SEESP NEWSLETTER ISSUE NUMBER 2
S O U T H E A S T E U R O P E A N
SEESP
INSIDE THIS ISSUE:
Letter from the SEESP Director
TURKISH-GREEK EXCHANGES
Conference: Greek-Turkish
Rapprochement
Tuba nl
Workshop: The Annan Plan and
Reconciliation in Cyprus
Othon Anastasakis & Kalypso
Nicoladis
Commentary: Dealing with
Memory
Rene Hirschon
SEESP KEYNOTE LECTURE
Introduction to Prime Minister
Erdoan
Kalypso Nicoladis
Why the European Union Needs
Turkey?
Recep Tayyip Erdoan
Prime Minister of Turkey
EU ENLARGEMENT
Commentary: Unfinished
Symphony
Timothy Garton Ash
FOCUS: KOSOVO
Panel Discussion: Successes and
Failures of International
Involvement in Kosovo 10
Denisa Kostovicova
Commentary: Quo Vadis Kosovo? 11
Richard Caplan
CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
DEBATES
Workshop: Nationalism, Society
and Culture in Post-Ottoman
South East Europe
Dimitar Bechev
Workshop: Understanding Borders,
Conflict and Reconciliation in
South East Europe 14
Olga Demetriou
RESEARCH PROJECTS
IBEU : Social Capital and EU
Institution Building
Dimitar Bechev & Ruby Gropas
Cultural Aspects of the EU-
Enlargement Process :Turkey and
the European Union 16
Ioannis Grigoriadis & Kerem ktem
S T U D I E S P R O G R A M M E
E U R OP E A N S T U D I E S C E N TR E
S T A N TO N Y S C OL L E GE
JULY 2004
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR
1
The South East European Studies Programme
has finished its second year in operation, a
year of consolidation and rigorous expansion.
The current newsletter reflects this
2 remarkable year and intends to give the
reader an idea of our activities and output
during the academic year 2003-2004. The
SEESP concentrated on three main thematic
2 priorities in South East Europe: transition in
post-communist Balkans; Greek-Turkish
rapprochement & reunification of Cyprus;
contemporary Turkey & Turkish-EU relations.
5 Our activities included workshops, public
conferences, public lectures and panel
discussions, research seminars, networks
and research projects. Our output included
policy papers, opinion pieces, research
papers and occasional papers.
7 While the SEESP is forward looking and its
2004 will be remembered as the year when
the EU opened its doors to 10 new countries,
7 the overwhelming majority of them from the
ex-communist East. Our firm belief is that
the process of European unification will not
be complete without the inclusion of South
East European countries. During the past
year, we focused our attention on national
9 and regional developments and their
connection with the goal of European
integration. We structured our 2004 Hilary
Research Seminar Series around the theme
of The state of South East Europe in the
year of enlargement and invited eminent
speakers to present their views and
suggestions. We organised a number of
public lectures and panel discussions on the
Bulgarian and Romanian EU prospects, on
domestic developments in the Western
Balkan countries and on Turkish expectations
in view of the December 2004 decision
regarding the start of accession talks with
the EU. We also debated extensively the
Serbian and Croatian national elections, the
March 2004 violent events in Kosovo or the
12 Greek national elections.
The Greek Turkish Network (GTN) - a group
of experts and academics from Turkey,
Greece and abroad - continued its fruitful
debate under the auspices of our Programme
on issues that occupied the headlines and
tested the bilateral Turkish-Greek
rapprochement and relationship. Following
the practice that we inaugurated during our
15 first year, we brought the GTN members in
Oxford for their second GTN brainstorming
meeting. We combined the physical presence
of all these academics in Oxford with the
organisation of a one-day public conference
entitled The continued rapprochement
between Greece and Turkey: Still Genuine?
and debated with a wide audience the nature
of the rapprochement and its prospects for
the future. Our highlight was our SEESP
Keynote Lecture, this year delivered by the
most central figure in all this, the Prime
Minister of Turkey Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoan.
The Turkish Prime Minister gave his talk on
Why the EU needs Turkey? and expressed
his views on Turkish-Greek rapprochement,
the Cyprus problem and the European
prospects for his country. Last year was also
a critical year for Cyprus, and the Annan plan
dominated the debate on the re-unification of
the island. The SEESP addressed the Cyprus
issue on relevant occasions, culminating in a
workshop entitled Still on the Table? The
Annan Plan and Re-unification of Cyprus.
agenda is mostly linked with the European
integration of the countries of South East
Europe, we have also included a more multi-
disciplinary, comparative and historical
approach in our understanding of the current
realities in the region. The SEESP co-
sponsored with the Oxford Balkan Society, a
public conference on Nationalism, Society
and Culture in Post-Ottoman South East
Europe and supported a workshop entitled
Understanding Borders, Conflict and
Reconciliation in South East Europe. In
addition, in the context of our annual
conference on Greek Turkish rapprochement,
we dedicated a session on the issue of
memory, on how the two peoples deal with
their shared history and past.
With the end of the academic year 2003-
2004, it is time to assess on past
performance and reflect on the future. The
SEESP team has done a brilliant job not only
in preserving the academic focus on the
South East European region but also in
coming up with a fresh and innovative
approach, free from prejudices and negative
predispositions. On behalf of Kalypso
Nicoladis, Chair of the SEESP and myself, we
would like to thank all those who have
contributed in one way or another for the
production of this rich output. As for the
future, we will continue to expand and
contribute to the constructive study of the
region.
Othon Anastasakis
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

TURKISH-GREEK EXCHANGES

SESP ANNUAL PUBLIC CONFERENCE
The Continued Rapprochement between
Greece and Turkey: Still Genuine?
Tuba nl
St Antonys College, University of Oxford
Under its Greek-Turkish pillar, SEESP operates the Greek-
Turkish Network (GTN), a group of Turkish and Greek
academics and policy analysts discussing on-line questions
of common interest. The GTN aims not only to promote
greater mutual knowledge but also to address the numerous
issues between Greece and Turkey and launching ideas on
consolidating the politics of dtente.
On 28 May 2004, the SEESP invited the members of the
GTN to Oxford and organised a public conference entitled
The Continued Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey:
Still Genuine?
Co-sponsored by the SEESP and NATOs Public Diplomacy
Division, the conference addressed the following questions:
Dr Ker-Lindsay, Dr Nicoladis
What are the repercussions of the referenda in Cyprus
on the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece?
How far has the strategy of rapprochement on mostly
low-politics issues brought the two countries closer?
How successful have the two countries been in finding a
middle ground between Greeces Europeanist and
Turkeys Atlanticist orientation?
How has rapprochement affected Turkeys EU
membership prospects?
Session 1: Cyprus after the Referenda
Prof. Tzn Baheli (King's University College, University of
Western Ontario) noted that a Cyprus settlement requires
the commitment of both the Cypriot communities, Athens
and Ankara as well as the UN, the US, and the EU. As this
remains, in his view, a tall order, it would be constructive to
consider the conditions under which the parties might
consider revising their long-held positions. He made a
comparison with those actors' positions on the Annan
initiative and the previous major endeavours by the UN, in
particular the 1992 Set of Ideas. He argued that although
the two documents have much in common, for instance the
nature of the federal settlement, the security arrangements
and territorial provisions, the Set of Ideas never stood a
great chance. Baheli asked what had caused the change in
attitudes of both sides during the last decade. He
highlighted the following factors: In the 1990s, the
governing coalitions in northern Cyprus were made up of
right-wing parties committed to keeping the TRNC alive. In
addition, the economy was performing quite well. Lately,
Turkish Cypriots had moved away from parties on the right
partly because of the recession in 2000. Support for the
TRNC weakened. Peoples' receptivity for reunification, as
part of the island's accession to the EU, had grown. In
Turkey, the election of AKP in November 2002 - the first
majority government in more than a decade - symbolised a
policy shift away from the previous Ecevit coalition. What

The Annan Plan and Reconciliation in Cyprus

Othon Anastasakis & Kalypso Nicoladis

In October 2003, the SEESP organised a brainstorming meeting on the UN Plan for Cyprus entitled Still on the Table? The Annan Plan and Recon-
ciliation in Cyprus. The workshop was attended mainly by Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as Alvaro de Soto, Special Advisor to Kofi Annan, who
drafted the latest UN Plan for Cyprus. The workshop took place after the collapse of the talks on March 10th 2003 and followed the partial lifting of
the restrictions on the green line on April 23rd. It was based on the assumption that the resumption of talks was likely to happen following the De-
cember 2003 elections in the North. The workshop brought together Cypriots from both communities - policy makers, advisors, politicians and civil
society representatives - who engaged in an open discussion on ways to make the plan more functional and acceptable to the people in both parts of
the island. The discussion focused on the issues of refugees and properties, citizenship and settlers from Turkey, constitutional sustainability, and
civil society concerns. Our policy paper entitled Getting to Yes: Suggestions for Embellishment of the Annan Plan for Cyprus reflects the spirit of
the discussions and offers some suggestions for going forward. The SEESP workshop provided strong support for the adoption of the Annan frame-
work on the basis of the so-called embellishment technique. We believe that, despite its shortcomings, the Annan Plan was the result of a careful
constitutional engineering, and took into account most of the two communities sensitivities and civil society concerns. We thought at the time that
the document should serve as a single negotiating text but that the Plan needed to be revisited to reflect changed circumstances as well as new
ideas for positive sum trades.

Obviously the success of such an embellishment exercise rested on political will from both sides as well as trust that the adopted changes would not
be perceived as damaging to any one of the two sides. In the end, there was neither enough political will nor enough trust from the Greek-Cypriot
people that the fifth and final version of the Annan plan would be an improvement on their current situation. Some argue that Greek-Cypriot con-
cerns, such as security and property, were not sufficiently addressed in the rejected plan; others argue that organising a referendum a few days be-
fore Cypruss accession to the EU acted as a counter-motive for Greek-Cypriot concessions. The reality is that the Annan framework risks becoming
another failed attempt in a series of UN plans designed to solve this long-standing international dispute. How this will affect Greek-Turkish rapproche-
ment and the accession of Turkey to the EU is still a matter for speculation. Is there still a chance for getting to yes between now and the December
EU decision on Turkey? The EU has brought within its ranks a dispute that it was trying to avoid in the first place and should act upon it sooner rather
than later.

The workshop programme and the policy paper can be found at http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/SEESP-events.shtml

2
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
was important was the strong commitment to pursue EU
membership and to solve the Cyprus problem as an obstacle
to Turkey's accession. It helped that the rapprochement
between Greece and Turkey was continuing, and that
Athens declared its support for the Annan plan and for
Turkey's EU membership. Baheli concluded that above all
Cyprus' EU membership and Turkey's hope to join the Union
have been key catalysts for change compared to the 1990s.
With regard to future prospects, he contended that although
the Annan plan is dead, neither side is likely to be content
with the continued division of the island. Finally, he pointed
out that the prospect of a settlement in Cyprus remains
alive as long as Turkey's hope of joining the EU persists.
Prof. Alexis Heraclides (Panteion University) noted that the
24th April, date of the referenda, was a watershed.
According to him, the Cyprus conflict has now entered a
new phase where the Cyprus-Turkish relationship is much
more opaque. He argued that the last three years had
provided the most favourable conditions for resolving the
problem, and if settlement was not agreed, it would not
seem likely that it would be in the future. Opinion polls
showed that the Annan plan was never accepted by the
Greek Cypriots. Heraclides claimed that it would have had a
chance if the EU had allowed Cyprus to accede only after
reunification. For him, one of the main reasons why the no
vote was favoured was that once Cyprus became a member
of the EU, it would be in a better position to negotiate a
better deal. He contended that after the Greek-Cypriot no,
the possibility of a second referendum had become
meaningless since the no has settled the Cyprus question.
He argued that Greek Cypriots demonstrated that they were
unable to accept the other side as an equal or even as a
junior partner, and that at the moment Cyprus remains an
unimaginable community. Heraclides offered three
scenarios for the day after: a) The conflict will go on for
the foreseeable future. It may not be resolved through
reunification. A loose confederation of Cyprus is a possibility
but only under the aegis of the EU; b) the task now is no
longer settlement, but basically conflict management,
easing the points of friction; c) bureaucratic sleight of hand:
a EU-handled incremental reunification through the back
door, which will only be possible in a post-Denkta, post-
Papadopoulos era. In this context, Heraclides stressed the
importance of incorporation of the Turkish side into the EU
as smoothly and quickly as possible. With regard to the
bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey, he
emphasized that cooperation in the Aegean would offer a
win-win solution to both sides.
In explaining the various reasons why the Greek-Cypriots
voted against the Annan Plan, Dr James Ker-Lindsay
(Civilitas Research) focused on the internal dynamics of
Greek-Cypriot politics. He stressed the negative role of the
media and highlighted the fact that the government did little
to correct unbalanced reporting and failed to condemn
efforts to prevent senior international figures from
explaining the UN proposals. On other occasions the
government could have stepped in to correct false or
erroneous impressions of the proposals. For example, it
could have explained that the majority of the 9000 pages of
legislation introduced in the plan were existing Greek
Cypriot laws that had been passed in preparation for EU
accession. Likewise, the government could have clarified the
fact that a report that claimed that a solution would cost
over CY16 billion was based on exaggerated figures. The
Greek Cypriots did, however, harbour legitimate concerns,
most notably over security. In particular, they were worried
about ensuring the full and timely implementation of the
plan by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Speculating about
the future, Ker-Lindsay pointed out the lack of a medium-
term scenario. According to him, even though the majority
of Greek Cypriots might support a new referendum if
security guarantees were put in place, AKEL, which supports
this policy, is unlikely to push for a new referendum for
party reasons. In the meantime, President Papadopoulos
continues to insist that substantive negotiations must take
place. In the ensuing discussion, Ker-Lindsay asserted that
the decision of the Turkish Cypriots to support the plan was
based more on their desire to join the EU than their wish to
live together with the Greek Cypriots and that the Cyprus
issue will continue to pose a legal, if not political, problem
for Turkey as it seeks to join the EU.
Session 2: Five years of Rapprochement between High
and Low Politics
Prof. Meltem Mftler-Ba (Sabanc University) focused on
the impact of systemic-level transformations on Greek-
Turkish relations. She argued that the 1999 Helsinki summit
marked a turning point, even though the actual
rapprochement began earlier, and that the real impact was
felt in Helsinki. Since then, there has been unprecedented
functional bilateral cooperation especially in low politics
areas like water transport, disaster assistance, civil aviation
and the fight against human trafficking. This process has
been driven by the EU acquis: for example, Greeces efforts
to meet the eurozone requirements prompted it to
cooperate more with Turkey. Mftler-Ba acknowledged
that cooperation in high politics issues is more difficult to
achieve. Nevertheless, functional cooperation could change
the expectations of both sidesand, in the long term, lead to
conflict resolution through positive spill-overs. She pointed
out that both sides have been conducting low-key
negotiations on the Aegean, and speculated that
rapprochement might move forward on that front, rather
than Cyprus. Mftler-Ba stressed that Turkeys EU
candidacy gave the Aegean issues a European dimension,
whereas previously they were bilateral in character. She,
therefore, compared Greece and Turkey to France and
Germany after 1945 and claimed that peaceful relations
could develop. She concluded by emphasising that Turkeys
possible EU membership would benefit Greece as problems
would be easier to deal with within an EU framework.
Dr Anastasakis, Mr Sitilides
Prof. Keridis, Mr zel, Prof. Mftler-Ba
In his talk on the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Prof.
Dimitris Keridis (University of Macedonia) made four points.
First, he noted that the process had begun before 1999. It
came with the end of the Greek attitude that the enemy of
the enemy is my friend, which had proved very dangerous.
Keridis argued that the hard lessons of the Macedonian
issue boosted certain liberal ideas on Greek identity and
foreign policy. The result was a new policy of engagement.
The EU was the catalyst in Greek-Turkish relations during
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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
this time. Importantly, Cyprus has increasingly become a
European problem whereas the role of the US has
decreased. Second, Keridis argued that there is no hierarchy
between low and high politics in terms of their priorities,
since economic issues proved to be rather significant. For
example Greek-Turkish trade worth 1.2 million dollars,
numerous joint ventures and growing cross-border
investment. According to him, the two economies are
compatible. Turkey is stronger in manufacturing and Greece
in tourism and banking. There is a great potential for
economic cooperation. Thirdly, he drew attention to the
inter-personal relationships between the countries prime
ministers. During the last elections in Greece, the Turkish
minority voted for conservative New Democracy, which
caused some to claim that there was a silent deal between
the two leaders. Lastly, Keridis argued that for Greece,
Cyprus had been the top priority on the path to
rapprochement. Karamanlis, however, made clear that
regardless of the referenda results, he would continue with
the rapprochement agenda with Turkey. Yet, Keridis
contended that Greece cannot be neutral regarding Turkeys
effort to join the EU. Greece should be an active supporter
of a positive outcome as disengagement will be rather
counterproductive. In his view, it is essential to determine
without delay how to keep the process on track.
Mr Soli zel (Bilgi University) argued in favour of decoupling
Cyprus, the main problem between Greece and Turkey,
from all other bilateral issues. For him, those outstanding
questions have lost their vital importance. He claimed that
over the past two years Greek-Turkish rapprochement,
which was perhaps more forcefully driven by Greece, has
undergone such decoupling. For him, Turkeys zero-
problem-with-neighbours policy, the liberalisation of
domestic politics and the Turkish no vote to the US
intervention in Iraq brought the two countries closer.
However, problems of management, some of which relate to
Cyprus, remain. In his opinion, all structural arguments will
amount to nothing if the Greek Cypriots can simply render
the plan useless despite all the pressure from the US, NATO,
the EU, Greece and Turkey. Underlying the significance of
the December 2004 European Council decision, zel noted
that there should be at least a recognition of the EUs
commitment to engage in Turkey. Should that not happen,
he warned that the new liberal Turkish foreign policy could
not sustain the shock. In the ensuing discussion, zel
questioned the argument regarding the Europeanist nature
of Greek policies as opposed to Atlanticist Turkey. He said
that the Europeans do not pay attention to the divergence
between Turkish and US foreign policies, and suggested
that Turkey could act as mediator.
Mr. John Sitilides (Western Policy Center) discussed the
future of Greek-Turkish security cooperation in the eastern
Mediterranean. He argued that, despite all the differences
between Greece and Turkey, in the post-9/11 era their
relations are increasingly focused on new trans-national
threats such as international terrorism. This will further the
rapprochement between the two countries because their
vulnerability to terrorist acts will prompt them to cooperate
militarily. Sitilides underlined the necessity of collective
defence in South East Europe, which he considered exposed
to terrorism and a broad spectrum of asymmetrical threats.
He argued that Greece and Turkey will have the
responsibility of leading the alliance's regional defence. In
his view, the Aegean Sea and its island archipelago
are difficult to defend in both peace and war
time; therefore, Greek-Turkish cooperation is essential.
In the larger war against militant Islamist extremism, the
Mediterranean Sea has in many ways been transformed into
a NATO lake. From an American perspective, a good
relationship between Greece and Turkey is of strategic
importance. He contended that even if there is no
immediate terrorist threat, the threat of environmental
disasters can render Greek-Turkish cooperation vital.
Sitilides concluded by saying that no countries can choose
their neighbours, but they are faced with new realities that
will bind them together in years to come. To further their
national causes, Greece and Turkey need to protect their
common interests.
The lunch session Dealing with memory: Shared history re-
visited, moderated by Dr Rene Hirschon, reflected on the
shared past of Turkey and Greece, the historical memories
and their effects on contemporary politics (see report
below).
Session 3: Beyond Helsinki? Greeces role in Turkeys
accession to the EU
The third and final session dealt with how the current
rapprochement can be made to last in the long run and the
possible political gestures by the two sides and by the EU to
increase the likelihood of the December 2004 decision.
Prof. Ali arkolu (Sabanc University) presented the results
of a recent survey of Turkish public opinion on Greek-
Turkish rapprochement and, in particular, the Cyprus
question. Half of the sample could be qualified as
xenophobic, that is espousing the view that Turkey is
surrounded by enemies. Xenophobes are to be found mostly
amongst religious conservatives and the political right.
Findings also indicate that the centre is quite successful in
competing against the periphery for the control over the
xenophobic sentiment. Attitudes on foreign policy are
similarly split into two camps of equal strength. arkolu
asserted that the Turkish public considers the country as
having already fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. He argued
that should the EU fail to start accession talks with Turkey,
this would be very difficult to justify to the government and
the Turkish public by simply invoking EU standards. The
result could well be more xenophobic feelings amongst
Turkish people.
Prof. Hale, Prof. ni, Dr Nicoladis, Prof. arkolu, Prof. Ifantis
By providing a short historical account of Turkey-EU
relations from the 1960s onwards, Prof. William Hale
(School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London) argued that Turkeys approach to the EU has
always been heavily influenced by its relationship with
Greece. The major reason for this was the perception that
Greece would use its EU membership against the Turkish
interests, particularly in the Cyprus issue. Hale said that the
atmosphere of hostility and mistrust between the two
countries continued into the 1990s, although in the middle
of the decade there were important reversals in its policy;
instead of opposing Turkeys accession they realised that it
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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
would be best if the country joined the EU and supported its
promotion toward candidacy. Greek commitment continued,
and now it might be the Republic of Cyprus, rather than
Greece, that obstructs Turkeys membership. Hale argued
that the Greek Cypriot no in the referendum means the
Cyprus question seems to be off the Turkish-Greek agenda.
Removing the Cyprus obstacle on the road to the EU was
the most important objective of the Erdoan government
when it pushed for the Annan plan. Yet, Hale noted that a
positive answer in December 2004 remains crucial. He
claimed that even though there may be a new crisis in ten
years time, there are promising new developments. Hale
first pointed at the people-to-people rapprochement after
the 1999 earthquakes, supplementing the government-to-
government one, and secondly at the possibility of Turkish
membership to the EU.
Prof. Kostas Ifantis (University of Athens) contended that
since 1974 Athens has been exercising a deterrent strategy
towards Turkey. He argued that this strategy has become
more sophisticated from the 1990s onwards as it has been
linked to EU membership. Greece viewed the EU as the best
framework to set conditions because the country enjoys the
comparative advantage of membership. Yet, Ifantis noted,
this strategy has been limited now, particularly after the
failure of the Annan plan. He introduced a set of dilemmas
that Greece has to face: a) the future of the Cyprus
question, b) the relationship between Athens and Nicosia,
and c) Greek support for Turkeys EU bid. Ifantis claimed
that previously Nicosia made decisions and Athens backed
them but this pattern has now been transformed. Hence, it
remains to be seen to what extent Athens disassociates
itself from the Cyprus problem.
Prof. Ziya ni (Ko University) began by stating that both
Greece and Turkey viewed the EC from the same
perspective in the 1960s. However, their stances diverged in
the 1990s once Greece became an important insider and
Turkey remained an outsider. He argued that the turning
point in both EU-Turkey and Greece-Turkey relations came
in 1999. This was reflected in a reorientation on long-
standing bilateral problems such as Cyprus. Greece played a
significant role in promoting the candidacy of Turkey. This
was, in part, evidence of consolidation of democracy and the
Europeanisation of the Greek politics. At the same time,
ni pointed to the unprecedented Europeanisation reforms
in Turkey over the last five years impacting on the domestic
and foreign policy spheres. He made a distinction between
pro- and anti-EU reforms, the latter being promoted by the
active groups outside the state. ni argued that
rapprochement is real from the Turkish perspective and
cooperation is happening in key areas, even though the
process is at its initial stages. He maintained that further
progress is likely on issues like Balkan reconstruction, and
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, as well as on rolling
back armaments and defence expenditures. He suggested
economic cooperation could spill over to other fields. Yet, he
pointed to a certain assumption in Turkey that the process
could be improved if Greece had a deeper commitment to
equitable solutions of long-standing problems, especially the
Cyprus issue. In addition, he maintained that Greece has
done more in the period leading to the referendum in trying
to influence the decision making process in southern
Cyprus, but it could have done more to influence the EU
since the latter did not provide sufficient incentives for
Turkey in the Cyprus question. ni concluded that there is
a real possibility of expanding bilateral rapprochement but it
requires deeper Greek commitment on several key issues.
For him, sidelining those will not help but may even reverse
the process.
In her closing remarks, Dr Nicoladis addressed
conference question and pointed out that the discussions
demonstrated genuineness of the continued attempts at
Greek-Turkish rapprochement on the part of both countries.
At the same time, she stressed that despite the de-linkage
of the relationship from bilateral conflicts, there has been a
reversal of logic. The EUs internal difficulties have started
to spill over to the rapprochement between the two
countries. To her, the current aim should be to prevent this
from happening.
The programme of the conference is available at http://
www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/GreeceTurkeyProgramme.pdf
Commentary: Dealing with memory:
shared history re-visited
Rene Hirschon
St Peters College, University of Oxford
The aim of this session, part of the SEESP Conference on
The continued rapprochement between Greece and
Turkey, was to create an open discussion forum in the
days proceedings, and to broaden its scope. There was an
intentional change of focus from the high level of
international relations and politics to that of the individual
and cultural. This is based on the recognition of the salience
of human agency and the fundamental importance of social
and cultural influences, as well as history and the way it is
remembered, in the sphere of international relations. It is
easy to neglect the fact that major players at the
international level, national politicians and policy makers,
are all persons with particular life histories whose individual
characteristics play an important part in the way in which
they operate. As well as having the power to effect changes,
they are affected by a wider political context and climate
they have lived in. The questions posed by this panel were
directed at examining this feature, particularly the influence
of nation-state identity and consciousness in this arena.
The session outline included the following questions: How
has the rapprochement affected the way the two sides deal
with their shared history and memory? In the last few
years, Turkish and Greek academics have started to discuss
and analyse these matters jointly. But has this led to a real
change in the way the two peoples perceive and understand
specific past events? Can the deep distrust towards each
others reading of the past be alleviated? How has the
contested nature of history affected the parameters and
depth of the rapprochement?
the
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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
Rene Hirschon introduced the session by noting that
memory is par excellence a human characteristic. It is the
basis for cultural continuity and tradition. Narratives about
the past, enshrined both in official history and in oral
accounts, play a key part in the way we see the present. For
Greeks and Turks, different interpretations of the events
around 1922-23 clearly demonstrate this. That moment of
shared history holds very different meanings for each side.
For Turkey, 1922-23 is a time of triumph, ending the War of
Independence, a victory which culminated in the
establishment of the Turkish Republic. For Greece, however,
1922 marks the Asia Minor Catastrophe, a disaster which
ended the Hellenic presence in the Anatolian heartland.
This marked asymmetry in the experiences of the two
countries continued as one of the noteworthy features of the
subsequent period. The divergent paths of the two nation-
states in the following decades ended what once constituted
a common or shared history. The separation was reinforced
by nationalistic accounts of the past, especially by the
official teaching of history, which emphasised hostile
relations, aggression, oppression, and mutual betrayal.
Estrangement was the inevitable consequence of the
building of nation-state identity in which hostility towards
the other is always cultivated. It is clear that trust is an
essential element in the negotiation of relationships of all
kinds but, in the case of Greece and Turkey, institutionalised
enmity and suspicion have dogged the perceptions of each
side for long periods. Contributing to this point and
highlighting the fluctuating nature of international relations
between Turkey and Greece, Richard Clogg (St Antonys
College, Oxford University) outlined a pattern in which the
periods of rapprochement have alternated with periods of
hostility over the past 80 years. Significantly, when relations
between the two countries are amicable, proposals are
made to revise the history textbooks on both sides.
The discussion, in which lively contributions came from the
younger generation, mainly focused on questions regarding
the various sources of influence on attitudes to those of the
other country, particularly the role of history-teaching in
their home countries. Volunteering from personal
experience, speakers (predominantly postgraduate students
from Turkey, Greece and Cyprus at British universities),
related how they had been subject to prejudice from various
sources in their home country, as well as to an overall
ignorance. Some noted that it was not only the content of
the school-teaching but their teachers attitudes, often
highly nationalistic, that had been equally influential. One
Greek student pointed out how teaching at the university
level in Greece differed from that at school since wider
sources were used and generally accepted ideas were
questioned. Another recalled the bitterness of his refugee
familys memories regarding his grandparents flight and
expulsion, and suggested that a process modelled on the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission might
well contribute to the rapprochement between Turks and
Greeks.
Many speakers related how their first encounters with the
other side had occurred as students at foreign universities
where they were surprised to discover how many similarities
existed, and that they had been able to become friends.
One Turkish doctoral student noted how all his perceptions
had changed after meeting Greeks at a British university
a quasi-Greek republic! Despite the prejudices of his
background, he now has many Greek friends. A young
Turkish-Cypriot woman who had initially been rather
hesitant about contacts with Greeks admitted that she was
beginning to find such friendships do-able. Several
personal accounts revealed how critical attitudes from the
family had been expressed regarding any positive interest in
the other side. The examination and revision of attitudes
was a common theme in the accounts from these students.
Clearly, many young people are actively engaging with and
contesting the negative stereotypes and prejudices of the
context they have grown up in.
Bruce Clark (The Economist) addressed the artistic cultural
arena. He noted that even when political relations between
the Greek and Turkish states were at their worst, cultural
and intellectual exchanges between the two nations have
never entirely ceased. Despite the "official discourse" which
generally presents Turkish-Greek relations in black-and-
white terms, there have always been novels, films, songs
which portrayed a more subtle state of affairs. Here, the
ambivalence of a relationship in which mutual fascination,
and consciousness of common cultural roots co-exists with
fear, suspicion, and resentment. He noted how since 1999
there has been a plethora of cultural and academic
exchanges between Greece and Turkey, giving the
impression that many problems have been solved. But he
cautioned about the pervasive stereotypical representations
of the other, and a tendency to emphasise amicable
relationships, while avoiding more difficult issues. Greeks
and Turks cannot really understand themselves, or their
own societies, unless they delve into their common
collective memories, whether pleasant or painful, and
realise how closely their worlds were intertwined for 400
years.
The open panel format broke new ground through involving
a range of younger participants. It revealed the effects of
prejudice, some of its sources, and how it is dealt with at
the level of personal experience. The relevance of these
accounts lies in the way they reveal how ingrained
prejudices are part of the cultural experience of all of us.
Bound up with various processes involved in constructing
collective social identity and self-definition, memory, history
and narrative are key elements in forming attitudes to the
other. The accounts heard in this session revealed how
important face to face contacts are, since they provide
opportunities for first-hand knowledge and the possibility of
building up mutual respect, trust, and friendship. This is not
easy, and it requires time and openness of mind. The
younger generations willingness to engage with this process
is surely grounds for optimism for the future relations
between these two countries. The long-shared past, with
both troubled and harmonious periods, may in this way once
again become part of a common dialogue and heritage.
6
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
SEESP KEYNOTE LECTURE
Excerpts from the introduction to
Prime Minister Erdoan
Dr Kalypso Nicoladis
On 28 May 2004, following the conference on Greek-Turkish
rapprochement, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr Recep
Tayyip Erdoan, delivered the SEESP keynote speech on
Why the EU needs Turkey? Dr Nicoladis introduced the
guest speaker.
Sayn Babakan, Oxforda geldiiniz iin bize onur verdiniz.
It is a great pleasure and honour to welcome Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoan to Oxford University. At the risk of
being accused of exploiting the Prime Ministers goodwill we
have asked him to perform a double bill this afternoon. First
his address stands as the keynote lecture for the annual
conference of our South East European Studies Programme
which brings together our Greek-Turkish network of scholars,
working in close cooperation with the Programme on
Contemporary Turkey (represented here by Dr Robins).
At the same time, Mr Erdoan is delivering today the annual
lecture of the European Studies Centre, following in the
footsteps of Jos Maria Aznar and George Papandreou who
both delivered the lecture in the preceding two years under
the respective EU presidencies of Spain and Greece. I leave
it to you to infer from these precedents our belief that
Turkey should be an integral part of the EU.
Indeed, this joint invitation in the Spring of 2004 is meant
to convey the belief shared by many here in Oxford that the
prospect of EU membership for Turkey would constitute the
most powerful signal yet that the EU is indeed a new kind of
global normative power in the making which instead of
banishing the Muslim world as Europes other, is capable
of taking on the challenge of having a Muslim country as its
biggest member state one day. Europe is an idea, not a
tribe to be defined in ethnic or religious terms, as our
chancellor and European commissioner Chris Patten recently
argued in a speech here at Oxford()
It would take too much time to list the numerous reforms
implemented in the last one and a half year in Turkey under
Mr Erdoans leadership. Suffice it to say that they reflect
what we understand to be from here a triple commitment to
democratic pluralism, economic growth and redistribution,
and of course what will occupy us tonight, to membership
in the European Union()
Many questions and even paradoxes remain before us today.
There is the paradox of "revolutionary conservatism" -a very
Turkish phenomenon- and whether a party can both claim to
better represent society and lead it towards unchartered
territories. There is the paradox of "Secular Islam" and
whether it is possible to create new political spaces where
tradition and modernity can coexist beyond easy slogans.
There is the tension between Turkey's rightful claim to
europeanness and its equally rightful ambition to bridge the
West and the rest (...)
Turkey fascinates so many in Europe today because its path
towards modernisation is both so utterly unique and yet also
so potentially universal. In this contradiction it is ALSO
European and no-one other than Mr Erdoan himself is
better placed today to share his thoughts on this Turkey and
its actual and potential role in Europe.
Full text of Dr Nicoladis introductory speech is available at
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/lectures/
Why the European Union Needs Turkey?
Recep Tayyip Erdoan
Prime Minister of Turkey
Mr Erdoan started his speech with extensive reference to
Turkeys relations with Greece. He emphasised the
important role that mutual perceptions have played in
Turco-Greek relations. For decades, he maintained, both
sides perceived the other as possessing hegemonic
aspirations. He further noted that,
If Turco-Greek rapprochement is possible today, it
is because we have a common ground through
which mutual perceptions are formed most
accurately. That common ground is the EU. It is a
Europe as a union of values, instead of a
narrowly-defined geography or a union of rigidity,
which is capable of producing a synergy that will
rectify perceptions before policies. If this capability
is utilised correctly, we could then be more
optimistic about the future of our region and the
world.
A significant part of Mr Erdoans speech was devoted to the
Cyprus question and the recent events following the
referenda:
Our priority is to ensure that the Turkish Cypriots,
who voted for a solution, should no longer be
punished. Effective and bold steps need to be taken
to end their isolation. In the same vein, we cannot
accept Turkey-EU relations to be over-shadowed by
the Cyprus issue any more.
The Prime Minister suggested that the best way to keep the
Eastern Mediterranean balance and security is to gather
Turkey, Greece and Cyprus within the EU as member states.
Our universal values face today a threat which has
no ideology, nationality, religion, geography or an
address. The threat perceptions are no longer
limited to our borders. They are in the minds, ways
of life, thoughts and beliefs of those who portray
themselves as the other. Under such
circumstances, it is to our common good that the
Turco-Greek-Cypriot equation is not detrimental to
security in the Eastern Mediterranean. The formula
to ensure this situation is already available: Just
match up the equation with the EU. And ensure
that Turkey, Greece and Cyprus meet within the EU
on an equal footing as partners, instead of
7
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

adversaries. If that could be ensured, all agendaDocument Titleforgotten the efforts needed to boost the EU
items such as Cyprus or the Aegean issues which
we now perceive to be controversial, would be
absorbed in our common geography.
Throughout his speech, the Prime Minister emphasised
Turkeys determination to be part of the EU. He stated that
currently Turkey is closer to EU membership than ever
before, mainly due to Turkeys willingness to make the
European values, Ankara values.
Turkeys ability to shoulder the responsibilities of
EU membership with great seriousness and
conscience is now better appreciated especially
after, Turkeys efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue
have proved its determination.
economies.
Finally, he argued that those who object to Turkeys
membership on religious or cultural grounds, are in fact
hindering the integration of the Muslims who already live in
the EU. He acknowledged differences between Turkey and
the EU and stressed that these differences signify strength
and wealth for both sides. In this regard, he urged all to
view Turkeys differences as potential added value for the
EU. For him, the full membership of Turkey, which has
reconciled its traditional Islamic culture with its secular and
democratic structures, will reinforce the desire and will for
co-habitation between the Christians and Muslims.

Mr Erdoan reiterated Turkeys keenness to fulfill the

membership requirements and denounced those who argue
that Turkey will be a burden to the Union due to its chronic
problems. He maintained that such claims are based on
Turkeys current situation, not its potential. He underlined
that

We are ready to abide by the rules of the game.

However, we cannot and will not abide with
prejudices. We cannot agree with those who allege
without foundation that Turkey will be nothing but
a burden to the EU. Those who pay no heed to
Turkeys potential to contribute to the EUs regional
and trans-Atlantic relations are definitely not doing
any good to the EU.

The Prime Minister argued that it is unjust to put the burden

on Turkey to prove why it is European. The reason for this,
in his opinion, is that Turkeys strength, its capabilities and
global contribution have not been correctly perceived.
I do not deny the issues that Turkey has to
overcome. However, I do not believe that it is in
Turkeys or the EUs interest to portray Turkey as
nothing more than an amalgamation of issues.
The Prime Minister then addressed the question posed by
the title of his speech by highlighting strategic, economic,
and cultural factors. First, Mr Erdoan pointed to Turkeys
strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean, in
addition to Turkeys function as a burden-relieving
mechanism for the EU with regard to Cyprus. He noted that
Turkeys role in this region has gained even more
significance in the face of the danger of a new Cold War
this time among values, civilizations, religions, cultures and
identities. In light of the recent developments in Turkeys
vicinity, he underlined common interests that Turkey and
the EU hold, as well as the potential for cooperation.
The nature of the threat has also changed. In
that context, it has once more become vital that
Turkey has chosen integration with the EU as its
main strategic aim.
Mr. Erdoan, SEESP steering committee and Turkish diplomats
Noting that none of the previous candidate countries was
assessed as having fulfilled the political criteria, he
contended that,
Once a level has been reached in the process of
democratisation, which Turkey has achieved,
fulfilment of the political criteria is no longer a
matter of yes or no; but of degree and intensity.
After that, a sustainable track record and political
determination start to count.
But that the most important factor will remain whether or
not we have shown the required determination and progress
in the specified areas. He reaffirmed his contention that
when assessed from this perspective, Turkey has reached
the required threshold in both legislative terms and effective
implementation. The Prime Minister of Turkey concluded by
stating that,
Being a European who understands Europeanness
as politics commanded by values, I would expect
all that I have said to be put on record as
expressed for the common good of Europe and the
world.

Then, Mr Erdoan stressed Turkeys potential to contribute

to the EUs regional and trans-Atlantic relations by
reminding the audience that according to the IMF reports, The lectures full text is available at
the Turkish economy ranked 22nd in the world in 2003. In http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/lectures/Erdogan.pdf
future Turkey will offer to the EU much wider export and
investment opportunities, once it has completed its
structural reforms and reinforced the competitiveness and
flexibility of its market. He claimed that,

Those who disregard this potential seem to have

8
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

EU ENLARGEMENT
Commentary: Unfinished Symphony Germany is still more likely to be a building worker or
cleaning lady than a manager or a professor. But this will
Timothy Garton Ash on the EU 2004 Enlargement
change. In the 1950s, au pairs in Britain were Swiss, German
or French. In the 1970s, they were Spanish or Portuguese.
May 1, 2004 is a great day in European history. Nothing - not
Now they are Polish or Slovak, but in 10 years they may be
the fears or the resentments, not the terrorists or the
Ukrainian or Turkish. At which point, the everyday, human
demagogues - should stop us celebrating this day as it
story reconnects to the larger, political one.
deserves.
This enlargement is not just the end of a long chapter; it's
What we achieve with the eastward enlargement of the
also the beginning of a new one. Don't let's kid ourselves that
European Union is more than just the demolition of the
this is the last enlargement for years to come. Romania and
remnants of the Berlin wall, which artificially divided Europe
Bulgaria have already been promised membership. The rest
into "west" and "east". It's an unprecedented step towards a
of the Balkans will come in step by step, though in what
Europe whole and free. Never before in European history
jigsaw of states remains to be seen. In December, we decide
have so many countries of central and eastern Europe been
whether to open negotiations with Turkey - which we
together with their western neighbours as democracies in the
definitely should, for reasons I'll explore another time. A sour
same political, economic and security community, with equal
note in this enlargement has been struck by Greek Cypriots
rights and obligations. For centuries, they've been second-
voting against reunification of that island, while Turkish
class citizens, poor relatives, objects of others' designs. For
Cypriots voted for it; as a result, with stunning logic, the
centuries, they've had a complex of backwardness and
Greek Cypriots are rewarded by membership of the EU, while
exclusion, while west Europeans have caricatured them as
the Turkish Cypriots are punished by having to stay outside.
exotic, eccentric and obscure. Ruritania. Dracula. Tintin's
Syldavia.
The fact remains: the EU has not only become much larger
and more diverse, but will continue to grow even larger and
The German historian Leopold von Ranke wrote what he
more diverse. I have some sympathy with those
called a history of the Latin and Germanic peoples. The Slavs
Eurosceptics, in Britain and elsewhere, who fear bureaucratic
didn't get a look in. They were not history-makers. A senior
homogenisation. Yet the truth is that with this enlargement,
German politician once told me, in his heavily accented
diversity has won. The question is no longer: will our
English, that the history of central Europe had been shaped
individual national identities be devoured by a European
by "the interaction of Germans, Jews and slaves". It took me
superstate, a Europa run by bureaucrats in Brussels? It is:
a moment to realise that he meant Slavs. Never again to be
how can we prevent the councils of Europe descending into
slaves, the Slavs join our Latin and Germanic leaders at the
17th-century sejmiki, those often riotous parliamentary
top table in Brussels - and, before that, at a party in Dublin
assemblies of seldom entirely sober Polish lords? But if we
(plus, of course, the non-Slav Hungarians, Maltese, Estonians
can manage that feat, Europe will be an extraordinary
and Greek Cypriots). A third great chord of Europeanness is
community, unique in the world, of 25 going on 35
finally reintroduced to the unfinished symphony.
democracies, and 455 million going on 600 million citizens,
living together in mutually reinforcing freedom, peace and
These are grand, sweeping terms. What do they mean for
prosperity.
everyday lives? First of all, they mean that more Europeans
are more free than ever. When I started travelling to these
Yes, I know this is a very tall order. I know this party will in
countries, more than 25 years ago, my contemporaries lived
fact be full of long faces, among both old and new members
in a different world. They could not say what they thought, in
of the union. I can write the lament as well as anyone. The
public, or they would lose their university places or jobs.
new members are mostly poor, measured against the
They could not travel where they wanted. They could not
average of the EU of 15, and, even with their superior growth
read what they liked. Their shop windows often resembled an
rates, will remain significantly poorer for decades to come.
empty morgue.
Many have shocking levels of corruption in public life,
unstable party systems and disaffected voters. The old EU
Acid jokes told their story. "Rabbi, can one build socialism in
members fear immigration, chaos and competition from
one country?" "Yes, my son, but one must live in another."
cheap skilled labour or more favourable tax regimes. Many
"Are the Russians our brothers or our friends?" "Our brothers
west Europeans, particularly in the original six member
- you can choose your friends." Or this, from a Poland
states of the European Economic Community, secretly wish
plagued by food shortages: A man goes into a butcher.
this enlargement wasn't happening at all. No one knows how
"Could I have some pork, please?" "No, we haven't any."
decisions will be reached around that giant table for 50
"Lamb?" "Nope". "Veal?" "Nope". "Some beef sausages?"
ministers in Brussels.
"Nope". He leaves, downcast. "What an idiot!" the butcher's
assistant says. "Yes," replies the butcher, "but what a
But let's leave all those troubles aside because we are
memory!"
celebrating a great change. If we keep measuring Europe
against the United States, or some utopian dream of United
Now the sons and daughters of the friends I made then, in
Europe, we shall always find it sadly wanting. But compare
Warsaw, Budapest, Prague or Ljubljana, have life chances
this Europe of 2004 with its own past. Think what Europe was
that are not so drastically different from those of my own
like 20 years ago, in 1984, let alone in 1944. Then put
children. They can read and write what they like. They can
Dvorak's Slavonic Dances on your CD player, and crack open
travel where they like, subject only to our common tyrant,
the vodka.
money, or the shortage of it. They can shout what they like
in a public square. On this May Day, there will be no
Timothy Garton Ash is Director of the European Studies
compulsory marches, with yawning youngsters holding aloft
Centre and Gerd Bucerius Senior Research Fellow in
banners of Lenin, Brezhnev and local mini-Brezhnevs.
Contemporary History at St Antony's College, Oxford, and a
Instead, some will celebrate EU accession on the streets,
Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
because they want to, while others join an anti-globalisation
He is the author of Free World: Why a Crisis of the West
demo.
Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time (Penguin, 2004). The
commentary is based on an article published in The Guardian
To be sure, the Pole or Slovak you meet in Britain or
on 29 April 2004.

9
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
FOCUS: KOSOVO
Panel Discussion: Kosovo
Successes and Failures of International Civil and
Military Involvement
Denisa Kostovicova
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE
The unexpected outburst of interethnic violence in Kosovo
on 17 and 18 March 2004 raised serious doubts about the
effectiveness of policies designed to stabilise Kosovo and
lead to a final settlement of Kosovos final status after
nearly five years of international civil and military
involvement in the disputed province. Calling the expertise
on South East Europe, the South East Europe Faculty
Development Programme based at the Centre for the Study
of Global Governance at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and the South East European Studies
Programme based at St Antonys in Oxford, organised a
public debate entitled, Kosovo: Successes and Failures of
International Civil and Military Involvement. This
collaborative effort aimed to tackle difficult dilemmas and
the renewed violence in the Balkans posed for academics,
policy-makers and diplomats. The panels chair Othon
Anastasakis, the Director of the South East European
Studies Programme, opened the debate by asking whether
the protectorates in South East Europe were capable of
tackling the complex problems on the ground, and queried
whether the international community might need to change
its strategy in the region? The presentations which followed
took up the chairs challenge focusing on Kosovos
multiethnicity, local perception of international
administration, the issue of war crimes and responsibility, as
well as on the economic dimension as a key aspect of
insecurity in Kosovo.
Denisa Kostovicova argued that the misunderstanding of
Kosovos multi-ethnicity on the part of the international
community and the policy based on such a region, while controlled migration into the EU was the only
misunderstanding reinforced ethnic inclusiveness and
radicalism on both sides Albanian and Serbian. Pointing
out that historically one of the key features of Kosovos
multi-ethnicity has been ethnic separation rather than
integration, she posited that the expected progress in the
area of the integration of minorities and the return of the
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Kosovo is lacking
because of the absence of a prior model of integration as
compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina. She concluded that the
challenge remains how to incorporate ethnic integration
into the concept of the democratic governance.
Daut Dauti (free lance journalist from Kosovo) offered an
inside perspective on the international community and its
strategy in Kosovo. Dauti pointed to a growing schism
between the locals, both the Serbs and the Albanians, and
the international staff in Kosovo. According to him the key
problem is the lack of transparency and accountability in the
day-to-day international governance of Kosovo. Dauti
pointed out that the UNMIK managed to establish an
administrative structure and procedure, but failed to build
democracy. He concluded that it did not manage either to
engage the citizens in the political process or to bring the
two communities together.
Richard Caplan (Oxford University) analysed the
international communitys policy in Kosovo, assessing its
appropriateness after the March violence. He suggested that
international policy had not been a complete failure because
it reflected a sound approach, or at least 'the least worst'
approach (see commentary below).
In her presentation, Gordana Igri (Institute for War and
Peace Reporting) tackled the issue of war crimes and the
implications of the impunity for crimes. Igri suggested that
the weakness of the UN mission in Kosovo and its ability to
control the security situation in the territory can be
attributed to a lack of resolve to apprehend war criminals at
the very start of the mission after the NATO intervention.
According to Igri, impunity was motivated by good
intentions. It was guided by the logic according to which if
you put radicals under political control, then they are easier
to control. However, such an approach has not only led to
the creation of ethnic Serb enclaves in Kosovo, but also
encouraged other criminal activities such as smuggling,
human trafficking, political murders, and, eventually,
ordinary murders. Igri concluded by saying that the final
status of Kosovo has to be addressed quickly, regardless of
whether it will be independence or not. Still, she pointed out
that the biggest challenge will be how to deal with the
radicals whom neither the Albanian political institutions nor
the international community have proved capable of
confronting.
Lastly, Dominik Zaum (Oxford University and European
Stability Initiative) addressed the economic causes of the
crisis. According to Zaum, the market was put in place in
Kosovo, but not the rules to make it run. After the war,
Kosovo experienced two years of boom fuelled by the
construction and the inflow of diaspora and international-
donor money. However, the decline of international aid and
diaspora remittances showed the post-war boom had a very
limited structural effect on the Kosovan economy. Zaum
singled out de-industrialisation as a key issue faced by
Kosovo, while building of physical infrastructure,
establishing of a legal framework for a market economy and
establishment of the institutions for macroeconomic policy-
making were key undertakings by the UNMIK and the EU in
dealing with the grave economic situation in Kosovo. Zaum
concluded by saying that addressing the socio-economic
issues was essential for the stability of Kosovo and the
policy that could quickly relieve demographic pressures, and
address poverty and deindustrialisation in Kosovo.
Although their perspectives differed on a number of points,
all speakers agreed that the riots in mid-March 2004
demonstrated the precarious state that Kosovo found itself
in after five years of international protectorate. Despite
UNMIKs upbeat rhetoric, ethnic polarisation and economic
decline have fed into growing tensions on the ground.
Paradoxically, Serbs and Albanians find themselves united
only in their distrust towards the international
administration in the province. The panelists also agreed
that the international community needs to rethink its next
steps in Kosovo. These particularly concern a redesigning of
the UNMIK operation so as to better fulfil its role as a
facilitator for democratic consolidation rather than appearing
as an alienated institutional structure involved in
overbearing top-down governance. The uncertain issue of
Kosovos status was judged by all as yet another contributor
to instability in Kosovo and in the region. However, it was
made clear that even the overarching status issue is no
easy answer for some of the structural problems related to
socio-economic development.
Denisa Kostovicova is Fellow at the South East Europe
Faculty Development Programme, Centre for the Study of
Global Governance, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
A full report can be found at http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/
areastudies/Denisa.pdf
10
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
Commentary: Quo Vadis Kosovo?
Richard Caplan
Linacre College, Oxford University
The events of March 2004 in Kosovo have tested
international policy as no other developments have since
the establishment of the UN administration in June 1999.
The violence of 17-18 March - perpetrated by Kosovo
Albanian extremists against the minority Serb, Roma, and
Ashkali communities - resulted in 19 deaths, 954 injured,
and the damage or destruction of 730 minority homes,
according to UN reports. In addition, 36 Orthodox churches,
monasteries, and other religious sites - some of these
centuries-old buildings - were either damaged or destroyed.
Two months after the riots, 2,638 displaced persons, most
of them Serbs, had still not returned to their homes.
The March events (Serbs are calling them a pogrom) were
a direct attack on the notion and the reality, however frail,
of a multiethnic Kosovo. As such they represent a serious
setback for international policy. But are these events
evidence of the failure of that policy, as some commentators
have charged? There are several reasons why a more
cautious judgement may be warranted:
First, before the March riots international arrangements
appeared to be working in many important respects: the
violence had been receding, ethnically motivated crimes had
been decreasing, and KFOR, as a result, was removing
checkpoints and barriers across the province. In 2002 there
had been only 68 murders in all of Kosovo, of which two
alone involved a victim and perpetrator of different
ethnicitya very low rate of interethnic violence by any
measure. Meanwhile, nearly 15 per cent of the Kosovo
Police Service (KPS) was by then made up of minorities,
making it one of the more multiethnic institutions in Kosovo.
As evidence of the professionalism of this force, tens of KPS
officers were themselves targets of the violence in March.
Kosovo is hardly a model of ethnic harmony but many of the
trends until then had been encouraging.
Second, international policy has reflected a sound approach.
Although it might have been better to deal with the issue of
Kosovos final status while Milosevic was still in control -
when avenues for the peaceful resolution of the conflict
were closed and when the Serbian democratic opposition,
not yet having come to power, would have more easily been
able to swallow the bitter pill of Kosovo independence - the
logic of the international approach has nevertheless been a
valid one. The emphasis that UNMIK had been placing on
building democratic institutions of self-governance and
insisting on respect for human and minority rights while
avoiding the inflammatory issue of final status for the
moment (Standards before Status), arguably had the
potential to succeed.
Third, uneven progress and setbacks may reflect not the
failure of policy but the difficulties of achieving success in an
inherently difficult situation. Such situations can make even
sound policy seem fundamentally flawed. Building peace
after war is no easy thing, Paddy Ashdown observed in his
inaugural speech as High Representative of neighbouring
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002. And, indeed, progress in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, has been punctuated by
incidents of major violence since the Dayton agreement was
signed in 1995. Part of the challenge is that of managing
expectations. It may take a very long time before Kosovo
enjoys any real economic development. However, local
expectations of rapid progress are high, partly due to the
massive international presence on the ground. High
expectations - and frustration - vis--vis international
administrations are not uncommon, as the experience of the
UN administration of East Timor makes clear. But they are
not necessarily a testament to the failure of international
policy.
What makes the Kosovo situation an inherently difficult one
is that there are two principal national communities in
Kosovo, each with legitimate, though irreconcilable,
aspirations. These communities are often unwilling to
cooperate or to compromise, fearful of and mistrusting each
other. Under the circumstances, there is no easy solution
and no approach will ever win universal support. To the
contrary, any approach is likely to attract spoilers, as the
March violence confirms.
What is the way ahead? Vigorous prosecution of the
instigators of the violence is necessary in the first instance.
In addition, the defence of Serb and other minorities, not
just by the international forces but by the Kosovo police,
has to be stepped up. That will require the international
community to transfer more security competences to the
Kosovars, closely supervised, which until now UNMIK has
been reluctant to do. The Albanian leadership must also
demonstrate its commitment to the protection of human
and minority rights, both as a confidence-building measure
and to signal to the Albanian community that acts of ethnic
violence simply have no place in Kosovo. The reconstruction
campaign launched by Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi to
rebuild Serb homes and religious buildings is an
encouraging sign of support for, if not multi-ethnicity, then,
at least, peaceful coexistence among the communities in
Kosovo.
Map of Kosovo was taken from http://
www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kosovo.html
Beyond these immediate measures, there are four options
for the future:
The first is reintegration of Kosovo with Serbia and
Montenegro (or Serbia alone as the state union may
very well be dissolved in 2005). This option is untenable
as it would result in a permanent state of war between
Kosovo Albanians and Serbia. After living for so many
years under Belgrades oppressive yoke, Kosovo
Albanians - who make up more than 90 per cent of the
population - would violently resist any reassertion of
Belgrades sovereign authority over the territory, even
if they were to be granted the widest conceivable
11
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
degree of autonomy.
The second option, which many Serbs favour, is
partition of the northern part of Kosovo where they
represent the majority. But this is not a solution for the
Serbs at all. Only one-third of Kosovo Serbs live north
of the Ibar River, according to the European Stability
Initiative; the remainder - some 75,000 Serbs - live in
the Albanian-majority south, largely in rural areas. Most
of these Serbs, it is interesting to note, have chosen to
remain in Kosovo ever since the withdrawal of
Belgrades forces in 1999. Partition would leave them
stranded and further exposed.
The third option is indefinite continuation of the
international administration and further postponement
of any resolution of the status question. This is not a
viable solution in the long term either. Continuation of
the uncertain status of Kosovo is a destabilizing factor.
It is fuelling local frustration, discouraging investment,
and fostering a dependency culture. It is this frustration
that underlies support for the violence in March. Even if
only a small minority of Albanians triggered the
violence, it had resonance with the larger Albanian
community, in part because of peoples frustration born
of the lack of clarity about the future. The continued
ambiguity about the territorys status also keeps alive
Serb hopes for a reintegrated or partitioned Kosovo.
The fourth and only viable option for Kosovo in the long
term is independence. But independence for Kosovo
would have to be accompanied by a very large measure
of cultural, political, and possibly even territorial
autonomy for the minority communities. Furthermore, it
would have to be made conditional upon meeting the
security needs of all peoples of Kosovo. The promise of
CROSS-DISCIPLINARY DEBATES
Conference: Nationalism, Society and Culture in Post-
Ottoman South East Europe
Dimitar Bechev
St Antonys College, Oxford University
On 29-30 May 2004, the Oxford Balkan Society held its
second graduate workshop entitled Nationalism, Society and
Culture in Post-Ottoman South East Europe, which was
convened by Kerem ktem and Dimitar Bechev of the
SEESP. It focused on the formation of nation-states
following the demise of the multiethnic and multireligious
Ottoman, tracing the common patterns of nation building in
the region (the Balkans and Turkey) and the impact of
identity politics nowadays. SEESP co-organised and
sponsored the event, which was also generously supported
by the Tsakopoulos Foundation in the US and the Oxford
Programme on Contemporary Turkey. The workshop was
attended by more than 70 doctoral students and senior
academics from a number of countries and disciplines,
which testified to the considerable interest of the scholarly
community.
The workshop was launched with a keynote speech by Glenn
Bowman (University of Kent), who discussed from an
anthropological perspective the issue of ethnicity in former
Yugoslavia and Israel/Palestine. His talk was followed by a
panel on the construction of grand narratives of nation by
historiographers and intellectual elites. Bojan Aleksov
(Central European University, Budapest) presented the
independence arguably would spur Albanians to work
towards meeting these obligations. Continued use of
conditionality - to qualify for development assistance,
for instance - could help to reinforce this behaviour.
Independence for Kosovo would not necessarily mean
the end of all international supervision. As a further
condition the Kosovars could be required to accept a
continued international presence to monitor and enforce
the protection of minority rights.
How can independence be justified given that Serbia is now
if not a democratic then at least a democratising state?
Even liberal democratic societies - societies whose
governments represent the whole of the people on the basis
of equality and without discrimination - have at times been
willing to entertain the possibility of secession of a
constituent unit. The 1998 advisory judgement of the
Canadian Supreme Court is instructive in this regard. The
Court defended the right of Quebec to pursue secession in
the event that a clear majority of its population were to be
in favour and so long as in pursuing that goal Quebec
respected the rights of others. While this judgement does
not support a unilateral right of secession, it does suggest
that the federal government has an obligation to respect the
wishes of a clear majority - as, presumably, Serbia would do
in the event that a majority of Montenegrins were to opt for
independence. Kosovo is a different case, of course. But
while it may be too much to expect Serbia to yield easily or
at all on this question, any attempt to force Kosovo
Albanians to live again under Belgrades authority would be
a prescription for protracted conflict.
Richard Caplan is University Lecturer in International
Relations and a Fellow of Linacre College, Oxford. He is the
author of International Governance of War-torn Territories
(Oxford University Press, 2005).
debate on conversions to Islam in Serbian historiography of
the 19th and 20th century. He highlighted the varying
answers to the question of whether and how Serbo-Croat
speaking Muslims fitted in the Serb national project.
Aleksovs paper tied in with the talk by Dr Blent Bilmez
(Yeditepe University, Istanbul) dealing with the popular
historical representations of Shemseddin/Sami Frasheri in
Turkey and Albania. Not unlike the Slavic-speaking Balkan
Muslims, Frasheri remains a challenge, being an in-
between character that defies the strict national
demarcations. Rigels Halili (Polish Academy of Sciences), in
his turn, analysed how academic communities tackle such
complex social configurations to craft cohesive national
programmes for mass consumption. His focus was the
infamous 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of
Sciences and a similar document issued by the Albanian
Academy in 1998. Finally, Artan Puto (European University
Institute) offered an account of the Albanian historians
views of the Ottoman period. He highlighted certain loci
communes shared throughout the region, notably the myth
of forceful separation from Europe and the portrayal of the
Ottoman past as defined by economic backwardness and
political relapse.
The second session concentrated on the impact of
nationalism on multiethnic localities. Vangelis Kechriotis
(Bosphorus University, Istanbul) presented the case of
Smyrna in the period 1900-1912 and examined the
development of the trope of Hellenic city in Greek nationalist
discourse. Dr Gila Hadar (Haifa University) gave a paper on
the ethnic and religious mosaic of Salonika in the first half of
12
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

the 20th century, with a special focus on the citys large
Jewish population. Umut Kolda (METU, Ankara) talked
about the repressions against the Jews in Turkish Thrace
termed the 1934 events and their representation by the
press at the time. All three papers thus cast light on the
homogenising effects of nation-state ideologies and policies
through time.
The third panel offered an insight into how national projects
impact local contexts in our own days. Elif Babl (Bosphorus
University) discussed Turkeys understanding of sovereignty
and nationhood by looking at the various socio-ethnic
groups in the island of Imvros and the differentiated
practices of citizenship. Emel Akal (Paris IV) focused on
post-Dayton Bosnia and argued that the politics of
reconstruction harden inter-ethnic boundaries at both macro
and micro levels. Zerrin Biner (Cambridge) presented her
anthropological research on Mardin in South East Turkey to
illustrate how the Turkish states nationalising policies have
reshuffled local ethnic and kinship structures.
The first day of the workshop ended with a session on
nationalism and culture. One of the common themes was
the deep-running linkages between nation-building and
Westernisation. Dr Mathew Elliott (British School of
Archeology, Jerusalem) presented the attempts by Mustafa
Kemal Atatrk to engineer a full-blown music revolution in
Turkey in late 1920s and early 1930s, along the lines of the
radical reforms of the countrys alphabet and clothing. For
his part, Joost Jongerden (Wageningen University) analysed
the thought of Nusret Kemal Koymen, an intellectual of the
early republican period, dedicated to the buildup of a
Turkish model reconciling Western ideas on development
and Turkeys rural character. Carmen Popescu (Paris IV)
showed that similar dilemmas were not alien to Romania.
While eager to emulate Western examples, Romanian
architects strove to assert the originality of their own
culture. The resulting National Style of the early 20th
century incorporated a number of elements, previously
dismissed as tokens of Oriental barbarism.
communist Bulgaria towards the Slav diaspora from Greek
Macedonia. Focusing on roughly the same geographical
area, albeit in a different period (the beginning of the 20th
century), pek Yosmaolu-Turner (Princeton) demonstrated
how the contending Bulgarian and Greek nationalisms drew
dividing lines through previously tightly-knit communities.
Building on the same set of issues, the workshops last
panel examined the question of internal others within South
East European states, that is ethnic and religious minorities.
Seil Deren (Leiden University) examined the ever-
narrowing definition of national identity in Turkey. If initially
Islam was a sufficient marker of Turkishness, by the 1980s
Kurds and Alevis were, to a varying degree, excluded from
the national body and rebranded into minorities by the
discourse on nationhood. Taking the discussion further,
Ioannis Grigoriadis (School of African and Oriental Studies,
London) applied some insights from the academic literature
on political culture to the issue of minorities in Turkey.
Katerina Lagos (University of California, Sacramento)
tackled the same set of questions in reference to the
policies of the 1930s regime of General Metaxas towards
Jews in Greece. These ranged between repression to
attempts at linguistic assimilation, but importantly indicated
the difficulty in deciding what were the constitutive traits of
Greekness. The session was closed with a presentation by
Dikran Zenginkuzucu (stanbul University) dealing with the
legal and social status of the Armenians in present-day
Turkey. It elucidated further the clash between the
citizenship-based definition of nationality and the practices
of inclusion and exclusion prevalent in the Turkish society.
As the Nationalism, Society and Culture in Post-Ottoman
South East Europe workshop ended, all participants and the
conveners acknowledged that it had been a rewarding
experience. Undoubtedly, the resulting network of young
scholars will be an asset for future SEESP research projects
and publications.

The workshops fifth panel tackled the topic of education

and nationalism. It was opened by Leda Glyptis (LSE), who
explored the ways in which present-day Greek textbooks
narrate the 1922 defeat in the Anatolian war against the
Kemalist armies. She outlined the discursive strategies
employed to shape and solidify historical stereotypes
amongst pupils of different age groups. Dr Andreas
Helmedach (Braunschweig University) fuelled further the
discussion with his paper on the image - almost universally
negative - of the Ottomans in Balkan history textbooks.
Milena Methodieva (Princeton) steered away from narratives
to schooling, and examined the Bulgarian Principalitys
educational policy toward its Muslim minorities in the period
1878-1908. She traced the states gradual adoption of a
more assertive nationalising approach, notably vis--vis the
Bulgarian-speaking Muslims.

The following session focused on the issue of identity

formation through demarcating Self from Other. Kristine Participants in the Oxford Balkan Society conference
Barseghyan (Polish Academy of Sciences) explored the
modes in which Turkey is present in the contemporary
political discourse in Armenia. She argued that Turkish
Otherness is in flux; for Armenia, Turkey is now turning
from the Other to just an-other neighbouring state. Mila Most of the papers are available at
Maeva (Sofia University) talked about the Bulgarian Turk http://ww.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/OBSworkshop.shtml
immigrants living in the area of zmir highlighting their
status of dual marginality: within both the Bulgarian and the
Turkish societies. Tchavdar Marinov (EHESS, Paris) provided
an account of how a similarly marginal group becomes a
target of homogenisation efforts aimed at full incorporation
into the national Self. His paper discussed the policies of

13
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
Research Workshop: Understanding Borders, Conflict
and Reconciliation in South East Europe
Olga Demetriou
St Peters College, University of Oxford
The region of South East Europe has witnessed some
spectacular developments in recent years. From Turkey and
Cyprus to the post-communist Balkan countries changes in
the political and societal landscape have significantly
affected the way academics, policy makers and people
perceive change and development in the region. The Greek-
Turkish rapprochement, border-crossing in Cyprus and the
Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan, reconciliation as
well as conflict in the wider Balkan context, have been some
of the main issues that have affected the debate on the
regions development and its link with the European and
global environment. The workshop Understanding Borders,
Conflict and Reconciliation in South East Europe was
organised with the intention of exploring common themes
across disciplines in the study of conflict and reconciliation
in this region.
Such radical changes have in fact been occurring in the
region for at least the last five years - another mark of
which would be the shaking of Greece and Turkey into a
new phase of rapprochement politics following the
disastrous earthquakes of 1999. These major shifts in the
political landscape have had a significant impact on the
ways South-Eastern Europe is talked about, not only in
political circles, but academia as well. That these changes
followed almost immediately the long and devastating
redrawing of Balkan borders, the effects of which still
reverberate in the region and beyond, makes their
comparative study all the more pressing. Furthermore, their
effects on the social life of Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and the
Balkans seem to extend far beyond the political sphere.
This workshop was designed to explore some of the
questions posed by the mirroring of political shifts in
academic research; the shift in research priorities in ways
that match those of policy-making, the proliferation of
concepts and discourses commonly used in policy and
research yet often via a shift in meaning, and the shifting
emphasis of research in terms of both disciplinary and inter-
disciplinary as well as geographical focus, being only some
examples. In this sense, the workshop set out to delineate
the effects of radical political change in the area of South-
Eastern Europe while at the same time challenging the
associated meanings of a variety of concepts including those
referring to geographical designations such as the Balkans
or South East Europe.
These aims were from the beginning recognised as
constituting issues for on-going reflection and for this
reason the organisation of the workshop was driven by a
vision of a series of meetings to follow-up this initial
exchange of ideas. Such exchanges would themselves need
to encompass a variety of disciplinary and theoretical
perspectives. The perspectives that participants were asked
to consider were themselves heavily influenced by concerns
with inter-disciplinarity and comparative research across
geographical regions.
The concept of borders was for these reasons chosen as
the main focus of the workshop. Participants were asked to
discuss a variety of perspectives on borders and their role
in research, where these had reference to both geographical
and disciplinary borders. Alongside this, the concept of
conflict and its attending concept of reconciliation were
the other major themes structuring the discussion, since it
is through these idioms that the political changes in the area
have been described.
The participants considered the implications of insights
borne out of research in border areas of nation-states as
well as areas wrought apart by ethnic conflict. They
discussed the historical development of conflict, the
influence of social theories on the conceptualisation of
conflict, the role of individuals in conflict analyses, the role
of institutions and the legacy of conflict in the creation of
different kinds of citizens, as well as the role of
geographical classifications in local and national
identification processes.
The first session explored inter-disciplinary approaches to
conflict studies and began with a presentation by Glenn
Bowman (University of Kent at Canterbury) entitled Policies
and Practices of Alterity and Identity in the Mixed Towns of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Israel-Palestine. In the
presentation he examined urban multi-culturalism and the
impact of state ethnic policies on the everyday interaction of
populations in a number of mixed cities in the two areas.
Bowman argued that the development of such interactions
must be the focus of diachronic study, which can illuminate
the ways in which different groups come to view each other
as enemies.
The second presentation of the session was by Vanessa
Pupavac (University of Nottingham) entitled The Influence of
Anglo-American Social Psychology on the Conceptualisation
of Conflict. The presentation dealt with the ways in which
psychological concepts are used in analysis to explain
conflict by pathologizing it. Pupavac argued that there is a
change in the understandings of war, according to which it
is no longer the continuation of politics by other means, but
rather a situation that arises because society is
dysfunctional.
The second session consisted of presentations that
integrated top-down and bottom-up analyses of border
crossing. In the first presentation Costas Constantinou
(Keele University) drew on the example of the opening of
the barricades in Cyprus in 2003 to comment On Homo-
Diplomacy. Constantinou explained that his coining of the
term reflects an attempt to articulate a concept of
diplomacy that extends beyond the level of government
politics to encompass discourses and practices of individuals
capable of transforming enmity. The situation observed in
the mass crossings of the Green Line in Cyprus when the
barricades opened, it was argued, called for this kind of
diplomacy, as the hetero-diplomacy of the official level that
related to the other as Other, and which was responsible for
mobilising hostility, proved unable to mediate the new
situation. Homo-diplomacy as carried out by people, who in
crossing the Line were discovering both self and other,
emphasised in analytical terms the need to maintain the
potential for transformation as central to the concept of
diplomacy. In the second presentation, entitled The right
to return and the right to stay in the margins of Europe,
Effie Voutira (University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki)
presented part of her on-going research on types of
migration in Greece. The presentation centred on the
different categories employed in Greek to name and classify
migrants and their relation to the emerging Greek migration
policies. Voutira pointed out that the term prosfyges
(refugees) as used in modern Greek refers primarily to the
1922 refugees who left Asia Minor after the Greco-Turkish
war and that this concept of refugee-ness has functioned
as a precedent for subsequent categorisations.
Palinostountes on the other hand, is a later term introduced
in the late 1980s, to refer to the returnees of Greek origin
to the motherland after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
14
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
while epanapatrizomenoi (repatriates) mainly refers to the
political exiles returning to Greece after the end of the
military dictatorship in 1974. These categories of co-ethnic
migrants were analysed as privileged categories by
comparison to other - alien-migrants and asylum seekers,
who are generally described under the broad term
lathrometanastes (clandestine migrants) or economic
migrants.
The final session aimed to revisit theoretical paradigms in
South East European Studies through a presentation by
Sarah Green (University of Manchester) entitled Too hybrid
for postmodernity? The re-Balkanisation of the Balkans.
Green used ethnographic data from the region of Pogoni on
the Greek-Albanian border and insights from chaos theory
RESEARCH PROJECTS
Functional Borders and Sustainable Security:
Integrating the Balkans into the European Union
Ruby Gropas
ELIAMEP
The SEESP is one of the participating institutions in the IBEU
research project, which is coordinated by the Greek think-
tank Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP) has completed its first year of research and
funded by the European Commission. This project focuses
on the changing nature of borders and security in the
Balkans, and adopts the notion of functional borders to
explore social capital and civil society in SE Europe, the
informal sector, migration patterns and regional cooperation
both within the Balkans as well as with the EU. The partners
of the consortium have conducted empirical work on the
thematic areas mentioned above.
Social capital: A comparative questionnaire/survey
measuring inter-personal trust, trust in institutions,
participation in associations and interest in politics in Serbia
and Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania has
been completed and the preliminary conclusions have been
drawn up by the Centre for Liberal Studies, Sofia (CLS),
Romanian Academic Society (SAR) and ELIAMEP teams. The
conceptual and policy-relevant aspects of social capital are
being explored with particular emphasis on shared
knowledge, beliefs and patterns of interaction that groups or
actors in this region use. This team is working on
deconstructing Balkan particularism in order to identify the
factors that influence social capital formation in SEE, with
the ultimate aim of designing policy recommendations that
address the challenges of particularism.
Migration: IBEU studies migration in terms of security, weak
states and the degree of inclusion/exclusion of migrant
populations given the formal and informal borders that
characterize SE Europe. The team, composed of researchers
from the Institute for Central/Eastern Europe and the
Balkans (IECOB) and ELIAMEP, are currently drafting a
series of papers on migratory patterns. With regard to
migratory patterns within the Balkans, there are three
strands of research. The first focuses on an historical
approach to migration patterns in the Serbo-Croat cultural
space during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and
involves the status of refugees and internally displaced
persons. The second examines Herzegovian migration to
and particularly the theorisation of fractals to comment on
the ways in which the Balkans have been constituted as a
location in social scientific literature as well as the
implications of this conceptualisation for local processes of
identification. She pointed out that fragmentation has come
to epitomise analyses about the area and that this has led
to different analytic responses about how to deal with the
gaps opened up by this fragmentation. These politics of
analysis have included the tendency to abandon attempts at
a conclusive explanation, to invoke the ideas of fantasy,
invention and meaninglessness as ultimate explanations, or
to continue trying to arrive at answers. Green argued that
the problem is not that there is too much fragmentation, but
rather that there is too much connection in the way the
Balkans are conceptualised.
Dalmatia during and after the war in Bosnia, and
concentrates on the city of Split as a symbol of multicultural
experience. The third team carried out research in Kosovo
studying the ethnic communities relationship with borders
(formal and informal) as well as the situation of the Roma
population. With regard to migratory patterns from the
Balkans into the EU, the main focus is on Albanian
populations in Greece and Italy as new host migration
countries.
Informal sector: IBEU is also concentrating on the informal
sector in SE Europe. Researchers from the London School of
Economics (LSE) have undertaken fieldwork on privatization
and informal practices in Bulgaria and Croatia. The Institute
for Market Economies, Sofia (IME) has completed its survey
on Incentives, Characteristics and Strategies of Firms
Operating in the Shadows that covered Romania, Bulgaria,
Serbia and Montenegro. This report assesses the incentives
to engage in informal activities and the resulting
characteristics of company organization and strategy. The
LSE and Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WIIW) are also working together to measure the size of the
informal economy in the Balkans.
Regional cooperation: WIIW and ELIAMEP are concentrating
on regional cooperation in SE Europe with particular
emphasis on trade, infrastructure and banking. The working
hypothesis is that for most countries in SE Europe, bilateral
relations with the EU are more important than the regional
ones; therefore, coordination has produced limited results
beyond restricted regional or sub-regional cooperation.
Hence, the role of the EU is examined in terms of how it can
encourage more extensive regional cooperation in the areas
of trade, investment, exchange rate policy, fiscal policy and
competition policy.
Workshops have been held in Athens, Sofia, Bertinoro, Forl,
Bucharest and Vienna to coordinate the research teams, and
present preliminary findings have been presented in a
number of international conferences and workshops on the
Balkans by the individual researchers.
The working papers on all the research themes mentioned
are available at http://www.eliamep.gr/main.asp?cat=3
15
 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004
The SEESP Contribution to IBEU:
Social Capital and EU Institution Building in the
Western Balkans
Dimitar Bechev
It is now common to talk about the EU as the only game in
town for the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro). Joining the
Union has been declared, time and again, the key aim of all
states and societies in the region. For its part, the EU
employs different strategies to promote positive change
within and amongst the states in question. As elsewhere, its
most effective tool seems to be hard-nosed conditionality
tied to benefits such as trade access, financial transfers, and
advancement on the membership path. In doing so, the EU
operates as a domestic actor critically impacting a range of
political and socio-economic arrangements and policies.
Conditionality is a form of power that the EU wields not only
to induce partner governments to behave in certain ways,
and embark on particular measures and policies, but also to
shape the institutional environment of the countries in
question for the long term.
In light of the pre-accession policies all-pervasive nature,
the SEESP research team inquires into the nature of the
state-society relationship promoted by the EU. We focus, in
particular, on the question of how the EU views institution
building in the Western Balkans and weigh the compatibility
of the EUs approach with the concept of social capital. Thus
its key normative assumption is that in order to be
sustainable any institutional arrangement should be backed
by or capable of generating a degree of public support.
The SEESP project analyses the EU strategy by looking at
the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development
and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme. The choice is
conditioned by the fact that this particular financial
instrument is a key element in the EU-Western Balkans
relationship, as well as the EUs primary institution-building
tools. What is also interesting is that different parts of
CARDS represent respectively the top-down and bottom-up
approaches the EU employs in order to boost
democratisation and institution building in the Western
Balkans. Bottom-up strategies refer to strengthening of civil
society and the structures of local governance, while top-
down is associated with institution building at the central
level concerning various segments of the executive branch.
Thirdly, CARDS arguably provides us with a good picture of
how the EU structures its policy in the region. It is
methodologically appropriate for assessing the EUs
approach on institution building because one can relatively
easily assess the relative importance of different goals and
priorities.
Map of the Western Balkans was taken from
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe.html
Cultural Aspects of the EU-Enlargement Process:
Turkey and the European Union
Ioannis Grigoriadis & Kerem ktem
The prospect of Turkeys membership of the European Union
has sparked intense debate in all EU member states. Issues
related to European identity, culture and borders are
brought about in view of the continuing enlargement of the
European Union, while Turkeys potential EU membership is
viewed as a challenge not only for Turkey, but also for the
European Union itself. In particular, the cultural factor has
become a key factor for understanding the scope, objectives
and limits of thoughts and perceptions on EU-Turkey
relations.
As part of a wider research project funded by Volkswagen
Stiftung and led by the University of Konstanz in Germany
on Cultural Aspects of the EU-enlargement process
discussed though the relationship between Turkey and the
European Union, the SEESP seeks to explore similar
cultural patterns in the political discourse in the United
Kingdom. Within the wider study, which deals with the
issues of European identity and difference in the context of
EU-Turkey relations, the SEESP focuses on two general
questions:
a. Do identity-based discourses result in a collective bond
among European partners that leads to the emotional
exclusion of potential member states on the basis of not
being culturally compatible with Europe?
b. To what extent is Turkeys possible EU accession an
experience of ambivalence? What are the boundaries of
Europeanness according to the British discourse?
The relations between the United Kingdom and Turkey are
influenced by a set of factors. First, the United Kingdom has
a particular relationship with Turkey, due to its historical
strategic role in the Eastern Mediterranean and its
involvement in Cyprus, both as a guarantor state and a
holder of sovereign military bases. Second, the United
Kingdom is a large EU member state with clout in matters of
common foreign and security policy. Third, both the United
Kingdom and Turkey share a strong transatlantic
orientation, while they also share an inter-governmental
approach as regards developments related to the future of
the European Union.
While the EU-Turkey debate in France and Germany is
heavily influenced by a charged culturalist essentialism, in
the UK it appears to be more practical and less influenced
by culturalist and value-oriented arguments. This SEESP
study aims to highlight the prevailing perceptions of and
attitudes towards a potential accession of Turkey to the
European Union in the UK and explore the hypothesis that
the British political discourse on EU-Turkey relations differs
to a significant degree from that of many of its continental
European partners.
For this purpose, the SEESP addresses three sets of
interrelated questions:
To what extent is the assumption of a more
dispassionate attitude towards EU enlargement and
Turkeys possible EU accession justified in the case of
the United Kingdom? Is it true that this dispassionate
attitude, especially in the political discourse used by
Tony Blair, does not raise issues of cultural otherness
but insists on the technical side of the accession
process as is the case for all other EU candidate states?
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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

Is this attitude the result of a generally more liberal and
inclusive position towards immigrants in the UK, or is it
rather an expression of the limited significance of the
issue of Turkeys EU accession in UK politics? Which role
does the Turkish case play within the European
project of British political parties?
position for the debate on ambivalence and European
identity? What does the British approach towards
Turkish membership tell us about European identity and
the borders of Europe?

To what extent does widespread EU-scepticism explain More information can be found at http://www.uni-
the British position? What are the political implications konstanz.de/FuF/SozWiss/fg-soz/ag-wis/JSVersion/
of this attitude for the European integration process in mitarbeit/giannakopoulos/EU/
Southeast Europe? What are the implications of this

PUBLICATION

SEESP Occasional Paper No. 1/04

Turkish Accession to the EU in Comparative Perspective

Paul Kubicek
Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan

While the European Union has recently added ten new states, the status of Turkey's bid to join the organization remains in
doubt. This paper seeks to compare the Turkish experience with two other states, Slovakia and Romania, that also had initial
difficulties in meeting the criteria for membership in the EU. It argues that all three countries can be labeled "reluctant
democratizers," and looks at EU efforts to promote democratization in each case. In East-Central Europe, one can see that EU
political conditionality can work, as the incentives to join the EU are quite strong. However, the EU must work with domestic
actors to overcome resistance and even then, as Romania demonstrates, it requires time to root out entrenched problems such
as corruption. In the Turkish case, there has been substantial progress since the door to membership was opened to Turkey in
1999, and the election of the moderately-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 has given more impetus to
domestic political reform. It is clear that the EU has a significant impact on the course of reform in Turkey, involving political
parties, non-governmental organizations, and the public at large.

The full version of the paper is available at

http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/kubicek.pdf

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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

A BOUT SE ES P

PEOPLE AT SEESP

Director
Dr Othon Anastasakis
St Antony's College
SEESP SEMINAR SERIES
Hilary Term 2004 Chair
Dr Kalypso Nicoladis
What Can the EU Learn from the Enlargement Process to University Lecturer in International Relations
Improve its Policies for South East Europe? St Antony's College
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform
Dimitris Papadimitriou, University of Manchester Balkan Unit

Informal Sector and Organised Crime Dr Svetlozar Andreev

Misha Glenny, SEE Change 2004 Mr Dimitar Bechev
Aleksandar Fati, University of Montenegro Ms Tuba nl

Prospects and Challenges for Economic Development Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Unit
Laza Keki, Economist Intelligence Unit
Felix Martin, European Stability Initiative Dr Gilles Bertrand
Dr Olga Demetriou
On Cyprus Mr Ioannis Grigoriadis
Vassilis Fouskas, Kingston University Mr Kerem ktem
Thomas Diez, University of Birmingham Ms Tuba nl

Transatlantic Relations and Balkan Security Steering Committee

Spyros Economides, LSE
Richard Caplan, University of Oxford Sir Marrack Goulding
Chair of the Steering Committee
South East European Prospects for EU membership Warden, St Antony's College
Othon Anastasakis, Dimitar Bechev
Richard Crampton, Kalypso Nicoladis, Dr Richard Caplan
University of Oxford University Lecturer in International Relations
Linacre College

Prof. Richard Crampton

PUBLIC LECTURES Professor of East European History
St Edmund Hall
Democratisation in Serbia
Dr Rene Hirschon
Vukain Pavlovi, University of Belgrade and
Lecturer in Social Anthropology
Eric Weaver, University of Oxford
St Peter's College
Kosovo: Successes and Failures of
Mr Timothy Garton Ash
International Civil and Military Involvement
Director, European Studies Centre
co-organized with the Centre for the Study of Global
St Antony's College
Governance, London School of Economics
Prof. Michael Kaser
The Outcome of the March 2004 Greek National Elections
Emeritus Fellow
Othon Anastasakis (SEESP), Bruce Clark (The Economist),
St Antonys College
Richard Clogg (St Antony's College), Dimitris Triantaphyllou
(London School of Economics)
Dr Noel Malcolm
Senior Research Fellow
Bulgaria, Romania and EU Accession
All Souls College
Richard Crampton
University of Oxford
Dr Philip Robins
University Lecturer in Middle East Politics
St Antony's College

Dr Jan Zielonka
University Lecturer in European Politics
St Antony's College

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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAMME (SEESP)

European Studies Centre, St Antonys College
University of Oxford

The South East European Studies Programme was launched in 2002 as part of the European Studies Centre, St Antonys College, Uni-
versity of Oxford. It focuses on contemporary politics and society in the post-communist Balkans, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Drawing on
the academic excellence of the College, the University and an international network of associates, this Programme seeks to foster academic
and policy relevant research and discussions on the dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction, transition, Europenisation, and EU integration,
change and transnationalism. In investigating each of these poles as well as their interrelationship, its ambition is to be provocative and
constructive.

General Objectives of the Programme

To support high quality action research on South East Europe with special focus on the politics of long-term EU enlarge-
ment;
To organise conferences, workshops and research seminars;
To promote a multi-disciplinary study of the regions developments within Oxford University working in collaboration with
students groups, academics, Centres and Programmes within the University;
To spearhead exchanges and debates among networks of individuals and institutions beyond Oxford on these issues;
To foster cooperation between the academic and the policy making community.

The Southeast European Studies Programme: 2004-2006

Areas of activity
Southeast Europe

Post-Communist Greece, Turkey

Balkans Cyprus
(Workshops, ) (GTN, conferences)

Europeanisation vs EU-isation:
Challenges and Pitfalls on the
Road to Accession
Thematic priorities

Transnational agents of change: States and Nations in transition:

Histories and Futures of Politics, Economics,
Minorities, Migrants, Displaced, Culture and Society
Refugees and Diasporas in the Region

_________________________________________________________________

St Antonys College was founded in 1950 as a graduate college focusing on area studies. The College is the most international of the
graduate colleges of the University of Oxford specialising in international relations, economics, politics and history of various parts of the
world. The European Studies Centre opened in 1976 to promote the interdisciplinary study of Europe at Oxford.
__________________________________________________________________

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 SEESP Newsletter No 2, July 2004

SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAMME

European Studies Centre, St Antony's College

70 Woodstock Road,
Oxford OX2 6JF

Telephone: + 44 (0) 1865 274 537 Fax: + 44 (0) 1865 284478

email seesp@sant.ox.ac.uk

web http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/southeasteur.shtml

Newsletter Editorial Committee:

Othon Anastasakis

Dimitar Bechev

Kalypso Nicoladis

Tuba nl

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