2014-04-14

Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox
by X.Y. Newberry

Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as x! Px " #Px! $ Qx! . %he strong similarity of the resulting logic with &ichard 'ia(’s truth)relevant logic is pointed out. Section * further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. +t is noted that, given this valuation, ,-del’s sentence becomes neither true nor false. %he similarity of this outcome with ,oldstein and ,aifman’s solution of the .iar paradox, which is discussed in section /, is emphasi(ed. Section 0 returns to the definition of meaningfulness1 the meaninglessness of certain sentences with empty subjects and of the .iar sentence is discussed. %he objective of this paper is to show how all the above)mentioned concepts are interrelated.

1. Justification of Strawson’s Theory of Presuppositions
P.F. Strawson is known for introducing the logic of presuppositions. According to this theory, the sentence !he present king of France is wise." #1.1$

is neither true nor false if there is no king of France. %ntuiti&ely #1.1$ is 'eaningful. Strawson considered the (uestion of how a 'eaningful sentence can )e neither true nor false as the 'ain pro)le' #Strawson, 1*+0, pp. ,21-,24- 1*+2, pp. 1.4-1.+$, and he proposed a solution. /e 'ade a distinction )etween a sentence and the use of a sentence. For e0a'ple #1.1$ is a sentence, )ut it can )e used differently on different occasions. %f so'eone uttered #1.1$ in the era of 1uis 2%3, he would )e 'aking a true assertion- if so'eone uttered it in the era of 1uis 23 he would )e 'aking a false assertion- and if so'e)ody uttered it today it would )e neither true nor false. Strawson defined 'eaning as follows4 to gi&e the 'eaning of a sentence is to gi&e general

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directions for its use in 'aking true or false assertions." #Strawson, 1*+0, p. 15+$. /e co'pared it to gi&ing a 'eaning to %" or this." %n short, Strawson e'phasi6ed that #1.1$ was inde0ical. !his was too 'uch for 7ertrand 8ussell, who wrote4 As regards the present 9ing of France", he fastens upon the egocentric word present" and does not see' a)le to grasp that, if for the word present" % had su)stituted the words in 1*0+", the whole of his argu'ent would ha&e collapsed." #8ussell, 1*+., p. ,5+$ % will suggest a new :ustification of the logic of presuppositions using the following three definitions. 'efinition 12 A sentence is meaningful iff it or its internal negation e0presses a possi)le state of affairs. 'efinition 22 A sentence is true iff the possi)le state of affairs it e0presses corresponds to an actual state of affairs. 'efinition *2 A sentence is false iff the possi)le state of affairs e0pressed )y its internal negation corresponds to an actual state of affairs. ;efinition 1 is Ayer<s interpretation of =ittgenstein. A genuine proposition pictures a possi)le state of affairs." #Ayer, 1*54, p. 112$ =hether Ayer intended it or not, this is not the sa'e as the &erification principle. % consider a state of affairs possi)le iff we can picture it to oursel&es. >ontradictions are 'eaningful in the sense that they can )e interpreted as denying the state of affairs e0pressed )y its internal negation. For e0a'ple ?!he apple in the )asket is red and not red? denies that the apple is either red or not red. ;efinition 2 is &ery si'ilar to %n order to tell whether a picture is true or false we 'ust co'pare it with reality." #=ittgenstein, 1*@1, p. 10.$ !he internal negation in definitions 1 and , 'eans the denial of the predicate rather than

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A no&el could ha&e )een written in the era of 1uis 2%3 a)out the French 'onarchy in 1*0+. !herefore the sentence is neither true nor false. %t is illu'inating to contrast the two. pp.2$ e0presses a possi)le state of affairs. 1ater Strawson 'odified his stance and offered this definition4 %t is enough that it should )e possi)le to descri)e or imagine Ae'phasis addedB circu'stances in which its use would result in a true or false state'ent. 1P is an alternati&e to the !heory of . !here are two interesting o)ser&ations a)out the logic of presuppositions #1P$. =e can picture to oursel&es what the sentence states.. >learly !he 9ing of France in 1*0+ was wise. the 9ing of France in 1*0+ will not appear on either list.the denial of the state of affairs.$ =hen translated into our parlance. /owe&er.escriptions #!. %nstead of saying the king of France is not wise" we could say the king of France is unwise" or perhaps e&en the king of France is foolish." #1.*. his decisions are not well thought out and his acts often ha&e unintended or detri'ental conse(uences.. 1*+2. Firstly. . 1*+2.$. 1.$ Secondly. !he denial of the state of affairs is a wider concept and includes the possi)ility that there is no king of France at all. if we enu'erate all the things that are wise and all the things that are not wise.1." #Strawson." !his is &ery si'ilar to our theory. p. this )eco'es it should )e possi)le to picture to oursel&es circu'stances in which its use would result in a true or false state'ent." that is. it is co'pati)le with the traditional Aristotelian syllogis' #Strawson. . A negation in this sense asserts that the king of France does not posses the property of )eing wise.efinite . 15+.

." can )e analy6ed either as D#Ex$(fx F ~gx) or as 4 #2. 1@. 1P also holds that #1. is to elucidate the sentences where the gra''atical su):ect is in the singular with the definite article.-1. proposes that #1.$ is usually considered A&acuouslyB true. 2.1$ .. % do not find this plausi)le.7oth 1P and !.$ 1P treats such sentences and uni&ersally (uantified sentences unifor'ly while !.2$ #2. %n contrast !. Presuppositions & Truth Relevance 2.$ are neither true nor false.*$. although #1. does not.4$ is false. According to 1P )oth All the kings of Swit6erland ha&e )een wise.1. Perhaps Aristotle and Strawson were right while 8ussell was wrong. pp. #%t is not clear why we need to analy6e the definite article considering that 'ost languages including 1atin do not ha&e it.1$ can )e false only if there is a king of France.1...." #1.1. Strawson has o)ser&ed that the natural language sentence All Cohn<s children are asleep. Presuppositions %n Strawson<s &iew a sentence is neither true nor false if its su):ect class is e'pty #Strawson.$ !he purpose of !. #!he su):ect class 'ust )e none'pty for the sentence to ha&e a truth &alue. hold that #1.." and !he present king of Swit6erland is wise. 1*+2.1$ can )e true only if there is a king of France.4$ #1.

1.4$ would open the (uestion of what the translation into English of D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" is.1." Gote that if we accept this solution then #Ex$#fx$" is no longer a part of the translation of All Cohn<s children are asleep. #2..1.4$ are false.1.$ and #2. !he sentence #2.1.1. Accepting #2.1. Strawson re:ected all three interpretations and proposed a different approach4 !he sentence #2. All Cohn<s children are asleep" is now a con:unction of three for'ulas of which D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ is only one." and #Ex$#gx$ #2. #2.1.$ or #2." %f Cohn does not ha&e any children then. %n other words the two following conditions hold4 #a$ if All Cohn<s children are asleep" is true then Cohn has children" is true #)$ if All Cohn<s children are asleep" is false then Cohn has children" is true =e say that #2.1$ presupposes Cohn has children.1.2$ is true. where #Ex$#fx$ stands for Cohn has children..1.1.@$ stands for So'ething is asleep. according to classical logic." !he reason is that it is not possi)le to e0press )oth + .1$ and D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ can no longer )e e(ui&alent.+$ #2.1$ is neither true nor false if Cohn has no children..$ #2.4$ #2.D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ F #Ex$#fx$ or as D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$ F #Ex$#fx$ F #Ex$#Dgx$.1.

$ and #2. So.. for a sentence of the @ . we ha&e #a$ if D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$" is true then #Ex$# x F D x$" is true #)$ if D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$" is false then #Ex$# x F D x$" is true 7ut #Ex$# x F D x$" is not true hence D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$ is neither true nor false.. #2.1." !he logic is no longer classical.11$ #2.1.*$ #2.10$ #2.1. !he following e0a'ple fro' arith'etic. #2.1.12$ #2. =e will depart fro' Strawson )y re(uiring that the predicate class not )e uni&ersal. !he sa'e applies to its e(ui&alent #x$## x F D x$ H !x$.5$ #2. we o)tain #x$#Dgx H Dfx$.#2.1. we can let D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" stand as the for'ali6ation of All Cohn<s children are asleep.5$ are neither true nor false )ecause D#Ex$# x F D x$ is always true. =e note that #2. !his generali6es to any Fx and Gx.1.1. !herefore. is neither true nor false as well. #0$##2 I 0 I 4$ -I D#0 J 0 K 1$$.1$ and its negation as a con:unction of so'e wff with #Ex$fx.1.1. 7y Lodus !ollens.1.$ Gow Dgx is the su):ect class and it ought to )e none'pty. !herefore.2$ is e(ui&alent to #x$#fx H gx$. %n particular." !hen #a$ if D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" is true then #Ex$#fx$" is true #)$ if D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" is false then #Ex$#fx$" is true D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" presupposes #Ex$#fx$.

!he ter' $ is not rele&ant to the deter'ination of p H #$ H p$. 0" stands for uknown. =hen e&aluating for'ulae of classical propositional calculus. 1*51.ia6. p H #$ H p$ is true" #. . @+-. and hence p H #$ H p$ is true.ia6 pu)lished a 'onograph in which he presented truth" rele#ant logic #. =e will call this kind of rele&ance truth"rele#ance. then p H $ is true. e&en if we do not know the truth &alue assigned to one of its &aria)les in any #aluation. if $ is true. again )y 2. Suppose p is true. regardless of the &alue of p !here are e&en so'e for'ulae whose truth &alue 'ay )e deter'ined in e&ery &aluation. @+$. %f p is false. A for'ula is truth rele&ant if all the &aria)les occurring in it are truth rele&ant. we often find oursel&es using shortcuts such as 1. 2.2. if p is false. then )y 1. )oth #Ex$#fx$" and #Ex$#Dgx$" 'ust hold. then p H $ is true. pp.for' D#Ex$#fx F Dgx$" to )e either true or false.2 Truth Relevance %n 1*51 8ichard ." . !he shortcut ta)les for dis:unction and con:unction are )elow.ia6. 1*514 p. !hen $ H p is true )y shortcut 2.$ %t has striking si'ilarities with the logic of presuppositions. regardless of the &alue of $ 2. A case in point is p H #$ H p$.

1 & | F x T ---------F | F F F x | F x x T | F x T !a)le 1. #D & $ & !. p. P | Q | ~((P & ~P) & ~Q) -----------------------T | x | T F F F x F | x | T F T F x !a)le 1." #. Mf special interest is the set of tautologies that are also t-rele&ant. An e0a'ple of a t-rele&ant tautology is 'odus tollens4 5 .ia6.v | F x T ----------F | F x T x | x x T T | T T T !a)le 1.2 And here is an e0a'ple of how to use these ta)les to e&aluate D## F D $ F D!$.. @.$ !he tautologies that are not t rele&ant are the propositional counterparts of the &acuously true" sentences of classical logic4 # F D $ H !% D## F D $ F D!$. =e do not need to use the truth &alue of ! to deter'ine that the for'ula is a tautology.. 1*51.

3on t)relevant tautology # FD $H! D## F D $ F D!$ 4ormula with an empty subject class #x$## x F D x$ H !x$ D#Ex$## x F D x$ F D!x$ 3on t)relevant tautology ( H D#) F D)$ D#( F #) F D)$$ 4ormula with universal predicate class #x$#(x H D#)x F D)x$$ D#Ex$#(x F #)x F D)x$$ !he for'ulae on the right are )ut generali6ations of the for'ulas on the left. %n all likelihood truth-rele&ant logic can )e used as the )asis for for'ali6ing the logic of presuppositions. For 'ore detail please see Gew)erry #200*$. 2. * .# & ~!$ H #! & ~ $.3 Conclusion =e note the iso'orphis' )etween the tautologies that are not t-rele&ant and the for'ulas that are neither true nor false )ecause their sub'ect class is empty or their predicate class is uni#ersal.

#.1.1...1.. %n su''ary. When re Relations !either True !or "alse# =hen are relations neither true nor falseN For e0a'ple when is #x$#y$D#Fxy F Gxy$ neither true nor falseN %n classical logic. #x$#y$*xy is interpreted as follows.1.$.1. >ollect all the #y$*aiy and #x$*xbi that are either true or false. %n the e0a'ple in Figure 1. =hen a O t.. !he 'eaning of #.$ #.2$ is false.1$ =hen is #. %f there is no such #y$*aiy or #x$*xbi then #..1.4$ is G for so'e biN # G" stands for D#! & F$".2$ true in the logic of presuppositionsN =hat if #.1.. for all bi in the range of y% it is the case that #x$*xbi. 7ut there is no bi in the range of y for which #x$#Fxbi F Gxbi$ is ! & F.. then #Ey$Fay and #Ey$Gay.1$ will )e ! & F iff there is an ai such that 10 #. For for'al se'antics.1..1..4$ #.2$ is then defined )y the following procedure.2$ is G...2$ is true..2$ #.1.1.1. For all ai in the range of x% it is the case that #y$*aiy and..$ =e will si'ply count" only those #y$*aiy and #x$*xbi that are either true or false.@$ . there are so'e #y$#Faiy F Gaiy$ #.1.. please see Gew)erry #201.. if one is false then #.1.3..+$ that are ! & F. %f all of the' are true then #. #.$ is G for so'e ai or if #.

. . . . . . . | . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | .. . . . . | . . . . | . . . . . finally Figure . F F F F F . . it will )e ! & F if #Ex$A#Ey$Fxy F #Ey$GxyB F #Ey$A#Ex$Fxy F #Ex$GxyB.1$ is D#! & F$. .1$ is true. . . | . .1. . .#Ey$Faiy and #Ey$Gaiy and there is a bi such that #Ex$Fxbi and #Ex$Gxbi. . Figure 1 shows the case when #. . . . . | . . . . . . . #. . . | . . .x t Figure 1 11 . . . . . . . . . . .. . | . . shows the case when #. . . . . . . . . . .$ #. . . . . | . . . . . . . . | . . | . y | | .. . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2 shows the case when #. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .1$ will )e ! & F if F and P o&erlap along )oth a0es. . G G G G G G G . . . .1. . . . .1. . . . . . . . G G G G G . . . . . . F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . .1$ is false. . . . . . .1. . . . . . . . . . ----------------------------------------------. . .1. . | . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5$ #. . . . . . . . | . . .1. . . . . . . | . . . . .. . F F F F F F F F .. F F F F F F F F . G G G G G . .*$ !his 'eans that #. . . . .1. . . | . . . . F F F F F F .. . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . | . !hus. !he asterisk 'eans )oth F and P. G G G G G G G . .

| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . .y | | . . . . . . . . . . | . . . | . . . | . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . ******* 12 . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . | . . F F F F F F F . . . | . . | . . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . F F F F F * * G G G G G G G . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------------------------------------------------x Figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G . . . G G G G G G G G G . | . . . F F F F F F * * G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . . . . G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . | . . . . F F F F F . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . | . ------------------------------------------------x Figure 2 y | | . | . . . . F F F F F F F . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . | . . . F F F F F F F . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F * * G G G G G G G . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F . . . | . . | . . . . . | . . . . . . F F F F .

/ere there are only two cases..our logic is not classical.2. D#Ex$#Ey$#Fxy F Gy$.2..2..2. !his is so )ecause the two regions do not o&erlap along the x a0is. 1et our do'ain )e the set of natural nu')ers. 1et us pick y O 54 D#Ex$A#x K 5 J @$ F #5 O 5$B.$.$ #. %n this case the two regions will not o&erlap #Figure +$.@$ is D#! & F$ analogously to #1.2$ is e0pressed as D#Ex$#Ey$AFxy F ##y O m$ F #x O x$$B.2..!< #.. . say. For e0a'ple let Gy" )e y O m"4 D#Ex$#Ey$#Fxy F #y O m$$... %n case of #. #.2.1$ can )e either false or neither true nor false. =e o)ser&e that #.@$ that is.. !hen # 5x! 5y!6 x 7 y 8 9! " y : ..$ #..1$ will )e D#! & F$ if D#Ex$Fxm is true...1et us now study a special case.it can ne&er )e true.+$ #. 1..$ %t is apparent that #. Either the two regions o&erlap #Figure 4$ or they do not #Figure +$.. =e o)ser&e that D#Ex$#x K 5 J @$#. !here is no x" at G".1$.2.2$ #. there were two further su)cases4 either the for'ula was true #Figure 2$ or it was neither true nor false #Figure 1. when the two regions did not o&erlap..2.4$ is D#! & F$ #Figure @$.2. #.1$ !he situation is depicted in Figures 4 and +. such that only one y O m satisfies Gy.1.2.2. 1et us pick. )ut we can i'agine that #.

| . .1=! are not equivalent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. . . . .. . . . . | . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . .. . . | . | . . . . .+$ is D#! & F$. . . | .2. | . .2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +n the logic of presuppositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5$ that is. . . . . . . . . . | . . .0! and *.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*$ #. . . . . .y O 44 D#Ex$A#x K 4 J @$ F #4 O 5$B. 8 9! #. . | . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . %t is apparent that for any choice of y% the corresponding sentence will )e D#! & F$. . . . n | G G G * * * * * G G G G G G G G G G G G | . . . . #. . . . . . . . | . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . .. . .2. . . . . . . . . . . . . | . Ge&ertheless. . . .2. . . . . . . . . .2. .. . .5$ is D#! & F$. . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . # 5x! x 7 . . F F F . . . . . . . . | . | . . . | . -------------------------------------------------x Figure 4 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . .2. . . . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . .10$ is true. . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . y | | . . . . . F F F F F . hence #. . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =e o)ser&e that D#Ex$#4 O 5$#. . *. .

. . . . | . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7| . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F . . . . . . 3| . . . 0| . . . . . . . . . . . . 0| F F F F F F . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . 5| . . . . . . . . m | G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8| G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 7| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . --------------------------------------------------x Figure + y | 8| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . 6| . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . | . | . . . . . . . . . 2| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . | . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5| F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Figure @ ******* 1+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6| . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . 2| F F F F . . . . . | . . . . . . 3| F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1| F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1| . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . 9| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4| . . . . . . . . . . 4| F F . . . . . . . .y | | . . -------------------------------------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$ is pro&a)le in S.....4$ #.that is...PQdel<s sentence has the sa'e for' as #. 1@ ..1$4 D#Ex$#Ey$# rf(x%y) F +his(y)$..1$ is D#! & F$... !hen #..10$....$ is unpro&a)le. 1et there )e a hypothetical deri&ation syste' S that deri&es only true sentences in Strawson<s sense..1$ rf(x%y) 'eans that x is the proof of y. #.. 1et<s now use our i'agination and suppose that D#Ex$ rfRR#x%mR$ #. A presupposition of #.2. if PQdel<s sentence is not deri&a)le. %t is not surprising that it is not pro&a)leS Gote the close si'ilarity of this outco'e with Poldstein and Paif'an<s solution of the 1iar parado0 )elow. #......$..+$ nor their negations.. it deri&es neither #2..1.+$ #.. Syste' S has gaps.+$ does two things4 %t asserts that #... 7ut then #.. !he e(ui&alent of PQdel<s sentence in the hypothetical syste' S would )e D#Ex$#Ey$# rfRR#x%y) F +hisR#y)$..2. that D#Ex$ rf(x% m) #. it is neither true nor false.$ is #Ex$ rf.. where x and y are PQdel nu')ers of wffs or se(uences of wffs.. and it denies a presupposition of #.. !hus...2$ is true.. +his(m) has )een constructed such that it holds :ust when m is the PQdel nu')er of #... %t does not deri&e any of the &acuously true" for'ulas of classical logic as indeed the logic of presuppositions does not regard these as true. !hat is.1$ is not deri&a)le...... #..$ is neither true nor false...(x%mR$...1$ Assu'e that PQdel<s sentence #.

=hen we e&aluate #4.ine * !he sentence ne0t to the la)el ?1ine 1? is not true. . %t is the latterTthe su):ect of this workT that necessitates an attri)ution of truth &alues to pointers" AAuthor4 i.ine 2 !he sentence on line 1 is not true. 1ess con&incing is his unable" to"say paradox.1$ and #4. and no truth &alue will e&er )e assigned to #4.2$ is true. hence #4.1@$. p. which consists of our )eing una)le to say that the line 1 sentence is not true. . %aif&an’s Solution of the 'iar Para(o) !he two-line pu66le is the launching point for the solution proposed )y /ai' Paif'an #2000$.$.ine 2 !he sentence on line 1 is not true. !hus #4. #4.+he sentence on line x is not true/ is false% else the latter is true.$4 Go to line x and e#aluate the sentence written there.$ 1.ine 1 !he sentence on line 1 is not true.1$ and #4. p. without repeating this &ery sa'e sentence. /ence.. -f that sentence is true% then . #4. to tokensB #Paif'an.2$ #4. .1$ #4.2$ we already know that the sentence on line 1 is not true. !he sentences #4. #4.1$ is neither true nor false.e. 7ut consider the e0a'ple )elow4 .2$ /ow do we e&aluate a sentence of the for' !he sentence on line x is not true"N Paraphrasing Paif'an #2000. 2000.. .1$.ine 1 !he sentence on line 1 is not true. % find Paif'an<s e&aluation procedure (uite con&incing. .2$ are assigned different truth &alues although their gra''atical su):ects ha&e the sa'e referent and their predicates the sa'e e0tent.2$ )elow are two different sentence-tokens of the sa'e sentence-type. =hen we e&aluate the sentence on line 1 we are instructed to e&aluate the sentence on line 14 =e enter an infinite loop.1$ #4.

we indeed tend to interpret #4. Ge&ertheless we do o)tain a consistent syste' e&en if we take the sentence-types to )e the truth )earers.2$ are not e(ui&alent when the sentence-tokens are the truth )earers. #4. !his sentence is not true" is not true.1$ and #4. we ha&e replaced the gra''atical su):ect of sentence #4. 1et us now assu'e that the sentence-types are the truth )earers.. %t is a different token than the sentence on line 1. For e0a'ple.4$.+$ #4. UUUUUUU Gote that we can replace the gra''atical su):ect of !his sentence is not true. %ts gra''atical su):ect has the sa'e referent as the su):ect of #4.1$ is not true.1$ and #4.2$ as true.that is. !he latter is true )ut the for'er is neither true nor 15 . =hen using a natural language.1$ with a synonym. then we also ought to accept that #4. )ut it is also a different type. na'ely the sentence #4..2$ ha&e the sa'e truth &alue. %t succeeds in e0pressing our conclusion. For e0a'ple. !hen #4. na'ely neither true nor false. %f we accept Paif'an<s thesis that #4.1$ and #4.Mn line .4$ and R !his sentence is not true" R in #4.4$ !his sentence" in #4. Synony's )y definition ha&e the sa'e referent. and its predicate has the sa'e e0tent as the predicate of #4. with a synony'. that sentence #4.1$.$ are not e(ui&alent e&en if the sentence-types are the truth )earers. 7ut the sentence on line . the construction of for'al languages is greatly si'plified when we adopt the con&ention that the sentence-types are the truth )earers. without a contradiction.+$ ha&e the sa'e referent.1$. )ut they alter the sentence-type. is still true. all the sentence-tokens of the sa'e sentence-type ha&e the sa'e truth &alue.

.false analogously to #4.+$ is pro&a)le then #. %f #. [~G]) (Ex)Prf(x...... =e ha&e an al'ost co'plete analogy with the 1iar parado0.. %+(el an( the 'iar =e concluded in section 4 that gi&en V O !his sentence is not true". =e ha&e reached the sa'e conclusion through different 'eans in Gew)erry #2005. APB" stands for PQdel nu')er of P".$ are 'eaningless.1$ and #4.5-10$.[G]) ?alue D! F DF F F ! #+. *. %n section .$..1$ !a)le +. #4.e. #?P? stands for PQdel<s sentence. pp. Lore for'ally we can put V O !his sentence is not true".. A si'ilar result is o)tained )y 1awrence Poldstein #1**2.$ 3atural . we utili6ed the following definition4 1* . >o'pare also #4.. #. we postulated a hypothetical deri&ation syste' S of the logic of presuppositions that deri&ed only the sentences that were true in Strawson<s sense #i. =e ha&e seen that the e(ui&alent of PQdel<s sentence in the hypothetical syste' S would )e #.$ is unpro&a)le. if their presuppositions were true$. [G]) ~(Ex)Prf(x . !hen D!#V$ is true and V is neither true nor false. D!#V$ was true )ut V was neither true nor false.....1$ and #.+$ with #...ang.2$....... pp... %n section 1. V F#V$ !#V$ D!#V$ >rithmetic G (Ex)Prf(x.1$.4$.$.1-2$.1 7ut there is yet another parallel4 7oth #+.

..'efinition 12 A sentence is meaningful iff it or its internal negation e0presses a possi)le state of affairs.4$ #+. An e0a'ple of such a sentence is All Cohn<s children are asleep #+. #0$##P0 F DP0$ -I W0$ #0$##2I0I4$ -I #0 I 0K1$$ D#E0$#Ey$A#0 K y J @$ F #y O 5$B PQdel<s sentence #. !he 1iar sentence is e(ually 'eaningless. % for' the sentence A4 !he apple is red !his sentence is 'eaningful. %t is possi)le for Cohn<s children to e0ist.+$ #+. Mur 'ain o):ecti&e then was to account for the sentences that were 'eaningful yet neither true nor false.@$ 20 . =e further clarified that a state of affairs was possi)le if we could picture it to oursel&es.$ is 'eaningless if it is not deri&a)le.2$ when Cohn does not ha&e any children. For e0a'ple All round s(uares are large #+. !he 'eaningless sentences are a proper su)set of the sentences that are neither true nor false. Si'ilarly in case of #+. !he following sentences are 'eaningless as well. /owe&er. )ut it is i'possi)le for round s(uares to e0ist. !o deter'ine if it is true or false % ha&e to co'pare the possi)le state of affairs it e0presses with the actual state of affairs..$ !he sentence a)o&e does not e0press any possi)le state of affairs.. 'eaningless sentences also e0ist.. Suppose % ha&e a )asket with a red apple.

%n all these cases. > e0presses the possi)le state of affairs that the possi)le state of affairs e0pressed )y A corresponds to the actual state of affairs. !he &erification principle as a criterion of 'eaningfulness is too restricti&e. and we can for' sentences a)out sentences.2 %n general to e&aluate a sentence of the for' X!he sentence 2 is true< we would follow 21 @ ! F F . see !a)le +." A can )e false. !his would lead to the a)surd conclusion that only true sentences were 'eaningful.e.74 !he apple is green %f % did not understand the possi)le state of affairs it e0pressed #i. % could perhaps &erify A )ut not falsify 7.. > ! G F !a)le +. For e0a'ple >4 A is true !o deter'ine if > is true. !he e0istence and properties of sentences are also facts. 7ut this does not 'ean that there should not )e a criterion. %n short > is true if A is true. > is false. =hat if A is not trueN =e apply 'efinition *2 A sentence is false iff the possi)le state of affairs e0pressed )y its internal negation corresponds to an actual state of affairs. !he internal negation of A is true" is A is not true. neither true nor false or e&en 'eaningless.2. its 'eaning$ % would not know what to co'pare it with or how to &erify it. we apply 'efinition 22 A sentence is true iff the possi)le state of affairs it e0presses corresponds to an actual state of affairs.

Vet it appears to say that the sentence .. 1et us apply it to .. does not say that it itself is an ele'ent of the set of untrue sentences )ecause . %t has no truth &alue. therefore the co'positional se'antics is not applica)le. %t says the sa'e thing as #+. is true we need to deter'ine if . indeed is an ele'ent of the set of untrue sentences. =hat possi)le state of affairs does . ..$ does not say that it itself is not deri&a)le.. we have arrived at an exact replica of . Sentence . E&en if we use a rela0ed criterion of 'eaningfulness such as .. p. %t does not e0press any. Further'ore . 2000. is 'eaningless :ust like #+. that is nothing. 2000.1@$ >ontrary to appearances.. e0pressN %t e0presses" that the possi)le state of affairs that . 22 . !he algorith'ic procedure esta)lishes that .. is still 'eaningless. lea&es us in an infinite loop as well. =e are in an infinite loop and no truth &alue will )e assigned to .aifman’s evaluation procedure #Paif'an.it ought not to )e deri&a)le. is not true %n order to deter'ine if . is 'eaningless. 7ut in fact . Asing our definitions of truth. e0presses. An atte'pt to find the 'eaning of .efinition 1. well . p.4 !he sentence . #. /ai' Paif'an 'ay ha&e put it )est when he said4 if the sentence fails to express a proposition it does not% contrary to appearance% say of itself that it is not true" #Paif'an..$.. =e are not a)le to picture to oursel&es the state of affairs . .. is true..$. is clearly not &erifia)le. %n S there is no separation of truth and deri&a)ility. )ecause it is 'eaningless.+he sentence X is true/ is true% otherwise it is false. is an ele'ent of the set of untrue sentences. e0presses does not correspond to an actual state of affairs. -f that sentence is true% then .+$.this procedure4 Go to the label X and e#aluate the sentence written there.

!his procedure is the sense of the sentence states Paif'an.that the liar sentence does not )elong to the set of true sentences. =hat a)out its referenceN Paif'an does not say. )ut it does notS =e ha&e a tendency to erroneously pro:ect the 'eaning of the sentence #4.+$ argue4 ?)o we can a#oid all the unpalatable conclusions if we ac0nowledge that there is a sentence% the 1iar sentence% that is grammatically correct and meaningful (we can% after all% understand it and translate it into French) but deny that it can be used to ma0e a statement. 2.. 7ut is this not what we usually 'ean )y ?'eaning?N Poldstein and 7lu' #2005.and this is the source of the confusion . !hat is there are cases such that e&en if there is an ob'ect corresponding to each ter' of a sentence.$ into #4. !his is the case whether the ter's are in French or in English. . p. !he construct of the proposition or statement is not necessary to esta)lish that V does not ?say? anything. %t seems to )e saying . it causes a tre'endous a'ount confusion. Firstly. % can only conclude that he would agree that the 1iar sentence #or token$ has no interpretation in the domain of sentences. it does not follow that if all the co'ponents of a sentence ha&e referents then the whole sentence does. !he 'eaning of the 1iar sentence is the e#aluation procedure that re&eals that the sentence has no truth &alue. there is no state of affairs that corresponds to the whole sentence. And % would dispute that we actually understand the sentence.1+$ prefers to say that the 1iar sentence is 'eaningful )ut that it does not e0press a proposition.Paif'an #2000. why can we not argue that if we understand it then it 'ust )e 'aking a state'entN Secondly. 7ut that does not 'ean that we ?understand? it. p. For one.? !he point is not well taken.1$.

StrawsonRs logic of presuppositions yields the result that a sentence is neither true nor false if its su):ect class is e'pty. !he sentence 24 !he sentence 2 is not true is e&aluated as follows4 Go to the label X and e#aluate the sentence written there.$ =hen this theory is applied to self-referential sentences it yields the sa'e e&aluation as the one proposed )y /ai' Paif'an. %t can )e generali6ed to sentences with 'any &aria)les. -f that sentence is true% then . and we find that then PQdel<s sentence is neither true nor false.+he sentence X is not true/ is false% else the latter is true. and as a result the 1iar sentence is neither true nor false. #>ontrary to the current trends it is a thesis of this paper that while the &erification principle is too restricti&e a criterion of meaningfulness is re$uired. i.ia6Rs truth-rele&ant logic. which is co'pati)le with StrawsonRs logic of presuppositions. 24 . =e o)ser&e that such a logic is )ut a (uantified &ersion of . !his outco'e parallels the result we o)tained a)o&e for the 1iar sentence.e. =hen )rought to its logical conclusions it i'plies that #0$##P0 F DP0$ -I W0$ is neither true nor false. if D#E0$F0 then #0$#F0 -I P0$ is neither true nor false. Since the procedure ne&er ends no truth &alue is assigned to 2.Conclusion % ha&e outlined a si'ple theory of 'eaning and truth.

21Y. #201. 4ind% 99 #2@.elhi4 %ndian >ouncil of Philosophical 8esearch4 .*Y121.B 8ussell. Pupta. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww. +he (easoner% 2#2$4 4-+. Strawson.co'ZdocZ.kent. Gew)erry. Lunich. *nalysis 02 #1$4 1Y2.ZSyste'-!8 AAccessed 21 August 2010B.colu')ia.52. 7lu' A #2005$ ?=hen is a state'ent not a state'entNY=hen it<s a 1iar?. 2+ . #200*$ )ystem +( for +ruth"(ele#ant 1ogic.i-lio. 1. A&aila)le at4 http4ZZwww.ZFor'al-Se'antics-for-!he-1ogic-of-Presuppositions AAccessed * April 201.C. %n4 A.V. #1*+2$ -ntroduction to 1ogical +heory. +he (easoner.$ Lr. #2005$ 3an Fraassen on presupposition and self-reference..ukZseclZphilosophyZ:wZ!he8easonerZ&ol2Z!he8easoner-2#12$-screen.V.24. eds. 4ind.pdf Gew)erry. Poldstein.co'ZdocZ@.pdf AAccessed 2* Culy 2010B. 2.22*@4@.25.ac. 1ondon4 8outlege F 9egan Paul >opyright © 2. 2. #1*@1$ +ractatus 1ogico" hilosophicus.scri)d.ukZseclZphilosophyZ:wZ!he8easonerZ&ol2Z!he8easoner-2#2$. #2010$ Gotes on Paif'anRs Solution of !he 1iar Parado0. . A&aila)le at http4ZZwww.V. Strawson on referring. Poldstein. A.pdf AAccessed 2* Culy 2010B. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww. #2000$ Pointers to propositions.raphy Ayer. 1.eduZDhg1. P. >hapuis F A.+$4 . 1ondon4 Lethuen. 7.pdf Gew)erry.scri)d. =ittgenstein. #1**2$ X!his State'ent %s Got !rue< %s Got !rue.$4 .ac. #1*51$ +opics in the 1ogic of (ele#ance. Per'any4 Philosophia 3erlag. 2. 2ircularity% 3efinition% and +ruth% Gew . +he (easoner. 2. Gew)erry. /.F. 2 #12$4 +Y@.. 0B #2. 1.Zgaif'an@. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww. Paif'an.5+.8. Gew)erry 2010-2014 For non-co''ercial purposes this docu'ent 'ay )e freely copied and distri)uted.kent. P.F.ia6. A&aila)le at http4ZZwww.ac.kent.V.$ Formal )emantics for +he 1ogic of resuppositions. L. #1*54$ hilosophy in the +wentieth 2entury% Gew Vork4 3intage 7ooks. #1*+.ukZseclZphilosophyZ:wZ!he8easonerZ&ol4Z!he8easoner4#2$-screen.V. #1*+0$ Mn referring. /#2$4 22-2. Strawson.

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