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2014-04-14

Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox
by X.Y. Newberry

Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as x! Px " #Px! $ Qx! . %he strong similarity of the resulting logic with &ichard 'ia(’s truth)relevant logic is pointed out. Section * further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. +t is noted that, given this valuation, ,-del’s sentence becomes neither true nor false. %he similarity of this outcome with ,oldstein and ,aifman’s solution of the .iar paradox, which is discussed in section /, is emphasi(ed. Section 0 returns to the definition of meaningfulness1 the meaninglessness of certain sentences with empty subjects and of the .iar sentence is discussed. %he objective of this paper is to show how all the above)mentioned concepts are interrelated.

1. Justification of Strawson’s Theory of Presuppositions
P.F. Strawson is known for introducing the logic of presuppositions. According to this theory, the sentence !he present king of France is wise." #1.1$

is neither true nor false if there is no king of France. %ntuiti&ely #1.1$ is 'eaningful. Strawson considered the (uestion of how a 'eaningful sentence can )e neither true nor false as the 'ain pro)le' #Strawson, 1*+0, pp. ,21-,24- 1*+2, pp. 1.4-1.+$, and he proposed a solution. /e 'ade a distinction )etween a sentence and the use of a sentence. For e0a'ple #1.1$ is a sentence, )ut it can )e used differently on different occasions. %f so'eone uttered #1.1$ in the era of 1uis 2%3, he would )e 'aking a true assertion- if so'eone uttered it in the era of 1uis 23 he would )e 'aking a false assertion- and if so'e)ody uttered it today it would )e neither true nor false. Strawson defined 'eaning as follows4 to gi&e the 'eaning of a sentence is to gi&e general

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directions for its use in 'aking true or false assertions." #Strawson, 1*+0, p. 15+$. /e co'pared it to gi&ing a 'eaning to %" or this." %n short, Strawson e'phasi6ed that #1.1$ was inde0ical. !his was too 'uch for 7ertrand 8ussell, who wrote4 As regards the present 9ing of France", he fastens upon the egocentric word present" and does not see' a)le to grasp that, if for the word present" % had su)stituted the words in 1*0+", the whole of his argu'ent would ha&e collapsed." #8ussell, 1*+., p. ,5+$ % will suggest a new :ustification of the logic of presuppositions using the following three definitions. 'efinition 12 A sentence is meaningful iff it or its internal negation e0presses a possi)le state of affairs. 'efinition 22 A sentence is true iff the possi)le state of affairs it e0presses corresponds to an actual state of affairs. 'efinition *2 A sentence is false iff the possi)le state of affairs e0pressed )y its internal negation corresponds to an actual state of affairs. ;efinition 1 is Ayer<s interpretation of =ittgenstein. A genuine proposition pictures a possi)le state of affairs." #Ayer, 1*54, p. 112$ =hether Ayer intended it or not, this is not the sa'e as the &erification principle. % consider a state of affairs possi)le iff we can picture it to oursel&es. >ontradictions are 'eaningful in the sense that they can )e interpreted as denying the state of affairs e0pressed )y its internal negation. For e0a'ple ?!he apple in the )asket is red and not red? denies that the apple is either red or not red. ;efinition 2 is &ery si'ilar to %n order to tell whether a picture is true or false we 'ust co'pare it with reality." #=ittgenstein, 1*@1, p. 10.$ !he internal negation in definitions 1 and , 'eans the denial of the predicate rather than

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!herefore the sentence is neither true nor false. if we enu'erate all the things that are wise and all the things that are not wise..*..$.the denial of the state of affairs. p. =e can picture to oursel&es what the sentence states." #Strawson. it is co'pati)le with the traditional Aristotelian syllogis' #Strawson. A negation in this sense asserts that the king of France does not posses the property of )eing wise. 1. 15+. /owe&er. . !here are two interesting o)ser&ations a)out the logic of presuppositions #1P$.1. >learly !he 9ing of France in 1*0+ was wise.efinite . %nstead of saying the king of France is not wise" we could say the king of France is unwise" or perhaps e&en the king of France is foolish. 1ater Strawson 'odified his stance and offered this definition4 %t is enough that it should )e possi)le to descri)e or imagine Ae'phasis addedB circu'stances in which its use would result in a true or false state'ent. this )eco'es it should )e possi)le to picture to oursel&es circu'stances in which its use would result in a true or false state'ent." #1. A no&el could ha&e )een written in the era of 1uis 2%3 a)out the French 'onarchy in 1*0+. !he denial of the state of affairs is a wider concept and includes the possi)ility that there is no king of France at all. pp. the 9ing of France in 1*0+ will not appear on either list. 1*+2. .escriptions #!. 1*+2.2$ e0presses a possi)le state of affairs. %t is illu'inating to contrast the two. his decisions are not well thought out and his acts often ha&e unintended or detri'ental conse(uences." that is.$ =hen translated into our parlance. 1P is an alternati&e to the !heory of .$ Secondly. Firstly." !his is &ery si'ilar to our theory.

1*+2. Perhaps Aristotle and Strawson were right while 8ussell was wrong. % do not find this plausi)le. does not.$ is usually considered A&acuouslyB true.4$ is false. pp. proposes that #1. 1P also holds that #1.1.. hold that #1.-1.1$ ." can )e analy6ed either as D#Ex$(fx F ~gx) or as 4 #2. although #1.1$ can )e false only if there is a king of France. is to elucidate the sentences where the gra''atical su):ect is in the singular with the definite article.$ 1P treats such sentences and uni&ersally (uantified sentences unifor'ly while !.. Strawson has o)ser&ed that the natural language sentence All Cohn<s children are asleep. 1@. %n contrast !.1. According to 1P )oth All the kings of Swit6erland ha&e )een wise..$ !he purpose of !.. #!he su):ect class 'ust )e none'pty for the sentence to ha&e a truth &alue." #1.4$ #1. Presuppositions & Truth Relevance 2." and !he present king of Swit6erland is wise.*$. #%t is not clear why we need to analy6e the definite article considering that 'ost languages including 1atin do not ha&e it.2$ #2..7oth 1P and !.. 2.1$ can )e true only if there is a king of France.1.$ are neither true nor false. Presuppositions %n Strawson<s &iew a sentence is neither true nor false if its su):ect class is e'pty #Strawson.

1$ is neither true nor false if Cohn has no children.1..2$ is true.D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ F #Ex$#fx$ or as D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ F #Ex$#fx$ F #Ex$#Dgx$." %f Cohn does not ha&e any children then. Accepting #2..4$ would open the (uestion of what the translation into English of D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" is. %n other words the two following conditions hold4 #a$ if All Cohn<s children are asleep" is true then Cohn has children" is true #)$ if All Cohn<s children are asleep" is false then Cohn has children" is true =e say that #2..1." Gote that if we accept this solution then #Ex$#fx$" is no longer a part of the translation of All Cohn<s children are asleep.$ or #2.+$ #2. Strawson re:ected all three interpretations and proposed a different approach4 !he sentence #2.1.1$ and D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ can no longer )e e(ui&alent.4$ are false.1$ presupposes Cohn has children. #2.$ #2.1." and #Ex$#gx$ #2. #2.1. where #Ex$#fx$ stands for Cohn has children. according to classical logic.1.1.1.1.1.4$ #2.$ and #2.1.1. All Cohn<s children are asleep" is now a con:unction of three for'ulas of which D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ is only one.@$ stands for So'ething is asleep. !he sentence #2." !he reason is that it is not possi)le to e0press )oth + .

1$ and its negation as a con:unction of so'e wff with #Ex$fx. we o)tain #x$#Dgx H Dfx$.11$ #2. #0$##2 I 0 I 4$ -I D#0 J 0 K 1$$. =e will depart fro' Strawson )y re(uiring that the predicate class not )e uni&ersal.12$ #2. we ha&e #a$ if D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$" is true then #Ex$# x F D x$" is true #)$ if D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$" is false then #Ex$# x F D x$" is true 7ut #Ex$# x F D x$" is not true hence D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$ is neither true nor false." !he logic is no longer classical.5$ #2. =e note that #2.1.*$ #2.1. is neither true nor false as well.2$ is e(ui&alent to #x$#fx H gx$. !his generali6es to any Fx and Gx.$ and #2. 7y Lodus !ollens. #2." !hen #a$ if D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" is true then #Ex$#fx$" is true #)$ if D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" is false then #Ex$#fx$" is true D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" presupposes #Ex$#fx$. !he sa'e applies to its e(ui&alent #x$## x F D x$ H !x$.1.$ Gow Dgx is the su):ect class and it ought to )e none'pty.. So.5$ are neither true nor false )ecause D#Ex$# x F D x$ is always true. !herefore. #2.1. !herefore.1.1.10$ #2.1. !he following e0a'ple fro' arith'etic.#2.1. we can let D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" stand as the for'ali6ation of All Cohn<s children are asleep. %n particular.. for a sentence of the @ .1.1.

!he shortcut ta)les for dis:unction and con:unction are )elow.2 Truth Relevance %n 1*51 8ichard . p H #$ H p$ is true" #. .2. A for'ula is truth rele&ant if all the &aria)les occurring in it are truth rele&ant. !he ter' $ is not rele&ant to the deter'ination of p H #$ H p$." . %f p is false.ia6. @+-. !hen $ H p is true )y shortcut 2. A case in point is p H #$ H p$. if $ is true. =hen e&aluating for'ulae of classical propositional calculus. 2. 1*514 p. we often find oursel&es using shortcuts such as 1. 1*51. 0" stands for uknown. and hence p H #$ H p$ is true. =e will call this kind of rele&ance truth"rele#ance. regardless of the &alue of p !here are e&en so'e for'ulae whose truth &alue 'ay )e deter'ined in e&ery &aluation.for' D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" to )e either true or false. then p H $ is true.ia6 pu)lished a 'onograph in which he presented truth" rele#ant logic #. @+$. then )y 1. then p H $ is true.$ %t has striking si'ilarities with the logic of presuppositions. )oth #Ex$#fx$" and #Ex$#Dgx$" 'ust hold. Suppose p is true. again )y 2.ia6. if p is false. e&en if we do not know the truth &alue assigned to one of its &aria)les in any #aluation. pp. regardless of the &alue of $ 2.

An e0a'ple of a t-rele&ant tautology is 'odus tollens4 5 ..ia6. #D & $ & !." #. 1*51. P | Q | ~((P & ~P) & ~Q) -----------------------T | x | T F F F x F | x | T F T F x !a)le 1.$ !he tautologies that are not t rele&ant are the propositional counterparts of the &acuously true" sentences of classical logic4 # F D $ H !% D## F D $ F D!$.v | F x T ----------F | F x T x | x x T T | T T T !a)le 1. Mf special interest is the set of tautologies that are also t-rele&ant..1 & | F x T ---------F | F F F x | F x x T | F x T !a)le 1. =e do not need to use the truth &alue of ! to deter'ine that the for'ula is a tautology. p.2 And here is an e0a'ple of how to use these ta)les to e&aluate D## F D $ F D!$. @.

* .# & ~!$ H #! & ~ $. 2. 3on t)relevant tautology # FD $H! D## F D $ F D!$ 4ormula with an empty subject class #x$## x F D x$ H !x$ D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$ 3on t)relevant tautology ( H D#) F D)$ D#( F #) F D)$$ 4ormula with universal predicate class #x$#(x H D#)x F D)x$$ D#Ex$#(x F #)x F D)x$$ !he for'ulae on the right are )ut generali6ations of the for'ulas on the left. For 'ore detail please see Gew)erry #200*$. %n all likelihood truth-rele&ant logic can )e used as the )asis for for'ali6ing the logic of presuppositions.3 Conclusion =e note the iso'orphis' )etween the tautologies that are not t-rele&ant and the for'ulas that are neither true nor false )ecause their sub'ect class is empty or their predicate class is uni#ersal.

. %n su''ary.2$ is false.1.1.3.1. #. there are so'e #y$#Faiy F Gaiy$ #.1. When re Relations !either True !or "alse# =hen are relations neither true nor falseN For e0a'ple when is #x$#y$D#Fxy F Gxy$ neither true nor falseN %n classical logic.1.1$ will )e ! & F iff there is an ai such that 10 #.2$ is G.2$ is true.1. if one is false then #.... !he 'eaning of #. #x$#y$*xy is interpreted as follows.1.1.1.. %n the e0a'ple in Figure 1.$. 7ut there is no bi in the range of y for which #x$#Fxbi F Gxbi$ is ! & F. %f there is no such #y$*aiy or #x$*xbi then #.. For all ai in the range of x% it is the case that #y$*aiy and.1.. %f all of the' are true then #. for all bi in the range of y% it is the case that #x$*xbi. then #Ey$Fay and #Ey$Gay... #...2$ #. please see Gew)erry #201.1.1..4$ #.2$ true in the logic of presuppositionsN =hat if #.1.4$ is G for so'e biN # G" stands for D#! & F$".$ =e will si'ply count" only those #y$*aiy and #x$*xbi that are either true or false...@$ .2$ is then defined )y the following procedure.1$ =hen is #.$ is G for so'e ai or if #. For for'al se'antics.+$ that are ! & F...1.$ #. >ollect all the #y$*aiy and #x$*xbi that are either true or false. =hen a O t.

. . . . . . . . . . . .x t Figure 1 11 . . . F F F F F F F F .1. . . . .. . | . . Figure 2 shows the case when #. . . .. . | . . . . . . . . .. G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . finally Figure . . . . . .1$ is D#! & F$. . . . ... . . . . . . . shows the case when #. . . G G G G G . . . . . . . . . .1. . . . . . | . F F F F . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . F F F F F F F . .1.1$ will )e ! & F if F and P o&erlap along )oth a0es. . F F F F F F . . . . . . . .1$ is true. . . . . . . . . .1. . .*$ !his 'eans that #. . . it will )e ! & F if #Ex$A#Ey$Fxy F #Ey$GxyB F #Ey$A#Ex$Fxy F #Ex$GxyB. . . . . . . . . . .. . | . G G G G G G G . . . . | . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . !hus. . | . . . . . . . . . .1$ is false. | . . . . . . . . .5$ #. . . . . . | . . . | .$ #. . #. . .#Ey$Faiy and #Ey$Gaiy and there is a bi such that #Ex$Fxbi and #Ex$Gxbi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----------------------------------------------. .1. . . . ..1. . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . G G G G G . . Figure 1 shows the case when #. y | | . . | . . . . . . . . .1. . | . !he asterisk 'eans )oth F and P. . . G G G G G G G . . . . | . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . | . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . F F F F F F F . . | . | . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F . | . . | . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F * * G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . -------------------------------------------------x Figure . | . F F F F F F F F . . . | . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .y | | . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . | . | . . . . | . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . F F F F . . . | . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . ******* 12 . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . F F F F F . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . | . . . | . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------------------------------------------------x Figure 2 y | | . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . F F F F F * * G G G G G G G . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F * * G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . | . . . . . . . . | . . . | . G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . G G G G G G G G . . | . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . .

%n case of #.our logic is not classical. !his is so )ecause the two regions do not o&erlap along the x a0is..2$ #.2. Either the two regions o&erlap #Figure 4$ or they do not #Figure +$.. #.1$ will )e D#! & F$ if D#Ex$Fxm is true.it can ne&er )e true.. D#Ex$#Ey$#Fxy F Gy$..$ #. 1et us pick.2.2.4$ is D#! & F$ #Figure @$..2.2$ is e0pressed as D#Ex$#Ey$AFxy F ##y O m$ F #x O x$$B.. For e0a'ple let Gy" )e y O m"4 D#Ex$#Ey$#Fxy F #y O m$$. there were two further su)cases4 either the for'ula was true #Figure 2$ or it was neither true nor false #Figure 1. such that only one y O m satisfies Gy. 1.1.@$ that is. when the two regions did not o&erlap.+$ #. !here is no x" at G".2.2. =e o)ser&e that D#Ex$#x K 5 J @$#. !hen # 5x! 5y!6 x 7 y 8 9! " y : .. 1et us pick y O 54 D#Ex$A#x K 5 J @$ F #5 O 5$B. =e o)ser&e that #... 1et our do'ain )e the set of natural nu')ers..1$.1$ !he situation is depicted in Figures 4 and +. %n this case the two regions will not o&erlap #Figure +$..@$ is D#! & F$ analogously to #1. )ut we can i'agine that #.2.2..!< #.2. say.$..$ %t is apparent that #.1et us now study a special case. /ere there are only two cases.2.$ #. ..2. #..1$ can )e either false or neither true nor false.

. . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . Ge&ertheless. . . . | . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . +n the logic of presuppositions. . . . . . . . . . .*$ #. . | . .10$ is true. . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9! #.2. . . . . . .2. F F F F F . . | . . . . . . .0! and *. . .2. . F F F . . . . . . . . . .2.+$ is D#! & F$.2. n | G G G * * * * * G G G G G G G G G G G G | . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . .. . . . . . | . . . . . .2. . . . . . . . .5$ is D#! & F$. . . . . . -------------------------------------------------x Figure 4 14 . .y O 44 D#Ex$A#x K 4 J @$ F #4 O 5$B.. . . . . . #. . =e o)ser&e that D#Ex$#4 O 5$#. . | . F F F F F . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . *. . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . .2. . . . .5$ that is. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . .. . . | . F F F F F F F F . . .1=! are not equivalent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . | . | . . y | | . . . . . . | . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . # 5x! x 7 . . . %t is apparent that for any choice of y% the corresponding sentence will )e D#! & F$. . . . . . . | . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . hence #. . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6| . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m | G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------------------------------------------------. | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6| . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3| F F F . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .y | | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F . 4| . . . . . . . . . . 1| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --------------------------------------------------x Figure + y | 8| . | . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . | . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . 0| F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5| F . . . . | . . . . . 8| G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 7| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Figure @ ******* 1+ . . . 7| . . . . . . . | . . . . 2| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1| F F F F F . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2| F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . | . . 3| . . . . . . . . . . . 9| . . . . . . . . . 4| F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . .

.$ is neither true nor false.... 1@ ... it is neither true nor false.2.that is... !hus.. that D#Ex$ rf(x% m) #... #.... !hen #. +his(m) has )een constructed such that it holds :ust when m is the PQdel nu')er of #. %t is not surprising that it is not pro&a)leS Gote the close si'ilarity of this outco'e with Poldstein and Paif'an<s solution of the 1iar parado0 )elow.. #.2$ is true.1... 1et there )e a hypothetical deri&ation syste' S that deri&es only true sentences in Strawson<s sense.4$ #.1$ is not deri&a)le.+$ does two things4 %t asserts that #..1$4 D#Ex$#Ey$# rf(x%y) F +his(y)$.1$ Assu'e that PQdel<s sentence #. 1et<s now use our i'agination and suppose that D#Ex$ rfRR#x%mR$ #.. !hat is.1$ is D#! & F$.. and it denies a presupposition of #... A presupposition of #. #... !he e(ui&alent of PQdel<s sentence in the hypothetical syste' S would )e D#Ex$#Ey$# rfRR#x%y) F +hisR#y)$....$..+$ #... %t does not deri&e any of the &acuously true" for'ulas of classical logic as indeed the logic of presuppositions does not regard these as true.... 7ut then #. it deri&es neither #2.$ is unpro&a)le...... Syste' S has gaps..$ is #Ex$ rf...10$.. where x and y are PQdel nu')ers of wffs or se(uences of wffs.. if PQdel<s sentence is not deri&a)le.(x%mR$...+$ nor their negations.PQdel<s sentence has the sa'e for' as #..$ is pro&a)le in S..2.1$ rf(x%y) 'eans that x is the proof of y.

1$ #4.1$. =hen we e&aluate the sentence on line 1 we are instructed to e&aluate the sentence on line 14 =e enter an infinite loop.1$ #4.2$ )elow are two different sentence-tokens of the sa'e sentence-type.2$ we already know that the sentence on line 1 is not true. hence #4. 1ess con&incing is his unable" to"say paradox. %aif&an’s Solution of the 'iar Para(o) !he two-line pu66le is the launching point for the solution proposed )y /ai' Paif'an #2000$.2$ #4.e.+he sentence on line x is not true/ is false% else the latter is true. %t is the latterTthe su):ect of this workT that necessitates an attri)ution of truth &alues to pointers" AAuthor4 i. .. .$4 Go to line x and e#aluate the sentence written there. to tokensB #Paif'an. #4. !he sentences #4. which consists of our )eing una)le to say that the line 1 sentence is not true.ine 1 !he sentence on line 1 is not true.ine 2 !he sentence on line 1 is not true. #4.ine * !he sentence ne0t to the la)el ?1ine 1? is not true. and no truth &alue will e&er )e assigned to #4. =hen we e&aluate #4. .1$ and #4. .. !hus #4.1@$.ine 1 !he sentence on line 1 is not true. p. p.2$ /ow do we e&aluate a sentence of the for' !he sentence on line x is not true"N Paraphrasing Paif'an #2000. 2000. #4.1$ is neither true nor false. /ence. .1$ and #4.2$ are assigned different truth &alues although their gra''atical su):ects ha&e the sa'e referent and their predicates the sa'e e0tent.2$ is true.$.$ 1. -f that sentence is true% then . % find Paif'an<s e&aluation procedure (uite con&incing. 7ut consider the e0a'ple )elow4 . without repeating this &ery sa'e sentence.ine 2 !he sentence on line 1 is not true.

4$ and R !his sentence is not true" R in #4.4$ !his sentence" in #4.1$. %ts gra''atical su):ect has the sa'e referent as the su):ect of #4..2$ as true. that sentence #4. we indeed tend to interpret #4.2$ are not e(ui&alent when the sentence-tokens are the truth )earers.Mn line .$ are not e(ui&alent e&en if the sentence-types are the truth )earers. 7ut the sentence on line .1$ and #4. )ut it is also a different type. the construction of for'al languages is greatly si'plified when we adopt the con&ention that the sentence-types are the truth )earers.that is. is still true. %t succeeds in e0pressing our conclusion. without a contradiction. !hen #4. with a synony'. UUUUUUU Gote that we can replace the gra''atical su):ect of !his sentence is not true.. 1et us now assu'e that the sentence-types are the truth )earers.1$ and #4.1$ is not true.1$ and #4. Ge&ertheless we do o)tain a consistent syste' e&en if we take the sentence-types to )e the truth )earers. For e0a'ple. all the sentence-tokens of the sa'e sentence-type ha&e the sa'e truth &alue.1$. For e0a'ple. and its predicate has the sa'e e0tent as the predicate of #4. !his sentence is not true" is not true.1$ with a synonym. we ha&e replaced the gra''atical su):ect of sentence #4.4$. =hen using a natural language.2$ ha&e the sa'e truth &alue. Synony's )y definition ha&e the sa'e referent.+$ #4. !he latter is true )ut the for'er is neither true nor 15 . %t is a different token than the sentence on line 1. then we also ought to accept that #4. na'ely the sentence #4. )ut they alter the sentence-type. na'ely neither true nor false. %f we accept Paif'an<s thesis that #4.+$ ha&e the sa'e referent. #4.

$ is unpro&a)le.. !hen D!#V$ is true and V is neither true nor false. [G]) ~(Ex)Prf(x .. [~G]) (Ex)Prf(x. *. #... pp.. we utili6ed the following definition4 1* .. %n section 1.... =e ha&e reached the sa'e conclusion through different 'eans in Gew)erry #2005.false analogously to #4.. #4. we postulated a hypothetical deri&ation syste' S of the logic of presuppositions that deri&ed only the sentences that were true in Strawson<s sense #i... %+(el an( the 'iar =e concluded in section 4 that gi&en V O !his sentence is not true". #?P? stands for PQdel<s sentence..e. APB" stands for PQdel nu')er of P".$.[G]) ?alue D! F DF F F ! #+..1$..$ are 'eaningless..1$ !a)le +. =e ha&e seen that the e(ui&alent of PQdel<s sentence in the hypothetical syste' S would )e #..+$ is pro&a)le then #.. =e ha&e an al'ost co'plete analogy with the 1iar parado0...2$. D!#V$ was true )ut V was neither true nor false. Lore for'ally we can put V O !his sentence is not true".1-2$.$. %n section . pp.. >o'pare also #4. %f #.1 7ut there is yet another parallel4 7oth #+.1$ and #4.+$ with #..5-10$. V F#V$ !#V$ D!#V$ >rithmetic G (Ex)Prf(x.$ 3atural .4$.ang.1$ and #. if their presuppositions were true$.. A si'ilar result is o)tained )y 1awrence Poldstein #1**2..

% for' the sentence A4 !he apple is red !his sentence is 'eaningful.'efinition 12 A sentence is meaningful iff it or its internal negation e0presses a possi)le state of affairs.. =e further clarified that a state of affairs was possi)le if we could picture it to oursel&es. /owe&er. !he following sentences are 'eaningless as well.$ is 'eaningless if it is not deri&a)le..+$ #+.. Si'ilarly in case of #+.. Mur 'ain o):ecti&e then was to account for the sentences that were 'eaningful yet neither true nor false. 'eaningless sentences also e0ist.@$ 20 . !he 'eaningless sentences are a proper su)set of the sentences that are neither true nor false. !he 1iar sentence is e(ually 'eaningless. For e0a'ple All round s(uares are large #+.. #0$##P0 F DP0$ -I W0$ #0$##2I0I4$ -I #0 I 0K1$$ D#E0$#Ey$A#0 K y J @$ F #y O 5$B PQdel<s sentence #. )ut it is i'possi)le for round s(uares to e0ist.4$ #+. %t is possi)le for Cohn<s children to e0ist. Suppose % ha&e a )asket with a red apple.2$ when Cohn does not ha&e any children.$ !he sentence a)o&e does not e0press any possi)le state of affairs. !o deter'ine if it is true or false % ha&e to co'pare the possi)le state of affairs it e0presses with the actual state of affairs. An e0a'ple of such a sentence is All Cohn<s children are asleep #+.

%n short > is true if A is true. > e0presses the possi)le state of affairs that the possi)le state of affairs e0pressed )y A corresponds to the actual state of affairs. For e0a'ple >4 A is true !o deter'ine if > is true. its 'eaning$ % would not know what to co'pare it with or how to &erify it. neither true nor false or e&en 'eaningless. and we can for' sentences a)out sentences." A can )e false.e. !he &erification principle as a criterion of 'eaningfulness is too restricti&e. !he internal negation of A is true" is A is not true.74 !he apple is green %f % did not understand the possi)le state of affairs it e0pressed #i. % could perhaps &erify A )ut not falsify 7. > ! G F !a)le +.2 %n general to e&aluate a sentence of the for' X!he sentence 2 is true< we would follow 21 @ ! F F .2. %n all these cases. see !a)le +. !his would lead to the a)surd conclusion that only true sentences were 'eaningful. !he e0istence and properties of sentences are also facts. > is false. =hat if A is not trueN =e apply 'efinition *2 A sentence is false iff the possi)le state of affairs e0pressed )y its internal negation corresponds to an actual state of affairs. 7ut this does not 'ean that there should not )e a criterion.. we apply 'efinition 22 A sentence is true iff the possi)le state of affairs it e0presses corresponds to an actual state of affairs.

=e are not a)le to picture to oursel&es the state of affairs . we have arrived at an exact replica of .. =hat possi)le state of affairs does . e0presses. #.4 !he sentence .. 22 .this procedure4 Go to the label X and e#aluate the sentence written there. e0pressN %t e0presses" that the possi)le state of affairs that . %t has no truth &alue.. 1et us apply it to . . An atte'pt to find the 'eaning of .. )ecause it is 'eaningless. 2000.aifman’s evaluation procedure #Paif'an. therefore the co'positional se'antics is not applica)le. 7ut in fact . %n S there is no separation of truth and deri&a)ility.+he sentence X is true/ is true% otherwise it is false. indeed is an ele'ent of the set of untrue sentences. is an ele'ent of the set of untrue sentences...efinition 1.it ought not to )e deri&a)le. E&en if we use a rela0ed criterion of 'eaningfulness such as . is true. /ai' Paif'an 'ay ha&e put it )est when he said4 if the sentence fails to express a proposition it does not% contrary to appearance% say of itself that it is not true" #Paif'an. is 'eaningless :ust like #+.. -f that sentence is true% then . is clearly not &erifia)le.. is still 'eaningless. Asing our definitions of truth. Vet it appears to say that the sentence .. p. is true we need to deter'ine if . that is nothing. =e are in an infinite loop and no truth &alue will )e assigned to . e0presses does not correspond to an actual state of affairs. %t says the sa'e thing as #+.1@$ >ontrary to appearances. Further'ore .$ does not say that it itself is not deri&a)le. 2000.. lea&es us in an infinite loop as well.. well . is 'eaningless. %t does not e0press any. is not true %n order to deter'ine if . .$.$.+$. Sentence . !he algorith'ic procedure esta)lishes that . does not say that it itself is an ele'ent of the set of untrue sentences )ecause . p.

7ut is this not what we usually 'ean )y ?'eaning?N Poldstein and 7lu' #2005. p.? !he point is not well taken.and this is the source of the confusion . it does not follow that if all the co'ponents of a sentence ha&e referents then the whole sentence does. %t seems to )e saying .1+$ prefers to say that the 1iar sentence is 'eaningful )ut that it does not e0press a proposition.Paif'an #2000. !he construct of the proposition or statement is not necessary to esta)lish that V does not ?say? anything. p. % can only conclude that he would agree that the 1iar sentence #or token$ has no interpretation in the domain of sentences. !hat is there are cases such that e&en if there is an ob'ect corresponding to each ter' of a sentence.+$ argue4 ?)o we can a#oid all the unpalatable conclusions if we ac0nowledge that there is a sentence% the 1iar sentence% that is grammatically correct and meaningful (we can% after all% understand it and translate it into French) but deny that it can be used to ma0e a statement.. !he 'eaning of the 1iar sentence is the e#aluation procedure that re&eals that the sentence has no truth &alue. 7ut that does not 'ean that we ?understand? it. . why can we not argue that if we understand it then it 'ust )e 'aking a state'entN Secondly. Firstly. And % would dispute that we actually understand the sentence. !his procedure is the sense of the sentence states Paif'an. there is no state of affairs that corresponds to the whole sentence.that the liar sentence does not )elong to the set of true sentences. !his is the case whether the ter's are in French or in English.1$. 2. For one. =hat a)out its referenceN Paif'an does not say. )ut it does notS =e ha&e a tendency to erroneously pro:ect the 'eaning of the sentence #4. it causes a tre'endous a'ount confusion.$ into #4.

which is co'pati)le with StrawsonRs logic of presuppositions.Conclusion % ha&e outlined a si'ple theory of 'eaning and truth.ia6Rs truth-rele&ant logic.e. =hen )rought to its logical conclusions it i'plies that #0$##P0 F DP0$ -I W0$ is neither true nor false. if D#E0$F0 then #0$#F0 -I P0$ is neither true nor false. =e o)ser&e that such a logic is )ut a (uantified &ersion of . !his outco'e parallels the result we o)tained a)o&e for the 1iar sentence.$ =hen this theory is applied to self-referential sentences it yields the sa'e e&aluation as the one proposed )y /ai' Paif'an. i. StrawsonRs logic of presuppositions yields the result that a sentence is neither true nor false if its su):ect class is e'pty. -f that sentence is true% then . and as a result the 1iar sentence is neither true nor false. Since the procedure ne&er ends no truth &alue is assigned to 2. #>ontrary to the current trends it is a thesis of this paper that while the &erification principle is too restricti&e a criterion of meaningfulness is re$uired.+he sentence X is not true/ is false% else the latter is true. %t can )e generali6ed to sentences with 'any &aria)les. !he sentence 24 !he sentence 2 is not true is e&aluated as follows4 Go to the label X and e#aluate the sentence written there. 24 . and we find that then PQdel<s sentence is neither true nor false.

2 #12$4 +Y@. .V.ac. 1ondon4 Lethuen. +he (easoner% 2#2$4 4-+.co'ZdocZ..scri)d. #201.V.$ Formal )emantics for +he 1ogic of resuppositions.+$4 .raphy Ayer. #2010$ Gotes on Paif'anRs Solution of !he 1iar Parado0.24. Poldstein.5+.pdf AAccessed 2* Culy 2010B.ZSyste'-!8 AAccessed 21 August 2010B. +he (easoner. Strawson.F. 7.B 8ussell. #200*$ )ystem +( for +ruth"(ele#ant 1ogic. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww. 2+ .ZFor'al-Se'antics-for-!he-1ogic-of-Presuppositions AAccessed * April 201. /.21Y.elhi4 %ndian >ouncil of Philosophical 8esearch4 . #1*54$ hilosophy in the +wentieth 2entury% Gew Vork4 3intage 7ooks. P. #1*+0$ Mn referring. 2. Per'any4 Philosophia 3erlag. #1*@1$ +ractatus 1ogico" hilosophicus.pdf Gew)erry.8.$4 .co'ZdocZ@.F. #1*+2$ -ntroduction to 1ogical +heory. #1*51$ +opics in the 1ogic of (ele#ance. 4ind. 2ircularity% 3efinition% and +ruth% Gew .ac. Paif'an.. P. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww.scri)d. Poldstein. +he (easoner. 2. *nalysis 02 #1$4 1Y2. #2005$ 3an Fraassen on presupposition and self-reference. Lunich.*Y121.colu')ia. Gew)erry. Strawson on referring.kent. Strawson. 1ondon4 8outlege F 9egan Paul >opyright © 2. 1. A.$ Lr. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww. 1.ia6. 0B #2.V.C.ukZseclZphilosophyZ:wZ!he8easonerZ&ol2Z!he8easoner-2#12$-screen. %n4 A.eduZDhg1.ukZseclZphilosophyZ:wZ!he8easonerZ&ol2Z!he8easoner-2#2$. Pupta.V. 4ind% 99 #2@. =ittgenstein.i-lio. 2. eds.25. >hapuis F A.22*@4@. 7lu' A #2005$ ?=hen is a state'ent not a state'entNY=hen it<s a 1iar?.Zgaif'an@. 2. #2000$ Pointers to propositions.52.kent. #1**2$ X!his State'ent %s Got !rue< %s Got !rue. #1*+.ac. L. Gew)erry. 1. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww.pdf AAccessed 2* Culy 2010B. /#2$4 22-2. Gew)erry 2010-2014 For non-co''ercial purposes this docu'ent 'ay )e freely copied and distri)uted. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww.kent.V.ukZseclZphilosophyZ:wZ!he8easonerZ&ol4Z!he8easoner4#2$-screen.pdf Gew)erry. A&aila)le at4 http4ZZwww.