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MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES C.

VASQUEZ DE ARROYO
GR No. L-17014 AUGUST 11, 1921

FACTS:

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and
have lived together as man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away
from their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband.
Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain.
Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of
the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of
separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as
permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the
evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to
blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification nor her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with
each other?

HELD:

No, it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the
other. Where the property rights of one of the pair are invalid, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction
the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered
to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof, and the experience of these countries where the
court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore
unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint, though he is without doubt entitled
to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment
appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital
home without sufficient cause, and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263 NOVEMBER 2, 1916

FACTS:

Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,


defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They
established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived
together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the
home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the
defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded
plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs
in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the
defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word
and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his
repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged
to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband
for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant
objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the


conjugal domicile.

HELD:

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new


relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that
defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her
in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is
not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the
defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal
home.
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN vs. FELIX ICAO
G.R. No. 26795 JULY 31, 1970

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the


defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times
under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result,
Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and
as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The
complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte
on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby
girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the
original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that conceived child, although as yet


unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The conceived child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally
represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 74.

Lower courts theory on Article 291 of the Family Code declaring


that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates Article 40
aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the Order is that Icao
being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

The order under appeal are reversed and set aside and the case
remanded to the court of the origin for further proceedings
comfortable to the decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.
CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL FUSTER
G.R. No. L-7487 DECEMBER 29, 1913

FACTS:

On 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo, both citizens of Spain,


got married in a Catholic ceremony in Malaga, Spain. On 1892, Gabriel Fuster
came to the Philippines and acquired real and personal property. Towards the
middle of 1896, Contanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal
relations until April 1899. On April 4, 1899, they made an agreement in a public
document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to
such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move
to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases". Fuster undertook
in the same document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her
support, payable in Madrid from June 1899, but he only complied until August
1899. Contanza Barnuevo returned to Manila in 1909 to file a divorce against
her husband on the ground of adultery committed by Fuster. Fuster denied that
either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila. He argued that they had
their domicile in Barcelona, Spain and he alleged that both of them were natives
and subjects of Spain. Fuster denied Barnuevo's statements concerning the
possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the
statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal property.
The Court of First Instance of Manila decreed the suspension of life-in-common
between Barnuevo and Fuster and directed the communal property to be divided
between the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by
Barnuevo against Fuster who are citizens of Spain.

HELD:

Yes, the CFI did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for,
although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of Manila and had their
domicile herein. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal
domicile other than which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the 17
years preceding the date of the complaint. He had kept open house and had
acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is not the object
of conjugal society. The plaintiff is without proof to the contrary that his wife
resided in Manila from middle of 1896 until April 1899.

Article 36 of the Civil Code: "Spaniards who change their domicile to a


foreign country, where they may be considered as natives without other
conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required in order to preserve
the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish
diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of Spanish
residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children
they may have."
FELISA S. MARCELO vs. DANIEL ESTACIO
G.R. No. L-46626 NOVEMBER 7, 1939

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken by the defendant Daniel V. Estacio from the orders
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal of November 18 and 28 respectively, the
first of which denied his motion to reconsider the order of August 23, 1938
directing his arrest, and the second of which denied his motion of November 7,
1938, for the same purpose. It appears from the record that the plaintiff-appellee,
Felisa S. Marcelo, married the defendant-appellant, Daniel V. Estacio, on April
24, 1921, but she separated from him after a year of marital life. On May 17,
1937, when she learned that the defendant had been named justice of the peace
of the municipalities of Moncada and San Manuel, Province of Tarlac, said
plaintiff-appellee brought suit for support. In its judgment of October 25, 1937,
the court ordered the said defendant-appellant to pay to the plaintiff-appellee a
monthly allowance of P30 from May 18, 1937. On November 18, 1937, the
defendant-appellant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the court
in its order of December 7, 1937. On January 8, 1938, the said defendant-
appellant announced his exception and intention to appeal. On February 5,
1938, the said defendant-appellant filed his bill of exceptions. On February 8th
of the same year, the attorney for the plaintiff-appellee filed in the Court of First
Instance of origin a motion asking that the said defendant-appellant be ordered
to pay her the allowance awarded to her in the decision, or to post a bond of
P2,000 notwithstanding the appeal taken by him to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not affording the defendant an
opportunity to prove his poverty and his inability to pay his wife, the plaintiff-
appellee, the allowance for support to which he was sentenced.

HELD:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court of First Instance of Rizal


in ordering the execution of the judgment, rendered by it against the defendant-
appellant Daniel V. Estacio, sentencing him to pay an allowance to his wife, and
the issuance of an order of arrest in case of non-compliance with said judgment,
after the approval of the bill of exceptions, acted without jurisdiction, wherefore,
said order of execution of the judgment is illegal and void. Wherefore, the
appealed judgment is affirmed insofar as it orders the defendant Daniel V.
Estacio to pay an allowance for support to his wife, Felisa S. Marcelo, and the
arrest of the defendant for non-compliance therewith, issued after the approval
of the bill of exceptions and the elevation thereof to the appellate court, is
reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
CANONIZADO VS. ALMEDA-LOPEZ
109 PHIL 1177

FACTS:

Petitioner and her husband, Cesar Canonizado lived together


until February 18, 1956. The latter left the conjugal home for reason
of insufferable conduct of the herein wife/petitioner. He left with him
his child named Chrisitina Beatriz who is now 13 years old and since
then, remained under the custody and care of wife/petitioner. In
order to assert support for her and daughter, petitioner filed a
petition to ask for support from Cesar Canonizado. In resolving the
case, the respondent judge rendered decision denying the petition of
support pendente lite by reason that herein petitioner is engaged in
gainful occupation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in its ruling denying the petition
for support pendente lite for the by reason that herein petitioner is
engaged in gainful occupation.

HELD:

Yes, court erred in its ruling when it denied the petition for
support. The law expressly provides that while for the properties be
exempt from attachment and executions, courts cannot provide for
the other exemptions. Cost is against the respondent.
ENRIQUE T. JOCSON and JESUS T. JOCSON
vs.
THE EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. No. L-10792 April 30, 1958

FACTS:

Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons


and properties of his minor children Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique
and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety
and managed his childrens properties that included war damage
payments, which formed part of their inheritance from their mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic
accounts to the court for expenses for education and clothing of the
children.

After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority
and thereafter appointed guardian of her still minor brothers Enrique
and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustins accounts,
claiming that illegal disbursements were made from the guardianship
funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority,
Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of
illegality of disbursementswhich Empire Insurance Co. and
Agustins administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these
should have come instead from the support, which they were entitled
to receive from their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is valid that the petitioners-appellants


contention with their fathers disbursements from their guardianship
funds are illegal.

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that right to support, which includes


education and clothing, must be demanded and established before it
becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners mere
relationship with their father. The need for support, as already
stated, cannot be presumed and especially must this be true in the
present case where it appears that the minors had means of their
own. Therefore, the disbursements made by Agustin, which were
even sanctioned by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support
should also be done in a separate action, not in guardianship
proceedings. The Judgment is affirmed without costs since the case
is a paupers appeal.
SYBIL SAMSON and CONSUELO ENRIQUEZ-SAMSON
vs.
HON. NICASIO YATCO, ARSENIO SAMSON and DOROTEA
ANGELES VDA. DE SAMSON
G.R. No. L-15952 APRIL 28, 1961

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 67 of the


Rules of Court to set aside an order entered on 1958 by the CFI of
Rizal, Quezon city that dismissed with prejudiced a petition for
support (Civil Case No. Q-2620). Among the facts of the case states
that Sybil Samson, a minor is a legitimate child of Consuelo Enriquez
(petitioner/plaintiff) and Arsenio Samson (respondent) whom after
years of living in the maternal house of the latter, Consuelo Enriquez,
decided to leave the house of her mother-in-law bringing with her
their child Sybil Samson for the reason that she had been maltreated
in the said house. Subsequently said spouse filed a petition for
support for her and her child. In one of the hearings, petitioners failed
to appear before the court and reasoned-out that said minor child is
sick. Upon verification by the court, said child was found to be only
experiencing a slight fever and that said minor can still walk. That
the following circumstances led to the dismissal of the petition for
support upon failure to appear in court on the part of the
petitioner/plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said CFI erred in dismissing said petition for


mere reason of failure to appear in court on the part of the
petitioner/plaintiff.

HELD:

Yes, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. The petitioners


right to support from the respondent, under Article 301 of Civil Code
cannot be renounced, and they should not be deprived of their right
to present and future support. The cost of case against the
respondent.