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1) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

VILLASOR

Facts: A writ of execution (a writ to put in force the sentence that the law has given) was issued by the court against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a judgment rendered against the Philippine Government.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of execution, issued by respondent judge, is valid.

Held: It was ruled that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had
been previously granted and even if the State liability had been adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives
its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.

2) DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were
deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay,
and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects
nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule
effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is
exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State
may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through
a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be
made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to

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the suit against the State.4177 hectares. It may be invoked by the courts at any stage of the proceedings. was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded. either expressly of by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. Waiver of immunity. however. the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines. except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued. But. performed any act proprietary in character. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question. that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property. while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 2 . for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregated area of 1. 1954. under the administration of te National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). 3) REPUBLIC V. be that as it may. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Camarines Sur. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by act of the legislative body. that the property in question. ISSUE: Can the State be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land? RULING: No. started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers. FELICIANO [ 148 SCRA 424 ] Facts: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court revising the order of the Court of First Instance which dismissed the complaint of Pablo Feliciano for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. Act No. which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24. to Commonwealth Act 327. in fact. In the case. the Land Authority. President Ramon Magsaysay issued a Proclamation No. will not be inferred lightly. 90. Camarines Sur. a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. he took actual possession of the same. represented by the Land Authority. the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract. Pursuant. after which the NARRA and its successor agenby. nor that it could have. 90 reserving for settlement purposes. that his title of ownership based on the informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. express or implied. the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit. 1954. Moreover. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract.have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. Municipality of Tinambac. as amended by PD 1145.364. On November 1. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question for Victor Gardiola by virtue of Contract of Sale and followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale. but must be construed strictly. introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952. situated in Barrio of Salvacion. the Proclamation is not the legislative act. under settled jurisprudence is not permitted.

whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. which excepts those who "are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds" from the coverage of said section 9 — predicated upon its interpretation that the phrase other Government funds" includes funds of the United States Government — fails to persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its cancellation of del Mar monthly life pens. 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability. and. After due trial. the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims. PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension and PVA also asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. as amended. in March 1950. he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20. As a general proposition. a. a." since the funds from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by Congress for the PVA. he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20. 4) QUIRICO DEL MAR vs. constitutes well established doctrine in this jurisdiction. This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed in seriatim. there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief. and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA. 3 . The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. would render the Republic of the Philippines liable therefor. through the United States Veterans Administration. 3. 1. if adjudged finally to be meritorious. in the present controversy — involves a question solely of a legal nature. in reality. del Mar alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to court action. 4. the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury. The action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention. the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly life pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the Philippine Government. a. the said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government. we must initially determine whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines." 2. The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectual its policies. 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability.Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To resolve this issue. precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government. whether it exercises governmental functions. Pursuant to the foregoing. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA constitutes the core of the present controversy. The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil case because it involves a money claim against the said PVA — a mere agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no juridical personality of its own — and. in the affirmative. partakes of an action against the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without its consent. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION Del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command. The PVA's pretense that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of Republic Act 65. by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during World War II. this Court referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as "a claim for a sum of money against the Government. which claim. The rest of the assigned errors relate to the allege undue interference by the court a quo with the purely discretionary functions of the PVA in the matter of granting discontinuing the pension benefits.

1950 . the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. 356. 103." The order of August 26. in the exercise of their adjudicatory capacity. court of Industrial Relations6 is squarely in point. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City... COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS Facts: Petitioner’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice. and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. reads as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorize deputy sheriff of this Court. the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City. the NASSCO has a personality of its own. pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law . It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. Act No. 4201 has. There is no longer any reason. distinct and separate from that of the Government. [Wherefore]. as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs. 105. 5) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff. 1970. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash. a. to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13. Manansala had previously been issued.. or by any person authorized by this Court.. which is national in nature. and under this law. subject of this certiorari proceeding.' Accordingly. therefore. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6. Gabriel V. as amended. the same may not be garnished. as such. in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance. has already been dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9. the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. but in a resolution dated September 22. dated October 23. later Chief Justice. Hence. the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country." 4 . This Court directs the appellant Philippine Veterans Administration to compute and then to pay to the appellee del Mar his past and accumulated monthly life pension at the aforementioned statutory rates.' Following the law.. Issue: WON the funds mentioned may be garnished? Ruling: No Rationale: National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. The law concedes to administrative bodies the authority to act on and decide claims and applications in accordance with their judgment. since June 19. Manansala. this certiorari petition. for withholding action in this case. it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. and that. and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff. including Quezon City. 1965. as a government owned and controlled corporation. 1970. already repealed Commonwealth Act No."5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. The Court finds no merit in this argument. . since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character.. is untenable for. At this stage. the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment. Republic Act No. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. 1970.. He was the counsel of the prevailing party. it was denied. 1459). attached or levied upon.

(Bank of the United States v. Court of Industrial Relations. 5 . He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva. GABI president. held: "On the other hand. according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of Appeals. insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business. so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations. this petition. With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution. that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice." Then it can sue and be sued. Moreover. the new Chairman of the NPDC. CA FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. sought to clean up Rizal Park." Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions. it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Manila Hotel Company. 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29. Inc. as chairman of NPDC. However. Manila Hotel Employees Association v. In another notice dated March 5. 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. Issues: • WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents’ complaint against petitioner. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind. Although blind. without again anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.8 this Court. Iglesias. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation. Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. 244). the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. 6 L. Hence. through Justice Ozaeta. who is totally blind. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC. On appeal.. claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. 6) LANSANG vs.ed. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented. 1988. 1988 to vacate. GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC. the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. herein petitioner. The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias.In a 1941 decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority. its funds may be levied upon or garnished.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park.9 Wheat.M. the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. respondents were given until March 8. petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion. in front of the Army and Navy Club. As such. In a written notice dated February 23. Planters' Bank. It is an entirely different matter if. 1988. Kalaw St. One such kiosk was located along T. then chief warden of Rizal Park. 904. allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. Thereafter.

11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified. 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Lansang may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents. End result = some people were killed. Popularly known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. There were shooting and no one knows who started it.The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. It also does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity. Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. 6 . Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit. Branch 9 Facts: • This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22. in their personal capacity. • February 23. such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. uniformed individuals. The petitioner maintained that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Held: (1) NO . 7) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANDOVAL Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila. Twelve people died and the heirs of these people are seeking for retribution.) • Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages. Public officials are not exempt.There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang. • President Aquino issued AO no. GABI was allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. • WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner’s act of terminating respondent GABI’s concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty. thus. 1987. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for damages by the petitioners. Public streets. who may be ejected from the park when necessary. (2) NO . The most significant recommendation that they made was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. (the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Public parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and. could not be subject of a lease contract. This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to perform positive act. from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.

without having sounded any whistle or horn. the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent. • The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. the General Hospital ambulance. riding on a motorcycle. energy. By reason of the resulting collision. • Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The committed a prohibited act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. instead of turning toward the south. after passing the center thereof. the plaintiff was so severely injured that. 3. so that it would be on the left side of said avenue. as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. by which movement it struck the plaintiff. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. (8) MERITT vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS When the plaintiff. and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed. while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. • The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. sec. for he had lost the agility. • Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent was given in this case. who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street. deaths and casualties that took place. a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head. According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses. The commission was a fact finding body. Based on the investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are o When the Republic is sued by name o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. It also rests on reason of public policy – that public policy would be hindered and the public endangered. upon reaching said avenue. The commission was merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself. • The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation. if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder. Held: No Ratio: • Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI . and ability 7 . he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. into the right side of Taft Avenue. was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura.

Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law. (9) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs RUIZ Facts: The USA had a naval base in Subic. In determining the scope of this act . officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. a suit for specific 8 . except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. 1915. simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages. 2457. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between Philippines. is well settled. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government. As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract . that: SECTION 1. the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. supra. to which Mr. reads: An Act authorizing E. E. Did the defendant. . according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable. Act No. . be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature.that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency.By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. or create any cause of action in his favor. effective February 3. or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. to which Mr. therefore. . Zambales. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. By authority of the United States. It is. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. and to determine the amount of the damages. E. for the acts of its agents. if any. . Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. in enacting the above quoted Act. if any. and the US. to defendant said Government at the same.It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. For this reason. We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur." In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. E.

the restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. a function of the government of highest order. duly subscribe with Gov. Gullas' views of the desirability of settling this case noting that the deplorable conditions of some roads and bridges in the Province of Cebu await much. 9 . duly authorized by proper resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. after a series of conferences the latest of which was called upon the initiative of Honorable Eduardo R. who were sued in their official capacities. The Restrictive Theory of State Immunity means that a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. Eduardo R. as they hereby waive. • [Whereas]. nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. the private respondents-employees. 1968 up to the present date. Gov. hereby agrees to immediately appropriate and pay full back wages and salaries as awarded by the trial Court in its decision to all the private respondents-employees from and after July 1. • [Whereas]. respondents. It reads as follows: • [Whereas]. on the other hand. 1968. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. However. • [Whereas].needed funds for their immediate repair and/or improvement.performance was filed by him against the US.. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. and considering. In this case. commercial and proprietary acts. It does not apply where the contracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. Gullas. except for those who are qualified for compulsory retirement whose back salaries and wages shall be limited up to the effective date of their retirement. the parties agree. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private. up to the date of the approval of the herein Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Supreme Court. indisputably. they are not utilized for . to enter into a Compromise Agreement in the above-captioned case under the following terms and conditions: o The respondent Province of Cebu. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. (United States vs. However. • [Now Therefore]. pointed out the desirability of settling this case in the interest of all parties concerned. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. have long ceased to hold office. the sad plight of the private respondents-employees who have been out of job since July 1. its commercial activities or economic affairs. Ruiz) (10) COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS VS BURGOS On June 14. this Court received a pleading entitled Compromise Agreement. the rules of international law are not petrified. the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines. the date of their termination. 1979. Gullas. Only when it enters into business contracts. o That the private respondents-employees waive. their demand for reinstatement. Held: The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. has been authorized by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to negotiate and conclude an amicable settlement of this case. • [Whereas]. the parties after conferring together have agreed on all the terms and conditions of the final and complete settlement of this case. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign.

After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation. (11) CO KIM CHAM vs EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case. Ramon B. 3. Ceniza subject to said lawyer's charging and retaining liens. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. o That the petitioner Commissioner of Public Highways. 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws. Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case. o That private respondents-employees shall be entitled to collect their accumulated sick leave and vacation leave pay which shall be paid from JJ funds to be held in trust for the purpose as well as benefits under the Medicare and Workmens Compensation Act. for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of 10 . The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments. however. those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and. supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. o That upon approval by this Honorable Supreme Court of the herein Compromise Agreement the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower Court is deemed automatically vacated and lifted o That the amounts payable to the employees concerned. 2. lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation. are absolved of any and all personal and other civil liabilities of whatsoever nature. represented by Atty. with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Municipal laws and private laws. The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not the October 23. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation. regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts. o That private respondents-employees who are qualified for compulsory retirement as of the date of approval of this Compromise Agreement shall be allowed to retire in accordance with the existing retirement laws with the private respondent Province of Cebu appropriating and paying the Government's share of the GSIS retirement and insurance premiums o That the respondent Province of Cebu agrees to pay gratuity pay and/or optional retirement benefits to private respondents-employees qualified for optional retirement as of the date of the approval of this Compromise Agreement. o Those private respondents-employees who have died shall be paid back salaries and wages and retirement benefits through their heirs up to the time of their death upon presentation of the corresponding death certificate or other satisfactory proof. Civil obedience is expected even during war. without an enabling law. usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. initiated during the Japanese occupation.

they become his and derive their force from him. even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines. the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. the court said. it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. according to international law. 2. therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments. of course.” In the case of US vs Reiter. the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 3. the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant. “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power.society. IF. Summary of ratio: 1. as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now. It is a legal maxim that. and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan. The second question. non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) 11 . which would be in violation of international law. but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. by being continued as required by the law of nations. 3012. ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. or great mischief done. excepting of a political nature. And if they were not valid. or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.” Until. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. such construction is to be avoided. Since the laws remain valid. laws and courts of Japan. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila.” Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become. unless required by clear and unequivocal words. then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.” Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction. until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. Therefore.

the relief board allotted $365. judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80.000 for the earthquake beneficiaries. Therefore on October 6 of that year.85 for distribution. 1833. by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad. The Attorney-General in representation of the Philippine Islands.through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. in accordance with the above-mentioned allotments. It’s a most beneficient function & often necessary to be exercised in interest of humanity & prevention of injury to those who can’t protect themselves. Parens Patriae: parental authority/guardian Right to enforce all charities of a public nature by virtue of its general superintending authority over public Interests where no other person is entrusted with it inherent in supreme power of every state. denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state) (12) GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Facts: On June 3. The Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. April 14. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15. which was then under the Spanish Crown. and the costs of the cause. dated February 1. by order dated the 1st of that month. that devastated a lot of civilians. leaving a balance of S365. filed a claim for the $80. by authority of the King of Spain. 1863. represented by the Insular Treasurer. Held: The decision of the lower court was upheld with costs against the appellant. March 12. the Philippine Government.000 of the relief fund in installments of $20.000 each. whether lodged in a royalty or legislature & has no affinity to those arbitrary powers w/c are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people & the destruction of their liberties. together with interest. After a thorough investigation and consideration. to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by donors. Issue: Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has the capacity to file the suit to recover the $80. and June 2. the sum of $30. 1883. for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3. 403. a devastating earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands.000.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution.299.703. together with legal interest from February 28. Taking care of those who can’t vindicate their rights & protection of sovereign authority. 1912. The Government of the Philippine Islands as Parens Patriae.65. These were later distributed.000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency. This brings us to this case. and after due trial in the lower court. 1912. by the Government of the Philippine Islands. 12 . directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80. and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. a central relief board was appointed. has the right to enforce all charities of public nature.