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Jason Ivler vs San Pedro

G.R. No. 172716

November 17, 2010


Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the MeTC of
Pasig City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Pences husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage
to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty on the first offense and meted public censure as penalty. He
invokes this conviction as a ground in his motion to quash the information for the second offense contending it
places him in double jeopardy for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal of the information, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. Thus
petitioners motion for certiorari was elevated before the RTC while moving for the suspension of the criminal
case before the MeTC pending resolution of the prejudicial question as subject of his motion for reconsideration
at the RTC. MeTC however proceeded with the criminal proceeding. The non-appearance of Ivler to the
proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his bail and order of his arrest was issued. Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained

By virtue of this arrest order, respondent Ponce filed a motion to dismiss the motion for certiorari filed
by Ivler on the ground that he loss standing to maintain suit. RTC dismissed said petition on this ground thus
this petition to the Supreme Court.

Whether or not reckless imprudence is a single crime which bars further proceedings on the second
offense. (Constitutional right under Double Jeopardy Clause)


Yes. Reckless imprudence is a single crime. Its consequences on persons and property are material only
to determine the penalty.
In this case, the two charges were prosecuted by the court under the provision of Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code that penalizes quasi-offenses such as negligence. What this provision contemplates in quasi-
offenses of criminal negligence is punishing the act of negligence that if intentionally done will constitute a
criminal offense. Thus, the law punishes the negligent act and not the result thereof. It takes into account the
gravity of the offenses in determining the penalty but not to qualify the substance of the offense. It treats a
negligent act as single whether the injurious result affects one or several persons. The offense of criminal
negligence remains as one and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions. The principle of
prosecuting quasi offenses remain intact in the case thus the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of
similar charges on reckless imprudence. His prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for
the second offense by virtue of the principle of double jeopardy. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the lower court.