issue the license collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing
Hazards Considerations amendment before the expiration of the or petition for leave to intervene is filed
30-day notice period, provided that its by the above date, the Commission or an
I. Background
final determination is that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
Pursuant to Public Law 97–415, the amendment involves no significant designated by the Commission or by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission hazards consideration. The final Chairman of the Atomic Safety and
(the Commission or NRC staff) is determination will consider all public Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
publishing this regular biweekly notice. and State comments received before request and/or petition; and the
Public Law 97–415 revised section 189 action is taken. Should the Commission Secretary or the designated Atomic
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as take this action, it will publish in the Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
amended (the Act), to require the Federal Register a notice of issuance notice of a hearing or an appropriate
Commission to publish notice of any and provide for opportunity for a order.
amendments issued, or proposed to be hearing after issuance. The Commission As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a
issued, under a new provision of section expects that the need to take this action petition for leave to intervene shall set
189 of the Act. This provision grants the will occur very infrequently. forth with particularity the interest of
Commission the authority to issue and Written comments may be submitted the petitioner in the proceeding, and
make immediately effective any by mail to the Chief, Rules and how that interest may be affected by the
amendment to an operating license Directives Branch, Division of results of the proceeding. The petition
upon a determination by the Administrative Services, Office of should specifically explain the reasons
Commission that such amendment Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory why intervention should be permitted
involves no significant hazards Commission, Washington, DC 20555– with particular reference to the
consideration, notwithstanding the 0001, and should cite the publication following factors: (1) The nature of the
pendency before the Commission of a date and page number of this Federal petitioner’s right under the Act to be
request for a hearing from any person. Register notice. Written comments may made a party to the proceeding; (2) the
This biweekly notice includes all also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two nature and extent of the petitioner’s
notices of amendments issued, or White Flint North, 11545 Rockville property, financial, or other interest in
proposed to be issued from October 18, Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 the proceeding; and (3) the possible
2002, through October 31, 2002. The last a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. effect of any order which may be
biweekly notice was published on Copies of written comments received entered in the proceeding on the
October 29, 2002 (67 FR 66005). may be examined at the Commission’s petitioner’s interest. The petition should
Public Document Room (PDR), located also identify the specific aspect(s) of the
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
at One White Flint North, 11555 subject matter of the proceeding as to
Amendments to Facility Operating
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, which petitioner wishes to intervene.
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Maryland. The filing of requests for a Any person who has filed a petition for
Hazards Consideration Determination,
hearing and petitions for leave to leave to intervene or who has been
and Opportunity for a Hearing
intervene is discussed below. admitted as a party may amend the
The Commission has made a By December 12, 2002, the licensee petition without requesting leave of the
proposed determination that the may file a request for a hearing with Board up to 15 days prior to the first
following amendment requests involve respect to issuance of the amendment to prehearing conference scheduled in the
no significant hazards consideration. the subject facility operating license and proceeding, but such an amended
Under the Commission’s regulations in any person whose interest may be petition must satisfy the specificity
10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation affected by this proceeding and who requirements described above.
of the facility in accordance with the wishes to participate as a party in the Not later than 15 days prior to the first
proposed amendment would not (1) proceeding must file a written request prehearing conference scheduled in the
involve a significant increase in the for a hearing and a petition for leave to proceeding, a petitioner shall file a
probability or consequences of an intervene. Requests for a hearing and a supplement to the petition to intervene
accident previously evaluated; or (2) petition for leave to intervene shall be which must include a list of the
create the possibility of a new or filed in accordance with the contentions which are sought to be
different kind of accident from any Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for litigated in the matter. Each contention
accident previously evaluated; or (3) Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10 must consist of a specific statement of
involve a significant reduction in a CFR part 2. Interested persons should the issue of law or fact to be raised or
margin of safety. The basis for this consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714,1 controverted. In addition, the petitioner
proposed determination for each which is available at the Commission’s shall provide a brief explanation of the
amendment request is shown below. PDR, located at One White Flint North, bases of the contention and a concise
The Commission is seeking public 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), statement of the alleged facts or expert
comments on this proposed Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available opinion which support the contention
determination. Any comments received records will be accessible from the and on which the petitioner intends to
within 30 days after the date of rely in proving the contention at the
publication of this notice will be 1 The most recent version of Title 10 of the Code hearing. The petitioner must also
considered in making any final of Federal Regulations, published January 1, 2002, provide references to those specific
determination. inadvertently omitted the last sentence of 10 CFR sources and documents of which the
2.714(d) and paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) regarding
Normally, the Commission will not petitions to intervene and contentions. For the
petitioner is aware and on which the
issue the amendment until the complete, corrected text of 10 CFR 2.714(d), please petitioner intends to rely to establish
expiration of the 30-day notice period. see 67 FR 20884; April 29, 2002. those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68729

must provide sufficient information to or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. administrative controls. The proposed
show that a genuine dispute exists with A copy of the request for hearing and amendment would also delete TS 4.8,
the applicant on a material issue of law petition for leave to intervene should ‘‘Main Steam Isolation Valves,’’ along
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to also be sent to the attorney for the with the reference to TS 4.8 in Table
matters within the scope of the licensee. 4.1–2, Item No. 6. This change would
amendment under consideration. The Nontimely filings of petitions for delete a monthly requirement for a
contention must be one which, if leave to intervene, amended petitions, partial stroke test, but would not affect
proven, would entitle the petitioner to supplemental petitions and/or requests testing performed in accordance with
relief. A petitioner who fails to file such for a hearing will not be entertained the American Society for Mechanical
a supplement which satisfies these absent a determination by the Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel
requirements with respect to at least one Commission, the presiding officer or the Code (ASME Code), which the licensee
contention will not be permitted to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that states would continue to ensure
participate as a party. the petition and/or request should be operability of the MSIVs. The proposed
Those permitted to intervene become granted based upon a balancing of changes would also revise Figure 5–1,
parties to the proceeding, subject to any factors specified in 10 CFR ‘‘Extended Plot Plan,’’ to correct
limitations in the order granting leave to 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d). inaccurate information, and Figure 5–3,
intervene, and have the opportunity to For further details with respect to this ‘‘Gaseous Effluent Release Points and
participate fully in the conduct of the action, see the application for Liquid Effluent Outfall Locations,’’ and
hearing, including the opportunity to amendment which is available for its accompanying table to reflect the
present evidence and cross-examine public inspection at the Commission’s modification which permanently
witnesses. PDR, located at One White Flint North, isolated the liquid outfall associated
If a hearing is requested, the 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), with emergency discharge from Three
Commission will make a final Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2.
determination on the issue of no records will be accessible from the Additional administrative and clerical
significant hazards consideration. The Agencywide Documents Access and changes are also included in the
final determination will serve to decide Management System’s (ADAMS) Public proposed TSs to delete obsolete
when the hearing is held. Electronic Reading Room on the Internet references to TS sections that have been
If the final determination is that the at the NRC web site, http:// deleted, improve the consistency and
amendment request involves no www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If clarity of the TSs, and revise the Bases
significant hazards consideration, the you do not have access to ADAMS or if of TS 3.1.6 to delete the setpoint range
Commission may issue the amendment there are problems in accessing the for emergency core cooling system
and make it immediately effective, documents located in ADAMS, contact cubicle leak detection and replace it
notwithstanding the request for a the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1–800– with a single value.
hearing. Any hearing held would take 397–4209, 304–415–4737 or by e-mail to Basis for proposed no significant
place after issuance of the amendment. pdr@nrc.gov. hazards consideration determination:
If the final determination is that the
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
amendment request involves a
No. 50–289, Three Mile Island Nuclear licensee has provided its analysis of the
significant hazards consideration, any
hearing held would take place before Station, Unit 1, Dauphin County, issue of no significant hazards
the issuance of any amendment. Pennsylvania consideration, which is presented
A request for a hearing or a petition Date of amendment request: below:
for leave to intervene must be filed with September 30, 2002. 1. Operation of the facility in accordance
the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Description of amendment request: with the proposed amendment will not
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The proposed amendment would revise involve a significant increase in the
Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention: the technical specification (TS) probability or consequences of an accident
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff, or definition of containment integrity to previously evaluated.
Changes to the definition of containment
may be delivered to the Commission’s ensure that all power-operated valves, integrity and the additional operability
PDR, located at One White Flint North, relief valves, and check valves are requirements for Containment Isolation
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), included. The proposed changes would Valves (CIVs) provide additional
Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. provide operability requirements to requirements and add clarity to the Technical
Because of continuing disruptions in include the Type III containment Specifications. The addition of a provision
delivery of mail to United States isolation valves (CIVs), those valves that for permitting intermittent opening of
Government offices, it is requested that are in line with a containment isolation normally closed CIVs or manual control of
petitions for leave to intervene and barrier consisting of a closed system power-operated CIVs under administrative
requests for hearing be transmitted to within containment (e.g., main steam control is consistent with the Standard
Technical Specifications or a similar
the Secretary of the Commission either isolation valves (MSIVs)). The proposed provision in the current TMI Unit 1
by means of facsimile transmission to amendment would revise the Technical Specifications. This assures that
301–415–1101 or by e-mail to applicability of CIV operability the containment will be isolated if necessary
hearingdocket@nrc.gov. A copy of the requirements for those plant conditions in the event of an accident previously
request for hearing and petition for when containment integrity applies and evaluated and offsite dose from an accident
leave to intervene should also be sent to the reactor is not critical. The proposed will not be significantly increased. The
the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. amendment would clarify that the additional operability requirements provide
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, exceptions to containment integrity additional conservatism to the technical
Washington, DC 20555–0001, and provided in TS 3.6.1 apply equally to specifications.
None of the changes included with this
because of continuing disruptions in TS 3.6.2, whenever containment License Amendment Request will result in
delivery of mail to United States integrity is required. The proposed any change to the configuration of plant
Government offices, it is requested that amendment would incorporate components, affect any accident initiators
copies be transmitted either by means of provisions for intermittent manual associated with any accident previously
facsimile transmission to 301–415–3725 operation of the CIVs under evaluated or result in a significant increase

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68730 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

in the offsite dose consequences of accidents standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are and NEI [Nuclear Energy Institute] 94–01.
previously evaluated. The administrative satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff Industry experience has shown, as
changes are needed to correct errors and the proposes to determine that the documented in NUREG–1493, that Type B
editorial changes will improve the clarity, and C containment leakage tests have
consistency and readability of the Technical
amendment request involves no
identified a very large percentage of
Specifications and do not affect the intent or significant hazards consideration. containment leakage paths and that the
interpretation. Attorney for licensee: Edward J. percentage of containment leakage paths that
Therefore, operation of the facility in Cullen, Jr., Esquire, Vice President, are detected only by Type A testing is very
accordance with the proposed amendment General Counsel and Secretary, Exelon small. TMI, Unit 1 ILRT test history supports
will not involve a significant increase in the Generation Company, LLC, 300 Exelon this conclusion. NUREG–1493 concluded, in
probability or consequences of an accident Way, Kennett Square, PA 19348. part, that reducing the frequency of Type A
previously evaluated. NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer. containment leak tests to once per twenty
2. Operation of the facility in accordance (20) years leads to an imperceptible increase
with the proposed amendment will not create AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket in risk. Therefore, the proposed Technical
the possibility of a new or different kind of No. 50–289, Three Mile Island Nuclear Specification change does not involve a
accident from any accident previously Station, Unit 1, Dauphin County, significant increase in the consequences of an
evaluated. Pennsylvania accident previously evaluated.
The changes associated with this proposed 2. The proposed Technical Specification
amendment do not result in any additional Date of amendment request: change does not create the possibility of a
hardware or design changes to structures, September 30, 2002. new or different kind of accident from any
systems, or components (SCCs) of the plant; Description of amendment request: accident previously evaluated.
nor will any of these changes affect the The proposed amendment would revise The proposed revision to [the] Technical
ability of an SSC to perform its design Technical Specification (TS) Section Specifications involves a one-time extension
function. No new failure mechanisms, 6.8.5, ‘‘Reactor Building Leakage Rate to the current interval for Type A
malfunctions, or accident initiators will be containment testing. The reactor containment
introduced that were not considered in the Testing Program,’’ to allow a one-time
and the testing guidelines invoked to
design and licensing basis. deferral of the next Type A, periodically demonstrate the integrity of the
Therefore, operation of the facility in Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test reactor containment exist to ensure the
accordance with the proposed amendment (ILRT) from October 2003 to no later plant’s ability to mitigate the consequences of
will not create the possibility of a new or than September 2008. an accident and do not involve the
different kind of accident from any accident Basis for proposed no significant prevention or identification of any precursors
previously evaluated. hazards consideration determination: of an accident. The proposed Technical
3. Operation of the facility in accordance As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Specification change does not involve a
with the proposed amendment will not physical change to the plant or the manner
licensee has provided its analysis of the
involve a significant reduction in a margin of in which the plant is operated or controlled.
safety. issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented Therefore, the proposed Technical
Additional operability requirements Specification change does not create the
provide conservative improvements to the below: possibility of a new or different kind of
Technical Specifications. The addition of a 1. The proposed Technical Specification accident from any accident previously
provision for permitting intermittent opening change does not involve a significant evaluated.
of normally closed CIVs or manual control of increase in the probability or consequences 3. The proposed Technical Specification
power-operated CIVs under administrative of an accident previously evaluated. change does not involve a significant
control is consistent with the Standard The proposed revision to Technical reduction in a margin of safety.
Technical Specifications or with similar Specification Section 6.8.5 (‘‘Reactor The proposed revision to [the] Technical
provisions in the current TMI Unit 1 Building Leakage Rate Testing Program’’) Specifications involves a one-time extension
Technical Specifications. This condition involves a one-time extension to the current to the current interval for Type A
assures that the containment will be isolated interval for Type A containment testing. The containment testing. The proposed Technical
if necessary in the event of an accident. current test interval of ten (10) years would Specification change does not involve a
Changes to the MSIV [main steam isolation be extended on a one-time basis to no longer physical change to the plant or a change in
valve] test requirements do not alter the than fifteen (15) years from the last Type A the manner in which the plant is operated or
Inservice Test requirements in accord[ance test (1993). The proposed Technical controlled. The specific guidelines and
with] the American Society of Mechanical
Specification change does not involve a conditions of the Reactor Building Leakage
Engineers (ASME) [Boiler and Pressure
physical change to the plant or a change in Rate Testing Program, as defined in [the]
Vessel] Code, which will continue to assure
the manner in which the plant is operated or Technical Specifications, exist to ensure that
operability. The administrative changes are
controlled. The reactor containment is the degree of reactor building containment
needed to correct errors and the editorial
designed to provide an essentially leak tight structural integrity and leak-tightness that is
changes will improve the clarity,
barrier against the uncontrolled release of considered in the plant safety analysis is
consistency, and readability of the Technical
radioactivity to the environment for maintained. The overall containment leakage
Specifications and do not affect the intent or
postulated accidents. As such, the reactor rate limit specified by [the] Technical
interpretation.
containment itself and the testing guidelines Specifications is maintained. The proposed
None of the changes included with this
request have the potential to significantly invoked to periodically demonstrate the change involves only the extension of the
reduce a margin of safety. These changes do integrity of the reactor containment exist to interval between Type A containment
not affect the design of a plant component or ensure the plant’s ability to mitigate the leakage tests. Type B and C containment
instrument setpoint so as to [a]ffect its design consequences of an accident, and do not leakage tests will continue to be performed
basis or affect the controlling numerical involve the prevention or identification of at the frequency currently required by plant
value for any parameter established in the any precursors of an accident. Therefore, the Technical Specifications and NEI–94–01.
updated final safety analysis report or the proposed Technical Specification change NUREG–1493 concludes that reducing the
license. does not involve a significant increase in the Type A Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT)
Therefore, operation of the facility in probability of an accident previously testing frequency to one per twenty (20) years
accordance with the proposed amendment evaluated. was found to lead to imperceptible increase
will not involve a significant reduction in a The proposed change involves only the in risk. Additionally, while Type B and C
margin of safety. extension of the interval between Type A tests identify the vast majority (greater than
containment leakage tests. Type B and C 85%) of all potential leak paths,
The NRC staff has reviewed the containment leakage tests will continue to be performance-based alternatives are feasible
licensee’s analysis and, based on this performed at the frequency currently without significant risk impacts. Since
review, it appears that the three required by plant Technical Specifications leakage contributes less than 0.1 percent of

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overall risk under existing guidelines, the line isolation valve drain piping, which will modification can be implemented without
overall effect is very small. The TMI, Unit 1 be within the ALT pathway pressure prior NRC approval. Therefore, the proposed
plant specific risk analysis supports this boundary after a loss-of-coolant-accident change does not involve a significant
conclusion. Therefore, the proposed (LOCA), obviate the need to install check reduction in a margin of safety.
Technical Specification change does not valve MVD–V5008. This is because the Unit Based on the above, CP&L concludes that
involve a significant reduction in a margin of 2 steam bypass system was designed for full the proposed amendment presents no
safety. bypass capability and thus has two steam significant hazards consideration under the
bypass chests; whereas Unit 1 has only one standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and,
The NRC staff has reviewed the steam bypass chest. The Unit 2 design accordingly, a finding of ‘‘no significant
licensee’s analysis and, based on this includes a drain line from the steam bypass hazards consideration’’ is justified.
review, it appears that the three chest, which ties into the same line that on The NRC staff has reviewed the
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are Unit 1 was isolated post-LOCA by use of the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 1–MVD–V5008 valve. Since, for Unit 2, the
entire line is required to be seismically review, it appears that the three
proposes to determine that the
verified, up to and including the steam standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
amendment request involves no satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
bypass chest, there was no benefit in
significant hazards consideration. proposes to determine that the
installing the new check valve MVD–V5008
Attorney for licensee: Edward J. on Unit 2. amendment request involves no
Cullen, Jr., Esquire, Vice President, CP&L has performed an evaluation of the significant hazards consideration.
General Counsel and Secretary, Exelon Unit 2 ALT path modification, in accordance Attorney for licensee: William D.
Generation Company, LLC, 300 Exelon with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, and Johnson, Vice President and Corporate
Way, Kennett Square, PA 19348. determined that the modification can be Secretary, Carolina Power & Light
NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer. implemented without prior NRC approval.
As such, the requested amendment merely
Company, Post Office Box 1551,
Carolina Power & Light Company, aligns the wording of the current license Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
Docket No. 50–324, Brunswick Steam condition with the design of the Unit 2 ALT NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.
Electric Plant, Unit 2, Brunswick path modification. The original intent of the Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
County, North Carolina license condition was to ensure that check Docket No. 50–336, Millstone Power
valves being installed as a result of the
Date of amendment request: Station, Unit No. 2, New London
modification would be included in the
September 16, 2002. facility check valve program. This intent is County, Connecticut
Description of amendment request: maintained by the proposed license Date of amendment request:
The proposed change revises a license condition. Therefore, the proposed change September 26, 2002.
condition, contained in Appendix B of does not involve a significant increase in the Description of amendment request:
the Technical Specifications, to reflect a probability or consequences of an accident The proposed amendment would
modification to support the previously evaluated. change Technical Specification (TS)
implementation of an alternative source 2. Does the proposed change create the
3.3.3.1, ‘‘Monitoring Instrumentation,
possibility of a new or different kind of
term (AST) on Unit 2 that would ensure Radiation Monitoring,’’ TS 3.3.4,
accident from any accident previously
seismic ruggedness of the alternate evaluated? ‘‘Instrumentation, Containment Purge
leakage treatment (ALT) piping and Response: No. Valve Isolation Signal,’’ TS 3.7.6.1,
appendages. As a result of further As stated above, CP&L has performed an ‘‘Plant Systems, Control Room
modification development, it has been evaluation of the Unit 2 ALT path Emergency Ventilation System,’’ TS
determined that only one check valve modification, in accordance with the 3.9.4, ‘‘Refueling Operations,
will be installed (i.e., MVD–V5009) by provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, and determined Containment Penetrations,’’ TS 3.9.8.1,
the Unit 2 ALT piping modification. that the modification can be implemented ‘‘Refueling Operations, Shutdown
The proposed license amendment without prior NRC approval. The requested Cooling and Coolant Circulation—High
amendment merely aligns the wording of the
revises the affected license condition to Water Level,’’ TS 3.9.8.2, ‘‘Refueling
current license condition with the design of
require that only MVD–V5009 must be the Unit 2 ALT path modification. Therefore, Operations, Shutdown Cooling and
added to the facility check valve the proposed change does not create the Coolant Circulation—Low Water Level,’’
program. possibility of a new or different kind of and TS 3.9.15, ‘‘Refueling Operations,
Basis for proposed no significant accident from any accident previously Storage Pool Area Ventilation System.’’
hazards consideration determination: evaluated. In addition, the TS Bases would be
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 3. Does the proposed change involve a revised to address the proposed
licensee has provided its analysis of the significant reduction in a margin of safety? changes. The basis for the proposed
issue of no significant hazards Response: No. changes is a re-analysis of the limiting
consideration, which is presented The proposed change revises a license
condition, added to Appendix B, Unit 2 TSs
design basis Fuel Handling Accident
below: in Amendment 246. Therefore, the proposed using an Alternative Source Term in
1. Does the proposed change involve a change does not involve a significant accordance with Title 10 of the Code of
significant increase in the probability or reduction in a margin of safety. This license Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section
consequences of an accident previously condition currently requires that ALT path 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183.
evaluated? check valves MVD–V5008 and MDV–V5009 Basis for proposed no significant
Response: No. be include in the facility check valve hazards consideration determination:
The proposed change revises a license program. The proposed revision to affected As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
condition, added to Appendix B, ‘‘Additional Unit 2 license condition eliminates reference licensee has provided its analysis of the
Conditions,’’ of the Unit 2 Technical to a CP&L September 27, 2001, submittal and issue of no significant hazards
Specifications (TSs) in Amendment 246, the requirement to include MVD–V5008 in
which approved the implementation of the facility check valve program. The
consideration, which is presented
Alternative Source Term. This license requested amendment merely aligns the below:
condition currently requires that alternate wording of the current license condition with 1. Involve a significant increase in the
leakage treatment (ALT) path check valves the design of the Unit 2 ALT path probability or consequences of an accident
MVD–V5008 and MDV–V5009 be included in modification which has been evaluated, in previously evaluated.
the facility check valve program. Differences accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR The proposed changes involve the
between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 main steam 50.59, and it has been determined that the reanalysis of a Fuel Handling Accident (FHA)

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68732 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

in the Containment, FHA in the Spent Fuel of at least 72 hours. In addition, The NRC staff has reviewed the
Pool Area, and the Cask Drop Accident in the administrative controls are put in place to licensee’s analysis and, based on this
Spent Fuel Pool Area. The new analyses, provide for closure of Containment review, it appears that the three
based on the Alternative Source Term (AST) atmosphere boundary openings in the event
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, will of a FHA. Use of an alternative analysis
replace the existing analyses which are based method does not affect fuel parameters or the satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
on methodologies and assumptions derived equipment used to handle the fuel. The proposes to determine that the
from Regulatory Guide 1.25, Standard above proposed changes to the Technical amendment request involves no
Review Plan (SRP) 15.7.4, SRP 15.7.5, and Specifications reflect assumptions made in significant hazards consideration.
TID–14844. Because different methodologies the FHA Analyses. The other changes to the Attorney for licensee: Lillian M.
are used, the new calculated doses are not Technical Specifications are also consistent Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel,
directly comparable to the current calculated with the revised FHA Analyses. Therefore, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
doses. If a consistent basis is used, it is the proposed changes do not involve a Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385.
expected that the new analyses assumptions significant increase in the probability or
NRC Section Chief: James W.
in some cases result in a decrease in dose at consequences of an accident previously
the site boundary or to control room evaluated. Andersen (Acting).
personnel and in some cases result in an 2. Create the possibility of a new or Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos.
increase in dose at the site boundary or to different kind of accident from any accident 50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Nuclear
control room personnel. However, in all previously evaluated.
cases the analyses results are within the 10 The proposed amendment involves the use
Station, Units 1 and 2, Located in
CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 of an alternative analysis methodology for the Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
acceptance criteria. evaluation of the dose consequences from a Date of amendment request:
As a result of the new analyses, changes to FHA that is postulated to occur in either the September 30, 2002.
the Technical Specifications are proposed Containment or the Spent Fuel Pool area. The Description of amendment request:
which take credit for the new analyses. The analysis demonstrates that Containment The proposed amendments would
proposed changes to the Technical closure conditions and automatic closure of
Specifications modify requirements regarding the Containment purge are not required to
revise the Technical Specifications for
Containment closure and Spent Fuel Pool maintain dose consequence within regulatory the plant’s reactor building integrity.
area ventilation during movement of limits following a postulated FHA inside The proposed amendment would (1)
irradiated fuel assemblies in Containment Containment. Therefore, the new analysis modify the surveillance requirement to
and in the Spent Fuel Pool area. The supports proposed changes to requirements be consistent with the design of the
proposed changes will allow Containment for Containment closure during movement of reactor building access openings, (2)
penetrations, including the equipment door irradiated fuel assemblies in Containment. modify the frequency of the surveillance
and personnel airlock door, to be maintained The analysis results also demonstrate that requirement for visual inspections for
open under administrative control. The operation of the Spent Fuel Pool area the exposed interior and exterior surface
proposed changes will eliminate the ventilation system is not required to maintain
requirements for automatic closure of dose consequences within regulatory limits
of the reactor building, and (3) modify
Containment purge during Mode 6 fuel following a postulated FHA in the Spent Fuel the administrative controls for the
movement. The technical specifications Pool area. The Containment closure containment leakage rate testing
associated with storage pool area ventilation components (e.g., equipment door, personnel program.
will be deleted. These proposed changes do airlock doors, and various Containment Basis for proposed no significant
not involve physical modifications to plant penetrations) and filtration systems are not hazards consideration determination:
equipment and do not change the operational accident initiators. The proposed changes do As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
methods or procedures used for the physical not involve the addition of new systems or licensee has provided its analysis of the
movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in components nor do they involve the issue of no significant hazards
Containment or in the Spent Fuel Pool area. modification of existing plant systems. The consideration, which is presented
As such, the proposed changes have no effect proposed changes do not affect the way in
on the probability of the occurrence of any which a FHA is postulated to occur.
below:
accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes do not As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), this
The revised requirements apply only when create the possibility of a new or different analysis is provided to demonstrate that the
irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved in kind of accident from any previously proposed license amendment does not
Containment or the Spent Fuel Pool area. evaluated. involve a significant hazard.
Previously evaluated accidents with the plant 3. Involve a significant reduction in a Conformance of the proposed amendment
in other conditions including Modes 1 margin of safety. to the standards for a determination of no
through Mode 5 are not impacted. The AST The existing dose analysis methodology significant hazards, as defined in
methodology is used to evaluate a FHA that and assumptions demonstrate that the dose 10CFR50.92, is shown in the following:
is postulated to occur during fuel movement consequences of a FHA are within regulatory (1) Does the proposed license amendment
activities in Containment and in the Spent limits for whole body and thyroid doses as involve a significant increase in the
Fuel Pool area. The AST analyses follow the established in 10 CFR 100. The alternative probability or consequences of an accident
guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.183 and dose analysis methodology and assumptions previously evaluated?
the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.67. The also demonstrate that the dose consequences No. The proposed amendment to the
analyses demonstrate that the dose of a FHA are within regulatory limits. The Technical Specifications does not result in
consequences meet the regulatory acceptance limits applicable to the alternative analysis the alteration of the design, material, or
criteria. are established in 10 CFR 50.67 in construction standards that were applicable
The FHA Analyses conservatively assume conjunction with the TEDE (total effective prior to the change. The proposed change
that the Containment building and the fuel dose equivalent) acceptance criteria directed will not result in the modification of any
storage building, including ventilation in Regulatory Guide 1.183. The acceptance system interface that would increase the
filtration systems for those buildings do not criteria for both dose analysis methods have likelihood of an accident since these events
diminish or delay the assumed fission been developed for the purpose of evaluating are independent of the proposed change. The
product release. The analysis does take credit design basis accidents to demonstrate proposed amendment will not change,
for, and technical specifications enforce, the adequate protection of public health and degrade, or prevent actions, or alter any
presence of 23 feet of water over the safety. An acceptable margin of safety is assumptions previously made in evaluating
irradiated fuel while fuel movement inherent in both types of acceptance criteria. the radiological consequences of an accident
activities are being performed. The analysis Therefore, the proposed changes do not described in the [Updated Final Safety
also takes credit for, and the technical involve a significant reduction in a margin of Analysis Report] UFSAR. Therefore, the
specification bases enforce a fuel decay time safety. proposed amendment does not result in the

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68733

increase in the probability or consequences be performed each 18 months. A note Third Standard
of an accident previously evaluated. provides that, on a once per 60 month Operation of the facilities in accordance
(2) Does the proposed change create the frequency, the service test requirement with this amendment would not involve a
possibility of a new or different kind of significant reduction in a margin of safety.
may be met by performing a modified
accident from any accident previously The change to the battery surveillance will
evaluated? performance test. The TS change would
remove the once per 60 month ensure each station’s batteries are maintained
No. This change does not create the in a highly reliable manner. The batteries
possibility of a new or different kind of restriction, thus allowing the will continue to be tested every 18 months
accident from any accident previously requirement for a service test to be met with the modified performance test
evaluated. No new accident causal by a modified performance test that enveloping the service test. The equipment
mechanisms are created as a result of NRC bounds the conditions of the service powered by the batteries will continue to
approval of this amendment request. No test. The licensee states that the provide adequate power to safety related
changes are being made to the facility which loads in accordance with analysis
proposed change will allow the use of
should introduce any new accident causal assumptions.
mechanisms. This amendment request does a consistent battery testing technique in
order to provide consistent data for Based on the preceding discussion, Duke
not impact any plant systems that are Energy has concluded that the proposed
accident initiators, since the containment trending battery performance. amendment does not involve a significant
and reactor building function primarily as Basis for proposed no significant hazard consideration.
accident mitigators. hazards consideration determination:
(3) Does the proposed change involve a The NRC staff has reviewed the
significant reduction in margin of safety? As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee’s analysis and, based on this
No. Implementation of this amendment licensee has provided its analysis of the review, it appears that the three
would not involve a significant reduction in issue of no significant hazards standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
the margin of safety. Margin of safety is consideration, which is presented satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
related to the confidence in the ability of the below: proposes to determine that the
fission product barriers to perform their
The following discussion is a summary of amendment request involves no
design functions during and following an
accident situation, including the performance
the evaluation of the change contained in this significant hazards consideration.
of the containment and reactor building. The proposed amendment against the 10 CFR Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lisa F.
ability of the containment and reactor 50.92(c) requirements to demonstrate that all Vaughn, Legal Department (PB05E),
building to perform their design function will three standards are satisfied. A no significant Duke Energy Corporation, 422 South
not be impaired by the implementation of hazards consideration is indicated if Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina
this amendment at McGuire Nuclear Station. operation of the facility in accordance with 28201–1006.
Consequently, no safety margins will be the proposed amendment would not: NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.
impacted. 1. Involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
Conclusion
previously evaluated, or 368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2,
Based on the preceding analysis, it is 2. Create the possibility of a new or Pope County, Arkansas
concluded that the proposed license different kind of accident from any accident
amendment does not involve a Significant previously evaluated, or
Date of amendment request:
Hazards Consideration Finding as defined in 3. Involve a significant reduction in a September 19, 2002.
10 CFR 50.92. margin of safety. Description of amendment request:
The NRC staff has reviewed the The proposed amendment would extend
First Standard
licensee’s analysis and, based on this the allowable outage time (AOT) for the
Operation of the facilities in accordance emergency diesel generators (EDGs)
review, it appears that the three with this amendment would not involve a
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are from 72 hours to a maximum of 14 days.
significant increase in the probability or Basis for proposed no significant
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff consequences of an accident previously hazards consideration determination:
proposes to determine that the evaluated. The Class 1E DC [direct-current]
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
amendment request involves no power system is not an initiator to any
accident sequence analyzed in the Updated licensee has provided its analysis of the
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lisa F. Final Safety Analysis Report. The safety issue of no significant hazards
Vaughn, Legal Department (PB05E), features of the batteries will continue to consideration, which is presented
Duke Energy Corporation, 422 South function as designed and in accordance with below:
Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina all applicable TS. The design and operation 1. Does the proposed change involve a
of the system is not being modified by this significant increase in the probability or
28201–1006.
proposed amendment. This amendment only consequences of an accident previously
NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.
revise[s] the requirements for testing the evaluated?
Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos. batteries. Therefore, there will be no impact Response: No.
50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Nuclear on any accident probabilities or The proposed TS [technical specification]
Station, Units 1 and 2, and Docket Nos. consequences. change does not affect the design, operational
50–413 and 50–414, Catawba Nuclear Second Standard characteristics, function or reliability of the
EDGs. The EDGs are not the initiators of
Station, Units 1 and 2, Located in Operation of the facilities in accordance previously evaluated accidents. The EDGs are
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina with this amendment would not create the designed to mitigate the consequences of
and York County, South Carolina possibility of a new or different kind of previously evaluated accidents including a
Date of amendment request: August accident from any accident previously loss of offsite power. Extending the AOT for
evaluated. No new accident causal a single EDG would not affect the previously
29, 2002.
mechanisms are created as a result of this evaluated accidents since the remaining EDG
Description of amendment request:
proposed amendment. No changes are being supporting the redundant Engineered Safety
The proposed amendments would made to any structure, system, or component Features (ESF) systems and the AACDG
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) which will introduce any new accident [alternate alternating current diesel
for the plants direct-current (DC) system causal mechanisms. This amendment request generator], which has the capability to
batteries. The Surveillance does not impact any plant systems that are support either train of ESF systems, would
Requirements for the current TS for DC accident initiators and does not impact any continue to be available to perform the
sources require a battery service test to safety analysis. accident mitigating functions.

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68734 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

The duration of a TS AOT is determined The NRC staff has reviewed the Group Joint Applications Report for Low
considering that there is a minimal licensee’s analysis and, based on this Pressure Safety Injection System AOT
possibility that an accident will occur while review, it appears that the three Extension.
a component is removed from service. A risk- The proposed change allows a combination
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
informed assessment was performed which of equipment from redundant trains to be
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff inoperable provided that at least the
concluded that the increase in plant risk is
small and consistent with the guidance proposes to determine that the equivalent flow of a single HPSI and LPSI
contained in Regulatory Guide 1.177. amendment request involves no train of ECCS remains operable. Analyzed
The current TS requirements ensure that significant hazards consideration. events are assumed to be initiated by the
redundant systems relying on the remaining Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. failure of plant structures, systems or
EDG are operable. In addition to these Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, components. Allowing equipment from
requirements, administrative controls will be 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC redundant trains to constitute a single
established to provide assurance that the 20005–3502. operable train does not increase the
AOT extension is not applied during adverse NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm. probability that a failure leading to an
weather conditions that could potentially analyzed event will occur. The ECCS
affect offsite power availability. Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– components are passive until an actuation
Administrative controls are also 368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, signal is generated. This change does not
implemented to avoid or minimize risk Pope County, Arkansas increase the failure probability of the ECCS
significant plant configurations during the components. As such, the probability of
Date of amendment request: occurrence for a previously analyzed
time when an EDG is removed from service.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
September 19, 2002. accident is not significantly increased.
involve a significant increase in the
Description of amendment request: Therefore, the proposed change will not
The proposed amendment would extend involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
the allowed outage time (AOT) for a probability or consequences of any accident
previously evaluated.
single inoperable low pressure safety previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
injection (LPSI) train from 72 hours to 2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously 7 days. In addition, an AOT of 72 hours accident from any accident previously
evaluated? would be included for other conditions evaluated?
Response: No. where the equivalent of a single The proposed change does not change the
The proposed change does not involved a emergency core cooling system (ECCS) design or configuration of the plant. No new
change in the design, configuration, or subsystem flow is still available to both equipment is being introduced, and installed
method of operation of the plant that could equipment is not being operated in a new or
create the possibility of a new or different
the LPSI and high pressure safety
injection (HPSI) trains. Also, if 100% of different manner. There is no change being
kind of accident. The proposed change made to the parameters within which the
extends the AOT currently allowed by the TS ECCS flow is unavailable due to two
inoperable HPSI or LPSI trains, an plant is operated, and the setpoints at which
to 14 days. It also provides for a reduction protective or mitigative actions are initiated
to 72 hours, not to exceed 14 days, should action statement would been added to are unaffected by this change. No alteration
the AACDG become inoperable during the restore at least one of each HPSI and in the procedures, which ensure the plant
extended AOT. LPSI train to operable status within one remains within analyzed limits, is being
Therefore, the proposed change does not hour. proposed and no change is being made to the
create the possibility of a new or different Basis for proposed no significant procedures relied upon to respond to an off-
kind of accident from any previously hazards consideration determination: normal event. As such, no new failure modes
evaluated. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the are being introduced. The proposed change
3. Does the proposed change involve a will only provide the plant some flexibility
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards in maintaining the minimum equipment
Response: No. required to be Operable to perform the ECCS
The ESF systems required to mitigate the consideration, which is presented
function while in this Condition. The change
consequences of postulated accidents consist below: does not alter assumptions made in the safety
of two independent trains. The ESF systems 1. Does the proposed change involve a analysis and licensing basis.
on either of the two trains provide for the significant increase in the probability or Therefore, the proposed change will not
minimum safety functions necessary to shut consequences of an accident previously create the possibility of a new or different
down the unit and maintain it in a safe evaluated? kind of accident from any accident
shutdown condition. Each of the two trains The HPSI and LPSI trains are part of the previously evaluated.
can be powered from one of the offsite power ECCS subsystem. Inoperable HPSI or LPSI 3. Does the proposed change involve a
sources of its associated EDG. In addition, the components are not accident initiators in any significant reduction in a margin of safety?
AACDG is available to provide power to accident previously evaluated. Therefore, The CE NPSD–995 and ANO–2 [Arkansas
either or both of the two trains. This design this change does not involve an increase in Nuclear One, Unit 2] PSA evaluations
provides adequate defense in depth to ensure the probability of an accident previously demonstrate that the changes are essentially
that diverse power sources are available to evaluated. Both the HPSI and LPSI systems risk neutral or risk beneficial. The margin of
accomplish the required safety functions. are primarily designed to mitigate the safety is established through equipment
Thus, with one EDG out of service, there are consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident design, operating parameters, and the
sufficient means to accomplish the safety (LOCA). These proposed changes do not setpoints at which automatic actions are
functions and prevent the release of affect any of the assumptions used in the initiated. None of these are adversely
radioactive material in the event of an deterministic LOCA analysis. Hence the impacted by the proposed change. Sufficient
accident. consequences of accidents previously equipment remains available to actuate upon
The proposed change does not affect any evaluated do not change. demand for the purpose of mitigating a
of the assumptions or inputs to the Final In order to fully evaluate the LPSI AOT transient event. The proposed change, which
Safety Analyses Report and does not erode extension, probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) allows operation to continue for up to 72
the decrease in severe accident risk achieved methods were utilized. The results of the hours with components inoperable in both
with the issuance of the Station Blackout analyses show no significant increase in the ECCS subsystems, is acceptable based on the
(SBO) Rule, 10 CFR 50.63, ‘‘Loss of All core damage frequency. As a result, there remaining ECCS components providing
Alternating Current Power.’’ would be no significant increase in the 100% of the required ECCS flow.
Therefore, the proposed change does not consequences of an accident previously Therefore, the proposed change will not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of evaluated. The analyses are detailed in CE involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety. NPSD–995, Combustion Engineering Owners safety.

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68735

The NRC staff has reviewed the consequences of an accident previously assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed
licensee’s analysis and, based on this evaluated. event, nor are they assumed in the mitigation
review, it appears that the three 2. Will not create the possibility of a new of consequences of accidents. Therefore, the
or different kind of accident from any proposed change does not involve a
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
accident previously evaluated. significant increase in the probability or
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff No new or different [kind] of accidents or consequences of an accident previously
proposes to determine that the malfunctions than those previously analyzed evaluated[.]
amendment request involves no in Pilgrim’s UFSAR [Updated Final Safety 2. Does the change create the possibility of
significant hazards consideration. Analysis Report] are introduced by this a new or different kind of accident from any
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. proposed change because there are no new accident previously evaluated?
Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, failure modes introduced. Therefore, the Response: No. The proposed change does
1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC proposed changes will not create the not involve any physical alteration of plant
possibility of a new or different kind of equipment and does not change the method
20005–3502. accident from any accident previously by which any safety-related system performs
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm. evaluated. its function. As such, no new or different
3. Will not involve a significant reduction types of equipment will be installed, and the
Entergy Nuclear Generation Company,
in the margin of safety. basic operation of installed equipment is
Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear The proposed changes to trip level settings unchanged. The methods governing plant
Power Station, Plymouth County, and surveillance intervals were established operation and testing remain consistent with
Massachusetts using approved methodologies subject to a 10 current safety analysis assumptions.
CFR, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Therefore, the proposed change does not
Date of amendment request:
program and existing radiological limits are create the possibility of a new or different
December 12, 2001, as supplemented on met. These changes do not impact Pilgrim’s kind of accident from any accident
October 10, 2002. configuration or operation. previously evaluated.
Description of amendment request: Editorial and administrative type changes 3. Does the proposed change involve a
The proposed amendment would do not impact the operation or configuration significant reduction in a margin of safety?
change the Technical Specification of Pilgrim. For the above reasons the Response: No. The proposed change is
Tables 3.2.A, 3.2.B, 4.2.A, and 4.2.B. proposed change does not result in a administrative in nature, does not negate any
The proposed changes affect various significant reduction in the margin of safety. existing requirement, and does not adversely
affect existing plant safety margins or the
instrument trip level settings and The NRC staff has reviewed the
reliability of the equipment assumed to
decreases the calibration frequencies for licensee’s analysis and, based on this operate in the safety analysis. As such, there
a variety of instruments. The proposed review, it appears that the three are no changes being made to safety analysis
changes also involve clarifications to the standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. assumptions, safety limits or safety system
Reactor Water Cleanup system trip Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to settings that would adversely affect plant
configuration and the titles of certain determine that the amendment request safety as a result of the proposed change.
trip systems. In addition, the proposed involves no significant hazards Margins of safety are unaffected by
changes would make certain editorial consideration. requirements that are retained, but relocated
Attorney for licensee: J. M. Fulton, from the Technical Specifications to the
and administrative corrections. The UFSAR. Therefore, the proposed change does
proposed setpoint changes and Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, not involve a significant reduction in a
calibration frequencies are based on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600 margin of safety.
licensee’s evaluation. Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth,
Massachusetts, 02360–5599. The NRC staff has reviewed the
Basis for proposed no significant licensee’s analysis and, based on this
hazards consideration determination: NRC Section Chief: James W.
Andersen, Acting. review, it appears that the three
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.
licensee has provided its analysis of the Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
issue of no significant hazards Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear determine that the amendment request
consideration, which is presented Power Station, Plymouth County, involves no significant hazards
below: Massachusetts consideration.
1. Will not involve a significant increase in Date of amendment request: July 5, Attorney for licensee: J. M. Fulton,
the probability or consequences of an 2002. Esquire, Assistant General Counsel,
accident previously evaluated. Description of amendment request: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600
The methodology used to determine the Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth,
The proposed amendment would
proposed trip level settings and surveillance
relocate the ‘‘Primary System Massachusetts 02360–5599.
intervals ensure adequate performance of the
Boundary—Shock Suppressors NRC Section Chief: James W.
affected instrumentation. In addition, the
affected instruments are not initiators of any (Snubbers),’’ Technical Specifications Andersen, Acting.
accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the (TS) 3/4.6.I, from the TS to the Updated Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
proposed trip level setting and surveillance Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear
intervals will not involve a significant Basis for proposed no significant Power Station, Plymouth County,
increase in the probability of an accident hazards consideration determination:
previously evaluated. Massachusetts
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
The proposed changes to trip level settings licensee has provided its analysis of the Date of amendment request: August
and surveillance intervals were establish 16, 2002.
issue of no significant hazards
using methodologies subject to 10 CFR Description of amendment request:
Appendix B Quality Assurance program and consideration which is presented below.
The proposed amendment would
ensure existing radiological limits are met. 1. Does the proposed change involve a relocate certain Control Rod Block
Therefore, the proposed trip level settings significant increase in the probability or
and surveillance intervals will not involve a consequences of an accident previously
functions from Technical Specifications
significant increase in the consequences of an evaluated? 3/4.2.C, ‘‘Instrumentation that Initiates
accident previously evaluated. Response: No. The proposed change is Rod Blocks,’’ to the Updated Final
Other changes are editorial or administrative in nature and does not involve Safety Analysis Report.
administrative in nature and can not the modification of any plant equipment or Basis for proposed no significant
significantly increase the probability or affect basic plant operation. Snubbers are not hazards consideration determination:

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68736 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC of the reactor containment is subject to two
licensee has provided its analysis of the and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., types of failure mechanisms which can be
issue of no significant hazards Docket No. 50–271, Vermont Yankee categorized as (1) activity based and (2) time
based. Activity based failure mechanisms are
consideration which is presented below. Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
defined as degradation due to system and/or
1. Does the proposed change involve a Vermont component modifications or maintenance.
significant increase in the probability or Date of amendment request: October Local leak rate test requirements and
consequences of an accident previously 4, 2002. administrative controls such as design
evaluated? Description of amendment request: change control and procedural requirements
Response: No. Change the Technical Specifications by for system restoration ensure that
The proposed change is administrative in containment integrity is not degraded by
extending the primary containment
nature and does not involve the modification plant modifications or maintenance
of any plant equipment or affect basic plant integrated leak rate testing (ILRT) activities. The design and construction
operation. These control rod blocks are not interval on a one-time basis from 10 requirements of the reactor containment itself
assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed years to no longer than approximately combined with the containment inspections
event, nor are they assumed in the mitigation 10.6 years. performed in accordance with ASME
of consequences of accidents. Therefore, the Basis for proposed no significant [American Society of Mechanical Engineers]
proposed change does not involve a hazards consideration determination: Section XI, the Maintenance Rule and
significant increase in the probability or As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Licensing commitments related to
consequences of an accident previously licensee has provided its analysis of the containment coatings serve to provide a high
evaluated. degree of assurance that the containment will
issue of no significant hazards not degrade in a manner that is detectable
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
consideration which is presented below: only by Type A testing. Therefore, the
accident from any accident previously 1. The operation of Vermont Yankee proposed Technical Specification change
evaluated? Nuclear Power Station in accordance with does not involve a significant increase in the
Response: No. the proposed amendment will not involve a consequences of an accident previously
The proposed change does not involve any significant increase in the probability or evaluated.
physical alteration of plant equipment and consequences of an accident previously 2. The operation of Vermont Yankee
does not change the method by which any evaluated. Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
safety-related system performs its function. The proposed revision to Technical the proposed amendment will not create the
As such, no new or different types of Specifications 6.7.C ‘‘Primary Containment possibility of a new or different kind of
equipment will be installed, and the basic Leak Rate Testing Program’’ involves a one- accident from any accident previously
operation of installed equipment is time extension to the current interval for evaluated.
unchanged. The methods governing plant Type A containment testing. The current test The proposed revision to the Technical
operation and testing remain consistent with interval of 10 years would be extended on a Specifications involves a one-time extension
current safety analysis assumptions. one-time basis to no longer than to the current interval for Type A
Therefore, the proposed change does not approximately 10.6 years from the last Type containment testing. The reactor containment
create the possibility of a new or different A test. The proposed Technical Specification and the testing requirements invoked to
kind of accident form any accident change does not involve a physical change to periodically demonstrate the integrity of the
previously evaluated. the plant or a change in the manner in which reactor containment exist to ensure the
3. Does the proposed change involve a the plant is operated or controlled. The plant’s ability to mitigate the consequences of
significant reduction in a margin of safety? reactor containment is designed to provide an accident and do not involve the
Response: No. an essentially leak tight barrier against the prevention or identification of any precursors
The proposed change is administrative in uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the of an accident. The proposed Technical
nature, does not negate any existing environment for postulated accidents. As Specification change does not involve a
requirement, and does not adversely affect such, the reactor containment itself and the physical change to the plant or the manner
existing plant safety margins or the reliability testing requirements invoked to periodically in which the plant is operated or controlled.
of the equipment assumed to operate in the demonstrate the integrity of the reactor Therefore, the proposed Technical
safety analysis. As such, there are no changes containment exist to ensure the plant’s Specification change does not create the
being made to safety analysis assumptions, ability to mitigate the consequences of an possibility of a new or different kind of
safety limits or safety system settings that accident, and do not involve the prevention accident from any accident previously
would adversely affect plant safety as a result or identification of any precursors of evaluated.
of the proposed change. Margins of safety are anaccident. Therefore, the proposed 3. The operation of Vermont Yankee
unaffected by requirements that are retained, Technical Specification change does not Nuclear Power Station in accordance with
but relocated from the Technical involve a significant increase in the the proposed amendment will not involve a
Specifications to the FSAR [Final Safety probability of an accident previously significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Analysis Report]. Therefore, the proposed evaluated. The proposed revision to Technical
change does not involve a significant The proposed change involves only the Specifications involves a one-time extension
reduction in a margin of safety. extension of the interval between Type A to the current interval for Type A
containment leak rate tests. Type B and C containment testing. The proposed Technical
The NRC staff has reviewed the containment leak rate tests will continue to Specification change does not involve a
licensee’s analysis and, based on this be performed at the frequency currently physical change to the plant or a change in
review, it appears that the three required by plant Technical Specifications. the manner in which the plant is operated or
standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Industry experience has shown, as controlled. The specific requirements and
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to documented in NUREG[–]1493, that Type B conditions of the Primary Containment Leak
determine that the amendment request and C containment leakage tests have Rate Testing Program, as defined in
involves no significant hazards identified a very large percentage of Technical Specifications, exist to ensure that
consideration. containment leakage paths and that the the degree of reactor containment structural
Attorney for licensee: J. M. Fulton, percentage of containment leakage paths that integrity and leak-tightness that is considered
are detected only by Type A testing is very in the plant safety analysis is maintained.
Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, small. VY’s [Vermont Yankee] ILRT test The overall containment leak rate limit
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600 history supports this conclusion. NUREG– specified by Technical Specifications is
Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth, 1493 concluded, in part, that reducing the maintained. The proposed change involves
Massachusetts 02360–5599. frequency of Type A containment leak tests only the extension of the interval between
NRC Section Chief: James W. to once per twenty (20) years leads to an Type A containment leak rate tests. The
Andersen, Acting. imperceptible increase in risk. The integrity proposed surveillance interval extension is

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68737

bounded by the 15 month extension Water Level—High instrumentation from in methods governing normal plant operation
currently authorized within NEI [Nuclear existing float-type level switches to are consistent with the current safety analysis
Energy Institute] 94–01. Type B and C electronic analog trip units. Analog trip units assumptions. Therefore, these proposed
containment leak rate tests will continue to are a proven technology that is more reliable changes will not create the possibility of a
be performed at the frequency currently than existing equipment. The proposed new or different kind of accident from any
required by plant Technical Specifications. design is consistent with a generic design accident previously evaluated.
VY’s, as well as the industries experience, that has been previously reviewed and 3. The proposed TS changes do not involve
strongly supports the conclusion that Type B approved by the NRC. Analog trip units are a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
and C testing detects a large percentage of used in various applications at DNPS, Margins of safety are established in the
containment leakage paths and that the including the Reactor Protection System design of components, the configuration of
percentage of containment leakage paths that (RPS) Low Water Level Trip Function. components to meet certain performance
are detected only by Type A testing is small. The proposed Technical Specifications parameters, and in the establishment of
The containment inspections performed in (TS) changes add new Unit 3 Channel Check setpoints to initiate alarms and actions. The
accordance with ASME Section XI, the and trip unit calibration Surveillance proposed changes support a planned
Maintenance Rule and the Coatings Program Requirements (SRs) for the new analog trip instrumentation upgrade to enhance the
serve to provide a high degree of assurance units associated with the Scram Discharge reliability of RPS instrumentation. The
that the containment will not degrade in a Volume Water Level—High RPS Trip proposed changes do not affect the
manner that is detectable only by Type A Function. These new Unit 3 SRs are not probability of failure or availability of the
testing. Additionally, the on-line applicable to the existing instrumentation affected instrumentation. The revised
containment monitoring capability that is because the existing float-type level switches Allowable Value, addition of a Channel
inherent to inerted BWR [Boiling Water are non-indicating and do not employ trip Check and trip unit calibration, and revision
Reactor] containments allows for the units. In addition, the proposed TS changes of other SRs for RPS Instrumentation
detection of gross containment leakage that add a new trip unit calibration SR for Channel Check and trip unit calibration, and
may develop during power operation. The existing Unit 2 and 3 instrumentation that is revision of other SRs for RPS Instrumentation
combination of these factors ensures that the composed of differential pressure type level Function 7 (Scram Discharge Volume Water
margin of safety that is inherent in plant transmitter switches. Level—High) are conservative changes that
safety analysis is maintained. Therefore, the TS requirements that govern operability or align the SRs for proper determination of
proposed Technical Specification change routine testing of plant instruments are not operability with that of similar
does not involve a significant reduction in a assumed to be initiators of any analyzed instrumentation. Therefore, it is concluded
margin of safety. event because these instruments are intended that the proposed changes do not result in a
to prevent, detect, or mitigate accidents. reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
Therefore, these proposed changes will not The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
involve an increase in the probability of an licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three accident previously evaluated. Additionally, review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are these proposed changes will not increase the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff consequences of an accident previously satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the evaluated because the proposed changes do
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no not adversely impact structures, systems, or
components. The planned Unit 3 instrument requested amendments involve no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. David R. upgrade is a more reliable design than significant hazards consideration.
existing equipment. The proposed changes Attorney for licensee: Mr. Edward J.
Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
establish requirements that ensure Cullen, Deputy General Counsel, Exelon
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW.,
components are operable when necessary for BSC—Legal, 2301 Market Street,
Washington, DC 20037–1128.
NRC Section Chief: James W.
the prevention or mitigation of accidents or Philadelphia, PA 19101.
transients. Furthermore, there will be no NRC Section Chief: Anthony J.
Andersen, Acting. change in the types or significant increase in Mendiola.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, the amounts of any effluents released offsite.
In summary, the proposed changes do not Florida Power and Light Company,
Docket Nos. 50–237 and 50–249,
involve a significant increase in the Docket No. 50–389, St. Lucie Plant, Unit
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 probability or consequences of an accident No. 2, St. Lucie County, Florida
and 3, Grundy County, Illinois previously evaluated.
2. The proposed TS changes do not create
Date of amendment request: October
Date of amendment request: August
the possibility of a new or different kind of 15, 2002.
16, 2002. Description of amendment request:
Description of amendment request: accident from any accident previously
evaluated. The proposed amendment modifies the
The proposed amendments would
The proposed changes support a planned reactor coolant system flow rate from
modify the Unit 3 allowable value, and
instrument upgrade on Unit 3 by 363,000 gallons per minute (gpm) to
the Units 2 and 3 surveillance incorporating SRs required to ensure 355,000 gpm in Saint Lucie Unit 2
requirements for the reactor protection operability. There is no change being made Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.3–
system scram discharge volume water to the parameters within which DNPS is 2 and a footnote for Table 2.2–1.
level-high function. operated. The proposed changes do not Basis for proposed no significant
Basis for proposed no significant adversely impact the manner in which the
hazards consideration determination:
hazards consideration determination: Scram Discharge Volume Water Level—High
RPS instrumentation will operate under As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
normal and abnormal operating conditions. licensee has provided its analysis of the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
The proposed changes will not alter the issue of no significant hazards
issue of no significant hazards
function demands on credited equipment. No consideration, which is presented
consideration, which is presented
alteration in the procedures, which ensure below:
below: DNPS remains within analyzed limits, is 1. Operation of the facility in accordance
1. The proposed TS changes do not involve proposed, and no change is being made to with the proposed amendment would not
a significant increase in the probability or procedures relied upon to respond to an off- involve a significant increase in the
consequences of an accident previously normal event. Therefore, these proposed probability or consequences of an accident
evaluated. changes provide an equivalent level of safety previously evaluated.
Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), and will not create the possibility of a new The proposed amendment would decrease
Unit 3 plans to implement a design change or different kind of accident from any the value of design reactor coolant system
that upgrades the Scram Discharge Volume accident previously evaluated. The changes flow rate. This reduction in the reactor

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68738 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

coolant system (RCS) flow requirement will Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408– assumption is upheld. The inherent delay
support operation of the plant with an 0420. associated with completing the required
increased steam generator (SG) tube plugging. NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe. preparatory steps for moving fuel in the
The changes to the Technical Specification reactor vessel further ensures that the
(TS) bases either support the proposed flow Florida Power and Light Company, proposed 72-hour decay time will be met for
reduction or are administrative in nature, Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251, Turkey a refueling outage.
consistent with the current design basis. The Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, Miami-Dade Therefore, operation of the facility in
parameters affected by the proposed changes County, Florida accordance with the proposed amendments
are not accident initiators and do not affect would not involve a significant increase in
the frequency of occurrence of previously Date of amendment request: October the probability or consequences of an
analyzed transients. Additionally, there are 21, 2002. accident previously evaluated.
no changes to any active plant component. Description of amendment request: 2. Will operation of the facility in
This evaluation has demonstrated The proposed amendment deletes the accordance with this proposed change create
acceptable results for all the accidents requirements defined in Technical the possibility of a new or different kind of
previously analyzed. It is concluded that the Specification (TS) 3/4.9.3, ‘‘Refueling accident from any accident previously
radiological consequences would remain Operations, Decay Time,’’ and places evaluated?
within their established acceptance criteria No. The impact of the proposed change is
them in the TS Bases. Additionally this limited to fuel handling operations and spent
when including effects of the proposed
amendment proposes to modify the TS fuel pool cooling. No physical plant changes
reduction in the RCS flow, which would
support an increased steam generator tube Bases definition of ‘‘recently irradiated are proposed to accommodate the timing
plugging level. fuel’’ will be re-defined as fuel that has change for fuel movement. Hence, no new
Therefore, operation of the facility in occupied part of a critical reactor core failure modes are created that would cause a
accordance with the proposed amendment within the previous 72 hours. new or different kind of accident from any
would not involve a significant increase in Basis for proposed no significant accident previously evaluated. The
the probability or consequences of an hazards consideration determination: supporting analysis for the timing change
accident previously evaluated. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the demonstrates that the associated increase in
2. Operation of the facility in accordance decay heat load will not cause any spent fuel
licensee has provided its analysis of the pool (SFP) component or structure to operate
with the proposed amendment would not issue of no significant hazards
create the possibility of a new or different outside design limits. Adequate margins to
kind of accident from any previously
consideration, which is presented safety are maintained with respect to SFP
evaluated. below: water temperature and structural loading.
This proposed amendment revises the RCS 1. Will operation of the facility in The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee’s
design flow requirement to cover plant accordance with this proposed change analysis and, based on this review, it appears
operation with increased steam generator involve a significant increase in the that the three standards of 50.92(c) are
tube plugging. There are no physical changes probability or consequences of an accident satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
to the plant systems or system interactions previously evaluated? determine that the amendment request
due to the proposed changes. The modes of No. The accident of concern related to the involves no significant hazards
operation of the plant and the design proposed change is the fuel handling consideration.
functions of all the safety systems remain accident (FHA). This accident assumes a Additionally, the manner which the
unchanged. dropped fuel assembly. One of the minimum in-reactor vessel decay time is
Therefore, operation of the facility in assumptions made in the analysis is that fuel controlled will not impact the operation of
accordance with the proposed amendment movement is delayed for some time period any structure, system, or component.
would not create the possibility of a new or after shutdown to accommodate cooldown of Therefore, operation of the facility in
different kind of accident from any accident the reactor coolant system and disassembly accordance with the proposed amendments
previously evaluated. of the reactor pressure vessel. This delay would not create the possibility of a new or
3. Operation of the facility in accordance period allows for radioactive decay of the in- different kind of accident from any
with the proposed amendment would not reactor vessel fission product inventory. previously evaluated.
involve a significant reduction in a margin of Reducing the analyzed decay time from 100 3. Will operation of the facility in
safety. hours to 72 hours does not increase the accordance with this proposed change
The impact of the proposed changes on the probability of a FHA because the timing of involve a significant reduction in a margin of
design basis accident analysis was evaluated fuel movement in the reactor pressure vessel safety?
and it is concluded that the setpoint and does not alter the manner in which fuel No. The proposed change in plant
safety analyses of all design basis accidents assemblies are handled. operation does not significantly reduce the
meet the applicable acceptance criteria with Reducing the analyzed decay time from margin of safety. It has been shown by
respect to the radiological consequences, 100 hours to 72 hours does increase the reanalysis of a FHA involving irradiated fuel
specified acceptable fuel design limits offsite dose and control room dose with at least 72 hours of decay that the
(SAFDL), primary and secondary projections of a FHA above those previously projected doses will be well within
overpressurization, peak containment reviewed and approved by the NRC for applicable regulatory limits. Additionally, it
pressure and temperature, and 10 CFR 50.46 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 per Amendments has been shown by thermal hydraulic
requirements. 216 and 210. However, it has been shown by analysis that operation of the SFP cooling
Therefore, operation of the facility in reanalysis of such an accident involving system in accordance with the restrictions
accordance with the proposed amendment irradiated fuel with at least 72 hours of decay and limitations identified in the amendments
would not involve a significant reduction in that the projected doses remain well within application will maintain adequate margins
a margin of safety. applicable regulatory limits. Hence, the to pool boiling. Analysis of transient SFP
proposed change in timing of fuel movement concrete temperatures similarly demonstrates
The NRC staff has reviewed the in the reactor pressure vessel does not that the integrity of the pool structure will
licensee’s analysis and, based on this involve a significant increase in the not be compromised if the amount of in-
review, it appears that the three consequences of a FHA. reactor vessel fuel assembly decay time is
standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Additionally, the manner in which the reduced from 100 hours to 72 hours.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to minimum in-reactor vessel decay time is The proposed change in the manner in
determine that the amendment request controlled will not impact the probability of which the minimum in-reactor vessel decay
occurrence, or the consequences of a FHA. time will be controlled will not impact plant
involves no significant hazards Relocating the decay time requirement from safety. Relocating the decay time requirement
consideration. the TS to the TS Bases document and other from the TS to the TS Bases document and
Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, administrative controls will continue to other administrative controls will continue to
Attorney, Florida Power & Light, P.O. ensure that this key accident analysis ensure that this key accident analysis

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68739

assumption is upheld. The inherent delay changes are intended to improve readability, hazards consideration under the standards
associated with completing the required consistency with NUREG–1431, Revision 2, set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly,
preparatory steps for moving fuel in the and appearance. In addition, they do not alter a finding of ‘‘no significant hazards
reactor vessel further ensures that the any requirements. The bases change provides consideration’’ is justified.
proposed 72-hour decay time will be met for explanatory information only. Thus, the
a refueling outage. probability of occurrence of an accident The NRC staff has reviewed the
Therefore, operation of the facility in previously evaluated is not significantly licensee’s analysis and, based on this
accordance with the proposed amendments increased.
review, it appears that the three
does not involve a significant reduction in Consequences of an Accident Previously
the margin of safety.
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
Evaluated
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
The NRC staff has reviewed the The proposed changes to the degraded proposes to determine that the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this voltage and loss-of-voltage setpoints and time amendment requests involve no
review, it appears that the three delay affect when an emergency bus that is
experiencing low or degraded voltage will significant hazards consideration.
standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to trip from offsite power and shift to an Attorney for licensee: David W.
emergency diesel generator. While the Jenkins, Esq., 500 Circle Drive,
determine that the amendment request setpoints that initiate this action will be
involves no significant hazards Buchanan, MI 49107.
modified, they are bounded by the current
consideration. safety analysis. The function of the plant NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, equipment remains the same. The proposed
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC,
Attorney, Florida Power & Light, P.O. changes improve the reliability of safety-
Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408– related equipment to operate as designed. Docket No. 50–220, Nine Mile Point
0420. The format changes are intended to improve Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Oswego County,
NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe. readability, consistency with NUREG–1431, New York
Revision 2, and appearance. In addition, they
Indiana Michigan Power Company, do not alter any requirements. The bases Date of amendment request: October
Docket No. 50–316, Donald C. Cook change provides explanatory information 7, 2002.
Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Berrien County, only. Thus, the consequences of an accident
previously analyzed are not significantly
Description of amendment request:
Michigan The proposed amendment would add
increased.
Date of amendment request: October 2. Does the proposed change create the Specification 4.0.3 to address missed
16, 2002. possibility of a new or different kind of surveillances. This new specification
Description of amendment request: accident from any accident previously specifies an initial 24-hour delay period
The proposed amendment would revise evaluated? for performing a missed surveillance
Response: No. prescribed by Specification 3.0.3.
Technical Specification Table 3.3–4,
The proposed changes to the degraded
‘‘Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Specification 4.0.3 will also require: ‘‘A
voltage and loss-of-voltage setpoints and time
System Instrumentation Trip delay do not affect existing or introduce any risk evaluation shall be performed for
Setpoints.’’ The proposed changes are new accident precursors or modes of any surveillance delayed greater than 24
part of a planned design change to operation. The relays will continue to detect hours and the risk impact shall be
replace the existing 4160 volt (4kV) undervoltage conditions and transfer safety managed.’’ In addition, the licensee
offsite power transformers, loss-of- loads to the emergency diesel generators at a proposed to add wording to each of the
voltage relays, and degraded voltage voltage level adequate to ensure proper safety following existing specifications such
equipment performance and to prevent that the new Specification 4.0.3 would
relays with components of an improved
equipment damage. The function of the
design to increase the reliability of relays remains the same. The format changes
apply to them: Specification 6.16, 6.17,
offsite power for safety-related are intended to improve readability, 6.18, and 6.19.
equipment. consistency with NUREG–1431, Revision 2, The NRC staff issued a notice of
Basis for proposed no significant and appearance. In addition, they do not alter opportunity for comment in the Federal
hazards consideration determination: any requirements. The bases change provides Register on June 14, 2001 (66 FR 32400),
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the explanatory information only. Thus, the
proposed changes do not create the on possible amendments concerning
licensee has provided its analysis of the missed surveillances, including a model
issue of no significant hazards possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously safety evaluation and model no
consideration, which is presented evaluated. significant hazards consideration
below: 3. Does the proposed change involve a (NSHC) determination, using the
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? consolidated line item improvement
significant increase in the probability of Response: No. process. The NRC staff subsequently
occurrence or consequences of an accident The proposed changes will allow all safety-
related loads to have sufficient voltage to
issued a notice of availability of the
previously evaluated?
perform their intended safety function while models for referencing in license
Response: No.
ensuring spurious trips are avoided. Thus, amendment applications in the Federal
Probability of Occurrence of an Accident Register on September 28, 2001 (66 FR
the results of the accident analyses will not
Previously Evaluated
be affected as the input assumptions are 49714).
The proposed changes to the degraded protected. The format changes are intended
voltage and loss-of-voltage setpoints and time to improve readability, consistency with
The licensee affirmed the
delay affect when an emergency bus that is NUREG–1431, Revision 2, and appearance. In applicability of the following NSHC
experiencing low or degraded voltage will addition, they do not alter any requirements. determination in its application dated
trip from offsite power and shift to an The bases change provides explanatory October 7, 2002. The NSHC
emergency diesel generator. While the information only. Thus, the proposed determination is restated below.
setpoints that initiate this action will be changes do not involve a significant
modified, the function remains the same. The reduction in a margin of safety.
Basis for proposed no significant
setpoints have been analyzed to ensure In summary, based upon the above hazards consideration determination:
spurious trips will be avoided. The proposed evaluation, [Indiana Michigan Power As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
changes will not significantly affect any Company] I&M has concluded that the analysis of the issue of NSHC is
accident initiators or precursors. The format proposed changes involve no significant presented below:

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68740 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not must be balanced against the real risk of accident from any accident previously
Involve a Significant Increase in the manipulating the plant equipment or evaluated.
Probability or Consequences of an Accident condition to perform the missed surveillance. The proposed change only affects the
Previously Evaluated In addition, parallel trains and alternate technical specifications and does not involve
The proposed change relaxes the time equipment are typically available to perform a physical change to the plant. Modifications
allowed to perform a missed surveillance. the safety function of the equipment not will not be made to existing components nor
The time between surveillances is not an tested. Thus, there is confidence that the will any new or different types of equipment
initiator of any accident previously equipment can perform its assumed safety be installed. The proposed change modifies
evaluated. Consequently, the probability of function. the allowed outage time for a single LPSI
an accident previously evaluated is not Therefore, this change does not involve a train from 24 hours to 7 days for the purpose
significantly increased. The equipment being significant reduction in a margin of safety. of performing preventive or corrective
tested is still required to be operable and Based upon the reasoning presented above maintenance, or surveillance testing. Actions
capable of performing the accident mitigation and the previous discussion of the will be taken to ensure the increase in LPSI
functions assumed in the accident analysis. amendment request, the requested change allowed outage time is incorporated
As a result, the consequences of any accident does not involve a significant hazards appropriately into plant procedures.
previously evaluated are not significantly consideration. Therefore, this change does not create the
affected. Any reduction in confidence that a possibility of a new or different kind of
The NRC staff proposes to determine
standby system might fail to perform its accident from any previously evaluated.
safety function due to a missed surveillance that the amendment request involves no 3. The proposed change does not involve
is small and would not, in the absence of significant hazards consideration. a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
other unrelated failures, lead to an increase Attorney for licensee: Mark J. The proposed change modifies the allowed
in consequences beyond those estimated by Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, outage time for a single LPSI train to permit
existing analyses. The addition of a 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC necessary ECCS [emergency core cooling
requirement to assess and manage the risk 20005–3502. system] maintenance or testing to be
introduced by the missed surveillance will NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer. performed in a measured, deliberate fashion.
further minimize possible concerns. Results of an integrated assessment of the
Therefore, this change does not involve a Omaha Public Power District, Docket overall plant risk associated with the
significant increase in the probability or No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit adoption of the proposed AOT extension
consequences of an accident previously No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska show a negligible increase in plant risk. The
evaluated. increase in allowed outage time will also
Date of amendment request: October permit more efficient and more safely
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
8, 2002. managed plant operations and can help
Kind of Accident From Any Previously Description of amendment request: reduce the risk associated with changing
Evaluated The proposed amendment will change plant operating modes.
the Limiting Condition for Operation An evaluation of the impact of extending
The proposed change does not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (no new or (LCO) 2.3(2).a, ‘‘Emergency Core the AOT for a single LPSI train on plant risk
different type of equipment will be installed) Cooling Systems,’’ for the allowed was performed for the conditions of the plant
or a change in the methods governing normal outage time (AOT) for a single train of being at power. While at power, the
plant operation. A missed surveillance will the low pressure safety injection system. incremental conditional core damage
not, in and of itself, introduce new failure frequency (ICCDF) was determined to be
The proposed change is based on the
modes or effects and any increased chance 1.396E–05 per year, with a 5.80E–07 per year
Combustion Engineering Owners Group incremental increase in the core damage
that a standby system might fail to perform Topical Report CE NPSD–995, ‘‘Joint
its safety function due to a missed frequency attributed to extending the allowed
Applications Report for Low Pressure outage time from 24 hours to seven days.
surveillance would not, in the absence of
other unrelated failures, lead to an accident Safety Injection System AOT A sensitivity analysis was performed to
beyond those previously evaluated. The Extension.’’ This amendment will identify the impact on core damage
addition of a requirement to assess and permit the licensee to extend the AOT probability over a seven day interval that
manage the risk introduced by the missed for a single low pressure safety injection results from performing maintenance on one
surveillance will further minimize possible (LPSI) train from the existing 24 hours LPSI train while in a shutdown mode.
concerns. Thus, this change does not create Results of this study show that even small
to 7 days.
the possibility of a new or different kind of improvements in LPSI train reliability will
Basis for proposed no significant produce a decrease in core damage
accident from any accident previously hazards consideration determination:
evaluated. probability, thus the net impact of
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the performing LPSI train preventive
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not licensee has provided its analysis of the maintenance while at power is risk-
Involve a Significant Reduction in [a] Margin
issue of no significant hazards beneficial.
of Safety The unavailability of one LPSI train
consideration, which is presented
The extended time allowed to perform a below: resulted in a large early release frequency of
missed surveillance does not result in a 2.636E–06 per year, with a 2.40E–08 per year
significant reduction in [a] margin of safety. 1. The proposed change does not involve incremental conditional large early release
As supported by the historical data, the likely a significant increase in the probability or frequency (ICLERF) attributed to extending
outcome of any surveillance is verification consequences of an accident previously the allowed outage time from 24 hours to
that the LCO [Limiting Condition for evaluated. seven days.
Operation] is met. Failure to perform a The allowed outage time is not an initiator Therefore, this technical specification
surveillance within the prescribed frequency of any previously evaluated accident. The change does not involve a significant
does not cause equipment to become proposed change to the allowed outage time reduction in the margin of safety.
inoperable. The only effect of the additional for a single LPSI train will not prevent the
time allowed to perform a missed safety systems from performing their accident The NRC staff has reviewed the
surveillance on [a] margin of safety is the mitigation function as assumed in the safety licensee’s analysis and, based on this
extension of the time until inoperable analysis. review, it appears that the three
equipment is discovered to be inoperable by Therefore, this change does not involve a
the missed surveillance. However, given the significant increase in the probability or
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
rare occurrence of inoperable equipment, and consequences of any accident previously satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
the rare occurrence of a missed surveillance, evaluated. proposes to determine that the
a missed surveillance on inoperable 2. The proposed change does not create the amendment request involves no
equipment would be very unlikely. This possibility of a new or different kind of significant hazards consideration.

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Attorney for licensee: James R. 3. The proposed change does not involve margin of inventory to prevent any future
Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L a significant reduction in a margin of safety. concerns.
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005– The proposed change relocates Therefore, this change does not involve an
requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling increase in the probability or consequences
3502. of any accident previously evaluated.
that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in
NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek. TS set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The 2. The proposed change does not create the
Omaha Public Power District, Docket change will not reduce a margin of safety possibility of a new or different kind of
since the location of a requirement has no accident from any accident previously
No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit
impact on any safety analysis assumptions. evaluated.
No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska No changes to the Emergency Diesel
In addition, the relocated requirements for
Date of amendment request: October Nuclear Detector Cooling remain the same as Generator fuel oil storage and distribution
8, 2002. the existing TS. Since any future changes to system configuration or usage are required to
Description of amendment request: these requirements or the surveillance achieve the inventory increase. FO–10 has a
procedures will be evaluated per the capacity of 18,000 gallons. Therefore, FO–10
The proposed amendment would can readily accommodate the additional 2000
relocate the requirements of Technical requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, there will be
no reduction in a margin of safety. gallons of inventory. Therefore, the proposed
Specification (TS) 2.13, ‘‘Nuclear changes will not create the possibility of a
Detector Cooling System,’’ to the Fort The NRC staff has reviewed the new or different kind of accident from any
Calhoun Station Updated Safety licensee’s analysis and, based on this previously evaluated.
Analysis Report (USAR). The accident review, it appears that the three 3. The proposed change does not involve
analyses do not assume operation of the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff The proposed change will increase the
nuclear detector cooling system; margin of safety by requiring that additional
therefore, this system does not meet the proposes to determine that the diesel fuel oil inventory be kept on-site to
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) amendment request involves no ensure that the 7 day on-site fuel supply
for inclusion in the TS. The significant hazards consideration. criteria is met.
requirements will be relocated to the Attorney for licensee: James R. Therefore, this technical specification
USAR. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L change does not involve a reduction in the
Basis for proposed no significant Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005– margins of safety.
hazards consideration determination: 3502. The NRC staff has reviewed the
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek. licensee’s analysis and, based on this
licensee has provided its analysis of the Omaha Public Power District, Docket review, it appears that the three
issue of no significant hazards No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
consideration, which is presented No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
below: proposes to determine that the
Date of amendment request: October amendment request involves no
1. The proposed change does not involve
a significant increase in the probability or 8, 2002. significant hazards consideration.
consequences of an accident previously Description of amendment request: Attorney for licensee: James R.
evaluated. The proposed amendment would Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L
The proposed change relocates increase the amount of diesel fuel oil Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005–
requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling required by Technical Specification (TS) 3502.
that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in 2.7, ‘‘Electrical Systems,’’ to be kept in NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.
the TS set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The the auxiliary boiler fuel oil storage tank.
requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling Omaha Public Power District, Docket
A recent calculation determined that the
are being relocated from TS to the USAR, No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit
amount of diesel fuel oil required by TS
which will be maintained pursuant to 10 CFR No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska
50.59, thereby reducing the level of 2.7 is slightly insufficient (35 gallon
shortfall) for 7 days of emergency diesel Date of amendment request: October
regulatory control. The level of regulatory
control has no impact on the probability or generator (EDG) operation. 8, 2002.
consequences of an accident previously Basis for proposed no significant Description of amendment request:
evaluated. Therefore, the change does not hazards consideration determination: The proposed amendment will relocate
involve a significant increase in the As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the the requirements of Technical
probability or consequences of an accident licensee has provided its analysis of the Specification (TS) 3.5(5), ‘‘Surveillance
previously evaluated. issue of no significant hazards for Prestressing System,’’ for testing
2. The proposed change does not create the consideration, which is presented prestressed concrete containment
possibility of a new or different kind of tendons to the Fort Calhoun Station
accident from any accident previously
below:
(FCS) Updated Safety Analysis Report
evaluated. 1. The proposed change does not involve (USAR). This proposed amendment will
The proposed change relocates a significant increase in the probability or also add a TS requirement (TS 5.21) for
requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling consequences of an accident previously
that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in evaluated.
a containment tendon testing program
TS set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The No changes to the EDG diesel fuel oil consistent with that presented in
change does not involve a physical alteration storage and distribution system configuration Section 5.5 of NUREG–1432, ‘‘Improved
of the plant (no new or different type of or usage is required to achieve the inventory Standard Technical Specification (ITS)
equipment will be installed) or make changes increase. This change only increases the for Combustion Engineering Plants.’’
in the methods governing normal plant current minimum inventory requirements Basis for proposed no significant
operation. The change will not impose listed in TS 2.7 and assures that the hazards consideration determination:
different requirements, and adequate control inventory will meet the capacity As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
of information will be maintained. This requirements of IEEE–308, which requires licensee has provided its analysis of the
change will not alter assumptions made in sufficient fuel for 7 days of EDG operation issue of no significant hazards
the safety analysis and licensing basis. following the most severe accident.
consideration, which is presented
Therefore, the change does not create the Increasing the minimum inventory
possibility of a new or different kind of requirement of FO–10, the auxiliary boiler below:
accident from any accident previously fuel oil tank by 2000 gallons enables the site 1. The proposed change does not involve
evaluated. to meet this criterion and provides an extra a significant increase in the probability or

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68742 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

consequences of an accident previously Description of amendment request: equipment will be installed) or make changes
evaluated. The proposed amendment will change in the methods governing normal plant
The proposed change relocates Technical Specification 5.19, operation. This change will not alter
requirements for testing Prestressed Concrete assumptions made in the safety analysis and
Containment Tendons that do not meet the
‘‘Containment Leakage Rate Testing
licensing basis. Therefore, the change does
criteria for inclusion in the TS set forth in 10 Program,’’ to extend the integrated leak not create the possibility of a new or different
CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The requirements for rate test (ILRT) surveillance interval kind of accident from any accident
testing Prestressed Concrete Containment from 10 to 15 years. The proposed previously evaluated.
Tendons are being relocated from TS to the changes are justified based on a 3. The proposed change does not involve
USAR, which will be maintained pursuant to combination of risk-informed analysis a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.59, thereby reducing the level of and assessment of the containment The proposed change will not result in
regulatory control. The level of regulatory operation of the facility involving a
structural condition utilizing ILRT
control has no impact on the probability or significant reduction in a margin of safety.
consequences of an accident previously historical results and containment
inspection programs. The proposed change adds a one-time
evaluated. Therefore, the change does not extension to the current interval for Type A
involve a significant increase in the Basis for proposed no significant
testing. The current test interval of 10 years,
probability or consequences of an accident hazards consideration determination: based on performance history, would be
previously evaluated. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the extended on a one-time basis to 15 years from
2. The proposed change does not create the licensee has provided its analysis of the the last Type A test. Reference 10.3 has found
possibility of a new or different kind of issue of no significant hazards that generically very few potential leaks are
accident from any accident previously
consideration, which is presented not identified in Type B and C tests.
evaluated.
below: Reference 10.3 concluded that an increase in
The proposed change relocates
the test interval to 20 years resulted in an
requirements for testing Prestressed Concrete 1. The proposed change does not involve imperceptible increase in risk. Furthermore,
Containment Tendons that do not meet the a significant increase in the probability or
the extended test interval would have a
criteria for inclusion in TS set forth in 10 consequences of an accident previously
CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The change does not minimal effect on such risk since Type B and
evaluated.
involve a physical alteration of the plant (no C testing detect over 95 percent of potential
The proposed changes do not involve a
new or different type of equipment will be leakage paths. A plant specific risk
significant increase in the probability or
installed) or make changes in the methods consequences of an accident previously calculation, as part of Reference 10.2,
governing normal plant operation. The evaluated. The proposed change adds a one- [WCAP–15691, Joint Applications Report for
change will not impose different time extension to the current surveillance Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
requirements, and adequate control of interval for Type A testing (ILRT). The Interval Extension, Revision 3, August 2002]
information will be maintained. This change current test interval of 10 years, based on on this topic obtained results consistent with
will not alter assumptions made in the safety performance history, would be extended on the generic conclusions of Reference 10.3.
analysis and licensing basis. Therefore, the a one-time basis to 15 years from the last The overall increase in risk contribution was
change does not create the possibility of a Type A test. The proposed extension to Type determined as 0.31%.
new or different kind of accident from any A testing cannot increase the probability of
accident previously evaluated.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
an accident previously evaluated since the
3. The proposed change does not involve containment Type A test is not a licensee’s analysis and, based on this
a significant reduction in a margin of safety. modification, nor a change in the way that review, it appears that the three
The proposed change relocates plant systems, structures, or components are standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
requirements for testing Prestressed Concrete operated, and is not an activity that could satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
Containment Tendons that do not meet the lead to equipment failure or accident proposes to determine that the
criteria for inclusion in TS set forth in 10 initiation. The proposed change does not amendment request involves no
CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The change will not involve a significant increase in the significant hazards consideration.
reduce a margin of safety since the location consequences of an accident since research
of a requirement has no impact on any safety in Reference 10.3 [NUREG–1493, Attorney for licensee: James R.
analysis assumptions. In addition, the Performance Based Containment Leak-Test Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L
relocated requirements for testing Prestressed Program] has found that generically very few Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005–
Concrete Containment Tendons remain the potential leaks are not identified in Type B 3502.
same as the existing TS. Since any future and C tests. Reference 10.3 concluded that an NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.
changes to these requirements or the increase in the test interval to 20 years
surveillance procedures will be evaluated per resulted in an imperceptible increase in risk. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, there will FCS provides a high degree of assurance (SCE&G), South Carolina Public Service
be no reduction in a margin of safety. through testing and inspection that the Authority, Docket No. 50–395, Virgil C.
The NRC staff has reviewed the containment will not degrade in a manner Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit
licensee’s analysis and, based on this only detectable by Type A testing. No. 1, Fairfield, County, South Carolina
Inspections required by ASME code and the
review, it appears that the three
Maintenance Rule are performed in order to Date of amendment request:
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are identify indications of containment September 24, 2002.
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff degradation that could affect leak tightness.
proposes to determine that the Description of amendment request:
Type B and C testing required by 10 CFR 50,
amendment request involves no Appendix J are not affected by this proposed
This proposed license amendment
significant hazards consideration. extension to the Type A test interval and will request would revise Technical
Attorney for licensee: James R. continue to identify containment penetration Specification (TS) 4.8.1.1, ‘‘AC Sources’’
Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L leakage paths that would otherwise require a and the associated Bases section related
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005– Type A test. to the Emergency Diesel Generators
3502. 2. The proposed change does not create the (EDG). This change would clarify the
possibility of a new or different kind of requirement for the start time test
NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.
accident from any accident previously performed on a 184 day and an 18-
Omaha Public Power District, Docket evaluated.
The proposed change adds a one-time
month frequency. The proposed change
No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit will revise Surveillance Requirement
No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska extension to the current surveillance interval
[* * *] for Type A testing (ILRT). The (SR) 4.8.1.1.2.f.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.g.5 to
Date of amendment request: October change does not involve a physical alteration more accurately reflect the plant
8, 2002. of the plant (no new or different type of conditions during EDG start testing.

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68743

Basis for proposed no significant assurances that the fuel oil is acceptable for changes are consistent with NUREG–1431,
hazards consideration determination: sustained engine operation. Eliminating or NUREG–1366, industry operating experience,
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the revising methodologies for testing of the fuel and VCS operating experience and do not
oil will not increase any probabilities or adversely affect the design bases, accident
licensee has provided its analysis of the
consequences to any accident previously analysis, reliability or capability of the EDGs
issue of no significant hazards evaluated. to perform their intended safety function.
consideration, which is presented 2. The proposed amendment will not The revised footnote will assure that once the
below: create the possibility of a new or different action is initiated, it will be completed
1. The change does not involve a kind of accident from any accident regardless of when the EDG is restored to
significant increase in probability or previously evaluated. operability.
consequences of an accident previously The change revises SR 4.8.1.1.2.f.1 The proposed change to the fuel oil testing
evaluated? requirements to clarify which voltage and methodology has no impact on any safety
This proposed amendment modifies an frequency limits are applicable during the margin. Accident analysis requires that the
EDG Surveillance Requirement and does not transient and steady state portions of the EDG EDGs provide electric power to selected
impact the offsite AC distribution system; start testing. No changes are being made in components during an accident scenario. The
therefore the probability of any LOOP [loss equipment hardware or software, operational fuel oil quality will continue to meet
of off-site power], including one concurrent philosophy, testing frequency, how the established acceptance criteria and support
with a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident] is not system actually operates, or how the system the design function of the EDGs.
significantly increased. is physically tested. Therefore, the proposed Since the design and licensing basis of the
The proposed change revises the SR to amendment will not create the possibility of plant is unaffected, the proposed amendment
better match the plant conditions during the a new or different kind of accident from any will not involve a significant reduction in a
test. SR 4.8.1.1.2.f.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.g.5 are accident previously evaluated. margin of safety.
performed with the EDG unloaded and as a The elimination of unnecessary
surveillance testing does not affect the design The NRC staff has reviewed the
result, overshoots its target nominal voltage
and frequency during the test. In an actual bases of the EDGs. The EDGs are designed to licensee’s analysis and, based on this
event, the EDG would be almost immediately provide electrical power to the equipment review, it appears that the three
loaded once minimum voltage and frequency important for safety during all modes and standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
requirements are satisfied, thereby plant conditions following a loss of offsite satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
minimizing the overshoot. power. The proposed changes to the Action proposes to determine that the
To ensure the EDGs are capable of fulfilling requirements are consistent with NUREG– amendment request involves no
their safety function, the proposed SR 1431, NUREG–1366, Generic Letter 93–05,
significant hazards consideration.
requires EDG voltage and frequency to industry operating experience, and VCS
operating experience. These changes are
Attorney for licensee: Thomas G.
achieve the specified minimum acceptable
valued within 10 seconds, and to settle to a intended to improve plant safety, decrease Eppink, South Carolina Electric & Gas
steady state voltage and frequency within the equipment degradation, and remove Company, Post Office Box 764,
minimum and maximum values. That is, the unnecessary burden on personnel resources Columbia, South Carolina 29218.
upper limits are only applicable for steady by reducing the amount of testing that the TS NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.
state operation and do not apply during the requires during power operation.
transient portion of the EDG start. This The revision to the fuel oil testing Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
change revises the acceptance criteria of methodology does not impact the capabilities Inc, Docket Nos. 50–348 and 50–364,
4.8.1.1.2.f.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.g.5 to clarify which or functions of the EDGs. This testing Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1
voltage and frequency limits are applicable methodology change will continue to assure and 2, Houston County, Alabama
during the transient and steady state portions the EDG is not degraded due to the fuel oil Date of amendment request: April 4,
of the EDG start test. used. Existing test methodologies and
This change does not affect the EDGs guidance will continue to be followed, unless
2002.
ability to supply the minimum voltage and an evaluation demonstrates another Description of amendment request:
frequency within 10 seconds or the steady methodology is as effective. Since the The proposed amendments would
state voltage and frequency required by the changes do not adversely impact important to revise Technical Specifications 5.5.17,
FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]. The safety equipment that is used in mitigating an ‘‘Containment Leakage rate Testing
EDGs will continue to perform their intended accident, they will not create the possibility Program,’’ to reflect a one-time deferral
safety function, in accordance with the safety of an accident different from any previously of the Type-A Containment Integrated
analysis. Thus, the consequences of any evaluated. Leak Rate Test (ILRT). The 10-year
previously analyzed event are not 3. The proposed amendment will not interval between ILRTs is to be
significantly increased by this change. involve a significant reduction in a margin of
extended to 15 years from the previous
The proposed change to 3.8.1.1, Action b.2 safety.
will not increase the probability or The EDGs will still perform their intended ILRTs that were completed in March
consequences of an accident previously safety function, in accordance with the 1994 for Unit 1 and March 1995 for Unit
evaluated. The change to this requirement to VCSNS accident analysis. The revised test 2.
allow determination of no common cause acceptance criteria are a much better match Basis for proposed no significant
failure mechanism has no impact on any for the tested condition (unloaded). The hazards consideration determination:
accident. This change allows for not testing performance of other TS SRs (in particular As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
the redundant EDG if it can be demonstrated 4.8.1.1.2 g.4.b, 4.8.1.1.2g.6 and 4.8.1.1.2g.14) licensee has provided its analysis of the
the failure mechanism of the affected EDG is demonstrate EDG operability in conditions issue of no significant hazards
not common cause. The normal TS that are more representative of postulated consideration, which is presented
surveillance testing schedule assures that accident conditions (loaded in the actual
operable EDG(s) are capable of performing time sequence assumed in the accident
below:
their intended safety functions. The revision analysis). The proposed amendment does not 1. The proposed Technical Specifications
to the footnote on page 3/4.8–1 assures the alter any acceptance criteria or equipment change does not involve a significant
action will be completed even if the EDG is testing scope, which could impact the increase in the probability or consequences
restored to operable status within the action accident analysis. of an accident previously evaluated.
completion time. The proposed change to exempt specific The proposed revision to Technical
The proposed revision to the fuel oil surveillance testing, as long as potential Specifications 5.5.17, ‘‘Containment Leakage
surveillance program will not preclude the common cause can be ruled out, and Rate Testing Program,’’ involves a one time
EDGs from fulfilling their design functions. eliminate unnecessary mechanical stress and extension to the current interval for Type A
These changes provide flexibility to the wear on the diesel generator is an effort to containment leak testing. The current test
testing program and continue to provide improve plant reliability and safety. These interval of ten (10) years would be extended

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68744 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

on a one time basis to no longer than fifteen integrity of the reactor containment exist to Description of amendment request:
(15) years from the last Type A test. The ensure the plant’s ability to mitigate the The proposed amendments would
proposed Technical Specifications change consequences of an accident and do not revise Technical Specifications (TS)
does not involve a physical change to the involve the prevention or identification of
Limiting Conditions for Operation
plant or a change in the manner in which the any precursors of an accident. The proposed
plant is operated or controlled. The reactor Technical Specifications change does not 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency
containment is designed to provide an involve a physical change to the plant or the Filtration/Pressurization System; and
essentially leak tight barrier against the manner in which the plant is operated or associated Bases. These changes will
uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the controlled. Therefore, the proposed allow maintenance on ventilation area
environment for postulated accidents. As Technical Specifications change does not pressure boundaries (i.e., doors) that
such, the reactor containment itself and the create the possibility of a new or different cannot be conducted within the
testing requirements invoked to periodically kind of accident from any accident requirements of existing TS. The
demonstrate the integrity of the reactor previously evaluated.
changes are based on U.S. Nuclear
containment exist to ensure the plant’s 3. The proposed Technical Specifications
ability to mitigate the consequences of an change does not involve a significant Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved
accident, and do not involve the prevention reduction in a margin of safety. Technical Specification Task Force—
or identification of any precursors of an The proposed revision to Technical 287, Rev. 5. In addition, the proposed
accident. Therefore, the proposed Technical Specifications involves a one time extension amendments would revise TS 3.7.12 to
Specification change does not involve a to the current interval for Type A eliminate a requirement to cease power
significant increase in the probability of an containment leak testing. The proposed operation if the fuel handling accident
accident previously evaluated. Technical Specifications change does not function of the penetration room
The proposed change involves only the involve a physical change to the plant or a
filtration system is inoperable.
extension of the interval between Type A change in the manner in which the plant is
Basis for proposed no significant
containment leakage tests. Type B and C operated or controlled. The specific
containment leakage tests will continue to be requirements and conditions of the hazards consideration determination:
performed at the frequency currently Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
required by plant Technical Specifications. as defined in Technical Specifications, exist licensee has provided its analysis of the
Industry experience has shown, as to ensure that the degree of reactor issue of no significant hazards
documented in NUREG–1493, that Type B containment structural integrity and leak consideration, which is presented
and C containment leakage tests have tightness that is considered in the plant below:
identified a very large percentage of safety analysis is maintained. The overall
containment leakage rates limits specified by 1. Do the proposed changes involve a
containment leakage paths and that the
Technical Specifications is maintained. The significant increase in the probability or
percentage of containment leakage paths that
proposed change involves only the extension consequences of an accident previously
are detected only by Type A testing is very
of the interval between Type A containment evaluated?
small. FNP [Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant]
leakage tests. Type B and C containment The control room emergency filtration/
test history supports this conclusion. pressurization system (CREFS) and the
NUREG–1493 concluded, in part, that leakage tests will continue to be performed
at the frequency currently required by plant penetration room filtration (PRF) system are
reducing the frequency of Type A not initiators of any accident. The proposed
containment leak tests to once per twenty Technical Specifications.
FNP and industry experience strongly changes do not alter the physical plant nor
(20) years leads to an imperceptible increase do they alter modes of plant operation.
in risk. The integrity of the reactor support the conclusion that Type B and C
testing detects a large percentage of Therefore, the proposed changes do not affect
containment is subject to two types of failure the probability of any accident previously
mechanism which can be categorized as (1) containment leakage paths and that the
percentage of containment leakage paths that evaluated. Compensatory actions such as the
activity based and (2) time based. Activity availability of self-contained breathing
based failure mechanisms are defined as are detected only by Type A testing is small.
apparatus or iodine filters provide additional
degradation due to system and/or component The containment inspections performed in
assurance that the requirements of GDC
modifications or maintenance. Local leak rate accordance with ASME Section XI, the
[General Design Criteria] 19 are met.
test requirements and administrative controls Maintenance Rule and the Coatings Program
Prohibiting movement of irradiated fuel, or
such as design change control and procedural serve to provide a high degree of assurance
loads over irradiated fuel or core alterations
requirements for system restoration ensure that the containment will not degrade in a
when the control room boundary is
that containment integrity is not degraded by manner that is detectable only by Type A
inoperable and limiting movement of
plant modifications or maintenance testing. Therefore, the proposed Technical
irradiated fuel or loads over the fuel in the
activities. The design and construction Specifications change does not involve a
spent fuel pool room when its boundary is
requirements of the reactor containment itself significant reduction in a margin of safety. inoperable will eliminate the potential for
combined with the containment inspections The NRC staff has reviewed the exceeding GDC 19 due to a fuel handling
performed in accordance with ASME licensee’s analysis and, based on this accident. These actions will also prevent an
[American Society of Mechanical Engineers] off site dose release in excess of analyzed
review, it appears that the three
Section XI, the Maintenance Rule and the values. Therefore, the proposed changes do
containment coatings program serve to standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
not involve a significant increase in the
provide a high degree of assurance that the satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff probability or consequences of an accident
containment will not degrade in a manner proposes to determine that the previously evaluated.
that is detectable only by Type A testing. amendment request involves no 2. Do the proposed changes create the
Therefore, the proposed Technical significant hazards consideration. possibility of a new or different kind of
Specifications change does not involve a Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford accident from any previously evaluated?
significant increase in the consequences of an Blanton, Esq., Balch and Bingham, Post The CREFS and the PRF systems are not
accident previously evaluated. Office Box 306, 1710 Sixth Avenue initiators of any analyzed accident. The
2. The proposed Technical Specifications North, Birmingham, Alabama 35201. proposed changes do not alter the operation
change does not create the possibility of a NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski. of the plant or any of its equipment,
new or different kind of accident from any introduce any permanent new equipment,
accident previously evaluated. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, adversely impact maintenance practices or
The proposed revision to Technical Inc, Docket Nos. 50–348 and 50–364, result in any new failure mechanisms or
Specifications involves a one time extension Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 single failures. Any temporary equipment
to the current interval for Type A and 2, Houston County, Alabama utilized for compensatory measures will be
containment leak testing. The reactor subject to existing administrative controls
containment and the testing requirements Date of amendment request: that address issues such as fire prevention
invoked to periodically demonstrate the September 24, 2002. and seismic concerns. Therefore, there is no

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68745

potential for a new accident and no potential safety evaluation and model no beyond those previously evaluated. The
for changing the progression of an analyzed significant hazards consideration addition of a requirement to assess and
accident. The proposed changes do not create (NSHC) determination, using the manage the risk introduced by the missed
the possibility of a new or different kind of surveillance will further minimize possible
Consolidated Line Item Improvement concerns. Thus, this change does not create
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes result in a Process (CLIIP). The NRC staff the possibility of a new or different kind of
significant reduction in a margin of safety? subsequently issued a notice of accident from any accident previously
The proposed changes do not adversely availability of the models for referencing evaluated.
affect the ability of the fission product in license amendment applications in C. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a
barriers to perform their functions. Adequate the Federal Register on September 28, Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety
compensatory measures are available to 2001 (66 FR 49714). Tennessee Valley The extended time allowed to perform a
mitigate a breach in the control room, spent Authority reviewed the following missed surveillance does not result in a
fuel pool room and penetration room proposed NSHC determination significant reduction in the margin of safety.
pressure boundaries. The probability of a loss
published in the Federal Register as As supported by the historical data, the likely
of coolant accident that would place
part of the CLIIP for Technical outcome of any surveillance is verification
demands on these systems during a period
Specification Task Force (TSTF)–358, that the LCO [Limiting Condition for
that the ventilation system pressure
and concluded in its application of Operation] is met. Failure to perform a
boundaries would be allowed to be
surveillance within the prescribed frequency
inoperable has been shown to be very small. September 3, 2002, that the proposed
does not cause equipment to become
In addition, proposed administrative controls NSHC determination applied to inoperable. The only effect of the additional
eliminate the potential for a fuel handling Sequoyah. time allowed to perform a missed
accident, with potential to exceed dose Basis for proposed no significant surveillance on the margin of safety is the
limits, while the spent fuel pool room hazards consideration determination: extension of the time until inoperable
boundary room is breached. Therefore, the As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an equipment is discovered to be inoperable by
proposed changes do not result in a the missed surveillance. However, given the
analysis of the issue of no significant
significant reduction in a margin of safety. rare occurrence of inoperable equipment, and
hazards consideration is presented
The NRC staff has reviewed the below: the rare occurrence of a missed surveillance,
licensee’s analysis and, based on this a missed surveillance on inoperable
review, it appears that the three Adoption of TSTF–358, Revision 6—Missed equipment would be very unlikely. This
Surveillances must be balanced against the real risk of
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
manipulating the plant equipment or
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff A. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a condition to perform the missed surveillance.
proposes to determine that the Significant Increase in the Probability or In addition, parallel trains and alternate
amendment request involves no Consequences of an Accident Previously equipment are typically available to perform
significant hazards consideration. Evaluated the safety function of the equipment not
Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford The proposed change relaxes the time tested. Thus, there is confidence that the
Blanton, Esq., Balch and Bingham, Post allowed to perform a missed surveillance. equipment can perform its assumed safety
Office Box 306, 1710 Sixth Avenue The time between surveillances is not an function. Therefore, this change does not
North, Birmingham, Alabama 35201. initiator of any accident previously involve a significant reduction in a margin of
NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski. evaluated. Consequently, the probability of safety.
an accident previously evaluated is not In addition to the above
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. significantly increased. The equipment being
tested is still required to be operable and
determination of NSHC, the licensee has
50–327, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,
capable of performing the accident mitigation provided its analysis for the following
Hamilton County, Tennessee
functions assumed in the accident analysis. proposed NSHC determination:
Date of amendment request: As a result, the consequences of any accident Basis for proposed no significant
September 3, 2002. previously evaluated are not significantly hazards consideration determination:
Description of amendment request: affected. Any reduction in confidence that a As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
The proposed amendment would revise standby system might fail to perform its licensee has provided its analysis of the
the Technical Specifications (TS) by: (1) safety function due to a missed surveillance issue of no significant hazards
Modifying the wording of the current is small and would not, in the absence of consideration for the adoption of
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.0.1 and other unrelated failures, lead to an increase
in consequences beyond those estimated by
NUREG–1431, Revision 2, for
SR 4.0.3 to be consistent with NUREG– existing analyses. The addition of a Surveillance Requirements 3.0.1 and
1431, Revision 2, Improved Standard requirement to assess and manage the risk 3.0.3 wording and for the adoption of
Technical Specifications (ISTS) wording introduced by the missed surveillance will NUREG–1431, Revision 2, Technical
for SR 3.0.1 and SR 3.0.3; (2) modifying further minimize possible concerns. Specification Bases Control Program,
the current TS 6.8 by adding a new Therefore, this change does not involve a both of which are presented below:
subsection 6.8.j, which will include the significant increase in the probability or
NUREG–1431, Revision 2, ISTS wording consequences of an accident previously Adoption of NUREG–1431, Revision 2, for
for TS 5.5.14 that discusses the TS Bases evaluated. Surveillance Requirements 3.0.1 and 3.0.3
Wording
Control Program; and (3) modifying the B. The Proposed Change Does Not Create the
ISTS wording, adopted in item 1 above, Possibility of a New or Different Kind of A. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a
to allow a delay period of 24 hours or Accident From Any Previously Evaluated Significant Increase in the Probability or
up to the surveillance frequency The proposed change does not involve a Consequences of an Accident Previously
interval, whichever is greater, and to physical alteration of the plant (no new or Evaluated
require a risk analysis to be performed different type of equipment will be installed) The proposed change involves rewording
for any surveillance greater than 24 or a change in the methods governing normal of existing Specification 4.0.1 and 4.0.3 to be
plant operation. A missed surveillance will consistent with NUREG–1431, Revision 2.
hours. not, in and of itself, introduce new failure These modifications involve no technical
The NRC staff issued a notice of modes or effects and any increased chance changes to the existing TS [Technical
opportunity for comment in the Federal that a standby system might fail to perform Specifications]. This change is administrative
Register on June 14, 2001 (66 FR 32400), its safety function due to a missed in nature and does not affect initiators of
on possible amendments concerning surveillance would not, in the absence of analyzed events or assumed mitigation of
missed surveillances, including a model other unrelated failures, lead to an accident accident or transient events. Therefore, this

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68746 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

change does not involve a significant C. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a physics testing is being changed to allow the
increase in the probability or consequences Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety temporary bypass of one power range
of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change involves channel. The reactor protection system will
B. The Proposed Change Does Not Create the incorporation of the NUREG–1431, Revision continue to function in a manner consistent
Possibility of a New or Different Kind of 2, Bases Control Program requirements into with the plant design basis since a sufficient
Accident From Any Previously Evaluated SQN Units 1 and 2 TS. The change is number of power range channels will remain
administrative in nature and will not involve OPERABLE to assure the capability of
The proposed change involves the protective functions, even with a postulated
rewording of the existing Specification 4.0.1 any technical changes. The change will not
reduce a margin of safety because they have single failure. [The number of required
and 4.0.3 to be consistent with NUREG–1431, channels for certain functions in Table 3.3.1–
Revision 2. The change does not involve a not impact on any safety analysis
1 is only being reduced from 4 to 3 channels.]
physical alteration of the plant (no new or assumptions. Since this change is
All design, material, and construction
different type of equipment installed) or administrative in nature, no question of
standards that were applicable prior to the
changes in the methods governing normal safety is involved. Therefore, the proposed
request are maintained.
plant operation. The change will not impose change does not involve a significant
The proposed change will allow the
any new or different requirements or reduction in a margin of safety.
temporary bypass of one power range
eliminate any existing requirements. Based upon the reasoning presented above neutron flux channel during the performance
Therefore, the proposed change does not and the previous discussion of the of low power physics testing in MODE 2.
create the probability of a new or different amendment request, the requested change This results in a temporary change to the
kind of accident from any accident does not involve a significant hazards coincidence logic from one-out-of-three
previously evaluated. consideration. under the current TS (with a trip imposed on
C. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a The NRC staff has reviewed the the channel used for physics testing) to two-
Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety licensee’s analysis and, based on this out-of-three under the proposed TS (the
review, it appears that the three channel used for physics testing would be in
The proposed change involves rewording a bypassed state). However, this two-out-of-
of the existing Specification 4.0.1 and 4.0.3 standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are three coincidence logic still supports [the]
to be consistent with NUREG–1431, Revision satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff required protection and control system
2. The change is administrative in nature and proposes to determine that the applications, while reducing plant
will not involve any technical changes. The amendment request involves no susceptibility to a spurious reactor trip.
change will not reduce a margin of safety significant hazards consideration. The proposed change will not affect the
because it has no impact on any safety Attorney for licensee: General probability of any event initiators. There will
analysis assumptions. Since this change is be no change to normal plant operating
administrative in nature, no question of
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 10H, parameters or accident mitigation
safety is involved. Therefore, the proposed performance.
change does not involve a significant Knoxville, Tennessee 37902. The proposed change will not alter any
reduction in a margin of safety. NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe. assumptions or change any mitigation actions
Adoption of NUREG–1431, Revision 2, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating in the radiological consequence evaluations
Technical Specification Bases Control Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf in the USAR [Wolf Creek Updated Safety
Program Analysis Report].
Creek Generating Station, Coffey Therefore, the proposed change does not
A. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a County, Kansas involve a significant increase in the
Significant Increase in the Probability or Date of amendment request: October probability or consequences of an accident
Consequences of an Accident Previously previously evaluated.
Evaluated
1, 2002.
Description of amendment request: 2. The proposed change does not create the
The proposed change involves The amendment would add a phrase to possibility of a new or different kind of
incorporation of the NUREG–1431, Revision accident from any accident previously
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) evaluated.
2, Bases Control Program requirements into
the SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear Plant] Units 1 3.1.8, ‘‘Physics Tests Exceptions—Mode There are no permanent hardware changes
and 2 TS. This change involves no technical 2,’’ of the technical specifications (TSs). nor are there any changes in the method by
change to existing TS, it simply adds The phrase to be added is that the which any safety-related plant system
wording on how the bases section of the TS number of required channels for certain performs its safety function. This change will
will be maintained and controlled. This functions in Table 3.3.1–1 of LCO 3.3.1, not affect the normal method of power
change is administrative in nature and does ‘‘RTS Instrumentation,’’ may be reduced operation or change any operating
not affect initiators or analyzed events or from four to three required channels. parameters. No performance requirements
assumed mitigation of accident or transient will be affected.
LCO 3.1.8 applies to reactor Mode 2 No new accident scenarios, transient
events. Therefore, this change does not
involve a significant increase in the
during physics tests. precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting
probability or consequences or an accident
Basis for proposed no significant single failures are introduced as a result of
previously evaluated. hazards consideration determination: this amendment. There will be no adverse
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the effect or challenges imposed on any safety-
B. The Proposed Change Does Not Create the
Possibility of a New or Different Kind of
licensee has provided its analysis of the related system as a result of this amendment.
issue of no significant hazards The proposed amendment does not alter
Accident From Any Previously Evaluated
consideration, which is presented the design or performance of the 7300
The proposed change involves Process Protection System, Nuclear
incorporation of the NUREG–1431, Revision
below:
Instrumentation System (other than as
2, Bases Control Program requirements into 1. The proposed change does not involve discussed above), or Solid State Protection
the SQN Units 1 and 2 TS. The change does a significant increase in the probability or System used in the plant protection systems.
not involve a physical alteration of the plant consequences of an accident previously [The number of the required channels is not
(no new or different type of equipment evaluated. an initiator of an accident.]
installed) or changes in the methods Overall protection system performance [for Therefore, the proposed change does not
governing normal plant operation. The the proposed change] will remain within the create the possibility of a new or different
change will not impose any new or different bounds of the previously performed accident kind of accident from any previously
requirements or eliminate any existing analyses since there are no permanent evaluated.
requirements. Therefore, the proposed hardware changes. The design of the RTS 3. The proposed change does not involve
change does not create the probability of a [reactor trip system] instrumentation will be a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
new or different kind of accident from any unaffected; only the manner in which the There will be no effect on the manner in
accident previously evaluated. system is connected for short duration which safety limits or limiting safety system

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices 68747

settings are determined nor will there be any Unless otherwise indicated, the application and did not change the
effect on those plant systems necessary to Commission has determined that these staff’s initial proposed no significant
assure the accomplishment of protective amendments satisfy the criteria for hazards consideration determination.
functions. There will be no impact on the
overpower limit, departure from nucleate
categorical exclusion in accordance The Commission’s related evaluation of
boiling ratio (DNBR) limits, heat flux hot with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant this amendment is contained in a Safety
channel factor (FQ), nuclear enthalpy rise hot to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental Evaluation dated October 18, 2002.
channel factor (F’H), loss of coolant accident impact statement or environmental No significant hazards consideration
peak cladding temperature (LOCA PCT), peak assessment need be prepared for these comments received: No.
local power density, or any other margin of amendments. If the Commission has
safety. The radiological dose consequence Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
prepared an environmental assessment Docket No. 50–336, Millstone Power
acceptance criteria listed in the Standard under the special circumstances
Review Plan will continue to be met. Station, Unit No. 2, New London
The proposed change does not eliminate
provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has County, Connecticut
any RTS surveillance or alter the Frequency made a determination based on that
of surveillances required by the Technical assessment, it is so indicated. Date of application for amendment:
Specifications. The nominal RTS and For further details with respect to the July 19, 2002, as supplemented
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System action see (1) the applications for September 6, 2002.
(ESFAS) trip setpoints (TS Bases Tables B amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) Brief description of amendment: The
3.3.1–1 and B 3.3.2–1), RTS and ESFAS the Commission’s related letter, Safety amendment revises Technical
allowable values (TS Tables 3.3.1–1 and Evaluation and/or Environmental Specification (TS) Surveillance
3.3.2–1), and the safety analysis limits Assessment as indicated. All of these Requirement (SR) 4.0.3 to extend the
assumed in the transient and accident delay period, before entering a Limiting
analyses [(USAR Table 15.0–4)] are items are available for public inspection
unchanged. None of the acceptance criteria at the Commission’s Public Document Condition for Operation, following a
for any accident analysis is changed. The Room, located at One White Flint North, missed surveillance. The delay period is
potential reduction in the frequency of 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), extended from the current limit of
spurious reactor trips would effectively Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available ‘‘* * * up to 24 hours’’ to ‘‘* * * up to
increase the margin of safety or, at a records will be accessible from the 24 hours or up to the limit of the
minimum, be risk-neutral. Agencywide Documents Access and specified surveillance interval,
Therefore, the proposed change does not Management Systems (ADAMS) Public whichever is greater.’’ In addition, the
involve a significant reduction in a margin of following requirement is added to SR
safety. Electronic Reading Room on the internet
at the NRC Web site, http:// 4.0.3: ‘‘A risk evaluation shall be
The NRC staff has reviewed the www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If performed for any surveillance delayed
licensee’s analysis and, based on this you do not have access to ADAMS or if greater than 24 hours and the risk
review, it appears that the three there are problems in accessing the impact shall be managed.’’ The
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are documents located in ADAMS, contact amendment also makes administrative
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) changes to SRs 4.0.1 and 4.0.3 to be
proposes to determine that the Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– consistent with NUREG–1432, Revision
amendment request involves no 415–4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 2, ‘‘Standard Technical Specifications,
significant hazards consideration. Combustion Engineering Plants.’’
Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, et al., Date of issuance: October 15, 2002.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, Docket No. 50–219, Oyster Creek Effective date: As of the date of
2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean issuance and shall be implemented
20037. County, New Jersey within 90 days from the date of
NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek. Date of application for amendment: issuance.
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to April 26, 2002, as supplemented on July Amendment No.: 271.
Facility Operating Licenses 11 and September 12, 2002. Facility Operating License No. DPR–
Brief description of amendment: The 65: This amendment revised the TSs.
During the period since publication of amendment revised Sections 2.3, Date of initial notice in Federal
the last biweekly notice, the ‘‘Limiting Safety System Settings,’’ 3.1, Register: August 22, 2002 (67 FR
Commission has issued the following ‘‘Protective Instrumentation,’’ and 3.10, 54497).
amendments. The Commission has ‘‘Core Limits,’’ of the Technical The September 6, 2002, letter
determined for each of these Specifications, and approved the use of provided clarifying information that did
amendments that the application flow control reference cards to support not change the initial proposed no
complies with the standards and implementation of the Boiling Water significant hazards consideration
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act Reactor Owners Group Option II determination.
of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the solution for the long-term reactor The Commission’s related evaluation
Commission’s rules and regulations. stability problem. of the amendment is contained in a
The Commission has made appropriate Date of Issuance: October 18, 2002. Safety Evaluation dated October 15,
findings as required by the Act and the Effective date: October 18, 2002, and 2002.
Commission’s rules and regulations in shall be implemented within 30 days of No significant hazards consideration
10 CFR chapter I, which are set forth in issuance. comments received: No.
the license amendment. Amendment No.: 235.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
Amendment to Facility Operating 50–269, 50–270, and 50–287, Oconee
16: Amendment revised the Technical
License, Proposed No Significant Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3,
Specifications.
Hazards Consideration Determination, Date of initial notice in Federal Oconee County, South Carolina
and Opportunity for A Hearing in Register: May 28, 2002 (67 FR 36926). Date of application of amendments:
connection with these actions was The July 11 and September 12, 2002, July 29, 2002.
published in the Federal Register as letters provided clarifying information Brief description of amendments: The
indicated. within the scope of the original amendments revised Technical

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68748 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2002 / Notices

Specification Surveillance Requirement No significant hazards consideration Safety Evaluation dated October 21,
3.7.2.2 to decrease the allowable closure comments received: No. 2002.
time for the turbine stop valves from 15 No significant hazards consideration
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
seconds to 1 second. comments received: No.
Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo
Date of Issuance: October 24, 2002.
Effective date: As of the date of Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. Portland General Electric Company, et
issuance and shall be implemented 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, al., Docket No. 50–344, Trojan Nuclear
within 30 days from the date of California Plant, Columbia County, Oregon
issuance. Date of application for amendments: Date of application for amendment:
Amendment Nos.: 329, 329, 330. October 17, 2001, as supplemented by November 15, 2001 as supplemented by
Renewed Facility Operating License letters dated February 26, August 14 and letters dated January 31, July 31, and
Nos. DPR–38, DPR–47, and DPR–55: September 13, 2002. October 3, 2002.
Amendments revised the Technical Brief description of amendments: The Brief description of amendment: The
Specifications. amendments revise (1) Technical amendment revises License Condition
Date of initial notice in Federal Specification (TS) Section 1.1, 2.C(10), ‘‘Loading of Fuel into Casks in
Register: September 3, 2002 (67 FR ‘‘Definitions,’’ for Dose Equivalent I– the Fuel Building,’’ to license number
56320). 131, to allow the use of the thyroid dose NPF–1 for the Trojan Nuclear Plant
The Commission’s related evaluation conversion factors, listed in the (TNP). Specifically, these design
of the amendments is contained in a International Commission on changes are the result of the licensee’s
Safety Evaluation dated October 24, Radiological Protection Publication 30, selection of Holtec International’s
2002. ‘‘Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by design components (e.g., the Multi-
No significant hazards consideration Workers,’’ and (2) Section 3.9.4, Purpose Cannister versus the
comments received: No. ‘‘Containment Penetrations,’’ to allow Pressurized Water Reactor Basket. The
Energy Northwest, Docket No. 50–397, the equipment hatch, personnel air lock new design basis limits impact the cask
Columbia Generating Station, Benton doors, and emergency air lock doors to loading operations and contingency
County, Washington remain open during core alterations and unloading in the Fuel Building.
movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Date of issuance: October 21, 2002.
Date of application for amendment: Effective date: As of the date of
Date of issuance: October 21, 2002.
July 18, 2002. issuance to be implemented and shall be
Brief description of amendment: The Effective date: October 21, 2002, to be
implemented within 30 days from the implemented prior to placing Holtec
amendment revises Surveillance International MPC’s in the TNP ISFSI.
Requirement (SR) 3.0.3 to extend the date of issuance, including the
completion of the administrative Facility Operating License No. NPF–1:
delay period before entering a Limiting The amendment changes the cask
Condition for Operation following a procedures that ensure that closure of
the open containment penetrations, loading and contingency unloading
missed surveillance. The delay period is operations in the Fuel Building.
extended from the current limit of with direct access to the outside
atmosphere during refueling operations Date of initial notice in Federal
‘‘* * * up to 24 hours or up to the limit Register: April 2, 2002 (67 FR 15626).
of the specified Frequency, whichever is with core alterations or irradiated fuel
movement inside containment, will be The January 31, July 31, and October
less’’ to ‘‘* * * up to 24 hours or up to 3, 2002, supplemental letters provided
the limit of the specified Frequency, initiated immediately in the event of a
fuel handling accident inside clarifying information that did not
whichever is greater.’’ In addition, the change the scope of the original Federal
following requirement is added to SR containment, or if severe weather
warnings are in effect. Register (67 FR 15626) notice or the
3.0.3: ‘‘A risk evaluation shall be original no significant hazards
performed for any Surveillance delayed Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—155; Unit
2—155. consideration determination.
greater than 24 hours and the risk The Commission’s related evaluation
impact shall be managed.’’ Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
80 and DPR–82: The amendments of the amendment is contained in a
Date of issuance: October 8, 2002. Safety Evaluation dated October 21,
Effective date: October 8, 2002, to be revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal 2002.
implemented within 60 days from the No significant hazards consideration
date of issuance. Register: January 8, 2002 (67 FR 929).
comments received: No.
Amendment No.: 180. The supplemental letters dated
Facility Operating License No. NPF– February 26, August 14 and September Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day
21: The amendment revised the 13, 2002, provided additional clarifying of November 2002.
Technical Specifications. information, did not expand the scope For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Date of initial notice in Federal of the application as originally noticed, John A. Zwolinski,
Register: September 3, 2002 (67 FR and did not change the staff’s original Director, Division of Licensing Project
56321). proposed no significant hazards Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
The Commission’s related evaluation consideration determination. Regulation.
of the amendment is contained in a The Commission’s related evaluation [FR Doc. 02–28483 Filed 11–8–02; 8:45 am]
Safety Evaluation dated October 8, 2002. of the amendments is contained in a BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

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