SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153788. November 27, 2009.]

ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37,
Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO
ENTERPRISES, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated
October 16, 2001 and Resolution 3dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July
26, 2000 4 and March 7, 2001 5 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City,
denying petitioner Roger V. Navarro's(Navarro) motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first
complaint) 6 and 98-598 (second complaint), 7 before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against
Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor
vehicles in Navarro's possession.
The first complaint stated:
1. That plaintiff KAREN T. GO is a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro
City and doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES, an entity duly registered and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, which has its business address at Bulua, Cagayan
de Oro City; that defendant ROGER NAVARRO is a Filipino, of legal age, a resident of 62 Dolores Street, Nazareth,
Cagayan de Oro City, where he may be served with summons and other processes of the Honorable Court; that
defendant "JOHN DOE" whose real name and address are at present unknown to plaintiff is hereby joined as party
defendant as he may be the person in whose possession and custody the personal property subject matter of this
suit may be found if the same is not in the possession of defendant ROGER NAVARRO;

2. That KARGO ENTERPRISES is in the business of, among others, buying and selling motor vehicles, including
hauling trucks and other heavy equipment; SEHACI

3. That for the cause of action against defendant ROGER NAVARRO, it is hereby stated that on August 8, 1997, the
said defendant leased [from] plaintiff a certain motor vehicle which is more particularly described as follows

Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE

Serial No. FK416K-51680
Motor No. 6D15-338735
Plate No. GHK-378
as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASEentered into by and between KARGO
ENTERPRISES, then represented by its Manager, the aforementioned GLENN O. GO, and defendant ROGER
NAVARRO . . .; that in accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO
PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-dated checks each in the amount of
SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE & 33/100 PESOS (P66,333.33) which were
supposedly in payment of the agreed rentals; that when the fifth and sixth checks, i.e., PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS-CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH CHECKS NOS. 017112 and 017113, respectively dated
January 8, 1998 and February 8, 1998, were presented for payment and/or credit, the same weredishonored and/or
returned by the drawee bank for the common reason that the current deposit account against which the said checks
were issued did not have sufficient funds to cover the amounts thereof; that the total amount of the two (2)
checks, i.e., the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS
(P132,666.66) therefore represents the principal liability of defendant ROGER NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the basis
of the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE; thatdemands, written and
oral, were made of defendant ROGER NAVARRO to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66), or to return the subject motor vehicle as
also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE, but said demands were, and still are,
in vain to the great damage and injury of herein plaintiff; . . .

4. That the aforedescribed motor vehicle has not been the subject of any tax assessment and/or fine pursuant to law,
or seized under an execution or an attachment as against herein plaintiff;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That plaintiff hereby respectfully applies for an order of the Honorable Court for the immediate delivery of the
above-described motor vehicle from defendants unto plaintiff pending the final determination of this case on the
merits and, for that purpose, there is attached hereto an affidavit duly executed and bond double the value of the
 personal property subject matter hereof to answer for damages and costs which defendants may suffer in the event
that the order for replevin prayed for may be found out to having not been properly issued.

The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first complaint, except that the Lease
Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is dated October 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle leased is described as
follows:
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE
Serial No. FK416K-510528
Motor No. 6D14-423403

The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount of
P100,000.00, to Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored when presented
for payment. 8SAHIDc

On October 12, 1998 9 and October 14, 1998, 10 the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result,
the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause
of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, thelease
agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
On Navarro's motion, both cases were duly consolidated on December 13, 1999.
In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause
of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed dated May 26, 2000, 11 the RTC issued another
order dated July 26, 2000 setting aside the order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing
business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the
action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the
complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules). 12 Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a
motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
When the RTC denied Navarro's motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2001, Navarro filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, essentially contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reconsidered
the dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to amend her complaints by including her husband Glenn Go as co-
plaintiff. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with
a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarro's petition and affirmed the RTC's order. 13 The CA also denied
Navarro's motion for reconsideration in its resolution of May 29, 2002, 14 leading to the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have
the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was
Karen Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to
state a cause of action.
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include Glenn Go as a
co-plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action
cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the
lower court created a cause of action for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Even worse, according to Navarro, the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory of
the complaints, to his great prejudice. Navarro claims that the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it assumed
that the leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of Glenn and Karen Go. Since Karen Go is the registered
owner of Kargo Enterprises, the vehicles subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the RTC gravely
erred when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.
Navarro likewise faults the lower court for setting the trial of the case in the same order that required Karen Go
to amend her complaints, claiming that by issuing this order, the trial court violated Rule 10 of the Rules.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that the complaints
were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements
before the complaints for replevin were filed.
 Lastly, Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued based on flawed complaints, the vehicles
were illegally seized from his possession and should be returned to him immediately.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no real interest in the
subject of the complaint, even if the lease agreements were signed only by her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner
of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises.
Moreover, Karen Go maintains that Navarro's insistence that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Go's paraphernal property is
without basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed
to be conjugal property. Finally, Karen Go insists that her complaints sufficiently established a cause of action against
Navarro. Thus, when the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with the
rule that spouses should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure the complaints' lack of cause of action.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. 15
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo
Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro, while the lease
contracts were in Kargo Enterprises' name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so the actual
parties to the lease agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.
As a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the inclusion
of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff, since this in effect created a cause of action for the complaints when in truth, there was
none.
We do not find Navarro's arguments persuasive.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises.
The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under
the name KARGO ENTERPRISES", and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint.
Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that
the defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint
specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the plaintiff and
the defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides:
This agreement, made and entered into by and between: AHDaET

GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at . . ., herein referred to as the LESSOR-
SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager,

xxx xxx xxx

thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by
the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises
and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person,
nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, 16 Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. This
legal reality leads to the question: who then is the proper party to file an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo
Enterprises?
We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 17 where we said:
 Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes
the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual,
and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay
taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor
empower it to file or defend an action in court.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware.
The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or
owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words "doing
business as Juasing Hardware" may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done. 18 [Emphasis supplied.]

This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states: DECSIT

SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or theparty entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured
by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally
incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease
Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as
this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.
Glenn Go's Role in the Case
We find it significant that the business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of Karen T. Go, 19 who described
herself in the Complaints to be "a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City,
and doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES". 20 That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to
each other is a fact never brought in issue in the case. Thus, the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registeredin
the name of a married woman, a fact material to the side issue of whether Kargo Enterprises and its properties are
paraphernal or conjugal properties. To restate the parties' positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo Enterprises is Karen
Go's paraphernal property, emphasizing the fact that the business is registered solely in Karen Go's name. On the other
hand, Karen Go contends that while the business is registered in her name, it is in fact part of their conjugal property.
The registration of the trade name in the name of one person a woman does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married. By law, all property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. 21 Our examination of the records of
the case does not show any proof that Kargo Enterprises and the properties or contracts in its name are conjugal. If at
all, only the bare allegation of Navarro to this effect exists in the records of the case. As we emphasized in Castro v.
Miat: 22
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed
to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". This
article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. 23 [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship
is conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property.
Article 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property, provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision. ESTDcC
xxx xxx xxx

This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in managing their
conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before
performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses' marriage settlement
and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between
the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.
 A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses' circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.
The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners, has an
equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership
purposes; . . .

Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties
registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying Article
484 of the Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed
by the provisions of this Title", we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners
to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property.
While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we find that this rule can be applied
to the circumstances of the present case, following our ruling in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman. 24 In this case, one
spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a personal property considered conjugal property, without including the
other spouse in the action. In resolving the issue of whether the other spouse was required to be included as a co-
plaintiff in the action for the recovery of the credit, we said:
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang,
seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, dismissal would be proper.
If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in
the complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. CDcaSA
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superseded:

Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter.

In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of
specific partnership property". Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the
four checks used to pay for petitioners' stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are
part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the
recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we held that, in a co-
ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit
of his co-owners. In the latter case and in that ofDe Guia v. Court of Appeals, we also held that Article 487 of the
Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action
for the recovery of possession.

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery
of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even
without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. 25 [Emphasis
supplied.]

Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the
Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code,
supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do
not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouse's consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4,
Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.

Non-joinder of indispensable parties

not ground to dismiss action
 Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases 26 that
the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we stated
in Macababbad v. Masirag: 27
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined
party may be severed and proceeded with separately. TAHIED
In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable
party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion
of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable
parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.

In these lights, the RTC Order of July 26, 2000 requiring plaintiff Karen Go to join her husband as a party plaintiff is fully
in order.
Demand not required prior to filing of replevin action
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed, Navarro apparently likens
a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section
2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under
a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed undercustodia legis, or if so seized, that
it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in
the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for
the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.

We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of
the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an
action for a writ of replevin.
More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has
already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay
his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarro's position that a demand is necessary and has not
been made is therefore totally unmeritorious. acCITS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
Roger V. Navarro.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., concur.
||| (Navarro v. Escobido, G.R. No. 153788, [November 27, 2009], 621 PHIL 1-21)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166519. March 31, 2009.]
NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special
Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the May 12, 2004
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43085 and the December 1, 2004 Resolution 2 denying
reconsideration of the challenged decision. THSaEC

The pertinent facts and proceedings follow.

In 1974, petitioners 3 filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of First
Instance (now, Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of Maasin, Southern Leyte against respondents. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. R-1949. The property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587 in the name of petitioner Nieves with an area of 2.6360 hectares. 4 In
their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property
and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages. 5
Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners' allegation of ownership and possession of the premises, and
interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor,
Francisco Plasabas. 6
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was
not the sole and absolute owner of the land. Based on the testimonies of petitioners' witnesses, the property passed on
from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves' grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her
mother; and then to her and her siblings Jose, Victor and Victoria. 7
After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been
terminated at inception for petitioners' failure to implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners Jose, Victor and
Victoria.
In its April 19, 1993 Order, 8 the trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without prejudice,
thus:
This Court, much as it wants to decide the instant case on the merits, being one of the old inherited cases left behind,
finds difficulty if not impossibility of doing so at this stage of the proceedings when both parties have already rested
their cases. Reluctantly, it agrees with the defendants in the observation that some important indispensable
consideration is conspicuously wanting or missing. CTSDAI

It is not the Court's wish to turn its back on the crucial part of the case, which is the pronouncement of the judgment
to settle the issues raised in the pleadings of the parties once and for all, after all the time, effort and expense spent
in going through the trial process.
But, rules are rules. They have to be followed, to arrive at a fair and just verdict. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides:
". . . Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."
What the Court wants to say here is that the instant case should have been dismissed without prejudice a long time
ago for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no
complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as
INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final determination of the case. Not impleading them, any judgment would have
no effectiveness.

They are that indispensable that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the Court cannot proceed
without their presence. There are abundant authorities in this regard. Thus

"The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that
when it appears of record that there are other persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who
are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made
either plaintiffs or defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). . . . Where the petition failed to join as
party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be
dismissed. . . . When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. (People,
et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. Nos. L-14059-62, September 30, 1959) (sic)CDISAc
 "Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court). The burden of procuring the presence of all
indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. (39 Amjur[sic] 885). The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent
the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to include with him,
either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole
matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, * 38 Phil. 177,
178).
"An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without inquiring or affecting such interest; a party who has
not only an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. (67 C.J.S. 892). Indispensable parties are those without whom no action can be
finally determined." (Sanidad v. Cabataje, * 5 Phil. 204)

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, both the complaint and the counterclaim
in the instant case are ordered DISMISSED without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 9

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In the challenged May 12, 2004 Decision, 10 the appellate
court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further, declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties
would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that
the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action. 11
With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1, 2004 Resolution, 12 petitioners
filed the instant petition.
The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for disposition on the merits. TaIHEA

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory
action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-
owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. 13
With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for
recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to
this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled
to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners
who are indispensable parties. 14
Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is
immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings,
and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf. 15 Impleading the
other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.
In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case,
after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure
to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by
order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are
just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith. 16 AcIaST

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial
court for appropriate proceedings. The trial court is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH
DISPATCH.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio-Morales, * Chico-Nazario and Peralta, JJ., concur.
||| (Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, [March 31, 2009], 601 PHIL 669-676)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161916. January 20, 2006.]
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, petitioner, vs. EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M.
ADLAWAN, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921
which set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case
No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment 3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro
Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan's unlawful detainer suit against respondents Emeterio
and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals which denied
petitioner' s motion for reconsideration.
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties' dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, 5registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata,
Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child 6 of
Dominador who died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an
affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon. 7 Out of respect and generosity to respondents who
are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same
should his need for the property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house
and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title 8 with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents' refusal
to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000. 9
On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age, respectively, 10 denied that they begged
petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the
house standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased
father, Ramon Adlawan 11 and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia
Maacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine 12 children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents
Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property.
Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same. 13 Petitioner, on the
other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were
not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the
only one in the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, 14 a title was
issued to Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the execution of the
simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents' ownership of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did
not disturb respondents' possession of the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively. ScCIaA

Respondents also contended that Dominador's signature at the back of petitioner's birth certificate was forged, hence, the
latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of Lot 7226. 15 They argued that even if petitioner is
indeed Dominador's acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by
his wife, Graciana. 16
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of petitioner's filiation and the
settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner's action for ejectment. It added
that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to
their share in Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff's cause of action, the
above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 17

On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title of Dominador over Lot 7226
cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner
and to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The decretal portion thereof, provides:
Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case
No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and
the house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their use and
occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.
So ordered. 18
Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal 19which was opposed by the alleged
nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention. 20 They
contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary to protect their right
over the property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot
7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.
The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene. 21 It, however, recalled the order granting the execution pending appeal
having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals. 22
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC.
It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject
respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property.
Thus
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated
February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED. 23

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact executed an
affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned
January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate
son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the
theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so
because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the
demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. 24 By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot
7226. 25 The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the
share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations.
The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of
Lot 7226. HaIATC

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). 26 A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that
where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the
litigated property, the action should be dismissed. 27
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained
. . . A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff
alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
(Emphasis added) 28

In Baloloy v. Hular, 29 respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but the
evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent's
authority to file the case, the Court held that

Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers
all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-
owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the
suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit
the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession
thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
 In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and
praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their
rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case
in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and
entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter's siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-
owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that
the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the
nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is
impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent's siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings
subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 30

In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own
benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not
recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer
suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner
forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone
will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of
Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should
be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as "fictitious heirs," the State will
inherit her share 31 and will thus be petitioner's co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property. SaAcHE

The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a
suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals, 32 and Sering v. Plazo, 33 the co-owners who
filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo
and Teresa Santiago,34 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots
owned in common. 35 Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta, et al., 36 the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one
of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive
owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his
co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted
absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate
on 28 May 1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff
became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the aforementioned house and lot. . .
(Emphasis added) 37

Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner's action operates as a complete repudiation of the
existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper.
As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action
[under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing
the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."38
Indeed, respondents' not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot
deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as
co-owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted
possession of their ancestral property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will
probably spend the remaining days of their life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu,
dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003.]
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B.
ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The subject fishpond has a total area of 79,220 square meters, co-owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego, married
to Juan Abejo, and registered in their names under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. Petitioner De Guia,
along with a certain Aniano Vieta, acquired possession of the entire fishpond by virtue of a document captioned Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan (Lease Contract) executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva Lejano, effective from
30 July 1974 to 30 November 1979 for a consideration of Pl00,000 with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, the
sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo who acquired 1/2 undivided share of the latter by intestate succession. Teofilo Abejo,
now deceased, sold his undivided share in the fishpond to his son Abejo. Despite the expiration of the lease contract, De
Guia continued to possess the entire fishpond and to derive income therefrom despite. several demands to vacate by Teofilo
Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, Abejo. The last demand letter was dated 22 November 1983. Abejo filed his
complaint for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia for the other 1/2 undivided portion of the fishpond
which has not been finally adjudicated for or against him. De Guia offered as evidence of his ownership of the other
undivided portion of the fishpond the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Contract of
Lease (Kasunduan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan) with Preliminary Injunction signed by the
heirs of Primitiva Lejano which he filed for himself and in representation as attorney-in-fact of said heirs. He alleged that he
acquired his 1/2 undivided share in the fishpond from the Lejano Heirs in 1986, and that they filed the complaint for
annulment of said document because Primitiva Lejano allegedly signed these documents under duress and without
consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment against De Guia, holding: a) that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate
and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJO'S. share in the fishpond, but in the meantime, due to lack of evidence of judicial
or extrajudicial partition of the property, DE GUIA was ordered to pay a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJO's
share; (b) that DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs as well as their successors-in-interest are not entitled to the relief prayed for
in the amended complaint to annul the Kasunduan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng
Palaisdaan and DISMISSED the same for lack of cause of action. The trial court likewise declared the "Kasunduan ng
Sanglaan" as valid and ordered the sheriff to proceed to foreclose the aforesaid mortgage.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, among others, that: (a) there is no irregularity in the
execution of the aforementioned contract of mortgage; and (b) ABEJO's right over his 1/2 undivided share in the fishpond
justified the action for recovery of possession. The trial court's decision effectively enforces Abejo's right over the property
which was violated by DE GUIA by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the Court of Appeals,
partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision, just like accounting when necessary.
On review; the Supreme Court ruled that the petition is partly meritorious, and held: (a) that any co-owner may file an action
under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership, but the plaintiff cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior
to partition; (b) the courts cannot proceed without the actual partitioning of the property, hence, judicial or extrajudicial
partition is necessary; (c) despite DE GUIA'S acquisition of his 1/2 undivided share in the fishpond on Nov. 22, 1983, after
the expiration of his lease of the entire fishpond which was agreed upon by the Lejano heirs and Teofilo Abejo in 1979, DE
GUIA should pay reasonable rent to ABEJO corresponding to the latter's share of the 1/2 undivided portion computed at
the yearly rental of P825,000.00.
DECISION
CARPIO, J : p

The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the 22 August 1994 Decision2 as well as the 27 June 1995 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
("trial court") of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 8796-M. The trial court's Decision ordered petitioner Manuel
T. De Guia ("DE GUIA") to turn over to private respondent Jose B. Abejo ("ABEJO") possession of the one half () undivided
portion of a fishpond and to pay actual damages and attorney's fees.
The Antecedents
On 12 May 1986, ABEJO 4 instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint,
ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond ("FISHPOND") situated in
Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over
approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPOND's total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO further averred
that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJO's
damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the
FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIA's sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.
ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay
damages.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of
Appeals resolved several issues concerning the validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged
that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally
owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to him, ABEJO is not the
owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He
assailed ABEJO's ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided
half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements
he introduced as a builder in good faith.
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief 5 on 05 April
1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial brief 6 on 31 July 1990. DE GUIA's pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case the
amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to
Compromise, 7 offering to settle ABEJO's claim for P300,000 and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJO's
choice.
Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4 December 1990. DE GUIA's last witness completed her
testimony on 22 November 1991. The trial court summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA as follows:
Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land covering a fishpond with a total area of
79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned
by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one half undivided portion owned by
Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh.
B), the only heir of the original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole fishpond
(79,220) was the subject of a "Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano
with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant. The contract provided
that the period of lease shall be until November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and defendant failed to surrender
the fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27, 1983 were made for defendants to pay back
rental and to vacate the premises in question (Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver possession and also to pay
the rentals due. In anticipation, however, that defendant will vacate the fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21, 1983
entered into a two year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for a consideration of
P50,000.00 (Exh. G). This contract, despite its execution and even already notarized, had to be cancelled and the
amount of P50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant did not heed the demand to vacate the
fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks payment of P450,000.00
and P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

On the other hand, defendant's evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was
leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of one half of
the undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. As
to the area pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he introduced improvements worth P500,000 and being in
good faith, he asked that he should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however, defendant raised the
only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff is entitled to in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the
testimonies of defendant's witnesses particularly Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea was the amount
of rental of fishponds in the same locality as the fishpond in question at a given time. However, the documentary
evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence. 8

The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
and hereby orders that:

1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided portion of the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall
enjoy the benefits and fruits in equal share with the defendant effective immediately until such time that
partition of the property is effected;
2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by way of actual or compensatory damages;
3. Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9

Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender
possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and attorney's fees. The Court of
Appeals found DE GUIA's appeal without merit and affirmed the trial court's decision. Upon DE GUIA's motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500.
Hence, the instant petition.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adopted in toto by the Court of Appeals are restated as follows:
1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond situated in Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan
Abejo.

2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of
the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:
PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single share;and LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina,
of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, share,

3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters. ABEJO is seeking to recover
possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.

4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire FISHPOND by virtue of a document
captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan ("Lease Contract") executed between him and the heirs
of Primitiva Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to 30 November 1979 for a
consideration of P100,000.
5. The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego
Abejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza Araniego Abejo's undivided share in the FISHPOND by intestate
succession.

6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his undivided share in the FISHPOND to his son, ABEJO, on 22 November
1983.
7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to derive income from the property despite the expiration
of the Lease Contract and several demands to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-
interest, ABEJO. The last demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.
8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA on 12 May 1986.
9. DE GUIA's claim of ownership over the other undivided portion of the FISHPOND has not been finally
adjudicated for or against him.

DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Contract of Lease with Preliminary
Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano as proof of his ownership of the other undivided half portion of the
FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA filed the complaint for himself and as attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano ("Lejano Heirs") 10 against Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros Villarico, et
al. ("Defendants"). The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil
Case. No. 86-27-M. The complaint alleged that DE GUIA acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND from the Lejano
Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs sought to annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng
Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan, executed on 10 November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the Defendants. DE GUIA and
the Lejano Heirs claimed that Primitiva Lejano signed these documents under duress and without consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment 11 on 28 February 1992 against DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs as follows:
WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly Manuel De Guia, their successor-in-interest, not
entitled upon the facts and the law to the relief prayed for in the amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED
with costs against said plaintiff. Instead, as prayed for by defendants, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the "Kasulatan ng Sanglaan" (Exhs. "A" & "1") dated November 10, 1979, and the "Kasulatan ng
Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan" (Exhs. "C" & "3") also dated November 10, 1979, as valid for all legal intents
and purposes;

2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject real
estate mortgage; and
3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 12

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court of
Appeals found the claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the documents as highly improbable since Primitiva
Lejano's son, Renato Davis, witnessed the signing of the documents and found nothing irregular at the time. The appellate
court also held that assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs with immediate foreclosure,
Defendants were merely exercising their legitimate right of foreclosing the mortgaged property for non-payment of the loan.
In addition, Primitiva Lejano's lawyer and notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abao, testified that the parties appeared before him
to affirm the contents of the documents. He also stated that he was present when Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano Davis
and her son Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In
the event the Court of Appeals' Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the FISHPOND.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJO's
undivided share in the FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIA's sublease contract expired in 1979 and
ABEJO acquired his father's share in 1983. However, the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of
the judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his
co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending
partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJO's share in the
FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should
pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the reasonable amount but under certain conditions which ABEJO found
unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered the Lease Contract between ABEJO and a
certain Ruperto C. Villarico which provided for a yearly rent of P25,000 for undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The trial
court declared that the total amount of rent due is P212,500, computed from November 1983 when ABEJO became a co-
owner of the FISHPOND up to 1991 13or a period of eight and one half years. The trial court further ordered DE GUIA to
pay an additional P50,000 which represents the amount ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the
Lease Contract between them due to DE GUIA's refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive
an equal share in the benefits from the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while there is no
contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall govern the rights of the parties.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals debunked DE GUIA's claim that partition and
not recovery of possession was the proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE
GUIA's failure to respect ABEJO's right over his undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of
possession. The trial court's decision effectively enforces ABEJO's right over the property which DE GUIA violated by
possession and use without paying compensation. According to the Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a
mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting when necessary.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIA's claim that the award of compensatory damages of P242,000, computed
based on the rent stipulated in the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly exorbitant. The
Court of Appeals clarified that the amount the trial court awarded was P262,500 and not P242,000 as erroneously alleged
by DE GUIA. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico
carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE GUIA's witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando
Pea. The Court of Appeals also upheld the award of attorney's fees since the parties could have avoided litigation had DE
GUIA heeded the justifiable demands of ABEJO. aCATSI

On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500. The
Court of Appeals explained that the trial court correctly computed the total amount of rent due at P212,500. The trial court
erred, however, in adding the sum of P50,000 representing the rent for 1983 and 1984 which ABEJO returned to Ruperto
C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified that the sum of P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the rent of P25,000 by 8
years. The 8 year period already included the two months rent received from and then subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto
C. Villarico.
The Issues
DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DENYING PETITIONER'S
PLEA FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO
TURN OVER THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE FISHPOND WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF
CO-OWNERSHIP;
 III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME;
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S FAVOR. 14

In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for recovery of possession and turn-over of the undivided
portion of a common property is proper before partition; and (2) whether there is sufficient basis for the award of
compensatory damages and attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of Possession
DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property owned in common until there is a
partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since the
court cannot implement any decision in the latter case without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery
of possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the action is part of an undivided, co-owned property. The
procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement difficult if not impossible since
there is still no partition of the subject property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons." A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an "owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises
the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract." 15 On the other hand, there
is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately
identifiable, even if not yet technically described. 16

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." This article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions are brought before
municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession. However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery
of the right to possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the
proper regional trial court. 17
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who
takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. 18 In the latter case, however, the only purpose
of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the
property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of
the property. 19
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, 20 we reiterated
the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over
the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has
a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a
quoerred when they ordered the delivery of one-half () of the building in favor of private respondent.

Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA
disputed ABEJO's claim of ownership over the undivided portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly
recognized ABEJO's undivided share by offering to settle the case for P300,000 and to vacate the property. During the
trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the
entire FISHPOND. Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing an action for recovery of
possession and the recovery of compensatory damages.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the
FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO
and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the
same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains
indeterminate or unidentified. 21 As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the
entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An
action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. 22 Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. 23 Neither
ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.
To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-
ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial
partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is
also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary
consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.
DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when they ordered the recovery of rent when the exact
identity of the portion in question had not yet been clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to pay
damages in the form of rent is premature before partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote
common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. 24 Hence, if the subject is a residential house,
all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone
occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-
owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can
demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these
options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by
their silence have allowed him to use the property. 25
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying
the proper rent. 26 Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of
an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net
profits. 27
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA's lease expired in
1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJO's right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his share in
the FISHPOND had it been leased to others. 28 Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22
November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJO's portion beginning
from that date. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property, 29considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA
shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to ABEJO's undivided share in the FISHPOND.
However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before
the trial court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years.
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in
arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article
2209 30 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment. 31
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory Damages
DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant. He assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence
the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico that served as basis for the yearly rent of P25,000 for ABEJO's
share in the FISHPOND.
DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to the testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben
Camargo ("Camargo") and Marta Fernando Pea ("Pea") that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for much lesser
considerations.
This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may
raise only questions of law in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. 32 More so in the instant case, where
the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. 33
It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Camargo and Pea because DE GUIA failed to present
documentary evidence to support their testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of Camargo
and Pea unconvincing. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts,
they determine who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before them. 34
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts' evaluation of the witnesses' testimonies. We likewise
find reasonable the P25,000 yearly compensation for ABEJO's undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being a
question of fact, it is for the trial and appellate courts to decide and this Court will not disturb their findings unless clearly
baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this case.

Fourth Issue: Attorney's Fees

The trial court did not err in imposing attorney's fees of P20,000. Attorney's fees can be awarded in the cases enumerated
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code specifically:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his interest;
xxx xxx xxx

DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property.
Although DE GUIA offered to settle the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO.
Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208
of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory
damages of P212,500 and attorney's fees of P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:
1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the entire FISHPOND covered
by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is recognized without prejudice to the
outcome of CA-G.R. CV No. 38031 pending before the Court of Appeals and other cases
involving the same property;
2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of the entire FISHPOND
prior to partition;
3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing rent from 27 November 1983 until
May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this
decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until full payment;
4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of P25,000 from June 1992 until finality of this
decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the same period, and thereafter at 12% interest
per annum until full payment;
5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively possesses the entire
FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental of P25,000 for the latter's undivided
share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo secures from the proper court an order fixing a
different rental rate in view of possible changed circumstances. ADaSET

SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
||| (De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, [October 8, 2003], 459 PHIL 447-469)