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Chua v. Cabangbang 27 SCRA 791

FACTS: Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a
hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with
a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with
Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on
December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no
one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling
joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another
child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated.
Without means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave her away to acomadre in Cebu. Sometime in
May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of the child
Betty who was then barely four months old. They have since brought her up as their own. They had her
christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12, 1958. There is some testimonial conflict on how the
Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of the girl Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October
1958, while she and Villareal were still living together, the latter surreptitiously took the child away and
gave her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for favors received. She supposedly came to
know of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the girl, who was then about three years
old, was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter returned the child to the Cabangbangs
allegedly thru threats intimidation, fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that
Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence; that she reared
her as her own and grew very fond of her; and that nobody ever molested them until the child was 5-½
years of age.

LOWER COURT: That the child was given to the Cabangbang spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and
consent of Pacita Chua. By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy
furnished to Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the
child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua filed on June 14, 1963 a petition for habeas corpus
with the CFI of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her parental authority
over the girl. Named respondents in the petition were Villareal and the spouses Cabangbang. On June
15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any of his deputies to produce
the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the court a quo on June 17, 1963, at 8:30 a.m.
However, for reasons not stated in the record, the child was not produced before the lower court as
ordered. On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their answer
the next day.

CFI OF RIZAL: Petition dismissed. It will be for the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace
Cabangbang to be under the custody of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang.

(1) The lower court erred when it awarded the custody of petitioner's daughter Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old, in favor of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome

(2) Illegally deprived petitioner of parental authority over her daughter."

HELD: Both issues resolved against the petitioner.

I. Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is
an issue that is now moot and academic. Having been born on December 15, 1957, the child is now 11
years of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the
separation of a child under seven years of age from her mother, "unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure," has no immediate relevance. The petitioner correctly argues, however, that
the reasons relied upon by the lower court —i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright woman" and "it
will be for the welfare of the child" — are not strictly speaking, proper grounds in law to deprive a
mother of her inherent right to parental authority over her child. It must be conceded that minor
children — be they legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural by legal fiction or illegitimate, other
than natural as specified in art. 269 of the Civil Code — are by law under the parental authority of both
the father and the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But the court take the
view that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises, the petitioner can be
deprived of her parental authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays down the rule
that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of guardianship or
adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession," it indicates in the next that "The
courts may, in cases specified by law deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed
valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental authority over the
minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the
Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it
cited the facts that the petitioner did not at all — not ever — report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when she allegedly
discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that she
did not make any move to recover the child because the Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The
petitioner is bound by the foregoing findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court, she
is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court.

Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:

The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they should
treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or
examples, or should make them beg or abandon them. (emphasis supplied) Abandonment is therefore
one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over their children. Was the petitioner's
acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of
the child? To the mind of the court, mere acquiescence — without more — is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment. But the record yields a host of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray
the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to completely forego all parental response possibilities
and forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child. She surrendered the custody of her child
to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years,
before she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her
child because the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of
credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The
natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she alleged, and her child was in the
custody of the Cabangbangs — should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but still
respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger. It is a matter of record — being the
gist of her own unadulterated testimony under oath — that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay,
the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld
and ceased to give when she gave the child away. A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as
a means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether stopped living with
and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that at the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo,
she expressed her willingness that the child remain with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in
exchange give her a jeep and some money. The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the
proceedings below, reveal that her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart.
Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to
obtain concessions — financial and otherwise — either from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If
she gets the child back, support for her would be forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father,
Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they
gave her a jeep and some money. Indeed, the petitioner's attitude,does nothing but confirm her
intention to abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to give her away to
the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment stage of life and needed the utmost care and
solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once move to recover the child.
She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which she owed to the child; completely
withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to display maternal affection; and totally
denied her support and maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged to such a point that
her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim over her, can and should
be inferred as a matter of law. Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of
her own flesh and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in
Cebu because she could not support it. Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course
of the petitioner's lengthy testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty
Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang — or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal — because she
loves her, cares for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She wants Betty
Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged father would resume giving her (the petitioner)
support. She wants her back to humiliate and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her
knowledge and consent, gave the child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most unkindest cut of all"! — she
nevertheless signified her readiness to give up the child, in exchange for a jeep and some money. THE
Court therefore affirmed the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a ground
which the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child. Contrast the petitioner's
attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang — especially the respondent Flora Cabangbang who,
from the moment the child was given to them, took care of her as if she were her own flesh and blood,
had her baptized, and when she reached school age enrolled her in a reputable exclusive school, for
girls. Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist not in taking the child
away from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the custody of the petitioner. For, by her own
admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income, and it is doubtful, to say the very least, that
she can provide the child with the barest necessities of life, let alone send her to school. There is no
insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay — an unknown quantity, as far as the record goes —
would resume giving the petitioner support once she and the child are reunited. What would then
prevent the petitioner from again doing that which she did before, i.e., give her away? These are of
course conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is the bounden duty of courts
— which they cannot shirk — to respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to a child's natural
and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual environment. 5 This is not
to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure future is guaranteed for her. For life is
beset at every turn with snares and pitfalls. But the record indubitably pictures the Cabangbang spouses
as a childless couple of consequence in the community, who have given her their name and are rearing
her as their very own child, and with whom there is every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of
normal growth and development into respectable womanhood. Verily, to surrender the girl to the
petitioner would be to assume — quite incorrectly — that only mothers are capable of parental love and
affection. Upon the contrary, this case precisely underscores the homiletic admonition that parental
love is not universal and immutable like a law of natural science.

II. The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the
lower court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the
custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or
against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated — either legally or de
facto — and where it appears that both parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care,
custody and control of the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent
of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such
child, or commit it to and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society." 6 Parenthetically,
sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the petitioner's contention that the first sentence
of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which states that In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount..... applies only when the litigation involving
a child is between the father and the mother. That the policy enunciated, in the above quoted legal
provision is of general application, is evident from the use of the, adjective all — meaning, the whole
extent or quantity of, the entire number of, every one of. It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit
involving a child's custody is between a parent and a stranger, the law must necessarily award such
custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely contemplates, among others, a suit
between a parent and a stranger who, in the words of the provision, is "some reputable resident of the
province." And under the authority of the said rule, the court — if it is for the best interest of the child
— may take the child away from its parents and commit it to, inter alia, a benevolent person. Sec. 1,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." The petitioner has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and
moral obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal and
moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted correctly in dismissing her petition.


MIGUEL FUENTES, ET AL., appellants-appellee, vs. JUANA CANON Y FAUSTINO, ET AL.,Defendant-

Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aguedo Velarde, for appellee.


The twentieth clause of the will of Josefa Faustino y Mendoza, who died on the 1st day of April, 1887, is
as follows:

Vigesima. - Mando se entreguen a los conyuges Don Miguel de la Fuente y Doña Potenciana Medrano
tres mil pesos para invertirlos en compra de buenos terrenos de labor quedandose con una tercera
parte y repartiendo las dos restantes la una a la viuda e hijo de Don Eriberto de la Fuente y la otra a los
hijos y herederos de Don Honorio de la Fuente.

The plaintiffs herein, Miguel de la Fuente and Potenciana Medrano, brought this action against the
twenty heirs of Josefa to recover the 3,000 pesos mentioned in this legacy. Judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiffs in the court below. Defendants excepted to the judgment, and have brought the
case here by bill of exceptions. No motion for a new trial was made in the court
below.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The first claim of the appellants is that the plaintiffs are required to give a bond before they are entitled
to the delivery of the 3,000 pesos, the legacy here in question being defined in law 21, title 9, partida 6,
and known as a legado modal. There is nothing in this claim. As far as the heirs of the testatrix are
concerned, there is no condition whatever attached to the legacy. With the rights of the beneficiaries
mentioned in the said twentieth clause the defendants in this case have nothing to do. As to them there
was an absolute gift of 3,000 pesos, and the plaintiffs have the right to receive that from the heirs, and
they are under no obligation to give security to the heirs before the money is
paid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The court below ordered judgment against the defendants for 3,000 pesos and interest from January 1,
1894. The appellants claim that this was error. It was proved that in November, 1893, the plaintiffs
commenced an action against the heirs of the testatrix to recover this legacy. For some reason that case
was not brought to trial. It, however, amounted to a judicial demand for the payment of the money, and
the interest commenced to run from that date.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case shows that upon the death of Josefa her property was divided among two nephews and a
niece. One of the nephews afterwards died, and his property was divided among heirs of two other
nephews who had died before Josefa and the nephew and niece who had survived her. The court
ordered judgment against the twenty defendants for the payment of 3,000 pesos and interest, without
any statement as to how much each defendant was to pay. The judgment as it stands must be construed
as imposing an equalpro rata liability, and for this reason we think it is erroneous. The liability imposed
upon the heirs to pay this legacy is pro rata ( mancomunada) and in proportion to the amount of the
estate to which each one was entitled. The judgment of the court below is modified, and judgment is
rendered against the defendants for the following amounts, to wit: Maria Josefa Canon Faustino, 1,250
pesos; Cipriana Pilar Faustino, Lazaro Faustino, Filomena Faustino, and Francisco Faustino, 62.50 pesos
each; Emerenciano Faustino, Jose Faustino, Exequiel Faustino, Trinidad Faustino, Pedro Faustino, Jose
Faustino, and Manuel Faustino, 35.71 pesos each; Juana Canon Faustino, Fernanda Canon Faustino,
Marciana Canon Faustino, and Fernando Canon Faustino, 250 pesos each; Concepcion Suarez y Canon
Faustino, Alfredo Suarez y Canon Faustino, Adolfo Suarez y Canon Faustino, and Alfonso Suarez y Canon
Faustino, 62.50 pesos each.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Judgment is also rendered against each one of the defendants for interest at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 1st day of January, 1894, on the sum for which judgment is herein entered as above set
forth. With this modification the judgment of the court below is affirmed. No costs will be allowed to
either party in this court. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered herewith and
ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper procedure. So ordered.chan


FACTS: The testator, Genoveva Rosales, made Chong Joc-soy as her legatee. Her will reads as follows:
"3. Of the third part of the estate, which is at my free disposal, I bequeath to the Chinaman Chiong Joc-
Soy, the sum of 50,000 pesos, Mexican currency, of which amount 20,000 pesos are for the aforesaid
Chiong Joc-Soy, and the balance of 30,000 pesos for the expenses of interment etc. of my late husband
Don Nicasio Veloso, . . ." The rest of her property, which amounted in all to upward of 800,000 pesos, she
left to her children. After her death the will was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Cebu and was duly proved and allowed and an administrator with the will annexed was
appointed, in which to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased. The petitioner, Chiong Joc-Soy, the
legatee named in the will, filed a petition in the said proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, Genoveva Rosales, asking that the administrator be directed to pay him the
50,000 pesos mentioned in the will. The court granted the petition and ordered the administrator to pay
the petitioner his share.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legacy contains a condition?

HELD: NO, the legacy does not contain a condition. Article 797 of the Civil Code is as follows:
"The statement of the object of the designation or of the legacy or the application to be given to what has
been left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the same, shall not be considered as a condition,
unless it appears that such was his will. "What has been left in this manner may be immediately claimed
and is transmissible to the heirs who give security for the fulfillment of the orders of the testator and the
repayment of what they may have received, with its fruits and interest, should they fail to comply with this
obligation." From the first paragraph of this article it is apparent that there is a presumption in cases of
this kind that the legacy is not conditional, and unless it clearly appears in the will that it was the intention
of the testatrix in this case to make the legacy conditional, the words used must be considered as not
imposing any condition. We think under all the circumstances of the case that the testatrix did not intend
to impose upon the legatee any condition in making this gift of 30,000 pesos. It is true, as claimed by the
heirs, that it is very evident that she intended the 20,000 pesos to be the absolute property of the
petitioner and that as to the 30,000 pesos she had a different intention, but this does not resolve the
question presented. That she wished and desired the petitioner to expend the 30,000 pesos as indicated
in the will is apparent, but the question is, did she intent to make her gift conditional, or did she rely upon
her confidence in the petitioner that he would carry out her suggestion without the necessity of imposing a
condition upon him? It appears that the husband of the testatrix was a Chinaman; that she was a Filipina,
and that the legatee was Chinaman. The manner in which persons of Chinese descent spend money to
perpetuate the memory of a deceased person of their race does not appear, nor the amount that they are
accustomed so to expend, nor the time during which it may be expended. All these circumstances were
doubtless known to the testatrix and we believe that knowing them she intentionally selected a person of
Chinese birth to carry out her purposes in these regard. We hold, therefore, that they legacy is not


FACTS: (A) Mrs. Clara Webber filed an additional opposition to the scheme of partition in so far as it
gives her one-half of the jewelry. She contends that inasmuch as the will gives her one-half of said
jewelry, and as its value has depreciated considerably, being hardly worth P500 at present, it is a serious
error and a manifest lack of equity to appraise its value at P2,995.50, adjudicating to her one-half thereof.
She proposes that the jewelry be sold and the proceeds divided equally between her and the other

(B) The last opposition is that filed by Frema Fischler, who claims the legal interest upon her legacy of
P10,000. It is argued that since this sum of money has been in the administrator's hands for many years,
this legatee is entitled to the legal interest upon it from the time of the testatrix's death.

(A) Whether or not Mrs. Webber’s contention is with merit?
(B) Whether or not the legatee is entitled to the legal interest?

HELD: (A) Court rules in the NEGATIVE. This contention is not well taken: first, because the will of the
testatrix must be carried out where it provides that one-half of the jewelry itself is to be given to this
opponent; and secondly, because there is no need of selling the jewelry; as for the value, that is
reasonable because it was fixed by the committee of appraisal, and no proper objection was entered in
due time. This additional opposition must be rejected.

(B) NO. There is no merit in this opposition. While it is true that under article 882 of the Civil Code the
legacy of a specific determinate thing vests in the legatee upon the testator's death, as well as any
pending fruits or income, inasmuch as we are here concerned with a generic or a so-called legacy of
quantity, article 884 of the Code must be applied, which provides that interest from the time of the
testator's death shall be given the legatee if the testator's death shall be given the legatee if the testator
has expressly so provided. With reference to the present opponent, it appears that the testatrix has not
clearly and expressly provided for the payment of the interest upon the P10,000 legacy; according to the
last-named article it is clear that the opponent is not entitled to the interest claimed. In Fuentes vs. Canon
and Chiong Joc- Soy vs. Vaño the Supreme Court ruled that generic legacies or legacies of quantity, like
the one adjudicated to the opponent, do not draw legal interest until a demand is made for them: and a
legacy cannot be legally demanded before the scheme of partition is duly approved by the probate court.
And in the case cited by counsel for Fred Frankel, the Supreme Court held that a cash legacy does not
earn interest until the person bound to deliver it — in this case the judicial administrator — is in default.
The administrator in the present case is not in default, for the scheme of partition not only has not yet
been approved, but is actually the subject matter of many oppositions filed by the legatees and the heir.
Legal or Intestate Succession

Testate Estate of the Late Adrian Maloto v. Maloto,
GR No.L-32328, September 30, 1977
(re: jurisdiction of the intestate court)

Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963. AldinaMalotoCasiano, together with the other nephews and nieces
of Adriana, commenced an intestate proceeding for the estate if Adriana before the CFI of Iloilo. During the proceeding,
Aldina and her cousins executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate of Adriana whereby they adjudicated unto
themselves ¼ share for each. The court approved said partition.
Three years later, a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana was given to the Clerk of
Court of the CFI of Iloilo. It appeared that AldinaCasiano, ConstancioMalotoPanfiloMaloto and FelinoMaloto are all
named heirs but Maloto and Constancio have bigger shared. Devisees and/or legatees were also named in the said will.
Aldina and Constancio filed a motion for reconsideration, annulment of the proceedings and for the allowance
of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. PanfiloMaloto and FelinoMaloto opposed the motion of
AldinaMalotoCasiano and ConstancioMaloto.
The CFI of Iloilo denied the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that it was filed out of time.
Aldina filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
without passing on the issue of whether or not the petitioners appealed on time. The Court said that the more
appropriate remedy of petitioners is for them to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.
Aldina then filed a separate proceeding for the probate of the last will and testament of Adriana. This was
opposed by Felino and Panfilo on the ground that the alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and
revoked by the testratix. It affirmed the earlier ruling in the intestate estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736.
Hence, this petition.

Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of
Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736.

No, the probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana
Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen was denied because the same was filed out of
time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been
revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968
that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will."And this court stated in its resolution of
May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question." The order of November 16,
1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana

Ortanez-Enderes v. CA
G.R. No. 128525 December 17, 1999
(re: jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate or intestate court and question of ownership)

Philippine International Life Insurance Co., Inc. (Philinterlife) is a registered corporate founded by the late Dr.
JuvencioOrtanez. Dr. Ortanez owned at least 51% of the capital stock of the company. At the special proceeding for the
settelement of the instesttae estate of Dr. Ortanez, Rafael Ortanez and Jose Ortanez were appointed as special
Ma.DivinaOrtanez-Enderes and other petitionersfiled before the SEC annulment of transfer of shared of
stocks to private respondents, annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting and inspection of
corporate books and records, and damages. They alleged that after the death of Dr. Ortanez and without authorization
from the istestate court, ½ of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortanez were transferred in the names of Jose Lee, Carlo See,
Angel Ong, Carmencita Tan, Benjamin Lee, Ma. Paz Lee and Alma Aggabao fraudulently. They also alleged that Jose
Lee misrepresented himself as president of Philinterlife and sold the parcel of land owned by the corporation to Citiriser
Development Corporation.
The private respondents said that the subject matter is not within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with the
Regional Trial Court. In their defense, Jose Lee said that Juliana Ortanez, the surviving spouse of Dr. Ortanez,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose Ortonez, dividing the estate of Dr. Ortanez
composed of ½ of his share in the conjugal properties. Later on, Rafael and Juliana assigned their respective shares of
stock in Philinterlife to Jose Ortonez. Jose Ortonez later sold his shares of stock to Jose Lee and the other private
respondents. Lee also contended that the sale of the parcel of land of Philinterlife to Citiriser Development Corporation
was approved and authorized by the Board of Philinterlife.
SEC Hearing Officer denied the petitioners’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
based on the ground that petitioners failed to make a valid cause to entitle them to the relief. Petitioners appealed the
case to the SEC En Banc which affirmed the decision of the SEC Hearing Officer. According to the SEC En Banc the
alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stocks owned by Dr. Ortonez belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular
court where the intestate proceedings is currently pending.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
resolution of the SEC and the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Whether petitioners can already be considered as owners of the shares of stocks of Philinterlife and thus are
entitled to a writ of injunction.

No, the petitioners cannot be considered as owners of the shares of stocks of Philinterlife yet because the
special proceeding for the intestate estate of Dr. Ortonez is still pending. As the petitioners are not considered as
owners of the shares of stocks, they have not yet established a clear existing rights to entitle them to a writ of
injunction to enjoining private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philinterlife.
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a
right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right.
Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests
over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and unsettled
rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional
trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of
determining whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the
parties. The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. Therefore, the possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the
possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnumabsqueinjuria.

Heirs of the Late Mario V. Changlionco
Adm. Matter 190-RET., October 18, 1977
(re: retirement benefits, salary adjustments, and unused vacation and sick leaves)

Atty. Mario V. Chanliongco died on July 12, 1976. He is entitled to retirement benefits having served more
than 38 years in the government. He is also entitled to money value of terminal leave, life insurance and refund of
retirement premium. His heirs filed the claim for these benefits before the Government Service Incentive System. Aside
from his widow, Dra. Fidel Chanliongco and son Mario II, other heirs filed the claim namely Angelina Buenaventura
and Mario, Jr, children both born out of wedlock to Angelina Crespo.
The life insurance proceeds and the refund of rent were already released to the claimants, what is left is the
retirement benefits and money value of leave.

How should the retirement benefits and money value of leave be distributed among the heirs?

Fidela B. Chanliongco, the widows, is entitled to ¼ of the retirement gratuity which is P19,535.025. As her
conjugal share in the leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustement, she is entitled to P6,725.72. As a legal heir she is
entitled to P1,688.18 for the leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment of Atty. Chanliongco.
Mario Chanliongco II, the legitimate son, is entitled to ½ share of the returement gratuity which is
P39,070.05. Hs share from money value of terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment is P3,376.36.
Ma. Angelina Buenaventura, the illegitimate daughter, is entitled to 1/8 share of returement gratuity which is
P9,767.51. She is also entitled to P844.10 as her share from money value if terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10%
adjustment of his father. Her brother, Mario Jr. will receive a share equal to hers from the retirement gratuity and
share from money value of terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment.

Bagunu v. Piedad
G.R. 140975, December 8, 2000
(right of representation)

Augusto H. Piedad died intestate. An intestate proceeding was filed before the RTC of Pasay. Ofelia Hernando
Bagunu, the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto Piedad, moved to intervene in the said proceeding. According to
her, the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities. There was incomplete publications of thenotice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heris and creditors and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and
withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. She was also deprived of her share in the estate of Augusto Piedad
when the probate court awarded the entire estate to PastoraPiedad, the maternal aunt of Augusto Piedad. The RTC
denied the motion thus Ofelia Bagunuelaveted the case to the Court of Appeals. PastoraPiedad moved for the dismissal
of the appeal contending that the issued brought up on appeal involve nothing else but questions of law to be raise
before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the questions are pure questions of law nevertheless the Court of Appeals can
take cognizance of the case as a resolution may be made without examining the facts on record. Dissatisfied, petitioner
filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.
However, the procedural decrepitude was set aside and the substantive issue was given more attention.

Whether the rule of proximity and right of representation in intestate succession can be applied among
collateral relatives.

The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which
group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate
children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles
or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. It provides that "In
the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor and then descent is
made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
PastoraPiedad, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes Ofelia
Bagunu, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestatoto the estate of the decedent.

Salao, et al. v. Salao
GR No.L-26699, March 16, 1976
(representation in collateral lines)

Spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio had four children namely Patricio, Alejandra, Juan and
Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. Patricio, the eldest son, died in 1186 and was survived by his only son,
Valentin. Valentina died in 1914 and her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. The estate was
partitioned extrajudicially. The deed was signed by Valentina’s four legal heirs, her children Alejandra, Juan and
Ambrosia and her grandson Valentin, in representation of his deceased father Patricio. One of the properties is the
Calunuran fishpond.
Evidence show that before the death of Valentina, her children Juan and Ambrosia were engaged in the
fishpond business. Using the capital from their late father’s estate and their own earnings, they were able to buy the
Calunuran fishpond and were able to secure a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond.
Juan Salao Sr. died in 1931 and Valentin died in 1933. The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned
extrajudicially between his two daughters Benita Salao-Marcelo and VictorinaSalao-Alcuriza. His estate consisted of
the two fishponds he inherited from his grandmother Valentina.
About a year before her death, Ambrosia donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in
question to her nephew, Juan Salao, Jr. Juan Salao, Jr., already owns the other half having inherited it from his father
Juan Salao Sr.
After Ambrosia’s death, Benita Salao filed an action for the reconveyance of the Canluran fishpond which was
allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao, Jr. Benita Salao informed Juan Jr. that
she owns one-third share in the two fishponds and Huan Jr. should deliver it to her. Juan Jr. refused saying that
Benita’s father, Valentin, does not have interest over the two ponds as this was owned only by his father Juan Sr. and
his aunt Ambrosia.
Beniat filed a complaint for annulment of donation to Juan Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the
Calunuranfishponda before the CFI of Bataan. During the trial, Juan Jr. died and he was substituted by his widow,
Mercedes Pascual and his six children.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Juan Jr.’s estate, the two fishponds in question were
adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties will remain under
administration during the pendency of the action for reconveyance.
The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Sr., Ambrosia and Valentin over
the two fishponds. The court rationalized that the omission of Valentin during his lifetime to assail the Torren titles of
Juan and Ambrosia signified that he was not a co-owner of the fishponds. It also held that the donation was validly
executed and even if it were void, Juan Jr. would nevertheless be the sole heir of his aunt Ambrosia. Benita appealed
since her action for reconveyance was dismissed. Mercedes also appealed since their counterclaim for damages was
also dismissed. Both appeals were filed before the Court of Appeals. However, since the amounts involved exceeded two
hundred thousand pesos, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Whether Benita Salao have successional rights to Ambrosia’s share.

No, even if the donation made by Ambrosia in favor of her nephew, Juan Jr., were declared void, the plaintiffs
would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan,
Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been
also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not
represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew
excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.

Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et. al.,
GR No.L-17759, December 17,1962
(re: presence of adopted children)

Maria Lindayag died intestate. Her sister Isabel Saguinsinfiled with the CFI of Olongapo a verified petition for
the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased.Dionisio V. Lindayag, the
surviving spous of Maria, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, she being
neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband,
Dionisioand their legally adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag the
decedent having left no legitimate natural or illegitimate child. A certified true copy of the decision of the Justice of the
Peace decreeing the adoption of said minors to the decedent and her husband was attached to the motion. The CFI
dismissed the motion of Isabel ruling that she is only a sister of the deceased who was survived by her husband and
adopted children and as such she is not an heir and has no interest over the estate.

Whether Isabel Saguinsin is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

No, Isabel Saguinsin is not an interested person in the estate of deceased Maria Lindayag.
A petition for letters of administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. It is
well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a
person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
In the given case, the deceased was survived by her husband Dionisio and by their three legally adopted
children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. It is manifest that Isabel is not an heir of her deceased sister and,
therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

Banawa v.Mirano
GR No.L-24750, May 16, 1980
(reversion adoptive)

Defendants-appellants spouses DoroteoBanawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of Maria Mirano, Juliana’s
niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant GliceriaAbrenica, their
legally adopted child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from
PlacidoPunzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses wanted
something for Maria after their death.
On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death she left only as her nearest
relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano,
all surnamed Mirano, who are children of the deceased’s brother.
The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba property as
legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that
they are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal
heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which
shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established by the
Civil Code for intestate estates.
The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and were substituted by
their legally adopted child GliceriaAbrenica and her husband CasianoAmponin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a petition for review by certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant
case because Maria Mirano was not legally adopted.

Whether or not the donor-spouses are entitled to the land in question by virtue of reservaadoptiva

No. The rule with respect to reservaadoptiva (reversion adoptive) prescribed in Section 5, Rule 100 of the
former Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads: “In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives
by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child
from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who
shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estate”, applies only to property that had been
received by a judicially adopted child. Extrajudicial adoption is not within the contemplation and spirit of the rule. It is
an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken
to mean exactly what it says.

Diaz, et al. v. IAC, et al.
GR No.L-66574, June 17, 1987
(re: iron curtain rule)
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the CFI, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate
of the late SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero," praying that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her
favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased.
It is undisputed: 1) that FelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that
Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born FelisaPamuti and another child who died during
infancy; 3) that SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that
Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents PascualSantero and SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero; 5) that
PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and SimonaSantero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of
his death was survived by his mother SimonaSantero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.
The trial court declared FelisaPamutiJardin as the sole legitimate heir of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero.
Petitioner Diaz and Pacursa filed their "Opposition and Motion to Exclude FelisaPamutiJardin from further taking part
or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero, and in the intestate estate of
PascualSantero and Pablo Santero. On 1980, the judge granted the motion and declared that JardinIs not an her of the
decedent Simona. Jardin’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. In the IAC, the trial court’s ruling
was reversed. The petitioners or the oppositors-appellees questioned the reversal in the IAC, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Can Diaz as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero inherit from SimonaPamutiVda.deSantero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of SimonaPamutiVda, de Santero.

No, petitioner’s contentions holds no water. The applicable law here is Art. 992 of the Civil Code. This article
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother" includes SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero, because of the barrier provided for under Art.
992 of the New Civil Code.

Leonardo v. CA
G. R. No. 51263, February 28, 1983
(re: barrier rule)
Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942. She was survived by two daughters, Maria and
SilvestraCailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who predeceased her.
Sotero Leonardo died in 1944 while SilvestraCailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a
complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the
estate of the deceased jointly with private respondent, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by Francisca Reyes
partitioned between him and Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties
from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his
share therein with legal interest.
On the other hand, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties
and alleged that petitioner was an illegitimate child who could not succeed by right of representation. The other
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties were now his by virtue of a valid and legal
deed of sale which Maria had executed in her favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural
Bank of Parañaque.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner having found the evidence of the private
respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit. From said judgment, private respondents appealed
to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied,
hence, this petition for review by Leonardo.

Whether or not properties in question were the exclusive properties of private respondents
Whether or not petitioner has established his filiation
Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, had legal right to inherit by right of

YES. Two properties were involved in this case. One of which was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a
deed of sale. Maria paid the realty taxes from 1918 to 1948. When he and her son left for Nueva Ecija, the deceased
Francisca Reyes managed her property and paid the realty tax of the land. For unexplained reasons, Francisca
declared the land in her own name. As to the second parcel of land which was bought by Francisca in 1917, Maria left
the administration of the property to Francisca. Similarly, the latter declared the property in her own name. Such
finding of facts could not be disturbed now on appeal
NO. The name of the child described in the birth certificate submitted in evidence is not that of the plaintiff
but a certain ‘Alfredo Leonardo’ who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other
than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the ‘Alfredo Leonardo’ mentioned
in the birth certificate was no other than he himself. Plaintiff, therefore, failed to prove his filiation in this action in
which he was claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question.
NO. Even if it were true that petitioner was the child of Sotero Leonardo, he still could not, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes. As found by the Court of Appeals,
Cresenciano was born out of wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September13, 1938, his alleged
putative father and mother were not yet married and his alleged father’s first marriage was still subsisting. At most,
petitioner would be an illegitimate child who had no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father, like the deceased.

Corpus v. Administrator
GR No.L-22469, October 23, 1978
(re: barrier rule)

Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus were married and was blessed with 5 children, when Tomas died,
Romona wed Luis Rafael Yangco and had 4 recognized acknowledged natural children and one of them was the
decedent TeororoYangco.
TeodoroYangco died on April 30, 1939 and his will was probated in 1941, at the time of his death, he had no forced
heirs, he only had his half brother, Luis Yangco, half sister, Paz Yangco, Amalia Corpus, the children of his half brother
Jose Corpus ,Juana and Juanita. Juanita died in 1944.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted by the administrator and the
legatees named in the will. The said partition was contested on the grounds that intestacy should be declared because
the will does not contain and institution of heir, and that the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will as
the testator intended that the estate should be conserved and not physically partitioned. Partition was approved by the
Probate Court.
Oppositors appealed to the SC but the appeal dismissed after the legatees and the appellants entered into
compromise agreement wherein the legatees agreed to pay 35k to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Isabel Corpus, and the
heir of Juanita Corpus, - her son Tomas corpus. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was
entered. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt acknowledging that he received from
the Yangco estate 2k, the legatees, executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco
estate which was approved by the probate court, and such partition was modified. Tomas Corpus still filed an action to
recover Juanita’s supposed share in Yangco’s estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangco’s will show perpertual
prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void and the partition is invalid. The trial court dismissed the case
based on res judicata and laches, and Corpus directly appealed to the SC.

Whether or not Juanita, the mother of Tomas, was legal heir of TeodoroYangco.

No, Juanita was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate, and
illegitimate relatives. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relaties of
his father or mother, nor shall such children of relatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child. Article
992 of the Civil Code is based on the theory that the lillegitmate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate
family. The law does not recognized blood ties and seeks to avoid further grounds for resentment. TeodoroYangco and 3
other children was acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child of Luis Yangco and Ramona, Jose Corpus,
was presumed the legitimate child of Tomas Corpus and Ramona. Tomas Corpus had no cause of action for the
recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita, as legal heir since legitimate relative of the mother
cannot succeed her legitimate child, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent. The natural daughter cannot succed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural brother.
Judgment Affirmed

Manuel v. Ferrer
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
(principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family)

Petitioners are the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, who initiated this suit.
During Antonio’s marriage with Beatriz, he had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this relationship,
Juan Manuel was born.
Juan Manuel, illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. The couple was not blessed with a child
of their own. They were impelled to take private respondent Modesta Manuel- Baltazar into their fold and so raised her
as their own “daughter.”
Juan Manuel died intestate and after two years, his wife, Esperanza also passed away. A month after
Esperanza died, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self- Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land, all
still in the name of Juan Manuel. The Office of the Register of Deeds cancelled the all the Certificate of Titles under the
name of Juan Manuel and new titles were issued under the name of Modesta.
Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity in the Regional Trail Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint holding that petitioners, NOT BEING HEIRS AB
INTESTATO of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally pay respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar and Estansilaoa Manuel
damages and atty. Fees and litigation expenses.

Whether or not the illegitimate brothers and sisters are entitled to the estate of their illegitimate brother Juan

No, they are not entitled to the estate of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel. In Art. 992 of the New Civil
Code, it states that “an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.” It is
also a principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family. The doctrine rejects
succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on
the other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on
the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
As to the case of Modesta, she admitted that she is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward
(ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither compulsory nor a legal heir.
The RTC’s decision is correct in dismissing the case of declaration of nullity for the petitioners are in real
Tolentino v. Paras
GR 43905, May 3, 1983 (
surviving legitimate wife and bigamous wife)

Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia G. Tolentino on July 31, 1943. While marriage was still subsisting,
he contracted another marriage with Ma. Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan on Nov. 1, 1948. He was convicted with
bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued living with Clemente until he died on July 25, 1974. Ma. Clemente
was the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Tolentino claims that she is the rightful surviving spouse
and petitions for correction of the death certificate. Lower court ( Judge Edgardo Paras) dismissed petition for lack of
publication or “lack of proper requisites under law”.

WON Petitoner is the rightful surviving spouse of Tolentino?

Yes. Petition granted.
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted of bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary
proof of the marital status of the petitioner and the deceased. The second marriage he contracted was void from the
beginning and thus has no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish invalidity of avoid marriage.
While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such
presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
Therefore, it should be the petitioner’s name on the death certificate and not the respondent.

Heirs of the Late Mario V. Changlionco
Adm. Matter 190-RET., October 18, 1977
(re: distribution of estate where the estate is left to a surviving spouse, legitimate son, and two recognized
illegitimate children)

Atty. Mario V. Chanliongco died on July 12, 1976. He is entitled to retirement benefits having served more
than 38 years in the government. He is also entitled to money value of terminal leave, life insurance and refund of
retirement premium. His heirs filed the claim for these benefits before the Government Service Incentive System. Aside
from his widow, Dra. Fidel Chanliongco and son Mario II, other heirs filed the claim namely Angelina Buenaventura
and Mario, Jr, children both born out of wedlock to Angelina Crespo.
The life insurance proceeds and the refund of rent were already released to the claimants, what is left is the
retirement benefits and money value of leave.

How should the retirement benefits and money value of leave be distributed among the heirs?

Fidela B. Chanliongco, the widows, is entitled to ¼ of the retirement gratuity which is P19,535.025. As her
conjugal share in the leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustement, she is entitled to P6,725.72. As a legal heir she is
entitled to P1,688.18 for the leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment of Atty. Chanliongco.
Mario Chanliongco II, the legitimate son, is entitled to ½ share of the returement gratuity which is
P39,070.05. Hs share from money value of terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment is P3,376.36.
Ma. Angelina Buenaventura, the illegitimate daughter, is entitled to 1/8 share of returement gratuity which is
P9,767.51. She is also entitled to P844.10 as her share from money value if terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10%
adjustment of his father. Her brother, Mario Jr. will receive a share equal to hers from the retirement gratuity and
share from money value of terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment.

Del Rosario v. Conanan
GR No.L-37903, March 30, 1977
(re: distribution of estate where the deceased leaves a surviving spouse, legitimate mother, and an adopted

Felix L. del Rosario died in a plane crash. He was survived by his spouse, Dorotea O. del Rosario and their
legally adopted child Marilou del Rosario. His mother, Gertruduesdel Rosario, filed a petition before the CFI of Rizal for
settlement and partition of estate of Felix. Dorotea and Marilou oppose said petition arguing that Gertrudes cannot be
considered as an intestate heir and thus she cannot be considered as a party in interest who has a right to file an
action for partition and settlement of estate.
The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Dorotea and dismissed Gertrudes’ petition. Gertrudes then filed a petition for
review of the decision of the CFI before the Supreme Court.

How should the estate of Felix del Rosario be divided among his heirs?

Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has the same
successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children".
Consequently , the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by
Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants
shall be entitled to onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the
illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the
other fourth.

Sarita v. Candia
Gr. No. 7768, November 14, 1912
(re: right of representation in the collateral line)

Spouses ApolinarioCedeno and Roberta Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land. Apolinario
died in 1895 and Roberta in 1909. Allegedly, during the lifetime of the Cedeno spouses, Andres Candia, nephew of
Roberta Montesa, cultivated the said land under a lease agreement. When Roberta died, Andres Candia refused to pay
the rent for the cultivation of the land and claimed that he is the owner thereof. Andres also took several animals and
the house erected on the land.
Apolinario had three brothers and a sister namely Macario, Domingo, Leon and Cristeta. The three brothers
were already dead and Cristeta was the only one alive. Macario had five children, one of whom is Tomas Cedeno.
Domingo also had five children, one of whom is Sofia who died leaving her son Manuel Sarita. Leon had four children,
one of whom is Gregorio Cedeno. Tomas Cedeno, Manuel Sarita together with other herein petitioners filed a case
against Andres Candia for the recovery of the land in question.
According to Andres, Apolonio previously sold the land to Juan BasaVillarosa in order to pay certain
shortages of the cabeceria under his charge. When Villarosa died the property was inherited by his sons, Sinfroso and
Vicente. Andres later on bought the property from Sinfroso and Vicente. Andres also argued that he never cultimated
the land under a lease agreement with the Cedeno Spouses. Andres also denied having in possession the said animals.
The CFI of Cebu ruled in favor of Andres Candia. Petitioners appealed the case through a bill exceptions.

Whether or not Manuel Sarita can represent his grandfather Domingo, the brother of ApolinarioCedeno.

No, he can not. In inheritance, the nearer relatives excludes the more remote, excepting the right of
representation in proper cases. In which line he is the remote one.
Manuel Sarita who joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others, who are brothers
and nephews of the predecessors in interest, lacks such representation, for it belongs in the collateral line only to the
nephews and not to the grandnephews. Hence, a sister and nephews of the deceased having appeared to claim the
inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin, exclude such remoter relative as the grandnephew.

Fuentes v. Cruz
36 O.G. No. 103, p. 1813
(re: collateral heirs and institution of the widow as sole heir)
FilomenaAbellana de Bacayo v. Gaudencio Ferraris de Borromeo, et al.,
GR No.L- 19382, August 31, 1965
(re: aunt vs. nephews and nieces)

Melodia Ferraris filed a petition for the summary settlement of her estate in 1960. More than 10 years have
elapsed since she was known to be alive, thus she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her
succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. Melodia left properties in Cebu including 1/3 share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant, or spouse, butbut was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, FilomenaAbellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto
Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of
Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs
claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
According to the trail court, Gaudencia, Conchita, Catalina and Juanito, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the Melodia, exclude the aunt FilomenaAbellana de Bacayo since the former are nearer in degree (two
degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation while Filomena is three degrees
distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers
or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Filomena appealed arguing that she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as Gaudencia et al, three
degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of representation could
take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but
rather the former succeed in their own right.

Whether or not Filomena can inherit from Melodia Ferraris.

No, Filomenacan not inherit.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in connection
with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal
parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship.
Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and
nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

Bicomong v. Almanza
GR No.L-37365, Nov. 29, 1977
(re: nephews and nieces inherit in their own right)


Policarpio v. Salamat
GR No.L-21809, January 31, 1966
Damasa Crisostomo died testate, giving the naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister,
Teodoricadela Cruz, while its usufruct to the children of her cousins, Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto
The children of Antonio, Patricia and Canuto turned out to be fourteen. Teodoricadela Cruz, the naked owner,
bequeathed in her will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose Salamat.
The 14 usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Gil Policarpio, the plaintiff herein, who used to give them
proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them. During the term of the lease, three of the usufructuaries died, and
upon their death, both he naked owner and the remaining 11- usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to the
deceased usufrucuaries.
In 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios, who after executing the
contract of lease, came to know the existing conflicting claims and not knowing to whom the money should be paid, the
lessees commenced an action for interpleader against both the naked owner and surviving usufructuaries and litigate
their respective claims.
The lower court ruled in favor of the naked owner, Jose Salamat. Hence, the appeal.
Who have the right over the fruits that would have corresponded to the 3-deceased usufructuaries, the
surviving 11 usufructuaries or the naked owner?

It is the surviving usufructuaries who have the legal right over the fruits in the contract of lease. In the will,
the testratix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her here cousins with the particular injunction that
they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. The will
was clear to this.
Hence, Gil Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to the surviving usufructuaries the
money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries.

Torres v. Lopez,
49 Phil. 504
(co-heir gets the share by accretion)

Nepomuceno v. CA,
GR No. 62952, October 9, 1985

Martin Jugo died, leaving a duly executed and notarized last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Rufina
Gomez and legitimate children as forced heirs and Sofia Nepomuceno as heir to the free portion. Petitioner
Nepomuceno was named as sole executor. It appeared in the will that Jugo admitted being estranged to his wife Gomez
and that he has been living as husband and wife with Nepomuceno. In fact, Martin Jugo and petitioner were married in
Tarlac despite subsisting marriage. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner,
that at the time of the execution of the will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her
living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted in his will cohabiting with
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. Ca set aside the decision of CFI of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The
respondent court declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

Whether or not the disposition in favor of petitioner is valid.

NO. It is invalid under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: 1) those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation; and Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The
prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. The
records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents: First. The last will
and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and
petitioner, the devisee. Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the
true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short, the parties
themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the
start of the proceedings. Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man
and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and
passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was
petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
There is no question from the records about the fact of prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his will. The
very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.