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ART ? 5. People vs.

Lacson

FACTS:

Before the court is the petitioners motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated
May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application
of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689
against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the
provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial
determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its
application are attendant.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the
heirs of the victims?

Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability,
namely:

1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for
provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the
defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through
counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was
given to the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.


(Tingin ko eto yung issue na related sa topic naten)

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied
retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to
the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New
rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months
to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and
therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales
must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-year period
fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of
hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.

The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar
retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31,
2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year
period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of
the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid
absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration
of justice.

Held: Motion granted