CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure and out

of curiosity, he took
several grams of its contents.
He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the
Facts: NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back
with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI
Sony Music Entertainment is suing Judge Dolores Español nullifying the Petition for Certiorari took custody of said packages. The contents, after examination by forensic chemists, were
with application for injunctive relief and then denying reconsideration of the said petition. found to be marijuana flowering tops.

From the said petition, the respondents were private namely James Uy, David Chung, Elena The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for
Lim and another officer of respondent Solid Laguna Corporation with violation were engaged questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs
in the replication, reproduction and distribution of videograms without license and authority Act.
from VRB. On Account of this and petitioner's own complaints for copyright infringement.
The National Bureau Investigation, through Agent Ferdinand Lavin, presided by Judge Issues:
Español, for the issuance of search warrants against private respondents doing business
under the name and style “Media Group” inside the factory and production facility of SLC. (1) Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized.
(2) Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied.
Agent Lavin and the witnesses conduct an investigation, in the course of which unnamed (3) Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on
persons informed them that allegedly infringing or pirated discs were being manufactured how said packages came to his possession.
somewhere in an industrial park in Laguna. The respondents prove before the Department of
Justice that they were licensed by VRB up to the time of search. DOJ dismissed VRB's Ruling:
complaint. Respondents issued Quash Search Warrants. No. “The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
Issue: without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
Whether or not Judge Español committed a grave abuse of her discretion regarding the case. and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence
Ruling: of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
No. Case, in fact, is lacking of evidence to prove that the respondents of the case were not made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
authorized reproducers of videograms. The fact that Agent Lavin do not have actual operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
knowledge about the CD he purchased was illegally reproduced, thus, he just have learned it packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the
from unnamed person. The fact that the respondents do have a license form VRB made them NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search
an authorized replicator and distributor of videograms. and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
The issuance of search warrant predicated on the sworn testimonies of persons without committed in aid thereof, is not search.”
personal knowledge of fact they were testifying on and who relied on a false certification
issued by VRB. Based as it were on hearsay and false information, its issuance was without No. “The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional
probable cause and therefore invalid. The decision was fair and the Judge did not abuse her rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131)
discretion. and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the
No. “Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to
Facts: the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim
Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. otherwise.”
Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined.
However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the
Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From
WATEROUS DRUG CORP. VS. NLRC, GR NO. 113271 Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside
because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that
Facts: there was no just cause to terminate her services.

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on
1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President- the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from
General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00
chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened
date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded:
the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with
the suppliers. With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the
medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of
charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already
fraudulent activities of Soliven. included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.

In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro Issue:
warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On
29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution,
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. under the Bill of Rights.

Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within Ruling:
twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to
give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving
However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March "commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her
1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico
occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the
Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the
protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to controversy.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her
check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and
averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced
incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on
the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum inadmissible in evidence.
notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the
Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be
his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed
practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the
failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management
investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including
He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement. legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to
explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990
issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was Issues:
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters.
Whether or not Maxicorp committed copyright infringement and unfair competition.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove
just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden Ruling:
would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that
Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Catolico's dismissal then was Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling
obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods.
employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must
rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or CORRO VS. LISING, 137 SCRA 541
suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. Facts:

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by
Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine
by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders,
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was
gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. denied.

Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement Ruling:
would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to
Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all
one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or
objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter. illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which
is objectionable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, 133 SCRA 800
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its
reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private Facts:
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional
rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
hereby set aside. Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known
as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Requisites for a valid warrant: Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
1. Probable cause paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and
MICROSOFT CORP. VS. MAXICORP, GR NO. 140946 other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the
Facts: search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend
Microsoft sued Maxicorp for copyright infringement and unfair competition for production, that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued
installing and selling of counterfeit Microsoft’s products. Microsoft alleged that they did not them before impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail
authorize Maxicorp for production or selling of their products. the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the 2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
search warrants. premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the 3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may
well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. not be owned by him.

2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former 4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
abovementioned address. machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only warrant.
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and
4. Real properties were seized. does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the
authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general.
against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be
issued by the Secretary of National Defense. With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore,
Issue: President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is
Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed. contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search
warrants are declared null and void.
In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower
court, this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of Facts:
the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of
the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
efforts to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
right to the possession of the seized property. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
On the enumerated reasons:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves Arguments:
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981and section 9 of Rule 119 for
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required legal basis).
preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the
that attended their preliminary investigation. inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

Issues: With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing unbeknown and beyond knowing.
warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process 2. Determination by a judge
during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 126005
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.
1. NO. Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner
2. NO. with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the
opportunities to be heard. same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
4. NO. public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No.
1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
Reasons: being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioner’s residence.
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due
cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were
person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges Issue:
should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
of arrest against them. Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
3. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf Labor Code
and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision Ruling:
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly the accompanying search was likewise illegal”. Every evidence thus obtained during the
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and illegal search cannot be used against accused.
prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order
was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the The Court cited Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution:
Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect… The power of effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.” Furthermore, the search and seizure personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
because it must identify specifically the things to be seized. describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials The Court held that the State “cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205. citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects”. The constitutional provision
“protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other
PEOPLE VS. BOLASA, GR NO. 125754 forms of restraint”.

In the old case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ZENAIDA BOLASA YNAKOBOAN and The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows:
ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999, the Supreme Court sustained 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
the appeal and stated that the case clearly illustrated “how constitutional guarantees against 2. Search of evidence in “plain view.”
illegal arrests and seizures could be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of The elements of the plain view doctrine are: (a) a prior valid intrusionbased on the valid
suspected drug offenders”. warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence wasinadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified
evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at mere seizure of evidence without further search.
a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. When they committed a criminal activity;
reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and x x x saw one man 4. Consented warrantless search;
and a woman repacking suspected marijuana." They entered the house and introduced 5. Customs search;
themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and 6. Stop and Frisk; and
some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea
bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an
contained marijuana. arrest is lawful even “in the absence of a warrant”:

According to the Court, the tea bags containing marijuana “were not seized in plain view or (a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
inadvertently discovered”. There was “no valid intrusion” and the accused were “illegally commit an offense in his presence;
arrested”. The police officers “intentionally peeped first through the window before they (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe
saw and ascertained the activities of accused inside the room”. that the person to be arrested has committed it; and,
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
The Court held that the apprehending officers “should have conducted first a establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
surveillance” considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (A
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and “determining the existence of person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
probable cause” for arresting accused, they should have “secured a search warrant prior to may be used as proof of the commission of the offense).
effecting a valid arrest and seizure”. The Court stated that “the arrest being illegal ab initio,
QUA CHEEN GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD, 9 SCRA 27 with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven
which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
• Re: the extent of the Pres’ power to investigate does it include authority to arrest? May it
• In May 1952 petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased be delegated? Here’s the history…
US Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000 without the necessary license from the Central Bank
of the Philippines and having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to themselves. • Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien
• Warrants were issued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released. under investigation
• Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board
of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an • Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 reorganized the deportation board to issue the
alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the
• Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release <this is incompatible with….>
power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin code 3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
Issue: upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
• Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens and delegate those powers, describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III,
under EO 398 of Pres Quirino which authorized the Deportation Board to issue warrants of Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
arrest of aliens during investigation (on the ground that such power is vested in the
legislature and that there must be a legislation authorizing the same) • Justice Laurel said that this constitutional provision is not among the rights of the accused.
Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course,
Ruling: indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. This
requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — do not specify who will determine the
The Pres has the power to carry out order of deportation but may not order arrest during existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be
investigation. And no, power may not be delegated. authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant
of arrest.
• Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in • The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an
to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation.
contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his • The extent of the curtailment of liberty dependent upon conditions determined by the
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses discretion of the person issuing a warrant. In other words, the discretion of whether a
in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves.

• While it did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable • It is an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the
aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the fact that such a procedure was provided for law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the
before the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, and fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. caution.

• Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be • The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such
effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section a shaky foundation.
69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No. 613.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of
aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation wherefrom,
MORANO VS. VIVO, 20 SCRA 562 we are confident, is impermissible. Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a
Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines. Reason:
Facts: Discourage entry under false pretenses.

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR NOS. 112708-09
November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a
first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, SYLLABUS
China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION;
first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DEEMED WAIVED FOR FAILURE
Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash TO INVOKE AT PROPER TIME. - A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native- administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a
born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of
prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained this case preclude the rightful application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG
several extensions. The lastextension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated decided to file its motion to dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in
August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the
Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the
failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal
bond. offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in “Sotto v. Jareno,”
144 SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: “Failure to observe the doctrine of
Issue: exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We
have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-
Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional. compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
Ruling: is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it.” PCGG is
guilty of estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume
Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non- with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it
immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived such
qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. perceived defect for “proper time” cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and
Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must unreasoned length of time. The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence
procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches - or the failure to do
undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time.
determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration
Act. This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SUSPEND PERIOD TO SUBMIT WRITTEN FORMAL OFFER OF
a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, AND FAILURE THEREFOR IS DEEMED A WAIVER;
and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. The gravamen of INCORPORATION IN JUDGMENT THE RESOLUTION OF MOTION TO DISMISS, PROPER.
petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila a native- - The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in the judgment the
born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been resolved
to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not first and separately. That would have been unnecessary in the light of the
one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first “peculiarities” of this case where there was nothing left for the parties to do but to
marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the wording of the await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the submission of
statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from thePCGG’s written formal offer of documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do
writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a within the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. That
Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed the 20-day period was not suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. The
to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the Court agrees with petitioners’ (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only period
State's power of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period to file an answer where a period is to
Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such
man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a suspension. PCGG filing of a motion to dismiss, without seeking leave of court to stay
woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a the running of the period for filing its written formal offer of evidence - as agreed upon
Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, and ordered in open court could not have the effect of suspending the period. Without
express leave of court, PCGG could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to 4. ID.; ID.; PCGG MADE USE OF AN UNAUTHORIZED AND CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE
suspend the running of the period agreed upon. PCGG is deemed to have waived SEARCH WARRANT TO EFFECT SEQUESTRATION. - The order which the PCGG issued
presentation of further evidence and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the against ALLIED typifies a search warrant. Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH
evidence on record. AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to make
available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is
3. POLITICAL LAW; RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; SEQUESTRATION ORDER AND unauthorized because nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3)
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER NULLIFIED FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OF invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SUFFICIENT PRIMA FACIE FACTUAL empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its mandated purpose of
FOUNDATION. - The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY’s case is recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the
Section 26 of Article XVIII. The Sandiganbayan voided the sequestration order issued powers of the PCGG; and the Court in “Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG” simplified these
against SIPALAY “for lack of sufficient prima facie factual foundation, x x x” In so powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority to issue a search and
concluding, it only took into account the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, seizure order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from
Bautista and Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the simplified
the SANDIGANBAYAN’S exclusive reliance on the testimonies of the three (3) PCGG enumeration in the “Cojuangco” case, by implication. “Baseco” has clarified once and
witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these for all the essential nature of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze orders
testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no and provisional takeover that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with. Attachment and
documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not involving an
evidence were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence active and drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search
decree that “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally warrant (or search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG
offered.” There is no doubt that the testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was created, therefore, ought to
offered as evidence meriting due appreciation by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since be viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in “Philippine Coconut
Section 35, Rule 32 of the Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence “must Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG” and being in fact a search warrant, the
be made at the time the witness is called to testify.” With respect to documents, SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acide test for validity
however, the same Section 35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their as provided by the prevailing constitution under which it was issued - the FREEDOM
offer. Dr. Doromal’s testimony is reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was over CONSTITUTION which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973
launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty. Alonte’stestimony, the Constitution. Supporting jurisprudence thus outline the following requisites for a
SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding the PCGG does not contest. As search warrant’s validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification:
to Commissioner Bautista’s supervening death in the course of her cross-examination, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined
the controlling case is “Fulgado v. C.A., et al., where the Court allowed the testimony by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
of the plaintiff who died before his cross-examination, to remain in the record. If determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-examination, with the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
more reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the witness’ issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
death (as in Commissioner Bautista’s case) remain intact. Dr. Doromal was basically seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND
preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly coming SEIZURE ORDER is so constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased
from Malacañang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony Commissioner Bautista’ s in-court declarations did not in any way established probable
essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the cause. This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported
sequestration order issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these facts and circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents
documents. But, to repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there was no she identified but which were never formally offered in evidence in the
offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized at this point that mere SANDIGANBAYAN. She never testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge to
identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any bolster the PCGG’S claim that ALLIED was in possession and control of illegally-amassed
evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered. Verily then, without the PCGG wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or
documents having been formally offered, however decisive and compelling they may uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search warrants are not issued on loose,
otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie evidence/s case does not exist at all. That makes vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG
Dr. Doromal’s testimony by and in itself worthless. The same can be said of deceased has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a “judge” and “such other
Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the mechanical process responsible officer as may be authorized by law” were empowered by the FREEDOM
of identification. In fact, her testimony and the documents she referred to were totally CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly, the order does not provide a
unrelated to the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY, as they chiefly dwelt on specification of the documents sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED. It
the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED. Being immaterial, EXPRESSLY REFERS TO “all bank documents” which is too all embracing, the obvious
nothing therefrom can shore up a prima facie case against SIPALAY. intent of which is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions
of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of seizure warrant is defendant for the first time, was filed beyond the one-year period fixed in the Carriage
not a particular description, thus contravening the explicit command of the of Goods by Sea Act. In “Seno,” one Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat was
Constitution that there be a particular description of things to be seized. Being a likewise impleaded as defendants for the first time under an amended complaint filed
general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally objectionable and beyond the ten-year period required under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code within
to be more precise, void for lack of particularity. which to bring an action upon a written contract. And in both cases, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of the complaints against these newly impleaded defendants by refusing
5. ID.; ID.; SUIT AGAINST SEQUESTERED ENTITY SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN the application of the “Pangasinan” ruling and decreeing that the amended complaints
SANDIGANBAYAN WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD AS FAILURE THEREOF did not stall the running of the prescription periods provided under the applicable
AUTOMATICALLY LIFTS SEQUESTRATION ORDER; SUIT AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS IS laws. Bearing once against similar factual features as the “Aetna” and “Seno” cases,
NOT SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION. - The last key issue involves another this particular sub-issue should, perforce, be resolved in accordance therewith. The
constitutional imperative - i.e., that the corresponding suit/s against a sequestered case of “Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al.” 240 SCRA 376 [January 23, 1995] where its
entity/ties should be brought in the proper court, the Sandiganbayan, within the “Final Disposition relating to the judicial action/proceeding in sequestration cases
prescribed period - failure of which automatically lifts the sequestration order or orders appear to clash with “INTERCO,” did not reverse, abandon or supplant “INTERCO.”
issued. At the fore is Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 What the Court did was to explain the two apparently colliding dispositions by making
Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Counting six (6) this a “hairline,” but critical, distinction: As in “INTERCO,” evidence of the PCGG is nil
months therefrom, August 2, 1987 was the constitutional deadline for the PCGG to file to even come up with a prima facie case against SIPALAY (and ALLIED). This similitude is
the corresponding judicial action/proceeding against entities it sequestered prior the one decisive factor that draws the instant case away from the “Final Dispositions”
to February 2, 1987. Among such entities were SIPALAY and ALLIED. The PCGG made by the Court in the 1995 “Republic v. Sandiganbayan” case thus making
admittedly did not file any direct complaint either against SIPALAY or ALLIED before the “INTERCO” as supported by the “Aetna” and “Seno” cases, the controlling
SANDIGANBAYAN between February 2, and August 2 of 1987. But within such period, precedent. The principle of Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for “when the
the PCGG filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN a civil case against Lucio Tan and others court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
docketed as CC No. 0005. It did not name SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants. SIPALAY will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
and ALLIED wereimpleaded as defendants in CC No. 0005 for the first time only after substantially the same. In answer therefore we hold that the sequestration and the
the lapse of more than four (4) years from the filing of the original complaint in July of search and seizure issued were indeed automatically lifted.
1987, under an amended complaint filed by the PCGG in September of 1991. In PCGG
v. INTERCO, the Supreme Court made a distinction between the juridical personalities 3. Personal examination
of a corporation and its stockholders, ruling that if a corporation is not impleaded, it
cannot be deemed to have been sued in an action against its SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, GR NO. 82585
stockholders. Petitioner Sipalay Trading was not specifically impleaded therein as
party-defendant, if at all, the latter has been included therein as part of principal Facts:
defendant’s ill-gotten assets. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, ‘(P)arties in In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the
either as plaintiffs or defendants.’ Sipalay Trading has a juridical personality separate finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and distinct from its stockholders. Any civil charge filed against principal and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of
defendant Lucio C. Tan and/or his dummies is not deemed a suit against the Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
former. Neither does mere inclusion in the list of ill-gotten assets as part of principal personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
defendant’s ill-gotten wealth suffice to comply with the constitutional cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30,
injunction. Impleading a party means bringing the suit against it. Listing or annexing it 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
to the complaint, on the other hand, implies being the objection of the action. The resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie
PCGG erroneously relies on“Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Philippine Farming Co., case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
Ltd.” where it was ruled to the effect that: This case dealt solely with a defect in the denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the
cause of action stated in the original complaint filed. It did not in any way involve a Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The
failure to implead a party-defendant. In the failure to implead a party in the original motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With
complaint, the Court on at least two occasions said that the rule in “Pangasinan” would these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative
not apply to the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. These remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
are the cases of “Aetna Insurance Co. v.Luzon Stevedoring Corporation” and “Seno, et
al. v. Mangubat, et al. cited by herein SIPALAY and ALLIED in their “Comment.” In Issues:
“Aetna,” the amended complaint filed by therein appellant Aetna Insurance Co. as
plaintiff before the then CFI of Manila impleading Barber Line Far East Service as (1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R.
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated
April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- KHO VS. MAKALINTAL, GR NO. 94902-06
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to
refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before SYNOPSIS
the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent This is a petition for certiorari assailing the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. Parañaque which denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrants emanating from the
same court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National Bureau of Investigation
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, handsets, transceivers, two
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and units of vehicles and motorcycle. Petitioners questioned the issuance of subject search
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose warrants, theorizing upon absence of any probable cause therefor. They contended that the
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. commission of a crime by the petitioners.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the The Court ruled as untenable petitioners’ contention. The application for the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their
may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution mistresses. The warrants in question complied with the Constitutional and statutory
now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
accurate interpretation. authorities. Considering that cases in court had been instituted against the petitioners, the
petition herein to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent NBI from using the said
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing objects as evidence, has become moot and academic. Herein petitioner was therefore
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the dismissed.
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and SYLLABUS
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANTS; ISSUANCE THEREOF;
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, WHEN PROPER; CASE AT BAR. -- It is therefore decisively clear that the application for
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses applicants and their witnesses. In the case of Central Bank vs. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Court ruled that the question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which
must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna vs.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent examination of the applicants and the witnesses. After a careful study, the Court
judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had
jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal
through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge hand, which cannot be solved by their present motion to quash. According to
was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the search sued upon
searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an
observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate agent and therefore, the NBI agents involved had no authority to search the aforesaid
accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be premises and to confiscate the objects seized. Whether the places searched and
searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his objects seized are government properties, are questions of fact outside the scope of
duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear to rule on such
before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings issues lest it preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI against
and impressions. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge the herein petitioners.
conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their
witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching Facts:
questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance
with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn 1. May 15, 1990, NBI agents Max Salvador and Eduardo Arugay applied for the
statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against petitioner Kho, in his
pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining residences in BF homes and Moonwalk, Paranaque.
Judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked 2. The search warrants were applied after teams of NBI agents had conducted
are germane to the pivot of inquiry the existence or absence of a probable cause. personal surveillances and investigation in the 2 houses on the basis of confidential
information they received that said places were being used as storage centers for
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE THING TO BE SEIZED MUST BE unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles.
DESCRIBED IN PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT ON 3. On the same day, respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the
THE PART OF THE SEARCHING AUTHORITIES. -- The use of the phrase and the like is of applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued search warrants.
no moment. The same did not make the search warrants in question general warrants. 4. May 16, 1990, NBI searched the premises and recovered unlicensed high-powered
In Oca vs. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the warrant although it described firearms, ammunitions, radio transceivers and unregistered motor vehicles.
the things to be seized as books of accounts and allied papers. The Court believes, and 5. May 28, 1990, petitioners file a Motion to Quash contending that said warrants
so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory were issued without probable cause and were in the nature of general warrants.
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described 6. July 26, 1990, respondent Judge denied said motion.
in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a Issue:
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since
the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in WON there was probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants?
researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of
the search nugatory. Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants Ruling:
did not render the same general. Retired Justice Ricardo Francisco's book on Criminal
Procedure has this useful insight: A description of the property to be seized need not - Yes.
be technically accurate nor necessarily precise: and its nature will necessarily vary - It is within the discretion of the examining judge to determine what questions to
according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of
concern. Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as the inquiry – the existence or absence of probable cause.
circumstances will ordinarily allow. x x x In People vs. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court - The respondent judge examined the applicants and witnesses under oath, and
held that, x x x But where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description asked them questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them
must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, for this enough to create a probable cause.
would mean that no warrant could issue. - On the issue of general warrants, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENFORCEMENT THEREOF; NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A MOTION TO doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Further, the description is required
QUASH; CASE AT BAR. -- The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement to be specific only so far as the circumstance will ordinarily allow.
of the challenged search warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a
Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of the warrant. The
manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to be
resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners have
remedies under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem at
ALVAREZ VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 64 PHIL. 33 As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a
Facts: liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them (State vs.Custer
On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding
David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search
petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs.U. S., 6
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee
In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the
his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or
this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal
petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a
and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the
seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner. purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U.
ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain S.vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambertvs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413;
accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative
articles in question be returned to him. necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
Issues: presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as contemplated in the law? sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of
2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant? the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal
3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit? but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night? witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the
5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional? issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains
6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees? sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
Ruling: hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is
necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is
General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and
papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., that the search could not legally be made at night.
241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law.
ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the
(People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472). article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could
have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the with his mother, but on said search operation, his brother and family were out. He testified
contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions that he was at his parent’s house because he visited his mother, that he saw the Receipt of
because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position Property Seized for the first time during the trial and admitted that the signature on the
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did. certification that the house was properly search was his.

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the Issues:
books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an
investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and 2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of the
documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a search.
criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional 3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence against
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the the accused.
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself
(Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs.U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Ruling:
Fed., 365; U. S. vs.Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U.
S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.
seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the 1) The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally;
validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, 2) the examination must be under oath;
because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he 3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or answers.
proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his
petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there examination of the applicant and his witnesses on the form of searching questions and
was a compromise it referred but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of answers before issuance of the search warrant. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the witnesses are not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge
petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but may be able to properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause.
such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with
protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents. the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
2) At that time the police officers presented the search warrant, appellant could not
Facts: determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with law. It was only during the
trial that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was
SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for illegally issued. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on constitutional grounds to the
marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur. During the search operation, the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial, after the
searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his
pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.
that the house was properly searched which was signed by the appellant and the barangay
officials who witnessed the search. 3) No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure
After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the PNP cannot validate an invalid warrant. The requirement mandated by the law that the
station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP Crime Laboratory issued examination of the complaint and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing
a report finding the specimens to be positive to the test for the presence of marijuana. in the form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search
Moreover, the person who conducted the examination on the urine sample of appellant warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to illegal search warrant cannot
affirmed that it was positive for the same. be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article III of the
Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house since he has been residing at a Constitution.
rented house and declared that it was his brother and the latter’s family who were residing
LIM VS. FELIX. GR NO. 94054-57 records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination
of probable cause and issuance of warrant).
Facts: Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the
existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion.
The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was Note:
designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge,
Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information
against the accused by virtue of the prosecutor’s certification in each submitted information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
recommending the existence of a probable cause. arrest, Distinguished.

Issue: The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTOR’S JOB. While the latter aka
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE.
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. CRUZ VS. JUDGE AREOLA, AM NO. RTJ-01-1642

Ruling: Facts:

Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa
Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on the
judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent
investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and
reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or recommended that the case be set for trial.
order for an arrest.
Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and his Branch
A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the fact that although
constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to
1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the give way to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the accused. They believe that there is
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, no longer any reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of
issue arrest warrant and arrest considering that the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there
2. If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the exists probable cause to indict the accused.
prosecutor’s certification and require the submission of the supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest
of probable cause. is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other
Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that “x x x probable cause hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resolutions
should be personally determined by the judge x x x”. This means that and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch.
1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge.
2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. Issue:
3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of the warrant
preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be of arrest.
held for trial or release.
In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is
only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly
for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for
kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause
The second kind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of
bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same.
In making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying on the Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court
evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of reliance depends on the room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order
circumstances of each case and is subject to the judge’s sound discretion. however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.

It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant Issue:
for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of
a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the
frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. latter’s documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.

It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were Ruling:
not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not
immediately issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
reinvestigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:
for performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent
Judge. SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or
complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
OKABE VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ, GR NO. 150185 parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution
on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-
Facts: existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records,
as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal
Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she 4. Particularity of description
entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was
engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was BACHE AND CO. VS. RUIZ, 37 SCRA 823
alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied
receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. Facts:

During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz
witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73,
probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for
prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses
P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case;
Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s permission, and returned to so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De
the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions
on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and
the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search
submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint was subsequently conducted.
for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of
the complainant, the respondent’s counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the
Issue: Issue:

Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant. Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the search warrant which
says “an undetermined amount of marijuana,” was too general and hence makes the warrant
Ruling: void for vagueness.

The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds. Ruling:
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to SC held that the appellant’s contention has no leg to stand on. The constitutional
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace
Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be
issue for more than one specific offense. required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant warrant could issue.
“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 169
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex
and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and Facts:
check stubs; records ofbank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,
covering the years 1966 to 1970.” -In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the
the things to be seized. club.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the -The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923,
guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the
police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the
PEOPLE VS. TEE, GR NOS. 140546-47 date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred.
Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so
Facts: as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the
outer door.
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A -Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police.
raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the
National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was
and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana. Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the
house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the
the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the
The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting
against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City in his refusal to submit to the search.
charged Modesto Tee, alias “Estoy Tee,” with illegal possession of marijuana.
-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and
Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will
him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through enable the officer to identify him when found.
the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of
and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other
his pockets. and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify
-All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio
again refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this
necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom
tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give
-The warrant read as follows: his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he
… can be identified.
SEARCH WARRANT (G) In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Police Force of the City of Manila. Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be
GREETING searched.
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the
Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe and does building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was
believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma.
building occupied by him and which is under his control, Veloso without difficulty.
namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in PANGANDAMAN VS. CASAR, 159 SCRA 599
violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips,
reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in Facts:
connection with the game commonly known as monte and that
the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects -On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at
with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear.
of the Gambling Law. -On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full
the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this date to blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of
make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom
situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine was, however, identified — and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed.
Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st endorsement" to the respondent Judge,
if you find the same or any part thereof, you are commanded to transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative
bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law. … (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923. office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases."
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO -No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until
Judge, Municipal Court Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before
him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No. 1748. On that same day, the
Issue: respondent Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under
oath thru … (his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the
WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid. witnesses and the latter's answers. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued
the corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named
Ruling: by the witnesses) and fifty (50) John Does.
-An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar
Yes. It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that “a (joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding
search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been
oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized.” "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded.
The respondent Judge denied the motion for “lack of basis”.
-The petitioners contend: This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the
- that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting
with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties
- that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second
proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest; phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint
- that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are or holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to
open from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible the provincial fiscal for appropriate action.
for respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty-
four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be
matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day"; completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued.
- that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to
Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously order the respondent's arrest:
prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as “Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.- xxx xxx xxx (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the
investigator."; municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
- that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
"... in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
to conduct his own investigation of the same; and he shag issue a warrant of arrest.”
- that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave
the persons or things to be seized. abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first
completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The
Issue: rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause,
not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation.
WON the warrant of arrest was null and void. More specifically stated, WON completion of
the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of FRANK UY VS. BIR, GR NO. 129651
a warrant of arrest.
In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho
The warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without
petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct
Does." The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole
the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same
court for further appropriate action. substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were
issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day
RD: for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these
Sec 3 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the procedure in warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched
conducting a pre-investigation of any crime cognizable in the RTCs. Although not specifically the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of
declared the said provision actually mandates two phases. UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a
motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via
The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.
affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the
determination by the Judge either: Issue:
(1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses
the complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
the case, to the provincial fiscal; or
(2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to
continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.

The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but
sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not
met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements,
in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined
by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who
should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy
and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the
latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.


Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.