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JULY 2017
ISSUE 10.7


Dutertismo's fundamental appeal lies not in Duterte's persona but in the
overall capacity of his administration to deliver concrete, tangible and
expeditious results to Filipinos, especially the marginalized
and vulnerable sectors of the society.

The electoral victory as well as continuing mass popularity of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
deserves careful scrutiny. As a self-professed socialist and anti-establishment candidate that ran
on the platform of bringing Tunay na Pagbabago or Radical Change during the campaign,
Duterte staged a melodramatic display of rage against dysfunctional post-EDSA governance.
Having been admired for transforming Davao City from a killing field to a more politically and
economically stable city, President Duterte promised to replicate this success nationwide.

In the process of currying the publics support, Duterte has unleashed a wave of popular fury,
reshaping the contours of contemporary political discourse and raising the possibility of altering
the configurations of power in post-EDSA Philippines. To better appreciate Dutertismo,
the phenomenon sending shockwaves in domestic and international politics, it is crucial
to explore both the material and symbolic sources of Dutertes legitimacy.

More specifically, this paper aims to:

1) Map the political, economic and social terrain, contextualizing Dutertes rise to power;
2) Critique the charge that Dutertismo is a purely theatrical phenomenon, and
3) Suggest a reinterpretation of Dutertismo as a movement aimed at altering the
post-EDSA configurations of power and at laying a blueprint for a
new order and narrative for future Philippine state

Image Credit:

* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Contextualizing Dutertes Phenomenal Rise to Power relative to the elite, as illustrated in their repeated calls for
greater participation in decision-making processes as well as
Class divides in the Philippines inform citizens political choices. for social and economic equality.5 They are distinguished from
This argument was raised by Nathan Quimpo, who found that the radical Left (i.e. the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
major stakeholders in Philippine politics have conflicting notions Peoples Army-National Democratic Front) by acknowledging
of democracy. Under Quimpos contested democracy framework, the possibility of a peaceful transition to a more participatory
these stakeholders are composed of two main blocs: the patrimonial and egalitarian brand of democracy. In contrast to the elite-led
oligarchic elite (heirs of wide tracts of land under the Spanish-era democracy of the post-EDSA generation, however, their vision
hacienda system) and the new bourgeois class (entrepreneurs that had not succeeded in installing its members at the highest
flourished under the Ferdinand Marcos regime), on one hand, echelons of Philippine politics. President Duterte, it
and the emergent Left composed of non-militant peoples can be argued, is the first exception to the rule.
organizations and non-government organizations, on the other.1

According to Quimpo, the oligarchic class perpetuates elite Warlord Politics in Philippine Democracy
democracy, wherein its members employ various methods at their
disposalfrom nurturing modest patron-client ties to resorting The 1986 People Power Revolution raised hopes for the eventual
to guns, goons and goldto win elections from the national level consolidation of democracy in the Philippines. However, early
down to regional and local levels.2 Once elected, Quimpo says, signs were not encouraging. Congressional and local elections
they entrench themselves in power and enrich their families through in 1987-1988 ushered in what E.U. Gutierrez called the return of
plunder or rent-seeking activities.3 Since at least the 1986 People the oligarchs, the rapacious politicians of the pre-authoritarian
Power Revolution, Philippine politics has arguably been defined era who were less interested in rectifying the structural ills
by this form of democracy. This dominance has had two main of the state than in institutionalizing corruption
characteristics: first, the consolidation of warlord political and violence for personal gain.6
families in the countryside and, second, the adoption of
doctrinaire economic liberalism (expounded below). By 1993, Alfred McCoy had characterized post-EDSA Philippine
politics as a series of synergistic interactions between the state
On the other hand, the emergent Left aims to establish and politico-economic dynasties, where the latter strengthen
democracy from below, wherein its members organize into social their power through the privatization of public resources, thereby
movements, non-governmental organizations and progressive, weakening the formers economic resources and bureaucratic
anti-trapo(traditional politician) groups against perceived oppressive apparatus.7 McCoy further noted that, while the politico-
hierarchical structures.4 They clamor for better status and conditions economic dynasties in Manila mostly engaged in rent-seeking

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04 Main global trafficking flows of opiates

as of 2013

activities, the elite in the provinces resorted to violence to quell unrest while sustaining
capital accumulation for their families.8 McCoy pointed out that these warlords
dominate in rural areas where the central government presence is weak.9

Not only do rural warlords continue to be important facets of the Philippine political
landscape, they have grown in sophistication over time. A quarter-century since the EDSA
Revolution, in 2010, Francisco Lara, Jr. revealed that warlord clans have distinguished
themselves by tapping into a new source of politico-economic power: the lucrative global
drug and arms trade.10 In connection with this, discoveries of small-scale drug laboratories
in Cotabato City and several towns in Lanao del Sur, as well as cocaine shipments in
Davao City and coastal areas along Eastern Visayas, indicate that the Philippines has
evolved into a supplier and/or consumer of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and methylene dioxy-methamphetamine (ecstasy), and into a
trans-shipment point for high-value drugs such as cocaine and heroin.11
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime via Bloomberg

The increased role of these narco-politico-warlords as power brokers in the illicit trade
may have contributed to the booming consumer market for drugs, not only in the rural
areas but also in urban centers. Based on a 2016 Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) Annual Main global trafficking flows of cocaine
Report, there was an uptick in drug consumption nationwide from 1999 to 2004 before as of 2013
it dropped in 2008 and 2012.12 At its peak in 2004, there were 6.7 million drug
users; the figure went down to 1.7 million in 2008 (1.9% of the population) and
then 1.3 million in 2012 (1.3% of the population).13

The need to protect illicit drug trade flows from state intervention provide an impetus for
warlord clans to invest in firepower and paramilitary forces.14 The tragic Maguindanao
massacre, for example, brought to light the unfettered access of clans such as the
Ampatuans to high-powered firearms usually used by law enforcement agencies and the
military.15 The massacre also reflected the breadth of these clans political alliances, not
only with drug syndicates and other gangs inside and outside the Philippines, but also
with corrupt elements within government offices who turn blind eyes to these
dangers in exchange for electoral support and monetary rewards.16

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime via Bloomberg

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Methamphetamine flows as perceived by recipient countries Official estimates of drug users in the Philippines
2011-2013 (1999-2012)

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime via Bloomberg Source: Dangerous Drugs Board

The Triumphalism of Doctrinaire Neoliberalism ideology pushes capitalist logic to the extreme, by envisioning its peak between 1979-1984 and averaging nearly 40%, before
the near-complete eradication of regulative elements slowly receding to around 30% by 2000.20 Having failed to
The rise of the modern-day Philippine principalia engaged in rent- (i.e. national protectionist laws) that constrain competition.18 industrialize, the Philippines has become reliant on the
seeking activities and political violence coincided with the era of services sector as the largest contributor to growth.21
economic globalization.17 This led elites to espouse doctrinaire The Philippines adoption of doctrinaire neoliberalism arguably led
neoliberalism as the core ideology for post-EDSA governance, to deindustrialization and decline in its manufacturing and heavy Unfortunately, the countrys leapfrogging from a manufacturing-
providing an ideological basis for the emasculation of the generative, industries.19 The Philippine industrial sector has been relatively to service-oriented economy has failed to generate jobs sufficient
redistributive and protective powers of the state. This neoliberal stagnant for three decades, with the industrial share of GDP reaching to uplift a larger segment of the population from poverty and

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

stimulate long-term economic growth.22 Poverty incidence among
Filipinos in 2015 was still at a high 21.6%, although this is a decline Poverty incedence among population
from the 2012 figure of 26.6%.23 Meanwhile, the incidence of (in percent)
subsistence poverty was estimated at 8.1% in 2015, a slight decline
from the incidence in 2012 of 10.4%.24 Over the same time, the
fortunes of the countrys top 50 richest families increased, worsening
the inequality gap. Their collective wealth went up by about 13% in
2014, reaching $74.2 billion (or 25.7% of GDP)up from
$65.8 billion in 2013 or 24% of GDP.25

Post-authoritarian administrations introduced policy reforms that

paved the way for the Philippines transformation into a neoliberal state.
The large-scale privatization of public utilities began under Corazon
Aquino, with the bulk taking place under the watch of Fidel Ramos,
between 1994 and 1998.26 The Ramos administration oversaw the
Water Crisis Act and Omnibus Energy Bill, as well as the privatization Source: PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY
of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Services and the
National Power Corporation.27 Joseph Estrada expanded the scope
of privatization by directing other government entities, including local
government units (LGUs), to determine other assets or activities that Subsistence incedence among population
(in percent)
would be better managed by the private sector.28 Under President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act formalized the privatization of NAPOCOR.29

More recently, the Benigno Aquino administration signed the Universal

Health Care Law in 2013 that, in principle, vowed universal health
access through subsidy of medical care, but rendered health services
costlier.30 Under Aquinos watch, the Enhanced Basic Education Act of
2013 was also passed. In principle, the bill aimed to provide affordable
quality education to Filipino children, but opened up opportunities for
private enterprises to participate with a heavy price tag.31 The retreat
of the state and the increase in the role of private corporations
led to skyrocketing costs for public goods, such as
water, electricity, health, and education. Source: PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017 Combined wealth of 50 richest Filipino families relative to Philippine GDP

Duterte: The New Vanguard of Democracy from Below?

Together, patrimonial oligarchic rule and the spread of doctrinaire neoliberalism

combined to thwart the emergence of the Philippine developmental, autonomous
state. The failure of the People Power Revolution to realize its promise of political and
socio-economic progress may have led to national introspection on the viability of
liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism as the pillars of the state. As a result of
the deficiencies of the post-EDSA system, a plurality of Filipinos have begun
to question the People Power Revolution as a genuinely revolutionary and
democratic moment in Philippine history, prompting them to
seek alternative systems and styles of governance.

Within this context, running on the platform of Radical Change, Davao City
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte projected himself as the Filipino peoples last card32 the
torchbearer of the emergent Left and a modern-day Messiah able to discipline the
patrimonial oligarchic elite and overhaul doctrinaire neoliberalism. As Nicole Curato
notes, Duterte sent a powerful campaign message that resonated well with the
electorate: the full restoration of law and order through suppression of criminality
and drugs.33 He vowed to adopt the successful socio-economic programs of
his predecessor and rival candidates,34 promote reindustrialization,35 and, finally,
embark on an ambitious project for systemic change: the transition of the countrys
political system from unitary-presidential to federal-parliamentary form.36

Coming from the impoverished island of Mindanao long neglected by Imperial

Manila, Duterte appeared to see the necessity of devolving political power and
redistributing socio-economic opportunities, not only along class lines but also along
geographical lines. He substantiated his claim with the narrative of a successful
transformation of Davao City from a notorious killing field to one of the countrys
most politically stable and economically developed cities.37 Despite his lack of
political machinery and financial resources, as well as occasional expletive-laden
outbursts that shocked conservative sensibilities, Duterte gradually climbed
the polls, besting his rival candidates with 16,601,997 votes.38

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Sources: World Bank, Philippine Statistics Authority, Forbes Magazine via CNN Philippines

One year after his election victory, Duterte continues to enjoy both high
approval rating among Filipinos. Based on the latest Social Weather Station SHARE OF VOTES IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(SWS) Survey conducted from 23-26 June 2017, Duterte attains new record-
high net satisfaction rating of +66 (% satisfied minus % dissatisfied).39 This is
classified as very good and marks a new personal record high,
a 3-point increase as compared to March surveys +63.40

Deconstructing Dutertismo

In light of post-EDSA Philippines shortcomings, how might we make sense

of Dutertismo as phenomenon? To date, most popular commentary on
Dutertismo has been focused on the phenomenons aesthetic or theatrical
appeal, with sociologists Randy David, Walden Bello and Nicole
Curato providing the pioneering definitions for the term. In my view,
these perspectives fall short in appreciating one major source Source: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
of Dutertes appeal: the ability to make change happen.

To David, Dutertismo is pure theateran experience of the senses dutertes net satisfaction ratings for 2nd QUARTER 2017
rather than the rational application of ideas to societys problems.41 In
discussing the phenomenon, David focuses on Dutertes melodramatic
patriotic gesturing during his election campaign, wherein he would share
his deep frustration with the dysfunctional central government, lament the
disintegration of law and order, and end his rallies by kissing the Philippine
flag.42 David juxtaposes these grandiose theatrical displays with what he
perceives to be Dutertes disdain for humanist values and liberal politics, as
well as a lack of a coherent philosophy of government or political program
to tackle the countrys structural ills.43 David concludes that Dutertismo is
the Philippine incarnation of Fascisma revolution without underlying
ideas, against ideas, against everything nobler, better,
decent, against freedom, truth and justice.44

Bello characterizes the Duterte phenomenon as the collective projection of

the Filipinos citizens anger, frustrations, and resentments that accumulated

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

under a succession of corrupt or inept administrations by competing The common thread cutting across the definitions of David, Bello, it provides a legitimizing narrative for a movement to overhaul
dynasties [].45 In other words, Bello characterizes Dutertismo as and Curato is the impression of Dutertismo as a theatrical display of the liberal reformism of the post-EDSA narrative.
sociological transference or a phenomenon whereby the people rage of the masses against the oligarchic class and the neoliberal
redirect their collective rage against the post-EDSA system onto idea that have become the pillars of the post-EDSA system. From
Duterte, a political outlier who they believe reflects their aspirations.46 their vantage point, Dutertismo should be dismissed as a hollow Dutertismo as State-Building Project
Bello concludes that Dutertismo is spontaneous electoral signifier devoid of any substance aimed at addressing the
insurgency that seeks to dramatize the overthrow of political, structural ills of the post-authoritarian state. However, by defining The post-EDSA eramarked by the return of the modern-day
economic and cultural hegemony of the oligarchic class. the phenomenon only in symbolic terms, the three neglect the principalia and the triumphalism of doctrinaire neoliberalismis
material and socio-cultural drivers behind the very existence of the the Philippines most recent lost decade. Due to the relative
For her part, Curato sets her sights on the nexus built between phenomenon. These perspectives fall short in locating the critical failure of post-EDSA administrations to establish a highly
Duterte and his supporters through narrative formation. Curato source of the current administrations political legitimacy: capable state, a plurality of Filipinos have grown disillusioned
equates Dutertismo as performance of crisis that paints a bleak Dutertes actual ability to translate word into action. by institutionalized corruption, pervasive political violence,
picture of the Philippines as a developing country besieged by deindustrialization and the erosion of social security nets.
destructive forces from within, on the brink of total disintegration
and, hence, in need of a strongman savior.47 This is in contrast to Reconstructing Dutertismo Consistent with Quimpos diagnosis, Rommel Banlaoi has
the narrative presented by Dutertes rival candidates, who gave an characterized the Philippines as a weak state because its
impression of a Philippines on track to becoming a developed I argue that Dutertismos fundamental appeal lies not in Dutertes bureaucratic and political apparatuses have been captured
state but still in need of another reformist push.48 persona but in the overall capacity of his administration to deliver by the family or clan for the primary purpose of personal
concrete, tangible and expeditious results to Filipinos, especially aggrandizement.53 To Banlaoi, the Philippine state has failed to
Curato notes that while the other candidates presented themselves the marginalized and vulnerable sectors of the society. In my view, insulate itself from the parochial interests of traditionally powerful
as capable of delivering on the promise of inclusive growth, Duterte the metamorphosis of Dutertismo from collective fury to a force to families and clans that compete in exercising control.54 Under
redirected the focal point of discourse on the basic issue of order.49 consolidate state powers will be determined mainly by the marked this scheme, preferential access to state resources and state-
Duterte built his narrative on the premise that sustainable economic improvement in the living conditions of the Filipino people in the conferred opportunities has traditionally been given to the politico-
development is impossible to attain without first ensuring peace short term as well as the introduction of radical political, economic elite, and friends and relatives of the regime in power.55
and stability.50 However, rather than providing a comprehensive set economic and social reforms that underpin long-term change.
of policies and strategies, Curato says that Duterte only gave his Using this framework, the Duterte administrations recent
constituents one vision for the country to aspire for: Davao City.51 Not only projection of strength, Dutertismo has two dimensions. policies and programs can be viewed as an integral part of
Curato notes that, with Duterte promising to replicate the Davao First, it is a state-building project aimed at fostering a renewed a two-fold project to weaken the clout of the post-EDSA
model, he gave Filipinos either a model for governing a sense of public order and at reengineering state institutions to alter patrimonial oligarchic eliteand, by extension, the influence of
democracy in crisis or an authoritarian fantasy.52 the post-EDSA configurations of power and create conditions more their guiding doctrinaire neoliberal ideologyand to strengthen
favorable for state capital accumulation and redistribution. Second, five key capacities of the state: to extract resource and produce

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revenue; to make and implement policies and enforce laws; to
regulate the market, redistribute wealth, and deliver
safety; and to keep public agencies running.56

This perspective may help explain Dutertes introspective form of

leadership, particularly the pursuit of the following: Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act,57 Universal Health Care,58
genuine tax reform,59 Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program,60 Php
8.3-billion additional allocation for free tuition fees in state colleges
and universities,61 and Php 3.6-trillion worth of mega-infrastructure
projects.62 Also included are Dutertes anti-corruption measures,
such as: Freedom of Information (FOI),63 8888 and 911anti-
corruption hotlines,64 relaxation of Bank Secrecy Law,65 and
the review and reinforcement of Mining Act.66 These capacities
put Dutertes emphasis on the anti-criminality campaignthe
controversial War on Illegal Drugs through Project Double
Barrel Alpha and Project Tokhang67into context.

Lastly, Dutertes quest for state-building is arguably critical to his

pursuit of an independent foreign policy.68 Given the pressing
internal security and governance challenges, on the one hand,
and the burgeoning need for foreign capital and access to foreign
markets to boost his administrations ambitious development and
industrialization agenda, on the other, Duterte may find it necessary
to stabilize the Philippines external security environment.

These merits of Dutertes leadership align with Francis Fukuyamas

exposition on the relative strength and weakness of nation-states.
In Fukuyamas scheme, a relatively strong state is one that is able
to clearly define its scope and exercise considerable strength to
implement public policies within it. Conversely, a relatively weak state
is one that defines for itself a given scope of functions but possesses

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insufficient strength to carry out such policies within its scope (see popularly accepted notion of nationalism, but rather on a narrow culprits that threaten domestic law and order and
table for exposition on the scope of state functions). As in South elite conception articulated by 19th century, Western-educated hinder the countrys economic take-off.
Korea and Taiwan, states with strong institutions are more effective Filipino thinkers.72 A generation later, anti-authoritarian
at consolidating their democracies.69 Meanwhile, weak states, sentiment was not commonly shared due to the divergence Finally, in order to secure the state, facilitate its metamorphosis,
such as Tajikistan, are usually susceptible to military coups, ethnic of experiences and the modalities of memory and forgetting ensure its long-term security and prosperity, and preserve the
conflicts and foreign interference. For this reason, they are prone to with regard to Marcoss authoritarian regime. interest of the next generation, Duterte asserts that it is both
long-term domestic instability that imperils their institution-building politically and morally justified to ostracize or even kill these newly
and, later, consolidation.70 It can be argued that, in principle, Today, Duterte is arguably introducing a new socio-cultural narrative defined enemies of the state.74 To put succinctly, the interweaving
Dutertes thrust to rebuild Philippine institutions may to legitimize his brand of state-building and provide a center-left of themes on the imminence of class war and state collapse, the
help pave the way for a more robust democracy. interpretation of Philippine history. For Duterte to successfully identification of new enemies of the state, and the need for
introduce his counter-narrative, however, he needs to explicitly raise a Messiah to crush the societal evils and restore societal
to the forefront the failures of the post-EDSA narrative and foment normalcy lies at the very core of Dutertismo as an emerging
Dutertismo as Myth Formation a crisis of legitimacy around the patrimonial oligarchic class and narrative for the post-post-authoritarian state.
neoliberal capitalist ideology. Such a crisis would provide Duterte
Dutertes persona has both a material and a narrative appeal. In an opening to introduce a new dominant narrative These steps are not unique to Duterte, and find consonance with the
contrast to David, Bello, and Curato, however, I argue that Dutertes to consolidate his power base. those outlined in Rene Girards myth-building playbook. In his work,
narrative is not ahistorical or otherwise divorced from Philippine Girard offers a series of concepts that could help us understand the
experience. Instead, the narrative is effective because it takes While he takes advantage of inter-class discord, Duterte is also re- socio-cultural aspect of Dutertismo, among them, sacrificial crisis
advantage of critical flaws in the post-EDSA system, which failed channeling public energies to avoid intensifying conflicts between and surrogate victimageor the process of identifying
to produce promised reforms, and because the narrative social classes and to instead lay down the foundation for a new and expulsing scapegoats as a way to unify the remainder
legitimizes a movement eager for more radical change. mode of relations that renders inter-class synergy possible. To do of the population around a point of virtue.75
this, Duterte has identified new scapegoats for public dissatisfaction.
Returning to the foundations of the Philippine state, Banlaoi has These are the three societal evils, namely criminals, drug pushers,
argued that the Philippines is a premature state because its unifying and corrupt public officials.73 In light of the Marawi crisis, he
narrative has been predominantly based on anticolonial sentiment includes Islamist-inspired terrorists, such as the Maute, Abu Sayyaf,
rather than common history, religion, or language.71 Moreover, even and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in the list. They are
anticolonial sentiment in the Philippines was not anchored on a framed as obstacles to successful nation- and state-building,

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.


The rise of Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte has become a Gordian knot, a political puzzle that warrants untangling
owing to its practical and long-term impact on the state and trajectory of Philippine politics and, by extension, Asian geopolitics.

Dutertismoa term coined to capture the sudden, spontaneous, and nationwide explosion of popular fury in the
Philippines against the post-EDSA systemhas been predominantly conceptualized as an
aesthetic phenomenon devoid of political and economic substance.

Randy David defines Dutertismo as one-man melodramatic patriotism bordering on Fascism. Walden Bello views it as citizens
sociological transference of anti-elite resentment. Nicole Curato understands it as Philippine reincarnation of populism. A
synthesis of their schemas paints Dutertismo as a movement aimed at establishing a theater state with Filipino characteristics.

However, beyond the campaign season and upon closer look at the developments during Dutertes first year in office,
Duterte has so far displayed results-oriented political leadership, a hands-on approach to state governance similar to what he
accomplished in Davao City. He has sublimated popular rage into imperfect yet concrete policies and strategies
with hybrid socialist and neoliberal features that appeal to both upper and lower classes.

Dutertismo can be understood as movement that aims to catch up with state capacity buildinga fundamental task
neglected by previous administrations. Second, it is a myth-building project designed to propagate a center-leftist brand of
Philippine historiography and provide a fresh narrative of legitimation for the state-building project. This tool for
socio-cultural consolidation may be necessary given the massive epochal and structural shift envisioned
from post-EDSA (unitary-presidential) to post-post-EDSA (parliamentary-federal) governance.

Building on these two definitions, I conclude that Dutertismo holds two distinct possibilities for the future of Philippine
nation- and state-building: either it becomes a positive force for liberating the Philippine state from the hold of the
post-EDSA patrimonial oligarchic class and the hegemonic influence of doctrinaire neoliberal ideology, leading to genuine
democratization, or it falls prey to its internal contradictions, ending up a target of popular rage it once sought to overcome.

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.


Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral 17
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Au-
Nestor Corrales, Duterte: I am the Filipino peoples last card,,
Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines, Comparative Politics, Vol thoritarian Features, Pacific Review, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (03 July 2009): 5. 21 February 2016, accessed 30 January 2017,
37. No. 2 (Jan. 2005): 243. url: duterte-i-am-the-filipino-peoples-last-card.

Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Dont Tell You about Capitalism (New
Ibid. York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 168 33
Nicole Curato (2017) Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte
and the New Terms of Philippine Populism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:1, 149,
Business Dictionary, s.v. Deindustrialization, accessed 29 January 2017, DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751. 34
Pia Ranada, Duterte to unimpressed businessmen: I will hire economic
Ibid, 242. minds, Rappler, 03 May 2016, accessed 30 January 2017,
Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos, Gemma Estrada and Jesus Felipe, Exploring nation/politics/elections/2016/131628-duterte-businessmen-hire-economic-minds.
Ibid. the Philippine Economic Landscape and Structural Change using the Input-Output
Framework, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection, Working Paper No.
Judy Quiros, Duterte says hell bring steel industry back to life, In-
E.U. Gutierrez, I.C. Torrente, and N.G. Narca, All in the Family: A Study of 631 (10 November 2010): 2., 10 January 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.
Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democ- net/754134/duterte-says-hell-bring-steel-industry-back-to-life.
racy, 1992), 160. 21
Ibid, 31.

Marc Jayson Cayabyab, Duterte wants federal government with prime
Alfred McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and 22
Ibid, 32. minister, president,, 25 July 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, http://
Family in the Philippines, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 10.
Philippine Statistics Authority, Poverty incidence among Filipinos registered dent.
at 21.6% in 2015, Philippine Government.
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Au-
Nicole Curato (2017) Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte
thoritarian Features, Pacific Review, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (03 July 2009): 9. 24
Ibid. and the New Terms of Philippine Populism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:1, 149,
DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751.
Alfred McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and
Paolo Taruc, A Tale of Two Economies: Exclusive Growth in the Philip-
Family in the Philippines, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, pines, CNN Philippines, 21 September 2015, accessed 29 January 2017, http://
Final results: 2016 presidential and vice presidential canvass, Inquirer.
10. net, 27 May 2016, accessed 30 January 2017,
html. philippine-elections-final-results-2016-congressional-canvass-presidential-vice-presi-

Francisco Lara, Jr., Warlords in drugs trade legitimized by foreign aid, dent-race.
GMA News Online, 13 March 2010, accessed 29 January 2017, http://www.gma- 26
Luis Corral, IFIs and Privatization in the Philippine Power and Water Sec- tors, Asian Labor Network on IFIs (ALNI)-Philippines (November 2013): 2.
Raynan F. Javil, Public satisfaction with Duterte peaks, Business World
mized-by-foreign-aid. Online, 07 July 2017, accessed 17 July 2017,
Ibid. php?section=TopStory&title=public-satisfaction-with-duterte-peaks&id=147918.
Ibid. 40

How serious is the Philippine drug problem? Rappler, 19 September
2016, accessed 30 January 2017, 29
Randy David, Dutertismo,, 01 May 2016, accessed 30 Janu-
data-drug-problem-philippines. ary 2017,

PhilHealth: The myth of universal health care under Aquino, Ibon, 30 July
Ibid. 2015, accessed 29 January 2017, 42
Ibid. 43
Curtis B. Riep, Commercialization of Education in the Philippines, Educa-
Ibid. tion International, 01 February 2016, accessed 29 January 2017, https://worldsofedu- 44

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.


Walden Bello, Chronicling an Electoral Insurgency: Dutertismo Captures 73
Victor Andres Manhit, Analysis: Understanding the Duterte vision for the
the Philippines, Transnational Institute, 19 May 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, rice-deal-for-filipino-farmers. Philippines, Philippine Star, 30 June 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.
tures-the-philippines. 61
Janvic Mateo, Free tuition in state schools next year, Philippine Star, vision-philippines.
17 December 2016, accessed 03 February 2017,

During his electoral campaigns, Bello notes that Duterte enthralled his au- lines/2016/12/17/1654307/free-tuition-state-schools-next-year. 74
Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, drugs and diplomacy, Al Jazeera, 16
dience by frequently peppering his talks with cuss words, such as putang ina, son October 2016, accessed 03 February 2017,
of a bitch, bakla (gay), or cono (cunt) as a show of indignation against the Filipino 62
Czeriza Valencia and Evelyn Macairan, Build! Build! Build! P3.6-T Rody in- talktojazeera/2016/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html.
patrimonial oligarchic class. (Ibid.) frastructure program unveiled, Philippine Star, 19 April 2017, accessed 17 July 2017, 75
Ibid, 61.

Nicole Curato (2017) Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte rody-infrastructure-program-unveiled.
and the New Terms of Philippine Populism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:149,
DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751
Alexis Romero, Duterte signs historic EO on Freedom of Information,
Philippine Star, 24 July 2016, accessed 03 February 2017,
Ibid. headlines/2016/07/24/1606146/duterte-signs-historic-eo-freedom-information.
Ibid, 148.
Dial 8888, 911: Govt opens complaints, emergency hotlines, ABS-
CBN News, 01 August 2016, accessed 03 February 2017,
Ibid. news/08/01/16/dial-8888-911-govt-opens-complaints-emergency-hotlines.
Ibid, 149. 65
Jess Diaz, Duterte eyes easing bank secrecy law, Philippine Star,
20 August 2016, accessed 03 February 2017,
Ibid, 150. lines/2016/08/20/1615260/duterte-eyes-easing-bank-secrecy-law.

Rommel Banlaoi, Globalization and Nation-Building in the Philippines,
Germelina Lacorte, DENR chief calls for review of mining law in PH, In-
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Post-9/11 World (London: CRC Press, 2010), 30. net/803123/denr-chief-calls-for-review-of-mining-law-in-ph.
Joseph Tristan Roxas, PNP implements Oplan Double Barrel Alpha, GMA
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Ibid. com/news/story/586421/news/nation/pnp-implements-oplan-double-barrel-alpha

Wu Fengshi, State Capacity Building (presentation, Comparative Politics 68
Arianne Merez, Dutertes independent foreign policy: A move to diversify
AS6001 class, Singapore, 19 September 2016). allies, ABS-CBN News, 30 June 2017, accessed 17 July 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.

Elizabeth Marcelo, Duterte vows full implementation of RH law, GMA
News Online, 25 July 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.gmanetwork.
Wu Fengshi, State Capacity Building (presentation, Comparative Politics
com/news/story/575011/news/nation/duterte-vows-full-implementation-of-rh-law. AS6001 class, Singapore, 19 September 2016).

Philippine Information Agency, DOH calls for universal health care for Filipi- 70
nos, Philippine Government.

Rommel Banlaoi, Globalization and Nation-Building in the Philippines,

Melissa Luz Lopez, Duterte tax plan right way to goIMF Business Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional and Global Challenges in the
World, 15 September 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.bworldonline. Post-9/11 World (London: CRC Press, 2010), 29.
go&8217----imf&id=133446. 72

Jon Viktor Cabuneas, Duterte approves P21-B rice deal for Filipino farm-
ers, GMA News Online, 04 October 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Mark Davis Madarang Pablo
is a Senior Research Associate at the Stratbase ADR Institute. In
2017, he graduated with an Master of Science in Strategic Studies
from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University in Singapore. Prior to joining ADRi, Mr. Pablo
specialized in Strategic Studies. He began his career as a Defence
Researcher/Analyst in the Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy
Management (OSSSM), the think tank of the General Headquarters,
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from 2013-2015. He graduated
Cum Laude from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2012 with a
bachelors degree in Political Science and Philosophy.

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