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Regional Organizations and Regional
Security
a b c
S. Neil MacFarlane & Thomas G. Weiss
a
Queens University, Kingston, Ontario
b
Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies
c
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island

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To cite this article: S. Neil MacFarlane & Thomas G. Weiss (1992): Regional Organizations and
Regional Security, Security Studies, 2:1, 6-37

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Regional Organizations and Regional Security

S. Neil M acFarlane and Thomas G . Weiss

bipolarity prevented war at the center of world politics. It did
O L D W AR
C little, however, to prevent serious conflict outside Europe and North
America. Arguably, it increased the incidence of conflict there, since the
freezing effect of bipolarity and mutual assured destruction on conflict in
Europe may have diverted the competitive impulses of East and West to safer
ground in the Third World.'
Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
sphere of influence may increase the probability of local wars in Europe, as
events in Moldova, Ossetia, Yugoslavia, and Nagorno-Karabakh illustrate.
They also do little to reduce the likelihood of conflict elsewhere. Military
conflict and its consequences appear just as endemic today and for the
foreseeable future as they were in the past.
The end of superpower rivalry, however, does enhance the capacity of
multilateral organizations to manage and resolve civil and interstate conflict.'
The improvement of superpower relations and the subsequent disappearance
of the Soviet Union remove the blocking effect of Soviet-American competi-
tion on international organizations as they attempt to deal with regional
conflicts.
That multilateral management of conflict is a growth industry is evident
from the rapid recent increase in the number and kind of peace-keeping
initiatives undertaken by the United Nations. Since its intense mediation of
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end to the Iran-Iraq War,
the United Nations has mounted thirteen new operations, the same number
as in the previous forty years. In the first few months of 1992 alone, some
30,000 soldiers were added to the UN payroll with the massive new undertak-
ings in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. Unpaid arrears approach one billion
dollars, while operations approved for the next twelve months are estimated
to cost three billion dollars.'
The question arises as to whether it is more appropriate to deal with loc al
conflict through multilateral organizations that are regional (for example, the
European Community) or universal (for ex ample, the United Nations) in

S. N eil MacFarlane is pro fessor of pol it ical scie nce at Queens Un iversit y, King ston , O nta rio;
Thomas G . Wei ss is associa te di rec to r of the Thomas J. W at son , Jr. In st itute for Internati onal
Stud ies a nd asso ciate d ean of th e faculty at Br own U nive rsi ty, Providence, Rh od e Island .

SE C U R IT Y ST UD IES. vol. 2. no. I. Aut um n 1992. pp.6-37.
Pu blished by Frank Ca sso Lo ndo n

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 7

scope. The traditional preference of policy makers in the United States has
been for regional management of regional conflict, a principle that was
enshrined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter at the insistence of the United
States and Latin American delegations.' The successful completion of the
Gulf War has engendered a strong sense that the original security provisions
of the Charter are finally being implemented, including a renewed interest in
regional organizations.' Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's water-
shed report, An Agenda for Pcace.: contains a chapter on them and reflects his
own experience at the end of his diplomatic career as re sponsible for Egypt's
relations with the Organization of African Unity (o w ) a nd his doctoral
dissertation forty years ago.
The emphasis on regional bodies is not surpri sing and reflects both
cognitive and instrumental reasoning. There is reason to believe that regional
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actors are intrinsically equipped to deal with the dynamics of regional
conflict. The UN is overstretched while the great powers dominating its
decision making are loath to multiply their n na ncia l responsibilities in
foreign policy. A group of eminent persons called together by the Swedish
prime minister agreed last year that "World leaders must now act deter-
minedly to build a new system for peace and secur ity, at both a global and
regional scale. "7
In this article, however, we argue that the hopes placed on regional
organizations are unduly optimistic, if not altogether misplaced. In the next
section we examine the general arguments for a nd aga inst a regional
approach to conflict management. We then examine a number of recent cases
of involving regional organizations in conflict management: the Association
of South-East Asian Nations ( ASEAN) in Cambodia; the OA U in va r ious recent
conflicts in Africa; the actions of the Economic Commun ity o f West African
States (E COWAS) in Liberia; and the Organization of American States ( O AS) in
both Nicaragua and EI Salvador. Finally, the European Community's
dithering in Yugoslavia is discussed as an illustration of the incapacity of even
well-endowed regional organizations to manage effectively conflicts in their
locale.
The theoretical discussion and the empirical cases suggest that regionalism
is not a promising approach to conflict regulation. Although it makes sens e to
strengthen regional organizations where possible, and some suggestions a re
made in the conclusion along these lines, they should not be viewed as a via ble
alternative to the United Nations in a conflict management role. Ill-founded
reliance on regional organizations could even result in neglecting the one
organization most likely to fulfil the role of regional conflict manager.

The supposed deficiencies of universal international organizations and the resulting apparent strengths of regional ones are examined under three headings : the ambiguity of "region" as a concept. pre. culturally. rather than the Security Council. Such groups could include treaty- based organizations. vol. Not only did the active use of the veto (279 to be exact) throughout the Cold War prevent the utilization of the Security Council as anticipated in the Charter. In the Soviet backyard.S. and even article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations noted the validity of regional understandings as a basis for maintaining peace. a position that was clearly articulated at the outset of the present Charter regime. In fact. thus allowing a flexibility for governments fashioning instruments to foster international peace and security. Thus." The creation of the Security Council with its enforcement power gave globalism a significant edge over regionalism. 8 SECURITY STUDIES. backyard. or ad hoc mechanisms created to deal with a specific issue of concern. ideologically. the . In the U. dominated by the Soviet Union ." The basic idea was to make efforts Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 to settle local disputes regionally before referring them to the United Nations. East-West tensions also meant that regional organizations provided Washington and Moscow with convenient pretexts for keeping disputes out of the United Nations. and also for the Security Council to encourage the growth and capacities of regional bodies.or post-dating the UN.2. While the commonsensical notion of region is related to geography. the overstretched capacities of the UN in the area of international peace and security. and economically. no. dominated by the United States. whose opening paragraph refers to "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. and the Dominican Republic were relegated to the OAS." The Charter deliberately was drafted to avoid a precise definition. Cuba. crises in Guatemala. but Chapter VIII on "Regional Arrangements" was considered essential. the ambiguity of the Charter means that a region can also be conceived geopolitically. and better familiarity with local crises of member states of regional organizations. There is an evident lack of precision in Chapter VIII. I THE CAPACITY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR CONFLI CT MANAGEMENT There is reason to believe that regional organizations are the appropriate locus for the management of local conflict. in addition to such geographic entities as the OAU or the OAS. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were in the jurisdiction of the "socialist community" of the Warsaw Pact. observers tend now to overlook the fact that the relative balance between regionalism and universalism was one of the most controversial aspects at the San Francisco conference. Panama.

and the Contadora Group. recent research points to the emergence of such "subregional" units as the Gulf Cooperation Council (occ) or the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as significant players of the future in the Third World. and it may also slow down vigorous action by universal institutions. The end of the Cold War diminishes greatly the interest perceived by the West in many regional conflicts. Congress is recalcitrant about . governing elites and publics seek to divert expenditure from foreign policy and security tasks to long postponed domestic economic and social needs. the Warsaw Pact. have the flexibility to define Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 the nature of their jurisdiction and even their duration.while patterns of payment are unacceptably slow and unpaid arrears approach $1 billion . Domestic constituencies supporting UN activities are generally weak. We cannot simply say. " For example. " The concept of regionalism thus remains a conundrum for social scientists. There were political reasons why the Gulf War was not commanded or controlled by the UN. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 9 Charter's definition also includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 'A region is a region is a region. The great powers appear reluctant to pay for any substantial expansion of UN conflict management responsibilities. the Islamic Conference. A second issue concerns institutional wherewithal. The United Nations is in serious financial difficulty and sorely lacks sufficient and qualified staff. wrote: "For the political scientist the definition of a region is considerably more difficult than the definition of a rose was to Gertrude Stein. whatever the species. but there would have been no professional military capacity to do so had the allies been willing.' "II However ambiguous the U N Charter and academic conceptions. there has even been a drop among traditional supporters and an unwillingness to increase expenditures by multilateral institutions in spite of a steady recognition of the importance of the United Nations. The ever-growing number of operations strains excessively limited UN financial and human resources. "regional" organizations themselves. Great power resources are limited. among other things.means that the organization is finding it increasingly difficult to handle even those conflicts in which it has taken a role. for example. Karl Deutsch. In the post-Cold War context. while the Bush administration has committed itself to repaying arrears over a five-year period. '! A quintupling of its peace-keeping budget from 1991 to 1992 to meet the exigencies of Yugoslavia and Cambodia and perhaps Somalia . According to a recent public opinion poll conducted by the United Nations Association of the USA. In fact in the security arena. This definitional ambiguity can cause problems in the management of conflict if governments expect more from an organization than it can provide. the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). by the current global recession.

Forces in the field faced critical logistical problems as a result of the failure of some supporting contingents to arrive. In mid-1992 the United Nations was falling behind schedule in implementing of the agreement on disarmament and political transition. regional actors are perhaps those best suited to mediation in local conflicts. for instance. the world organization was still having difficulty finding international personnel to staff five Cambodian govern- ment departments.2 . Leaders 'a re far more likely to have personal connections to protagonists in local conflicts. 10 SE CURITY STUDIES . Canada is commonly considered the " back bo ne" of multi- lateralism. In this context. They understand the dynamics of strife and cultures more intimately than do outsiders. social. They receive. President Bush initially told the UN Secretary-General to hold any more requests for peace- keeping operations until after the November elections. the UN capacity to undertake additional responsibilities is dubious. which may be used as a basis for mediation." In short. Involvement by other regional powers is less likely to be perceived . As the campaign began to heat up and the situation in Yugoslavia soured. although this sugges- tion could not be respected. They receive the refugees and bear the political. Moreover. The members of these organizations suffer most dramatically from the destabilizing consequences of war in their area. Smaller powers traditionally active in peacekeeping are unlikely to pick up more of the tab. Local conflict and the consequent perceptions of regional instability dampen investment flows and retard growth. Regional powers and organizations have the greatest stake in the manage- ment and resolution of conflict in their locale. willingly or unwillingly. The capacity of the U N to sustain the operation through to elections was drawn into question by the penury of the Security Council's approach to operations in the field. Various member states contributing to the operation were trim- ming their commitments. The situation of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is an Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 eloquent testimony to these problems. They divert public resources into defense expenditures. no. They face the choice of pacifying and repatriat- ing combatant and noncombatant aliens on their ternitory or of resisting hot pursuit by those from whom these refugees have fled. regional approaches to crisis management and conflict resolution seem attractive. while the will of its domi- nant members to do so is often weak. but it has recently announced its desire to withdraw from the U N operation in Cyprus after twenty-seven years. and economic consequences. I even the normal contribution to the U N budget. not least because the Khmer Rouge were refusing to cooperate. While the Japanese parliament finally authorized the controversial use of its own nationals in UN operations overseas. the combatants of neighboring countries seeking sanctuary. They sh are the sam e economic problems of their larger brethren. vo l.

Instead of extensive narrative accounts. so much so that they have not been able to carry out mandates in peace and security. That the three apparent advantages of regional institutions are benefits more in theory than in practice will become obvious as we proceed through case studies in the next section.familiarity with Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 the issues. As a "crucial casc. In short.To what extent does the regional organization's attempt to deal with a local conflict reflect the divergent interests of member states and to what extent does this impede an effective organizational response? . In reality." " we conclude this section with an examination of the role of the European Community in the Serb-Croat crisis of 1991-92. The cases have been chosen to provide reasonably comprehensive geographic coverage of the role of regional organizations in conflict regu- lation in the Third World. Finally. and lack of resources. we discuss in turn the role of ASEAN in Cambodia. since the latter have much broader agendas and many more distractions. local rivalries. ECOW AS in Liberia. S OME CA SE ST U DI E S O F R E GI O NA L OR G A NIZ ATI O N S IN A CTI O N We turn now to a number of post-Cold War instances of conflict and conflict management. there is good reason to doubt not just the will but also the capacity of regional organizations to perform well in the management of conflict within their areas. The institutional capacities of regional organizations are extremely feeble. issues relating to local conflict are far more likely to be given full and urgent consideration in regional fora than in global ones. we focus on five specific issues that ha ve a direct bearing on our attempt to determine the significance of regional organizations in regional security: . Finally. the OAU in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa. these organizations are far less capable than the United Nations to deal with regional security. the so-called comparative superiority of organizations in the actual region in conflict . The concept of regionalism is inchoate and not useful as a policy tool to guide decisions under Article VIII of the UN Charter. accentuating the role of regional organizations and analyzing the reasons for their general failure to make much of a difference. insulation from outside powers. and the G A S in Central America. The end of the Cold War does little to change this concl us ion. The cases are structured comparatively. As noted above. need to deal with acute crises .are more than offset by' such practical disadvantages as partisanship. RE GI ONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 11 as an illegitimate interference than is that of extra regional organizations.

and the major powers have helped diplomatically since the end of the Cold War. In the process. and information) and to oversee national elections. the new government's first act was to evacuate all cities and towns. external affairs. internal security.i . The insurgent forces captured Phnom Penh and took over the government in April 1975. Vietnam sponsored a full-fledged invasion in 1978 to oust the Khmer Rouge. in mid-1992 there still Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 appeared some chance that a more promising era might be ushered in by the U N most comprehensive. displacing almost the entire population to clear jungle. The UN is playing the central operational role. with the support of the Vietnamese. vol.To what extent do power imbalances at the regional level impinge on the behavior of the regional organization and complicate conflict resolution? . demanding the removal of what were then North Vietnamese forces and abolishing the monarchy.2.To what extent was or is the organization's response to the crrsis In question constrained by financial and organizational limitations? ASEAN'S Role in the Cambodian Conflict During two decades of foreign occupation. kept this issue alive on the international agenda until the ebbing of the Cold War made action possible. and a civil war began between the newly- installed government and the Khmer Rouge. ASEAN. The bill for the first fifteen months of U N T AC . a new government. genocide. But efforts by a sub-regional economic organization. Nonetheless. n o . at least one million persons were executed or died from enforced hardships. In 1970 the pro-United States Lon Nol seized power from Prince Norodom Sihanouk. 12 SE CURITY STUDIES . the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salva- tion. In January 1979. The present plans for the U N Transitional Authority in Cambodia consist of some 15.To what extent is a lack of inclusiveness an obstacle to effective conflict management by the regional organization? . was formed which soon triggered the second mass movement of refugees into Thailand or as "boat people. Under the titular guidance of Sihanouk and with support . operation since the Congo. and perhaps dangerous. national defense. excluding the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees. approaches two billion dollars.000 troops and about half that many civilians to staff virtually every level of government (finance.What does the case suggest about the organization 's capacity to cope with internal as opposed to interstate conflict? . Under the leadership of the infamous Pol Pot. and civil war about one- third of the Cambodian population died." What temporarily became "Kampuchea" was isolated internationally except for Vietnam and the rest of the Soviet bloc. The prince formed a government-in-exile in Peking.

It is already obvious . and the UN previous embarrassment in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 should give cause for some alarm. ASE AN joined with China and the West in demanding the unconditional Vietnamese withdrawal and recognized the ousted Pol Pot regime as "legitimate" rather than the government in Phnom Penh. decided to maintain the pressure diplomatically. In fact. Hanoi began slowly withdrawing its advisers as early as 1980 and its troops beginning in 1982. The complexity of external assumption of government power is obvious enough. And it was particularly so when geopolitics changed and all five permanent members of the Security Council backed the regional position. ASEA N also backed rearmament of the opposition. reflecting the virtual end of Soviet support and lack of interest in the region. the difficulties of the military operations under UN auspices may be less obviously problematic. and UN troops to disarm and cantonize all four Cambodian armies. which meant strengthening the Khmer Rouge as well as groups loyal to Sihanouk and Son Sann. RE GI ONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RE GIONAL SECURITY 13 from China and the United States. Vietnam remained in Cambodia. including the Khmer Rouge. Some a rg ue that the continuing ability of the Khmer Rouge to use Thailand is based on the desire of some military . offering to withdraw only after the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from any future government and the removal Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 of the Chinese threat against Vietnam itself. Vietnam dropped its conditions and had completed its unilateral withdrawal by the end of 1989. The proposal of the "Perm 5" that emerged one year later became the mandate for UNTAC : UN civilian personnel to supervise five key ministries and oversee elections. whose own burgeoning economies were disrupted by the confrontation between major powers and by refugees. a coalition. ASEAN was useful in the diplomacy of the mid-1980s in dealing with a conflict that was both internal as well as inter-state.that there are disputes about declared manpower and firepower and that the proliferation of weapons is so extensive that disarmament can probably not be ensured by cantonment alone. Once inside. Moreover. 70 percent are to disarm and be integrated into the local economy while 30 percent are to remain armed and form the basis for an integrated national army. ASEA N diplomacy was then able to be combined with that of the permanent five members of the Security Council beginning in Paris in August 1989. Nonetheless. began a guerrilla campaign against the government and the Vietnamese.particularly for the Khmer Rouge who have always been the most volatile and unpredictable element in agreements and negotiations and who have refused to disarm their fighters in the countryside since June . " The countries in the region. Each of the four factions is to move from its operational bases and regroup into predesignated assembly areas (or "canton- ments"). but they merit serious scrutiny here. for purposes of occupying the seat in the United Nations.

the six members of ASEAN were able to overcome internal differences in view toward Vietnam (especially between hard -liners in Thailand and the compromisers in Indonesia). Each resulted in widespread infrastructural destruction. eventually. As one military observer has aptly noted: "If Cambodia turns out to be less than a 'best-case scenario. Each displayed an occasionally sig- nificant potential for spillover.OL A AND THE HOR N O F AFRI C A Two of the more troublesome complexes of conflict in the African security system of the 1980s were the combined civil and regional conflict in Angola. or Sudan in Ethiopia) and in turn invited retaliatory destabilization. which in fact may also be beyond the capabilities of the United Nations. Zaire in Angola. In the interests of economic progress and trade amongst themselves.2. But ASE AN governments are different from members of most regional institutions. loss of civilian and military life (both directly and indirectly through famine resulting in part from extended conflict and its disruption of economic activity). The danger of regional escalation pro- vided an additional incentive for regional involvement. nor was China or Japan.' the international community must be prepared to underwrite the security of the peace process.! officers and private corporations to profit from illegal trade in timber and narcotics."I. 14 SE CURITY STUDIES . yet to a considerable degree autonomous of. While a limited membership thus facilitated discussions. but neither their organization as a whole (it is an economic group) nor the countries individually had sufficient leverage or. vol. But this small organization of only six members had no resources or mandate to undertake the operational requirements of implementing the peace process. they have a unified position and perception of interests. it was a problem in another way. and about the relative importance of Chinese and Vietnamese Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 threats to stability. None of the countries of Indo-China (Vietnam . no. the Cold War. and all of these countries played an essential role in fueling and eventually settling the conflict. 1M Both were in part produced by. military capacity to monitor the complex agreement among the Cambodian factions. Cambodia. Laos) was a member. TH E OAU AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: AN( . One would thus have expected the organization to have taken an active role for this reason alone. . In some ways the weakness in membership permitted outside mediation by the ASEAN countries. and massive displacements of population. To some extent each was an instance of the negative consequences of the non-African intervention that che OAU has been established to forestall. and the civil wars in Ethiopia and Somalia. as neighboring states became involved in civil disputes (for example.

the USSR. In the Angolan case. and the OAU was committed in the first place to supporting member states threatened by the South African regime. In the changing international (and. Northern Somalia has de facto severed its ties to Mogadishu. domestic) situation of the late 1980s. and Cuba). In the case of the Horn. continuation of the war no longer served their interests. The Soviet Union had supported the MPLA regime with military assistance since the winning of Angolan independence in 1975. resumed its active support of UNITA in 1985 after the repeal of the Clark Amendment as part of the so-called Reagan Doctrine to reverse communist gains in developing countries. A combination of external pressure from past patrons and war- weariness produced the internal accord. . The AngolanlNamibian nexus of conflict directly involved South Africa. They have achieved this de facto with the collapse of the Mengistu regime. and in the second place to the liberation of the black majority population from apartheid. both the Ethiopian and the Somali civil wars drew into question the inviolability of the post-colonial legacy of states and borders. For all of these reasons. An agreement on termination of the South African involvement in Angola and on independence for Namibia was reached in December 1988. This case is that of the dog that did not bark. The Ethiopian case is particularly poignant because OAU headquarters are in Addis Ababa. Much of the political history of the OAU and the African community of states has focused upon the avoidance of just this sort of Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 outcome to processes of civil conflict. and indirect intervention through assistance to and training of UNITA. In neither case was such a response forthcoming. the African community in the late 1980s faced an endemic civil war between UNITA and the MPLA government. Another between UNITA and the MPLA on a political settlement of the internal war followed within a year. having abandoned the field at the end of 1975 as a result of congressional prohibition on American involvement in the war. The United States. The picture of OAU functionaries observing through their office windows the final battle for Addis between remnants of the Mengistu dictatorship and Tigrean guerrillas is an eloquent metaphor for the role of the organization itself with regard to these and other conflicts in Africa. the two conflicts touched in important respects on fundamental norms specific to the organization. the USA. in the South African case. one would have expected a strong response on the part of the regional organization. Agreement was achieved on these issues among the principal external participants (South Africa. ceteris paribus. This was combined with direct South African intervention to retain a strategic glacis in southern Angola to protect South Africa's hold over Namibia. Various groups in Somalia sought (and seek) the departure of their regions from the Somali state. The Eritreans clearly sought secession of their region from the Ethiopian state. REGIONAL OR GANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 15 Finally.

and the combined forces of the EI'L F and the TI'LF were approaching the capital. financial. but did nothing to address the continuing internal one. This mission was extended and expanded into a second phase in order to monitor the elections called for in the agreement in late 1992. After years of arguing that it would not deal with the United Nations because the world organization had taken stances against the Republic. who were unwilling to accept the status quo in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia provides a further striking illustration of OA U paralysis in regional conflict management. 16 SECURITY STUDIES. there was never any question of dealing with the OA U. Zaire in particular had a strong record of hostility to the MI'I. Many of the organization's southern African members were vul- nerable to South African reprisals in the event that the organization attempted to act resolutely against South African intervention.A and UNITA. Nor could it rely any longer on the assistance of Cuban forces which had left in 1988-89. The increasing desperation of the Ethiopian situation induced a second US effort at mediation. In terms of international monitoring. vol . When American assistance to UNITA resumed in the mid-1980s. This division coincided to an important degree with divergences in regional attitudes towards the United States and the Soviet Union. despite massive infusions of military assistance. Opinion within the organiza- tion was seriously divided between proponents and opponents of the MI'I. \ The principal mediator was the United States. South Africa. The Ethiopian government then turned its Soviet weaponry on the Eritreans and Tigreans." Additional assistance was provided in the mediation of the internal accord by Portugal. The Carter Center and subsequently the State Depart- ment attempted to produce a political settlement to forestall the final assault . the Ethiopian government was losing substantial engagements in Eritrea.A and support of U N I T A . and military resources that it did not possess. Tigre. and Gondar. it was the United Nations that fielded the First UN Angola Verification Mission ( UNAVEM) to verify the departure of Cuban combat troops. in the person of Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker. An ambitious initiative by the organization would have required technical. it entered via Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Zaire. By the late 1980s. The Soviet Union meanwhile had decided to scale down substantially its military assistance to Ethiopia so that the regime could no longer recoup its losses of equipment and personnel. The OA U. and hence they were not enthusiastic about going beyond rhetoric. no . by contrast.Z. The victory of Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime over the Somalis in 1977-78 reduced the external threat to the country. had no significant role. Any attempt by the regional organization to mediate the conflicts was severely circumscribed by its exclusion of the principal regional power. South Africa nonethe- less cooperated with the UN . and which had been less than useful in dealing with internal insurgency in any event.

alo ng with the League of Arab St ates a n d the Org ani zation of the Islami c Con ference. as well as o u t o f a n tipa t hy for Isr ael. In this sense. with a gener. R EGI O N AL O RGAN IZAT IONS AND REGI O N AL SECU RITY 17 o n Addis Ababa. o nce th e parties agreed. the U n ite d N ati ons was fin all y a ble in A ugus t 1992 to a u t ho r ize a SOO-member infantry battali on fro m Pak ist an to prot ect the port of M ogadi shu a nd help w ith food d istribution in th e city . In this instance. It is aga in st rik ing ju st how unimportant th e OA U w as in a tt e m pt ing to halt the bloodshed. The logical ext reme in civil w ars has occurred sinc e the flight o f Siad Barre in January 1991. the organization was hampered by the unwillingness of both parties to negotiate seriously until the final stages of the conflict. cu lt ure. removing one of the two parties to the negotiation. Here. but these or gani zations w ere un able to respond operation - all y o r pol iti call y. language. th e Security Cou nc il subseq ue n tly approved a nothe r 3. The third sect io n o f OA U C ha rter Article III proscribes interference in th e in te r nal affa irs o f member states. The orga n iza tio n w as also hampered by normat ive impediments to m ore su bs ta n t ial in vol vement. a cursory a na lys is o f recent e ven ts in Somali a w ould fu rthe r su bs ta n tia te this lin e of a rgu men t. A people sh aring a common religion .000 sol diers for humanitarian purposes. a nd heritage ha s now been divided a m ong well-armed clans of the sa m e eth n ic g ro u p. h ad participated in ea rl ie r mediation efforts. Libya in particular tended to su p po rt the central government while Sudan a n d Eg ypt to va rying d egrees su p po rt ed th e E ri t rea ns . this shibboleth impeded th e organ ization in its spo ra d ic efforts to come up with a re sponse to th e co nflict. The fin al constraint w as fin ancial and bureau- cra tic. The OA U .alized rhetoric in favour of pea ce being accom - panied by political a nd military su p port of th e va r ious parties to the conflict. O u ts ide the ca pita l. With one-third of its population at ri sk fro m sta rva t ion because human itarian age ncies w ere unable to ha ve ac cess to civ ilia ns. There were again serious differences am ong African states regard- in g Ethiopia. while seve ra l Arab Middle E astern countries provided assista n ce to the Eritreans o n Islamic a nd geost ra tegic (control of the Red Sea) lines. Many of th em a re potential o r act u a l protagonist s in su ch co n flict. T he o rga niza tion lacked th e res ources a n d in fr astructure to pl aya sig n ifica n t role eve n if it had possessed the w ill to tr y. The regime crumbled under heavy military pressure while the talks progressed . as elsewhere. This norm reflect s the interest of many o f th e region's leaders to av o id any precedent whereby international bodies inter vene in ci vil di sputes. they repl ayed th eir ow n sp ec ific ri valries through com petit ive in vol vement in Ethiopia. This proces s was not limited to th e continent. Wh ile limitation s o f space prevent a length y d iscussion here. The Israelis played out their ongoing co n flict with the Arabs (as well as their desire to buy Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Ethiopian Jews out o f Ethiopia) through support of the center against Eritrea. .

On the urging of Nigeria's President Babangida. Guinean. and Sierra Leone contingents was deployed in August 1990. External actors. The argument is that subregions may well be more cohesive and effective in coping with local conflict than their broader regional analogue. Ghanaian." On 24 December 1989 the civil war in Liberia began when Charles Taylor entered Liberian territory from Burkina Faso via the Ivory Coast at the head of a group of guerrillas dedicated to the removal of President Doe. the initial 4. with the result that by July 1990 Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia ( NPFL) held almost all of the countryside and was ready to enter Monrovia. Gambian.l The OAU demonstrated incapacity to manage regional security has pro- voked a degree of interest in the use of sub-regional organizations to fill the gap. The result was a month of massacre and countermassacre and the complete breakdown of the Liberian state. was seem- ingly not enough to trigger a response from outside the region. at the outset of Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 the organization's peacekeeping mission in Liberia. out of Monrovia. a peace-keeping force under the auspices of ECO W AS and com prised of Nigerian. this replicates at a still lower level the abstract case for focusing on regional rather than universal organizations in the management of conflict. vol. Since the Bamako Accord there have been at least six multilateral conferences sponsored by ECOW A S.one in Monrovia in March and . Regional Management of the Liberian Crisis. the same number that led to the humanitarian intervention in Kurdistan. This setback for the NPFL produced the November 1990 Bamako cease-fire accord. 18 SECURITY ST UDIES.500-man force was strengthened. ECOW AS efforts to address the Liberian crisis are an example of this approach. executive secretary of the Economic Community of West African States.5 million persons were displaced. In a w ay. 1990-92 West Africa has partially demonstrated a local capacity to find African solutions to its own problems as was pointed out by Abbas Bundu. Prince Johnson's forces broke off from the NI'FL and began to resist Taylor's entry into Monrovia while pressing against the remnant of President Doe's forces. at which time an interim government under Amos Sawyer was established.000.2 . and with the approval of the O AU . no. At this stage. there have been two all- Liberian conferences inside the country . clearly preferring a regional solution to the crisis when both were heavily preoccupied by the Gulf crisis. supported the EC OWAS deployment. After some hesitation. The Liberian govern- ment's military response proved deficient. ultimately reaching 10. such as the United Nations and the United States." The fact that some 1. In addition. clearing the city by the end of September with the cooperation of Prince Johnson's forces. The ECOWAS "Monitoring Group" (ECOMOG) began a campaign to force the NP FI.

The level o f violence and o f co lla te ra l d amage h as been sig n ifica ntly reduced . through the countryside a n d alo ng the borders in order to est ablish a secu rity environment conducive to fr ee and fair elections. In so d oing .. th e o rga n iza tio n has ne ver ac h ieved full un anim it y o n the a p p ro p r ia te a pp roac h to th e Liber ian crisis. In the meantime. Th is . A measure of sec u ri ty has be en restored . regi onal act ors h a ve a di sproportionatel y st ro ng interest in th e confl ict. a nd the Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 full depl oyment of ECOMOC. this process is w ell beh ind sche d u le. in particular with the introduction from Sierra Leone of a guerrilla force dedicated to wresting control of the countryside from Taylor. it frus t ra ted e ffo rts of th e interim gove rn me nt to pressure Ta ylor into compromi se through eco no m ic em ba rgo of a reas that he held. A n a lys is of the reasons for t he slo w prog ress of th e q uest fo r a pol it ical settle me n t illustrates m an y of th e p roblems a llu ded to ea rl ie r. As o f mid -1992 th e co u n t ry continues to be divided into two sections. a nd Burkina F aso. a nd little progress in ge tt ing Taylor's forces in to ca m ps . and the othe r (tw elve o u t of thirteen counties) by the NPFL. alt hough ov e rall vio le nce decl in ed significantl y as a re sult of the ECOMOG deployment. On th e whole and in sp ite of in cidences o f non -professional co nd uc t by its so ld ie rs. a llowi ng th e transp ort of esse n tia l m ilitary a nd ot he r su p plies. The Ivory Coast m a inta in ed a n o pe n bord er w ith l"I'FI. occasiona l e xchanges o f fir e. ECOMOG co u ld be consid ered a relati ve succ ess. low le vel s o f military con flict ha ve continued in the co u n trysid e. w it h T aylor see k ing a maximum o f pow er a n d Sawyer a n d Johnson see ki ng to m arginalize h im. There a re a lso m ore prosaic pe ace -keeping issu es su ch as the implementation o f th e di sarmament a nd encampment provisions o f va rio us acc ords." T ogo. The April 1992 m eetings o f the ECOWAS Com m ittee o f Fi ve with the prot agon ists in the co n flict p roduced yet a nothe r agreeme n t on ho w to implement di sarmament of the fac tions a nd a political tr ansition a nd was foll o w ed by th e beg inning s of a n e xte ns io n o f ECOMOG co ntrol into NPFL. R EGI O N AL O RGAN IZAT IONS AND R EGI O N A L SECU R IT Y 19 A p ril of 1991 a n d o ne sp onsored by th e NPFL in G ba rnga in April 1992 . The internal issues preventing resolution a p pea r to be th e issue of w ho rul es. In this in stan ce. o pposed th e d eployment.\S p rotocol o n nonaggression a nd st ress ing th e lim ited ca pacity of th e o rga niza- tion to sus ta in a su bs ta n tia l mil itary o peratio n in th e field . The 1vo ry Coast ha s repeat edl y ca lled for th e repl acement of EOlMO(. So fa r. with a United N ati ons presence. T hey a lso perceiv e th eir interest s to d ive rge. In th e fir st place. a mo ng o the rs. T a ylor en joyed a nd by so m e reports co n tin ues to e n joy su bs ta n tial su p po rt fr om a number of franc ophone members of ECOWAS . th e Ivory Coast. a rgu ing th at it co n t ra ve ne d th e 1978 ECllW . Yet the failure to p roduce a last in g sett le m e n t suggests th at th is qual ified o pe ra tiona l success is fragi le. one d om in at ed by the interim gov e rn me n t a n d by ECO MOG largely in Monrovia. has been accom pa nied by sig n ifica n t NPFL obs t ruct ion.hel d sectors of L ibe ria .held a reas.

no. inclusiveness is not a problem here be cause a ll rel e vant sta te actors in the region are m embers of ECOWAS . The Ivory C oast a n d other francophone sta tes resisted because of their di scomfort with th e assertiveness of the regional hegemon. usually interpreted to include intervention in the internal affa irs o f member sta tes. Similar concerns arise in view o f the political situa t io n in N ig eri a. A n d N igeria' s capacity to foot the bill is not infinite. the o pe ra tio n is see n to a n eve n g rea te r d egree as a Nig erian . In other words. It was Nigerian in sistence that caused ECOWAS to ignore its restrictions on involvement in the internal affairs of member states. Nor on the whole is the limitation on the capacity of regional organizations to in volv e themselves in internal conflicts. to the e xten t that Nigeria pays th e cost s." The co u n t ry co n ti n ues to face se r io us econom ic problems of its ow n." particularly for th ose with eno ug h hi storical memory to recall that Nig eri a 's participat ion in th e OA U o pe ra tio n in C ha d in 1981 found ered for lack o f o u ts ide fun d s. afte r all." By contrast . divergent interests in the context o f an uneven di stribution of power ha ve impeded the capacity of this re gional o rga n iza t io n to res ol ve this speci fic conflict. France. This re gional organization is.1. At the sa m e time. Nigeria 's approach toward the in vol vement of ECOWAS was expedient a n d perhaps e ven a bit ca valier. by far the most powerful state in West Africa. These divergences of approach and policy reflect closely the power imbalances of the region a n d the fear of the less powerful that Nigeria is see k in g to establish a dominant regional role. The initial decision to deploy came at the in itiative of Nigeria . rather than a co m m u n ity. because parties to the conflict can and do benefit from the differences of views.

01. The . economic with no explicit political mandate a n d no previous invol vement in the m aintenance of international pea ce and secu r ity.l divergence has impeded resolution of the conflict. 20 SECU RIT Y STU D IE S. a position refl ectin g not ju st their ow n concern a bo u t Nigerian preponderance. largely due to th e in ca pa city o r unwillingness o f poorer members to pa y their dues Yet. initiative. H owever. sym bo lized not least by the most recent and su bs ta ntia l deva lua tio n o f the naira ea rl y in 1992. Nigeria's willingness pay the entire bill for ECO MOG'S operations (which a t the initial level of depl oyment w as es t ima te d a t fift y million d ollars a year a n d is no doubt at a bou t twice that lev el now ) o bv ia tes th e issue. but that o f the ir traditional patron . Although the 1978 ECOWAS protocol supposedly prohibits acts o f agg ressio n. Nigeria w as su fficie n tly power ful sim ply to ov e r ride obj ections. The expa ns io n o f task s in this directi on m a y ultimately stiffe n th e o p posit io n of members uncomfortable with the exercise o f Nig erian po w er. The financi al sta tus o f ECOWAS is parlous. The fin al issue is that o f o rga ni za t io na l re sources. Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 which in turn stiffe ns hi s resol ve to resist accommodations that might weaken his own position. Th is di scomfort has translated into prolonged su p po rt of T ayl or.

the O AU o r S:\ I>CC. Although a final evaluation must a wa it further evolution of the process of political tr ansition. put th eir via b ility in d oubt. the tentativeness Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 of our cha racte riza tio n of this "su ccess" illustrates the fragility of regional organizations in fostering regional secu rity. In sho rt. . the ECOMO( . The process will culminate in 1993 in a presidential election. M oreover. C ha nges in th e Soviet U n io n indi cat ed th at Mosco w wou ld not ba il th em ou t. yet another "fina l offe ns ive" had failed to spa rk a re volt. the main regional orga n iza tio n in the Western Hemisphere. This too m ay cause complications for prolonged in volvement. but it also reveals a number of the same significant problems raised by the O A U 'S failures in the preceding section. while th e fall-ou t from the Ir an -contra a ffa ir. along with th e failur e of th e co n tras to pose a real threat. This may cause the Nigerians to cut short their ECOMOG in volvement. these cases a re particularl y interesting in that the O . The appearance of sub-regi onal. In N ica ragua . ad hoc groupings is a n ad d ition a l va r ia b le of sig n ifica nce in the analysis. The attention of Nigeria's policy-makers is in creasingl y focused on internal issues. There is no guarantee that a n elected federal g ov e rn m en t will sha re the foreign policy priorities of the current military ad m in ist ra tion. which will become stronger if the federal electoral process is accompanied by violence. in th eory. as w ell as paral yzing o pe ra tio na l a n d fin ancial con- stra in ts. R EGI ON AL O RGA N IZ A T IONS A ND R EGI ONAL SEC U R IT Y 21 country is most of the way through a transition to democracy. say . It provides a n illustration of a regional body that is thus. m ore politicall y a n d fin anciall y via ble than. both the US a nd Ca na da are members. In the ca se o f El Salv ad or. having just in stalled elected local and state administrations. Th e OAS in Central A m erica The a w k wa rd absence ov e r the last decade of the O rga n iza tio n of American St ates. There a re ine vit able tensions as th ey a tt em pt to deal w ith ci vil w ars spilling over national boundaries. a sha ky d emocracy under Presid ent Jose N apole on Duarte see med to be taking hold. A t th e sa m e time it wa s al so ev id e n t th at the go vernment o f El Sal vad or co u ld not d efeat th e guerrillas o u t rig h t. a ltho ug h C u ba is still left o u t as part o f W ashington 's bl ockade of H a vana .-\S is not cha racte rized by an absence of industrial ized co u n t ries. in w indi ng d ow n internal co n flicts in both Ni caragua a n d El Sal vador is illus t ra t ive of st ruc t u ra l problems faced by other regional in stitutions. By th e mid-1 980s it had become clear th at neither th e contras in Nicaragua nor th e Frente Farabundo M arti para la Liberacion N aci onal ( F~lI S) in E l Sal vade r co u ld hope to evict th e go vernments there by force. th e Sandinistas co u ld a lso not w in th e wa r ou t righ t a nd w ere fail in g to bring t he eco no my und er control. experience is in so m e re spects a qualified success for ECOWAS .

The effort began in 1983 involving Mexico. the Contad ora Group outlined a series of initiatives between 1983 and 1986 that aimed at treating the conflict as a Latin-American issue from which the EastlWest rivalry should be separated. a change emanating not from Washington or Moscow or even from the rest of Latin America. Z. Not surprisingly. Initially perceived by Nicaraguans as a United States-inspired provoca- tion. committing the different states in the region to the implementation of the total Arias Plan. they were subsequently joined by a "support group" composed of the newly democratic governments in Argentina. the Contadora process. disarmament. national reconcilia- tion." Changes in the Soviet Union. no. and in EI Salvador. what would become known as the "Arias Plan" and for which he would be awarded the Nobel Prize later that year. was succeeded by an elected successor. in U. In Nicaragua the Sandinistas began talks with the opposition about . Early in his administration. Peru. but from Central America itself. and in Central American conditions had produced a deadlock in which the parties began to see possibilities for compromise. the Arias Plan gathered political momentum in Central America. President George Bush reached an agreement with Congress to reduce sharply aid for the contras. vol. Colombia. Known as Esquipulas I. Jose Napoleon Duarte. confidence-building measures. In Nicaragua the contras had failed to regain the initiative. and Uruguay. accepting it as a true Central American initiative. 22 SECURITY STUDIES. On 7 August 1987 the Esquipulas II agreement was signed. in January of 1987. this effort floundered in the face of the Reagan administration's view of the problems in Central America as arising from "Soviet-Cuban expansionism" and Washington's determination to fight back against international comrnun- Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 ism. The ailing president ofEI Salvador. Hence. By April the Nicaraguans had signed on to the plan. Venezuela. prevented the organization from dealing with the wars in the area.S. and international ve r ifica t io n. Alfredo Cristiani of the right-wing Arena Party. Between August 1987 and April 1990 there were six Central American summits where agreements were hammered out on free elections. It was President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica who seized the initiative by presenting. 1989 marked a pi votal year in terms of the Central American conflict. policy. the final guerrilla offensive of November 1989 failed miserably. this session set the stage for Central American summits that would ultimately serve as a vehicle for successful regional negotiations.l 1986 was also the year when the original Latin-American effort to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict in Central America. The first summit of Central American presidents was held in Guate- mala in May 1986. Brazil. and Panama. reached an impasse. Washington. which contributes the lion's share of the G A S budget.

much to its surprise. and the new government pursued national reconciliation. the two parties pursued their discussions. and the non-use of the territory of one state for attacks on others. it is worth examining in some depth the main operational activities with special relevance for future regional settlements: small arms control. put restrictions on the armed forces. In EI Salvador Cristiani proved sincere in his search for peace with the FMLN. territorial sea. In February 1990." This operation was established in October 1989 in response to a request by the Central American presidents for UN verification of the secu rity aspects of two unresolved problems in Esquipulas II: the cessation of aid to irregular forces. Paid for by the United States the forty million dollars. the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega Saavedra lost the elections to the UNO coalition . Following the Nicaraguan elections in February 1990 and agreements concerning the demobilization of the contras in March. The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ON UCA) conducted the most extensive military operations that can still be categorized as "observa- tion. one-year effort of civilian liaison in the countryside was designed to keep contras from returning to war and the Sandinistas from influencing unduly the reintegration of these former guerrillas into the local economy. the International Commission of Support and Verification ( CIAV/ O EA was the Spanish abbreviation). Given that disarmament is a central requirement for lasting peace. the OAS fielded a little known operation. verification of arms reductions. and the second to prevent any act of aggression aga ins t one sta te from the land. and supervision of elections. or airspace of another. After the United Nations had finished its task. agreeing to internationally monitored elections in February 1990 with the Unified Nicaraguan Opposi- tion (UNO) under Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. ONUC A thus became responsible for destroying weapons delivered by insurgents and establishing of "security zones" where former contras awaited reintegration into the economy. Over the course of two years of discussions in Mexico City brokered by the U N . finally agreeing to a comprehensive peace plan for peace and reconciliation in EI Salvador on 16 January 1992. Spot checks and ad hoc investigations were made by highly mobile teams of UN military observers based in sensitive border areas. and provided for the guerrillas to di sarm a nd participate in the democratic process. In December 1989 ON UCA 'S mandate was expanded to ' include verification of any sub- sequent agreements about the cessation of hostilities and demobilization of irregular forces. The first problem was understood to include the cessation of all form s of military assistance to insurgents. It guaranteed the safety of the FMLN. REGIONAL OR GANIZATION S AND REGIONAL SECURITY 23 implementing the national reconciliation process. . Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 In Nicaragua.

Z. In fact . but they also ensured liaison with military personnel from ONUCA providing security assistance.in particular a Venezuelan battalion that was moved from Namibia to help out immediately . which is why the use of both UN civilian and military personnel in the UN Observer Mission in EI Salvador ( O N USAL) was noteworthy. a n d it was a n important task-expansion by the United Nations in relationship to the sh ibbolet h of domestic jurisdiction enshrined in Charter article 2(7) a n d so dear to Third World governments. The United N ations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua ( O N U V E N) was dispatched by the secretary -general following a decision by Central American presidents that the Nicaraguan elections Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 should be internationally observed. Significantly. but rather ad hoc mechani sms. vol. an e xa m in a t ion of evidence over a longer period in the region suggests that . 24 SECURIT Y STUDIES.has the experience and credibility in this area and that the OAS was only associated as "window dressing" reflects the type of operational problems forced by regional institutions. In Nicaragua. The distinction between the military and civilian components within future operations is likely to be blurred as already in the Haitian elections and as scheduled in Cambodia. rather than a plebiscite as in Namibia." The deployment of military and civilian observers prior to the ceasefire was a significant advance. This was the first instance of UN verifica- tion of a domestic election in a sovereign state. The ability to integrate a wide variety of experiences is likely to give the United Nations a distinct advantage." The fact that the U N . the precedent in Central America is of particular signifi- cance. During the long and grueling civil war. Not only d id the UN personnel orchestrate the el ection observation. The adva n ta ges of a universal rather than a regional body were thus aptl y illustrated in both the urc-b roke red assistance a n d negotiations for Nicaragua and EI Salvador. the Contadora and Lima Support Groups and afterwards the Central American presidents themselves who led the way diplomatically while the UN wa s the logical choice for operations. another precedent that appears significant for future settlements of regional conflicts. no. 1 particularly in countries with large members of heavily-armed regular and irregular forces. but there had been little international verifica - tion. it was not the established regional body of the O AS. The expansion of UN capabilities to monitor the destruction of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction as part of the comprehensive cease-fire imposed by the Security Council after the Gulf War strengthens this operational advantage of the world organization. non -governmental organizations had routinely reported human rights abuses. which indicated confidence in the world organiza- tion. Perhaps no issue rai ses more red flags a bo u t sov ereignty than human rights. ONUVEN was an entirely civilian bod y who spearheaded other civilian observers from private organizations and a lso from the OAS.

both operational and financial. The regional organization in question. The European Community in Croatia : The "Crucial Case" As noted earlier. One would expect that if any regional organization were to show promise in the area of conflict management and resolution. it would be this one. While the organization runs a number of military training efforts through its Inter-American Defense Board. personnel. The O AS is particularly prone to the influence of the one remaining superpower among its membership. "the United Nations and the Secretary-General were the preferred vehicles because an extraregional dimension was involved. That is why the Economist wrote: "The rising star is the EC . and financial resources of which most Third World regional entities could only dream . the OAS'S main experience was as a surrogate in 1968 for the U. the secretary-general's special representative in Central America who was the principal UN negotiator. it is useful to complement the cases of efforts by regional organizations in the Third World to manage local conflicts with considera- tion of a case where a First World organization attempted to resolve a regional conflict. "peace-keeping" operation in the Dominican Republic. After its flop in the Gulf show. rhetorically in any event. ?" Even prior to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. hardly a model for the future from the point of view of Latin Americans. the community is defying the critics who concluded that it could never perform convincingly in foreign policy. the existence of bitter tensions within the region and the involve- ment of outside support were combined with a paucity of experience and resources. Yugoslavia will be remembered as its first big part. to create insuperable obstacles for Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 effective action by the OAS in both Nicaragua and EI Salvador. the members of the EC. " 2Q The ebbing in the Cold War finally permitted the United States to respond favorably to the UN secretary-general's initiative. a situation not peculiar to the Americas. are strongly committed to the expansion of the political role of their organization and to the development of consensual perspectives on the major foreign policy issues of the day. after years of trying to keep the conflicts within the bailiwick of the OAS where they were officially deadlocked. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL S EC U R IT Y 25 "virtually all of the successful mediation efforts of the inter-American system succeeded because of ad hoc arrangements utilized by forceful per- sonal ities. the European Community. In . there are no capacities or procedures for multilateral opera- tions in either inter-state or civil wars. In concrete matters of conflict manage- ment.":" Hence. In the words of Alvaro de So to. is composed of countries possessing organizational.S.

it was reasonably easy to compromise on Slovenia. Concern over potential Serb domination brought Slovenia to the point of a referendum on inde- pendence in December 1990. This retreat apparently had little to do with the European Community's initiative. vol. the European Community serves as a "crucial case" where the generalizations of this analysis are least likely to hold. with 94 percent of the voting population . As the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe collapsed.the Serbian minority having abstained . It lasted until the end of the year. A return to barracks obviated many of these tactical and operational problems.6 million people were Serbs. a 14. and historical heritage were eminently predisposed to rekindling civil conflict. " Yugoslavia's constitutional structure.2. and Slovene collection of federal duties at customs posts on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. After Slovenia set up independent customs posts. It involved the return to barracks of the Serb-dominated federal army. many of whom were clustered along the frontier with Serbia. no. a three-month period of negotiation. but more with the army's difficulties in operating in Slovenia. By mid-July of 1991 fighting had shifted to the eastern Slavonia and Krajina regions. They went into action at the end of June 1991. but they failed to make substantial headway against Slovene territorial militias. if hypotheses hold with regard to this case. the central military establishment. The world organization deployed the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) . It involved Serbian irregulars and federal army troops acting more or less in unison against Croatian militia and police units. The Slovene episode ended rather quickly when the Yugoslav army returned to barracks after 4 July. where 12 percent of the 4.400-strong peace-keeping operation to separate Croat and Serb forces and to replace the federal army in the enclaves . Matters were different in Croatia. decided to challenge the Slovene secession. On 25 June 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia declared their Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 independence. An overwhelming majority supported seces- sion. Croatia followed in May of 1991. 26 SECURITY STUDIES. with which Serbia has no common frontier and in which there is no substantial Serb minority. The European Community made repeated efforts at arranging a ceasefire. where foreign ministers of the community defined a settlement between Serbia and Slovenia. However. They also offered to provide constitu- tional advisers and a truce observation team. At the political level. culminating in the Brioni Conference. I this respect. then they are likely to be valid across the universe of cases. where any isolated units were at the mercy of rather effective Slovene territorials.opting for inde- pendence. the release of political control unleashed a rapid upsurge of ethnic nationalism. when a cease-fire negotiated by U N special envoy Cyrus Vance held . with the encouragement of Serbian president Slobo- dan Milose vic. ethnic demography.

REGIONAL OR GANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 27 of Croatia that it had controlled . an interweaving of military and paramilitary units with the civilian population. and it held a number of sessions of its peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington. There was an almost total lack of clearly defined fronts. The United States made clear in the summer of 1991 that it viewed the crisis to be a European matter and preferred that the EC take the lead. In the first instance. France was far more committed to the retention of some kind of Yugoslav confederation than was Germany. ambiguous lines of command and authority. if anything. however. hostilities have ended. leaned far more strongly towards formal acknowledgement of the de facto dissolution of the Yugoslav state. With some difficulty. As fighting worsened. Leaving aside these practical problems. Germany forced this issue when it departed from the consensus-building mechanism on 16 December 1991. and significant autonomy enjoyed by local commanders. As the republics of Slovenia and Croatia and then Macedonia made clear their intention to depart. the Community made repeated efforts to Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 arrange cease -fires. Germany. France and its allies in the Community resisted recognition and preferred an effort at the constitutional reconstruction of the Yugoslav state. this preference translated itself into seriously divergent perspectives on the recognition of new sta tes. the regional organization's initiatives did little. not least that the conflict itself was intrinsically difficult for outsiders to manage. With the spread of the conflict. Ultimately. to curb the violence in Croatia. the community extended its monitoring mission from Slovenia to Croatia in the late summer. There are several reasons for this signal failure. The U N took a similar position. U N units were deployed in the late winter of 1991-92 and. whatever the other members did. the Germans were persuaded to post- pone their action until 15 January. And all of this took place in the context of the deep historical animosity between the two peoples ". the capacity of the EC to take an effective stand on the Yugoslav issue was constrained by serious differences in preference and in policy among its principal member states. announcing that it would recognize Croatia and Slovenia on the 19th. and to some extent Denmark. Despite all of these maneuvers. The European Community was not idle. threatening economic sanctions if cooperation were not forthcoming. ostensibly to leave time for the search for . and ultimately the lead in peace-keeping devolved to the United Nations. In August the community declared its readiness to sponsor a conference and laid out principles for a settlement (notably guarantees of human rights and against any forcible change of borders) . That the cease-fire held may have more to do with the Serbs attaining their objectives in Eastern Croatia than with the pressure of the international community. although there has been no formal peace agreement between Serbia and Croatia.

or the Western European Union (WEU).not just among warring parties but between also France and the US over American troops in Europe . Yugoslavia was not a member of the EC. but also by the alliance's lack of mandate to deal with "out of area" operations. And no doubt the same constraints will apply in future crises. Both NATO and WEU have subsequently approved the creation of special units for peace-keeping in Europe.are likely to handicap future CSCE decision-making. fundamentally reflecting the imbalances of power and resources within the region and divergences in view. The CSCE was the only European organization with a regional security dimension of which Yugoslavia was a member. European responses were also hampered by the exclusive character of the Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Community and other western European organizations.

Related Interests

01. Nor was the WEU treaty configured to deal with civil conflicts outside of western Europe. I t was UN .2. While we have examined the case of Croatia. \. However. A NATO response was precluded in the first place by American opposition. Internal disputes among members . the need for Europe and the United States to seek a UN Security Council blessing for humanitarian relief to the civilian population threatened by the regular Serbian Army and by paramilitary Serbs in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflected a similar reality in the summer and fall of 1992. 28 SECURITY STUDIES. I I . it lacked any significant institutional infrastructure or resources. In return the Community as a whole agreed to recognize those countries requesting recognition at that time and qualifying for it by virtue of their acceptance of frontiers and their protection of minority rights. a situation that does not appear likely to change soon. Moreover. no . French diplomacy drew in part on the growing concern about rising German power and the possible recreation of a German economic and political space in Eastern Europe.). and financial strength did not impede the EC in any significant way. rendered it useless as a means of addressing the crisis in Croatia. the failure to agree on an appropriate and effective European Community response to the Yugoslav crisis also reflected power imbalances within the region. The European Community finally abdicated its efforts to manage the crisis in favor of the United Nations. A lack of expertise. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). German and French differences on the question of Yugoslavia reflected in part the close German historical connection with and substantial domestic support for Croatia and France's analogous relationship with Serbia.rather . military capability. linked to the 52- member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csct. but its rules of decision by consensus. 1 alternatives short of the dismantlement of the Yugoslav Federation. the latter two being arguably more appro- priate in the management of security problems. coupled with the diversity and divergent interests of its members.

es pecia lly hand icapped .pro positio n that suc h o rga n iza tions a re unpromisin g mechan isms fo r the m anagement of regi onal co n flict.000-6.IONA L SECU R IT Y 29 than EC . the Yugosla v case is aga in a clear exa m p le of the failur e of a reg ional o rga ni za tio n to m an age co nflict. L ord O we n. C< )I\: CL VS I< )I\:S O u r theoretical di scu ssion a nd case-st ud ies illustrate the fund am ental p robl ems of re sorting to regi onal o rga n iza t io ns to e n h a nc e regional security. A t the sa m e t ime th ey fre q ue n tly h a ve sta kes in these co nfl icts . Re gi onal org anizations a re. but under a blue V I\: banner. questi onable . The basic problem with this a pp roac h w a s that exte rn al ac to rs lacked the leverage to induce loc al parties to th e co n flict to cooperate.000 m ore V I\: soldiers to esc o rt co nvoys involve I\: A T O tro ops. Except under e xce p- tional circ u msta nces they ha ve neither su fficien t military capacity nor dipl omat ic leverage to mit igate o r re sol ve regi onal co n flicts. fictitious. or I\: A T O . a nd sta n d to benefit by influencin g the o u tco me unil aterall y. a t best . The cr ucia l case sus tai ns the ge ne ra l. how difficult it is for any regi onal o rga n iza tio n to intervene suc cess fu lly in ac t ive civ il co n flict. WE V . R E GI O N A L O RGAN IZA T IONS AN D RE C. This produced the internati onal con ference o n the Bosnian co n flict in L ond on a t the e nd o f A ugus t. The co n fe re nce ado pte d a set of general principles and an act io n progam in volving the esta blish me n t o f six w orking groups to tackle sp ecifi c Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 co m po ne n ts of the process of pacification. O n the w hole. o r. The conference resulted in the a p po in tme n t o f V I\: e nvoy Cy rus V an ce to sha re the re sponsibilities of m ediation w it h L ord Ca r ringto n 's repl ac ement. Upo n closer exa mi na tio n m an y of the fact ors os te ns ib ly fav oring regi onal o rga niza t io ns a re. Regi onal ac to rs do tend to suffe r m ost fro m the des t r uc tive co n seq ue n ces of co n flict in vol vin g their ne igh bors. It was th e inefficie ncy of EC effo rts to m ediate the Bosn ian crisis th at induced Fran ce in pa rtic u la r to call for a b ro ad en in g of international effo rt s a t conflict resolu - ti on. in the fir st place. however. a t w orst . in which V I\: Secret ary -General Bout ro s Boutros-Ghali pla yed a prominent role. a re co m mi tted to o ne side o r a nothe r. In th is se nse th eir st r uc t u re of interest is m ore co m p lex than m an y . The result w as the co n ti n ua tio n of the w ar a n d it s broadening into conflict between C roa ts a nd M us lims as well. The peace conference avoid ed the difficult choic e of ei the r forcing the Serbs a nd Muslims to ac q u iesce in the creation of a federal Bosnian sta te o r acce pti ng the fait accom pli of Serbian victory. The ca ses underline.forces that entered Saraje vo to provide secu rity for the tenuous lifeline o f food a nd m edical su p plies th at w as o r ig in a lly begun in Jul y. The o ngoing d iscussions to ad d 3. Frequentl y they a re active participan ts.

Similar difficulties were evident in OA U efforts to cope with crises in Chad and the Western Sahara. In South Asia it is hard to see how any regionally based initiative to settle the Afghan civil war might have succeeded. the capacity of the South Asian Association for Cooperation (SAARC) to act as a neutral mediator of conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is extremely problematic. In Africa. This disagreement was manifested in the more or less even split in the vote on the government's membership of the organization in 1976. no.l proponents of regional organizations suggest." Such relative gain issues are far more likely to be prominent in regional international relations than they are at the global level. In the terminology of international relations theory. With its headquarters in Addis Ababa. efforts by A SE A N to resolve the Cam- bodian conflict were handicapped by differing conceptions of Chinese and Vietnamese threats to the region. 30 SECURITY STUDIES. vol. where. Elsewhere on the continent. in the post- Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Cold War era. the O A U appeared particularly inept in helping to end the Ethiopian civil war. OA U efforts are critically handicapped by the reluctance of members to sanction international intervention in internal conflict. we have simultaneous absolute gain (stability) and relative gain (power) considera- tions. as they are in the realm of national security . the paralysis of the OA U in curbing intervention and in managing the civil war in Angola reflected deep disagreement among its own members about the desirable outcome of the process of liberation. There is no certainty that the former will predominate. The lack of any substantial OAU initiative also reflected the fact that other African states were deeply implicated in the conflict in pursuit of perceived national interests which diverged one from another. the latter are likely to oppose such initiatives.Z. Since a favorable outcome for one regional power is likely to enhance its regional position at the expense of others. In Somalia. Situating crises in their regional historical and political contexts enhances the overall argument considerably. Their shared interest in the public good of regional stability is often accompanied by unilateral interest in obtaining specific favorable outcomes to the conflict in question. In Central America the ability of the OAS to deal effectively with civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador was inhibited greatly by the American pursuit . the recent literature provides compelling arguments to the effect that co- operation and regime maintenance are particularly difficult where questions of relative gain are prominent. To take a more extreme case. they tend to be submerged. the two principal members of the organization are the very states involved in the conflict. not only because of the presence of Soviet forces but also because India had no interest in seeing a pro- Pakistani or Islamic fundamentalist regime replace that of Najibullah in Kabul. Indeed.

Regional organizations replicate within themselves power imbalances. Nigeria in West Africa. As a group. defined in large part by its members' opposition to the threat posed by the excluded parties. The premise of these organizations has been partiality. in numerous instances the reluctance to become involved in civil conflict reflects the sensitivity of regional powers to the creation of precedents that might subsequently justify intervention in their own countries. or was. Taking Africa as a case in point. A further concrete problem with regional organizations as managers of conflict is that frequently their membership is not inclusive and. this situation will not really change once these anomalies are rectified in light of the vast differences in levels of economic development. the consciousness of the organization is. " Perhaps most importantly. or is likely to appear. The Arab League excludes one of the three major regional powers (Iran). This problem has appeared. India in South Asia. Laos. The capacity of the European Community to come up with an effective response to the civil war in Croatia was significantly constrained by deep differences of opinion between France and Germany on the crisis. In a number of these instances (the OAU in Southern Africa. OA U conflict management in southern Africa has been inhibited by the organization's exclusion of the region's major military and economic power. As such. Nigeria's manipulation of ECOW AS is perhaps the most obvious case in point.CC excludes two of three (Iraq and Iran). REGIONAL ORGANIZATION S AND REGIONAL SECURITY 31 of a unilateral agenda of preventing revolution in El Salvador and reversing it in Nicaragua . a great number of regimes are threatened by the possibility of civil conflict. they may be used by the more powerful expanding their influence at the expense of the weak. and the United States in the Americas. these organizations have traditionally demonstrated their greatest structural weaknesses in dealing with civil war. " This shortcoming follows in part from the international legal impediments associated with the doctrine of noninter- ference in internal affairs. and ASEAN). The ( . Moreover. the ( . Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Indonesia in South-East Asia. therefore. and a number of disagreements among NATO members prevented military humanitarianism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. a principal category of regional conflict that many observers see as the main growth industry for international conflict managers. which have proven extremely acute for many countries in the Third World preoccupied with exerting control over their own tenuous bases for power. hardly a capacity for neutral intervention and security management. therefore. The same might be said of ASEAN'S role as a conflict manager given the historical exclusion of Vietnam. their coverage of their own region is partial. and Cambodia. in regions where power imbalances are so substantial that it is not possible for weaker states in coalition to balance the strong.C C in the Gulf. they . Cases in point include South Africa in southern Africa.

Comparing the frequency of regional conflict in Africa with the paucity of substantive attempts by the OA U to manage such conflict and the persistent reliance of the region on external intervention for purposes of regional security leads to great skepticism concerning the capacity of that organization as it now stands to contribute substantially to the security of Africa. including AS E AN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSC E). In fact. exist on paper and during intergovernmental sessions. The OA U has almost no staff. the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Given the increasing demands that threaten to outstrip its resources. For all of these reasons. no research resources. 32 SECURITY STUDIES. However. its domination by the United States has largely discredited the institution in the peace and security arena. While the OAS has a staff and even runs military training for officers through the IAI>H. it would appear desirable to shift some of the burden to regional institutions. For example." And such results hardly suggest enthusiasm with regard to Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 the capacity of this reasonably well-endowed regional organization to contribute to conflict resolution. financial. I are extremely cautious about fostering norms in regional politics that would legitimize regional intervention. The question thus arises as to whether the international community could not determine on a case-by- case basis the comparative advantage of specific regional institutions. the OAS had to take a clear secondary position to the United Nations. and military capacities as well as fund of peace-keeping and conflict management ex - perience are generally vastly inferior to those of the United Nations. yoU. and is in a chronic financial crisis. work be st in tandem with the UN ? In the words of UN secretary -general Boutros-Ghali in his recent report to the Security Council: Under the Charter. Other regional organiza - tions that have been active in regional conflicts. the general case for reliance on regional organiza - tion is weak . their organizational. This is not surprising. either constituted by treaty or formed on an ad hoc basis to meet a crisis." it is likely to play more strongly at the regional level. The OA U record in coping with civil conflict is very poor. during the Nicaraguan and El Salvador mediation efforts. but they have virtually no institutional infrastructure. How could such institutions. At the same time the United Nations is overstretched with new and very large operations cropping up on every continent. the Arab League's intervention in the Lebanese civil conflict was largely a fig leaf for one member to pursue a long-standing desire to form a "greater Syria. While this weakness was shared during the Cold War by the United Nations. and its respect for sovereignty has verged on slavishness. no. even if they were in theory the appropriate instru - ment for conflict management. .

This is not the plac e to discuss th e much-needed improvements in the professionalization o f these international military operations. this di vision oflabor could be Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 reversed. a nd these sou rces sh ou ld be in - . While purely U N forces w ould probabl y never be feasible in conflict s in vol ving su ch m aj or Third W orld powers as Iraq . the UN would deploy its troops a nd work closely with regional partners in diplomatic arm-twisting. consensus and democratization in international affairs. A co m pa ra ble readiness d oe s not ex ist in ot her re gi ons o f the world . Britain. some potentiall y useful illustra- tions resulted from sc ru tiny o f Cen tra l America a n d Ca m bo d ia w he re sub- regi onal d iplo m a t ic effo rt s we re esse n t ia l to negotiations a nd the su ccessful implementation of peace plans by the United Nations. di stinctions shou ld be made between Europe and the Third World as well as between the use of outside military force s to keep the peace and diplom atic measures to build th e basis for ne gotiations." But these improvements a re possible and . assuming their implementation. N ow that E astern European countries a n d the republics of the former So viet Union a re colla bo ra ting acti vel y w ith NATO. logi stically-supported . UN forces shou ld then be co m b ined with the use of regional diplomacy. RE GI ON AL O RGAN IZA T IO N S A N D RE GI ONAL SE C URITY 33 but regional action as a matter of decentralization. India. which provides that the Security C ou n cil can utilize regional a rrang em en ts for enforcement under its a u t ho ri ty." In attempting to determine a possible division of labor between universal a n d regional organizations to meet the exigencies of particular regional conflicts. In Europe UN diplomacy could well be combined with the use of NATO forces under a UN flag in regional di sputes. Moreo ver. as a p pea rs increasingly likely in humanitarian relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina. and th e United States would h a ve already agreed in the Security Co u ncil to field su ch a force under the UN flag. This eventuality w as foreseen in C h a rt e r article 53. NATO constitutes a unique pool of trained. the common interest wou ld be served if procedures were found to fa cilitate a more regular exchange of information. In terms of peace-mak in g a n d m ediation. In addition . for wh ich UN sold ie rs a re the be st solu t ion . o r Pakist an ." their use elsewhere w ould certainl y be pl ausible a n d desir able. In the Third World . delegation and cooperation with United N ations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation . France. they w ould be unlikel y to ob ject to the use of troops in Bosnia or N agorno- K arabakh. a rm ed . and coordinated soldiers who co u ld be deployed rapidly to keep the peace as decided by the Security Co u ncil. The U N secretariat shou ld arrange periodic consultations with the secreta riats of regional organizations on developments affect in g regional sec u rity.

3. The Insecurity Dilemma : National Security ofThird World States (Boulder. Rosenau. ed .: Lynne Rienn e r. Kessler. The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean (Boulder. 2. the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina among others indicates that it is no panacea. Blight. 1 corporated into what should become the secretary-general's routine briefings of the Security Council and as an input into a functioning early warning system. ed. Part of the information should be an analysis of the economic and social indicators that are normally at the root of regional conflicts. and Thomas G.. given the financial and organizational constraints under which the United Nations was operating. In a recent address to the National Press Club in Washington. and not rhetoric. see Thomas G.: Lynne Rienner. Analysis. Colo. should determine policy. 4. but also mandatory sanctions or help with elections .not only military. Weiss." The end of the Cold War has opened up new possibilities to enhance regional security at the same time that it has permitted the eruption of a variety of regional conflicts. Weiss and [ar at C ho pra. Weiss and James G . and to take an example from the cases considered below. peace- making. The opportunities for peace-keeping. preventive diplomacy. Leonard .: Lynne Rienner. 34 SECURITY STUDIES. vol.to support and endorse the action taken by regional organizations. With regard to American attitudes. Moreover. A focus on the comparative advantages of different levels of institutional approach to conflict resolution should not obscure that success in the management of regional conflict also requires the political will to search for peace on the part of the parties to the conflict. Finally. Brian Job.2. For a discussion of these issues. Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder. UN Peacekeeping : An ACUNS Teaching Text (Hanover: ACUNS.: Lynne Rienner. D. 1992). forthcoming). (992). (991). eds. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke fervently both of the desirability of "decentralizing" peacekeeping responsibilities and of the necessity of doing so. The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder. Colo. and enforcement require a greater attention to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations and regional organizations. Colo. NOTES I. The Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 preceding analysis strongly suggests that regionalism is not a promising approach to conflict mitigation and containment in most circumstances. Colo.: Lynne Rienner. although the foregoing suggests that there are numerous reasons to prefer globalist rather than regionalist approaches to conflict resolution... The Security Council could then take a variety of actions . the one organization most likely to fulfil the role of regional conflict manager. and Thomas G . eds.C.. See Thomas G. See James N . Colo. 1992). (992).. improvements in regional organizations should not take place at the cost of neglecting the United Nations. Weiss and Meryl A. Collective Security in a Changing World (Bou ld er. no.

28 Octobe r 41. 1991. As F red Bergsten put it : "Collec tive lead ersh ip . p. mea n t th at the U ni ted Sta tes lend s a nd the U ni ted Sta tes co lle cts. th e m a ssi ve (by co m pa riso n) o rga n iz atio nal a nd fin a nc ial resources of th e co m m u n ity. 1580. 309.:j Time/or R etum ." International Organizatio n 19. " T he Role of Regi onal Collec t ive Sec ur ity A r ra nge me n ts . " d raft paper p resen te d to th e Ea st A sian In st it ut e a t Col u mbia U n ive rsity.Decem be r 1( 91 ). a nd B. " Ric h ness. paras. N ationalism and Its A lternatives (New York : Kn opf. reg iona l o rga niza tio ns we re see n to be a possibl e g rowi ng facto r in inte rnatio na l peace a nd secu r ity. Collecti ve Secu rity in a Changing World. . " A m e rica n Pu bl ic O pin io n a n d th e Un ited Nat io ns .<:': Refug ee Po licy ( . p. A Succ essor Vision: The United Nations of T om orrow (La n ha m. II. th e sel f-co nscio u s e xte ns io n o f th e pr ocess o f integ ra tio n in to th e foreign pol icy a nd de fe nce sp he res in th e lead up to th e Maa stricht T rea ty a nd in th e tr eat y itself. G oodrich a nd E d va rd H amb ro . Md . 1990. 1991 ). 14. For th e lat er period . the EC diffe rs from th e o the r reg ional o rga n izat io ns un d er co nside rat io n beca use of the long hi story of d eepen in g integrat ion a mo ng its m embers. Fo r a di scussion o f thi s ea rly pe rio d. 17. Wilcox. 80 . d eputy ass ista nt sec re ta ry of sta te for Afr ica. On th e co nce pt o f th e "c ruc ia l case : ' see Jack Sny de r."lntematiol/al Security 9 . see Ben Ki ernan. See Jeffrey Laurent i. p.. Rigor. ed s. no . Th is the me is p redomi na n t in Agenda (n . 1992. Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 10. 12. 60-65 . H . no . F ar er. 1( 91 ). In th is in stance . see Ki ernan 's "C a m bod ia 's Mi ssed C ha nce. 3 (W in te r 1984/ 85) : 106. See Lel and M . D eutsch. pp. "S tre ngthe n ing Coo pe ra ting w ith Re g ional Bod ies. 72 (Nove m be r. 9. See P et e r Frorn uth . 1>. we w ould prefer to see th e resolution of the L iberian c r isis rem ain in A fr ican h and s. Ward s." Be rgs te n . Rivl iri's pa per is o ne of the few cr iti cal exa mi na tio ns of the performance of reg io nal o rga n iza t io ns in secu rity m atters.. Berkel ey. ." in (. See Th e St ockh olm In itiat ive on Global Security and Governa nce (Stoc k ho lm : Prime Minist er 's Office ." C ited in West Africa . See th e Economist . 16. 13." 6. H oII' Pol Pot Came to Pourer (Lond on : Sc ho cke n. 93. 7. 5. 23-29 September 1991. H. ed. 44 . Interna t ional and Area Stu d ies Resear ch Se ries no . Breslauer. a nd "The Mak in g of the Par is Ag ree me nt o n C a m bodia . 1969). " Reg io na lis m a n d th e United N at ions. 15." Foreign Policy . 87 (S u m me r 1992): I I. T he 1988 Peace Accords . K arl W . 6 (New York : Ut\: A . Tow. 1992).: U n ive rsi ty Press of A m e rica. ed . Rece n t d eta ils of t he e vo lu tio n of th ese co nrlic ts ar e : Robert Ja ster.91.. For a discuss io n of th e c:--: plan wi th pa rticu la r referen ces to re fugees. Subregional Secu rity Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder. John Mac k inlav." Christia n Scie nce M onitor. Boutros Boutros-Chali. U nive rsity ofCa lito r n ia. Charter of the Un ited N ation (Boston : W orld Peac e F oundati on." UN. Colo . no. a nd T om J." Indochina Neusletter. a nd Rel ev an ce in th e St udy o f Sovi et F oreign Poli cy.~ -USA Occasional Paper no.18." in W eiss. Eve n prior to th e Persian Gulf. and th e a vai la bi lity o f large m obile and w ell eq u ip pe d milita ry forces. 14.5. R econciliation an d Reconstruction (Was hi ngton .: L ynn e Rienner. . 6). See Franci s O . " De fe r ri ng Peace in C a m bo dia. A n Ag enda fo r Peace (New York : U ni ted Na tio ns . " L' l' i\lo nito rs in Ca m bodia H a ###BOT_TEXT###quot;C a Big T a sk Ahead. no. de cla red in 1991: " W h ile we are no t o p posed to a technical ass ista nce te am from th e UN going to Liberia to ass ess the si t ua tio n . 64. 1992). Beyond th e Co ld War : Conflict and Cooperatio n in th e Th ird Wo rld . 1988). 18. 23 M a y-I June 1992 . Se c re ta ry-Ge ne ra l Bo u tros Bout ros -G ha li sha res th is desi re to wi nd up th e Cy p ru s deploy me nt. See William T. 59-82. 1990). see Cambodia : . 3 (Su m me r 1965 ): 789-8 11. 194 9). R EGI O N AL O RG AN IZAT IONS A N D R EGI O N AL SE CU R IT Y 35 Robinson.roup. part icu- larl y p. 1( 85). W. Krei sler . "The Primacy of Eco nom ics. The "c rucia l case" is o ne w he re th e h yp otheses a re least lik el y to h ol d . The a u tho rs a re g ra tefu l to Ben jamin Ri vlin wh o recall ed thi s quote in h is " Reg io na l A r ra nge me nts a nd th e U N Sys te m for Collec tive Sec ur ity a nd Con flict Re solution : A Ne w Road A head?" (Pa pe r pr esented a t th e 1992 A n n ua l M eeting of t he Internat ional Stud ies Associa tio n).

" West Africa. 24-37. Treverton. Alternative To Intervention (Boulder. In actuality. ed. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwy betrayed exactly this concern in a May 1991 comment on the feasibility of a permanent ECOW AS force : "The problem here would be one of cost. 1989). 27. 30..' in Thomas G. 269 (London : IISS. 1990). International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder. For a discussion with reference to Yugoslavia.2. See Bruce Bagley. 21. 197-231. refused to be bound by the conclusions of the Badinter Commission. For a discussion of new possibilities. 29. 1990). see Richard J. The Economist. see F .50. 1985). As cited in West Africa. 28. : D. 1986). 570." The Changing Role ofthe United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping (Document produced by the Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore and the UN Department of Public Information. Germany. For a discussion of the lack of a monitoring capacity in the development of the human rights regime. 1087. see Jack Donnelly. They were granted permission to transit the Ivory Coast on their way to Liberia. 49." in S. The United Nations took up the Liberian issue at a meeting of the Security Council called at the request ofthe Ivory Coast in January 1991. Zartman. Colo. West Africa. For a discussion .. Colo." in Weiss. 34. 1992). In September of 1991. T . 19. The Contadora Process (Boulder. however. 270 (London: IISS. however. p. Adelphi Paper no. 26. 1991). for example. see Chester A. Crocker. In this context. See John Mackinlay. 42. p.. 23-29 September 1991. has strongly supported the majority position and contributed troops from the outset of ECOMO(. Bloomfield and Gregory F . 32. 24. p. The linguistic split is not absolute. 25. Conflict in Central America (London : Hurst. 22. Prior to the deployment of NPFL to Liberia at the end of 1989. 1991). Taylor and his men were resident in facilities in Burkina Faso. Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 23. "Case Study: The Peace Process in Central America. eds. Humanitarian Emergencies. no . W. see John Zametica. 1992). . 38-60. How do you maintain such a force on a permanent basis? Our economies are so weak and the cost of maintaining this [Liberian] particular operation is biting deep into our finances. Ronald Scheman and John W. Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa (London : Macmillan. I and the Future of Southwestern Africa. 1979/ 80. Ford. "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. ed. The Economist.. Heath. For his account. 3 (May/June 1990): 221-32. for example. one is tempted to agree with the commentator who noted that there might not have been much that outsiders could do in attempting to resolve the conflict. President Campaore admitted that several hundred soldiers from Burkina Faso accompanied Taylor to Liberia and participated in early stages of the war. Guinea. 36 SECURITY STUDIES. 13-15 March 1991).. "The Significance of Past Peacekeeping Operations in Africa to Humanitarian Relief. Security in the Horn of Africa. "The Organization of American States as Mediator.C. and Samuel Makinda. Adelphi Paper no . : Westview. 20. 1-7 July 1992. The Council resolved to call on all parties to respect the Bamako ceasefire accord and to cooperate fully with the ECOW AS operation. a commentator in West Africa noted that the Ivory Coast's obstinate opposition to the ECOMOG deployment reflected France's unwillingness to see Nigeria emerge as a dominant regional power. 139. Liu. and David P. 35. Alvara de Soto. Adelphi Paper no. Mass. p. 12 October 1991. 31. 27 May-2 June 1991. the first such precedent occurred under British auspices in Zimbabwe. Forsythe. 4-10 February 1991. "Southern African Peace-making.: Lynne Rienner. Weiss. vol. eds. 33. 13 July 1991. p." Survival 32. 'S deployment. Colo. ed. and Jack Child . Touval and I. The Yugoslav Conflict. West Africa. no. The Internationalization ofHuman Rights (Lexington. 16. 1987). 253 (London: IISS. : Westview.

38." Washington Quarterly I '5. par." International Organization 62. 19-34. see Gene M . eds.." International Security 15." in Weiss and Kessler. 40." New Yorker. 67-79. The Secretary-General himself agrees in Agenda. The Challenge to the South (New York : Oxford University Press.. 24 August 1992. I (Summer 1990): 44. See also the arguments made by a group of Third World intellectuals under the chairmanship of Julius Nyrere. 1990). 3 (Summer 1992): 113-34. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno. 60-71. "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains ?" International Studies Quarterly 33. Collective Security in a Changing World . It bears mention that French and German policies are not the only political impediment to effective community policy on Yugoslavia. 39." in Weiss. ed.. 1990). no. see James S. and the Greek nationalist aversion to other states carrying the name of what they perceive to be a Greek region have prevented any community action on the recognition of Macedonian independence. 64." 43. no. eds. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation : A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. The Insecurity Dilemma. 42. pa r. and Ayoob. no. "T he Diplomatic Round : Dodging the Problem. 63-80. "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention. pp . . Greek reservations about the potential irredentism of an independent Macedonia. "The Security Legacy of the I 980s in the Third World. see John Mackinlay and [arat Chopra. For a diverse set of essays. Weiss. On this point. "United Nations Decision Making: Future Initiatives for the Secretary-General and the Security Council. 44. see Joseph Grieco. I (March 1989). Sutterlin." Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992): 15-117. 43 : "Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons.. Agenda. See James Rosenau. 3 (Summer 1988): 488-507. See Mohammed Ayoob. "Second Generation Multinational Operations. For an intriguing account of the international diplomacy surrounding all of the issues in the former Yugoslavia." in Job. For a di scussion of these issues. and Augustus Richard Norton. Third World Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Security. no. For a lengthier discussion of these possibilities. 4 1. ed. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. see [arat Chopra and Thomas G. and John Mearsheimer. 37. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press. For a discussion of the international legal argumentation. 36. see John Newhouse. "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State- Making in a Comparative Perspective. Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (forthcoming). REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 37 established by the EC to assess the claims of Yugoslav republics for recognition.

Related Interests

01. The . economic with no explicit political mandate a n d no previous invol vement in the m aintenance of international pea ce and secu r ity.l divergence has impeded resolution of the conflict. 20 SECU RIT Y STU D IE S. a position refl ectin g not ju st their ow n concern a bo u t Nigerian preponderance. largely due to th e in ca pa city o r unwillingness o f poorer members to pa y their dues Yet. initiative. H owever. sym bo lized not least by the most recent and su bs ta ntia l deva lua tio n o f the naira ea rl y in 1992. Nigeria's willingness pay the entire bill for ECO MOG'S operations (which a t the initial level of depl oyment w as es t ima te d a t fift y million d ollars a year a n d is no doubt at a bou t twice that lev el now ) o bv ia tes th e issue. but that o f the ir traditional patron . Although the 1978 ECOWAS protocol supposedly prohibits acts o f agg ressio n. Nigeria w as su fficie n tly power ful sim ply to ov e r ride obj ections. The expa ns io n o f task s in this directi on m a y ultimately stiffe n th e o p posit io n of members uncomfortable with the exercise o f Nig erian po w er. The financi al sta tus o f ECOWAS is parlous. The fin al issue is that o f o rga ni za t io na l re sources. Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 which in turn stiffe ns hi s resol ve to resist accommodations that might weaken his own position. Th is di scomfort has translated into prolonged su p po rt of T ayl or.

the O AU o r S:\ I>CC. Although a final evaluation must a wa it further evolution of the process of political tr ansition. put th eir via b ility in d oubt. the tentativeness Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 of our cha racte riza tio n of this "su ccess" illustrates the fragility of regional organizations in fostering regional secu rity. In sho rt. . the ECOMO( . The process will culminate in 1993 in a presidential election. M oreover. C ha nges in th e Soviet U n io n indi cat ed th at Mosco w wou ld not ba il th em ou t. yet another "fina l offe ns ive" had failed to spa rk a re volt. the main regional orga n iza tio n in the Western Hemisphere. This too m ay cause complications for prolonged in volvement. but it also reveals a number of the same significant problems raised by the O A U 'S failures in the preceding section. while th e fall-ou t from the Ir an -contra a ffa ir. along with th e failur e of th e co n tras to pose a real threat. This may cause the Nigerians to cut short their ECOMOG in volvement. these cases a re particularl y interesting in that the O . The appearance of sub-regi onal. In N ica ragua . ad hoc groupings is a n ad d ition a l va r ia b le of sig n ifica nce in the analysis. The attention of Nigeria's policy-makers is in creasingl y focused on internal issues. There is no guarantee that a n elected federal g ov e rn m en t will sha re the foreign policy priorities of the current military ad m in ist ra tion. which will become stronger if the federal electoral process is accompanied by violence. in th eory. as w ell as paral yzing o pe ra tio na l a n d fin ancial con- stra in ts. R EGI ON AL O RGA N IZ A T IONS A ND R EGI ONAL SEC U R IT Y 21 country is most of the way through a transition to democracy. say . It provides a n illustration of a regional body that is thus. m ore politicall y a n d fin anciall y via ble than. both the US a nd Ca na da are members. In the ca se o f El Salv ad or. having just in stalled elected local and state administrations. Th e OAS in Central A m erica The a w k wa rd absence ov e r the last decade of the O rga n iza tio n of American St ates. There a re ine vit able tensions as th ey a tt em pt to deal w ith ci vil w ars spilling over national boundaries. a sha ky d emocracy under Presid ent Jose N apole on Duarte see med to be taking hold. A t th e sa m e time it wa s al so ev id e n t th at the go vernment o f El Sal vad or co u ld not d efeat th e guerrillas o u t rig h t. a ltho ug h C u ba is still left o u t as part o f W ashington 's bl ockade of H a vana .-\S is not cha racte rized by an absence of industrial ized co u n t ries. in w indi ng d ow n internal co n flicts in both Ni caragua a n d El Sal vador is illus t ra t ive of st ruc t u ra l problems faced by other regional in stitutions. By th e mid-1 980s it had become clear th at neither th e contras in Nicaragua nor th e Frente Farabundo M arti para la Liberacion N aci onal ( F~lI S) in E l Sal vade r co u ld hope to evict th e go vernments there by force. th e Sandinistas co u ld a lso not w in th e wa r ou t righ t a nd w ere fail in g to bring t he eco no my und er control. experience is in so m e re spects a qualified success for ECOWAS .

The effort began in 1983 involving Mexico. the Contad ora Group outlined a series of initiatives between 1983 and 1986 that aimed at treating the conflict as a Latin-American issue from which the EastlWest rivalry should be separated. a change emanating not from Washington or Moscow or even from the rest of Latin America. Z. Not surprisingly. Initially perceived by Nicaraguans as a United States-inspired provoca- tion. committing the different states in the region to the implementation of the total Arias Plan. they were subsequently joined by a "support group" composed of the newly democratic governments in Argentina. the Contadora process. disarmament. national reconcilia- tion." Changes in the Soviet Union. no. and in EI Salvador. what would become known as the "Arias Plan" and for which he would be awarded the Nobel Prize later that year. was succeeded by an elected successor. in U. In Nicaragua the Sandinistas began talks with the opposition about . Early in his administration. Peru. but from Central America itself. and in Central American conditions had produced a deadlock in which the parties began to see possibilities for compromise. the Arias Plan gathered political momentum in Central America. President George Bush reached an agreement with Congress to reduce sharply aid for the contras. vol. Colombia. Known as Esquipulas I. Jose Napoleon Duarte. confidence-building measures. In Nicaragua the contras had failed to regain the initiative. and Uruguay. accepting it as a true Central American initiative. 22 SECURITY STUDIES. On 7 August 1987 the Esquipulas II agreement was signed. in January of 1987. this effort floundered in the face of the Reagan administration's view of the problems in Central America as arising from "Soviet-Cuban expansionism" and Washington's determination to fight back against international comrnun- Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 ism. The ailing president ofEI Salvador. Hence. By April the Nicaraguans had signed on to the plan. Venezuela. prevented the organization from dealing with the wars in the area.S. and international ve r ifica t io n. Alfredo Cristiani of the right-wing Arena Party. Between August 1987 and April 1990 there were six Central American summits where agreements were hammered out on free elections. It was President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica who seized the initiative by presenting. 1989 marked a pi votal year in terms of the Central American conflict. policy. the final guerrilla offensive of November 1989 failed miserably. this session set the stage for Central American summits that would ultimately serve as a vehicle for successful regional negotiations.l 1986 was also the year when the original Latin-American effort to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict in Central America. The first summit of Central American presidents was held in Guate- mala in May 1986. Brazil. and Panama. reached an impasse. Washington. which contributes the lion's share of the G A S budget.

much to its surprise. and the new government pursued national reconciliation. the two parties pursued their discussions. and the non-use of the territory of one state for attacks on others. it is worth examining in some depth the main operational activities with special relevance for future regional settlements: small arms control. put restrictions on the armed forces. In EI Salvador Cristiani proved sincere in his search for peace with the FMLN. territorial sea. In February 1990." This operation was established in October 1989 in response to a request by the Central American presidents for UN verification of the secu rity aspects of two unresolved problems in Esquipulas II: the cessation of aid to irregular forces. Paid for by the United States the forty million dollars. the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega Saavedra lost the elections to the UNO coalition . Following the Nicaraguan elections in February 1990 and agreements concerning the demobilization of the contras in March. The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ON UCA) conducted the most extensive military operations that can still be categorized as "observa- tion. one-year effort of civilian liaison in the countryside was designed to keep contras from returning to war and the Sandinistas from influencing unduly the reintegration of these former guerrillas into the local economy. the International Commission of Support and Verification ( CIAV/ O EA was the Spanish abbreviation). Given that disarmament is a central requirement for lasting peace. the OAS fielded a little known operation. verification of arms reductions. and the second to prevent any act of aggression aga ins t one sta te from the land. and supervision of elections. or airspace of another. After the United Nations had finished its task. agreeing to internationally monitored elections in February 1990 with the Unified Nicaraguan Opposi- tion (UNO) under Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. ONUC A thus became responsible for destroying weapons delivered by insurgents and establishing of "security zones" where former contras awaited reintegration into the economy. Over the course of two years of discussions in Mexico City brokered by the U N . finally agreeing to a comprehensive peace plan for peace and reconciliation in EI Salvador on 16 January 1992. Spot checks and ad hoc investigations were made by highly mobile teams of UN military observers based in sensitive border areas. and provided for the guerrillas to di sarm a nd participate in the democratic process. In December 1989 ON UCA 'S mandate was expanded to ' include verification of any sub- sequent agreements about the cessation of hostilities and demobilization of irregular forces. The first problem was understood to include the cessation of all form s of military assistance to insurgents. It guaranteed the safety of the FMLN. REGIONAL OR GANIZATION S AND REGIONAL SECURITY 23 implementing the national reconciliation process. . Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 In Nicaragua.

Z. In fact . but they also ensured liaison with military personnel from ONUCA providing security assistance.in particular a Venezuelan battalion that was moved from Namibia to help out immediately . which is why the use of both UN civilian and military personnel in the UN Observer Mission in EI Salvador ( O N USAL) was noteworthy. a n d it was a n important task-expansion by the United Nations in relationship to the sh ibbolet h of domestic jurisdiction enshrined in Charter article 2(7) a n d so dear to Third World governments. The United N ations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua ( O N U V E N) was dispatched by the secretary -general following a decision by Central American presidents that the Nicaraguan elections Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 should be internationally observed. Significantly. but rather ad hoc mechani sms. vol. an e xa m in a t ion of evidence over a longer period in the region suggests that . 24 SECURIT Y STUDIES.has the experience and credibility in this area and that the OAS was only associated as "window dressing" reflects the type of operational problems forced by regional institutions. In Nicaragua. The distinction between the military and civilian components within future operations is likely to be blurred as already in the Haitian elections and as scheduled in Cambodia. rather than a plebiscite as in Namibia." The deployment of military and civilian observers prior to the ceasefire was a significant advance. This was the first instance of UN verifica- tion of a domestic election in a sovereign state. The ability to integrate a wide variety of experiences is likely to give the United Nations a distinct advantage." The fact that the U N . the precedent in Central America is of particular signifi- cance. During the long and grueling civil war. Not only d id the UN personnel orchestrate the el ection observation. The adva n ta ges of a universal rather than a regional body were thus aptl y illustrated in both the urc-b roke red assistance a n d negotiations for Nicaragua and EI Salvador. the Contadora and Lima Support Groups and afterwards the Central American presidents themselves who led the way diplomatically while the UN wa s the logical choice for operations. another precedent that appears significant for future settlements of regional conflicts. no. 1 particularly in countries with large members of heavily-armed regular and irregular forces. but there had been little international verifica - tion. it was not the established regional body of the O AS. The expansion of UN capabilities to monitor the destruction of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction as part of the comprehensive cease-fire imposed by the Security Council after the Gulf War strengthens this operational advantage of the world organization. non -governmental organizations had routinely reported human rights abuses. which indicated confidence in the world organiza- tion. Perhaps no issue rai ses more red flags a bo u t sov ereignty than human rights. ONUVEN was an entirely civilian bod y who spearheaded other civilian observers from private organizations and a lso from the OAS.

both operational and financial. The regional organization in question. The European Community in Croatia : The "Crucial Case" As noted earlier. One would expect that if any regional organization were to show promise in the area of conflict management and resolution. it would be this one. While the organization runs a number of military training efforts through its Inter-American Defense Board. personnel. The O AS is particularly prone to the influence of the one remaining superpower among its membership. "the United Nations and the Secretary-General were the preferred vehicles because an extraregional dimension was involved. That is why the Economist wrote: "The rising star is the EC . and financial resources of which most Third World regional entities could only dream . the OAS'S main experience was as a surrogate in 1968 for the U. the secretary-general's special representative in Central America who was the principal UN negotiator. it is useful to complement the cases of efforts by regional organizations in the Third World to manage local conflicts with considera- tion of a case where a First World organization attempted to resolve a regional conflict. "peace-keeping" operation in the Dominican Republic. After its flop in the Gulf show. rhetorically in any event. ?" Even prior to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. hardly a model for the future from the point of view of Latin Americans. the community is defying the critics who concluded that it could never perform convincingly in foreign policy. the existence of bitter tensions within the region and the involve- ment of outside support were combined with a paucity of experience and resources. Yugoslavia will be remembered as its first big part. to create insuperable obstacles for Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 effective action by the OAS in both Nicaragua and EI Salvador. the members of the EC. " 2Q The ebbing in the Cold War finally permitted the United States to respond favorably to the UN secretary-general's initiative. a situation not peculiar to the Americas. are strongly committed to the expansion of the political role of their organization and to the development of consensual perspectives on the major foreign policy issues of the day. after years of trying to keep the conflicts within the bailiwick of the OAS where they were officially deadlocked. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL S EC U R IT Y 25 "virtually all of the successful mediation efforts of the inter-American system succeeded because of ad hoc arrangements utilized by forceful per- sonal ities. the European Community. In . there are no capacities or procedures for multilateral opera- tions in either inter-state or civil wars. In concrete matters of conflict manage- ment.":" Hence. In the words of Alvaro de So to. is composed of countries possessing organizational.S.

it was reasonably easy to compromise on Slovenia. Concern over potential Serb domination brought Slovenia to the point of a referendum on inde- pendence in December 1990. This retreat apparently had little to do with the European Community's initiative. vol. the European Community serves as a "crucial case" where the generalizations of this analysis are least likely to hold. with 94 percent of the voting population . As the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe collapsed.the Serbian minority having abstained . It lasted until the end of the year. A return to barracks obviated many of these tactical and operational problems.6 million people were Serbs. a 14. and historical heritage were eminently predisposed to rekindling civil conflict. " Yugoslavia's constitutional structure.2. and Slovene collection of federal duties at customs posts on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. After Slovenia set up independent customs posts. It involved the return to barracks of the Serb-dominated federal army. many of whom were clustered along the frontier with Serbia. no. a three-month period of negotiation. but more with the army's difficulties in operating in Slovenia. By mid-July of 1991 fighting had shifted to the eastern Slavonia and Krajina regions. They went into action at the end of June 1991. but they failed to make substantial headway against Slovene territorial militias. if hypotheses hold with regard to this case. the central military establishment. The world organization deployed the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) . It involved Serbian irregulars and federal army troops acting more or less in unison against Croatian militia and police units. The Slovene episode ended rather quickly when the Yugoslav army returned to barracks after 4 July. where 12 percent of the 4.400-strong peace-keeping operation to separate Croat and Serb forces and to replace the federal army in the enclaves . Matters were different in Croatia. decided to challenge the Slovene secession. On 25 June 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia declared their Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 independence. An overwhelming majority supported seces- sion. Croatia followed in May of 1991. 26 SECURITY STUDIES. with which Serbia has no common frontier and in which there is no substantial Serb minority. The European Community made repeated efforts at arranging a ceasefire. where foreign ministers of the community defined a settlement between Serbia and Slovenia. However. They also offered to provide constitu- tional advisers and a truce observation team. At the political level. culminating in the Brioni Conference. I this respect. then they are likely to be valid across the universe of cases. where any isolated units were at the mercy of rather effective Slovene territorials.opting for inde- pendence. the release of political control unleashed a rapid upsurge of ethnic nationalism. when a cease-fire negotiated by U N special envoy Cyrus Vance held . with the encouragement of Serbian president Slobo- dan Milose vic. ethnic demography.

REGIONAL OR GANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 27 of Croatia that it had controlled . an interweaving of military and paramilitary units with the civilian population. and it held a number of sessions of its peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington. There was an almost total lack of clearly defined fronts. The United States made clear in the summer of 1991 that it viewed the crisis to be a European matter and preferred that the EC take the lead. In the first instance. France was far more committed to the retention of some kind of Yugoslav confederation than was Germany. ambiguous lines of command and authority. if anything. however. hostilities have ended. leaned far more strongly towards formal acknowledgement of the de facto dissolution of the Yugoslav state. With some difficulty. As fighting worsened. Leaving aside these practical problems. Germany forced this issue when it departed from the consensus-building mechanism on 16 December 1991. and significant autonomy enjoyed by local commanders. As the republics of Slovenia and Croatia and then Macedonia made clear their intention to depart. the Community made repeated efforts to Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 arrange cease -fires. Germany. France and its allies in the Community resisted recognition and preferred an effort at the constitutional reconstruction of the Yugoslav state. this preference translated itself into seriously divergent perspectives on the recognition of new sta tes. the regional organization's initiatives did little. not least that the conflict itself was intrinsically difficult for outsiders to manage. With the spread of the conflict. Ultimately. to curb the violence in Croatia. the community extended its monitoring mission from Slovenia to Croatia in the late summer. There are several reasons for this signal failure. The U N took a similar position. U N units were deployed in the late winter of 1991-92 and. whatever the other members did. the Germans were persuaded to post- pone their action until 15 January. And all of this took place in the context of the deep historical animosity between the two peoples ". the capacity of the EC to take an effective stand on the Yugoslav issue was constrained by serious differences in preference and in policy among its principal member states. announcing that it would recognize Croatia and Slovenia on the 19th. and to some extent Denmark. Despite all of these maneuvers. The European Community was not idle. threatening economic sanctions if cooperation were not forthcoming. ostensibly to leave time for the search for . and ultimately the lead in peace-keeping devolved to the United Nations. In August the community declared its readiness to sponsor a conference and laid out principles for a settlement (notably guarantees of human rights and against any forcible change of borders) . That the cease-fire held may have more to do with the Serbs attaining their objectives in Eastern Croatia than with the pressure of the international community. although there has been no formal peace agreement between Serbia and Croatia.

or the Western European Union (WEU).not just among warring parties but between also France and the US over American troops in Europe . Yugoslavia was not a member of the EC. but also by the alliance's lack of mandate to deal with "out of area" operations. And no doubt the same constraints will apply in future crises. Both NATO and WEU have subsequently approved the creation of special units for peace-keeping in Europe.are likely to handicap future CSCE decision-making. fundamentally reflecting the imbalances of power and resources within the region and divergences in view. The CSCE was the only European organization with a regional security dimension of which Yugoslavia was a member. European responses were also hampered by the exclusive character of the Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Community and other western European organizations. 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01. Nor was the WEU treaty configured to deal with civil conflicts outside of western Europe. I t was UN .2. While we have examined the case of Croatia. \. However. A NATO response was precluded in the first place by American opposition. Internal disputes among members . the need for Europe and the United States to seek a UN Security Council blessing for humanitarian relief to the civilian population threatened by the regular Serbian Army and by paramilitary Serbs in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflected a similar reality in the summer and fall of 1992. 28 SECURITY STUDIES. I I . it lacked any significant institutional infrastructure or resources. In return the Community as a whole agreed to recognize those countries requesting recognition at that time and qualifying for it by virtue of their acceptance of frontiers and their protection of minority rights. a situation that does not appear likely to change soon. Moreover. no . French diplomacy drew in part on the growing concern about rising German power and the possible recreation of a German economic and political space in Eastern Europe.). and financial strength did not impede the EC in any significant way. rendered it useless as a means of addressing the crisis in Croatia. the failure to agree on an appropriate and effective European Community response to the Yugoslav crisis also reflected power imbalances within the region. The European Community finally abdicated its efforts to manage the crisis in favor of the United Nations. A lack of expertise. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). German and French differences on the question of Yugoslavia reflected in part the close German historical connection with and substantial domestic support for Croatia and France's analogous relationship with Serbia.rather . military capability. linked to the 52- member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csct. but its rules of decision by consensus. 1 alternatives short of the dismantlement of the Yugoslav Federation. the latter two being arguably more appro- priate in the management of security problems. coupled with the diversity and divergent interests of its members.

es pecia lly hand icapped .pro positio n that suc h o rga n iza tions a re unpromisin g mechan isms fo r the m anagement of regi onal co n flict.000-6.IONA L SECU R IT Y 29 than EC . the Yugosla v case is aga in a clear exa m p le of the failur e of a reg ional o rga ni za tio n to m an age co nflict. L ord O we n. C< )I\: CL VS I< )I\:S O u r theoretical di scu ssion a nd case-st ud ies illustrate the fund am ental p robl ems of re sorting to regi onal o rga n iza t io ns to e n h a nc e regional security. A t the sa m e t ime th ey fre q ue n tly h a ve sta kes in these co nfl icts . Re gi onal org anizations a re. but under a blue V I\: banner. questi onable . The basic problem with this a pp roac h w a s that exte rn al ac to rs lacked the leverage to induce loc al parties to th e co n flict to cooperate.000 m ore V I\: soldiers to esc o rt co nvoys involve I\: A T O tro ops. Except under e xce p- tional circ u msta nces they ha ve neither su fficien t military capacity nor dipl omat ic leverage to mit igate o r re sol ve regi onal co n flicts. fictitious. or I\: A T O . a nd sta n d to benefit by influencin g the o u tco me unil aterall y. a t best . The cr ucia l case sus tai ns the ge ne ra l. how difficult it is for any regi onal o rga n iza tio n to intervene suc cess fu lly in ac t ive civ il co n flict. WE V . R E GI O N A L O RGAN IZA T IONS AN D RE C. This produced the internati onal con ference o n the Bosnian co n flict in L ond on a t the e nd o f A ugus t. The co n fe re nce ado pte d a set of general principles and an act io n progam in volving the esta blish me n t o f six w orking groups to tackle sp ecifi c Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 co m po ne n ts of the process of pacification. O n the w hole. o r. The conference resulted in the a p po in tme n t o f V I\: e nvoy Cy rus V an ce to sha re the re sponsibilities of m ediation w it h L ord Ca r ringto n 's repl ac ement. Upo n closer exa mi na tio n m an y of the fact ors os te ns ib ly fav oring regi onal o rga niza t io ns a re. Regi onal ac to rs do tend to suffe r m ost fro m the des t r uc tive co n seq ue n ces of co n flict in vol vin g their ne igh bors. It was th e inefficie ncy of EC effo rts to m ediate the Bosn ian crisis th at induced Fran ce in pa rtic u la r to call for a b ro ad en in g of international effo rt s a t conflict resolu - ti on. in the fir st place. however. a t w orst . in which V I\: Secret ary -General Bout ro s Boutros-Ghali pla yed a prominent role. a re co m mi tted to o ne side o r a nothe r. In th is se nse th eir st r uc t u re of interest is m ore co m p lex than m an y . The result w as the co n ti n ua tio n of the w ar a n d it s broadening into conflict between C roa ts a nd M us lims as well. The peace conference avoid ed the difficult choic e of ei the r forcing the Serbs a nd Muslims to ac q u iesce in the creation of a federal Bosnian sta te o r acce pti ng the fait accom pli of Serbian victory. The ca ses underline.forces that entered Saraje vo to provide secu rity for the tenuous lifeline o f food a nd m edical su p plies th at w as o r ig in a lly begun in Jul y. The o ngoing d iscussions to ad d 3. Frequentl y they a re active participan ts.

Similar difficulties were evident in OA U efforts to cope with crises in Chad and the Western Sahara. In South Asia it is hard to see how any regionally based initiative to settle the Afghan civil war might have succeeded. the capacity of the South Asian Association for Cooperation (SAARC) to act as a neutral mediator of conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is extremely problematic. In Africa. This disagreement was manifested in the more or less even split in the vote on the government's membership of the organization in 1976. no.l proponents of regional organizations suggest." Such relative gain issues are far more likely to be prominent in regional international relations than they are at the global level. In the terminology of international relations theory. With its headquarters in Addis Ababa. efforts by A SE A N to resolve the Cam- bodian conflict were handicapped by differing conceptions of Chinese and Vietnamese threats to the region. 30 SECURITY STUDIES. vol. where. Elsewhere on the continent. in the post- Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Cold War era. the O A U appeared particularly inept in helping to end the Ethiopian civil war. OA U efforts are critically handicapped by the reluctance of members to sanction international intervention in internal conflict. we have simultaneous absolute gain (stability) and relative gain (power) considera- tions. as they are in the realm of national security . the paralysis of the OA U in curbing intervention and in managing the civil war in Angola reflected deep disagreement among its own members about the desirable outcome of the process of liberation. There is no certainty that the former will predominate. The lack of any substantial OAU initiative also reflected the fact that other African states were deeply implicated in the conflict in pursuit of perceived national interests which diverged one from another. the latter are likely to oppose such initiatives.Z. Since a favorable outcome for one regional power is likely to enhance its regional position at the expense of others. In Somalia. Situating crises in their regional historical and political contexts enhances the overall argument considerably. Their shared interest in the public good of regional stability is often accompanied by unilateral interest in obtaining specific favorable outcomes to the conflict in question. In Central America the ability of the OAS to deal effectively with civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador was inhibited greatly by the American pursuit . the recent literature provides compelling arguments to the effect that co- operation and regime maintenance are particularly difficult where questions of relative gain are prominent. To take a more extreme case. they tend to be submerged. the two principal members of the organization are the very states involved in the conflict. not only because of the presence of Soviet forces but also because India had no interest in seeing a pro- Pakistani or Islamic fundamentalist regime replace that of Najibullah in Kabul. Indeed.

Regional organizations replicate within themselves power imbalances. Nigeria in West Africa. As a group. defined in large part by its members' opposition to the threat posed by the excluded parties. The premise of these organizations has been partiality. in numerous instances the reluctance to become involved in civil conflict reflects the sensitivity of regional powers to the creation of precedents that might subsequently justify intervention in their own countries. or was. Taking Africa as a case in point. A further concrete problem with regional organizations as managers of conflict is that frequently their membership is not inclusive and. this situation will not really change once these anomalies are rectified in light of the vast differences in levels of economic development. the consciousness of the organization is. " Perhaps most importantly. or is likely to appear. The Arab League excludes one of the three major regional powers (Iran). This problem has appeared. India in South Asia. Laos. The capacity of the European Community to come up with an effective response to the civil war in Croatia was significantly constrained by deep differences of opinion between France and Germany on the crisis. In a number of these instances (the OAU in Southern Africa. OA U conflict management in southern Africa has been inhibited by the organization's exclusion of the region's major military and economic power. As such. Nigeria's manipulation of ECOW AS is perhaps the most obvious case in point.CC excludes two of three (Iraq and Iran). REGIONAL ORGANIZATION S AND REGIONAL SECURITY 31 of a unilateral agenda of preventing revolution in El Salvador and reversing it in Nicaragua . a great number of regimes are threatened by the possibility of civil conflict. they may be used by the more powerful expanding their influence at the expense of the weak. and the United States in the Americas. these organizations have traditionally demonstrated their greatest structural weaknesses in dealing with civil war. " This shortcoming follows in part from the international legal impediments associated with the doctrine of noninter- ference in internal affairs. and ASEAN). The ( . Moreover. the ( . Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Indonesia in South-East Asia. therefore. and a number of disagreements among NATO members prevented military humanitarianism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. a principal category of regional conflict that many observers see as the main growth industry for international conflict managers. which have proven extremely acute for many countries in the Third World preoccupied with exerting control over their own tenuous bases for power. hardly a capacity for neutral intervention and security management. therefore. The same might be said of ASEAN'S role as a conflict manager given the historical exclusion of Vietnam. their coverage of their own region is partial. and Cambodia. in regions where power imbalances are so substantial that it is not possible for weaker states in coalition to balance the strong.C C in the Gulf. they . Cases in point include South Africa in southern Africa.

Comparing the frequency of regional conflict in Africa with the paucity of substantive attempts by the OA U to manage such conflict and the persistent reliance of the region on external intervention for purposes of regional security leads to great skepticism concerning the capacity of that organization as it now stands to contribute substantially to the security of Africa. including AS E AN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSC E). In fact. exist on paper and during intergovernmental sessions. The OA U has almost no staff. the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Given the increasing demands that threaten to outstrip its resources. For all of these reasons. no research resources. 32 SECURITY STUDIES. However. its domination by the United States has largely discredited the institution in the peace and security arena. While the OAS has a staff and even runs military training for officers through the IAI>H. it would appear desirable to shift some of the burden to regional institutions. For example." And such results hardly suggest enthusiasm with regard to Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 the capacity of this reasonably well-endowed regional organization to contribute to conflict resolution. financial. I are extremely cautious about fostering norms in regional politics that would legitimize regional intervention. The question thus arises as to whether the international community could not determine on a case-by- case basis the comparative advantage of specific regional institutions. the OAS had to take a clear secondary position to the United Nations. and military capacities as well as fund of peace-keeping and conflict management ex - perience are generally vastly inferior to those of the United Nations. yoU. and is in a chronic financial crisis. work be st in tandem with the UN ? In the words of UN secretary -general Boutros-Ghali in his recent report to the Security Council: Under the Charter. Other regional organiza - tions that have been active in regional conflicts. the general case for reliance on regional organiza - tion is weak . their organizational. This is not surprising. either constituted by treaty or formed on an ad hoc basis to meet a crisis." it is likely to play more strongly at the regional level. The OA U record in coping with civil conflict is very poor. during the Nicaraguan and El Salvador mediation efforts. but they have virtually no institutional infrastructure. How could such institutions. At the same time the United Nations is overstretched with new and very large operations cropping up on every continent. the Arab League's intervention in the Lebanese civil conflict was largely a fig leaf for one member to pursue a long-standing desire to form a "greater Syria. While this weakness was shared during the Cold War by the United Nations. and its respect for sovereignty has verged on slavishness. no. even if they were in theory the appropriate instru - ment for conflict management. .

This is not the plac e to discuss th e much-needed improvements in the professionalization o f these international military operations. this di vision oflabor could be Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 reversed. a nd these sou rces sh ou ld be in - . While purely U N forces w ould probabl y never be feasible in conflict s in vol ving su ch m aj or Third W orld powers as Iraq . the UN would deploy its troops a nd work closely with regional partners in diplomatic arm-twisting. consensus and democratization in international affairs. A co m pa ra ble readiness d oe s not ex ist in ot her re gi ons o f the world . Britain. some potentiall y useful illustra- tions resulted from sc ru tiny o f Cen tra l America a n d Ca m bo d ia w he re sub- regi onal d iplo m a t ic effo rt s we re esse n t ia l to negotiations a nd the su ccessful implementation of peace plans by the United Nations. di stinctions shou ld be made between Europe and the Third World as well as between the use of outside military force s to keep the peace and diplom atic measures to build th e basis for ne gotiations." But these improvements a re possible and . assuming their implementation. N ow that E astern European countries a n d the republics of the former So viet Union a re colla bo ra ting acti vel y w ith NATO. logi stically-supported . UN forces shou ld then be co m b ined with the use of regional diplomacy. RE GI ON AL O RGAN IZA T IO N S A N D RE GI ONAL SE C URITY 33 but regional action as a matter of decentralization. India. which provides that the Security C ou n cil can utilize regional a rrang em en ts for enforcement under its a u t ho ri ty." In attempting to determine a possible division of labor between universal a n d regional organizations to meet the exigencies of particular regional conflicts. In Europe UN diplomacy could well be combined with the use of NATO forces under a UN flag in regional di sputes. Moreo ver. as a p pea rs increasingly likely in humanitarian relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina. and th e United States would h a ve already agreed in the Security Co u ncil to field su ch a force under the UN flag. This eventuality w as foreseen in C h a rt e r article 53. NATO constitutes a unique pool of trained. the common interest wou ld be served if procedures were found to fa cilitate a more regular exchange of information. In terms of peace-mak in g a n d m ediation. In addition . for wh ich UN sold ie rs a re the be st solu t ion . o r Pakist an ." their use elsewhere w ould certainl y be pl ausible a n d desir able. In the Third World . delegation and cooperation with United N ations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation . France. they w ould be unlikel y to ob ject to the use of troops in Bosnia or N agorno- K arabakh. a rm ed . and coordinated soldiers who co u ld be deployed rapidly to keep the peace as decided by the Security Co u ncil. The U N secretariat shou ld arrange periodic consultations with the secreta riats of regional organizations on developments affect in g regional sec u rity.

3. The Insecurity Dilemma : National Security ofThird World States (Boulder. Rosenau. ed .: Lynne Rienn e r. Kessler. The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean (Boulder. 2. the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina among others indicates that it is no panacea. Blight. 1 corporated into what should become the secretary-general's routine briefings of the Security Council and as an input into a functioning early warning system. ed. Part of the information should be an analysis of the economic and social indicators that are normally at the root of regional conflicts. and Thomas G.. given the financial and organizational constraints under which the United Nations was operating. In a recent address to the National Press Club in Washington. and not rhetoric. see Thomas G.: Lynne Rienner. Analysis. Colo. should determine policy. 4. but also mandatory sanctions or help with elections .not only military. Weiss." The end of the Cold War has opened up new possibilities to enhance regional security at the same time that it has permitted the eruption of a variety of regional conflicts. Weiss and [ar at C ho pra. Weiss and James G . and to take an example from the cases considered below. peace- making. The opportunities for peace-keeping. preventive diplomacy. Leonard .: Lynne Rienner. 34 SECURITY STUDIES. vol.to support and endorse the action taken by regional organizations. With regard to American attitudes. Moreover. A focus on the comparative advantages of different levels of institutional approach to conflict resolution should not obscure that success in the management of regional conflict also requires the political will to search for peace on the part of the parties to the conflict. Finally. Brian Job.2. For a discussion of these issues. Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder. UN Peacekeeping : An ACUNS Teaching Text (Hanover: ACUNS.: Lynne Rienner. D. 1992). forthcoming). (992). (991). eds. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke fervently both of the desirability of "decentralizing" peacekeeping responsibilities and of the necessity of doing so. The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder. Colo. and enforcement require a greater attention to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations and regional organizations. Colo. NOTES I. The Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 preceding analysis strongly suggests that regionalism is not a promising approach to conflict mitigation and containment in most circumstances. Colo.: Lynne Rienner. although the foregoing suggests that there are numerous reasons to prefer globalist rather than regionalist approaches to conflict resolution... The Security Council could then take a variety of actions . the one organization most likely to fulfil the role of regional conflict manager. and Thomas G . eds.C.. See Thomas G. See James N . Colo. 1992). (992).. improvements in regional organizations should not take place at the cost of neglecting the United Nations. Weiss and Meryl A. Collective Security in a Changing World (Bou ld er. no.

28 Octobe r 41. 1991. As F red Bergsten put it : "Collec tive lead ersh ip . p. mea n t th at the U ni ted Sta tes lend s a nd the U ni ted Sta tes co lle cts. th e m a ssi ve (by co m pa riso n) o rga n iz atio nal a nd fin a nc ial resources of th e co m m u n ity. 1580. 309.:j Time/or R etum ." International Organizatio n 19. " T he Role of Regi onal Collec t ive Sec ur ity A r ra nge me n ts . " d raft paper p resen te d to th e Ea st A sian In st it ut e a t Col u mbia U n ive rsity.Decem be r 1( 91 ). a nd B. " Ric h ness. paras. N ationalism and Its A lternatives (New York : Kn opf. reg iona l o rga niza tio ns we re see n to be a possibl e g rowi ng facto r in inte rnatio na l peace a nd secu r ity. Collecti ve Secu rity in a Changing World. . " A m e rica n Pu bl ic O pin io n a n d th e Un ited Nat io ns .<:': Refug ee Po licy ( . p. A Succ essor Vision: The United Nations of T om orrow (La n ha m. II. th e sel f-co nscio u s e xte ns io n o f th e pr ocess o f integ ra tio n in to th e foreign pol icy a nd de fe nce sp he res in th e lead up to th e Maa stricht T rea ty a nd in th e tr eat y itself. G oodrich a nd E d va rd H amb ro . Md . 1990. 1991 ). 14. For th e lat er period . the EC diffe rs from th e o the r reg ional o rga n izat io ns un d er co nside rat io n beca use of the long hi story of d eepen in g integrat ion a mo ng its m embers. Fo r a di scussion o f thi s ea rly pe rio d. 17. Wilcox. 80 . d eputy ass ista nt sec re ta ry of sta te for Afr ica. On th e co nce pt o f th e "c ruc ia l case : ' see Jack Sny de r."lntematiol/al Security 9 . see Ben Ki ernan. See Jeffrey Laurent i. p.. Rigor. ed s. no . Th is the me is p redomi na n t in Agenda (n . 1992. Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 10. 12. 60-65 . H . no . F ar er. 1( 91 ). In th is in stance . see Ki ernan 's "C a m bod ia 's Mi ssed C ha nce. 3 (W in te r 1984/ 85) : 106. See Lel and M . D eutsch. pp. "S tre ngthe n ing Coo pe ra ting w ith Re g ional Bod ies. 72 (Nove m be r. 9. See P et e r Frorn uth . 1>. we w ould prefer to see th e resolution of the L iberian c r isis rem ain in A fr ican h and s. Ward s." Be rgs te n . Rivl iri's pa per is o ne of the few cr iti cal exa mi na tio ns of the performance of reg io nal o rga n iza t io ns in secu rity m atters.. Berkel ey. ." in (. See Th e St ockh olm In itiat ive on Global Security and Governa nce (Stoc k ho lm : Prime Minist er 's Office ." C ited in West Africa . See th e Economist . 16. 13." 6. H oII' Pol Pot Came to Pourer (Lond on : Sc ho cke n. 93. 7. 5. 23-29 September 1991. H. ed. 44 . Interna t ional and Area Stu d ies Resear ch Se ries no . Breslauer. a nd "The Mak in g of the Par is Ag ree me nt o n C a m bodia . 1969). " Reg io na lis m a n d th e United N at ions. 15." Foreign Policy . 87 (S u m me r 1992): I I. T he 1988 Peace Accords . K arl W . 6 (New York : Ut\: A . Tow. 1992).: U n ive rsi ty Press of A m e rica. ed . Rece n t d eta ils of t he e vo lu tio n of th ese co nrlic ts ar e : Robert Ja ster.91.. For a discuss io n of th e c:--: plan wi th pa rticu la r referen ces to re fugees. Subregional Secu rity Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder. John Mac k inlav." Christia n Scie nce M onitor. Boutros Boutros-Chali. U nive rsity ofCa lito r n ia. Charter of the Un ited N ation (Boston : W orld Peac e F oundati on." UN. Colo . no. a nd T om J." Indochina Neusletter. a nd Rel ev an ce in th e St udy o f Sovi et F oreign Poli cy.~ -USA Occasional Paper no.18." in W eiss. Eve n prior to th e Persian Gulf. and th e a vai la bi lity o f large m obile and w ell eq u ip pe d milita ry forces. 14.5. R econciliation an d Reconstruction (Was hi ngton .: L ynn e Rienner. . 6). See Franci s O . " De fe r ri ng Peace in C a m bo dia. A n Ag enda fo r Peace (New York : U ni ted Na tio ns . " L' l' i\lo nito rs in Ca m bodia H a ###BOT_TEXT###quot;C a Big T a sk Ahead. no. de cla red in 1991: " W h ile we are no t o p posed to a technical ass ista nce te am from th e UN going to Liberia to ass ess the si t ua tio n . 64. 1992). Beyond th e Co ld War : Conflict and Cooperatio n in th e Th ird Wo rld . 1988). 18. 23 M a y-I June 1992 . Se c re ta ry-Ge ne ra l Bo u tros Bout ros -G ha li sha res th is desi re to wi nd up th e Cy p ru s deploy me nt. See William T. 59-82. 1990). see Cambodia : . 3 (Su m me r 1965 ): 789-8 11. 194 9). R EGI O N AL O RG AN IZAT IONS A N D R EGI O N AL SE CU R IT Y 35 Robinson.roup. part icu- larl y p. 1( 85). W. Krei sler . "The Primacy of Eco nom ics. The "c rucia l case" is o ne w he re th e h yp otheses a re least lik el y to h ol d . The a u tho rs a re g ra tefu l to Ben jamin Ri vlin wh o recall ed thi s quote in h is " Reg io na l A r ra nge me nts a nd th e U N Sys te m for Collec tive Sec ur ity a nd Con flict Re solution : A Ne w Road A head?" (Pa pe r pr esented a t th e 1992 A n n ua l M eeting of t he Internat ional Stud ies Associa tio n).

" West Africa. 24-37. Treverton. Alternative To Intervention (Boulder. In actuality. ed. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwy betrayed exactly this concern in a May 1991 comment on the feasibility of a permanent ECOW AS force : "The problem here would be one of cost. 1989). 27. 30..' in Thomas G. 269 (London : IISS. 1990). International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder. For a discussion with reference to Yugoslavia.2. See Bruce Bagley. 21. 197-231. refused to be bound by the conclusions of the Badinter Commission. For a discussion of new possibilities. 29. 1990). see Richard J. The Economist. see F .50. 1985). As cited in West Africa. 28. : D. 1986). 570." The Changing Role ofthe United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping (Document produced by the Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore and the UN Department of Public Information. Germany. For a discussion of the lack of a monitoring capacity in the development of the human rights regime. 1087. see Jack Donnelly. They were granted permission to transit the Ivory Coast on their way to Liberia. 49." in S. The United Nations took up the Liberian issue at a meeting of the Security Council called at the request ofthe Ivory Coast in January 1991. Zartman. Colo. West Africa. For a discussion .. Colo." in Weiss. 34. 1992). In September of 1991. T . 19. The Contadora Process (Boulder. however. 270 (London: IISS. however. p. Adelphi Paper no. 26. 1991). for example. see Chester A. Crocker. In this context. See John Mackinlay. 42. p.. 23-29 September 1991. has strongly supported the majority position and contributed troops from the outset of ECOMO(. Bloomfield and Gregory F . 32. 24. p. The linguistic split is not absolute. 25. Conflict in Central America (London : Hurst. 22. Prior to the deployment of NPFL to Liberia at the end of 1989. 1991). Taylor and his men were resident in facilities in Burkina Faso. Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 23. "Case Study: The Peace Process in Central America. eds. Humanitarian Emergencies. no . W. see John Zametica. 1992). . 38-60. How do you maintain such a force on a permanent basis? Our economies are so weak and the cost of maintaining this [Liberian] particular operation is biting deep into our finances. Ronald Scheman and John W. Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa (London : Macmillan. I and the Future of Southwestern Africa. 1979/ 80. Ford. "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. ed. The Economist.. Heath. For his account. 3 (May/June 1990): 221-32. for example. one is tempted to agree with the commentator who noted that there might not have been much that outsiders could do in attempting to resolve the conflict. President Campaore admitted that several hundred soldiers from Burkina Faso accompanied Taylor to Liberia and participated in early stages of the war. Guinea. 36 SECURITY STUDIES. 13-15 March 1991).. "The Significance of Past Peacekeeping Operations in Africa to Humanitarian Relief. Security in the Horn of Africa. "The Organization of American States as Mediator.C. and Samuel Makinda. Adelphi Paper no . : Westview. 20. 1-7 July 1992. The Council resolved to call on all parties to respect the Bamako ceasefire accord and to cooperate fully with the ECOW AS operation. a commentator in West Africa noted that the Ivory Coast's obstinate opposition to the ECOMOG deployment reflected France's unwillingness to see Nigeria emerge as a dominant regional power. 139. Liu. and David P. 35. Alvara de Soto. Adelphi Paper no. Mass. p. 12 October 1991. 31. 27 May-2 June 1991. the first such precedent occurred under British auspices in Zimbabwe. Forsythe. 4-10 February 1991. "Southern African Peace-making.: Lynne Rienner. Weiss. vol. eds. 33. 13 July 1991. p." Survival 32. 'S deployment. Colo. ed. and Jack Child . Touval and I. The Yugoslav Conflict. West Africa. no. The Internationalization ofHuman Rights (Lexington. 16. 1987). 253 (London: IISS. : Westview.

38." Washington Quarterly I '5. par." International Organization 62. 19-34. see Gene M . eds.." International Security 15." in Weiss and Kessler. 40." New Yorker. 67-79. The Secretary-General himself agrees in Agenda. The Challenge to the South (New York : Oxford University Press.. 24 August 1992. I (Summer 1990): 44. See also the arguments made by a group of Third World intellectuals under the chairmanship of Julius Nyrere. 1990). 3 (Summer 1992): 113-34. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno. 60-71. "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains ?" International Studies Quarterly 33. Collective Security in a Changing World . It bears mention that French and German policies are not the only political impediment to effective community policy on Yugoslavia. 39." in Weiss. ed.. 1990). no. see James S. and the Greek nationalist aversion to other states carrying the name of what they perceive to be a Greek region have prevented any community action on the recognition of Macedonian independence. 64." 43. no. eds. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation : A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. The Insecurity Dilemma. 42. pa r. and Ayoob. no. "T he Diplomatic Round : Dodging the Problem. 63-80. "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention. pp . . Greek reservations about the potential irredentism of an independent Macedonia. "The Security Legacy of the I 980s in the Third World. see John Mackinlay and [arat Chopra. For a diverse set of essays. Weiss. On this point. "United Nations Decision Making: Future Initiatives for the Secretary-General and the Security Council. 44. see Joseph Grieco. I (March 1989). Sutterlin." Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992): 15-117. 43 : "Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons.. Agenda. See James Rosenau. 3 (Summer 1988): 488-507. See Mohammed Ayoob. "Second Generation Multinational Operations. For an intriguing account of the international diplomacy surrounding all of the issues in the former Yugoslavia." in Job. For a di scussion of these issues. and Augustus Richard Norton. Third World Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012 Security. no. For a lengthier discussion of these possibilities. 4 1. ed. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. see [arat Chopra and Thomas G. and John Mearsheimer. 37. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press. For a discussion of the international legal argumentation. 36. see John Newhouse. "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State- Making in a Comparative Perspective. Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (forthcoming). REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 37 established by the EC to assess the claims of Yugoslav republics for recognition.

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