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EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010

Learning from Earthquakes

The Mw 8.8 Chile Earthquake of February 27, 2010
From March 6th to April 13th, 2010, mated to have experienced intensity ies of the gap, overlapping extensive
a team organized by EERI investi- VII or stronger shaking, about 72% zones already ruptured in 1985 and
gated the effects of the Chile earth- of the total population of the country, 1960. In the first month following the
quake. The team was assisted lo- including five of Chile’s ten largest main shock, there were 1300 after-
cally by professors and students of cities (USGS PAGER). shocks of Mw 4 or greater, with 19 in
the Pontificia Universidad Católi- the range Mw 6.0-6.9.
As of May 2010, the number of con-
ca de Chile, the Universidad de
firmed deaths stood at 521, with 56
Chile, and the Universidad Técni- Tectonic Setting and
persons still missing (Ministry of In-
ca Federico Santa María. GEER Geologic Aspects
terior, 2010). The earthquake and
(Geo-engineering Extreme Events
tsunami destroyed over 81,000 dwell- South-central Chile is a seismically
Reconnaissance) contributed geo-
ing units and caused major damage to active area with a convergence of
sciences, geology, and geotechni-
another 109,000 (Ministry of Housing nearly 70 mm/yr, almost twice that
cal engineering findings. The Tech-
and Urban Development, 2010). Ac- of the Cascadia subduction zone.
nical Council on Lifeline Earthquake
cording to unconfirmed estimates, 50 Large-magnitude earthquakes
Engineering (TCLEE) contributed a
multi-story reinforced concrete build- struck along the 1500 km-long
report based on its reconnaissance
ings were severely damaged, and coastline in 1835, 1906, 1928, 1960,
of April 10-17. A complete list of
four collapsed partially or totally. The 1985, and 2010 (Cisternas et al.,
team members begins on page 19.
earthquake caused damage to high- 2005). Tectonic deformation result-
The research, publication, and dis- ways, railroads, ports, and airports ing from the February 27th quake
tribution of this report were funded due to ground shaking and liquefac- played a substantial role in the ob-
by the EERI Learning from Earth- tion. The earthquake was followed served damage. Ground shaking
quakes project, under grant #CMMI- by a blackout that affected most of and surface effects were observed
0758529 from the National Science the population, with power outages
Foundation. Additional support was affecting selected regions for
provided by the Pacific Earthquake days. Estimates of economic
Engineering Research Center, Fed- damage are around $30 billion.
eral Highway Administration, Ameri-
According to the USGS (2010),
can Society of Civil Engineers, and
the earthquake epicenter was
the host organizations of participat-
in a zone where the Nazca
ing individuals.
plate is being subducted down-
ward and eastward beneath
Introduction the South American plate. The
On Saturday, February 27, 2010, earthquake occurred as thrust
at 03:34 a.m. local time (06:34:14 faulting on the interface be-
UTC), an Mw 8.8 earthquake struck tween the two plates, with
the central south region of Chile, an epicenter at 35.909°S,
affecting an area with a population 72.733°W (just off the coast
exceeding eight million people, in- 105 km NNE of Concepción)
cluding 6.1M, 0.8M, and 0.9M in the and a focal depth of 35 km.
urban areas around Santiago, Val- The estimated dimensions of
paraíso/Viña del Mar, and Concep- the rupture zone were 500 km
ción, respectively. Figure 1 shows long by 100 km wide. The
the location of the main shock and earthquake struck in an area
aftershocks relative to major cities. that had been identified as a
In the region of strongest ground seismic gap, with projected
shaking, ground accelerations worst case potential to produce
exceeded 0.05g for over 120 s. an earthquake of Mw 8.0-8.5
Coastal locations were affected by (Ruegg et al., 2009). The rup- Figure 1. Main shock and aftershocks of
both ground shaking and tsunami. ture zone extended beyond the Mw 4 and larger between 2/27/10 and
Over 12 million people were esti- northern and southern boundar- 3/26/10 (USGS).


EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010

resulted in drowned tidal flats and
local areas of significant tsunami
erosion. To the north, from about
the town of Pichilemu to Valparaíso,
there was little or no obvious uplift/
subsidence. The areas of coastal
subsidence were exposed to sub-
stantial tsunami runup and scour,
as well as wave damage, whereas
areas of substantial uplift generally
had relatively little damage from
tsunami waves. However, in coastal
areas close to the epicenter with
only moderate uplift (e.g., Concep-
ción and Dichato), there was sub-
stantial damage related to both
strong ground motions and tsunami

Strong Motion
The main shock of the earthquake
was recorded by at least 15 strong
motion instruments in the area
Figure 2. Model of estimated surface deformation (after K. Wang, bounded by the cities of Santiago,
2010, personal communication), overlain by initial field estimates Viña del Mar, Angol, and Concep-
of coastal uplift (GEER, 2010). ción. At the station nearest to the
epicenter, Cauquenes city, the accel-
over an area more than 100 km uplift affected harbor facilities (Figure erometer maximum 1g range was
wide and 600 km long, from Val- 3), produced an emergent marine exceeded. Several of the recording
paraíso in the north to Tirúa in the platform, and exposed the tidal habitat instruments are analog, so process-
south. This is equivalent to the zone. In the central part of the rup- ing is slow and still underway. Some
entire coastline of Washington and ture zone, coastal subsidence over a of the digital instruments have been
Oregon. distance of about 50 km between the processed and reported in Boro-
towns of Constitución and Bucalemu schek et al. (2010) and National
In south-central Chile, regional geo-
logic characteristics are largely con-
trolled by long-term aseismic surface
deformation, punctuated by sudden,
coseismic coastal uplift and inland
subsidence. These influence the
pattern of ground motions and tsu-
nami runup, and hence earthquake
damage. The February 27 earth-
quake produced both uplift and sub-
sidence along the coastline (Figure
2), and the variable pattern of defor-
mation may have affected tsunami
impacts on coastal communities.
Reconnaissance-based estimates
of deformation (GEER, 2010) sup-
port initial models of surface defor-
mation. In the south, the Arauco
Peninsula was uplifted and tilted
gently eastward, with at least 2 m
of coastal uplift on Isla Santa Maria
and near the town of Lebu. The Figure 3. Fishing boats stranded within uplifted harbor of Lebu; uplift of
1.8 +/- 0.2 m in this area (photo: GEER, 2010).


2010 and DGF 2010) The cities of Viña del Mar and Station Maximum Maximum Talca. and ness park founded on deep silty/clay with compacted sand were dam- more than 120 s in Concepción area sediments. NS and EW are nominal where four structurally similar over. This behavior could be related to source or local soil condi- tions. Among seven Santiago Hosp.14 Santiago Elevated Train Station Mirador 0. addi. Tisne 0. manent ground movement and by files in the area approximately match strong shaking. Damage pat- terns observed in Chile suggest local site effects were important..14 0. Geotechnical Effects Local Site Effects.35 0. six were parallel to the Vi–a del Mar (Marga Marga) 0. coordinates.17 El Roble Hill 0. (from Boroschek et al. which defines the Vi–a del Mar (Downtown) 0. Another example of local stories. Viña del Mar downtown area earthquake records.28 site or basin effects. At a recently Seismological Service (2010).27 0. cated in Concepción on a site filled 60 s in most of the records.05 ground deformations affected the seismic performance of several modern buildings. Shaking buildings observed at Ciudad Empre.58 Buildings.20 Concepci—n Colegio San Pedro 0. (g) (g) Concepción is founded on a sedi- Santiago Universidad de Chile 0. however. Published data show that aged by liquefaction-induced per- records.23 0.05g lasted more than sarial. Table 1 summarizes damage. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 Table 1.19 0. constructed hospital in Curanilahue. pass bridges exhibited markedly dif.65 0. The site effects in Santiago was the se. a recently constructed busi.47 0. For example. Liquefaction-induced Valdivia Hospital 0. Santiago is located on an alluvial sediment-filled basin surrounded by the main and coastal ranges of the Andes. displacement spectra demands are in general lower than those required in the National Base Isolation Build- ing Code NCh2745. Four of vibrations (Figure 4). suffered extensive Acceleration Acceleration damage during the earthquake.24 damage there was associated with Santiago Hosp.13 mentary valley. founded on marine and al- Horizontal Vertical luvial deposits. so further studies are required.33 0. individual wings underwent the known peak accelerations. tional records from research and ferent performance: two collapsed with ten structurally isolated wings private institutions have not been while the other two had only minor ranging in height from one to six reported yet.26 La Pólvora fault. differential settlement and rotation records show two to three minutes vere structural damage of high-rise due to extensive liquefaction.13 distinct zones in the city where Santiago Cerro Cal‡n 0.24 0.27 0. Preliminary Processed Records Maximum Accelerations of the damaged structures there. tion recorded the 1985 Central Chile Earthquake. Soil conditions on several sta- tions are known only for the first 10 m. Sotero de R’o 0.11 buildings or bridges collapsed cata- Santiago Campus Antumapu 0.19 northwest edge of the basin. This same sta- Americo Vespucio Norte ring road. 8-story condominium buildings lo- higher than 0.11 strophically. The Riesco building Elastic response spectra of several the fundamental resonant periods at this site underwent 30 cm of dif- records are higher than elastic de- sign demands from the Chilean seis- mic design code NCh433. the fundamental periods of soil pro. and the extensive Santiago CRS MAIPU 0. Some records show important contributions to total signal energy from periods higher than 1 s. Curico Hospital 0. 3 . Localized damage was observed along the Figure 4.17 0.30 0.56 0.

Bridge. The Bio-Bio Railroad Bridge. built in 2008 near Iloca. also suffered dam- age associated with lateral spreading.5 m due to liquefaction. excessive in. near Copihue. 4 .2 m. cess of 0. Localized ground failures also had Figure 5. translational ground movement. Parral. Bridge. often resulting in the closure of structure. performed well. widespread impact on highways 2010). Ports. below and Figure 26). built in 1937 and closed in either northbound or southbound ern Concepción were torn apart by 2002 to all but pedestrian traffic. built in 1974. lanes (e. Damage from lateral spreading was also ob- served at the La Mochita Bridge in Concepción (significant transverse movement). the Tubul Bridge in Tubul (collapse). failures were observed inland along ternal deformations were imposed (See also Transportation Systems the main north-south highway. notably at Valparaíso and Coronel. Several ground tlement and rotation. At the Bio-Bio 5. Schematic plan view of the Riesco building in Concepción (GEER. throughout the region affected by ferential settlement across its foun. Liquefaction affected transportation systems most significantly along the coast. and up to 0. Route on the coupling beams in the super. although lateral spreading was observed at both abutments. The Llacolen Bridge. For example. well as interior pier settlement in ex.5 m of liq- uefaction-induced settlement was measured at one abutment. Ports are essential facilities for the Chilean economy. failures (Figure 7). and the Pulen and Pata- gual bridges near Hualqui (moderate cracking and distortion). as directions due to embankment slope result of the uneven foundation set. Figure 6 shows cracking of asphalt pavement at Coronel with lateral ground extension in excess of 1. was closed due the earthquake. Several homes in north. 2010). as they carry more than 90% of the coun- try’s imports and exports. built in 1889 and retrofitted in 2005. including lateral pile movement and misalignment of the rails.g. all four bridges cross- ing the Bio-Bio River near Concep- ción were damaged to varying de- grees by liquefaction-induced ground failure. suffered deck unseat- ing due to lateral spreading at its Figure 6.. The Juan Pablo II Coronel (photo: GEER.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 there was lateral spreading at the east approach and several spans collapsed in the middle. The Mata- quito Bridge. There was significant damage due to liq- uefaction and lateral spreading. Route 160 in Lota dation and 1 degree tilt in the north to column shear failure induced by along the coast was closed in both side of the building (Figure 5). Bridges and Roads. built in 2000. Liquefaction and lateral spreading-induced damage at the Port of north approach. As a lateral spreading at the approach.

over 500 km of coastline. splash values. While this section of levee showed no signs of distress after both the February 27 event and a Mw 6. particularly vulnerable (Figure 9). The third or the fourth were typically the largest. where liquefaction resulted in a flow failure of as much as 100. and localized subsidence and uplift due to the earthquake. The highest water levels recorded by ITST groups were generally in the 10–12 m range. fault slip. Tidal variations of about 1. Figure 8. and wave arrival times (Table 2). Post-event field investigation exhibit adverse effects. the end of the dry season in Chile. from Tirúa Pacific Ocean experienced.9 aftershock on March 11. aspect. it subsequently failed on March 13. homes and unreinforced or poorly International Tsunami Survey Teams Coihueco Dam. A around foundations. arriving between 90 minutes and four hours after the earthquake. These failures were 20-30 minutes intervals were still The Tsunami observed in the Valparaíso area often associated with lowland crossings or under-highway culverts. reinforced masonry structures were (ITST) were coordinated by UNESCO high zoned earth fill dam. The perfor. In Dichato.6 m from rise to fall in and Paine). eye witnesses reported three or four distinct surges. ing from floating debris. 5 . Another interesting failure was in a 7-m-high earth levee constructed with a silty-sandy gravel with cobbles near Colbún. destructiveness. The most significant fail- ure of an earth structure was at the Las Palmas Tailings Impoundment. and the International Tsunami Infor- eral scarps along its upstream crest. as well as bulging along the up- stream toe. Local tsunami water height and arrival times were influenced by bathym- etry. The earthquake produced a tsunami 7-8 hours after the earthquake. mance of earthen structures — to Pichilemu. excepting Figure 7. 1500 homes were mation Center (ITIC. levees. impact load- was recorded at over 150 locations. Slope failure on Route 160 in Lota (photo: GEER 2010). especially dur- Advisories) in 54 countries and ter- small number of earth structures did ing drawdown. coastal topography. 2010). in most areas. The first tsunami surges generally arrived less than 30 minutes after the earthquake. mine tailings dams. Tsunami damage to structures re- nandez Islands about 600 km off the and retaining structures — was good sulted from hydrodynamic loading coast. that caused major damage locally revealing the intense excitation the Earthen Structures. For example. which is a 31-m.5 km and caused four casual- ties (Figure 8). Around the Pacific. The earthquake struck near on structural elements. Timber-framed ritories. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 A conspicuous feature of the Chil- ean tsunami was its extreme varia- bility in height. and scour triggering tsunami alerts (Warnings/ when reservoir levels are low. had sev. the tsunami overall. and at the Juan Fer- dams. Upper scarp of Failed Tailings Impoundment (photo: GEER 2010).000 m3 of retained tailings a distance of up to 0.

9. 26* 3:50 4:17 4:50 5:20 below). 2010). were no education programs target- the puncture of steel pile bents by According to Ministry of Interior data ing tourists or other transient popula- floating debris in the Cardenal Silva in May 2010. because of a high level of tsunami awareness. performed tsunami inundation and drawdown. Older Iloca 4 . and the commercial fishing facilities along the wharf were also rendered inoperable. had no high second floor level. Compilation of preliminary water heights from NGDC (2010).6 . Dengler).6. dation and drawdown.2. Many towns had posted tsunami Talcahuano 3. 124 of the 521 identified tions. though reinforced concrete struc- tures were generally able to with- Figure 9. caused damage to masonry and steel-framed harbor buildings.11.6 4:00 4:50 5:20 6:00 1 evacuation zone signs (Figure 12). even when Elevated pore pressures led to fluid.2 4:00 4:25 residents had personal experience Juan Fernandez 5 4:25 4:40 of the 1960 earthquake and tsunami. Pellehue and Curanipe accounted just north of Iloca. In Talcahuano. The island was inundation reached well above the ization of backfill during tsunami inun.8.3. nonstructural dam- age was widespread.9. primarily because of no were also damaged due to up. though debris lifted large naval ships and barges. grounds were also filled. particularly in the form of fishing vessels. and soil-supported pave. sient populations.3 3:54 5:30 6:00 6:40 hazard zone signs and/or tsunami Valpara’so 2.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 Table 2. Debris impact. tsunami awareness and education hydrodynamic loads. There of several piers due to scour and damage was caused by the tsunami.5 . camp- the lateral distortion of the super. and was an informal camp- Bridges on coastal highways also scour that damaged sheetpile wharf ground packed on the weekend of sustained tsunami damage such as structures. few coastal residents died Dichato 3. Henriquez Bridge across the Maule River at Constitución. shipping containers. 2010). Arrow shows water piers at the Naval Base at Talcahua- height (photo: L. and the coastal schools had robust destroyed. Campers in structure of the Pichibudi Bridge ments. Sheetpile wharfs in loss of life from either ground shak- were destroyed in many other coast- Talcahuano Harbor collapsed or were ing or inundation was in Constitu- al towns. all schools are required to * Splash estimate prepare for local natural hazards. With the notable Curanipe 6-9 6:30 .7:00 exception of Constitución (see Constituci—n 6. generated by failed homes may Scouring of shallow foundations Most vulnerable were unaware tran- have progressively contributed to caused a number of buildings to col. foundations. and trucks.3 . (LA Times. The single largest the loading.2 . Wood building on left in Dichato was transported from across street stand the battering (Figure 10).4 4:00 5:00 7:30 in the tsunami. causing severe ground.4 3:50 4:20 ing. almost all exterior enclosures and contents of commercial buildings and industrial warehouses along the shorefront were damaged by the hydrodynamic loading of the flooding and debris field. Water Heights and Wave Arrival Times casualties and missing were attrib- Water Height Approximate Wave Arrival Time 2 uted to the tsunami (Forensic Medi- Community meters 1 1 st 2nd 3rd 4th cal Service. Light-framed buildings lapse (Figure 11). accessible only by boat.3 4:15 7:30 and many coastal residents recog- Pichilemu 4 3:50 4:20 nized ground shaking as the warn- San Antonio 2. the undermining workers indicated that the majority of for large numbers of fatalities. Reinforced concrete build- damaged by soil failure induced by ción. Eyewitness reports from dock. machinery with shallow February 27. The and collided with the concrete frame building on the right. Pellehue 7. 6 . ITST and EERI teams 2 Based on eyewitness accounts from ITST teams and El Mercurio (2010) In Chile. on La Isla Orrego in the River Maule very well structurally. programs. In other areas. on the other hand. where numerous people died ings.9 .

a length of 240 km (Astroza et al.. In Chilean after hearing of the cancellation. In man fatalities. masonry. An initial the failure of the official warning weak connections between adjoin- warning was cancelled by the Navy’s system may have had little impact. but is not reported here. 600 km ination of exterior stucco. These buildings generally performed very well. 2010). Seismic stacked in the area of the red ellipse and displaced up to 300 m in the direction resistance typically is provided by of the arrow. Figure 13 shows a typ- ical street scene from Talca. and adobe construction. delam- coastal communities. contributing to some hu- dio by Chile’s president. Chock). Federation other buildings constructed of adobe of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies). to a lesser extent. ings may have hindered evacuations. at the inter- There were difficulties with Chile’s tween the earthquake and tsunami. Shipping containers were originally or unreinforced masonry. This concrete frame and confined masonry building in Dichato (where observed) included diago- survived the hydrodynamic loads. In addition. forming a tight bond be- tween the masonry and concrete elements. Buildings Earthquake shaking caused exten- sive damage to many non-engi- neered and engineered buildings throughout the affected area. ing walls apparently led to the col- Hydrographic and Oceanographic although there are some reported lapse of walls and roofs in many Services and announced on the ra. Some damage to steel buildings also was observed. cases of people returning to the coast buildings. the lack of timely warn. 2010). alerting most of the residents on Robinson Crusoe Island (The Independent. Confined masonry construction is also widely used for buildings one to four stories tall (Figure 14). ior. tem. Absence of reinforcement and tsunami warning system. while not people recognized natural warning off the coast. with extensive damage observed from Santiago to Concepción. Historic churches were particularly hard hit. The team focused on concrete. created the appearance of significant damage in many other buildings. typical damage Figure 11. Damage was especially severe between latitudes 34. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 Fortunately a 12-year-old girl who felt the earthquake rang a village bell. and Figure 10. as this constitutes the vast majority of buildings. walls located around the perimeter and.5° and 36. churches. where most the Juan Fernandez Islands. but suffered substantial foundation scour nal cracking of masonry walls and (photo: G. Talcahuano Harbor 3 days after the tsunami (photo: Intl. jeopardizing the structural sys- signs and there was little time be. 7 .5°. Exterior walls of clay bricks are first con- structed on a concrete foundation and then reinforced concrete confin- ing elements are cast around the brick walls. The region contains a large number of older houses.

longitudinal bars were fractured. section remaining in the thin wall wall failure due to lack of confining and the entire wall section buckled The team observed severe damage elements around openings or poor laterally. damage was gener- was reported that. there was little bearing sign. Graehl). building in which large steel pipe col- Starting in 2008. Chile adopted a seismic code with Note the setback in the wall profile analysis procedures similar to those at this level. Moehle). Festival longitudinal axis. The team also observed spalled cover over lap splices of wall boundary reinforcement. In this example the longi- to 31 concrete wall buildings (10-26 quality of the confinements.g. It rise buildings in Chile are construct. in NCh433-1996 also enforces provi- buildings with subterranean high-rise buildings had permanent offsets at the roof. Viña ture. and Concepción. raising questions about repairability. with transverse and Acapulco). Street in Talca (photo: J. sions of ACI 318-95. but there are no prohibi- commodate automobile access to tions or penalties related to vertical parking spaces. a ten-story building in Viña del Mar. This condition was or horizontal system irregularities. Figure 13. however. Four concrete buildings collapsed 8 . tudinal bars buckled without frac- stories) in or around Santiago. The team did not tion uses a dual system of walls ings damaged in the 1985 earth- observe that type of reinforcement in and frames. An wide spacing of transverse rein- Figure 12.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 walls framing from the corridor to ity of damage was concentrated in the building high. directly north of the Marga-Marga some engineers used transverse sist both gravity and earthquake River. the new Chilean umns were being used to raise the Reinforced Concrete Code does re. del Mar. damage resulted from the slab acting as a coupling ele- ment. these rely on structural walls to re. There were several examples of doors becoming jammed be- cause of permanent offsets in the walls adjacent to the opening. Given the quire use of boundary elements. in this damage was likely in the first light of good building performance level below grade. of wall to floor areas are relatively Figure 15 shows typical damage to high compared with concrete build- a transverse wall in the first story of ing construction in the U. In Viña del Mar. Some build- ings omitted the coupling beams. in many cases. Most of ally concentrated in the alluvial plain required by the local building code.S.. even though not ed of reinforced concrete. observed in several buildings. In 1996. in recent years than in the past. A typical high-rise plan quake (and repaired) were again any damaged buildings. in the March 1985 earthquake. Curanipe (photo: N. Some build- Building Code. in many other examples the The vast majority of mid. building to enable repairs. has corridor walls centered on the seriously damaged (e. buildings are located. appar- ently due to subsidence of walls. many buildings had dam- age to these beams. where a majority of the taller reinforcement conforming to the ACI loads. provided mainly to ac- in UBC-97. some more recent construc. it was not required to provide closely Figure 16 shows a failed wall from spaced transverse reinforcement a subterranean level of a 12-story around wall vertical boundary bars. Typical ratios newer buildings. Coupling beams over doorways along corridor walls are typically reinforced with small-diameter hoops at relatively large spacing (20 cm). however. Several of the severely damaged mid. Chillán. a major. Tsunami evacuation apparent trend is to use thinner walls forcement.

Viña del Mar (photo: P. These buildings had four sprinkler systems. and 18. partitions. typical current practice in other U. and cable trays (Figure 19). functioning of Chilean society. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 The recently com.Of96) east face (shown) includes provisions for nonstructural and south face components. Some of the wall vertical reinforcement fractured and some lap splices failed on the tension side. Wall failure likely contributed to the collapses. sive nonstructural damage in practically all types of Nonstructural damage resulted in the completely or partially. el. and industrial. 9 . fire cepción. fered partial story With few exceptions (e. as in newer hospital spandrels. and inspec- building. closure of the international airports in these were nearly identical.. air handling units. Chile. for most buildings Components it is not clear who is responsible for Figure 14. A third collapsed building was the 15-story Alto Río condominium in Concepción (Figure 17). Wall damage. and the wall length was decreased in the first story on the side toward which the building collapsed. Exterior construction. some new- collapses at levels er hospitals). The building apparently rotated about its corridor walls as it collapsed. erably behind earthquake-resistant back (Figure 18). The pleted 23-story widespread nonstructural damage O’Higgins 241 caused significant economic loss office tower in and major disruption to the normal Concepción suf. commercial. regions of moderate seismicity. The cost of the earthquake to first-story parking level with a highly irregular wall layout. The state of practice is north and west similar to that for buildings construct- faces appeared ed in the early 1970s in California or undamaged. As Nonstructural with U. was damage to glazing. proxi. Bonelli). than two thirds of the air traffic in stories of condominium units atop a evators. piping systems. but the structural draw- ings indicate that concrete walls on the façade were discontinued. ceilings. which together handle more Santiago. these are usually not showed damage to enforced unless requested by build- both wall piers and ing owners. Although Section 8 of the Chil- shear walls on the ean seismic code (NCh 433.g. Commonly observed Santiago (see Figure 20) and Con- mate. installation. 14.S. Two of buildings — residential.S. Engineered confined masonry apartment and Systems the design. Figure 15. showing confining elements at boundaries of tion of seismic anchoring and bracing There was exten- walls and openings (photo: M. design practice for structural sys- The perforated tems. practice. of nonstructural components. Astroza). The team was unable to examine closely the side of the building toward which it collapsed. seismic anchoring/bracing of non- each coincident structural components lags consid- with a framing set. five-story buildings in Maipú. Chilean practice on 10. leading to tension failures of the transverse walls on the other side (the side from which the photo was taken).

the failure of which can lead to injuries.S. of the hospitals that were partially or completely closed as a result of the earthquake. Of the beds in public hospitals. MINSAL estimates the damage at $2. This earthquake illustrates the im- portance of improving seismic per- formance of nonstructural compo- nents. closures. The hospital operability study was focused on the Bio-Bio province of Chile. 62% suffered nonstructural dam- and collapsed in-fill walls. Santiago. water distribution systems. severely racked due to torsion. The Chilean Ministry of Health (MINSAL) found that of these. and and steel roof trusses buckled. Santiago’s 131 emergency call cen- ter (analogous to 911 in the U. The only hospital in the cho- sen study area with structural dam- age is the Victor Rios Ruiz Hospi- Figure 16. Two other buildings. newer buildings of this hospital. eight were operating only partially after the main shock. grain. in lost passenger traffic alone. Maffei). Note the 90-degree bends on the trans. and evac. Hospitals and Health Care slight cracking on the shear walls. gions affected by the earthquake. 83% lost some or all functionality exclusively due to non- structural damage (they suffered no structural damage). airports. and Figure 17. four hospitals became uninhabitable. Of the 130 public hospitals in re- had damage to some columns. 10 . circa 2005. suffered severe nonstructural damage and could not operate following the earthquake. was approximately $25 million especially important for critical facili. Wall damage. affected by the earthquake account uations in hospitals are attributed to nonstructural damage. 18% continued to be out of service one month after the earthquake. and fruit. This is shear walls. In one of the verse reinforcement (photo: J.).EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 for 71% of all public hospitals in Chile. Nonstructural damage also caused significant losses and disruption to industries associated with paper. the penthouse was Chile. and expects the replace- ment of severely damaged hospi- tals to take three to four years. twelve had greater than 75% loss of function. located in the uppermost level of the Posta Central building. tal of Los Angeles. and 62% needed repairs or replacement. ties such as hospitals. loss of functionality.8B. This wall age requiring repairs. For example. braced by concrete frames with LAN Airlines. Collapsed Alto Río tower showing underside (photo: J. the national airline in substantial economic losses. wine. Most of the The 130 hospitals in the six regions failure caused damage to nearby economic loss. Wallace).

medical records (Figure 21b) in ly. with adjacent buildings or tion system. telecommunication. Electric Power. age from pipe failures. Nonstructural damage in the Additionally. loss of utilities. The The TCLEE reconnaissance team collapse of ceilings and examined earthquake impacts to associated light fixtures electric power. Radiologic surgical ward. in 2003 (photo: E. the largest deficit was due tals of the Bio-Bio province built to the loss of 54% of beds in after the 1960 earthquake. and partition damage. due to water damage. but such redundancy damaged other than at joints was not present in their communica. and mechanical grills water and wastewater. Miranda). and evaluated unsanitary conditions lifeline interdependence and resil- that led to many evacu. culties for aid coordination. gas and (Figure 21a) discomfited liquid fuel. service. most suffered was due to the loss of patient nonstructural damage. ience. damage. However. The team visited three seis- pal water supplies. creating enormous diffi. The study of lifeline resilien- ations. and frequent. and 71% lost their munici. power and communication for sev- eral days. The most affected by earthquake saw no evidence of structural dam. all but one saw reduc- distilled water tanks. With hospital non-clinical services. the United States. 11 . care. none was water supplies. The transmission quired evacuation also network performed reasonably well lost use of elevators — and was ready to provide power due to lack of power or 24 hours after the main shock. In terms of patient age in any of the one-story hospi. In two cases. provide all regular Miranda). the Los Angeles Hospital. and other lifelines (not occupants and caused presented here). Chile makes extensive use of pantograph dis- Although no hospital lost connect switches and candlestick the capacity to Figure 18. Although structural damage was the most frequent interruption minimal in hospitals. narrow configuration of the weight rails — forcing system — dictated by the shape of staff to carry patients the country and the topography of down rubble-strewn the land — limits transmission line stairs. most hospitals reported nonstructural damage. the route dispersion and system redun- only reported patient dancy. located on the floor and laboratory services were below. other structures. providers. All hospitals in the collapsed and tipped file man- study area lost municipal electrical agement systems. cy must continue with a focus on cost-effective preparedness and A few hospitals also had loss reduction for lifeline service moderate water dam. Talca Supreme Court building constructed damage to their suspended ceilings. All hospitals were mically isolated hospital build- equipped with backup power and ings in Santiago. long. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 cracking of the plaster Lifelines over brick walls. The failure of the counter. immediately adjacent fixed- base buildings had moderate Figure 19. O’Higgins 241 office tower (photo: E. Most buildings that re. While much of the equip- casualties were due to ment is the same as that found in heart attacks. subsequently tions in multiple services for shutting down half of the hospital up to seven days.

Lower voltage subtransmis- sion systems near the coast. and digital loop carrier [DLC] re. The potable water systems water intake structure from both lat- reserve power. damage to suspended Figure 21. 12 . of which internal damage to the four clarifiers out of power.. serving about 4 million was severe damage to the raw remote offices relying on battery people. The backbone 220 kV and 500 kV systems.m. Damage to roads and 1. but that represented only a small percentage of the inventory (Figure 22). building fail. Only critical offices Water and Wastewater. equipment failures. Telecommunication. Nonstructural damage at the Santiago International Airport ter- vice was restored. there with the majority of cell sites and urban areas.200 km are in the city of Concep- (baffles. many utilities damage to the various Essbio and wireless services were bedev. most cell sites and remote sites ran sion and distribution pipe.000 km of transmis- eral spreading and ground shaking. Miranda). Areas within 60 m (or so) of river ures. The low-voltage distribution system was also affected by col- lapsed buildings and damaged poles. Mitrani-Reiser). and (b) tedious reorganization of medical records three weeks after the earthquake (photo: J.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 live-tank circuit breakers. Figure 20. ings and sea walls damaged buried mote terminals). and loss of reserve power in Both landline and wireless services banks often were affected by lateral most distributed network facilities were restored within seven days spreading and settlement. Holmes). utility Essbio delivers potable water to area water treatment plant. and (base stations. it difficult to dispatch maintenance in Concepción and Talcahauno. Both landline difficult. performed reasonably well overall. additionally. settlers and supporting bridges made access to these sites ción. which are used sparingly in the western United States. of the quake. that relied on wireless service found water systems was concentrated iled by commercial power outages. tsunami-related destruction to build- es. by about 6:30 a. Two weeks after the earth- quake. where there were higher levels of ground shaking. the distribution system ser. include about 7. crews in order to restore service. At the Concepción- have backup power generators. Chilean water water pipes. were damaged sporadi- cally. which were designed with earthquake provi- sions. minal (photo: E. There were more than 25 failures reported in these elements. (a) Ceiling collapse and nonstructural damage in Chilean hospital (photo: W. By far the largest amount of elements). small remote switch.

000 small rural potable water systems country-wide. tems increased their loss of func- Gas and Liquid Fuel. The early post-earthquake phase was characterized by uncertainty about road conditions and the ab- sence of power. transportation. TCLEE). Lack of telecommunica- tions during the blackout phase also led to delays in assessing the Figure 23. there were 72 breaks or leaks to large diameter (500+ mm) welded steel pipes. loads to structures. need to appraise possible been estimated that three to seven plants.000 barrels per day. one west beach sands. silience. as of April 12. Both refineries shut down (loss is currently being imported. including treatment of power. of which about 420 were in the areas of strong shaking. large-diameter interceptor damage) with only minor. toppling of control room computer monitors and computers. Primary causes of dam. and one of dence among power. were direct discharges of sewage restarted ten days after the earth- into rivers. there near Santiago had minor damage and 130.000 re- pairs had been made to smaller diameter pipes. This additional loss of of Santiago and one in Concep. non-critical months will be required to bring the pipes. Due to the damage. telecommunication and water sys- ing into the refinery failed due to liq. water quality laboratory). Chile has uefaction and lateral spreading of tionality or delayed the restoration two principal oil refineries. quake. In the Concepción-area distribution system. ers fell to the heater floors. Blackouts impaired telecommunication system opera- tion. The gasoline and diesel processes. At least 73 of the elevated tanks completely collapsed Figure 22. and by relational and logist- ical coupling among infrastructures and institutional entities. and small-diameter collector damage. for the service area of this refinery functionality reduced regional re- silience. 2010. the refractory in the heat. Over the past 50 years. There was heavy damage to waste. Damaged candlestick style live-tank circuit breakers (photo: (Figure 23). It has water systems. Concepción. the two steel crude oil pipelines feed. of which about 2/3 were for service laterals and 1/3 for pipe mains. Infrastructure interdepen- mations for pipes and inertial over. and toppling of water quality equip- ment and glassware from counter- tops. Typical collapsed elevated small steel tank (constructed in 1999) damage and safety of the power (photo: TCLEE). At the Bio-Bio refinery near Lifeline Interdependence and Re- age were permanent ground defor. ción. as well as by co- location. 13 . the federal government of Chile has construct- ed nearly 2. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 ceilings (control room. and it was triggered by physical and cyber interaction among lifeline systems. about 3. The Aconcagua refinery refinery to its operating capacity of pipes. Uncertainty about refinery shut- downs and fuel availability hampered water systems’ operation of the un- damaged and repaired portions of the network.

due to insufficient support were there interdependence- Specifications was adopted in 1998. and surface level co- increased to 0. These rods and terized by the increasing availability to roads and bridges. in Chile using design-build-and-oper. spectral accelerations.000 highway bridges in Chile. 0. This coefficient was with diaphragms and shear keys overhead. age was more likely to occur. gas. Figure 24. Columns well. Before the mid-1980s. waterway crossings. Of the nearly ties were largely ineffective in the of alternate transportation routes. the services of some companies. such as banks in dense urban areas. AASHTO Standard Specifications of their abutments seats (Figure 24). and 0. how. and a modified version of and were unseated in their acute in the field. umns under the approach span to by linking to relative search pro- grams. regions. built before the concession era and telecommunication. Despite higher-than-anticipated requirements for Performance Cat- cation downed poles. and shear keys for transverse restraint.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 distribution system.3. and water ever. limiting concessions. it lasted about three days. Where Most lifeline companies managed built by these concessions used pre. the lack of transverse restraint and buildings. These included The design coefficient was not. that time. the rate of lifeline restoration slowed down after a majority of customers were back on line. allowed a number of two-span and gas. damaged curtain walls (photo: Ministerio de Obras Públicas). spans slid sideways on their cap transmission levels. 12. Lateral movement of the superstructure of Las Mercedes Bridge Transportation Systems across Route 5 near Rancagua. Many of the bridges the demand on the columns. several skewed spans Although important underground. column dam- egories C and D of Division I-A. Further. so the remaining residential and commercial users endured sig- nificant inconvenience and indirect losses. in only a few instances Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard corners.12. 14 . due to absence of end diaphragms and Ground shaking and liquefaction transverse shear keys. This lack of restraint also ery of telecommunications. water lapsed spans. transverse direction. prestressed concrete girder su. and airports as noted above. In addition. rooftop tele. Straight bridges induced failures. approximately 200 were damaged. electric train were required to be designed to the halts from power and telecommuni. when three those with cast-in-place diaphragms lines conveyed by collapsed or seismic zones were introduced with and concrete shear keys behaved excessively displaced bridges at PGAs of 0. communication structure failures or age was slight. About 20 of these bridges had col.15 following the 1985 also rotated about a vertical axis located infrastructure was observed earthquake. this did not happen. Re-installation of utility infrastructure can interrupt their business for another three or four months.4g.2. but for the Concepción Concepción and Constitución also after high vertical ground accel- area. a steady recov. This phase ports. The most serious damage occurred 1985 earthquake. despite hav- ing completed their own retrofit projects. and improving power deliv. length (Figure 25). railroads. erations were recorded during the The subsequent phase was charac. However. many superstructures to separate lapsed facades or structures. and power distribution jor highways have been constructed insufficient support length allowed overhead lines pulled down by col. a number of ma. the bridge design code in Chile bridges to rotate about a vertical ery to customers along main feeders was based on the provisions in the axis through the pier and slide off and then laterals. column dam- to avoid operational personnel cast. such shortages by supporting workers perstructures without diaphragms or as the shear failures of several col- with food and water provisions. ate contracts with entities known as from their substructures. ficient of 0. with a seismic design coef. are not going to receive power and other utility services until demolition of tagged buildings takes place. perhaps because interrupted operations at collapsed Since the mid-1990s. Vertical rods and hold-down ties had different durations in different Highways and railroads between were provided to prevent uplift. and many restoration of power at the sub. changed until 2001. Note extreme deformation of vertical seismic bars and damaged highways. had substantial tsunami damage. beams.

but there was equipment was submerged and dis- (Route 5). ground shaking. The agricultural and wine produc- tion regions. The Figure 25. was not damaged. Total wine losses 60% complete and consists primar- were estimated at over 125M liters. appar. Unseating at the abutment of the skewed steel plate girder. repairs were made subsidence or toppling that ruptured under construction in Coronel. spreading. mic design code for industrial facilities top of its main bagging facility. had minimal structural damage from (FEPASA) maintains tracks paral. been finished or where there was spreading. placed from its original location by track and railway bridges were barrel stacks. and bottle storage the tsunami. buckling of steel braces near the Bio-Bio River in Concepción. whereas a neighboring conventional wharf of similar size had weld failures in some steel pile bents. however. but much of the lel to the Pan-American Highway ly in the tension braces. The very large. center) suffered only minor damage seismic settlement under some foun- The San Antonio Port had been to its installations. collapses. and was undamaged. Water damage to the damaged due to soil movement. wine (Figure 28). as noted above under adobe walls and timber roofs or Cellulose Plants. and ently due to imposed displacements performed well structurally. modern Bio-Bio cement plant south tions of the structure that had not ing and liquefaction-induced lateral of Curico (about 100km from the epi. Other resulted from improperly anchored plant at Talcahuano apparently suf- bridges across the Bio-Bio River equipment and contents. mostly in the form dations that were on spread footings. leading to loss of of Concepción. A new. across the Bio-Bio River in Con. Local buckling of Power Plants. tures were minimally damaged. fered more damage. Tsunami damage was tanks themselves. The large Arauco Geotechnical Effects. 15 . ribbed brick vaults sustained localized brown paper plant in Constitución The Ferrocarril del Pacífico S. is that modern industrial facilities Arias). Modern warehouse struc. some seriously. and the railroads were used piping or valves. Damage to the major ports of Val. tive reported that more than 75% of serious. One wine industry representa. equipment controls systems was Several piers and bearings sup.A. and forestry. however. racks. reconstructed between 1992 and of fine shear cracks around some of Refineries and Steel Mills. damage due to excessive move- from liquefaction-induced lateral significant downtime and losses ment of equipment. rather than the tsunami. some minor team was unable to enter either the seismically isolated wharf in Coronel (Figure 27). and cement and electricity plants in the Concepción area were also damaged. north of Santiago. refineries. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 the Juan Pablo II Bridge across the designed to the recent NCh2369 seis. most. Damage was limited to por- has been attributed to strong shak. its larger concrete silos. The Bio-Bio spreading (Figure 26). Industrial Facilities The Chilean economy is heavily centered on minerals extraction. were affected by the earthquake. Another Arauco cellulose porting the rail bridge at Chepe Hill total capital loss was from loss of wine plant at Nueva Aldea. The 1997. stretching south from Santiago towards Valdivia. and several areas of damage to steel fermentation tanks. with most appeared to have suffered no seri- cepción were damaged by lateral of the remainder from damage to the ous damage. The team visited the reported between Constitución and legged tanks in many cases led to 350 MW Santa Maria power plant Talca. as were the paper and cellulose mills located in the areas from Consti- tución south. from stainless steel tanks. carrying two container cranes. ily of three very large braced steel paraíso and Concepción (Coronel) Cement Factories. Some older wineries with spreading. Wineries. south quickly. Matta- overall impression from the team Quilicura Bridge. but the team also suffered damage from lateral was unable to visit that installation. agricultural production. near Chillán. Steel mills. The plant is about to help remove earthquake debris. due to insufficient support length (photo: J. frames.

Ministry of Planning (www. and building construction. by gated to administrative regions by comparison. way of territorial regulatory plans eans per million lost their and intermunicipal plans. fered significant structural damage. only 31 Chil. but it appeared that most light industrial steel buildings per- formed well. regional (involv- lapses of stacked. There is an excellent oppor. Arias). level of regional and local planning. and commu- Recovery nity facilities. municipal and district planning. plans (http://www. Both facilities were out of pro- research on the rebuilding of families. however. Urban Development is in charge of regulations and ordinances for Social Impacts. livelihoods. Concepción. well-being aspects of development. quake. and economies. mandate risk assessment at each duction and appeared to have suf- housing. if inconsistent- the propping action of the superstructure at the portant lessons in disaster ly so.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 contents fell to the floor in Governance and Territorial works on the social and state-society institution. struction code enforcement. 428 Chileans per Regional planning is legally dele- million lost their lives. due to lateral spreading and overview. Miranda). municipal plans and district plans This can be attributed to fall under the authority of municipal effective governance as governments. Neighborhood orga- measured by economic nizations provide local linkages to prosperity. even if the anchorages at the column bases would have been considered insufficient by to- day’s standards.subdere. Storage racks seem to have performed well even if the anchorage to the floors was minimal. perfor- mance depended on support details and whether silos were full. the Program interplay between pre. at the various tiers of territorial top of the column (photo: J. while lives in the 2010 quake. Shear failure in a column in northern al assets. most of their Figure 27. the Ministry of Housing and in food processing facilities. Table 3 presents approach to Juan Pablo II Bridge across Bio-Bio a damage assessment Risk reduction and emergency mea- River. and municipal. instruments of urban and regional mill in the San Vicente/Talcahuano tunity for long-term policy-relevant planning.and of Updating Territorial Planning Reg- post-disaster social and spatial in. though it does not yet area. The structure standards. as there was evidence of con- nection distress in the wall panel connections and some panel col- lapses. Response. Mideplan. inter- cured storage drums and municipal. the extended shaking. planning: national. Nation- similar items were evident ally. physical infra. Since 2002. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of regional In the 1960 Valdivia earth. urban development and land use. unse. neighborhoods. 16 . sures are articulated. Base-isolated wharf at Coronel (photo: E. Similar precast concrete structures did not fare so ulations has modernized Chile’s large ENAP refinery or the CAP steel equalities. Chile offers im. The team entered only a limited number of these structures. ing one or more provinces). Numerous examples of silo failures were observed. communities. A There are four tiers of territorial number of spectacular col. policy and highlights the planning. Natural hazard risks are to be ad- Food Processing Facilities and Warehouses. Figure 26.

By law. and few satellite phones are available. its recom.000 Maule region and comportment in maintaining Catholic churches 444 47% of all churches in post-disaster order. an intermediary between central water and electricity utility compa- is beginning the task of improving the government and regional-local gov. but also to synergies with non-governmental organizations. through CARITAS.” utes to the formulation of coastal the poor living in overcrowded condi. the ers in providing medical.440 All regions Houses (heavy damage) 108. A Na. breakdown in civic order. The Red Cross (with centers in Santi- dressed in detail in a city-level gen. central government’s slow emergency social. The Army has been Houses (minor damage) 179. lost 800. however. In general.000 All regions tral government’s National Emer. but it was not (heavily damaged) the country Impacted small cities 45 Over 5. given the resources available. and Concepción) and eral plan. The need to strengthen local cap- acities refers not just to govern- ments. Clearly. some having to do with its Impacted large cities 5 Over 100. tions was brought to public awareness (30-40 units on a site) in many mendations are not binding. Victims (estimated injured. Sabastian Piñera. has built small housing settlements land use policy. died. material. and Education.000 Santiago small. Universities responded quickly to the disaster by supplying volunteers Figure 28. ago. and other levels of support. as the disaster interrupt- ed cell phone service. Interior. Missing 56 All regions sponse to disaster events. Leon). regional. and missing) gency Management Office (ONEMI).000 historical association with General inhabitants Secondary schools 4. (damaged or destroyed) Economic losses US $30 billion All regions In the early weeks. Health. Talca. Loss Category Amount Location Deaths 521 All regions and local capacity for quick re. regional ONEMI Employment loss 15.33 billion All regions lacked direction from the main office Houses (total loss) 81. Although municipal emergency com. the Table 3: Estimated Losses by Category Chilean government did not demon- strate sufficient central. and the Hydrolographic and Oceanographic Institute. is Housing 12. housing. The cen.914 All regions in Santiago. Public Works. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 ment and alert between ONEMI and ministries such as Defense. private land development interests. Typical damage to storage tanks in wineries (photo: R. but disaster management mittees carried out search and rescue the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church’s hous- tional Coastal Commission contrib. The and everyone could see the two faces affected cities. Ministry of the Interior’s SUBDERE of the country: the modern versus the Insurance. The plight of ing NGO.000 jobs lost All regions offices were understaffed and Public sector losses US $9.000 All regions (damaged or destroyed) located in the Interior Ministry. Housing 200. Disaster Response. the The new president. response led to some looting and tance.013 All regions Pinochet. earthquake are estimated in the gional y Administrativo) serves as $US 6-9 billion range. marginalized. have been lead- territorial planning guidelines and ally. Insured losses from the (Subsecretaria para Desarrollo Re. (some damage) Source: Chile government documents 17 . and psychological assis- especially in coastal zones. operating often suffers from tensions between and damage assessment profession. nies (which are privatized) are re- coordination of emergency manage- ernment.000 deployed immediately for various inhabitants reasons. “Un Techo para Chile. Housing and Urban Development. the communication system requires upgrading.683 All regions widely praised for its effectiveness Housing damage 58.

which represented two- and urban zones will be rebuilt on and lifelines. including the United States. quake ground motion. geologic and house cannot be repaired. ly relevant and important to seismic risk reduction activities in other quired to have disaster insurance. and families who lost its effects put forth a wealth of data. number of reconnaissance teams with mortgages did carry the re- ment-supported apartments. Consequently. buildings. Team members urge People lacking earthquake insurance. have no titles. friends in nearby towns. Chile is also a nation of in- come inequality and many marginal structures that are at higher risk to earthquake effects. quake and its effects are especial- Construction of simple wood frame shelter is under way (photo: G. Families displaced to temporary tent camps in the center of Talca. and social impacts have camped out across from their Construction in Residential Sites and long-term recovery. bridges. mortgage did. a favorable bank loan. the same sites with support from gency response. but few units will be rebuilt on site. emer- thirds of the residential losses. will be able to obtain have been quickly demolished in priority. or are rent. and such settlements including seismology. early warning. Most build- families will be provided a subsidy ings that had been declared unsafe and technical assistance for repair of were bulldozed within two weeks of their dwellings. the earth- Figure 29. the event in order to prevent people earthquake-prone parts of the Churches and public buildings were from returning to them. demonstrated both the effectiveness and the shortcomings of modern earthquake risk reduction programs. on subjects paid full structural coverage if a new locations. Many families the Housing Solidarity Fund and the and health care. and six will be supported by the Housing geotechnical effects. Franco). Although content their houses. For families living in govern. Structures that these studies become a high but not poor. civil protection. tsunami. Low-income many towns and cities. or live in some already gathered and some coverage is very low. ing locally if possible. Destroyed or severe. while insurance cover- The central government proposes This brief report highlights some of age for residential buildings varied. including focused research small settlements of 10-12 families. 18 . world. strong earth- months of rent if it is not habitable. not insured. their that studied the February 2010 quired seismic insurance. earthquake.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 Closing Remarks Chile is a country with stable institu- tions and a prosperous economy that. Reconstruction. Continued destroyed or damaged houses in Program. with its long durations of earthquake ground shaking and ensuing tsunami in- undation. Like many other economi- cally developed countries in the world. The earthquake and who owned their houses without a poor families. the principal observations from a Ninety-five percent of households tions. in response to a history of frequent strong earthquakes. The February 27. Other more effectively reduce losses and will be rebuilt to original styles with victims are living with family or improve resilience following future special architectural heritage funds. and detailed documentation. has developed and implemented pro- grams and standards to improve safety and selective infrastructure operability following major earth- quakes. earthquakes. however. There was no insurance for adobe ly damaged adobe houses in rural performance of buildings. can Damaged houses in zones of tradi- and most expect to return to and produce data and procedures to tional (típica) Chilean building style rebuild on their own parcels. study. a variety of recovery housing solu. 2010. Solidarity Fund. owners are high-risk zones will be relocated to yet to be discovered. Extremely earthquake.

Team Members: Tony Allen (WA John Wallace (UCLA). Rodrigo Retamales María Ofelia Moroni. Jaimé Salazar Lagos The Pontificia Universidad Católica de (Burgos Arquitectos).). and Rodolfo Saragoni. Mark Sereci (Digi. Carlos Sempere (UCLA). A Humboldt State University team. Franco). Team Members: Pedro Arduino (U Washington). José Miguel Guillermo Franco (AIR Worldwide). Industries). Richard Betanzo (U Concepcion). The GEER team. Lenart González Chock (Martin and Chock. and Carl Lüders. ford & Chekene). Christian Ledez- ma (U Católica). Rubén The following additional individuals Boroschek (U Chile). Tom Kirsch with Vicente Ariztía. Alfredo Urzúa (Prototype (Forell/Elsesser). and Rubén Jennifer Tanner (U Wyoming). Pablo Herranz. Gabriel Candia Bissell (U Maryland). operated through UNESCO’s Inter- Asociados Ltda. Jonathan Stewart Team Members (Hawaii-Manoa). San Luis Obispo). Inc. Gonzalo Montalva (U Concepción). Rollins (BYU). Victor Sandoval. with Arturo Millán. land). Walter Llera. Co-Team Lead- ers: Jonathan Bray (UC Berkeley). Cristobal Moena. ard Tardanico (Florida International U). Leonardo Dorador uted generously to the EERI team (U Chile). Chile: Professors Juan Carlos De La Jeffrey Ger (FHWA). David Baska (Terracon). (UCLA). Claudio Frings. Rafael gon Dept of Geology and Mineral bieda (Cal Poly. W. San Luis Obispo). Rodrigo Ashford (Oregon State U). William Holmes Lopez (Vale Exploraciones). Juan Jose Besa.Tara Hutchinson (UC San Diego). Katherine Jones Dragovich (NIST). kolb Engineers). William Siem- Jack Moehle (UC Berkeley). Gabriel Ferrer Univ Science & Technology). Matias Hube. Robb Moss (Cal Poly SLO). Jeff versity: Professors Patricio Bonelli and (Golder Assoc. Keith Kelson (Fugro William Lettis & Associates). Carlos Aguirre. Sebastian Maureira (U (Georgia Tech). Alvaro Celestino (Degen. Ian Robertson 19 . (Johns Hopkins U). Nicholas Sitar (UC Berkeley). Roberto Leon (Stanford). and Terry Eldridge (Golder Associates).). Daniel Alzamora (FHWA). Scott Olson (U Figure 30. (U Católica). reconnaissance. Mark Yashinsky Contributors: Scott Ashford (Oregon DOT). David Frost (Georgia Tech). Robert Kayen (USGS). Judith Mitrani-Reiser (Johns (U Católica). Mike Mahoney Chile). Eduardo Miranda (Rutherford & Chekene). Co-Team Leaders: texx Data Systems). Claudio Medina (Golder Alvaro Carboni. Luis Fargier Gab.). Lopez (UCLA). Joe Maffei (Ruther. Engineering Inc. Dong Youp Kwak aldon (U Los Andes. César Sepúlveda. Gilberto Mosqueda (SUNY Buffalo). (Caltrans).). Dominic Assimaki (Georgia Tech). Gary Federico Santa Maria Technical Uni. The Puertas Verdes Camp in the outskirts of Constitución has Illinois Urbana-Champaign).). Eduardo Miranda (Stan. Leonardo Mas. Kyle capacity for about 100 families (photo: G. Mesut Turel (Georgia and Benjamin Westenenk. ford). Scott Farzin Zareian (UC Irvine). Mehmet Çelebi (UC Berkeley). Youssef Hashash (U Illinois). Mauricio Guzmán and Sandra Achurra. EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 Individuals from the Ministerio de Obras Públicas who greatly assisted the bridge team include José Orte- ga. Nevada-Reno). Constanza Tapia (FEMA). Genda Chen (MO de Salud Arauco). Rob Witter (Ore- The EERI team. Nicolas Santa Cruz. State U). Rich- Boroschek (U Chile). William Siembieda (Cal Poly. Aldo Faúndez (Servicio (USGS). and Claudia Welkner (Golder Hopkins U). and Nick Zoa (U Mary- Riddell (U Católica). Ian Buckle (U from three Chile universities contrib- Nevada-Reno). Saavedra (Rubén Boroschek y sone. Phillip Yen (FHWA). Venezuela). (UC Berkeley). Ramon Verdugo (U Chile). George Mylo- nakis (U Patras). Laurie Johnson (Laurie Johnson Consulting). Juan Assoc. Rodrigo Oviedo. Gokhan Pekcan (U The Universidad de Chile: Professors Associates). Juan Arias (U Nevada-Reno). Jim Bay (Utah State U). Tech).

C. “Pre- Villagran (Universidad Católica de decessors of the giant 1960 Chile Technical Council on Lifeline Earth- la Santísima Concepción). Wang (Oregon Dept Geology and doi:10.interior. Sponsored GEER Association Any opinions. Ruiz. Y. The March 22. Bill Fullerton (The Louis L. Leon Kempner (Bonneville Power of Chile Earthquake. Anshel Schiff (Stanford). 0758529 from the National Science island from catastrophe. publication. E. the TCLEE report on lifelines. eds. V. under grant #CMMI. “Interseis- of Public Works). Administration). NOAA/WDC Berger Group Inc). Youlton. Kamataki. found at http://www.). 27 February 2010 Mw8. Leon. chilean-island-from- 1034831.. dad Católica de la Santísima Con. Cooper Inc). Boroschek. Tom Ministry of Housing. 2010. Alex Tang. Machuca. kura. M. “Preliminary Report on the Mineral Industries). http://www. S. Febrero de 2010. Cordero. eeri-newsletter-insert/additional.191. National Geophysical Data Center System). 2010. Lori Dengler (HSU). year-old girl saved her Chilean 2010. J.8. Lista fallecidos. P. 2010. Yumei earthquake. between Constitución and Con- tics Administration)..latimes. and list of names is too long to include in com/2010/mar/21/world/la-fg- Francisco Luna (freelance journalist). http://diario.” Nature. als and organizations in Chile. Malik. “Gobierno evalúa shore Maule. Inc). J.eqclearinghouse. 4th Preliminary Report. “Geo-engineering Re. Eduardo Mesina mic strain accumulation mea- (Ministry of Public Works). org/20100227-chile/published- The research. Hugh Rud. Frost. Sebastian Araya (Stillwater). the EERI Learning from Earthquakes The Independent. National Seismological of the authors and do not necessarily earthquake.1038. MW 8. de Daños del Terremoto del 27 de hazard/tsu_db. United States Geological Survey Team. 2005. Salgado. Allison Pyrch Lagos. Univ. Santiago: Univ. 2010. 404 – 407. and conclu. cl/detalle/index. 2010.independent. J.. 2010. Mauricio Y. Soto. Massone. April 3 (Spanish). 2010. Team Leader org/20100227-chile/published-reports/ Ministry of the Interior.pdf. Leon. John Eidinger (G&E Engineering Astroza.” Physics of the (Shannon & Wilson Inc). Eduardo del F. included Team Leader teams was a direct result of gener- Los Angeles Times. Sawai.minvu. geotechnical engineering aspects co. Parra.eqclearinghouse. P. How 12- Forensic Medical Service (SML).aspx. http://www. http://articles.asp?id={6b20c703- reports bution of this report were funded by 8069-41a5-bb6a-28b9ac30dae6}. Univ.shtml. cepción in Chile. M.usgs. connaissance of the 2010 Maule. Cabezas. fallecidos.. Chile. M. findings. Cauquenes Earthquake. L. 2010. Nick Graehl (HSU grad student). “In Chile. B. Chile. of Emerson Network Power. 27 February us2010tfan/#details.ngdc. sions or recommendations are those (USGS). www. Off Central Chile. ardo Dueñas-Osorio (Rice U. The TCLEE team.38/itic/index. A. April 5 (Spanish). project. et al. I. Historical Tsunami Data Base. protocols. p. how-12yearold-girl-saved-her- ported by NSF under Grant # CMMI. March interior.134.EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 national Tsunami Survey Team The success of the reconnaissance ticle&id=2&Itemid=5. Team Members: Sonia Castellanos acknowledgments. 437. Central-South Chile Austin). Canto Hidalgo (Civil Aeronautics Intensidades Sismicas en el Area http://www.. C. Alexis Kwasinski (UT February 27. mologico Technical Report. A. Husni. http://www. Adm). Santiago). D. Eipert.elmercurio. 2010. Alejandro Kolbe (Ministry of 2010. pp. Moroni. F. (L&T Consulting Inc). Atwater. 2010.F. and distri.geerassociation. Solange Loyer (Universi. W. C. Servicio Sis- Comte. Public Works). G.8 Off- El Mercurio. jo´n. 2010. the bridge reconnaissance team. Bray & D. 175. Troy Nicolini ous assistance of numerous individu- a father’s hope washed away.” Acknowledgments March 31. 2010. FHWA and International Tsunami Information earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/ PEER provided financial support for Center (ITIC).” (NWS).uk/news/world/americas/ were based on GEER studies sup.” norma de edificación Foundation (NSF). reflect the views of NSF. Torre- sured by GPS in the seismic gap Lopez Muela Parra (Civil Aeronau.noaa. Ruegg. http:// http://www. catastrophe-1915821. Rizal & M. nick (Catholic University. 2010. T. Mottadelli. Geology and 4. Roy Imbsen (Earth. ASCE provided financial support for http://193. (NGDC). Rajendran. Chile Earthquake. Earthquake February 27. php?option=com_content&view=ar 20 . Juan Arrese Luco (Ministry Chile. of cepción). Shishi- Earth and Planetary References det_20100329164111. Cooper (T. M. quake Protection Systems.” report of NSF.html. 2010. GEER. M. R. 2010. K. of Chile. Rodrigo Cisternas. quake Engineering (TCLEE). this short report but instead can be chile-survivor22-2010mar22.