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AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN FOR THE Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Stan J.

Caterbone, Pro Se

Stan J. Caterbone
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
Freedom From Covert Harassment &

Surveillance,
Registered in Pennsylvania
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
www.amgglobalentetainmentgroup.com
stancaterbone@gmail.com
717-327-1566

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights


(IACHR), an Organization of American States (OAS)
_______________________________________________

RE:

THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN

REPREPESENTED BY William F. Pepper, Ed.D., J.D.,

_________________________________
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF AMICI CURIAE STANLEY J. CATERBONE
and ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
IN SUPPORT OF SIRHAN SIRHAN
_______________________________

The suspicion is, Pepper remarked, that Sirhan appeared to fit the parameters of
the infamous CIA drug and consciousness-altering program, MK-ULTRA. (Its former
director, Sid Gottlieb, destroyed most of the operations records in 1973.) Dr. Daniel
Brown, Harvard Medical School, spent nearly 70 hours examining Sirhan through
hypnosis and questioning, concluding that the Palestinian Christian had undergone a
variety of procedures coupled with drugs to make him controllable. Notably, Pepper
said, this could have occurred while Sirhan had mysteriously disappeared for two weeks
before the assassination. Seen as a patsy, he was prepped as a distraction while the
real murderer fired the close-up shots killing Kennedy, Pepper continued. Sirhan had
apparently had a handler, a woman in a polka dot dress, the attorney remarked. She
disappeared after she pinched the scapegoat on the neck, apparently triggering Sirhans
belief that he was really shooting at a paper, man-shaped target from a firing range.

William F. Pepper, Ed.D., J.D.,


JULY 20, 2017

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AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN FOR THE Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se

DATED AUGUST 5, 2017

___________/S/____________
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP

Freedom From Covert Harassment & Surveillance,
Registered in Pennsylvania
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
www.amgglobalentetainmentgroup.com
stancaterbone@gmail.com
717-327-1566

Notice and Disclaimer: Stan J. Caterbone and the Advanced Media Group have been slandered, defamed, and
publicly discredited since 1987 due to going public (Whistle Blower) with allegations of misconduct and fraud
within International Signal & Control, Plc. of Lancaster, Pa. (ISC pleaded guilty to selling arms to Iraq via
South Africa and a $1 Billion Fraud in 1992). Unfortunately we are forced to defend our reputation and the
truth without the aid of law enforcement and the media, which would normally prosecute and expose public
corruption. We utilize our communications to thwart further libelous and malicious attacks on our person, our
property, and our business. We continue our fight for justice through the Courts, and some communications
are a means of protecting our right to continue our pursuit of justice. Advanced Media Group is also a member
of the media. Unfortunately due to the hacking of our electronic and digital footprints, we no longer have
access to our email contact list to make deletions. How long can Lancaster County and Lancaster City
Continue to Cover-Up my Whistle Blowing of the ISC Scandel (And the Torture from U.S. Sponsored Mind
Control and the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE from the COINTELPRO PROGRAM)?

ACTIVE COURT CASES


J.C. No. 03-16-90005 Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals -
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIALMISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY re 15-3400 and 16-1149; 03-16-900046 re ALL
FEDERAL LITIGATION TO DATE
U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 16-6822 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI re Case No. 16-1149
MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert
U.S.C.A. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 16-1149 MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert;15-3400
MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert;; 16-1001; 07-4474
U.S. District Court Eastern District of PA Case No. 16-4014 CATERBONE v. United States, et.al.; Case
No. 16-cv-49; 15-03984; 14-02559 MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert; 05-2288; 06-4650, 08-02982;
U.S. District Court Middle District of PA Case No. 16-cv-1751 PETITION FOR HABEUS CORPUS
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board Case No. 2016-462 Complaint against
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas Judge Leonard Brown III
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case No. 353 MT 2016; 354 MT 2016; 108 MM 2016 Amicus for Kathleen Kane
Superior Court of Pennsylvania Summary Appeal Case No. CP-36-SA-0000219-2016, AMICUS for Kathleen
Kane Case No. 1164 EDA 2016; Case No. 1561 MDA 2015; 1519 MDA 2015; 16-1219 Preliminary
Injunction Case of 2016
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 08-13373; 15-10167; 06-03349, CI-06-03401
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for The Eastern District of Pennsylvania Case No. 17-10615; Case No. 16-10157

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AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN FOR THE Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Stanley J. Caterbone is a private citizen and the majority shareholder of the United States
incorporated business Advanced Media Group. Stanley J. Caterbone was a whistle-blower and
shareholder in 1987 involving the United States Defense Contractor International Signal & Control,
Plc., known as ISC. In 1992, International Signal & Control was indicted and found guilty of
among other things a Billion Dollar Fraud and export violations concerning illegally shipping cluster
bomb technologies, missile defense systems, and other defense systems to foreign interests
including South Africa, Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Cluster bombs and related technologies are
known to have been exported to Iraq by the Chilean Arms Dealer Carlos Cardoen, a joint venture
partner of International Signal & Control. The Central Intelligence Agency is confirmed to have
been involved in a covert program to arm Iraq during the 1980s with close ties to International
Signal & Control, which allegedly included the help of the National Security Agency, a former end
user of International Signal & Control technologies under the early 1980s program Project X. A
Presidential Finding in 1984 by the Bush Administration was executed to implement the program
of arming Saddam Hussein and Iraq with the cluster bomb technologies. Serious allegations of
these programs were the focus of investigations that included the knowledge and supervision of
then appointed nominee for the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Robert M. Gates.

Since 1987, Stanley J. Caterbone has been the victim of vast civil conspiracy that started in
1987 to cover-up allegations of fraud within International Signal & Control during the negotiations
and merger of International Signal & Control and Ferranti International of England. Stanley J.
Caterbone alleges that warrantless surveillance was used to obstruct justice and moot his
constitutional rights in an effort to divert attention away from his allegations of fraud within
International Signal & Control back in 1987, and afterwards to the present as a means to deny his
access to the courts for remedy and relief, and Federal False Claims Act violations. The business of
Advanced Media Group has been greatly compromised and intellectual property stolen during the
late 1980s and early 1990s that included information technology contracts with the United States
Government.

Organized stalking and harassment began in 1987 following the public allegations of fraud
within ISC. This organized stalking and harassment was enough to drive an ordinary person to
suicide. As far back as the late 1980's Stan J. Caterbone knew that his mind was being read, or
"remotely viewed". This was verified and confirmed when information only known to him, and
never written, spoken, or typed, was repeated by others. In 1998, while soliciting the counsel of
Philadelphia attorney Christina Rainville, (Rainville represented Lisa Michelle Lambert in the Laurie
Show murder case), someone introduced the term remote viewing through an email. That was
the last time it was an issue until 2005. The term was researched, but that was the extent of the

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AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN FOR THE Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se

topic. Remote Viewers may have attempted to connect in a more direct and continuous way
without success.
In 2005 the U.S. sponsored mind control turned into an all-out assault of mental telepathy;
synthetic telepathy; and pain and torture through the use of directed energy devices and weapons
that usually fire a low frequency electromagnetic energy at the targeted victim. This assault was
no coincidence in that it began simultaneously with the filing of the federal action in U.S. District
Court, or CATERBONE v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al., or 05-cv-2288. This assault began after
the handlers remotely trained Stan J. Caterbone with mental telepathy. The main difference
opposed to most other victims of this technology is that Stan J. Caterbone is connected 24/7 with
a person who declares that she is Interscope recording artist Sheryl Crow of Kennett Missouri.
Stan J. Caterbone has spent 3 years trying to validate and confirm this person without success.
Most U.S. intelligence agencies refuse to cooperate, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the U.S. Attorney's Office refuse to comment. See attached documents for more information.

In 2006 or the beginning of 2007 Stan J. Caterbone began his extensive research into
mental telepathy; mind control technologies; remote viewing; and the CIA mind control program
labeled MK ULTRA and it's subprograms.

In January of 2006, Stanley J. Caterbone was detained at every airport security check
point, which was during a policy of random checks, and taken out of line during travel from
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Houston, Texas, and on to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. At the Houston
Airport, Stanley J. Caterbone was falsely accused of carrying plastics explosives and taken to an
interview room by Homeland Security officials. Stanley J. Caterbone was also detained for three
days in Mexico, and was not provided with an opportunity to gain access to a flight out of the
country by Mexican Officials.

Today, Stan J. Caterbone is a pro se litigant in several state and local courts, in an effort to
be restored to whole since the WHISTLEBLOWING of 1987. Most notable is CATERBONE v. The
National Security Agency, NSA, et.al. In the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT CASE NO. 17-1904. That case is a PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF
FILED TO IMMEDIATELY HALT THE OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE THAT IS BEING ADMINISTERED
THROUGHT THE ILLEGAL COINTELPRO PROGRAM COUPELD WITH THE TORTURE PROGRAM.

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The following are the effects of the ILLEGAL AND LANDMARK COINTELPRO PROGRAM COUPELD
WITH THE TORTURE PROGRAM:

1. AS CONTAINED IN THE LANCASTER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CASE NO. 08-
13373 WHERE PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP WAS ADDED TO THE DEFENDANT'S LIST ON
JANUARY 23, 2017 AND OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL COURT CASES; THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION IS UTILIZING AN ILLEGAL COINTELPRO PROGRAM TO HARASS THE
APPELLANT, STAN J. CATERBONE AND OBSTRUCT JUSTICE BY DIRECTLING CAUSING IT
ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THOSE SAME CIVIL ACTIONS.
2. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION SIGNED (3) EXECUTIVE ORDERS THAT BROADENED THE
POWERS OF THE CITY OF LANCASTER POLICE DEPARTMENT TO COINCIDE WITH THE
ABOVE.
3. THE FACT THAT COMPLAINTANT STAN J. CATERBONE'S HISTORY WITH THE LANCASTER
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT TRACES BACK TO THE 1960'S WITH THE TARGETING OF
COMPLAINTANT STAN J. CATERBONE'S FATHER, SAMUEL CATERBONE, JR. IN THE VERY
SAME MANNER AS THE CURRENT TARGETING OF COMPLAINTANT STAN J. CATERBONE
TODAY IS REASON ENOUGH TO HAVE SUMMARY JUDGEMENTS IN ALL CIVIL ACTIONS IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS IMMEDIATELY ORDERED.
4. THE TARGETING CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:
A. AN UPRECEDENTED HARASSMENT PROGRAM CARRIED OUT BY RESIDENTS,
NEIGHBORS, STALKING GROUPS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND OTHERS.
B. AN UNPRECEDENTED HACKING PROGRAM OF ALL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT.
C. AN UNPRECEDENTED TORTURE PROGRAM UTILIZING ELECTROMAGNETIC AND OTHER
EXOTIC WEAPONS DEVELOPED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
D. AN UNPRECEDENTED CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO DRAIN THE APPELLANT STAN J.
CATERBONE OF ALL CASH RESOURCES, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A CASH POSITION
OF SOME $60,000.00 IN JUNE OF 2015 TO NOTHING TODAY.
E. THE UNPRECEDENTED CAMPAIGN OF FALSE STATEMENTS BY THE RESIDENTS OF 1252
FREMONT STREET AND THE PERJURED STATEMENTS OF LANCASTER CITY POLICE IN
RECENT CRIMINAL SUMMARY OFFENSES FILED IN DISTRICT MAGISTRATE ADAM
WITKONIS COURT.
F. AN UNPRECEDENTED CAMPAIGN OF DAILY HARASSMENTS AND THREATS BY THE
RESIDENTS OF 1252 FREMONT STREET, WHICH HAS BEEN ONGOING SINCE 2006.
G. UN UNPRECEDENTED CAMPAING OF THREATS OF PHYSICL HARM IN PUBLIC SPACES.
H. THE UNPRECEDENTED CAMPAIGN OF THE BREAKING AND ENTERING INTO THE
RESIDENCE OF THE COMPLAINTANT STAN J. CATERBONE CAUSING VANDALISM,
THEFTS, POISONING OF FOOD, AND THE STRATEGIC PLACEMENT OF COCK ROACHES

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ON A DAILY BASIS. THIS ALSO INVOLVES THE THEFT AND MANIPULATION OF COURT
FILINGS AND EVIDENCE.
I. THE ABOVE ARE ALL FACILITATED AND SUPPORTED WITH VIOLATIONS OF DUE
PROCESS IN THE COMPLAINTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT.
J. 1. , COMPLAINTANT STAN J. CATERBONE, PRO SEAM RECIEVING RETALIOTROY
ADVERSE AND HARASSING TREATMENT DUE TO THE FACT THAT 1. , I, COMPLAINTANT
STAN J. CATERBONE, PRO SE, AM THE AMICUS FOR FORMER PENNSYLVANIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL KATHLEEN KANE IN CASE NO. 3575 EDA 2016 IN THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF SUPERIOR COURT, CURRENTLY IN LITIGATION.

THE CUMULATIVE RESULTS OF THE ABOVE LAYS THE FOUNDATION FOR AN


UNPRECDENTED LANDMARK CASE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ANTI-TRUST
VIOLATIONS.

It is too easy for present and future administrations to abuse their power and utilize
warrantless surveillance as a means of subverting and obstructing justice for those that are
engaged in Whistle-Blowing cases that concern National Security. Without the proper oversight
and judicial review, a Whistle Blower can be place on terrorist lists for malicious reasons without
the knowledge or just cause. This is in direct conflict with keeping our democracy free of
corruption while adhering to the spirit of the constitution in the manner our founding fathers
envisioned.

The interest of amicus in this case is ensuring that constitutional rights of private citizens
are not compromised and justice subverted through information obtained from warrantless
surveillance upon which there is no just cause for any allegations or association with terrorism.
Whistle-Blowers are inherently supportive of a system of checks and balances within our
government that go beyond our constitutional doctrines regarding the same. Whistle-Blowers
ensure that the rule of law is universally applied to all government officials in all branches of
government. The Federal False Claims Act and its provisions protect individuals from abuse of
power, while providing relief and remedies for those that were wronged and those that had the
courage to cite a wrong.

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AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN FOR THE Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMICUS CURIE

Synthetic Telepathy Coupled with Electromagnetic Weapons used for pain have been
the ELECTRONIC WEAPONS OF CHOICE by the PERPETRATORS committing these haneus
crimes against AMICUS, STAN J. CATERBONE since at least 2005. My father, U.S. Navy
1943 to 1946) was a victim of MK-ULTRA and experienced the same effects since at
least the early 1960's and my brother, Sammy, (U.S. Air Force 1969-19710 received the
same victimization through the use of the LSD experiments of the same program.

AMICUS, STAN J. CATERBONE is relevant to this case and should be granted legal
standing for the very fact that the initial time of connection with the SYNTHETIC
TELEPATHY consisted of months of NON-STOP INTERROGATIONS BY MALE SUBJECTS
WHO IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS CIA OPERATIVES. The interrogations lasted hours
upon hours at a time and covered just about every aspect of AMICUS STAN J.
CATERBONE'S life. The HANDLERS, for lack of a better term, not only focused on the
WHISTLEBLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ISC IN 1987, but also covered mundane everday
experiences, as a form to harass and torture.

In late spring of 2005, the HANDLERS introduce females to the sessions. To this
day, the torture consists of the same, interrogations mixed in with harassment, sex, and
humor. It is the opinion of AMICUS STAN J. CATERBONE, that the only way to keep from
desensitizing and numbing to the harassment and pain is to experience pleasure and
laughter so as to keep the magnitude of the pain at it's highest level. THIS CAN BE
SUBSANTIATED AND VALIDATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION UNDER HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GRANTED AMICUS STAN J.
CATERBONE DISABILITY BENEFITS IN AUGUST OF 2009 FOR SYMPTOMS AND
ILLNESSES RELATED TO U.S. SPONSORED MIND CONTROL, AND IN FACT STATED IN THE
AWARD LETTER THAT DISABILITY WAS DETERMINED TO BEGIN IN DECEMBER OF 2005;
THE DATE AMICUS STAN J. CATERBONE DECLARED THAT THE SYNTHETIC TELEPATHY
HAD GONE FULL-TIME 24/7, WITHOUT INTERUPTION, TO THIS DAY.

The following article by psychologist JEFFREY KAYE along with the other exhibits
that detail the use of U.S. SPONSORED MIND CONTROL, or behavioral modification
programs, will substantiate that these illegal and criminal techniques were being used,
without any means to verify or evidence, on the prisoner detainees.

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Smoking Gun on CIA Torture Conspiracy? Human Experimentation


Central to EIT Program

Posted By Jeffrey Kaye On September 27, 2009 @ 4:26 pm In Torture | 4 Comments


photo by johnnyalive via flickr

A close reading of the CIAs Inspector General Report and the Senate Intelligence Committees
narrative on the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) torture memos reveals a more detailed picture of
the CIAs involvement in the construction of those documents.

What emerges is consistent with recent charges of CIA experimentation on prisoners, and of the
overall experimental quality of the torture program itself. It also points to a crucial piece of
analysis by the CIAs Office of Technical Services, a memo which may or may not include
damning medical and psychological evidence of the damaging effects of SERE techniques, and
which the IG report maintains was utilized in substantial part in the drafting of the August 1,
2002 Bybee memos. If one is looking for a smoking gun in the torture scandal, in my opinion, one
doesnt have to look much further than this.

The quote below is from the April 22, 2009 Senate Intelligence Committee narrative of the Office
of Legal Counsels opinions on the CIAs interrogation program. Please keep in mind as you read
the quote and the added bolded emphasis, that recent documentation has shown that for years
the CIA and Special Operations had researchers studying the effects of SERE training.

Moreover, the research had been published in peer-reviewed journals, in part because the
research was also meant to add to the psychiatric communitys understanding of the mechanisms
of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. Some of the research had also been published in the June 2000
edition of Special Warfare, The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School.

So, keeping this all in mind, consider the following from the Intel Committees narrative (emphasis
added): According to CIA records, because the CIA believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding
imminent threat information during the initial interrogation sessions, attorneys from the CIAs
Office of General Counsel met with the Attorney General, the National Security Adviser, the
Deputy National Security adviser, the Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, and the
Counsel to the President in mid-May 2002 to discuss the possible use of alternative interrogation
methods that differed from the traditional methods used by the U.S. military and intelligence
community. At this meeting, the CIA proposed particular alternative interrogation methods, including
waterboarding.

The CIAs Office of General Counsel subsequently asked OLC to prepare an opinion about the legality of its
proposed techniques. To enable OLC to review the legality of the techniques, the CIA provided OLC with
written and oral descriptions of the proposed techniques. The CIA also provided OLC with information
about any medical and psychological effects of DoDs Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
(SERE) School, which is a military training program during which military personnel receive counter-
interrogation training.

While the fact that the OLC accepted at face value the CIAs statements regarding the safety or the effects of
the interrogation procedures they were proposing is no surprise to anyone who has read the torture memos
and evidence of the unprofessionalism and bias of the memos authors the degree to which the
conspiracy (by CIA or OLC, or both) to withhold evidence of the real effects of the Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques (EITs) by the CIA has never been made more concrete than now.

To my knowledge, we do not have the specific document wherein the CIA provides the medical and
psychological effects of SERE school. I have been told that this document is still classified. But it seems
possible that the CIA did pass on the details of the research that was available to it, including the debilitating
effects of SERE techniques, which sent stress hormone levels, according to one research report, some of the
greatest ever documented in humans. Another report cited neuroendocrine changes [that] may have
significant implications for subsequent responses to stress.

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One of the authors of these reports, Charles A. Morgan, III, M.D., who has identified himself in certain
settings as a Senior Research Scientist on the CIAs Behavioral Science Staff, has criticized my coverage of
CIA experiments on the psychological and physiological effects of SERE training upon human subjects. While
he could not specify what aspects of this coverage he felt were inaccurate and misleading, he did insist:

The research conducted by our research team at the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is
not, and never has been, conducted for any other purpose than to help us understand the pathophysiology of
stress disorders and we might better help in the treatment of veterans.

In making his mea culpa, Dr. Morgan never mentions that some of this research was funded (over $400,000)
by the Army and the Office of Naval Research. He doesnt mention his acquaintance with great people who
do military interrogations. He also forgets to cite his book contribution, where he states (emphasis added):
The SERE training environment affords the military services the opportunity to collaborate with various
other government agencies in exploring old and new techniques in gathering human intelligence.

Of course, he neither confirms nor denies his affiliation with the CIA, an affiliation which I have traced to the
CIAs Science and Technology directorate, through his association (large PDF) with the Intelligence
Technology Innovation Center, which is a research organization under the CIAs authority that answers
directly to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate. But most of all, Dr. Morgans arrows fall way short
of his target, as I have never accused him of personal involvement in the reverse-engineering of SERE
techniques for use in the torture program.

What is disturbing is his seeming lack of concern over the possiblity that the research he helped conduct was
either used to further experiments upon torture victims in the CIAs clandestine prisons, or contrariwise, was
withheld from Office of Legal Counsel lawyers who relied upon CIA advice concerning the effects of
techniques derived from the SERE schools.

What is indisputable is that by virtue of his position, Dr. Morgan had access to CIA officials just at the time
that another department of the CIA, one to which he is affiliated, was, according to the CIAs own Office of
Inspector General Report (large PDF) involved in vetting the SERE techniques for use in interrogations. The
other department was the Office of Technical Services (OTS), part of the CIAs Science and Technology
Directorate. This, by the way, is the same division that was responsible for the MKULTRA experiments of the
1950s and 1960s. From the OIG report:

CTC [CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center], with the assistance of the Office of Technical Service (OTS),
proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on AbuZubaydah.

CIAs OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed EITs and their potential long-term psychological effects
on detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited from a number of psychologists and
knowledgeable academics in the area of psychopathology.

OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its
SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students. DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term
psychological effects resulted from use of the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the waterboard, on
SERE students. The OTS analysis was used by OGC [DoD's Office of General Counsel] in evaluating the
legality of techniques.

OTSs solicitation of information on SERE from JPRA elicited some sort of feedback from JPRA, which
supposedly told OTS that SERE training caused no long-term effects. The IG Report does not say if this was
in the form of a memo and only speaks of OTSs analysis. In any case, we should not confuse any OTS
analysis with the information provided by JPRA itself to the Office of General Counsel, which produced a
number of memorandum and attachments in late July 2003. Marcy Wheeler has been analyzing the timing of
these JPRA items, including the fact that one of these key documents is missing.

The CIA IG Report is relating a story whose emphasis differs from that produced in the narrative of the
Senate Armed Services Committee investigation (PDF) into SERE torture. In the latter, JPRA is
the main culprit in providing cover for the supposed safety of using SERE techniques. Yet, in the OIG account
it looks like the CIA used DOD/JRRA as a cover for the safety of techniques that it knew were in fact harmful
from their own analysis of the data. Moreover, it was the OTS analysis that was used in substantial part
as the basis of the August 1, 2002 memo approving the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs).
That legal opinion was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience and expertise of non-
Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long-term psychological effects would result from use

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of the proposed techniques.

Moreover, the CIAs Office of Medical Services was frozen out of the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of
EITs, and not even provided with a copy of the OTS report given to the White House Office of Legal Counsel.
Such compartmentalization of information is indicative of a covert operation, such as a Special Access
Program (SAP). This SAP would have included personnel in CIAs CTC, OTS, OGC, and Directorate of
Operations, also portions of DOD (JPRA and Special Operations Command),

and probably the White Houses OLC, Office of the Vice President, and National Security Council. It seems
highly likely that the CIA report to the OLC on the medical and psychological effects of the SERE school
program, mentioned in the Senate Intelligence Committee narrative quote above, is in fact the OTS report,
which came from the same CIA directorate to which Dr. Morgan belongs. This does not speak to Morgans
foreknowledge of what would be used, nor to the amount of his involvement. But it does speak to the
likelihood that the government research he conducted (with others) was available and likely used by his
associates in the CIA.

To what purpose was this information used? It seems Dr. Morgan has serendipitously given us the answer
himself: exploring old and new techniques in gathering human intelligence. The CIA appears to have used
torture to conduct what Physicians for Human Rights, in a white paper (PDF) recently published, called
possible unethical human experimentation, [which] urgently needs to be thoroughly investigated. The
government should declassify the OTS report, and bring the process of investigating the CIAs role in the
torture conspiracy fully into public purview.

This report was originally published on FireDogLake.com.


Jeffrey Kaye, a psychologist living in Northern California and a regular contributor The Public Record,
has been blogging at Daily Kos since May 2005, and maintains a personal blog, Invictus. E-mail Mr.
Kaye at sfpsych at gmail dot com.

AUGUST 5, 2017

___________/S/____________
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP

Freedom From Covert Harassment & Surveillance,
Registered in Pennsylvania
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
www.amgglobalentetainmentgroup.com
stancaterbone@gmail.com
717-327-1566

Notice and Disclaimer: Stan J. Caterbone and the Advanced Media Group have been slandered, defamed, and
publicly discredited since 1987 due to going public (Whistle Blower) with allegations of misconduct and fraud
within International Signal & Control, Plc. of Lancaster, Pa. (ISC pleaded guilty to selling arms to Iraq via
South Africa and a $1 Billion Fraud in 1992). Unfortunately we are forced to defend our reputation and the
truth without the aid of law enforcement and the media, which would normally prosecute and expose public
corruption. We utilize our communications to thwart further libelous and malicious attacks on our person, our
property, and our business. We continue our fight for justice through the Courts, and some communications
are a means of protecting our right to continue our pursuit of justice. Advanced Media Group is also a member
of the media. Unfortunately due to the hacking of our electronic and digital footprints, we no longer have
access to our email contact list to make deletions. How long can Lancaster County and Lancaster City
Continue to Cover-Up my Whistle Blowing of the ISC Scandel (And the Torture from U.S. Sponsored Mind
Control and the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE from the COINTELPRO PROGRAM)?

AMICUS - Inter-American Commission Page No. 10 of 2933 Saturday August 5, 2017


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Never Apologized
Sirhan Sirhan: A Reel Bad Arab? The Alleged Killer of
US War Crimes against North Korea: Sinchon
Robert F. Kennedy
Massacre by U.S. Military Exposed

By J. Michael Springmann Region: USA


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Legal? Global Research, July 23, 2017 Civil Rights

On the Beach 2017. The War was Over Was


it Started by an Accident or Mistake. There was
no Victor
On July 20, 2017, William F. Pepper, Ed.D., J.D., spoke at the National
EU to Become Global Balancer If It Gains Press Club about his previous days filing of a 200-page petition
Geopolitical Independence From the US regarding Sirhan Sirhan. Sirhan, jailed since 1968, is , late New York
U.S. senator and Democratic presidential candidate. Organized by
Most Popular All Articles
Andrew Kreig, J.D., editor of the Justice Integrity Project, the well-
attended conference enabled Dr. Pepper to discuss his long-sought
evidentiary hearing.

As Sirhans lawyer for many years, Pepper conceded that the legal remedies for his client in the United
States have been exhaustedat both the State and federal levels. California, where Kennedy had been
murdered in a Los Angeles hotel kitchen, did not assure a fair trial. Essentially, ineffective assistance of
counsel got the accused wrongly convicted. Grant Cooper, his attorney, under threat of a sealed
felony indictment, did almost nothing to defend Sirhan. He failed to investigate the matter, obtain the
autopsy report, or examine ballistics tests. He spent most of the court proceedings arguing that Sirhan
was guilty and, that because of diminished capacity, should not be given the death penalty.

Sirhan also got no relief in the federal system, neither with with the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, nor with the extremely liberal and contrarian U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit, nor with the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to review the case.

Now, Pepper is staking Sirhans chances on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), an Organization of American States (OAS) body. His goal is either a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing. The filing alleges that the California and U.S. justice systems violated Sirhans
right to a fair trial, as required under the OAS Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. By treaty,
the IACHR may review U.S. cases and those from 34 other nations when domestic remedies have
been exhausted.

Pepper, who had been a friend of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, is known for his
winning defense of Kings supposed murderer, James Earle Ray, during a 1993 mock trial on HBO. In
a celebrated wrongful death proceeding in 1999, Pepper obtained a symbolic award based on 10 years
of dogged pursuit of relevant evidence and witnesses. He is doing the same now with Sirhan.

Noting that the U.S. media is controlled, by high level businessmen, bankers, and other influential
figures who move in and out of government, such as John J. McCloy one-time U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany and member of the Warren Commission, Sirhans lawyer said that the
conclusive evidence reported as news was, in realty, extremely weak. There was never a hearing on
the facts, he commented. Such an investigation would have shown that Sirhan, the claimed criminal,
was nowhere near Kennedy when the shooting started. Thomas Noguchi, Los Angeles chief medical
examiner at the time, swore that Kennedy was struck by three shots fired within inches of his body,
from behind. Sirhan got off two shots at Kennedy from a six-foot distance, in front. Sirhan was
immediately tackled and pinned down while still pulling the trigger on his handgun. However, Sirhan
fired only eight shots total yet a carefully-examined sound recording heard thirteen rounds. Moreover,
the shots came from different directions.

Yet, the Los Angeles Police Department, Pepper revealed, failed to preserve the physical evidence
from the crime scene, such as ceiling tiles, doors, and door frames with bullets buried in them. The
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AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF SIRHAN SIRHAN FOR THE Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se
cops excuse? There was no space in which to store them. Pepper went on to say that the Los Angeles
Global Research Publishers
police had long-standing and very close ties to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The suspicion is, Pepper remarked, that Sirhan appeared to fit the parameters of the infamous CIA
drug and consciousness-altering program, MK-ULTRA. (Its former director, Sid Gottlieb, destroyed
most of the operations records in 1973.) Dr. Daniel Brown, Harvard Medical School, spent nearly 70
hours examining Sirhan through hypnosis and questioning, concluding that the Palestinian Christian
had undergone a variety of procedures coupled with drugs to make him controllable. Notably, Pepper
said, this could have occurred while Sirhan had mysteriously disappeared for two weeks before the
assassination. Seen as a patsy, he was prepped as a distraction while the real murderer fired the
close-up shots killing Kennedy, Pepper continued. Sirhan had apparently had a handler, a woman in a
polka dot dress, the attorney remarked. She disappeared after she pinched the scapegoat on the neck,
apparently triggering Sirhans belief that he was really shooting at a paper, man-shaped target from a
firing range.

COMMENT. Despite Andrew Kreigs extensive and most vigorous efforts, only a few members of the
Click Here To Order Online press turned up at the conference: an intern from the Washington Times, a representative from Al-
Mayadeen TV, Beirut, along with a knowledgeable White House correspondent for an alternative news
site. This appeared to validate Dr. Peppers view of the heavily-managed American media. And it
bodes ill for what seems to be the attorneys goal in filing with the OASto generate enough adverse
publicity to force the United States to re-examine the questionable trial of Sirhan Sirhan. Indeed, a
casual search of the Internet turns up a number of references about conspiracies revolving around
the problematically convicted man.

Perhaps everyone involved in this matter should take a look at Dr. Jack Shaheens writings on Arabs,
notably Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies A People.

This article was originally published by Haus Frau Leaks.

Featured image from the author

The original source of this article is Global Research


Copyright J. Michael Springmann, Global Research, 2017

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The project's research on questionable cases with a focus mainly, but not exclusively, on U.S. domestic federal investigations. Sample
areas include warrantless surveillance, intimidation of families and witnesses, suppression of evidence, appearance of judicial bias, and
irregular financial incentives. Also, the Project has examined oversight by higher courts, Congress, and the news media that permit
abuses that, in the aggregate, threaten the foundations of democracy.

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"All decent, fair-minded American citizens -- liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans -- need to let their voices
be heard in denouncing, castigating, and rejecting such deplorable, dangerous tactics."

Robert Ames Alden retired from the Washington Post in 2000 after more than 48 years as an editor, making him at the time of his
retirement the longest-serving editor in the papers history. As night news editor in 1963, he put together the Post's first extra edition since
Pearl Harbor to cover the assassination of President Kennedy. As world news editor in 1974, he was the principal architect for the Posts
coverage of the resignation of President Nixon.

Culminating a seven-year effort in 1975, he co-founded and later led the National Press Foundation to improve journalism education. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, he was the leading male advocate for the admission of women into the National Press Club, where he served
as president in 1976.

The first native Washingtonian to lead the Press Club, he began his career as a sportswriter for the Cleveland Press in 1947. He helped innovate the use of more
statistics in baseball coverage and was an award-winning writer.

He was a visionary community leader in planning a green, central park, library, outdoor stage, community center and theater for McLean, VA, whose Alden
Theater carries his name. He holds bachelor and masters degrees from the George Washington University, where he won the university's top history award as a
student for 17 years in the 1950s and 1960s. In 2005, university officials bestowing a distinguished alumnus award described Alden as a living legend in
Washington journalism.

James Ronald Fisher is an honors graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, retired Navy Captain, Founder and Executive Director of

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WeThePeopleNow.org, an engineer, businessman, church and community leader, and civil rights advocate.

Fishers 30 years of military service includes 15 nuclear submarine patrols during the Cold and Vietnam Wars. Also, he managed the
overhaul and repair of nuclear submarines and inspections of almost every major naval command as the Assistant Naval Inspector General
for Logistics on the staff of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations. His Navy work also included collateral duties as a prosecutor, defense counsel
and summary court martial officer. His Navy awards include the Legion of Merit.

As a civilian, he worked at two engineering services firms. He founded and led the Defense Fire Protection Association to improve the safety and survivability of
U.S. military forces. Also, he founded and led the Veterans Sales and Services Corporation (VetSS), which specialized in hiring disabled veterans.

His web site has, among other things, plans to end US wars and occupation, put more Americans to work and reform financial systems. In politics, he was
chairman of the Northern Virginia Presidential primary campaign for his classmate John McCain in 2000, and held the same post in 2008 for Dennis Kucinich. He
was first in his class in Submarine, Nuclear Power and Basic Engineering Duty Officer Schools and is the author of numerous research papers.

John Edward Hurley is Chairman of the McClendon Group, which is named for the legendary White House correspondent Sarah McClendon
and meets in the McClendon Room at the National Press Club. His career in the journalism and non-profit world has included his work with
the major media as a White House correspondent, as a commentator on News Talk America, and as a member of the Public Information
Committee of the National Academy of Sciences.

In addition to his work with the major media, he is the Commander of the National Press Club American Legion Post; developed the public
relations program that brought together the various breed registries that comprise the American Horse Council; was a long-time sponsor of
the Rappahannock Hunt; and is a patron of the Thornton Hill Hounds.

He also is President and Chairman of the Confederate Memorial Association's museum and library, the historian for the John Barry Division of the Hibernians,
and a co-founder of the Capitol HillCivil War Roundtable. Throughout his career, he has had a special interest in the integrity of the court system and has hosted
many news events on the subject, which have included coverage by C-SPAN from the National Press Club.

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Andrew Kreig is Justice Integrity Project editor and co-founder. Andrew Kreig has two decades experience as an attorney and non-profit
executive in Washington, DC. An author and longtime investigative reporter, his primary focus since 2008 has been exploring allegations of
official corruption and other misconduct in federal agencies. Also, he has been a consultant and volunteer leader in advising several non-
profit groups fostering cutting-edge applications within the communications industries. In 2008, he became an affiliated research fellow with
the Information Economy Project at George Mason University School of Law and from 2009 through 2012 he was a
senior fellow with the Schuster Institute for Investigative Journalism at Brandeis University.

As president and CEO of the Wireless Communications Association International (WCA) from 1996 until 2008, Kreig led its worldwide
advocacy that helped create the broadband wireless industry. He has lectured about communications on five continent, and co-keynoted
the annual Futures Summit of the National Association of Broadcasters. Previously, he was WCA vice president and general counsel, an
associate attorney at Latham & Watkins, law clerk to a federal judge, author of the book Spiked about the newspaper business, and a
longtime reporter for the Hartford Courant.

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EXHIBITS

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DOCUMENT DIVIDER

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The Public Record Smoking Gun on CIA Torture Conspiracy? Human E... http://pubrecord.org/torture/5558/smoking-torture-conspiracy-human/print/
U.S.
AMICUS CURIE IN THE CASE OF Sponsored
SIRHAN Mind
SIRHAN Control
FOR and the 2009 Commission
THE Inter-American Senate Investigations into CIA
on Human Rights byInterrogation Programs
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se

- The Public Record - http://pubrecord.org -

Smoking Gun on CIA Torture Conspiracy? Human Experimentation


Central to EIT Program
Posted By Jeffrey Kaye On September 27, 2009 @ 4:26 pm In Torture | 4 Comments

photo by johnnyalive via flickr

A close reading of the CIAs Inspector General Report and the Senate Intelligence Committees
narrative on the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) torture memos reveals a more detailed picture of the
CIAs involvement in the construction of those documents.

What emerges is consistent with recent charges of CIA experimentation on prisoners, and of the
overall experimental quality of the torture program itself.

It also points to a crucial piece of analysis by the CIAs Office of Technical Services, a memo which
may or may not include damning medical and psychological evidence of the damaging effects of SERE
techniques, and which the IG report maintains was utilized in substantial part in the drafting of the
August 1, 2002 Bybee memos. If one is looking for a smoking gun in the torture scandal, in my
opinion, one doesnt have to look much further than this.

The quote below is from the April 22, 2009 Senate Intelligence Committee narrative of the Office of
Legal Counsels opinions on the CIAs interrogation program. Please keep in mind as you read the
quote and the added bolded emphasis, that recent documentation has shown that for years the CIA
and Special Operations had researchers studying the effects of SERE training.

Moreover, the research had been published in peer-reviewed journals, in part because the research
was also meant to add to the psychiatric communitys understanding of the mechanisms of
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. Some of the research had also been published in the June 2000
edition of Special Warfare, The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School.

So, keeping this all in mind, consider the following from the Intel Committees narrative (emphasis
added):

According to CIA records, because the CIA believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding
imminent threat information during the initial interrogation sessions, attorneys from the
CIAs Office of General Counsel met with the Attorney General, the National Security
Adviser, the Deputy National Security adviser, the Legal Adviser to the National Security
Council, and the Counsel to the President in mid-May 2002 to discuss the possible use of
alternative interrogation methods that differed from the traditional methods used by the

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U.S. military and intelligence community. At this meeting, the CIA proposed particular
alternative interrogation methods, including waterboarding.

The CIAs Office of General Counsel subsequently asked OLC to prepare an opinion about
the legality of its proposed techniques. To enable OLC to review the legality of the
techniques, the CIA provided OLC with written and oral descriptions of the proposed
techniques. The CIA also provided OLC with information about any medical and
psychological effects of DoDs Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
(SERE) School, which is a military training program during which military personnel
receive counter-interrogation training.

While the fact that the OLC accepted at face value the CIAs statements regarding the safety or the
effects of the interrogation procedures they were proposing is no surprise to anyone who has read the
torture memos and evidence of the unprofessionalism and bias of the memos authors the
degree to which the conspiracy (by CIA or OLC, or both) to withhold evidence of the real effects of the
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) by the CIA has never been made more concrete than
now.

To my knowledge, we do not have the specific document wherein the CIA provides the medical and
psychological effects of SERE school. I have been told that this document is still classified. But it
seems possible that the CIA did pass on the details of the research that was available to it, including
the debilitating effects of SERE techniques, which sent stress hormone levels, according to one
research report, some of the greatest ever documented in humans. Another report cited
neuroendocrine changes [that] may have significant implications for subsequent responses to
stress.

One of the authors of these reports, Charles A. Morgan, III, M.D., who has identified himself in
certain settings as a Senior Research Scientist on the CIAs Behavioral Science Staff, has criticized
my coverage of CIA experiments on the psychological and physiological effects of SERE training upon
human subjects. While he could not specify what aspects of this coverage he felt were inaccurate and
misleading, he did insist:

The research conducted by our research team at the National Center for Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder is not, and never has been, conducted for any other purpose than to help
us understand the pathophysiology of stress disorders and we might better help in the
treatment of veterans.

In making his mea culpa, Dr. Morgan never mentions that some of this research was funded (over
$400,000) by the Army and the Office of Naval Research. He doesnt mention his acquaintance with
great people who do military interrogations. He also forgets to cite his book contribution, where he
states (emphasis added):

The SERE training environment affords the military services the opportunity to
collaborate with various other government agencies in exploring old and new
techniques in gathering human intelligence.

Of course, he neither confirms nor denies his affiliation with the CIA, an affiliation which I have traced
to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate, through his association (large PDF) with the
Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, which is a research organization under the CIAs
authority that answers directly to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate.

But most of all, Dr. Morgans arrows fall way short of his target, as I have never accused him of
personal involvement in the reverse-engineering of SERE techniques for use in the torture program.
What is disturbing is his seeming lack of concern over the possiblity that the research he helped
conduct was either used to further experiments upon torture victims in the CIAs clandestine prisons,
or contrariwise, was withheld from Office of Legal Counsel lawyers who relied upon CIA advice
concerning the effects of techniques derived from the SERE schools.

What is indisputable is that by virtue of his position, Dr. Morgan had access to CIA officials just at the
time that another department of the CIA, one to which he is affiliated, was, according to the CIAs
own Office of Inspector General Report (large PDF) involved in vetting the SERE techniques for use in
interrogations. The other department was the Office of Technical Services (OTS), part of the CIAs
Science and Technology Directorate. This, by the way, is the same division that was responsible for
the MKULTRA experiments of the 1950s and 1960s. From the OIG report:

CTC [CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center], with the assistance of the Office of Technical
Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on Abu

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Zubaydah.

CIAs OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed EITs and their potential long-term
psychological effects on detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited
from a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area of
psychopathology.

OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding
techniques used in its SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on
students. DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted from use of
the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the waterboard, on SERE students. The
OTS analysis was used by OGC [DoD's Office of General Counsel] in evaluating the
legality of techniques.

OTSs solicitation of information on SERE from JPRA elicited some sort of feedback from JPRA, which
supposedly told OTS that SERE training caused no long-term effects. The IG Report does not say if
this was in the form of a memo and only speaks of OTSs analysis. In any case, we should not confuse
any OTS analysis with the information provided by JPRA itself to the Office of General Counsel,
which produced a number of memorandum and attachments in late July 2003. Marcy Wheeler has
been analyzing the timing of these JPRA items, including the fact that one of these key documents is
missing.

The CIA IG Report is relating a story whose emphasis differs from that produced in the narrative of
the Senate Armed Services Committee investigation (PDF) into SERE torture. In the latter, JPRA is
the main culprit in providing cover for the supposed safety of using SERE techniques. Yet, in the OIG
account it looks like the CIA used DOD/JRRA as a cover for the safety of techniques that it knew were
in fact harmful from their own analysis of the data. Moreover, it was the OTS analysis that was used
in substantial part as the basis of the August 1, 2002 memo approving the Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques (EITs).

That legal opinion was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience
and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long-term
psychological effects would result from use of the proposed techniques.

Moreover, the CIAs Office of Medical Services was frozen out of the initial analysis of the risk and
benefits of EITs, and not even provided with a copy of the OTS report given to the White House
Office of Legal Counsel. Such compartmentalization of information is indicative of a covert operation,
such as a Special Access Program (SAP). This SAP would have included personnel in CIAs CTC, OTS,
OGC, and Directorate of Operations, also portions of DOD (JPRA and Special Operations Command),
and probably the White Houses OLC, Office of the Vice President, and National Security Council.

It seems highly likely that the CIA report to the OLC on the medical and psychological effects of the
SERE school program, mentioned in the Senate Intelligence Committee narrative quote above, is in
fact the OTS report, which came from the same CIA directorate to which Dr. Morgan belongs. This
does not speak to Morgans foreknowledge of what would be used, nor to the amount of his
involvement. But it does speak to the likelihood that the government research he conducted (with
others) was available and likely used by his associates in the CIA.

To what purpose was this information used? It seems Dr. Morgan has serendipitously given us the
answer himself: exploring old and new techniques in gathering human intelligence. The CIA appears
to have used torture to conduct what Physicians for Human Rights, in a white paper (PDF) recently
published, called possible unethical human experimentation, [which] urgently needs to be thoroughly
investigated. The government should declassify the OTS report, and bring the process of
investigating the CIAs role in the torture conspiracy fully into public purview.

This report was originally published on FireDogLake.com.

Jeffrey Kaye, a psychologist living in Northern California and a regular contributor The Public Record,
has been blogging at Daily Kos since May 2005, and maintains a personal blog, Invictus. E-mail Mr.
Kaye at sfpsych at gmail dot com.

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Article printed from The Public Record: http://pubrecord.org

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- The Public Record - http://pubrecord.org -

EXCLUSIVE: CIA Experiments on U.S. Soldiers Linked to Torture


Program
Posted By Jeffrey Kaye On September 9, 2009 @ 5:00 am In Torture | 7 Comments

Editors note: Click here to listen to Jeffrey Kaye discuss his groundbreaking report with radio talk
show host Peter B. Collins.

A number of new articles have been published recently that have highlighted evidence of illegal
human experimentation on U.S.-held terrorism prisoners undergoing torture. These articles
followed the release of a white paper by Physicians for Human Rights [PHR], Aiding Torture: Health
Professionals Ethics and Human Rights Violations Demonstrated in the May 2004 Inspector Generals
Report.

This report looks at those recent charges, and reveals that experiments by a CIA researcher on
human subjects undergoing SERE training went unreported in the legal memos the Bush
administration drafted to approve their torture program. It will also connect major military and
intelligence figures to the SERE experiments, and tie some of them to major science and
experimental directorates at the CIA and Special Operations Command.

An article by veteran journalist William Fisher, looking at PHRs white paper, asks, Did physicians
and psychologists help the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency develop a new research protocol to
assess and refine the use of waterboarding or other harsh interrogation techniques?

A column at Scientific American quotes PHRs medical advisor on the subject:

[PHR] also raises questions about the ethics of medical note-taking during some of the
interrogations. Medical doctors and psychologists colluded with the CIA to keep
observational records about waterboarding, which approaches unethical and unlawful
human experimentation, Scott Allen, lead study author and PHR medical advisor, said
in a prepared statement.

Finally, a story in Wednesdays UK Guardian discussed the significance of the charges of unlawful
human experimention:

Human experimentation without consent has been prohibited in any setting since 1947,
when the Nuremberg Code, which resulted from the prosecution of Nazi doctors, set
down 10 sacrosanct principles. The code states that voluntary consent of subjects is
essential and that all unnecessary physical and mental suffering should be avoided.

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The Geneva conventions also ban medical experiments on prisoners and prisoners of
war, which they describe as grave breaches.

After describing how [h]ealth professionals in the Office of Medical Services and psychologist
contractors engaged in designing and monitoring torture, as selecting and then rationalizing the
use of various harmful interrogation techniques, the PHR report goes on to say:

By requirement, all interrogations were monitored in real-time by health professionals.


Previous reports, including the ICRC report, document allegations that a medical device
called a pulse oximeter (a device to measure oxygen saturation in a subjects blood)
was placed on the finger of a detainee to monitor the effectiveness of his respiration
during waterboarding. In this way, medical professionals were used to calibrate physical
and mental pain and suffering.

The possibility that health professionals monitored techniques to assess and improve
their effectiveness, constituting possible unethical human experimentation, urgently
needs to be thoroughly investigated.

An Experimental Battle Lab

The CIAs Office of Medical Services was supposed to be in charge of monitoring detainee health
under interrogation. However their instructions, described in an annex to the CIA Inspector General
report, exemplifies the dual nature of the monitoring, as this example from the report shows:

If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral
range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented. [2 or 3
redacted lines]

At ambient temperatures below 18 [degrees]C/64 [degrees]F, detainees should be


monitored for the development of hypothermia. [Four redacted paragraphs]

Rather than make changes to ambient temperatures, to prevent harm to prisoners, medical
professionals are instructed to monitor and document the situation. The torture techniques used by
SERE are known to cause endocrine and metabolic disorders (see section on CIA research below),
prisoners tortured and subjected to cold are at higher risk of hypothermia, which for a normal person
can set in at an ambient temperature of 60 degrees F. The monitoring in this case seems to be as
much about experimentation as it is any concern for a prisoners health. (For what other possible
reason could this section be mostly redacted?) Parallels to the experiments on hypothermia by Nazi
scientists at Dachau are chilling, as is the fact that some of these scientists were later imported,
along with their data, to the United States.

Questions were raised around possible human experimentation in an article last May at Firedoglake
on The Zubaydah Torture Experiment, noting, Of the many fascinating details coming out of [the
May 2009 Senate] Judiciary hearing the references to the application of an experiment by the
ex-SERE CIA contractor, most likely James Mitchell, seemed especially important.

The experimentation was not limited to high-value CIA prisoners. Last April, another article at
Firedoglake reported how the Senate Armed Services Committee report (PDF) on prisoner abuse
described the creation of an experimental battle lab at Guantanamo, demonstrating support for the
torture program from the main Army intelligence school at Ft. Huachuca.

According to the Levin report, in August 2002, COL John P. Custer, then-assistant
commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona
conducted a review of interrogations operations at Guantanamo. Custer called
Guantanamo Americas Battle Lab in the war on terror, and recommended combining
FBI and military techniques to extract information by exploiting the detainees
vulnerabilities. The Battle Lab label stuck, though some, like Colonel Britt Mallow, of
the Criminal Investigative Task Force, objected.

MG Dunlavey and later MG Miller referred to GTMO as a Battle Lab meaning that
interrogations and other procedures there were to some degree experimental, and their
lessons would benefit DOD in other places. While this was logical in terms of learning
lessons, I personally objected to the implied philosophy that interrogators should
experiment with untested methods, particularly those in which they were not trained.

Later, Dunlavey denied using the term, and Miller testified he couldnt remember.

Pre-9/11 Experiments on SERE Torture


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The experiments on the effects of SERE-torture techniques began even earlier upon SERE trainees
themselves. An April 2009 AlterNet article reported on the history of experimentation on soldier
subjects undergoing SERE training. (SERE is a military program, the acronym standing for Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, Escape.) The article explained how the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the
CIA ignored a wealth of other published information about the effects of SERE stress inoculation,
citing a June 2000 article, Assessment of Humans Experiencing Uncontrollable Stress: The SERE
Course, in Special Warfare (PDF). Special Warfare is The Professional Bulletin of the John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (emphases added to following quote):

Results

As shown in the charts on page 7, SERE stress caused significant changes in students
hormone levels. Recorded changes in cortisol levels were some of the greatest
ever documented in humans. In some cases, the changes noted among the
trainees were greater than the changes noted in patients undergoing heart
surgery.

Changes in testosterone levels were similarly remarkable: In some cases,


testosterone dropped from normal levels to castration levels within eight
hours.

The Alternet article also quoted from a May 2000 article in Biological Psychiatry, Hormone profiles in
humans experiencing military survival training (emphasis added):

Conclusions: The stress of military survival training produced dramatic alterations in


cortisol, percent free cortisol, testosterone, and thyroid indices. Different types of
stressors had varying effects on the neuroendocrine indices. The degree of
neuroendocrine changes observed may have significant implications for
subsequent responses to stress.

Looking beyond more than physiological symptoms, other studies have looked at purely
psychological data. Consider this oft-quoted study from the August 2001 edition of the American
Journal of Psychiatry, which looked at dissociative symptoms, such as depersonalization,
derealization, psychic or emotional numbing, and general cognitive confusion, produced in military
subjects exposed to SERE torture techniques (emphasis added):

The current study was designed to assess the nature and prevalence of dissociative
symptoms in healthy humans experiencing acute, uncontrollable stress during U.S.
Army survival training. METHOD: In study 1, 94 subjects completed the Clinician-
Administered Dissociative States Scale after exposure to the stress of survival
training. In study 2, 59 subjects completed the Brief Trauma Questionnaire before
acute stress and the dissociative states scale before and after acute stress. A randomly
selected group of subjects in study 2 completed a health problems questionnaire after
acute stress. RESULTS: In study 1, 96% of subjects reported dissociative
symptoms in response to acute stress. Total scores, as well as individual item
scores, on the dissociation scale were significantly lower in Special Forces soldiers
compared to general infantry troops. In study 2, 42% of subjects reported dissociative
symptoms before stress and 96% reported them after acute stress.

Still image taken from the Amnesty International


film Stuff Of Life, a film about waterboarding, the
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practice of torturing prisoners by partially drowning
them.

Other research results include the effects of SERE-style torture upon the immune system and other
biological markers. The findings regarding high levels of cortisol upon subjects was corroborated by a
SERE psychologist at the Navy Brunswick, Maine, SERE school, who according to an unclassified,
undated Talking Paper from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency found empirical medical data
[of] elevated levels of cortisol in the brain stem caused by stress levels incurred during water-
boarding. The Brunswick school subsequently discontinued waterboarding as part of its SERE
training, as it created a negative learning environment. The other Navy SERE school, in North
Island, California, refuses to eliminate exposure to waterboarding as part of its training program,
despite the opposition of JPRA and the other SERE schools, which believe it can induce a learned
helplessness state in students.

SERE Research and the Development of the Torture Program

One of the lead researchers in a number of these studies is Yale psychiatrist Charles A. Morgan, III.
According to one source, Over the past 10 years, Dr. Morgan has served as a Subject Matter Expert
to the US Special Operations Command. But at a June 2004 symposium on The Nature and
Influence of Intuition in Law Enforcement, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Behavioral Analysis Unit of the FBI, and the American Psychological Association, Dr. Morgan is listed
as affiliated with Behavioral Science, CIA.

Additionally, in the Information Science Board (ISB) document, Educing Information which was
heavily drawn upon by President Obamas task force on interrogations, for recommendations on the
interrogations issue Dr. Morgan is identified as a member of the 11-person Government Experts
Committee, and listed as affiliated with the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center (ITIC).
According to Intelligence Online, ITIC is a research organization under the CIAs authority, which
answers directly to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate.

The Obama Interrogations Task Force recently made clear they found a lot to value in the ISB study
(emphasis added):

The Task Force concluded that the United States could improve its ability to
interrogate the most dangerous terrorists by forming a specialized interrogation group,
or High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), that would bring together the most
effective and experienced interrogators and support personnel from across the
Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense and law enforcement. The
creation of the HIG would build upon a proposal developed by the Intelligence
Science Board.

Whatever the fate of the HIG, what is noteworthy here is that the Office of Technical Services (OTS),
which was cited in the recently released 2004 CIA Inspector General report as having vetted the
aggressive SERE interrogation techniques, is, along with the ITIC, also a part of the Science and
Technology directorate. OTS, formerly the Technical Services Division (or Technical Services Staff),
was the branch of the CIA in charge of torture and assassination. It was also in charge of the
experimental mind control and interrogation program known as MKULTRA.

Dr. Morgans online profile states that between 1998 and 2002 he received over $400,000 in research
grants from the Army and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) for studies on Psychobiological
Assessment of High Intensity Military Training and Neuro endocrine assessment of Survival School
Training. A 1977 Washington Post expose those were the days of scandalous revelations
surrounding the CIAs MKULTRA program describes CIA use of ONR to funnel funds for secret
experiments in the 1950s and 1960s. The same relationship was also explored during a 1977 Senate
Intelligence Committee hearing. This is not evidence that Morgans research was paid for by the CIA,
but along with his institutional affiliation, it is suggestive of possible CIA involvement.

While it is unknown to what degree the CIA was directly involved in the SERE research (outside of Dr.
Morgans affiliation), Special Operations Command reportedly was a major supporter.

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A U.S. soldier undergoing SERE training.

The co-author of the Special Warfare article referenced above, and working with Dr. Morgan on a
number of other SERE research papers looking at physiological and psychological effects of SERE
techniques, was Gary Hazlett, a clinical psychologist with the Psychological Applications Directorate at
U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Moreover, Morgan and Hazlett cited the approval and
support [for their research] of Lieutenant General William Tangney, Major General Kenneth Bowra,
Major General William G. [B]oykin and many others

Maj. Gen. Bowra retired from the military in 2003, after serving as Commanding General of Army
Special Operations Command South, U.S. Southern Command. Following the military, he went to
work as Senior Program Director with Oak Ridge National Laboratory, serving as national laboratory
liaison to U.S. Joint Forces Command, J9 Directorate. Another source states that currently Bowra is
senior mentor/concept developer at USJFCOM J9 for Joint Urban Operations and Homeland Security
experimentation. J9 stands for the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate
(JCD&E). It leads the development of emerging joint concepts, conducts and enables joint
experimentation, and coordinates DoD JCD&E efforts in order to provide joint capabilities to support
the current and future joint force commander in meeting security challenges.

The possible involvement of USJFCOMs J9 in research upon SERE follows upon the revelation,
discussed above, that CIAs OTS, part of CIAs Science and Technology directorate, was heavily
involved in the implementation of the SERE techniques for use by the CIA. While the use of the term
experimentation appears to have a broad meaning in military usage, beyond that of conducting
scientific experiments, given the charges surrounding human experimentation upon torture victims,
any connections between these secretive experimental directorates and the SERE torture program,
or research upon it, is worrisome.

Maj. Gen. Boykin was the controversial former commander of Special Operations Command at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, who resigned over statements that indicated he saw the war on terror as a
religious war. At the time he was Special Operations commander at Fort Bragg, according to a recent
New York Times article, SERE psychologist James Mitchell was completing his last military
assignment as psychologist to an elite special operations unit in North Carolina. Boykin previously
served as CIA Deputy Director of Special Activities, and in June 2003, became Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence under Donald Rumsfeld right-hand man, Stephen
Cambone.

Lt. Gen. Tangney is yet another former commanding general at Army Special Operations Command.
Also retired from the military, he is currenly Senior Vice President for Intelligence, Security, and
Special Operations, at Future Technologies, Inc., a supplier of, among other things, a well-
developed global network of experienced intelligence, security and special operations professionals
working with Special Operations, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other military customers.

While Dr. Morgan appears to be well-connected among the military and intelligence elite, it is
important to remember that there is no reason to conclude that Dr. Morgan or his co-researchers
have ever been involved in torture or experiments meant to be used for torture. (We cannot say the
same for CIA or military medical or psychological personnel, however.) In fact, it is possible that Dr.
Morgans research has led him to oppose coercive interrogation techniques, as his published research
documents the debilitating effects of SERE torture, which utilized against a prisoner could only be
considered cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, if not torture. (Although, at the 2007 convention
of the American Psychological Association, Dr. Morgan indicated he was against the idea of removing
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psychologists from national security interrogations, which was being considered in a motion before
APA at that time.)

A 2007 New York Times article quotes Dr. Morgan:

Many SERE veterans were appalled at the reverse engineering of their methods, said
Charles A. Morgan III, a Yale psychiatrist who has worked closely with SERE trainers for
a decade.

How did something used as an example of what an unethical government would do


become something we do? he asked.

Dr. Morgans comments appear to put him at odds with other members of the CIAs Science and
Technology directorate, particularly those who work for OTS, as well as individuals within the
Pentagon and Special Operations Command, who have been tied to elements of the U.S. torture
program.

The Suppression of Research on SERE in the OLC Memos

What is clear is that the CIA and the Pentagon had plenty of experimental evidence from the
peer-reviewed, published research of Dr. Morgan and his associates (and possibly others), both
before and after 9/11, that SERE techniques had serious, debilitating effects on individuals subjected
to them. As this research is never cited in any of the Office of Legal Counsel memos issued to the
CIA around their torture program, it appears such research was deliberately withheld from
government attorneys as the CIA sought approval for the use of SERE-style torture. Nor was this
obscure research, but had been funded by the government at a minimum of hundreds of thousands of
dollars, and promoted by some of the Pentagons highest generals.

The frenzied search for data on waterboarding, sleep deprivation, isolation, confinement in a small
box, etc., to submit to OLC attorneys making legal determinations on whether proposed
interrogation techniques constituted torture, was a kabuki organized by the CIA. The OLC attorneys
involved John Yoo, Stephen Bradbury, Jay Bybee, and others were witting or unwitting partners
in suppression of CIA research on torture (as future investigations will disclose). Given the
participation of members of the Office of the Vice President, particularly David Addington and Vice
President Cheney himself, in the promulgation of the torture program, and the composition of the
memos, it seems likely they were also involved in the suppression of this material. As a result, the
memos produced authorizing the enhanced interrogation techniques were composed as the result of
fraud and bad faith, the result of a criminal conspiracy to implement illegal torture techniques.

The public response to the recent white paper by Physicians for Human Rights shows there is great
interest in following up on charges of human experimentation upon torture victims of the U.S.
government. The Congress and Department of Justice should move swiftly to initiate full, open
investigations and charges against those involved.

Jeffrey Kaye, a psychologist living in Northern California and a regular contributor The Public Record,
has been blogging at Daily Kos since May 2005, and maintains a personal blog, Invictus. E-mail Mr.
Kaye at sfpsych at gmail dot com.

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Article printed from The Public Record: http://pubrecord.org

URL to article: http://pubrecord.org/torture/4607/research-torture-charges-human/

Copyright 2009 The Public Record. All rights reserved.

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CIA doctors face human experimentation claims | World news | The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/02/cia-usa/print
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Medical ethics group says physicians monitored 'enhanced


interrogation techniques' and studied their effectiveness

Ed Pilkington in New York


guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 2 September 2009 18.39 BST

larger | smaller

A US flag at Camp Delta in Guantnamo Bay. Photograph: Paul J Richards/AFP/Getty


Images

Doctors and psychologists the CIA employed to monitor its "enhanced interrogation" of
terror suspects came close to, and may even have committed, unlawful human
experimentation, a medical ethics watchdog has alleged.

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), a not-for-profit group that has investigated the
role of medical personnel in alleged incidents of torture at Guantnamo, Abu Ghraib,
Bagram and other US detention sites, accuses doctors of being far more involved than
hitherto understood.

PHR says health professionals participated at every stage in the development,


implementation and legal justification of what it calls the CIA's secret "torture
programme".

The American Medical Association, the largest body of physicians in the US, said it was
in open dialogue with the Obama administration and other government agencies over
the role of doctors. "The participation of physicians in torture and interrogation is a
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effectiveness, using detainees as human subjects without their consent. The report
concludes that such data gathering was "a practice that approaches unlawful
experimentation".

Human experimentation without consent has been prohibited in any setting since 1947,
when the Nuremberg Code, which resulted from the prosecution of Nazi doctors, set
down 10 sacrosanct principles. The code states that voluntary consent of subjects is
essential and that all unnecessary physical and mental suffering should be avoided.

The Geneva conventions also ban medical experiments on prisoners and prisoners of
war, which they describe as "grave breaches". Under CIA guidelines, doctors and
psychologists were required to be present during the use of so-called enhanced
interrogation techniques on detainees.

In April, a leaked report from the International Committee of the Red Cross found that
medical staff employed by the CIA had been present during waterboarding, and had
even used what appeared to be a pulse oxymeter, placed on the prisoner's finger to
monitor his oxygen saturation during the procedure. The Red Cross condemned such
activities as a "gross breach of medical ethics". PHR has based its accusation of possible
experimentation on the 2004 report of the CIA's own inspector general into the
agency's interrogation methods, which was finally published two weeks ago after
pressure from the courts.

An appendix to the report, marked "top secret", provides guidelines to employees of the
CIA's internal Office of Medical Services "supporting the detention of terrorists turned
over to the CIA for interrogation".

Medical workers are given the task of "assessing and monitoring the health of all agency
detainees" subjected to enhanced techniques. These techniques include facial slaps,
sleep deprivation, walling where their padded heads are banged against walls
confinement in boxes, and waterboarding or simulated drowning.

The guidelines instruct doctors to carry out regular medical checks of detainees. They
must ensure that prisoners receive enough food, though diet "need not be palatable",
and monitor their body temperature when placed in "uncomfortably cool environments,
ranging from hours to days".

The most controversial guideline refers to waterboarding, the technique where


prisoners are made to feel as though they are drowning by having water poured over a
cloth across their face. The guidelines stress that the method carries physical risks,
particularly "by days three to five of an aggressive programme".

PHR is calling for an official investigation into the role of doctors in the CIA's now
widely discredited programme. It wants to know exactly how many doctors
participated, what they did, what records they kept and the science that they applied.

Physicians for Human Rights is a not-for-profit group


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guardian.co.uk Guardian News and Media Limited 2009

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Emptywheel Addingtons Direct Involvement in the Torture Memos http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2009/09/06/addingtons-direct-involv...
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What al-Nashiri and KSM Didnt Tell Us
Bad Max Provides More Details

Addingtons Direct Involvement in the Torture Memos


By: emptywheel Sunday September 6, 2009 2:03 pm

As I noted yesterday, I've been reading old HJC hearings--including the hearing at which Daniel Levin testified about the torture memos. Levin basically testified that he was asked to
resign while he was drafting what became the 2005 Bradbury memos.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Levin, let me begin with you and Mr. Wilkerson, and put frankly everything I have heard today in some context. And I want to pull out two particular
events. The first one is the circumstances of your not being at the Department. I know that you were very careful in your answers to Chairman Nadler earlier. But let me
make sure I understand you.

You didnt voluntarily leave the Department; is that correct?

Mr. LEVIN. I would have preferred to have stayed. I mean, when I was told I wasnt going to stay, I voluntarily left.

Mr. DAVIS. That tends to be what happens; when people who are over you tell you to go, you go. That is what in the real world is called being fired.

But he also revealed something else about what happened when he was drafting the replacements for John Yoo's crappy memos: he had no direct contact with David Addington during
the process--or anyone else in OVP.

Mr. ELLISON. Whom did you talk to in the redrafting?

Mr. LEVIN. I talked to a lot of people. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I think one of the problems with the earlier memo was, it was not the subject of sufficiently
broad collaboration and discussion.

I talked, in addition to everybody in the Office of Legal Counsel virtually, people at the Criminal Division, various other people in the Department, people at the State
Department.

Mr. ELLISON. Did you talk to anybody in the Vice Presidents Office?

Mr. LEVIN. I dont believe I did talk to anybody in the Vice Presidents Office. I did submit drafts to the White House Counsels Office, and whom they circulated it to in
the White House, I dont know.

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. Do you know ifdid Mr. Addington have any input into your redraft?

Mr. LEVIN. Not directly to me. Whether he did so indirectly, I am not sure. He may have provided comments to White House Counsel that were then communicated to me
as their comments. I was not ever told anything that were his comments, and he never spoke to me about it directly.

Now, that's remarkable. We know from Addington's testimony before HJC that Addington met with Alberto Gonzales and John Yoo on the Bybee One memo (and his care to specify that
this description pertained to Bybee One, and not Bybee Two, may suggest his influence was greater with the latter).

Mr. NADLER. Just tell us what your role was, if you can.

Mr. ADDINGTON. Yes, I will.

Mr. NADLER. Because you said it wasnt nonexistant but you didnt help shape it. So what was it?

Mr. ADDINGTON. Mr. Chairman, my recollection, first of all, I would be interested in seeing the document you are questioning me about. I think you are talking about a
document of August 2002.

Mr. NADLER. Yes.

Mr. ADDINGTON. It would be useful to have that in front of me so I can make sure that what I am remembering relates to the document you have and not a lot of other legal
opinions I looked at. But assuming you and I are talking about the same opinion, my memory is of Professor Yoo coming over to see the counsel of the President and I was
invited in the meeting, with the three of us, and he gave us an outline of here are the subjects I am going to address.

And I remember, when he was done, saying, Here are the subjects I am going to address, saying, Good, and he goes off and writes the opinion.

Addington goes on to describe himself as "essentially ... the client on this opinion." So we know that Addington (unsurprisingly) had direct conversations with Yoo about this opinion and
(as the rest of his testimony makes clear) others.

Now, when he testified before HJC, Steven Bradbury refused to answer questions about his contacts with Addington and others during the drafting of the torture memos. But the Comey
emails released earlier this year make it clear that Bradbury did have direct conversations with Addington as he was drafting the May 2005 memos (and that Addington was pressuring
him to get them done).

The AG explained that he was under great pressure from the Vice President to complete both memos, and that the President had even raised it last week, apparently at the
VP's request and the AG had promised they would be ready early this week. He added that the VP kept telling him "we are getting killed on the Hill." (Patrick [Philbin] had
previously reported that Steve [Bradbury] was getting constant similar pressure from Harriet Miers and David Addington to produce the opinions. Parenthetically, I have
previously expressed my worry that having Steve as "Acting"--and wanting the job--would make him susceptible to just this kind of pressure.

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Mind you, this is only proof that Addington had direct communication with Yoo and Bradbury, but not Levin. It doesn't prove that Levin was ousted to make it easier for Addington to
direct the OLC opinion writing process.

But Levin's ousting--and related ascension of Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney General--does appear to have had that effect.

Spotlight

97 Responses to Addingtons Direct Involvement in the Torture Memos


JohnForde September 6th, 2009 at 2:10 pm
1

When you cover Addington my eyes read your post as though they are in ALL CAPS.

Reply
skdadl September 6th, 2009 at 2:56 pm
2

This discussion will be halted for an indeterminate time while Mr Addington waves off his questioners, including the chair, and makes notes to himself on the documents in question, after
which he will speak flatteringly of Mr Yoo, seated to his left, in such a way as also to shift to Mr Yoo all responsibility for the opinions Mr Addington is being questioned about.

Reply
Boston1775 September 6th, 2009 at 2:56 pm
3

Im looking for a video of Addingtons testimony.

Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 3:01 pm
4

Theres a link at the Committee website.

Reply
rincewind September 6th, 2009 at 3:14 pm
5

Im struck by a (relatively) small point that I hadnt remembered from the testimony: that Addington claimed to be essentially the client of OLC for Bybee One less than a minute
after reading from the copy of the memo,

It is August 1, 2002, memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, counsel of the President, re: standards of conduct for interrogation under 18 USC Sections 2340 and 2340(a).

So did Addington essentially admit that Cheney was essentially the Pres, and he (Addington) was essentially Counsel to the Pres?

Reply
Boston1775 September 6th, 2009 at 3:27 pm
6
In response to emptywheel @ 4

Must see TV

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 3:50 pm
7

You know, it strikes me that all of this, and the bigger picture surrounding the memos, and question of WH interaction thereon, is exactly why there will not be any but the most
superficial and isolated of prosecutions, and arguably none at all, come out of the big Holder PR review. Any defendant is going to affirmatively allege justification; when they do so, it
then becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was not justified. This in turn involves the orders and memos they were based on. The
government will fight all this tooth and nail and submit affidavits and all kinds of shit to try to prove that everything was done in a regular fashion and properly. But it patently was not.
The defense will question and explore and demand discovery. Federal courts are clearly sick of the crapola pitched by the DOJ and they do not see anything has changed under Obama in
this regard either. This is all a path that will either lead to dismissal by the court, withdrawal of charges by the government and, perhaps most interestingly, the forum for a federal judge to
say Well the court has some serious concerns and questions too and I am going to appoint a special prosecutor from the court to look into this. It is within the courts power (as seen in
the Toobz case). This is all a door that I just do not see Holder/Obama being willing to open.

Reply
plunger September 6th, 2009 at 4:09 pm
8

Effectively standing-in-the-shoes of President Cheney, Addington makes it known that he is the client - who must be 100% pleased with the opinion that he has ordered written on
behalf of the Acting President. It is further understood that failure to deliver said document as proscribed will have severe consequences, for the Client, the Acting President, and the
opinions drafter (more accurately, transcriber).

Guns are smoking all over the room.

Reply
Boston1775 September 6th, 2009 at 4:09 pm
9

My father had a stroke, so I missed this testimony.


You simply gotta see this:
http://judiciary.house.gov/hea.....608_3.html
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Reply
Boston1775 September 6th, 2009 at 4:31 pm
10

OMG

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 4:37 pm
11

Addington is the key.


To the SAPs, to the legal opinions and the other things EW readers will be intrigued at when CIA starts to leak them.

Reply
Loo Hoo. September 6th, 2009 at 4:48 pm
12
In response to bmaz @ 7

the forum for a federal judge to say Well the court has some serious concerns and questions too and I am going to appoint a special prosecutor from the court to look into
this. It is within the courts power (as seen in the Toobz case)

Wowsers! So if Durham brings a case(s) to court, we may get a special prosecutor after all? Which court would likely hear the case? DC/Prettyman? And which judges would we hope
for?

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 5:08 pm
13
In response to Loo Hoo. @ 12

No, I think EDVA is more likely; but do not get me wrong I am saying that will never be allowed to happen; that is my whole point.

Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 5:22 pm
14
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 11

Yeah, raised as a military brat, a foreign service degree and work experience as a lawyer for CIA, Addington has the entire tool kit necessary for Cheneys dirty work.

I think at this point were merely looking for (or waiting for) that one or two pieces of the puzzle which cause this entire thing to cascade into place.

Reply
Loo Hoo. September 6th, 2009 at 5:24 pm
15

I cling to any possible hope these days

Reply
victoria2dc September 6th, 2009 at 5:31 pm
16

EW: Im reading the link you provide to the HJC hearing and Bradburys testimony. I am hoping that you or one of our lawyer types will give this section of that testimony some
thought. Why have we not heard this from Senator Whitehouse or someone like Leahy on this? Is there something in the US Code that prohibits an agency (um. the DOJ) from
investigating itself? I think we need to talk about this:

p. 25 @ http://judiciary.house.gov/hea../40743.PDF

Mr. ELLISON. General Mukasey testified in a Senate Judiciary Committee that he would not order an investigation of waterboarding depicted on the destroyed tapes,
because the OLC had issued opinions regarding torture that were presumably relied upon by those administering the technique.

He gave two reasons. It would not be appropriate for the Justice Department to be investigating itself was one reason. The other reason is it would not be fair to prosecute
persons who relied on
OLC opinions.

As to the first reason, this is precisely the conflict situation for which the special counsel regulations of the Department call for pointing to someone outside of the Department
to conduct important investigations.

But I want to focus on the second reason, which has certain implications I would like you to focus on. At a minimum, we need to investigate whether their actions exceeded
the legal advice that
OLC gave them, or whether they would have knowthat waterboarding could not be legal.

Could that be a reason for the narrow scope of the investigation?

Reply
eCAHNomics September 6th, 2009 at 5:45 pm
17
In response to victoria2dc @ 16

From someone who is not a lawyer and not into the weeds of the torture investigation. I think the narrow scope of the investigation is a political decision by Holder. He was shocked by
what was done (blahblahblahblah, are we supposed to think he cares?), so wants to suage his conscience by doing something, but doesnt want to offend his boss, who is totally against
doing anything.

Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
18

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O/T. Doesnt this make you feel all warm and cozy and safe? Yeah, me neither.

Central bankers empower global supervision of finance industries


BY RAW STORY Published: September 6, 2009 Updated -2285 second ago

The worlds most powerful bankers said on Sunday they had agreed on a package of measures to strengthen on a global scale the supervision of finance industries, raising liquidity
requirements for all the G20 member nations and pushing smaller institutions to develop countercyclical cash buffers to prevent future collapses.

The measures should substantially reduce the probability and severity of economic and financial stress, a statement released by the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) said.

More.

Reply
WarOnError September 6th, 2009 at 5:54 pm
19

Read THE DARK SIDE.

Addington was Cheneys hand puppet. I think that man sized safe in Cheneys office may have been for housing puppets.

Reply
libbyliberal September 6th, 2009 at 5:55 pm
20

I mean, when I was told I wasnt going to stay, I voluntarily left.

Worthy of Monty Python. But they brought up the Inquisition a lot, too.

You know the line in All the Presidents Men where the accounting assistant for Hugh Sloan says, If you could get Mitchell, that would be beautiful!

Well, if you could get Addington, that would be beautiful!

Reply
eCAHNomics September 6th, 2009 at 5:56 pm
21
In response to fatster @ 18

Just wait until the financial bets on people dying crash and burn. I wouldnt be surprised if Wall St. arranges hit squads to make sure people die soon enough to make their financial
instruments profitable. We aint anywhere near plumbing the depths of financial depravity.

Reply
alinaustex September 6th, 2009 at 6:06 pm
22

skimpypenguin@ 10
Glad to see you back - So if I follow you the careerist at Langley will be leaking material evidence that Addington on behalf of Cheney was making the illegal toture legally good -and that
kept the torture chambers open in various locales. Moreover if I also follow your discussion -that this leaking is done in the context of pushback to forestall any future Sec Defense from
further poaching on traditional CIA functions and missions -particularly intelligence gathering that could lead to affirmative actions being tasked and ordered - ( IE the illegal occupation
of Irak ) . Could these leaks from the line officers at Langley also include documents -such as working email threads talking about the Team B at the OVP s office ie Cambone, Feith ,
among others talking up the EIT s as a good way to get actionable intelligence that would lash al Qaida and Saddam togather -to futher future 9-11 type attacks against CONUS ? This
is all being discussed at about the same time frame -hellbells PappaDick is still out there talking up Atta s meet and greet in Prague with Baathist intelligence operatives .
Im asking Skimpypenguin in your best assesment will there be any smoking gun documentation come out linking directly the OVP with the promulgation /promotion and actual
carrying out of torture - ?(A smoking gun email detailing how the OVP pushed Gen Miller into illegal torture at Gitmmo - boy that would be a pretty good pushback from the OGA ers !)
Just trying to keep up with this whole shebang - sure looks like the criminal conspiracy aka Cheneys OVP , gwb43 , sure are counting on a whole bunch of eletronically generated and
transmitted information remainig lost and never resurrected . BTW skimpypenguin - what is a SAP report ?
Again skimpy thank you for your service -and thanks for contributing here .

Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 6:07 pm
23
In response to libbyliberal @ 20

I repeat, again, my judgment that the most surprising moment (to me) at the Libby Trial is the way Fitz had Addington purring like a kitty. To this day I dont know how that happened.

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 6:36 pm
24
In response to emptywheel @ 23

I dont think it was that shocking. Addington thinks he is the smartest guy in the room and he wants to let others know it too. Ask him the right questions, set up in the proper manner, and
he will blab I think. This is actually a fairly common phenomenon with lawyers suddenly on the stand answering questions instead of asking them. Fitzgerald did a very good job with
Addington in how he crafted the examination.

Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 6:50 pm
25

I compare it with HJC, which is obviously not a fair comparison.

That said, what surprised me was NOT that Fitz asked the right questions, but that Addy offered up so much totally damning answers.

Reply
BMcGarth September 6th, 2009 at 6:52 pm
26

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emptywheel,Obama is trying to look forward code for no intestinal fortitude to do the right thing.Its no surprise that Cheney & Addington were involved directly.
Thew problem is the Prez much like his AG seem ineffectual for the job of Prez,remember defending & up holding the laws of the Land ?

Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 6:54 pm
27

Dammitall, I cant figure out how I got down the rabbit hole Im in, but I think I tripped on something while poking around in all things Addington. Theres no direct line between
Addington and this stuff that I can see, just found a bunch of stuff and saw a possible pattern.

Remember the hullabaloo about John Bolton requesting NSA intercepts? It seems one of them was about Libyan stuff, and it was blown off at the time because it appeared to be under his
purview (unlike North Korea).

Apparently Bolton asked about William Burns, Asst. Secy of State for Near East Affairs. Burns was named ambassador to Russia in August 2005; he held the ambassadorship until late
spring of 2008.

Youll recall that Liz Cheney became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For Near Eastern Affairs as of Feb. 2005 upon her return from working for Bush/Cheney 2004. She
supported C. David Welch as Asst. Secy of State for Near East Affairs; Welch was named to this position in March 2005.

Note the gap: Burns is shown as stepping down and being replaced in March 2005 by Welch, but Burns has no apparent formal role with DoS until August 2005.

Welch ultimately is responsible for the agreement signed in 2008 between Libya and the U.S. to settle past claims, allowing Libya to restore a diplomatic relationship with the U.S.

In the background, there is the case of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who had been rendered and held as a ghost detainee until his apparent death this year in a Libyan prison. A speech by
Bush in October 2002 and Colin Powells report of Feb. 2003 to the UN were allegedly based on information from al-Libi. al-Libi had been shipped to Egypt and tortured some time in
early 2002 after hed already been interrogated with some success by the FBI in late 2001; he is shifted around, ghosted, located at some points in time in Pakistan and in Poland, until
he is identified as being moved to a black site in Mauritania in November 2005. al-Libi disappears from American control between November 2005 and September 2006, eventually
being repatriated to Libya sometime in 2006.

Keep in mind that the continent of Africa is part of the portfolio under the Asst. Secy of State of Near East Affairs.

Is all of this related, or just random circumstance?

Reply
libbyliberal September 6th, 2009 at 6:59 pm
28
In response to emptywheel @ 23

Addington was described by U.S. News & World Report as the most powerful man youve never heard of.

The omnipresent permission giver. Would have liked to have seen your Fitz wipe away that teflon smugness.

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 7:03 pm
29
In response to emptywheel @ 25

The structure of Waltons courtroom and a pro asking tailored questions is a hell of a lot different than the bozos at HJC. For all the bad about Addington, he strikes me as a laced up guy
when it comes to real authority over him; he was disdainful to HJC, but sure as heck not with Walton sitting next to and above him and an USA/AG designate examining him. I was
always bummed NSA/CREW didnt do more to put him in the chair, even for custodian testimony, but they probably wouldnt have done much anyway I suppose.

Reply
rincewind September 6th, 2009 at 7:03 pm
30
In response to emptywheel @ 25

I remember thinking at the time that Addington reminded me of a couple of Aspergers friends they just dont seem to have any internal inhibitor on saying whatevers in their mind
(and they DO think theyre the smartest people in the room ;> ) But yeah, Fitz played him very very well.

Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 7:40 pm
31
In response to bmaz @ 29

I think it was all seeded in whatever GJ/depositions he did. And it comes down to an absolute command of the facts.

Thats the kind of authority that makes David Addington heed, I think.

Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 7:40 pm
32
In response to rincewind @ 30

I said Aspergers at the time not really knowing what that meant. But yeahno filter, no understanding of social rules.

Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 7:49 pm
33
In response to emptywheel @ 32

Pretty sure I asked about Aspies during your live blog of his testimony; your description at the time sounded like he was absolutely compelled to dump, no inner voice telling him to stop.

Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 7:56 pm
34

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In response to Rayne @ 33

I remembered that had been discussed here at some time in the past, and googled. Used addington asperger as the search item. You popped right up when I did that.

Reply
STTPinOhio September 6th, 2009 at 8:06 pm
35

Addington, aka Cheneys Cheney, directly involved in torture memos?

Nooooo you dont say!

Will wonders ever cease?

Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 8:18 pm
36
In response to fatster @ 34

Yeah, I found my query during the second session of EWs liveblogging of Addington, at comment (51).

BTW, didnt realize that SourceWatch had put together a timeline of all the liveblogging of the Libby Trial how groovy is that??

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 8:33 pm
37
In response to alinaustex @ 22

SAP = Special Access Program

Yes, I think the field guys, not the career desk jockeys, will sink the whole OVP crowd.

Folks, this is survival of the fittest. This isnt going to end up with someone being fired or embarrassed in the 24 hour news cycle. Were talking federal indictments. CIA paramilitaries are
normal people like you and I. Set aside the partisan/ideological differences for a second. They have families, they have mortgages on nice houses in McLean and Chantilly, and they have
cars and college to pay for.

They are not going to let some CIA lawyer (Addington) and a draft-dodger (Cheney) get away with this unscathed. Many of them are ex-military and take this personally. They put their
lives, careers and freedom on the line to execute orders directly from the White House. And this is how theyre repaid?

Youre going to see so many leaks Empywheel is going to have to start a spin-off blog just to dissect it all. These people create counterinsurgencies, raise rebel armies and sneak around
the globe for a living. They arent going to let Cheney get away. And FYI: if the Obama Administration tries to block this investigation quietly (or pardon people who threaten to detail
operations that started during the Clinton years, which WILL come to light) theyll obliterate him in 2012, too.

These people do this for a living in hostile places all over the globe. Theyre not going to go down without a fight. Many of them are like me: if I got guidance from the White House -
directly - I wouldnt ask any questions. Neither would any of you. That kind of involvement and proximity to the Presidency/Vice Presidency is intoxicating. I met General Powell once in
Arlington, and I was speechless.

Cheney abused that power and the respect brave men and women have for the office of the Presidency and the Office of the Vice President. He manipulated the CIA to interrogate,
knowing he would hang them out to dry when the media caught on to it. But before that, he launched a parallel effort within JSOC to do all that in more, with the explicit intention of
subverting Congressional oversight.

I know the cliche is that CIA went rogue. Even JSOC and the contractors deserve a pass here. They trusted the OVP that this was legal and aboveboard. Did some of them relish operating
extra-legally? Some did.

Most did it because the Vice President asked them to. And now, they feel betrayed.

Reply
greenbird4751 September 6th, 2009 at 8:38 pm
38
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 11

again, hoping my dkos sig theft to be officially permitted by its author, wherever you are:
The Addington perpwalk is the trailhead for accountability in this wound on our national psyche.Sachem
and i use it wherever else i can.
I will be alert to your insights, sp, they are valuable.

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 8:42 pm
39
In response to alinaustex @ 22

In all seriousnessbefore anyone guffaws, GWB also deserves a pass.

The man was a born-again recovering alcoholic who dabbled with cocaine and barely graduated from college. He failed at everything he ever did and embarrasses probably the coolest
dad ever (his dad was a Navy pilot, the CIA director and the Vice President. What the fuck?)

Cheney, on the other hand, has stated on the record he felt the Presidency was diminished after Nixons administration. No conspiracy theory needed: He was planning to be the most
powerful VP for over 30 years. He didnt want to be President. He wanted to be VP and have the intelligence and defense portfolios. Cheney (and Addington) are all about ego and
revenge, not greed and power. The power was a means to an end. They had certain ideas of how the Presidential power should be expanded, and he conned Bush into delegating all the
boring stuff to him. Happened in Iran-Contra, happens every day in the military.

Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 8:47 pm
40
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37

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You may have a message about this.

Were in territory now where we are neophytes, much as people getting orders were in new territory a few years ago. Were going to need guidance and tools.

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 8:49 pm
41
In response to greenbird4751 @ 38

The key here is Addington. And I say that, because previously Addington, Libby, Flanigan, Cheney, Haynes and Yoo all played this really dangerous game called mutual assured
destruction.

One of them flipped, or grew a conscience, and theyd throw that person to the wolves.

The interesting thing to see is how much they all start to distance themselves from one another. Cheney may turn on Libby, Libby on Addington, or vice versa. And remember that
EVERYONE - except for Cheney - is a certified, actual lawyer. If it comes down to saving their own skin (especially Libby) they will turn on each other. Libby, Addington and Haynes
are the ones to watch, because they did the dirty work. Not even Cheney is as complicit as Addington. I was the guy that drew up plans and strategies for days on end when I started out.
Addington drafted complex four and five page legal memos in less than a day. He was driven and he was completely cognizant of the evil he was doing. And they didnt care if they
manipulated or burned CIA or the military, which is really going to bite them in the arse.

Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 8:49 pm
42
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37

We the People are betrayed. The persons who tortured violated law, international agreements, the Constitution, and humanitys collective conscience (though, apparently, not their own).
I recognize the comfort of thinking it was ordered by the OVP, but that excuse didnt pass in Nuremburg and rightly so. The overriding goal is to bring to justice those who orchestrated
and implemented these horrendous things.

Reply
Loo Hoo. September 6th, 2009 at 8:55 pm
43
In response to Rayne @ 36

It was fun looking through the comments there (not to mention the Addington spill)!

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 9:02 pm
44
In response to Rayne @ 40

Theyre smart. CIA/DIA/JSOC/SSB does this for a living.

Expect leaks after the first major Obama policy victory. That way its all over the teevee and the bloggers spread it. It wont be this week because of the health care/school noise.

Business ties, affairstheyll start with that to knock them off balance and then start getting former military at GTMO and SOUTHCOM to go on the record about GTMO being ordered
to use the same guidance the black sites fell under.

Simultaneously, there will be an intensive campaign to show no links between Iraq and Syria, and Iraq and AQ. Former Iranian sources theyve flipped, guys they were running out of
Mosul who used to work for Saddam, those types of people will come forward with their blessing and protection. The idea will be to discredit Cheney and the crew in preparation for the
big finale:

Faulty intelligence. Raids on places that dont exist, missed chances to find people in Pakistan, etc. Theyll tie it into the EIT program and show why it was ineffective. Some will stay
silent and try to angle for a pardon, others will come completely clean. Look for the logistical and operations personnel more than the paramilitaries themselves to have the best testimony.
If they were smart, they knew this day would come and kept all copies of cables, etc even if it was classified, to protect themselves. That stuff will start to come out when they know they
can blanket the airwaves with it. Think a media shock and awe, by insiders, and then open warfare at the hearings. A lot of it will closed-session but the staffers will leak most of that (the
money from WaPo, NYT, Newsweek is too good).

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 9:07 pm
45
In response to fatster @ 42

I have said on EW many times that it was not CIA, it was JSOC that did the truly horrible stuff. CIA stuck to the EITs (which themselves are indefensible) and contractors conducted the
waterboarding(s).

JSOC is the most guilty party. Followed by the contractors, and, finally, the least culpable and willing to go that far: college-educated, politically astute CIA paramilitaries.

Seeing as Xes indictments have dovetailed with this special prosecutor appointment, Id wager they will collide, if they havent already.

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 9:11 pm
46
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 41

Well, you better tell your buddies to hurry up then, because a new statute of limitation expires every day; some are five year statutes, some are eight year statutes. The death cases have
no statute, but they will be the hardest to prosecute and will not be amenable to traveling up the chain to the top as you describe. The offenses and conspiracy charges that could be
extrapolated from the overt acts of the offenses are starting to fritter away.

Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 9:20 pm
47
In response to bmaz @ 46

The only other out is crimes which have not yet been discovered and recognized as such, yes? once publicized, the clock begins ticking.

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Skimpy (44) we can see JSOCs extremely large footprints readily, and I think the tough part is going to be cracking the SAPs behind which they could hide, especially if they are
under ACCMs.

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fatster September 6th, 2009 at 9:27 pm
48
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 44

May you be correct! I will hold that thought.

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 9:39 pm
49
In response to Rayne @ 47

Unlikely. Statutes of limitation are presumed applicable and are effectively jurisdictional. You would have to show active concealment or an inability to discover the conduct, and courts
do not favor this and have a high burden for establishing it. For statutes such as most conspiracy charges, which require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the statute of
limitations begins to run on the date of the last substantive overt act. As the basic fact set that these specific crimes has been known, especially to the government (after all the govt. was
committing them), it would be hard to argue that the statutes of limitation should be tolled (i.e. suspended) simply because the government refused to properly investigate. I would say the
chances of that are about zero,

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Mary September 6th, 2009 at 9:54 pm
50
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37

They trusted the OVP that this was legal and aboveboard.

I dont buy that. You dont kidnap someone into torture and watch how the whole thing is hidden and how foreign govs are desparate to have their roles kept secret - you dont listent to
Bush parrot our commitment to humane treatment publically while you torture disappeared persons privatley and think it is aboveboard.

Im hoping you are right on the rest, but its hope, not belief. There has been a lot of remorselessness over the better part of a decade by now, and a lot of people who rely on the
protection of power of the offices of OVP and WH, no matter how much they may be angry over some things. And those people who need that protection have friends and colleagues
who wont want to rock the boat if it may damage them.

There may be a lot of people with mortgages and kids on the soccer team, but they are also people who grown accustomed to working with the torturers and they have had years now of
that subtle reinforcement hammering at them, that torture was patriotic and necessary and Cheney is the guy who will protect the torturers, their colleagues, themselves. Obamaco isnt
going to - they know that, theyve seen what happens with Bush whistleblowers under Obama. Its the Kappes and Brennans that Obama plays to, not the Moras and Tamms and
Tagubas.

With no real prosecutor and no real power, I really dont think anything will come of any of this and if it starts to go down a path where something may come of it, Obama will rush in
with claims of states secrets to cover things up. All someone will have to do is threaten to blow the foreign gov associations and theres no place Obama wont go to lock it down IMO.

But Ill hope Im wrong and wait to see if I can believe. I like believing and I dont get to do it much. Rachel Alexandra I believed in - Obama and his DOJ notsomuch and the concept of
a lot of good and decent people who worked in the torture cesspool for the better part of a decade just waiting to get an opportunity to expose themselves and their colleagues, I dont buy
that. I tried to buy the dominos of Goldsmith, Comey, Levin as good guys really trying to draw a line, but the more that comes out, the less you can believe any of that.

Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 10:08 pm
51

I tried to buy the dominos of Goldsmith, Comey, Levin as good guys really trying to draw a line, but the more that comes out, the less you can believe any of that.

Heh heh, I do not recall you being willing to spend much, if anything, on those unfit for use intended goods though.

Reply
readerOfTeaLeaves September 6th, 2009 at 10:31 pm
52
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37

Cheney abused that power and the respect brave men and women have for the office of the Presidency and the Office of the Vice President. He manipulated the CIA to
interrogate, knowing he would hang them out to dry when the media caught on to it. But before that, he launched a parallel effort within JSOC to do all that in more, with the
explicit intention of subverting Congressional oversight.

First, I hope youre genuinely who you claim to be.

Second, I hope youre right.

Third, if they allow themselves to get rolled by Mr Five Deferments, the Draft Dodger Extraordinaire Richard Cheney, then they should find other means of employment.

Fourth, I just want it to be legal and public. I want the law to work, because that would be the ultimate fuck you! for Cheney, Addington, Yoo, Cambone, Feith, Wolfowitz, Perle,
Gonzo, et al. Getting these bastards legally would be the ultimate payback. Heres hoping

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readerOfTeaLeaves September 6th, 2009 at 10:41 pm
53
In response to rincewind @ 30

I made a complete ass of myself in one of those conversations.


But watching Addington a bit more closely, he comes across as a guy who is so certain of his own omniscience, and so scornful of others, that his insolence really is breathtaking.

Hes aggressive, and he appears to have an incredibly inflated sense of his own importance; its a toxic combo.

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Auduboner September 6th, 2009 at 11:35 pm
54
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In response to bmaz @ 7

Ah, but this might be the Genius of Holders limited investigation, not that he knows it now.

Any tenacious defense counsel for an indicted low-level operative is going to DEMAND full discovery of the justifying documents, in order to buttress the defense that the President
authorized the (despicable) actions in question. That Discovery process will produce more damning evidence than all of the congressional hearings put together. Holders DoJ wont
jeopardize the prosecution case by limiting the Defenses access to White house documents, and can lay the blame for their disclosure at the feet of those Pesky Defense Attorneys.

Political retribution is achieved, and the present Administration can say, the Judge made us do it! Win-win.

Of course, all this assumes competent Defense Counsel is involved Can we all start contributing now to the Low Level CIA Torturer Defense Fund? Ive got the first $100

Reply
Styve September 6th, 2009 at 11:44 pm
55

As I have said over the past week, its all in the book by Gellman, Angler! Arrest these motherfuckers!!

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readerOfTeaLeaves September 6th, 2009 at 11:52 pm
56

Mind you, this is only proof that Addington had direct communication with Yoo and Bradbury, but not Levin. It doesnt prove that Levin was ousted to make it easier for
Addington to direct the OLC opinion writing process.

From SSCI Report: Release of Declassified Narrative Describing The DoJ OLCs Opinions on the CIAs Detention and Interrogation Program [22 April 2009, Sen John D
Rockefeller, IV]:

PREFACE: an initial narrative of the history of the opinions of the DoJs OLC from 2002 to 2007, on the legality of the CIAs detention and interrogation program

p. 3: In April 2002, attys from the CIAs Office of Gen Counsel began discussions with the Legal Advisor to the NSC and OLC concerning the CIAs proposed interrogation plan for
Abu Zubaydah and legal restrictions on that interrogation. CIA records indicate that the Legal Advisor to the NSC briefed the National Security Advisor [Rice?], Deputy National Security
Advisor [Hadley], and Counsel to the Pres. [Gonzo], as well as the AG [Ashcroft] and the head of the Criminal Division of DoJ [Chertoff?].

p. 7 In the spring of 2003, the DCI asked for a reaffirmation of the policies and practices of the interrogation program. In July 2003**, according to CIA recrods, the NSC Principals
met to discuss the interrogation techniques employed in the CIA program. According to CIA records, the DCI and the CIAs General Counsel attended a meeting with the Vice
President, the National Security Advisor [Rice], the AG [Ashcroft], the Acting Asst AG for the OLC [?? Levin???], the Counsel to the President [Gonzo], and the Legal Advisor to teh
NSC to describe the CIAs interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. According to CIA records, at the conclusion of the meeting, the Principals reaffirmed that the CIA
program was lawful and reflected administration policy.

p. 8: In May 2004, after the issuance of the IG review, CIA records indicate that the CIAs General Counsel met with the Counsel to the President [Gonzo], the Counsel to the VP
[Addington], the NSC Legal Advisor, and senior DoJ officials about the CIAs program and IG review.

** the month Valerie Plame was outed by OVP.


-

And from the SSCI Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Counducted By PCEG adn the OSP within DoD/Policy

Dec 2001: Rome meetings, in which Hadley and Wolfowitz tell Larry Franklin and Harold Rhodes to go to the meeting with Ghorbanifar and Iranians in Italy, and to tell no one,
including the CIA because the Iranians dont trust the CIA. Michael Ledeen sets up the meeting. (The Iranians are said to have distrusted the CIA, probably b/c the CIA knew they
were full of shit and it was the only way the Iranians could get away with feeding info into DoD-OVP.)

p. 6: The tasking later came back to [Rodman] through senior DoD channels as a request from NSA Hadley for the DoD to pursue the meeting with Iranians. Mr. Ledeen advised
[SSCI] that he had contacted Mr. Hadley, who he described as an old friend, and subsequently met with Mr Hadley and another NSC official to present Mr. Ghorbanifars## offer to
arrange meetings with Iranian officials.

p. 9: The US Govt officials involved in approving the Rome meeting had the authority to do so, even if it was considered an intelligence activity. Under the National Security Act of
1947, the NSC is given broad authority to identify intelligence needs, establish priorities to meet those intelligence needs, and establish policies relating to the conduct of intelligence
activities of the US

p. 9: Thus, Mr Hadley, who received concurrence from NSA Rice, had the authority to request Dep Sec Wolfowitz, who coordinated with Sec Rumsfeld, to dispatch two DoD employees
to Rome to meet with Iranians

p. 9: While the DoD had the authority to conduct the meeting in Rome, there was limited advance coordination of the activity outside the Department. Mr Hadley had advised DoD
to pursue the matter on a close-hold basis due to its unusual nature and Dep Sec Wolfowitz had reiterated that guidance [i.e., the totally cut the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, or any other
intel agency out of the meeting]

p. 14: it genuinely seemed to be Mr Franklins perception that [the info he received from the Iranians about attacks on US fighters in Afghanistan] had saved American lives. [I
include this bit because these are precisely the words Cheney uses to excuse torture.]

p. 22: Mr. Franklin recalled being approached by an official of the OVP in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifars plan and his judgements of its prospects for
success.

Both the SSCI report on the OCL memos, and the SSCI report on OSP (Feiths shop within DoD, set up by the neocons) have repeated references to the OVP, which brings Addington
into sharp relief drawing up the intertwining policies that led to the OLC memos and the activity in DoDs OSP office.

The OLC memos are only part of the story, but when one realizes that they were being written at the same period when Ledeen was putting together secret meetings in Italy (where DoD
employees were to meet with Iranians, but keep the meetings secret not even sharing intel with the CIA), its clear that all of this nonsense looks a bit Keystone Cops-ish, but it would
have required a legal ediface so complex that it would make baroque church organs look like simple gizmos.

## Ghorbanifar of Iran-Contra infamy.

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bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 12:17 am
57
In response to Auduboner @ 54

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I really cannot emphasize this enough, this is exactly why the preliminary review is not going to lead to anything substantive; not a sign there is some creative plan or available pathway
that it will. In fact, the odds are far, far greater that this is part of a designed limited hangout to give the slightest patina of having investigated to take away the claim by international
types that because there was no US investigation there should be international jurisdiction.

Reply
Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 12:38 am
58

And once they get through the layer of lawyers, theres going to be a layer of management which will claim they are covered under USC Title 10 (military actions under direction of
executive without Congressional oversight) versus USC Title 50 (intel operations subject to Congressional oversight).

This is teed up early with Addington and/or Yoo wrt to powers of president as C-in-C during a time of war. But it will be the little guys who are going to argue this point, that they were
told this was a military op and therefore not subject to any additional disclosure and oversight, ollie-ollie-oxenfree and all that.

Reply
x174 September 7th, 2009 at 1:51 am
59

thanks for staying on top of this festering heap of lies, distortions, untruths, misrepresentations, falsehoods, deceptions and, of course, crimes.

until the DOJ commences to actually DO something meaningful about the steaming heap of atrocities, i find it difficult to pay attention to all the legalistic shenanigans.

Reply
nanute September 7th, 2009 at 3:59 am
60

In response to Audoboner@53: Any good defense lawyer will demand full discovery.
Call me a cynic, but they wont produce all the relevant docs. Didnt a very prominent govt case against a Senator from Alaska just get overturned for this very same reason?

Reply
drational September 7th, 2009 at 5:19 am
61

I suspect Levin was predisposed to standing in the way of coverup. I bet you can compile a list of people they wanted out of the way to deal with the torture issue from the Comey
Testimony on warrantless wiretapping:

James Comey, Jack Goldsmith, Patrick Philbin, Chuck Rosenberg, Daniel Levin, James Baker, David Ayres, were all listed by Comey as DOJ folks prepared to resign from the
Government if the Warrantless Surveillance program continued illegally in 2004. Besides Levin, Philbin and Comey, I am not sure who else was around to resist the torture immunity
memos in 2005.

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alinaustex September 7th, 2009 at 6:01 am
62

skimpypenguin@ 38.
Maybe you can make an agument for Dubyas not being prosecuted for war crimes - but only if the Bush family promises to go after the Cheney clan hammer & tong. Hammer & Tong
meaning telling us where all the bodies are buried , or at least giving us guidance where to go seek that information.Furthermore the Bushies would have to give the ongoing investigation
political credence too -maybe send one of the the family lawyers/mouthpieces-like former Attorney General Thornburgh out to talk on the bobblehead shows -explaining why we
needed to bring Cheney and his unitarian neocon possee to Justice ! Then and only then would I consider giving President Cod Piece any semblance of a pass..
Again skimpypenguin thank you for still posting here -and I for one have full faith and confidence you are who you say you are -because frankly your insights track favorable with some
other formers I have been blessed to get to know.
So carry on -skimpypenguin -and God Speed
And ps ..bmaz if you are reading this you might want to go read a short book Operation Hotel California to get a sense in just how pissed off the spooks at the pointy end of the spear
have become , and for what reasons,,,,

Reply
JohnnyTable70 September 7th, 2009 at 6:17 am
63
In response to libbyliberal @ 20

Your quote makes me recall the scene in Annie Hall where Woody Allen produced Marshall McCluhan and says something like, if only life could be like this.

Reply
bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 6:20 am
64
In response to alinaustex @ 62

Where were these heroic and patriotic spooks the last eight years? Why are they suddenly going to come out and do the right thing after it is so late? Why do they wait until statutes of
limitation are expiring? When exactly are they going to manifest and execute this grand plan? When before has the rule of law been saved by a bunch of spooks (they are pretty effective
at breaking the law and lying and dissembling about it though)? Who is going to execute on this fantastical plan - the DOJ that is still corrupted and complicit? Obama and Holder who
have been quite consistently clear they do not intend to do anything of the sort? I have not read Operation Hotel California, but I am familiar with it and have heard an NPR interview
with the author.

Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 7th, 2009 at 6:52 am
65
In response to bmaz @ 64

Theyre coming out because now they might burn for someone elses arrogance.

Never underestimate self-preservation; its very powerful.

Reply
bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 7:07 am

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66
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 65

A fair answer perhaps, and always a solid default explanation in such criminal and quasi-criminal situations. Although I have to wonder what real exposure these folks have at this point.
There are likely no more than a handful, maybe two, that have any exposure to the limited review underway, and there is no reason whatsoever to believe it will go any further than that.

Reply
Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 7:14 am
67
In response to bmaz @ 66

Umm, dont discourage them, bmaz. We certainly cant see the future, either.

Reply
rincewind September 7th, 2009 at 7:17 am
68
In response to bmaz @ 49

For statutes such as most conspiracy charges, which require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last substantive overt
act.

But bushco was obstructing and lying right up until Jan 20, and hold-overs have continued till today (with ample assistance from Obama/Holder/Panetta) are those substantive overt
acts?

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behindthefall September 7th, 2009 at 7:25 am
69

Perhaps SKIMPYPENGUIN has made this clear and Ive just missed it, but what is heating up the tin roof on which these cats who might sing are sitting? Are they about to be let go? (SP
mentioned that they have everyday lives that depend on regular paychecks, not family fortunes.) But whos going to fire them? Who finds their continued employment inconvenient? Isnt
the wind just going to bend over the tops of the trees, not uproot trunks? (Sorry been following too many tropical depressions, I guess ) But isnt it very hard to change the
lower-downs in an organization? Isnt it usually the case that a few higher-ups get blown away, but little else happens, even with the best of will?

Reply
ondelette September 7th, 2009 at 7:31 am
70
In response to Mary @ 50

Goldsmith wrote an OLC memo justifying rendition and looking for loopholes in Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention. He argued that a prisoner who had not been charged was not
legally a civilian prisoner under 4th Geneva yet, so they could be deported as long as they were brought back after interrogation. Daniel Levin wrote a memo on how to make
waterboarding legal under the Torture Act for James Comey. There are more, Michael J. Garcia (U.S.A. S.D.N.Y. for 3 years, prosecuting terrorists) wrote more memoes justifying
rendition with respect to Geneva. There was a whole cottage industry in circumventing Geneva by people who have gone on either to undue respectability (Goldsmith), or at least lack of
scrutiny (Garcia) while people got imprisoned, shipped, or tried and convicted using torture data.

Reply
rincewind September 7th, 2009 at 7:33 am
71
In response to readerOfTeaLeaves @ 53

What I remember was having such a sense of deja vu watching Addington, and puzzling over what it was reminding me of, and then when ?Rayne? first mentioned Aspergers the light
went on a college prof/dept head (IT), a friend of mine in the dept (whos most likely either developing neural networks or a homeless loonie, could go either way), and my dad (a
recovering lawyer and a total putz at relationships).

Reply
Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 8:12 am
72
In response to rincewind @ 71

Hes surely without any awareness of how dickish he is; the video from the HJC committee linked above is quite good as we can see he has complete disregard for others social rank,
being focused only on his own agenda.

I can think of a manager I knew like that, an engineer by education who was completely blind to social ramifications of his assholishness. Got promoted to management for being a
technical whiz and definitely not for his people skills. (I swear to God that many of the problems with GM often the last several decades were because of placing assholes like this in
places where numbers mattered more than people.)

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readerOfTeaLeaves September 7th, 2009 at 8:36 am
73
In response to Rayne @ 72

Cluelessness, thy name is Addington.

Reply
Mary September 7th, 2009 at 8:37 am
74
In response to ondelette @ 70

and bmaz @ 50

I did actually try, even if it seems like Ive been standing on the other side of the line for a long time. Its like when a client comes in and tells their story and they are always the hero of
every story. And you want to believe that, because it is going to make everything easier. But you have that ugly part in your job description where you have to keep asking them the next
question and the next one and the answers always change the story and it never ever finishes with, and they all lived happily everafter.

Even though Ive been anklebiting for a long time, I have hung on to bits and pieces and in particular on the actual torture front waiting to see the memos or emails or any of it where
theres a no from someone, or anyone. That no that the planted pieces in Newsweek and WaPo etc. keep seeming to promise are there, *if only* we *knew* more, knew what the
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authors of the pieces knew. And then what comes out doesnt take you where they implied, ever.

Ondelette - I completely agree and have been saying some of that for a long time, but I still was willing to buy that there was this kind of titanic struggle, even though every question
answered shows there was not. Not only did Goldsmith write that crap - but he has gone on to persistently and prominently editorialize for keeping the victims of his original, imo criminal,
opinions disappeared and to try to further legitimize disappearing innocent people into depravity as a *sound policy* to *keep us safe.*

Sitting on the knowledge of the old men on walkers sold into shackles and drugging and stripping and hooding and assaults and abuse and human experimentation, and the children stolen
from their parents and shipped out of country to someplace like GITMO or disappeared into Bagram or Camp Cropper or elsewhere - sitting on the full pictorals and videos of what
happens with the chaos of Executive whim that the has promoted - the existing results arent enough for him. He has to editorialize for more, longer, more invovled, more people
interwoven in the process; a wider torture tent; a more public embrace of torture. Thats what he finds to be a worthwhile way to spend time. Its how his interaction with torture and
power shaped him and the frightening part is that its a face he proud to show and one that an institution like Harvard is willing to put on display. And in the end what you have is
someone like Katyal being seduced by it too, giving more and more the luster of acceptablity.

Some of the rest, the Thompsons at Pepsico (amazing Canadians are ok with that), the Comeys at Lockheed, the Ashcrofts raking in millions from Christies and elsewhere as lobbyists and
consultants, the Philbins and Levins Kirklands and White & Cases - at least a lot of those have made their contribution to torture regimes then kept quiet. Goldsmith, like Yoo, cant kick
back and be satsified with what theyve already destroyed. Thats just the chum on the water that draws them. They dont want the feeding frenzy to end. They want to make torture an
academic exercise in every way - and almost no one flinches from it. Certainly not Obama, who rushed to pick an Solicitor Gen from the ranks of those charmed by, and defensive of, the
torture consultants who were architects of massive fraud on the courts.

Its why I cant really buy into what Skimpy is floating, as much as I wanted, anymore than I could buy into what Newsweek floated or Goldsmith floated etc. I do think that people will
leak from self defense, but I think with Obamaco in office, and the strength of hands held by Cheney and torturers (with Kagan, who would ultimately argue the cases before the Sup Ct a
Goldsmith fan) the best self defense for a lot of those guys is keeping quiet for even longer. Or mentioning a foreign nations interaction as a surefire way to get high level states secrets
invocations and walk away.

Anyone who was going to be a hero I think already made their effort. And what has happened is that Obamaco used their leaks and whistleblowing to get into office, but has now hung
them out to dry. Watching what has happened to the Bush whistleblowers under Obama isnt really a great motivator for anyone else to step forward. And watching Obama adopt the
same policies doesnt help build the pool either. Theres not likely to be anyone out there with the goods who begins to buy into Soufans now we arent going to do that when they
know why Obama is reserving rights to torture renditions. They know that al-Libis suiciding happened on Obamas watch because he wouldnt do anyting about it. They knew Obama
wouldnt move troops to protect Dostums mass grave site. They knew Obama wont make a real commitment to doing the right thing and theyre biding their time bc thats been the
historic way to win and Obamas not a game changer on that. IM kinda depressed and tired today opinion.

Reply
Mary September 7th, 2009 at 8:42 am
75
In response to rincewind @ 71

He actually reminded me of other lawyers and business guys Ive known who have that same style. Im kind of refreshed to hear that for a lot of people they would think someone like
Addington falls into a a severe personality disorder group instead of something they hit up against in any big deal and too often in small deals.

Reply
bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 9:05 am
76
In response to rincewind @ 68

Impossible to tell without specific facts and charges laid out in a charging document; but that said, no I do not think those will serve as proper substantive overt acts. Look at it this way as
a overly rudimentary example, if the concept is conspiracy to commit torture, you are looking for the last act of torture as your last overt act for starting the running of the statute of
limitations. Is it really that simple, no; but that kind of gives an idea.

Reply
bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 9:12 am
77
In response to Mary @ 74

Yep.

Reply
fatster September 7th, 2009 at 9:22 am
78

Theyre ALL connected at the roots (=the root of all evil, or money).

Ring Prosecutors: Top Ashcroft Aide Helped Abramoff Client, Didnt Disclose Hoops Tix
Zachary Roth | September 7, 2009, 11:18AM

We told you on Friday that David Ayres, a close John Ashcroft ally, looks set to plead the fifth in the latest corruption trial of a Jack Abramoff underling. And over the weekend we got
fresh detail on what looks like Ayress cozy relationship with Team Abramoff.

In documents filed yesterday in the corruption trial of Abramoff aide Kevin Ring, and examined by TPMmuckraker, prosecutors asserted that Ayres who at the time was Ashcrofts
chief of staff at the Justice Department helped Ring win federal money for a prison to be built on the reservation of the Choctaw Indians, an Abramoff client. Prosecutors also asserted
that Ring then gave Ayres tickets to the 2002 NCAA basketball tournament in Washington D.C. And, they say, the following year, Ring gave Ayress wife tickets to a pro hoops game
after she had said that she wanted them as a birthday gift for her husband. Ayres didnt report any of these tickets on financial disclosure forms, say the Ring prosecutors.

More.

Reply
Cheryl September 7th, 2009 at 9:26 am
79
In response to emptywheel @ 32

How about Narcissistic personality disorder? Sounds like a pretty good match.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N.....y_disorder

Reply
Nell September 7th, 2009 at 10:10 am
80

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In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37

The CIA and special forces have been involved with torture engaging in it and training military and paramilitary clients for decades. The agency spent millions of dollars and many
years developing and refining a program of coercive interrogation. The frequency with which the CIA has incorporated special forces in its activities makes it hard to draw a line between
the two (as you yourself pointed on on a previous thread).

The picture of heroic field operatives utterly uninvolved with torture until led astray by the evil OVP is neither convincing nor useful in tracing the torture program as it existed from 2001
to early 2009.

Reply
Nell September 7th, 2009 at 10:12 am
81
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 39

all about ego and revenge, not greed and power

Right. The skyrocketing Halliburton stock was just a happy, accidental by-product.

Reply
Nell September 7th, 2009 at 10:19 am
82
In response to Rayne @ 47

For the sake of 98% of those who are reading along, it would be good to avoid this becoming a milspeakfest.

What is/are ACCM?

Reply
Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 12:39 pm
83
In response to Nell @ 82

ACCM = alternative or compensatory control measures.

See a defining comment at this link.

Reply
Mary September 7th, 2009 at 1:23 pm
84

Sometimes running like a girl beats being Macho, again and again and again.

@77 During Ashcroftian days the acting USA for Guam, Black, who was pushing on a lot of things, was fired and a report that he and another DOJ employee (Meissner, who also got
*demoted*) prepared for Congress got deep sixed and never sent on to Congress. The Black firing seems like a trial run for the USA firings, but they managed to get an IG report done
with Gonzales at the DOJ helm in 2006. It relied pretty heavily on things Kyle Sampson told the inspectors (Hello????? NORA?!) and pretty much left out all the nifty little things that
were, oh, say, in actual freakin emails sent by Abramoff.

This older article in The Nation has some background and a dkos poster, dengre, has a lot of stuff on this in multiple posts.

So Black sees issues and his info get directed to Gonzales who is WH Counsel at the time. Meissner takes issues to his boss, this guy named McNulty, then at the ED VA. You know, the
guy whose crew got the criminal investigation referrals for torture and the guy who had such a convincing line during the USAtty firings hearings. Oddly enough, they didnt get their
backs covered much by Gonzales and McNulty and then Gonzales and McNulty go on to end up as AG and DAG. Go figure. But the real disgrace is the IG report that was coughed up by
DOJ.

It just pretended there was no such thing as Abramoffs emails, despite everything going on with them. In particular, it ignored this email:
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.c.....ultpage=2&


The other immediate (next two weeks) challenge is the Justice Department.
Last week the bad guys who still work there (the ones who got that bad letter on Murkowski issued) started a drum beat that the CNMI had to be taken over, because it was
a loophole in the federal immigration network, and that, as such, was a threat on terrorism. They have been spending a week or so telling everyone who will listen that the
CNMI, if it is not taken over, will be a major entry point for terrorists. This, of course, is patently ridiculous, actually just the opposite, and we have been working to counter
this, but they are not backing down. We had the COS of the Justice Department [that would be David Ayres] in our box at todays Redskins game and it seems that
there might be a classified document floating in the department which deals with this matter. Making it classified, if that is indeed the case, was a good idea by our
opponents, since that means we cannot get it[darnit, all they can get is a chit chat about it from Ayers - that classified thingy works real well]. Hopefully Babauta has some
connections there and can get a copy (perhaps at least on a redacted version), which he can pass on to you to draft a response. If this is at a stage where it is gaining
momentum, he will need to leak into the press that they are considering this and how it is exactly the opposite of what should be happening. This is a real potential threat. It
will require some major action from the Hill and a press attack to get this back in the bottle. He should just follow the example we have used in the past, where we get the
press out front carefully and push the Administration back.

I am supposed to see the Attorney General next week (the Thursday after Simchas Torah) and Kevin was slated to play basketball with him before then. We will
both mention this to him. The AG will be fine, but the underlings are a worrisome matter. I am not sure what to suggest on this one, other than well pass on what we get
from the COS, and you guys should do your best to hook up with as many of the Asst AGs as possible and the political folks there. There are, I believe, some former travelers
(folks who visited the CNMI during Froilans time) among them. Well hope that the higher ups will take some time to squash this on their own. If not, it could get to be a
fire fight.

emph and [] added.

Ring was Ashcrofts staffer when Ashcroft was a Senator and was, with Coughlin, hired on by Abramoff for - well, for what he got. Access. Ayres chats about classified memos involving
Abramoffs clients to Abramoff, while Ayres is at a Redskins game favor of Abamoff; Abramoff sends out his emails, underlings like Black and Meissner get whacked hard on the job
front with something less than protection from Gonzales and McNulty, Ring and Abramoff are going to meet with and play hoops with Ashcroft to get the report squashed and voila -
not only do the authors get whacked hard but the DOJ takes it upon itself to make sure the report doesnt make it Congress. And there it sits until well after Abramoffs emails are made
public and the Congressional committee can push to get it.

All of which makes the things that are being pushed in the trials seem small potatoes and you have to wonder how many statutes vis a vis Ashcroft are being run out while DOJ changes
their game from PIG to HORSE to ELEPHANT to YELLOW THROATED EUPHONIA. But at least they are keeping Ashcroft distracted by having Christie throw money at him. Good
job guys.

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Reply
radiofreewill September 7th, 2009 at 5:37 pm
85
In response to Mary @ 84

Mary - There was a Judge, iirc, also involved in the Black/Meissner/CNMI affair - and, at about the same time that Black got fired and Meissner got demoted, again iirc, the Judge was
promoted onto a lifetime Bench seat. The Bush Administration said his promotion was the normal course of affairs at that point in the Judges career, or something like that.

Do we know who that Judge was? And, where do Judges for Territories, like CNMI, actually sit? Ever since the story dropped-off the radar, Ive wondered if the Judge was somehow
connected to Abramoff and/or Rove, or otherwise caught-up in manipulation by Noel Hillmans PIN (Public Integrity Section,) the same group that is said to have been involved in the
Judge-selection in the Seigelman Affair.

Reply
timbo September 7th, 2009 at 5:47 pm
86

bmaz and Mary,

Yeah, cynicism may be the order of the daybut it is not the best play. Rather than prepare folks for disappointment, how about continuing to cover whatever legal issues you feel might
increase the chances of legal consequences for the tortures, thugs, etc? Not questioning your credentials with that question, just making an observation that once your view has been
expressed that it does nothing to further accountability by outlining ways that Holder and Obama might take to get out of actually enforcing the laws and the Constitutionunless you
have a plan to thwart that? So, I keep my fingers crossed that there is indeed a plan. If not a plan, than at least an incling that burying justice isnt the only likely outcome of War On
Terror.

Reply
bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 6:55 pm
87
In response to timbo @ 86

I call em as I see em, for better or worse. It is not my job to be overly and patronizingly optimistic when there is no factual basis for the same. In the same vein, exposing the ways in
which this is all being shunted and gamed does, in fact, further the cause of accountability by exhibiting how the craven will try to escape it. A citizenry better informed of the avenues of
escape is a citizenry better prepared to foreclose them.

Reply
Mary September 7th, 2009 at 7:45 pm
88
In response to radiofreewill @ 85

Im not sure if I know which judge you mean (on the complicated Abramoff intersections dengre is about the best there is) but Hillman himself got put on the District Court bench after
his activities as head of Public Integrity were well received by RNC/White House/Abramoff and seemed to make Canary crew happy as well.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,182793,00.html

Anyway, when Hillman got his slot the WH tried to say it had all been in the works and appearances making it look like a payoff were coincidental and the similarity to Bybee giving
away the torture farm and then getting his judicial appointment were also coincidental.

EW did a piece on Hillman getting called in to discuss Siegelman


http://emptywheel.firedoglake......-subpoena/
Bush took a run at putting ex-Abramoff *prosecutor* Judge Hillman onto the Third Circuit, but that fizzled.
http://www.harpers.org/archive.....c-90000509

Reply
fatster September 7th, 2009 at 8:42 pm
89
In response to Mary @ 88

Thanks, Mary and radiofreewill @ 84. Despite all my frustration and anger about the Seigelman thing, I had forgotten the Hillman portion of this sorry mess. So, frustration and anger up
by many more notches now. Sigh.

Reply
Jeff Kaye September 7th, 2009 at 9:18 pm
90
In response to Nell @ 80

I also believe that SPs scenario doesnt fit all the facts. I agree with SP that JSOC is far more culpable than typically discussed. However, the interpenetration of SO and CIA is
something even less discussed. You are correct to emphasize the previous existence of a long-standing torture program. To my knowledge, it has never been totally disassembled, and
lived on within OTS at CIA, and perhaps J9 at JFCOM, if not at Ft. Huachuca. Cheney/Addington woke the tiger, and rode it, but the bureaucrats at these agencies have seen POTUSs
and Veeps come and go. They remain. They get promoted. They go into industry, or start their own companies. The military-intelligence-industrial complex does not boil down to Cheney
and Addington, no matter how you slice it. The latter may be indictable, and I certainly hope so, but we are looking at a many-headed hydra.

Reply
Garrett September 7th, 2009 at 9:43 pm
91

Im interested to see whether they prosecute the death of Asad Jaleel in Iraq.

It is the most brutal of all the deaths. It seems a very prosecutable case, without the evidence problems. He had official EPW status.

It was Special Forces and regular soldiers who beat him, at separate times.

There is a suggestion or a possibility of premeditated murder.

Two Special Forces interrogation notes before his deaths have notations like this guy is too dangerous to ever let out. He was already badly beaten, with the distinct ring of bruising
around his abdomen and some teeth knocked out, no longer able to stand, then they broke his neck and broke all his ribs and stuck a gag in his mouth.

Its very much the sort of case they say they are intending to reconsider. Clearly beyond anything like an authorization. But the Special Forces involvement raises awkward questions.

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Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 7th, 2009 at 11:04 pm
92
In response to Jeff Kaye @ 90

JPRA has always been a two-headed monster:


preparing to defend against it, and studying ways to implement it regardless of which POTUS is in office.

it being torture.

Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 2:52 am
93
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 65

bmaz asked you where were all of these heroic spooks for the last eight years.

Your reply was:

Theyre coming out because now they might burn for someone elses arrogance.

Never underestimate self-preservation; its very powerful.

Kinda gives their values away, doesnt it? SELF-preservation?

This is exactly how the head of the CIA, Admiral Stansfeld Turner, handled himself in front of the MKULTRA committee in 1977 after Kennedys committee was apprised of seven
boxes of information of CIA subprojects which were not destroyed - accidentally.

Stan (he probably had a wife, kids and a mortgage) says:

Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the then retiring Chief of the
Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost all of the people who had had any connection with the aspects of the project
which interested Senate investigators in 1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time. Thus, there was little detailed knowledge of the MKULTRA subprojects available to CIA
during the Church Committee investigations. This lack of available details, moreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the

destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and
approval of test programs.

Heres the information that WASNT intentionally destroyed - and mind you, the following acts were performed on Americans:

1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:

17 subprojects probably not involving human testing;

14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers;

19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not known, some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well;

6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.

2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs in combination.

3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.

4. Aspects of magicians art useful in covert operations: e.g., surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials: 4 subprojects.

5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.

6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.

7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques: 23 subprojects.

8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.

9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 3 subprojects.

10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue; provision of exotic pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems: 6 subprojects.

11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documentation: 3 subprojects.

12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected with the Armys Special Operations Division at Fr. Detrick, Md. This activity is outline in Book I of the
Church Committee Report, pp. 388-389. (See Appendix A, pp. 68-69.) Under CIAs Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents
and delivery systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops. The objectives of these subprojects cannot be identified from the recovered material beyond the fact
that the money was to be used where normal funding channels would require more written or oral justification than appeared desirable for security reasons or where operational
considerations dictated short lead times for purchases. About $11,000 was involved during this period 1953-1960: 3 subprojects.

13. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four
subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.

14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:

Blood Grouping research, controlling the activity of animals, energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and

stimulus and response in biological systems.

15. Three subprojects canceled before any work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on biologically active
materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.

Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedys Subcommittee on Health on these topics,
the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g., the names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA

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activities, and the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for
experimentation and clinical testing associated with various research projects, and a possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the principal types of
activities included have, for the most part, either been outlined to some extent or generally described in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and was
supplied by CIA to Senate investigators. For example:

Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149 numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance by CIA and were made
available to the Church Committee investigators in August or September 1975.

The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee and Senator Kennedys Subcommittee mentions electro-shock

and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16); covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp. 7, 10-12); the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in universities,
pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations (pp. 7, 9); and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144
subprojects related to the control of human behavior between 1953-1963 (p. 21).

Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 3:14 am
94
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 65

Theyre coming out because now they might burn for someone elses arrogance.

Never underestimate self-preservation; its very powerful.

In 1977, while Stan Turner was testifying under oath in front of Ted Kennedys committee, he was hiding the hideous fact that children were being tortured in dissociative states and
trained to be spies and sex-slaves.

The following is from a 1995 Presidential Hearing on Radiation and Mind Control Experiments done on American Citizens.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iflBkRlpRy0

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXDASDDrDkM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-ES8Bv0_8w

Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 3:26 am
95

Project Paperclip was organized to bring over Nazi scientists and doctors to the United States at the end of WWII.

The list of hospitals, universities, military sites, prisons and NASA facilities in which these experiments were done has been declassified. At the time of Ted Kennedys hearing, that list
was classified and Stan Turner said he would notify them privately. Hmmmm..

The way that the CIA obtained children for experimentation is told to you by the second youtube above.

You see, she was sexually abused by her family and exploited. When the CIA found the pictures or films which were spread through the pedophile rings, rather than arrest the families
and find homes for the children, the CIA allowed the children to be sold to them.

No jail time.

See how that keeps working out?

No jail time.

For a corroborating story, and interestingly, a CIA agent that actually apparently did something to save a child, Kelly is her name, read this pdf:

http://www.freedrive.com/file/.....1;c-obrien

Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 3:41 am
96

And if you are wondering where they got their supply of boys, google Boys Town, sexual abuse, CIA

Reply
Jeff Kaye September 8th, 2009 at 7:39 am
97
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 92

Since JPRA only goes back to 1999, do you mean the survival programs in general?

Reply
Sorry but the comments are closed on this post
What al-Nashiri and KSM Didnt Tell Us
Bad Max Provides More Details

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Washington: CIA Sets its Technology Priorities for 2006 - Intelligence Online http://www.intelligenceonline.com/NETWORKS/FILES/516/516.asp?ru...
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Washington: China and Iran Intelligence Online n 516 - 27/01/06


Prime Targets of Bureau of
Industry and Security
Washington: CIA Sets its Technology Priorities for 2006
London: 2006/2007:
A research organization under the CIA's authority, the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center
Security Technologies
(ITIC) is paying priority this year to technologies aimed at improving the sharing of intelligence.
Certified by GCHQ
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, the ITIC launched a research program on tools to analyze data called
Armaments: The Pentagon's Knowledge, Discovery and Dissemination (KDD). It allocated $8 million per year to the program that
Overseas Shopping List concerns the entire American intelligence community. Starting from this year, ITIC is intent on seeing the
Intelligence technologies: KDD program focus more specifically on technologies allowing for real cooperation between different
Narus at Center of agencies through the use of shared data bases. ITIC answers directly to the CIA's Science and
Controversy over NSA Technology directorate, as does the In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC), a unit that dovetails investment of the
Interceptions CIA's venture capital fund In-Q-Tel. However, ITIC and QIC don't operate in similar fashion. In-Q-Tel
invests mainly in companies developing information processing technologies (it answers to the CIA's Office
Washington: Debate on
of Advanced Information Technologies). For its part, ITIC chiefly subsidizes university labs and government
Merging Domestic and
Foreign Intelligence agencies even if it sometimes pumps money into private companies such as LC Technologies (for its
computer-controlled Eyetracking system in moving cars). In addition to KDD, ITIC coordinates and finances
Washington: NGA to research in a wide range of fields: nanotechnolgies (nanobatteries, miniaturization of sensors); biometrics;
Organize U.S. Geo-Space robotics, forecasting systems; fight against biological weapons; exploiting tera waves (a part of the
Research electromagnetic field between short waves and infrared waves that can enable a user to "look through
Paris: Business Intelligence walls" to detect explosives and mines) and the like.
Gains Ground in Big
Companies

Washington: The
Intelligence Community
Invests in Video

Defense: Paris Moves to


Streamline Political and
Military Research

Washington: CIA Sets its


Technology Priorities for
2006

Biometrics: Washington
Develops Facial Recognition
Technology

Washington: DIA Seeks Out


Weaknesses in Defense
Technologies

Security: Europe in the


Forefront with World
Interception Standards

Intelligence Technologies:
Full Steam Ahead for Mass
Data Processing Market

Washington: Bush
Overhauls PFIAB but Keeps
Room for His Friends

Counter-Proliferation: Has
China the Resources to
Control its Exports?

South East Europe: Private


Security Between Political
Patronage and Organized
Crime

Washington: Energy
Independence the Latest Copyright 1982-2009 Indigo Publications.
Battle Cry Reproduction et diffusion interdites (photocopie,intranet,web,...) sans autorisation crite

Information Technology:
European Groups Team Up
to Create Standards

Geospatial Intelligence: NGA


Beefs Up Research on Data
Fusion

List of Terrorists Soon to be


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The Memory Debate Archives: CIA Funded 1956 Research For Hypertens... http://www.tmdarchives.org/dbdoc.htm?category=govp&dtype=other&d...
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The Washington Post


August 19, 1977

CIA Funded 1956 Research For Hypertension Remedy


by Bill Richards and John Jacobs

The Central Intelligence Agency secretly spent nearly $3,900 in 1956 on dog research at the University of
Maryland to develop a drug to alleviate human hypertension, according to documents released to the school
yesterday by the agency.

Dr. John Krantz, a former head of the university's pharmacology department who got the money, said he was
never told the funds came from the CIA. A research collegue at the school suggested he apply for the funds,
Krantz said, and he received the money from the Geschikter Fund for Medical Research, a frequent covert
conduit for money used in the CIA's mind control experiments during the 1950s and 1960s known as Project
MK-ULTRA.

"I took a dim view of the whole Geschikter operation then," said Krantz, who is retired, "and I take an even
dimmer view now."

Krantz, who lives near Baltimore, said he met with Charles F. Geschikter, founder of the fund, during
discussions on the project and found him "a superficial scientist." Geschikter ran a cancer research program at
Georgetown University and also administered the fund with money from private philanthropic sources and from
the CIA.

Geschikter has been unavailable for comment since information about MK-ULTRA was made public by the CIA
earlier this month.

The documents on the hupertension experiment were turned over to University of Maryland officials yesterday.
The school was one of about 80 notified in the past week by the CIA that they were part of MK-ULTRA either
with or without their knowledge.

The hypertension experiment at Maryland was among "special studies embracing pharmacological testing and
evaluation of drugs of interest to TSD [the CIA's tehcnical services division]," according to the documents.

Specifically, they noted the experiment dealt with "the effect on blood vessels of the camphoric acid
derivatives," the documents said. The fragmentary records released to the university give no indication of what
use the intelligence agency made of the information.

Maryland is the first institution among those which were part of MK-CLTRA to receive documents from the CIA.
A university spokesman said yesterday that he was told by CIA officials that the dog experiment was the only
part of the program conducted there.

Several other schools, including Georgetown, George Washington and Harvard, have said they were also part of
the program and have requested additional information from the CIA.

Documents obtained by The Washington Post reveal that senior directors of the National Institute of Mental
Health "probably" knew that the CIA funneled money to the institute to administer LSD and other drugs to
federal prisoners at Lexington, Ky.

It has been reported that drug addicts at the Addiction Research Center in Lexington were given drugs as
rewards for taking part in CIA experiments. The CIA supplied $300,000 through the Office of Naval Research
between 1954 and 1962 to pay for the experiments.

An October, 1975, report on involvement in LSD testing by the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health
Administration, which includes NIMH, said knowledge of the source of funds was limited to senior staff members
at the Addiction Research Center and "was probably discussed with the NLMH scientific directors."

The report said that Dr. Harris Isbell, then director of the center, was approached by Sidney Gottlieh, the CIA
man in charge of MK-ULTRA, who told him that his research with LSD "was important to national interests." The
report goes on to say that "without specifying a precise interest on the part of the CIA, Mr. Gottlieb stated that
the CIA would provide money to continue these studies."
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Home / President

Ex-CIA Chiefs Decry Holder Interrogator Probe in


Letter to Obama
Seven former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency on Friday urged President Obama to reverse
Attorney General Eric Holder's decision to hold a criminal investigation of CIA interrogators who used
enhanced techniques on detainees

FOXNews.com
Friday, September 18, 2009

ShareThis

Seven former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency on Friday urged President Obama to reverse Attorney
General Eric Holder's decision to hold a criminal investigation of CIA interrogators who used enhanced techniques
on detainees.

The directors, whose tenures span back as far as 35 years, wrote a letter to the president saying the cases have
already been investigated by the CIA and career prosecutors, and to reconsider those decisions makes it difficult for
agents to believe they can safely follow legal guidance.

"Attorney General Holder's decision to re-open the criminal investigation creates an atmosphere of continuous
jeopardy for those whose cases the Department of Justice had previously declined to prosecute," they wrote.

"Those men and women who undertake difficult intelligence assignments in the aftermath of an attack such as
September 11 must believe there is permanence in the legal rules that govern their actions," the seven added.

The letter was signed by former directors Michael Hayden, Porter Goss, George Tenet, John Deutch, R. James
Woolsey, William Webster and James R. Schlesinger.

Last month, Holder appointed special prosecutor John Durham to examine allegations that terror suspects were
abused at the hands of their CIA interrogators. The highly controversial decision comes as the Department of
Justice released a 2004 report from the CIA's inspector general detailing allegations of harsh interrogation
practices, which Holder cited in his decision.

The report was accompanied by conclusions that the interrogations of the detainees had yielded valuable
information that had prevented further progress by terrorists.

After Holder's announcement, the White House said the president had no choice but to let the legal ramifications
play out. The CIA then said it would pay for the legal expenses of the agents should they be prosecuted.

Current CIA Director Leon Panetta responded by a spokesman saying he appreciates Obama's "strong support for
the men and women of the CIA," and suggested while he was in league with the sentiment of the directors, he is
bound to the administration.

"The director has stood up for those who followed legal guidance on interrogation, and he will continue to do so,"
said spokesman Paul Gimigliano.

"The CIA is cooperating with the official reviews now in progress, in part to see that they move as expeditiously as
possible. The goal is to ensure that current agency operations-on which the safety of our country depends-center
on protecting the nation," Gimigliano added.

But in their letter to Obama, the directors wrote that not only is there a significant personal burden put on agents
forced to defend themselves, "but this approach will seriously damage the willingness of many other intelligence
officers to take risks to protect the country."

They added that the president has the authority to decide which legal recommendations to permit for interrogation
methods, but at no time is public disclosure helpful for intelligence officers trying to protect the U.S. from further
attacks.

The directors also warned that if the investigations are opened up, they fear that the assistance given to the United
States by foreign intelligence agencies may jeopardize future cooperation.

"Foreign services are already greatly concerned about the United States' inability to maintain any secrets. They
rightly fear that, through these additional investigations and the court proceedings that could follow, terrorists may
learn how other countries came to our assistance in a time of peril," they wrote. "As a result of the zeal on the part
of some to uncover every action taken in the post-9/11 period, many countries may decide that they can no longer
safely share intelligence or cooperate with us on future counter-terrorist operations.

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Home / President

RAW DATA: Letter by Former CIA Directors to


President Obama
Seven former heads of the CIA wrote President Obama on Friday to ask him to end an investigation
launched by former Attorney General Eric Holder into the actions of CIA interrogators who used
"enhanced" techniques to question terror detainees.

FOXNews.com
Friday, September 18, 2009

ShareThis

September 18, 2009

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have served as directors of Central Intelligence or directors of the CIA for presidents reaching back over 35
years. We respectfully urge you to exercise your authority to reverse Attorney General Holder's August 24 decision
to re-open the criminal investigation of CIA interrogations that took place following the attacks of September 11.

Our reasons for making this recommendation are as follows.

The post-September 11 interrogations for which the attorney general is opening an inquiry were investigated four
years ago by career prosecutors. The CIA, at its own initiative, forwarded fewer than 20 instances where agency
officers appeared to have acted beyond their existing legal authorities.

Career prosecutors under the supervision of the US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that one
prosecution (of a CIA contractor) was warranted. A conviction was later obtained. They determined that
prosecutions were not warranted in the other cases. In a number of these cases the CIA subsequently took
administrative disciplinary steps against the individuals involved.

Attorney General Holder's decision to re-open the criminal investigation creates an atmosphere of continuous
jeopardy for those whose cases the Department of Justice had previously declined to prosecute. Moreover, there is
no reason to expect that the re-opened criminal investigation will remain narrowly focused.

If criminal investigations closed by career prosecutors during one administration can so easily be reopened at the
direction of political appointees in the next, declinations of prosecution will be rendered meaningless. Those men
and women who undertake difficult intelligence assignments in the aftermath of an attack such as September 11
must believe there is permanence in the legal rules that govern their actions.

They must be free, as the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman, has put it:
"to do their dangerous and critical jobs without worrying that years from now a future attorney general will
authorize a criminal investigation of them for behavior that a previous attorney general concluded was authorized
and legal." Similar deference needs to be shown to fact-based decisions made by career prosecutors years ago.

Not only will some members of the intelligence community be subjected to costly financial and other burdens from
what amounts to endless criminal investigations, but this approach will seriously damage the willingness of many
other intelligence officers to take risks to protect the country. In our judgment such risk-taking is vital to success in
the long and difficult fight against the terrorists who continue to threaten us.

Success in intelligence often depends on surprise and deception and on creating uncertainty in the mind of an
enemy. As president you have the authority to make decisions restricting substantive interrogation or any other
intelligence collection method, based on legal analyses and policy recommendations.

But, the administration must be mindful that public disclosure about past intelligence operations can only help Al
Qaeda elude U.S. intelligence and plan future operations. Disclosures about CIA collection operations have and will
continue to make it harder for intelligence officers to maintain the momentum of operations that have saved lives
and helped protect America from further attacks.

Finally, another certain result of these reopened investigations is the serious damage done to our intelligence
community's ability to obtain the cooperation of foreign intelligence agencies. Foreign services are already greatly
concerned about the United States' inability to maintain any secrets. They rightly fear that, through these
additional investigations and the court proceedings that could follow, terrorists may learn how other countries came
to our assistance in a time of peril.

The United States promised these foreign countries that their cooperation would never be disclosed. As a result of
the zeal on the part of some to uncover every action taken in the post-9/11 period, many countries may decide that
they can no longer safely share intelligence or cooperate with us on future counter-terrorist operations. They simply
cannot rely on our promises of secrecy.

We support your stated commitment, Mr. President, to look to the future regarding these important issues. In our
judgment the only way that is possible is if the criminal investigation of these interrogations that Attorney General
Holder has re-opened is now re-closed.

Sincerely,

Michael Hayden

Porter Goss
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George Tenet
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John Deutch

R. James Woolsey

William Webster

James R. Schlesinger

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About Us Our Business Our Customers Partners Careers News Contact

INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY & SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FTI has developed a proven track record for having the capability to
rapidly deploy resources from its well-developed global network of
experienced intelligence, security and special operations professionals.
Regardless of the task, FTI accomplishes your priorities in accordance with
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DNA Biometric Software

Security Support Services Naval Operations & Engineering

Mission planning, rehearsal, and execution support to the Joint


SOF Warfighter at all echelons from a Special Forces Team to a
Joint Special Operations Task Force.

FTI recruits and employs the most highly qualified and experienced
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importantly, were able to keep these professionals by establishing and
maintaining close working relationships while deployed. Because of FTIs
demonstrated ability to hire, expeditiously deploy, and retain talented
personnel, we consistently meet the customers quick response
requirement, which ensures a steady flow of quality, actionable intelligence
to operating forces worldwide. Today, FTI supports:

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)


Mission planning, rehearsal, and execution support to the Joint
SOF Warfighter at all echelons.

Intelligence Analysis, HUMINT and Physical Security Support to


USSOCOM forward deployed forces.

Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) Intelligence Support


Services, Intelligence Analysis, Counterintelligence, HUMINT, LEP
Screeners, Special Security Officers, and Database Management

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Intelligence Analysis
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both MNF-I and USSOCOM Forward Deployed Forces providing actionable
intelligence which assists Commanders in the Military Decision Making
process. FTI has been recently selected to provide analysts and other
support to DIA at various locations throughout the National Capitol Region
(NCR). Working extensively with the appropriate intelligence related
networks, FTI analysts utilize automated data processing systems (e.g.
Analysts Notebook, Falconview and Pathfinder, etc.) as they evaluate
HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT reporting.

FTI is a major subcontractor on the U.S. Special Operations Command


Mission Planning Environment Program Office contract ( SOMPE ) which
provides mission, planning, rehearsal, and execution support to the Joint
SOF Warfighter at all echelons of command from a Special Forces
Operational Detachment (SFODA) or Seal Platoon to a Joint Special
Operations Task Force ( JSOTF ). Utilizing an an integrated set of software
tools, SOMPE provides a real time, time sensitive and interoperable
environment which supports Joint SOF Forces in both the planning and
execution of their highly sensitive and classified missions.

Contact Information:

LTG (ret.) William P. (Bill) Tangney


Senior Vice President,
Intelligence, Security, and Special Operations (ISSO)
(813) 610-0161
tangneyw@ftechi.com

Steven J. (Steve) Baker


Deputy, ISSO
(540) 735-5064
bakers@ftechi.com

Donald D. (Don) Latella


Regional Manager, ISSO
(910) 624-3637
latellad@ftechi.com

Biographical Information:

Bill Tangney is the former Commander of US Army SOCOM and the Deputy
CINC USSOCOM. He has over 40 years of military and business
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Steve Baker is a retired Intelligence Officer, who served at the highest


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Don Latella is a retired Special Operations and Aviation Officer who has
commanded at all levels through Brigade. He has over 40 years of military
and business experience.

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About Us Our Business Our Customers Partners Careers News Contact

OUR LEADERSHIP

Leadership Bios
Mr. Ram N. Gupta, President/CEO
Ram N. Gupta is the President and CEO of Future Technologies, Inc. (FTI). He founded
FTI in 1992. As President and CEO of FTI he has managed the companys growth from a
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revenues of about $18 million. Mr. Gupta has a M.S. in Business from Kurukshetra
University, an MBA from George Mason University.

Tim Graham, Vice President


Timothy L. Tim Graham, Vice President for Future Technologies, Inc. (FTI), has over
25 years of military and senior technical management experience and is responsible for
information technology and engineering pursuits of FTI, and oversees the companys
Program Management Office. As Vice President, he is leading FTIs efforts to realize
Software Engineering Institute Capability Maturity Model Integrated (SEI-CMMI) level
III. Tim has a BS/MS in Mathematics.

Robert (Bob) Debold, Director Business Development and Strategic Programs


Mr. Debold oversees the Proposal Development Process while providing overall Business
Development and specific Capture Management for FTI. He has over 30 years of
specialized experience in Information Technology, Knowledge Management, Federal
Sales Support, Major Program Account Management, Business Development, and
Marketing in both government and commercial venues. At Honeywell he instantiated an
Account Technical Management (ATM) operations support group that implemented TQM
in support of the entire business base of the Federal Division. He has served in various
senior management capacities for Honeywell Federal Systems, HFSI Bull, Areawide Security Services, and
Primus Knowledge Solutions. Mr. Debolds experiences include bottom-line business development in diverse
environments, which include an IPO start-up enterprise, as well as in the global and Federal high-tech
information systems services. He began his career as a secondary school educator, has a BS in Mathematics
from Providence College and has a Masters in Organizational Management (MAOM) from the University of
Phoenix.

LTG (Ret). William P. Tangney, Senior Vice President, Intelligence


Lieutenant General (Ret.) Bill Tangney is FTI's Senior Vice President for Intelligence.
Special Operations, and related activities. A career Special Forces Officer with thirty five
years of active service, Bill has commanded at all levels from Lieutenant to Lieutenant
General and was the Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations
Command at the time of his retirement in November 2002. Other General Officer
assignments include tours as the Commanding General of Special Operations Command
Central Command; Commanding General of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command;
Commanding General of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School; and Commanding
General of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Bill graduated from the Citadel with a degree in
Political Science in 1967 and obtained an M.A. from the Maxwell School at Syracuse in 1975.

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the executive management of the companys contracts and Human resources
Department. He joined FTI in July 1997. Prior to joining FTI from 1988 he worked as
Cost Analysis Manager for EER Systems, which was bought by L3/GSI and was
responsible for the proposal preparation and interaction with DCAA. He worked as
Division Controller for Systematic Development Corporation from 1985 1988
responsible for contract management and program control. He holds a Graduate Degree
in Finance from Mary Mount University, Arlington, VA and a Graduate Degree in Economics from Madras
University in India.

J. Lawrence (Larry) Leonhardt, Vice President for Navy Programs


Larry Leonhardt oversees business operations and growth for Navy interests in
information technology, engineering, and program management support services. This
includes FTI operations in Dahlgren, VA; Newport, RI; Indian Head, MD; Patuxent River,
MD; and Moorestown, NJ. Mr. Leonhardt joined FTI in August, 2000 as a Regional
Manager for FTIs Mid-Atlantic operations in Dahlgren having many years of experience
managing programs and operations for U.S. Navy and other customers in the
Washington, DC and Dahlgren areas. His previous experience in the field of federal
contracting includes management positions with Vitro Corporation and NCI Information Systems. His hands-on
and management experience includes software development for the Terrier missile system, software
requirements development for the US Coast Guard COMDAC command and control system, system engineering
support for Mk92 gun simulation systems, information management system development for the Aegis Combat
System, network and computer system support for Navy and university facilities, and program support services
for various DoD customers. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Mathematics from the University of Louisville.

Paul Rogers, Vice President, Business Development and Proposal Management


Paul has over 25 years of progressively responsible positions, both as an operational
manager and in business development positions, within the Government technical and
professional services contracting arena. His positions have included President of a
privately held government contractor and Vice President at two major corporations. At
FTI he is responsible for the identification and pursuit of major new business
opportunities, as well as the management of the proposal management process. He is
also responsible for the Company's ISO quality Management System. Prior to joining
industry he was a Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy with several tours aboard ship and command of a River
Assault Division in Vietnam. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and has a Masters Degree in Human
Resource Management and Organizational Development from Pepperdine University.

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Sen. Bond Pulls GOP Staff Off Torture Investigation

Friday, September 25, 2009 4:18 PM


By Newsweek
By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
A major Senate probe of the CIA's interrogation and detention practices was seriously derailed Friday when Sen. Kit
Bond, the ranking GOP member of the Senate intelligence committee, revealed in a statement that he had pulled the
entire GOP staff out of the investigation. Bond blames the move on Attorney General Eric Holder's recent decision to
launch a separate criminal inquiry into the agency's abuse of detainees. The move appears to be part of a broader
campaign by congressional Republicans and the U.S. intelligence community to pressure Holder to rescind his recent
appointment of a special counsel to investigate allegations of torture during the Bush administration.
Bond contends that the intelligence-committee investigation had effectively become pointless, and the panel was
"spinning our wheels" because current and former agency officials will now refuse to cooperate with any congressional
probe when they face potential prosecution by the Justice Department. "DOJ sent a loud and clear message that
previous decisions to decline prosecution mean nothing, and old criminal charges can be brought any time against
anyone," Bond said. "Against these odds, what current or former CIA employee would be willing to gamble his freedom
by answering the committee's questions?"
But Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the committee's Democratic chairman, insisted the probe will continue regardless. Saying "I
very much regret" the GOP's decision, Feinstein added that her probe "is being pursued, additional staff are being hired,
and the committee is continuing the work with all due diligence."
Advertisement
The flare-up is significant because, whatever the results of Holder's criminal probe, the Senate panel's investigation
offered perhaps the only opportunity for a full public accounting of the U.S. intelligence community's conduct in the
aftermath of September 11 attacks. The panel has been granted access to millions of pages of internal CIA documents,
almost all of them still classified, and has been conducting interviews with current and former agency officials in order to
produce an exhaustive report on the agency's interrogations and detention policy, examiningamong other issues
whether the agency's methods had been effective in producing valuable information that had helped thwart terror
attacks.
Feinstein's aides have said they had hoped to produce a declassifiedand bipartisanpublic report by next year. But the
withdrawal of the Republican staff is likely, at a minimum, to set the panel's timetable back and embolden resistance to
cooperating with the probe among lawyers representing CIA officers. That resistance was already an obstacle and is now
likely to intensify. "The pendency of a criminal investigation by the Department of Justice will certainly deter individuals
from cooperating with committees of Congress," said Robert Bennett, the renowned Washington criminal-defense lawyer
who represents the former chief of the CIA counterterrorism center.
The blowup also underscores how the entire torture issueincluding whether CIA operatives and contractors had
violated the law when they waterboarded and engaged in other "enhanced" interrogation techniqueshas become
hopelessly politicized.
Egged on by former vice president Dick Cheney, Bond and other congressional Republicans have repeatedly attacked
Holder for suggesting that anybody in the Bush administration or the U.S. intelligence community might have engaged in
illegal conduct when, as they see it, they had simply been protecting the country.
Those arguments have also been advanced by seven former CIA directors who last week sent an extraordinary letter to
President Obama asking him to overrule Holder and halt the criminal probe of agency operatives. A senior administration
official derided the letter this week, saying that Holder had no intention of backing down because former CIA directors
(some of whom could likely become key fact witnesses in any criminal probe) were lobbying the White House to
intervene in a criminal investigation.
A spokesman for Holder did not immediately return calls for comment from NEWSWEEK.

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The Nature and Influence of Intuition


in Law Enforcement:
Integration of Theory and Practice

Sponsored by

National Institute of Justice


U.S. Department of Justice

Behavioral Science Unit


Federal Bureau of Investigation Training Academy
U.S. Department of Justice

The American Psychological Association

June 22-23, 2004


Marymount University
Arlington, Virginia

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When he was a police officer in Elizabeth, New Jersey, Sergeant Eddie owned the wisdom
of the street. He would say, If you have to look at something twice, something is
wrong, and things tell you things.
Stephen Band, Chief, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Training Academy.

The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky. . . .
together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their
bounded rationality. Daniel Kahneman, from his Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8,
2002.

What is intuition? When we make a decision based on gut instinct, how often are we
right? Why are some people more intuitive than others? Is intuition something that we should
encourage and even, teach? These were some of the issues discussed at a one and one-half day
meeting of some 50 members of the law enforcement, intelligence, legal and academic commu-
nities last July 2004 in Arlington, Virginia.
The goal of this meeting, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the
Training Academy of the FBI, was to construct a research agenda that could be taken up by the
NIJ and other agencies or organizations for the investigation of intuition, which then could be
used to inform both practice and training of police officers, intelligence agents, border guards,
airport screeners and all the other local, state and federal workers who are tasked with detecting
people who pose a threat to the American populace. Oftentimes, these individuals have little op-
portunity to gain information about a person or group of people who may have the capacity to
inflict harm; often, these agents must act quickly and decisively. Their actions may determine
the life or death of a single person, as in a police chase, or hundreds or even thousands of people,
as in entry onto an airplane or into a large sports arena. What can science do to facilitate those
agents who seem to have a 6th sense about what people are likely to do, or to teach those
agents who routinely fail to notice the important details about a person that signal intent to harm?
What do we know about cognitive and emotional processing, perception and memory that can be
made useful to the next border guard who encounters a man or woman crossing into the U.S.
plotting the next terrorist attack? What do we know about implicit cognition, the use of decision
heuristics, and stereotyping that can make the next soldier smarter about interactions with a civil-
ian populace in peace keeping operations?
Several themes repeated themselves in the discussions. There was widespread agreement
that intuition is real and that it plays a significant role in the everyday life of police officers,

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whether they are stopping a car for a search, taking in the details of a crime scene, or watching
people get in and out of cars in a restaurant parking lot. There was, at the same time, little
agreement on how to define intuition, and comparisons were made to complex pattern recogni-
tion, complex emergent processes, the sense of dread that came with some police calls and
not others, the hairs standing up on the back of your neck, and feeling the eyes of an animal
on you in the woods. Questions were raised about the reliability of the phenomenon: do we
only remember the 10% times we were right and forget the 90% times we were wrong (and can
someone have a wrong intuition?). There was concurrence that some young officers appear to
have good intuitive skills virtually from the beginning of their tenure as a police officer or intel-
ligence agent, and others never seem to be able to even acquire an intuitive sense. Almost in
contrast to this, there was agreement as well that much of good decision-making depends on ex-
perience, and that people learn what to look out for. Participants agreed that they frequently
made use of their gut instinct about, for example, whether to stop a car, but then faced the
challenge of finding sufficient cause for that stop because I had a gut feeling about the guy
would not be considered sufficient probable cause in a court of law.
Social and cognitive scientists have been studying intuitions for at least 30 years. A great
deal is known about intuitions the thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and
without much reflection (Kahneman, 2002) that may be applicable to the needs of the agents,
officers and operatives present at the meeting, and, of course, to their coworkers, current and fu-
ture. The questions raised by the men and women with experience in the streets resonated
with the programmatic research data collected largely in laboratories. The challenge ahead of us
is how to assess what we know that can be immediately translated into effective practice, how to
affect that translation from an organizational and policy point of view, and how to determine
what is still unknown and needs further scientific analysis.
A sample of the conversations is offered below. What can be seen is that the opera-
tional community has access to technical information and on-the-street experiences; the scien-
tific community has access to controlled laboratory conditions and years of good science. The
challenge is to find a way bring these groups together, for the advancement of science and to
make our streets safer for both those who patrol them and those who walk along them.

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What the officers reported What the scientists reported


In an informal survey of a National Acad- Intuitive behaviors are fast, automatic, ap-
emy class, about 90% of the respondents parently effortless, associative, slow to
reported experiencing a gut instinct, 6th change, and prone to error.
sense, or hairs rising on the back of your What happens when circumstances change?
neck feeling. What can be learned about the changes in
One kind of intuition is a gut response to life circumstances that make people vulnerable?
threatening or dangerous situations. A sec- Does this tell us something about the learn-
ond kind is interpreting deception, which ing processes? What is the learning curve?
can take some time. A third intuition is that Perhaps we can learn something about these
which occurs after a longer period of time, processes by investigating other instances
when you come back to a problem with an where people have to learn subtle changes in
intuition. behavior, such as how to prepare for an NFL
draft after playing soccer in Europe.
One might have good intuition in one setting
but not in another. A further distinction
If we want to study this from a scientific
should be made between intuitively respond-
view, we cant just ask about when it turns
ing in a way that is consistent with previous
out to be right; we also have to know about
training and intuitively responding in a way
false negatives and misses. For example, for
that is contrary to previous training. Also,
deciding whether to stop and question a sus-
being moved to act and moved not to act
pect, there is is a 2 x 2 matrix:
may reflect different types of intuition.
Stop and find evi- Stop and find no
We need to know success rate. It could be dence of crime (hit) evidence of crime
that we are missing the seven cars with the (false positive)
bodies and finding only one. If intuition
Do not stop and Do not stop and no
only works 10% of the time, it might cost
crime was commit- crime was commit-
more than it gains us. We cant measure all
ted (miss) ted (correct)
the wrong outcomes, but when we stop and
think about when the stakes were high and This can be understood in terms of signal
your life was on the line, every time you had detection theory, where peoples ability to
that feeling, in every occasion, you were pick up signals in a complex situation de-
right. In very simple terms, if we begin to pend on the signal strength and also on the
think we can read people in situations then criterion for deciding that each person as-
this is dangerous. But conversely, when the sumes.
hairs stands up on the back of my neck, al- We have been trying to develop individual
though I may not understand why at that differences measure of decision-making
moment, I want to be able to rely on that. competence, and have found some to corre-
late with real world behavior, but the corre-
We tend to get a lot of anecdotal details lation is based on people who are really in-
about the successes, but few about the fail- competent rather than competence. We
ures. might be better at finding the clueless cops
than the good cops.

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In police chases, we construct things after We know that memories are changed with
the fact and depending, at least in part, on each experience, and that way we recall
what the law and our instructors demanded. things is changed by what else happens.
This is not intentional, and happens without
Intuition might actually be heightened vigi-
our awareness. We dont always even have
lance.
conscious access to the information that we
use to make decisions. There also are some
Cognitive biases create problems in investi-
things for which we dont have articulation,
gative processes. Many times cases went off
for example, how to describe a highly prac-
the rails because someone had a gut instinct
ticed action such as a batter hitting a 90-
and acted on it and then the whole thing
mile-an-hour ball.
goes down the tube. We need to be able to
let go of intuition.
Both attitudes and cognitions can be im-
plicit, and vulnerable to perceptual biases
produced by cultural norms and stereotypes.
The guys that are most often right about
things based on gut instincts are usually
We need to identify levels of motivation so
that 20% of the force who do 80% of the
that intuition isnt conflated with good moti-
work, and are the ones that are most likely to
vation and that bad intuition isnt associated
get into trouble and not keep their mouth
with poor motivation. Successful officers
shut.
may also be good communicators, and have
good social and emotional skills, which may
Practitioners who have very good intuition
be confounded with successful intuitive deci-
tend also to have good social skills and great
sions.
enthusiasm for their jobs, and to be extro-
verted and highly motivated.
Positive mood supports intuitive decision
making. When people are depressed, they
have a narrower way of seeing the world.
Studies show that people who practice at
something report that they are better at it,
How can we identify people are actually whether or not they are.
have good gut instincts? Maybe we can use
arrest rates or search results as a metric. How do we study characteristics or habits
that are critical but so rarely used that they
could hardly be learned? If you get shot at
Can people have good gut instincts about once in five years, then you cant learn when
something they have never before experi- someone is going to pull a gun because it
enced? The average cop doesnt have much hardly ever happens. We have to think
experience with a terrorist. about training for the impossible.
New Haven police took mental health practi-
In the old days, when patrols were made in tioners in research ride-alongs, so that the
pairs, there was more chance for mentoring. psychologists could observe directly.

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Questions that need further research:


How representative within the law enforcement or intelligence community are incidents of intui-
tion? How often does acting on gut instinct lead to sound decisions as opposed to bad deci-
sions?
What are the determinant contextual and social variables that are relevant to gut instincts?
How can we learn, and teach others, to verbalize the thoughts and emotions that contribute to
their decision processes?
Is the ability to make good instinctual decisions relatively equal among individuals, or are there
significant differences due to gender, age, and years of experience on the job?
How can good intuition be learned and taught?
What are the legal implications of considering intuition as a basis for judgment and action on
the part of law enforcement officers?
How can we implement new training procedures, and evaluate them, while protecting the people
who participate in such experimental procedures?

Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University


Participants
Scott Gerwehr, RAND Corporation
Emma Barrett, UK
W. Louis Hennessey, Esq., member of the
Susan Brandon, Office of Science and Technol- Maryland State Legislature
ogy Policy, Executive Office of the President
Ray Hyman, University of Oregon
Shannon Bohrer, Range Master/Use of Force
Administrator for the Maryland Police and Cor- Clifford T. Keenan, Esq., Chief, Superior Court
rectional Training Commissions Division of the U.S. Attorneys Office, DC
Robert Chaney, Metropolitan Police Depart- Wayne Koka, Critical Incident Response Group,
ment, Washington, DC FBI
Brett Chapman, National Institute of Justices Robert Kinscherff, Massachusetts Trial Court,
Crime Control and Prevention Division Harvard Medical School
Michael Chitwood, Philadelphia Police Depart- Joe LeDoux, New York University
ment
Akiva Liberman, Office of Research and
Ed Davis, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Acad- Evaluation, National Institute of Justice
emy
Robert J. Louden, Director, Criminal Justice
Martha Davis, John Jay Criminal College of Jus- Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
tice
James Lucey, Chief of Operations at the Na-
Robyn Dawes, Carnegie Mellon University tional Gallery of Art
John Downs, Esq., Prosecutors Office, New Ning-Ning Mahlman, FBI
Castle County, Delaware Brian Moon, Klein Associates

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Robert Mericsko, ITIC CIA Jeff Sherman, Northwestern University

Charles A. Morgan III, Behavioral Science, CIA Andrew Silke, Home Office, London

Tom Morgan, Deputy County Counsel, Kern Marco Strano, Italian State Police
County Sheriffs Department
Bryan Vila, Director, Crime Control and Preven-
Geoffrey K. Mumford, Office of Science Policy, tion Research Division, National Institute of Jus-
American Psychological Association tice

Drew Outten, New Castle County Police De- Aldert Vrij, University of Portsmouth
partment, New Castle, Delaware
Gary Wells, Iowa State University
George Palermo, Director for the Center for Fo-
rensic Psychiatry and Risk Assessment Paul Whitesell, Ft. Wayne Police Department

John Pearse, Anti-Terrorist Branch, New Scot- Javan Wilson, U.S. Attorneys Office
land Yard
Bernd Wittenbrink, University of Chicago
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Behavioral Science Unit,
FBI Training Academy

Ron Rensink, University of British Columbia

D. Kim Rossmo, Vancouver Police Department

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llOTH CONGRESS
2nd Session
}
COMMITTEE PRINT {

INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT


OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES


UNITED STATES SENATE

NOVEMBER 20, 2008

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COMMITIEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman


EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH 1. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD D. DEBoBES, Staff Director

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director

INVESTIGATION STAFF

JOSEPH M. BRYAN, Majority Professional Staff Member

ILONA R. COHEN, Majority Counsel

MARK R. JACOBSON, Majority Professional Staff Member

WILLIAM M. CANIANO, Minority Professional Staff Member

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Counsel

BRYAN D. PARKER, Minority Investigative Counsel

BRIAN F. SEBOLD, Staff Assistant

(II)

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UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Contents

Note on Source Material Used in the Preparation of the Report (U) viii

List of Acronyms Used in the Report (U) ix

Executive Summary and Conclusions (U) xii

I. Early Influences on Interrogation Policy (U) 1

A. Redefining the Legal Framework For the Treatment of Detainees (U) 1

B. Department of Defense Office of General Counsel Seeks Information from the Joint

Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) (U) 3

C. JPRA Collaboration with Other Government Agencies (OGAs) (U) 6

D. JPRA Support to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (U) 8

E. JPRA Recommendationsfor GTMO (U) 11

F. Colonel Herrington's Assessment of GTMO (U) 12

G. JPRA Prepares Draft Exploitation Plan (U) 14

II. Development of New Interrogation Authorities (U) 16

A. CIA's Interrogation Program and the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah (U) 16

B. JPRA Assistance to Another Government Agency (U) 19

C. Senior SERE Psychologist Detailed From Department ofDefense to Other Government

Agency (U) 23

D. Department of Defense General Counsel Seeks Information on SERE Techniques From

JPRA (U) 24

E. The Department of Justice Changes the Rules (U) 31

F. JPRA 's Special Program In Support o f . (U) 35

1. August 2002 Training Proposal (U) 35

2. JPRA Creates Project 22B (U) 37

III. Guantanamo Bay as a "Battle Lab" for New Interrogation Techniques (U) 38

A. GTMO Stands Up a Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) (U) 38

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

B. Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) Personnel Contact the U.S. Army Special

Operations Command (USASOC) (U) 39

c. U.S. Southern Command Seeks External Review ofGTMO (U) .42

D. GTMO Personnel Attend Training at Fort Bragg (U) 43

E. Delegation ofSenior Government Lawyers Visits Guantanamo (U) 49

F. JTF-/70 BSCT Produces Interrogation Policy Memo (U) 50

G. CIA Lawyer Advises GTMO on Interrogations (U) 53

H. DoD Takes Lead on the Interrogation of Mohammed al Khatani (U) 57

IV. GTMO Seeks Authority to Use Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U) 61

A. GTMO Requests Counter-Resistance Techniques Influenced by SERE (U) 61

B. GTMO Staff Judge Advocate Conducts "Legal Review ofAggressive Interrogation

Techniques" (U) 63

C. Chain of Command Considers the Requestfor Interrogation Techniques as CITF and FBI

Raise Objections (U) 65

D. Military Services React to GTMO Requestfor Interrogation Techniques (U) 67

E. Department ofDefense General Counsel Quashes Joint Staff Legal Review (U) 70

F. GTMO and JPRA Plan for Additional Interrogation Training (U) 72

V. Command Change at Guantanamo as Dispute over Aggressive Techniques Continues (U) 73

A. Major General Geoffrey Miller Takes Command ofJTF-GTMO (U) 73

B. Khatani Interrogation Plan Fuels Dispute Over Aggressive Techniques (U) 74

I. JTF-GTMO Staff Circulate Khatani Interrogation Plan (U) 75

2. CITF and FBI Object to Proposed Interrogation Techniques (U) 78

3. JTF-GTMO Briefs DoD General Counsel's Office on Interrogation Plan (U)......... 79

4. "Final" Khatani Interrogation Plan (U) 8]

5. FBI and ClTF Continue to Object to Khatani Interrogation Plan (U) 84

6. Khatani Interrogation Begins, CITF Directed To "Stand Clear" (U) 87

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

7. Techniques Used During Khatani Interrogation (U) , ,..88

VI. JPRA's Assistance to Another Government Agency (U) 91

VII. Secretary Rumsfeld Approves Interrogation Authorities, GTMOPlans to Implement SERE

Techniques (U) '" 94

A. Secretary ofDefense Authorizes Aggressive Techniquesfor use at GTMO (U) 94

B. JTF-GTMO Develops Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Use ofSERE

Techniques in Interrogations (U) , 97

C. SERE School Trainers Provide Instruction for GTMO Interrogators (U) 103

D. Navy General Counsel Raises Concerns About Interrogation Techniques, Secretary


Rumsfeld Rescinds Authority (U) , 105

E. National Security Council (NSC) Principals Discuss DoD Interrogations (U) 109

VIII. New Interrogation Policy Developed for GTMO (U) 110

A. The Working Group Solicits Information on Interrogation Techniques lI0

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency Provides Information on Specific Interrogation

Techniques (U) 110

2. The Working Group Solicits Information About Interrogation Techniques From

CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM (U) '" 113

3. The Working Group Requests Informationfrom JPRA (U) 116

B. Department ofJustice Office of Legal Counsel's Analysis Is Presented As Controlling

Authority (U) , 118

C. Working Group Drafts Report Recommending Interrogation Techniques (U)................ 122

D. SOUTHCOM Presses for Additional Techniques (U) 128

E. JPRA Briefs Members ofthe Working Group on SERE Techniques, Including Physical

Pressures (U)............................................................................................... 130

F. The Working Group Finalizes Its Report and the Secretary of Defense Issues a New

Interrogation Policy For GTMO (U) " 130

IX. Aggressive Interrogations at GTMO (U) , 132

A. Allegations of Detainee Mistreatment (U) 132

B. Special Interrogation Plans Modeled on Khatani Interrogation (U) 135

1. JTF-GTMO Plans for Interrogation ofSlahi (U) 135

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

2. JTF-GTMO Formally Submits Special Interrogation Planfor Slahi (ISN 760)


(U).................................................................................136

3. Interrogation Begins Before the Special Interrogation Plan Is Approved (U)....... 138

4. Special Interrogation Plan Approved and Implemented Despite Apparent

Cooperation (U) 140

5. FBI Concerns with Special Interrogation (U) 141

6. Special Project at GTMO Uses Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U) 141

7. CITF Reissues Order for Agents to "Stand Clear" ofAggressive Interrogations


(U)..................................................................................................143

8. GTMO Seeks Approvalfor Two Additional Special Interrogation Plans (U) 143

a. Special Interrogation Plan #3 (U) 143

b. Special Interrogation Plan #4 (U) 144

c. SOUTHCOM and OSD SO/LIC Recommend Approval ofSpecial

Interrogation Plans #3 & #4 (U) 145

X. DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Withdraws March 14,2003 Legal Opinion Governing DoD

Interrogations (U) 146

XI. Development oflnterrogation Policy in Afghanistan (U) 148

A. Assessment Team Visit to Guantanamo Bay (U) 149

B. The Deaths ofDilawar and Habibullah (U) 151

c. Questions Raised About Task Force Participation in OGA Interrogations (U) 152

D. January 2003 Task Force Interrogation SOP (Afghanistan) (U) 153

E. CJTF-/80 Produces Memorandum on Interrogation Techniques (U) 154

F. CENTCOM Raises Concerns About Interrogation Techniques (U) 156

XII. Development of Interrogation Policy in Iraq (U) 157

A. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Policies (U) 158

1. SMU Task Force Uses Afghanistan Interrogation Policy (U) 158

2. OGA Comments on SMU TF Interrogation Techniques (U) 159

UNCLASSIFIED

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3. July 2003 Interrogation SOP Draftedfor Iraq SMU TF (U) J59

4. Iraq Survey Group Concerns with SMU TF Detainee Treatment (U) J62

B. Interrogation Policies for Conventional Forces in Iraq (U)......................................... J 64

J. CJTF-7 Stands Up (Summer 2003) (U) J64

2. Interrogation Operations Begin at Abu Ghraib (U) J 65

3. 51 y h MI Battalion at Abu Ghraib Seeks Additional Guidance (U) J66

4. 51yh MI BN Proposes Interrogation Policy (U) J66

5. CJTF-7 Solicits "Wish List" of Interrogation Techniques (U) J 67

6. Interrogation OIC at Abu Ghraib Resubmits the Proposed Interrogation Policy for
51yh MI BN(U) J69

C. JPRA Provides "Offensive" SERE Training in Iraq (U) J 70

1. Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq Seeks Assistancefrom JPRA (U) J 70

2. Awareness of the JPRA Trip to Iraq at Headquarters, Joint Forces Command


(JFCOM) (U) J7J

3. JPRA Provides Interrogation Support to the Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq
(U) J73

4. JPRA Team Authorized to Participate in Interrogations (U) J 74

5. JPRA Present as Interrogator Uses Stress Positions and Slaps (U) J 76

6. JPRA Team Authorized to Use SERE Techniques (U) J 79

7. JPRA Team ChiefSeeks Legal Guidance (U) J 79

8. JPRA Training Manager and Contractor Participate in an Interrogation (U)......... J8J

9. JPRA Team Chief Objects to SMU TF Interrogation (U)........................ J 82

JO. JPRA Develops a Concept of Operations (CONOP) (U) J84

JJ. JPRA Team Leaves Iraq (U) J86

J2. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Reviews JPRA Concept Of Operations
(CONOP) (U) J 87

J3. JFCOM Verifies Team Chief's Account of Events in Iraq (U) J88

UNCLASSIFIED

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D. Major General Geoffrey Miller Leads GTMO Assessment Team to Iraq (U) 189

1. CJTF-7 Commander Identifies Deficiencies (U) 189

2. GTMO Assessment Team Travels to Iraq (U) 190

3. GTMO Team Visits Iraq Survey Group (ISG) (U) 191

4. GTMO Team Visits Special Mission Unit Task Force (U) 193

5. GTMO Team Discusses Interrogations with CJTF-7 (U) 194

6. GTMO Commander Recommends CJTF-7 Develop an Interrogation Policy (U)...... 197

7. JTF-GTMO Assessment Team Produces Trip Report (U) 198

8. MG Miller Briefs Senior DoD Officials on Assessment Visit (U) 199

E. Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy Established (U) 200

1. CJTF-7 Commander Issues Policy Including Aggressive Interrogation Techniques


(U) 200

2. Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy Implemented at Abu Ghraib (U)....... 201

3. CENTCOM Raises Concerns About CJTF-7 Policy (U) 202

4. CJTF-7 Issues New Interrogation Policy (U) 204

F. SMU Task Force Issues a New Interrogation SOP (U) 206

XIII. Interrogation Techniques and Detainee Mistreatment at Abu Ghraib (U) 207

A. Use of Military Working Dogs (U) 208

B. Stress Positions and Physical Training (U) 210

C. Removal of Clothing (U) 211

D. Sleep Adjustment!Sleep Management (U) 213

E. Sensory Deprivation and Isolation (U) 215

F. "Lost Opportunity" to Fix Problems at Abu Ghraib (U) 216

1. Retired Army Intelligence Officer Leads Assessment Team (U) 216

2. Assessment Team Visits Abu Ghraib and CJTF-7 Headquarters (U) 217

UNCLASSIFIED

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3. Team Hears Reports of Detainee Mistreatment (U) 218

4. COL Herrington Reports Findings (U) 218

XIV. Interrogation Policies Following Abu Ghraib (U) 219

A. February 2004 CJSOTF Interrogation SOP (U) 219

B. Interrogation Plan in Iraq Derivedfrom SERE (U) 221

C. March 2004 Interrogation SOP for Conventional Forces in Afghanistan (U) 221

D. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Polices (U) 222

XV. CENTCOM Seeks JPRA Interrogation Assistance in Afghanistan (U).................................224

A. May 2004 CENTCOM Request (U) 224

B. CENTCOM Makes Another Request for JPRA Interrogation Assistance in Afghanistan


(U) 228

c. U.S. Joint Forces Command Issues Policy Guidance For JPRA "Offensive" Support (U)...230

UNCLASSIFIED

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Note on Source Material Used in the Preparation of the Report

(U) Over the course ofthe its inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody, the
Committee reviewed more than 200,000 pages of classified and unclassified documents,
including detention and interrogation policies, memoranda, electronic communications, training
manuals, and the results of previous investigations into detainee abuse. The majority ofthose
documents were provided to the Committee by the Department of Defense. The Committee also
reviewed documents provided by the Department of Justice, documents in the public domain, a
small number of documents provided by individuals, and a number of published secondary
sources including books and articles in popular magazines and scholarly journals.

(U) The Committee interviewed over 70 individuals in connection with its inquiry. Most
interviews were of current or former Department of Defense employees, though the Committee
also interviewed current and/or former employees ofthe Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The Committee issued two subpoenas and held two hearings to take
testimony from subpoenaed witnesses. The Committee also sent written questions to more than
200 individuals. The Committee held public hearings on June 17, 2008 and September 25, 2008.

(U) Military personnel referred to in the report are identified by their rank at the time the
events in question took place.

UNCLASSIFIED

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List of Acronyms (U)

AAR After Action Report


AOR Area of Responsibility
BCP Bagram Collection Point, Bagram Air Field, Mghanistan
BDE Brigade
BN Battalion
BSCT Behavioral Science Consultation Team
CCJ-2 Intelligence directorate at U. S. CENTCOM.
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CID Army Criminal Investigative Division
CITF Criminal Investigation Task Force
CJ-2 Combined J-2 (Intelligence directorate at combined organization)
CJ2X Combined J-2X; See J-2X
CJCS Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF-180 Combined Joint Task Force 180
CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force 7
CONOP Concept of Operations
CTC Central Intelligence Agency's CounterTerrorist Center
DHS(DH) Defense Human Intelligence Service, part ofDIA
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DoJ Department of Justice
DPMO Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
DUC Designated Unlawful Combatant
EPW Enemy Prisoner of War
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM34-52 US Army Field Manual on Interrogation (1987, 1992)
G-2 Intelligence directorate at Army Staff
GTMO (GITMO) U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVD High Value Detainee
HVf High Value Target
ICE Interrogation Control Element
ICRC International Committee ofthe Red Cross

UNCLASSIFIED

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IROE Interrogation Rules of Engagement
ISG Iraq Survey Group
ISN Internment Serial Number
J-2 Intelligence directorate within a joint organization, e.g. Joint Staff
J-2X Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer or organization
J-3 Operations directorate within ajoint organization, e.g. Joint Staff
JAG Judge Advocate General
JFCOM U.S. Joint Forces Command
JIOC Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
JIG Joint Interrogation Group
JPRA Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command
JTF-160 Joint Task Force 160 at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay
JTF-170 Joint Task Force 170 at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay
JTF-GTMO Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay
MWD Military Working Dog
NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA Other Government Agency
01 Operating Instruction
OIC Officer in Charge
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OLC Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations
OSO Operational Support Office (JPRA)
OTJAG Office of The Judge Advocate General
PAD Psychological Applications Directorate
POW Prisoner of War
PRA Personnel Recovery Agency
ROE Rules of Engagement
S-3 Anny operations directorate at brigade level or below
SERE Survival Evasion Resistance Escape
SJA StaffJudge Advocate
SMU Special Mission Unit
SOILIC Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
SOCOM U. S. Special Operations Command

UNCLASSIFIED

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SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SOUTHCOM U. S. Southern Command
S-V91 Department of Defense High Risk Survival Training
TF Task Force
TJAG The Judge Advocate General
TTPs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
USASOC U. S. Army Special Operations Command
USDI Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
VTC Video Teleconference
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNCLASSIFIED

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Executive Summary

"What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight ... is how we behave. In
everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate that we
treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and respect. While we are
warriors, we are also all human beings. "

-- General David Petraeus

May 10,2007

(U) The collection oftimely and accurate intelligence is critical to the safety of U.S.
personnel deployed abroad and to the security ofthe American people here at home. The
methods by which we elicit intelligence information from detainees in our custody affect not
only the reliability ofthat information, but our broader efforts to win hearts and minds and attract
allies to our side.

(U) AI Qaeda and Taliban terrorists are taught to expect Americans to abuse them. They
are recruited based on false propaganda that says the United States is out to destroy Islam.
Treating detainees harshly only reinforces that distorted view, increases resistance to
cooperation, and creates new enemies. In fact, the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate
"Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" cited "pervasive anti U.S.
sentiment among most Muslims" as an underlying factor fueling the spread ofthe global jihadist
movement. Former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in June 2008 that "there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that the fITst
and second identifiable causes of U. S. combat deaths in Iraq - as judged by their effectiveness in
recruiting insurgent fighters into combat - are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo."

(U) The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of
"a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States
government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to
create the appearance oftheir legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts
damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand
of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. This report is a product ofthe
Committee's inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Presidential Order Opens the Door to Considering Aggressive Techniques (U)

(U) On February 7,2002, President Bush signed a memorandum stating that the Third
Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda and concluding that Taliban
detainees were not entitled to prisoner of war status or the legal protections afforded by the Third
Geneva Convention. The President's order closed off application of Common Article 3 ofthe
Geneva Conventions, which would have afforded minimum standards for humane treatment, to
al Qaeda or Taliban detainees. While the President's order stated that, as "a matter of policy, the
United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of
the Geneva Conventions," the decision to replace well established military doctrine, i.e., legal
compliance with the Geneva Conventions, with a policy subject to interpretation, impacted the
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.

(U) In December 2001, more than a month before the President signed his memorandum,
the Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel's Office had already solicited information on
detainee "exploitation" from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), an agency whose
expertise was in training American personnel to withstand interrogation techniques considered
illegal under the Geneva Conventions.

(U) JPRA is the DoD agency that oversees military Survival Evasion Resistance and
Escape (SERE) training. During the resistance phase of SERE training, U.S. military personnel
are exposed to physical and psychological pressures (SERE techniques) designed to simulate
conditions to which they might be subject if taken prisoner by enemies that did not abide by the
Geneva Conventions. As one JPRA instructor explained, SERE training is "based on illegal
exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years." The techniques used in SERE school,
based, in part, on Chinese Communist techniques used during the Korean war to elicit false
confessions, include stripping students oftheir clothing, placing them in stress positions, putting
hoods over their heads, disrupting their sleep, treating them like animals, subjecting them to loud
music and flashing lights, and exposing them to extreme temperatures. It can also include face
and body slaps and until recently, for some who attended the Navy's SERE school, it included
waterboarding.

(U) Typically, those who play the part of interrogators in SERE school neither are trained
interrogators nor are they qualified to be. These role players are not trained to obtain reliable
intelligence information from detainees. Their job is to train our personnel to resist providing
reliable infonnation to our enemies. As the Deputy Commander for the Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM), JPRA's higher headquarters, put it: "the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel
how to respond and resist interrogations - not in how to conduct interrogations." Given JPRA's
role and expertise, the request from the DoD General Counsel's office was unusual. In fact, the
Committee is not aware of any similar request prior to December 2001. But while it may have
been the fast, that was not the last time that a senior government official contacted JPRA for

UNCLASSIFIED

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advice on using SERE methods offensively. In fact, the call from the DoD General Counsel's
office marked just the beginning of JPRA's support of U.S. government interrogation efforts.

Senior Officials Seek SERE Techniques and Discuss Detainee Interrogations (U)

(U) Beginning in the spring of 2002 and extending for the next two years, JPRA
supported U.S. government efforts to interrogate detainees. Duringthat same period, senior
government officials solicited JPRA's knowledge and its direct support for interrogations. While
much ofthe information relating to JPRA's offensive activities and the influence of SERE
techniques on interrogation policies remains classified, unclassified information provides a
window into the extent ofthose activities.

(U) JPRA's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner testified that in late
2001 or early 2002, JPRA conducted briefings of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel
on detainee resistance, techniques, and information on detainee exploitation.

(U) On April 16, 2002, Dr. Bruce Jessen, the senior SERE psychologist at JPRA,
circulated a draft exploitation plan to JPRA Commander Colonel Randy Mouhon and other
senior officials at the agency. The contents of that plan remain classified but Dr. Jessen's
initiative is indicative ofthe interest of JPRA's senior leadership in expanding the agency's role.

(U) One opportunity came in July 2002. That month, DoD Deputy General Counsel for
Intelligence Richard Shiffrin contacted JPRA seeking information on SERE physical pressures
and interrogation techniques that had been used against Americans. Mr. Shiffiin called JPRA
after discussions with William "Jim" Haynes II, the DoD General Counsel.

(U) In late July, JPRA provided the General Counsel's office with several documents,
including excerpts from SERE instructor lesson plans, a list of physical and psychological
pressures used in SERE resistance training, and a memo from a SERE psychologist assessing the
long-term psychological effects of SERE resistance training on students and the effects of
waterboarding. The list of SERE techniques included such methods as sensory deprivation,
sleep disruption, stress positions, waterboarding, and slapping. It also made reference to a
section ofthe JPRA instructor manual that discusses "coercive pressures," such as keeping the
lights on at all times, and treating a person like an animal. JPRA's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant
Colonel Daniel Baumgartner, who spoke with Mr. Shiffiin at the time, thought the General
Counsel's office was asking for the information on exploitation and physical pressures to use
them in interrogations and he said that JFCOM gave approval to provide the agency the
information. Mr. Shiffiin, the DoD Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence, confmned that a
purpose ofthe request was to "reverse engineer" the techniques. Mr. Haynes could not recall
what he did with the information provided by JPRA.

(U) Memos from Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner to the Office of Secretary of Defense
General Counsel stated that JPRA would "continue to offer exploitation assistance to those
government organizations charged with the mission of gleaning intelligence from enemy

UNCLASSIFIED

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detainees." Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner testified that he provided another government


agency the same information he sent to the DoD General Counsel's office.

(U) Mr. Haynes was not the only senior official considering new interrogation techniques
for use against detainees. Members ofthe President's Cabinet and other senior officials attended
meetings in the White House where specific interrogation techniques were discussed. Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice, who was then the National Security Advisor, said that, "in the spring
of2002, CIA sought policy approval from the National Security Council (NSC) to begin an
interrogation progTam for high-level al-Qaida terrorists." Secretary Rice said that she asked
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to briefNSC Principals on the program and asked
the Attorney General John Ashcroft "personally to review and confrrm the legal advice prepared
by the Office of Legal Counsel." She also said that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
participated in the NSC review ofthe CIA's program.

(U) Asked whether she attended meetings where SERE training was discussed, Secretary
Rice stated that she recalled being told that U.S. military personnel were subjected in training to
"certain physical and psychological interrogation techniques." National Security Council (NSC)
Legal Advisor, John Bellinger, said that he was present in meetings "at which SERE training was
discussed."

Department of Justice Redermes Torture (D)

(U) On August 1, 2002, just a week after JPRA provided the DoD General Counsel's
office the list of SERE techniques and the memo on the psychological effects of SERE training,
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued two legal opinions. The
opinions were issued after consultation with senior Administration attorneys, including then
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and then-Counsel to the Vice President David
Addington. Both memos were signed by then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel Jay Bybee. One opinion, commonly known as the first Bybee memo, was addressed to
Judge Gonzales and provided OLe's opinion on standards of conduct in interrogation required
under the federal torture statute. That memo concluded:

[F]or an act to constitute torture as defmed in [the federal torture statute], it must
inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental
pain or suffering to amount to torture under [the federal torture statute], it must
result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years.

(U) In his book The Terror Presidency, Jack Goldsmith, the former Assistant Attorney
General of the OLC who succeeded Mr. Bybee in that job, described the memo's conclusions:

UNCLASSIFIED

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Violent acts aren't necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a
defense; and even if you don't have a defense, the torture law doesn't apply if you
act under the color of presidential authority.

(U) The other OLC opinion issued on August 1,2002 is known commonly as the Second
Bybee memo. That opinion, which responded to a request from the CI~ addressed the legality
of specific interrogation tactics. While the full list oftechniques remains classified, a publicly
released CIA document indicates that waterboarding was among those analyzed and approved.
CIA Director General Michael Hayden stated in public testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee on February 5, 2008 that waterboarding was used by the CIA And Steven Bradbury,
the current Assistant Attorney General ofthe OLC, testified before the House Judiciary
Committee on February 14,2008 that the CIA's use of waterboarding was "adapted from the
SERE training program."

(U) Before drafting the opinions, Mr. Y 00, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
OLC, had met with Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and David Addington, Counsel
to the Vice President, to discuss the subjects he intended to address in the opinions. In testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Y00 refused to say whether or not he ever discussed
or received information about SERE techniques as the memos were being drafted. When asked
whether he had discussed SERE techniques with Judge Gonzales, Mr. Addington, Mr. Yoo, Mr.
Rizzo or other senior administration lawyers, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes testified that he
"did discuss SERE techniques with other people in the administration." NSC Legal Advisor
John Bellinger said that "some of the legal analyses of proposed interrogation techniques that
were prepared by the Department of Justice... did refer to the psychological effects ofresistance
training."

(U) In fact, Jay Bybee the Assistant Attorney General who signed the two OLC legal
opinions said that he saw an assessment of the psychological effects of military resistance
training in July 2002 in meetings in his office with John Yoo and two other OLC attorneys.
Judge Bybee said that he used that assessment to inform the August 1, 2002 OLC legal opinion
that has yet to be publicly released. Judge Bybee also recalled discussing detainee interrogations
in a meeting with Attorney General John Ashcroft and John Y 00 in late July 2002, prior to
signing the OLC opinions. Mr. Bellinger, the NSC Legal Advisor, said that "the NSC's
Principals reviewed CIA's proposed program on several occasions in 2002 and 2003" and that he
"expressed concern that the proposed CIA interrogation techniques comply with applicable U. S.
law, including our international obligations."

JPRA and CIA Influence Department of Defense Interrogation Policies (U)

(U) As senior government lawyers were preparing to redefine torture, JPRA - responding
to a request from U.S. Southern Command's Joint Task Force 170 (JTF-170) at Guantanamo Bay
(GTMO) - was finalizing plans to train JTF-170 personnel. During the week of September 16,
2002, a group of interrogators and behavioral scientists from GTMO travelled to Fort Bragg,
North Carolina and attended training conducted by instructors from JPRA's SERE school. On
September 25, 2002, just days after GTMO staff returned from that training, a delegation of

UNCLASSIFIED

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senior Administration lawyers, including Mr. Haynes, Mr. Rizzo, and Mr. Addington, visited
GTMO.

(U) A week after the visit from those senior lawyers, two GTMO behavioral scientists
who had attended the JPRA-Ied training at Fort Bragg drafted a memo proposing new
interrogation techniques for use at GTMO. According to one ofthose two behavioral scientists,
by early October 2002, there was "increasing pressure to get 'tougher' with detainee
interrogations." He added that ifthe interrogation policy memo did not contain coercive
techniques, then it "wasn't going to go very far."

(U) JPRA was not the only outside organization that provided advice to GTMO on
aggressive techniques. On October 2, 2002, Jonathan Fredman, who was chief counsel to the
CIA's CounterTerrorist Center, attended a meeting ofGTMO staff. Minutes of that meeting
indicate that it was dominated by a discussion of aggressive interrogation techniques including
sleep deprivation, death threats, and waterboarding, which was discussed in relation to its use in
SERE training. Mr. Fredman's advice to GTMO on applicable legal obligations was similar to
the analysis ofthose obligations in OLC's first Bybee memo. According to the meeting minutes,
Mr. Fredman said that ''the language ofthe statutes is written vaguely ... Severe physical pain
described as anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body parts. Mental torture
[is] described as anything leading to permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality."
Mr. Fredman said simply, "It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing
it wrong."

(U) On October 11,2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170
at Guantanamo Bay, sent a memo to General James Hill, the Commander of US. Southern
Command (SOUfHCOM) requesting authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques.
Several of the techniques requested were similar to techniques used by lPRA and the military
services in SERE training, including stress positions, exploitation of detainee fears (such as fear
of dogs), removal of clothing, hooding, deprivation of light and sound, and the so-called wet
towel treatment or the waterboard. Some ofthe techniques were even referred to as "those used
in US. military interrogation resistance training." Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, GTMO's
Staff Judge Advocate, wrote an analysis justifYing the legality of the techniques, though she
expected that a broader legal review conducted at more senior levels would follow her own. On
October 25, 2002, General Hill forwarded the GTMO request from Major General Dunlavey to
General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Days later, the Joint Staff
solicited the views of the military services on the request.

(U) Plans to use aggressive interrogation techniques generated concerns by some at


GTMO. The Deputy Commander ofthe Department of Defense's Criminal Investigative Task
Force (CITF) at GTMO told the Committee that SERE techniques were "developed to better
prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations and not as a means of obtaining reliable
information" and that "CITF was troubled with the rationale that techniques used to harden
resistance to interrogations would be the basis for the utilization oftechniques to obtain
information." Concerns were not limited to the effectiveness of the techniques in obtaining
reliable information; GTMO's request gave rise to significant legal concerns as well.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Military Lawyers Raise Red Flags and Joint Staff Review Quashed (D)

(U) In early November 2002, in a series of memos responding to the Joint Staff's call for
comments on GTMO's request, the military services identified serious legal concerns about the
techniques and called for additional analysis.

(U) The Air Force cited "serious concerns regarding the legality of many ofthe proposed
techniques" and stated that "techniques described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet
the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely..." The Air Force
also called for an in depth legal review ofthe request.

(U) CITF's Chief Legal Advisor wrote that certain techniques in GTMO's October 11,
2002 request "may subject service members to punitive articles of the [Uniform Code of Military
Justice]," called "the utility and legality of applying certain techniques" in the request
"questionable," and stated that he could not "advocate any action, interrogation or otherwise, that
is predicated upon the principle that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are not
aware of how we conduct our business."

(U) The Chief ofthe Army's International and Operational Law Division wrote that
techniques like stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and use of phobias to
induce stress "crosses the line of 'humane' treatment," would "likely be considered
maltreatment" under the UCMJ, and "may violate the torture statute." The Army labeled
GTMO's request "legally insufficient" and called for additional review.

(U) The Navy recommended a "more detailed interagency legal and policy review" of the
request. And the Marine Corps expressed strong reservations, stating that several techniques in
the request "arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to possible
prosecution." The Marine Corps also said the request was not "legally sufficient," and like the
other services, called for "a more thorough legal and policy review."

(U) Then-Captain (now Rear Admiral) Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that her staff discussed the military services' concerns with the
DoD General Counsel's Office at the time and that the DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes was
aware ofthe services' concerns. Mr. Haynes, on the other hand, testified that he did not know
that the memos from the military services existed (a statement he later qualified by stating that he
was not sure he knew they existed). Eliana Davidson, the DoD Associate Deputy General
Counsel for International Affairs, said that she told the General Counsel that the GTMO request
needed further assessment. Mr. Haynes did not recall Ms. Davidson telling him that.

(U) Captain Dalton, who was the Chairman's Legal Counsel, said that she had her own
concerns with the GTMO request and directed her staffto initiate a thorough legal and policy
review ofthe techniques. That review, however, was cut short. Captain Dalton said that General
Myers returned from a meeting and advised her that Mr. Haynes wanted her to stop her review,

UNCLASSIFIED

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in part because of concerns that people were going to see the GTMO request and the military
services' analysis of it. Neither General Myers nor Mr. Haynes recalled cutting short the Dalton
review, though neither has challenged Captain Dalton's recollection. Captain Dalton testified
that this occasion marked the only time she had ever been told to stop analyzing a request that
came to her for review.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Approves Aggressive Techniques (U)

(U) With respect to GTMO's October 11, 2002 request to use aggressive interrogation
techniques, Mr. Haynes said that "there was a sense by the DoD Leadership that this decision
was taking too long" and that Secretary Rumsfeld told his senior advisors "I need a
recommendation" On November 27, 2002, the Secretary got one. Notwithstanding the serious
legal concerns raised by the military services, Mr. Haynes sent a one page memo to the
Secretary, recommending that he approve all but three ofthe eighteen techniques in the GTMO
request. Techniques such as stress positions, removal of clothing, use of phobias (such as fear of
dogs), and deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli were all recommended for approval.

(U) Mr. Haynes's memo indicated that he had discussed the issue with Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, and General
Myers and that he believed they concurred in his recommendation. When asked what he relied
on to make his recommendation that the aggressive techniques be approved, the only written
legal opinion Mr. Haynes cited was Lieutenant Colonel Beaver's legal analysis, which senior
military lawyers had considered "legally insufficient" and "woefully inadequate," and which
LTC Beaver herself had expected would be supplemented with a review by persons with greater
experience than her own.

(U) On December 2,2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed Mr. Haynes's recommendation,


adding a handwritten note that referred to limits proposed in the memo on the use of stress
positions: "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"

(U) SERE school techniques are designed to simulate abusive tactics used by our
enemies. There are fundamental differences between a SERE school exercise and a real world
interrogation. At SERE school, students are subject to an extensive medical and psychological
pre-screening prior to being subjected to physical and psychological pressures. The schools
impose strict limits on the frequency, duration, and/or intensity of certain techniques.
Psychologists are present throughout SERE training to intervene should the need arise and to
help students cope with associated stress. And SERE school is voluntary; students are even
given a special phrase they can use to immediately stop the techniques from being used against
them.

(U) Neither those differences, nor the serious legal concerns that had been registered,
stopped the Secretary of Defense from approving the use of the aggressive techniques against
detainees. Moreover, Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the techniques without apparently
providing any written guidance as to how they should be administered.

UNCLASSIFIED

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SERE Techniques at GTMO (U)

(U) Following the Secretary's December 2, 2002 authorization, senior staff at GTMO
began drafting a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) specifically for the use of SERE
techniques in interrogations. The draft SOP itself stated that "The premise behind this is that the
interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for use in real-world
interrogations. These tactics and techniques are used at SERE school to 'break' SERE detainees.
The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation" The
draft "GTMO SERE SOP" described how to slap, strip, and place detainees in stress positions. It
also described other SERE techniques, such as "hooding," "manhandling," and "walling"
detainees.

(U) On December 30,2002, two instructors from the Navy SERE school arrived at
GTMO. The next day, in a session with approximately 24 interrogation personnel, the two
SERE instructors demonstrated how to administer stress positions, and various slapping
techniques. According to two interrogators, those who attended the training even broke off into
pairs to practice the techniques.

(U) ExemplifYing the disturbing nature and substance ofthe training, the SERE
instructors explained "Biderman's Principles" - which were based on coercive methods used by
the Chinese Communist dictatorship to elicit false confessions from U.S. POWs during the
Korean War - and left with GTMO personnel a chart ofthose coercive techniques. Three days
after they conducted the training, the SERE instructors met with GTMO's Commander, Major
General Geoffrey Miller. According to some who attended that meeting, Major General Miller
stated that he did not want his interrogators using the techniques that the Navy SERE instructors
had demonstrated. That conversation, however, took place after the training had already
occurred and not all ofthe interrogators who attended the training got the message.

(U) At about the same time, a dispute over the use of aggressive techniques was raging at
GTMO over the interrogation of Mohammed al-Khatani, a high value detainee. Personnel from
CITF and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigations (FBI) had registered strong opposition, to
interrogation techniques proposed for use on Khatani and made those concerns known to the
DoD General Counsel's office. Despite those objections, an interrogation plan that included
aggressive techniques was approved. The interrogation itself, which actually began on
November 23,2002, a week before the Secretary's December 2,2002 grant of blanket authority
for the use of aggressive techniques, continued through December and into mid-January 2003.

(U) NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that, on several occasions, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Bruce Swartz raised concerns with him about allegations of detainee abuse at
GTMO. Mr. Bellinger said that, in tum, he raised these concerns "on several occasions with
DoD officials and was told that the allegations were being investigated by the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service." Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that Mr.
Bellinger also advised her "on a regular basis regarding concerns and issues relating to DoD
detention policies and practices at Guantanamo." She said that as a result she convened a "series

UNCLASSIFIED

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of meetings ofNSC Principals in 2002 and 2003 to discuss various issues and concerns relating
to detainees in the custody ofthe Department of Defense."

(U) Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, Navy General Counsel Alberto
Mora spoke with the DoD General Counsel three times to express his concerns about
interrogation techniques at GTMO, at one point telling Mr. Haynes that he thought techniques
that had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense "could rise to the level oftorture." On
January 15,2003, having received no word that the Secretary's authority would be withdrawn,
Mr. Mora went so far as to deliver a draft memo to Mr. Haynes's office memorializing his legal
concerns about the techniques. In a subsequent phone call, Mr. Mora told Mr. Haynes he would
sign his memo later that day unless he heard defmitively that the use ofthe techniques was
suspended. In a meeting that same day, Mr. Haynes told Mr. Mora that the Secretary would
rescind the techniques. Secretary Rumsfeld signed a memo rescinding authority for the
techniques on January 15,2003.

(U) That same day, GTMO suspended its use of aggressive techniques on Khatani.
While key documents relating to the interrogation remain classified, published accounts indicate
that military working dogs had been used against Khatani. He had also been deprived of
adequate sleep for weeks on end, stripped naked, subjected to loud music, and made to wear a
leash and perform dog tricks. In a June 3, 2004 press briefing, SOUTHCOM Commander
General James Hill traced the source oftechniques used on Khatani back to SERE, stating: "The
staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to our SERE school and
developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided and looked at, said were OK." General
Hill said "we began to use a few ofthose techniques ... on this individuaL."

(U) On May 13, 2008, the Pentagon announced in a written statement that the Convening
Authority for military commissions "dismissed without prejudice the sworn charges against
Mohamed al Khatani." The statement does not indicate the role his treatment may have played
in that decision.

DoD Working Group Ignores Military Lawyers and Relies on OLC (D)

(U) On January 15, 2003, the same day he rescinded authority for GTMO to use
aggressive techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a "Working Group" to
review interrogation techniques. For the next few months senior military and civilian lawyers
tried, without success, to have their concerns about the legality of aggressive techniques reflected
in the Working Group's report. Their arguments were rejected in favor ofa legal opinion from
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel's (OLC) John Yoo. Mr. Yoo's opinion, the
final version of which 'was dated March 14,2003, had been requested by Mr. Haynes at the
initiation ofthe Working Group process, and repeated much of what the first Bybee memo had
said six months earlier.

(U) The first Bybee memo, dated August 1, 2002, had concluded that, to violate the
federal torture statute, physical pain that resulted from an act would have to be "equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of

UNCLASSIFIED

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bodily function, or even death." Mr. Yoo's March 14, 2003 memo stated that criminal laws,
such as the federal torture statute, would not apply to certain military interrogations, and that
interrogators could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using interrogation methods
that would otherwise violate the law.

(U) Though the final Working Group report does not specifically mention SERE, the list
ofinterrogation techniques it evaluated and recommended for approval suggest the influence of
SERE. Removal of clothing, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation,
hooding, increasing anxiety through the use of a detainee's aversions like dogs, and face and
stomach slaps were all recommended for approval.

(U) On April 16, 2003, less than two weeks after the Working Group completed its
report, the Secretary authorized the use of24 specific interrogation techniques for use at GTMO.
While the authorization included such techniques as dietary manipulation, environmental
manipulation, and sleep adjustment, it was silent on many ofthe techniques in the Working
Group report. Secretary Rumsfeld's memo said, however, that "If, in your view, you require
additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the
Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique,
recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee."

(U) Just a few months later, one such request for "additional interrogation techniques"
arrived on Secretary Rumsfeld's desk. The detainee was Mohamedou QuId Slahi. While
documents relating to the interrogation plan for Slahi remain classified, a May 2008 report from
the Department of Justice Inspector General includes declassified information suggesting the
plan included hooding Slahi and subjecting him to sensory deprivation and "sleep adjustment."
The Inspector General's report says that an FBI agent who saw a draft ofthe interrogation plan
said it was similar to Khatani's interrogation plan. Secretary Rumsfeld approved the Slahi plan
on August 13, 2003.

Aggressive Techniques Authorized in Afghanistan and Iraq (U)

(U) Shortly after Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2,2002 approval ofhis General
Counsel's recommendation to authorize aggressive interrogation techniques, the techniques
and the fact the Secretary had authorized them - became known to interrogators in Mghanistan.
A copy of the Secretary's memo was sent from GTMO to Mghanistan. Captain Carolyn Wood,
the Officer in Charge ofthe Intelligence Section at Bagram Airfield in Mghanistan, said that in
January 2003 she saw a power point presentation listing the aggressive techniques that had been
authorized by the Secretary.

(U) Despite the Secretary's January 15,2003 rescission of authority for GTMO to use
aggressive techniques, his initial approval six weeks earlier continued to influence interrogation
policies.

(U) On January 24, 2003, nine days after Secretary Rumsfe1d rescinded authority for the
techniques at GTMO, the Staff Judge Advocate for Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180),

UNCLASSIFIED

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u.s. Central Command's (CENTCOM) conventional forces in Afghanistan, produced an
"Interrogation techniques" memo. While that memo remains classified, unclassified portions of
a report by Major General George Fay stated that the memo "recommended removal of clothing
- a technique that had been in the Secretary's December 2 authorization" and discussed
"exploiting the Arab fear of dogs" another technique approved by the Secretary on December 2,
2002.

(U) From Afghanistan, the techniques made their way to Iraq. According to the
Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (lG), at the beginning ofthe Iraq war, special
mission unit forces in Iraq "used a January 2003 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which had
been developed for operations in Afghanistan." According to the DoD IG, the Afghanistan SOP
had been:

[I]nfluenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense


approved on December 2, 2002 and incorporated techniques designed for
detainees who were identified as unlawful combatants. Subsequent battlefield
interrogation SOPs included techniques such as yelling, loud music, and light
control, environmental manipulation, sleep deprivation/adjustment, stress
positions, 20-hour interrogations, and controlled fear (muzzled dogs) ...

(U) Techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense in December 2002 reflect the
influence of SERE. And not only did those techniques make their way into official interrogation
policies in Iraq, but instructors from the JPRA SERE school followed. The DoD IG reported that
in September 2003, at the request ofthe Commander ofthe Special Mission Unit Task Force,
JPRA deployed a team to Iraq to assist interrogation operations. During that trip, which was
explicitly approved by U.S. Joint Forces Command, JPRA's higher headquarters, SERE
instructors were authorized to participate in the interrogation of detainees in U.S. military
custody using SERE techniques.

(U) In September 2008 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Colonel
Steven Kleinman, an Air Force Reservist who was a member ofthe interrogation support team
sent by JPRA to the Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq, described abusive interrogations he
witnessed, and intervened to stop, during that trip. Colonel Kleinman said that one ofthose
interrogations, which took place in a room painted all in black with a spotlight on the detainee,
the interrogator repeatedly slapped a detainee who was kneeling on the floor in front ofthe
interrogator. In another interrogation Colonel Kleinman said the two other members ofthe
JPRA team took a hooded detainee to a bunker at the Task Force facility, forcibly stripped him
naked and left him, shackled by the wrist and ankles, to stand for 12 hours.

(U) Interrogation techniques used by the Special Mission Unit Task Force eventually
made their way into Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued for all U.S. forces in Iraq. In
the summer of2003, Captain Wood, who by that time was the Interrogation Officer in Charge at
Abu Ghraib, obtained a copy ofthe Special Mission Unit interrogation policy and submitted it,
virtually unchanged, to her chain of command as proposed policy.

UNCLASSIFIED

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(U) Captain Wood submitted her proposed policy around the same time that a message
was being conveyed that interrogators should be more aggressive with detainees. In mid-August
2003, an email from staffat Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) headquarters in Iraq
requested that subordinate units provide input for a "wish list" of interrogation techniques, stated
that "the gloves are coming off," and said "we want these detainees broken." At the end of
August 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller, the GTMO Commander, led a team to Iraq to
assess interrogation and detention operations. Colonel Thomas Pappas, the Commander ofthe
20S th Military Intelligence Brigade, who met with Major General Miller during that visit, said
that the tenor of the discussion was that "we had to get tougher with the detainees." A Chief
Warrant Officer with the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) said that during Major General Miller's tour
ofthe ISG's facility, Major General Miller said the ISG was "running a country club" for
detainees.

(U) On September 14,2003 the Commander ofCJTF-7, Lieutenant General Ricardo


Sanchez, issued the fIrst CJTF-7 interrogation SOP. That SOP authorized interrogators in Iraq to
use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military working dogs
in interrogations. Lieutenant General Sanchez issued the September 14, 2003 policy with the
knowledge that there were ongoing discussions about the legality of some of the approved
techniques. Responding to legal concerns from CENTCOM lawyers about those techniques,
Lieutenant General Sanchez issued a new policy on October 12,2003, eliminating many ofthe
previously authorized aggressive techniques. The new policy, however, contained ambiguities
with respect to certain techniques, such as the use of dogs in interrogations, and led to confusion
about which techniques were permitted.

(U) In his report of his investigation into Abu Ghraib, Major General George Fay said
that interrogation techniques developed for GTMO became "confused" and were implemented at
Abu Ghraib. For example, Major General Fay said that removal of clothing, while not included
in CJTF-Ts SOP, was "imported" to Abu Ghraib, could be ''traced through Mghanistan and
GTMO," and contributed to an environment at Abu Ghraib that appeared "to condone depravity
and degradation rather than humane treatment of detainees." Major General Fay said that the
policy approved by the Secretary of Defense on December 2,2002 contributed to the use of
aggressive interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib in late 2003.

OLC Withdraws Legal Opinion - JFCOM Issues Guidance on JPRA "Offensive" Support
(U)

(U) As the events at Abu Ghraib were unfolding, Jack Goldsmith, the new Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel was presented with a "short stack" of 0 Le opinions that
were described to him as problematic. Included in that short stack were the Bybee memos of
August 1,2002 and Mr. Yoo's memo of March 2003. After reviewing the memos, Mr.
Goldsmith decided to rescind both the so-called fIrst Bybee memo and Mr. Yoo's memo. In late
December 2003, Mr. Goldsmith notifIed Mr. Haynes that DoD could no longer rely on Mr.
Yoo's memo in determining the lawfulness of interrogation techniques. The change in OLe
guidance, however, did not keep JPRA from making plans to continue their support to
interrogation operations. In fact, it is not clear that the agency was even aware ofthe change.

UNCLASSIFIED

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(U) In 2004, JPRA and CENTCOM took steps to send a JPRA training team to
Afghanistan to assist in detainee interrogations there. In the wake of the public disclosure of
detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, however, that trip was cancelled and JFCOM subsequently issued
policy guidance limiting JPRA's support to interrogations.

(U) On September 29, 2004 Major General James Soligan, JFCOM's Chief of StatI,
issued a memorandum referencing JPRA's support to interrogation operations. Major General
Soligan wrote:

Recent requests from [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Combatant
Commands have solicited JPRA support based on knowledge and information
gained through the debriefing of former U.S. POWs and detainees and their
application to U.S. Strategic debriefmg and interrogation techniques. These
requests, which can be characterized as 'offensive' support, go beyond the
chartered responsibilities of JPRA... The use of resistance to interrogation
knowledge for 'offensive' purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of
JPRA

(U) Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, the Deputy Commander of JFCOM, later called
requests for JPRA interrogation support "inconsistent with the unit's charter" and said that such
requests "might create conditions which tasked JPRA to engage in offensive operational
activities outside of JPRA's defensive mission."

(U) Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing
the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S.
custody. The impact ofthose abuses has been significant. In a 2007 international BBC poll,
only 29 percent of people around the world said the United States is a generally positive
influence in the world. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have a lot to do with that perception. The
fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates our ability to attract allies to
our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies, and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that
can save lives.

(U) It is particularly troubling that senior officials approved the use of interrogation
techniques that were originally designed to simulate abusive tactics used by our enemies against
our own soldiers and that were modeled, in part, on tactics used by the Communist Chinese to
elicit false confessions from U.S. military personnel. While some argue that the brutality and
disregard for human life shown by al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists justifies us treating them
harshly, General David Petraeus explained why that view is misguided. In a May 2007 letter to
his troops, General Petraeus said "Our values and thelaws governing warfare teach us to respect
human dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our values
distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing the population, which must
understand that we - not our enemies - occupy the moral high ground."

UNCLASSIFIED

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Senate AImed Services Committee Conclusions

Conclusion 1: On February 7,2002, President George W. Bush made a written determination


that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which would have afforded minimum
standards for humane treatment, did not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees. Following the
President's determination, techniques such as waterboarding, nudity, and stress positions, used in
SERE training to simulate tactics used by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions,
were authorized for use in interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody.

Conclusion 2: Members of the President's Cabinet and other senior officials participated in
meetings inside the White House in 2002 and 2003 where specific interrogation techniques were
d~scussed. National Security Council Principals reviewed the CIA's interrogation program
during that period.

Conclusions on SERE Training Techniques and Interrogations

Conclusion 3: The use oftechniques similar to those used in SERE resistance training - such
as stripping students of their clothing, placing them in stress positions, putting hoods over their
heads, and treating them like animals - was at odds with the commitment to humane treatment of
detainees in U.S. custody. Using those techniques for interrogating detainees was also
inconsistent with the goal of collecting accurate intelligence information, as the purpose of SERE
resistance training is to increase the ability of U. S. personnel to resist abusive interrogations and
the techniques used were based, in part, on Chinese Communist techniques used during the
Korean War to elicit false confessions.

Conclusion 4: The use oftechniques in interrogations derived from SERE resistance training
created a serious risk of physical and psychological harm to detainees. The SERE schools
employ strict controls to reduce the risk of physical and psychological harm to students during
training. Those controls include medical and psychological screening for students, interventions
by trained psychologists during training, and code words to ensure that students can stop the
application of a technique at any time should the need arise. Those same controls are not present
in real world interrogations.

Conclusions on Senior Official Consideration of SERE Techniques for Interrogations

Conclusion 5: In July 2002, the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense General Counsel solicited
information from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) on SERE techniques for use
during interrogations. That solicitation, prompted by requests from Department of Defense
General Counsel William J. Haynes II, reflected the view that abusive tactics similar to those
used by our enemies should be considered for use against detainees in U.S. custody.'

Conclusion 6: The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) interrogation program included at least
one SERE training technique, waterboarding. Senior Administration lawyers, including Alberto

UNCLASSIFIED

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Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, were
consulted on the development oflegal analysis of CIA interrogation techniques. Legal opinions
subsequently issued by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) interpreted
legal obligations under u.s. anti-torture laws and determined the legality of CIA interrogation
techniques. Those OLC opinions distorted the meaning and intent ofanti-torture laws,
rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of Defense
determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use during interrogations
conducted by u.s. military personnel. .

Conclusions on JPRA Offensive Activities

Conclusion 7: Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) efforts in support of"offensive"


interrogation operations went beyond the agency's knowledge and expertise. JPRA's support to
U.S. government interrogation efforts contributed to detainee abuse. JPRA's offensive support
also influenced the development of policies that authorized abusive interrogation techniques for
use against detainees in U.S. custody.

Conclusion 8: Detainee abuse occurred during JPRA's support to Special Mission Unit (SMU)
Task Force (TF) interrogation operations in Iraq in September 2003. JPRA Commander Colonel
Randy Moulton's authorization of SERE instructors, who had no experience in detainee
interrogations, to actively participate in Task Force interrogations using SERE resistance training
techniques was a serious failure in judgment. The Special Mission Unit Task Force
Commander's failure to order that SERE resistance training techniques not be used in detainee
interrogations was a serious failure in leadership that led to the abuse of detainees in Task Force
custody. Iraq is a Geneva Convention theater and techniques used in SERE school are
inconsistent with the obligations of U.S. personnel under the Geneva Conventions.

Conclusion 9: Combatant Command requests for JPRA "offensive" interrogation support and
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) authorization ofthat support led to JPRA operating
outside the agency's charter and beyond its expertise. Only when JFCOM's Staff Judge
Advocate became aware of and raised concerns about JPRA's support to offensive interrogation
operations in late September 2003 did JFCOM leadership begin to take steps to curtail JPRA's
"offensive" activities. It was not until September 2004, however, that JFCOM issued a formal
policy stating that support to offensive interrogation operations was outside JPRA's charter.

Conclusions on GTMO's Request for Ageressive Techniques

Conclusion 10: Interrogation techniques in Guantanamo Bay's (GTMO) October 11, 2002
request for authority submitted by Major General Michael Dunlavey, were influenced by JPRA
training for GTMO interrogation personnel and included techniques similar to those used in
SERE training to teach U.S. personnel to resist abusive enemy interrogations. GTMO Staff
Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver's legal review justifying the October 11, 2002
GTMO request was profoundly in error and legally insufficient. Leaders at GTMO, including
Major General Dunlavey's successor, Major General Geoffrey Miller, ignored warnings from

UNCLASSIFIED

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DoD's Criminal Investigative Task Force and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation that the
techniques were potentially unlawful and that their use would strengthen detainee resistance.

Conclusion 11: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers's decision to cut
short the legal and policy review of the October 11,2002 GTMO request initiated by his Legal
Counsel, then-Captain Jane Dalton, undermined the military's review process. Subsequent
conclusions reached by Chairman Myers and Captain Dalton regarding the legality of
interrogation techniques in the request followed a grossly deficient review and were at odds with
conclusions previously reached by the Anny, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Criminal
Investigative Task Force.

Conclusion 12: Department of Defense General Counsel William 1. Haynes II's effort to cut
short the legal and policy review of the October 11,2002 GTMO request initiated by then
Captain Jane Dahon, Legal Counsel to the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
inappropriate and undermined the military's review process. The General Counsel's subsequent
review was grossly deficient. Mr. Haynes's one page recommendation to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld failed to address the serious legal concerns that had been previously raised by
the military services about techniques in the GTMO request. Further, Mr. Haynes's reliance on a
legal memo produced by GTMO's Staff Judge Advocate that senior military lawyers called
"legally insufficient" and "woefully inadequate" is deeply troubling.

Conclusion 13: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's authorization of aggressive


interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay was a direct cause of detainee abuse there.
Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2,2002 approval of Mr. Haynes's recommendation that most of
the techniques contained in GTMO's October 11, 2002 request be authorized, influenced and
contributed to the use of abusive techniques, including military working dogs, forced nudity, and
stress positions, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conclusion 14: Department of Defense General Counsel William 1. Haynes II's direction to the
Department of Defense's Detainee Working Group in early 2003 to consider a legal memo from
John Yoo ofthe Department of Justice's OLC as authoritative, blocked the Working Group from
conducting a fair and complete legal analysis and resulted in a report that, in the words ofthen
Department ofthe Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora contained "profound mistakes in its
legal analysis." Reliance on the OLC memo resulted in a final Working Group report that
recommended approval of several aggressive techniques, including removal of clothing, sleep
deprivation, and slapping, similar to those used in SERE training to teach U. S. personnel to resist
abusive interrogations.

Conclusions on Interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Conclusion 15: Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) interrogation policies were
influenced by the Secretary of Defense's December 2,2002 approval of aggressive interrogation
teclmiques for use at GTMO. SMU TF interrogation policies in Iraq included the use of
aggressive interrogation techniques such as military working dogs and stress positions. SMU TF

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policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu
Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq.

Conclusion 16: During his assessment visit to Iraq in August and September 2003, GTMO
Commander Major General Geoffrey Miller encouraged a view that interrogators should be more
aggressive during detainee interrogations.

Conclusion 17: Interrogation policies approved by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, which
included the use of military working dogs and stress positions, were a direct cause of detainee
abuse in Iraq. Lieutenant General Sanchez's decision to issue his September 14,2003 policy
with the knowledge that there were ongoing discussions as to the legality of some techniques in
it was a serious error in judgment The September policy was superseded on October 12,2003
as a result oflegal concerns raised by U.S. Central Command. That superseding policy,
however, contained ambiguities and contributed to confusion about whether aggressive
techniques, such as military working dogs, were authorized for use during interrogations.

Conclusion 18: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) failed to conduct proper oversight of
Special Mission Unit Task Force interrogation policies. Though aggressive interrogation
techniques were removed from Combined Joint Task Force 7 interrogation policies after
CENTCOM raised legal concerns about their inclusion in the September 14, 2003 policy issued
by Lieutenant General Sanchez, SMU TF interrogation policies authorized some ofthose same
techniques, including stress positions and military working dogs.

Conclusion 19: The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a
few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques such as stripping detainees oftheir
clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate them
appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at GTMO.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's December 2,2002 authorization of aggressive
interrogation techniques and subsequent interrogation policies and plans approved by senior
military and civilian officials conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were
appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody. What followed was an erosion in
standards dictating that detainees be treated humanely.

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I. Early Influences on Interrogation Policy (U)


A. RedefUJing the Legal Framework For the Treatment ofDetainees (U)
(U) From the time oftheir ratification until the invasion of Mghanistan in 2001, the
United States government had accepted the terms ofthe Geneva Conventions and the U.S.
military had trained its personnel to apply the Conventions during wartime. Soon after the
launch of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), however, Administration lawyers constructed a
new legal framework that abandoned the traditional U.S. application ofthe Geneva
Conventions. 1

(U) On January 9, 2002 attorneys at the Department of Justice wrote a memorandum to


Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel William "Jim" Haynes II, advising him that the
Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban in
Mghanistan. 2 The attorneys wrote the memo with the understanding that the Defense
Department had established a long-term detention site at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba (GTMO) for al Qaeda and Taliban members captured by U.S. military forces or transferred
from U.S. allies in Mghanistan. 3

(U) On January 18,2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the President
ofthe Department of Justice (Dol) opinion. 4 After being briefed by Judge Gonzales, the
President concluded that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al
Qaeda or to members of the Taliban, and that they would not receive the protections afforded to
Prisoners Of War (POWS).5

1 According to Jack Goldsmith, Special Counsel in the Department of Defense (2002-2003) and Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel (2003-2004): "never in the history of the United States had lawyers had such
extraordinary influence over war policies as they did after 9/11. The lawyers weren't necessarily expert on al
Qaeda, or Islamic fundamentalism, or intelligence, or international diplomacy, or even the requirements of national
security. But the lawyers---especially White House and Justice Department lawyers-seemed to 'own' issues that
had profound national security and political and diplomatic consequences." These Administration lawyers
"dominated discussions on detention, military commissions, interrogation, GlMO, and many other controversial
terrorism policies." Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration
(New York: W.w. Norton & Company 2(07) at 130-31 (hereinafter "Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency").
2 Memo from Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Y 00 and Special COl.D'lsel Robert Delahunty of Defense
General Counsel William 1. Haynes IL Application ofTreaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
(January 9, 2002).
3Ibid.; Department of Defense News Brieftng (December 27,2(01), available at
http://www.defnselink.mil/TranscriptsfTranscript.aspx?TranscriptID=2696 (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
announced plans to hold detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in a news conference).
4 M~mo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision Re Application Of
The Geneva Convention on Prisoners OfWar To The Corfflict With Al Qaeda And The TaIwan (January 25, 2(02).
, In a memo to the President, White House Counsel Gonzales noted "I understand that you decided that the [Third
Geneva Convention] does not apply [to the conflicts with al Qaeda or the Taliban] and, "accordingly, that al Qaeda
and raliban detainees are not prisoners of war" under the [Third Geneva Convention]. See Memo from White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision Re Application OfThe Geneva Convention
on Prisoners OfWar To The Conflict WithAl QaedaAnd The Taliban (January 25,2002).

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(U) On January 19,2002, Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld instructed the


Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, to infonn all Combatant
Commanders that al Qaeda and Taliban members are "not entitled to prisoner of war status"
under the Geneva Conventions. 6 Secretary Rumsfeld added that combatant commanders should
"treat [detainees] humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity,
in a manner consistent with the principles ofthe Geneva Conventions of 1949." 7 Secretary
Rumsfeld also instructed that his order be transmitted to the subordinate command at
Guantanamo Bay for implementation. On January 21,2002 the Chairman infonned the
combatant commanders ofthe new policy. 8

(U) During the next few weeks - after Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the
President to reconsider his decision - Administration attorneys debated the rationale for denying
legal protections under the Geneva Conventions to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. 9 On
January 25,2002, Judge Gonzales argued in a memorandum to the President that the war on
terror had "render[ed] obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and
render[ed] quaint some of its provisions ..." He recommended that the President stand by his
order to set aside the Geneva Conventions. 10

(U) On February 7,2002, President Bush signed a memorandum stating that the Third
Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda and concluding that Taliban
detainees (designated as ''unlawful combatants" in the memorandum) were not entitled to POW
status or the legal protections afforded by the Third Geneva Convention. 11 While the President
also found that Common Article 3 (requiring humane treatment) did not apply to either al Qaeda
or Taliban detainees, his order stated that as "a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces

6Memo from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
Myers Status.ofTaliban and Al Qaeda (January 19, 2002).
7 Ibid.
S Cable from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers to U.S. MilitaIy Unified Commands and
Services (January 21, 2002).
9 Memo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision Re Application Of
The Geneva Convention on Prisoners OfWar To The Coriflict WithAl Qaeda And The Taliban (January 25,2002).
Judge Gonzales dismissed as ''unpersuasive''legal and policy arguments that such an order would reverse
10
longstanding U.S. policy and practice; undermine the protections afforded to U.S. or coalition forces captured in
Afghanistan; limit prosecution of enemy forces under the War Crimes Act (which only applies if the Geneva
Conventions apply); provoke widespread international condemnation, even if the U.S. complies with the core
humanitarian principles of the treaty as a matter of policy; may encourage other countries to look for "technical
loopholes" to avoid being bound by the Geneva Conventions; may discourage allies from turning over terrorists to
the U.S. or providing legal assistance to the U.S.; may undermine U.S. militaIy culture which emphasizes
maintaining the highest standard of conduct in combat; and could introduce an element of uncertainty in the status of
adversaries. According to Gonzales, the "positive" consequences of setting aside the Third Geneva Convention
included "preserving flexibility" in the war and "substantially reduc[ing] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution
under the War Crimes Act." Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W.
Bush, Decision Re Application OfThe Geneva Convention on Prisoners OfWar To The Conflict With Al Qaeda And
The Taliban (January 25, 2002).
11 Memo from President George W. Bush, Humane Treatment ofal Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (February 7,
2002).

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shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles ofthe Geneva Conventions." 12

(U) The President's policy statement was directed at the United States Armed Forces.
The Committee is unaware ofa similar Presidential policy statement governing other agencies'
treatment of detainees. A February 2, 2002 State Department memo reflected that
Administration lawyers involved in the discussion about the application ofthe Third Geneva
Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda had "all agree[d] that the CIA is bound by the same legal
restrictions as the U.S. military.,,13 The memo also stated, however, that "CIA lawyers
believe[d] that, to the extent that the [Third Geneva Convention's] protections do not apply as a
matter of law but those protections are applied as a matter of polici" it is desirable to
circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA,,1 According to the memo,
"other Administration lawyers involved did not disagree with or object to the CIA's view."IS
Months later, in an October 2, 2002 meeting with DoD officials at Guantanamo Bay, Chief
Counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center (CTC) Jonathan Fredman reportedly stated that the
"CIA rallied" for the Conventions not to apply.16

(U) Several military officers, including members ofthe Judge Advocate General (JAG)
Corps, have described difficulties in interpreting and implementing the President's February 7,
2002 order. A former Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
stated that he thought the President's order was a tough standard for the Department of Defense
(DoD) to apply in the field because it replaced a well-established military doctrine (legal
compliance with the Geneva Conventions) with a policy that was subject to interpretation. 17 The
President's order was not, apparently, followed by any guidance that defined the terms
"humanely" or "military necessity." As a result, those in the field were left to interpret the
President's order. .

B. Department ofDefense OffICe ofGeneral Counsel Seeks Information from the


Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) (U)
(U) As Administration lawyers began to reconsider U.S. adherence to the Geneva
Conventions, the DoD Office ofthe General Counsel also began seeking information on
detention and interrogation. In December 2001, the DoD General Counsel's office contacted the

12 Memo from President George W. Bush, Humane Treatment ofal Qaeda and TaMan Detainees (February 7,
2002).
13The State Department memo reflected the views of lawyers from the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, Department of State, White House Counsel's office, Office of the Vice President, Joint Chiefs of StafT, and
the Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum from State Department Legal Adviser William Taft, IV to White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (February 2,2002).
14 Ibid.
H Ibid.
16 Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes (undated) at 4, attached to email from Blaine Thomas to Sam
McCahon, and Mark Fallon (October 24, 2002) (hereinafter "Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting
Minutes')
17 Committee staff interview of Daniel Donovan (November 28, 2007).

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Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for
infonnation about detainee "exploitation.,,18 .

(U) JPRA is an agency of the Department of Defense under the command authority ofthe
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Part of JPRA's mission is to oversee military Survival
Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) training. 19 In the "resistance" phase of SERE training,
students are subject to physical and psychological pressures (SERE techniques) designed to
simulate conditions to which they might be subject if captured by an enemy that did not abide by
the Geneva Conventions. Exposing U.S. military personnel to these physical and psychological
pressures in a highly controlled environment equips them with the skills needed to increase
resistance to hostile interrogations. Among the physical and psychological pressures used at
SERE schools are stress positions, sleep deprivation, face and abdomen slaps, isolation,
degradation (such as treating the student like an animal), and "walling." Until November 2007,
waterboarding was also an approved training technique in the U.S. Navy SERE school. 20

The SERE schools employ a number of strict controls to limit the physical
or psychological impact ofthese techniques on their students. 21 For example, there are limits on
the frequency, duration, and/or intensity of certain techniques. Instructors are also required to
consider the extensive medical and/or psychological screening records of each student before
administering any technique. 22 Students are even given a phrase they can use to make the
instructor immediately cease application of all pressures. 2

Heanng to ReceIve In ormatlon Re aung To e Treatment 0 Detamees, Senate CommIttee


on Armed Services, 110lb Congo (August 3,2007) (Testimony of Terrence Russell) at 32 (hereinafter "Testimony of
Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007)"); Fax cover sheet from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Richard Shiffrin
(December 17, 2001).
19 Oversight of SERE training is only part of JPRA's mission. JPRA is responsible for coordinating joint personnel
recovery capabilities. Personnel recovery is the term used to describe efforts to obtain the release or recovery of
captured, missing, or isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas.
20 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American
Prisoners and Detainees (undated), attached to Memo from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of
Defense General Counsel (July 26, 2002) (hereinafter "Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against
American Prisoners and Detainees'').
21 Responses of Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28,2008); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August
3,2007) at 123.
22Responses of Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28, 2008) ("Military SERE training students are
screened multiple times prior to participating in training to ensure that they are physical and psychologically healthy.
They get screened prior to entering the service to ensure that they don't have certain disorders. Students are
required to get screened by military doctors at their home bases prior to traveling for SERE training to ensure that
they meet the physical and psychological standards for participating in training. Most SERE schools also mandate
that students complete screening questionnaires after they arrive at SERE school as a ftnal safety check and for
additional help or interventions if needed, to include being restricted from experiencing particular training
procedures. Furthermore, the students arrive with their medical records in hand or available electronically to
document their entire medical history, and indications of prior psychological diagnoses since their original military
entry physicals. These procedures are used not only to screen people out of participating in training, but also for

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(U) SERE instructors are themselves psychologically prescreened prior to hiring, and
must submit to a nearly year-long training process, annual psychological screening, and
extensive monitoring and oversight during practical exercises. These requirements are designed
to prevent instructor behavioral drift, which ifleft unmonitored, could lead to abuse of
students. 24

(U) JPRA's expertise lies in training U.S. military personnel who are at risk for capture,
how to respond and resist interrogations (a defensive mission), not in how to conduct
interrogations (an offensive mission). 25 The difference between the two missions is of critical
importance. SERE instructors play the part of interrogators, but they are not typically trained
interrogators. SERE instructors are not selected for their roles based on language skills,
intelligence training, or expertise in eliciting infonnation. 26

_ ( The risk of using SERE physical pressures in an interrogation context,


instead of in the highly controlled SERE school environment, was highlighted by the senior
Army SERE psychologist LTC Morgan Banks in an email to personnel at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. He stated:

Because of the danger involved, very few SERE instructors are allowed to
actually use physical pressures. It is extremely easy for U.S. Army instructors,
training U. S. Army soldiers, to get out of hand, and to injure students. The
training, from the point ofthe student, appears to be chaotic and out of control. In
reality, everything that is occurring [in SERE school] is very carefully monitored
and paced; no one is acting on their own during training. Even with all these

identifying people who could be provided preventative interventions in order to increase their probab[ility] of
success in training.'')
23 The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Part I of the Committee's Inquiry Into the Treatment of
Detainees in u.s. Custody, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 110lh Congo (June 17, 2008) (hereinafter "SASC
Hearing (June 17,2008)"); FASO Detachment Brunswick Instruction 3305.C (January 1, 1998).
24 According to Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, the former Chief of Psychology Services at the Air Force SERE school and
current JPRA Chief Human Factors, instructors are constantly monitored by other JPRA personnel, command staff,
and SERE psychologists to minimize the potential for students to be injured. These oversight mechanisms are
designed to ensure that SERE instructors are complying with operating instructions and to check for signs that
instructors do not suffer from moral disengagement (e.g., by becoming too absorbed in their roles as interrogators
and starting to view u.s. military SERE students as prisoners or detainees). These oversight mechanisms are also
designed to watch students for "indications that they are not coping well with training tasks, provide corrective
interventions with them before they become overwhelmed, and if need be, re-motivate students who have become
overwhelmed to enable them to succeed." Responses of Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28,
2008); Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).
2' Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Review o/DoD-Directed Investigations o/Detainee
Abuse (U) (August 25, 2006) at 24 (hereinafter "DoD IG Report'').
:l6 A trained interrogator is expected to be familiar with the social, political and economic institutions and have an
understanding of the geography, history and language of "target" countries. Additionally, the more proficient an
interrogator is with languages the "better he will be able to develop rapport with his source" and "follow up on
source leads to additional information." Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52, 1-14.

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safeguards, injuries and accidents do happen. The risk with real detainees is
increased exponentially. 27

(U) Despite the differences between the simulated interrogations at SERE school and real
world interrogations of detainees, in December 2001, the DoD General Counsel's office sought
JPRA's advice on the "exploitation" of detainees. The Committee is not aware of JPRA
activities in support ofany offensive interrogation mission prior to that request from the General
Counsel's office. In response to the request, JPRA Chief of Staff Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner
sent Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffiin a memorandum on the
"exploitation process" and a cover note offering further JPRA assistance on "exploitation and
how to resist it.,,28

_ The memorandum outlined JPRA's view on "obtaining useful intelligence


information from enemy prisoners of war" (EPWs).29

(U) The memo provided the JPRA perspective on how their SERE school staff
would handle the "initial capture," "movement," and "detention" of prisoners. 30 It also provided
advice on interrogation and recommended various approaches, including the use ofundefined
"deprivations. ,,31

_ The memo cautioned, however, that while "[p]hysical deprivations can and
do work in ahering the prisoners' mental state to the point where they will say things they
normally would not say," use of physical deprivations has "several major downfalls.,,32 JPRA
warned that physical deprivations were "not as effective" a means of getting information as
psychological pressures, that information gained from their use was "less reliable," and that their
use "tends to increase resistance postures when deprivations are removed.',33 JPRA also warned
that the use of physical deprivations has an "intolerable public and political backlash when
discovered. ,,34

c: JPRA Collaboration with Other Government Agencies (OGAs) (U)


_(F In December 2001 or Janu
psychologist, Dr. James Mitchell, asked his former
colleague, the senior SERE psychologist at JPRA, Dr. John "Bruce" Jessen, to review documents

27 Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MN Paul Burney an~October 2, 2002).

28 Fax cover sheet from LTC Daniel Baumgartner to Richard Shiffrin (December 17, 2001).

29 Exploitation Process at 1, attached to fax from LTC Daniel Baumgartner to Richard Shiffrin (December 17,

2001).

31 Ibid. at 3-4.
32 Ibid. at 4.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.

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describin al aeda resistance traininThe two psychologists reviewed the materials,_


.35
and generated a paper on al Qaeda resistance capabilities

_On
and countermeasures to defeat that resistance.

February 12,2002, Dr. Jessen sent the paper to JPRA Commander Colonel
John "Randy" Moulton, who in tum, emailed the paper to his chain of command at JFCOM with
a recommendation that it be forwarded to the Joint Stafffor dissemination. 36 In his email, Col
Moulton wrote:

While JPRA is not in the business of strategic debriefmg (interrogation), we do


apply the most sophisticated techniques available in order to better prepare our
[personnel] for resistance. After over 30 years of training we have become quite
proficient with both specialized resistance and the ways to defeat it. 37

_ ( Col Moulton also recommended in his email that a JPRA team travel to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to "provide instruction on basic and advanced techniques and methods"
that JPRA had found effective in countering resistance in students at SERE courses. 38 Col
Moulton suggested that JPRA create a "short course" to teach relevant U. S; personnel about
"interrogation from the resistance side" notin that JPRA had alread received an informal
request to conduct training for the whose fersonnel were
supporting interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay and in Mghanistan. 3 The JPRA
Commander described the potential collaboration between JPRA a n . a s a "win-win
opportunity.,,40

_ ( In a subsequent email to Brigadier General (BG) Galen Jackman, the


Operations Chief at United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Brigadier General (Brig
Gen) Thomas Moore, JFCOM's Director for Operations and Plans (13), stated that JPRA was
"prepared to support [SOUTHCOM] in any potential collaboration," but that they would not
assist without an official request from SOUTHCOM or GTMO. 41

_ The JPR~ paper and Col Moulton's recommendations were further


circulated by email from JFCOM to officers at the Joint Staff and to several Combatant
Commands, including those with responsibility for Mghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay.42

3~ Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July 11, 2007); Email from Col John R. (Randy) Moulton to MAl
Jack Holbein, BGen Thomas Moore, CAPT Darryl Fengya, and (February 14, 2002).
36 Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (February 12, 2002).
37 Email from Col Randy Moulton to MAl Jack Holbein, BGen Thomas Moore, CAPT Darryl Fengya,
(February 14, 2002).
38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.; Memo from Col Mary Moffitt (via BG Ronald Burgess) to BGen Thomas Moore (undated) at 1.
40 Email from Col Randy Moulton to MAl Jack Holbein, BGen Thomas Moore, CAPT Darryl Fengya,
(February 14, 2002).
41 Email from BGen Thomas Moore to BG Galen Jackman et al. (February 14, 2002).
Email from LTC Michael McMahon to Lt Col Steven Ruehl, COL Jim Sikes, COL Daniel Bolger, Steve Wetzel,
42
CAPT Bill Pokorny, COL Cos Spofford, COL Edward Short, Col Kevin Kelley (February 14, 2002).

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D. JPRA Support to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (U)


------..m...rebruary 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA)
_ sent an official request for support to JFCOM's 13, Brig Gen Moore. 43

_ ( In response to the request, two JPRA personnel - senior SERE

ps chologist Bruce Jessen and JPRA instructor Joseph Witsch

The two week class was described as an "ad hoc 'crash' course on
interrogation" for the "next crew (rotation) going to SO HCOM.,,46 The JPRA team also
participated in a s arate video teleconference with leadership and GTMO interrogation
staffwhere issues were discussed. 47 Dr. Jessen said
that he and Mr. Witsch went to make a "pitch" to about how JPRA could assist. 48

~ Witsch stated that he worked with Dr. Jessen to develop a set of briefing
slides ~training.49 The Department of Defense provided the Committee with slide
presentations that appeared to have been produced b JPRA for the March 8 2002 trainin . Mr.
Witsch testified that two slide presentations (l)
Based on Recently Obtained AI Qaeda Documents" and (2) "Exploitation"
appeared to be the same as those used by JPRA in the March 8, 2002 trainin~essen told
the Committee that he did not recognize the slides as those that he presented _ _ but that the
vast majority of the slides were consistent with what he would have taught at the training
session. 51
_ The "AI Qaeda Resistance Contingency Training" presentation described methods
used by al Qaeda to resist interrogation and exploitation and

43 Memo from Col Mary Moffitt (via BG Ronald Burgess) to BGen Thomas Moore (undated).
44 Ibid.
4'Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (March 12, 2002); see also SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008)
(Testimony of Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner) ("DIA accepte~ [JPRA's] help ... with their deploying groups" and
JPRA instruction "centered on resistance techniques, questioning techniques, and general information on how
exploitation works.")
46 Email from Jim Perna to Christopher Wirts, Bruce Jessen, and Joseph Witsch (February 20,2002).
47 Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (March 12, 2002).
48 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2007).

49Hearing to Receive Information Relating To The Treatment of Detainees, Senate Committee on Armed Services,

110th Congo (September 4,2(07) (Testimony of Joseph Witsch) at 20 (hereinafter "Testimony of Joseph Witsch

(September 4, 2(07)'').

'0 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4,2007) at 20.

'1 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13,2007).

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The resentation also described countermeasures to defeat al Qaeda resistance, includin

Mr. Witsch testified to the Committee


that the countermeasures identified in the slides were "just an interpretation of what we were
doing at the time and what we constantly did when we trained SERE students.,,54

III( The presentation on detainee "exploitation" described phases of exploitation


and included instruction on initial capture and handling, conducting interrogations, and long
term exploitation. 5s The exploitation presentation also included slides on "isolation and
degradation," "sensory deprivation," "physiological pressures," and "psychological pressures.,,56

( The.
At SERE school, each ofthese terms has special meaning.

II instructor guide describes "isolation" as "a main building block


ofthe exploitation process" and says that it "allows the captor total control over personal inputs
to the captive.,,57 With respect to degradation, the guide contains examples of the methods used
by SERE instructors to take away the "personal dignity" of students at SERE schoo1. 58
!-I I

Mr. Witsch, the JPRA instructor who led the March 8, 2002 training, told the Committee that

stripping could also be considered a degradation tactic. 60

. ~tsch could not recall what the JPRA team discussed as part of the instruction

to _ relating to degradation. 61

5z_JointPersonnel Recovery Agency, Al QaedaResistance Contingency Training: Contingency Trainingfor


~onnelBased on Recently Obtained Al Qaeda Documents (undated).
53 Ibid.
54 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 46.
55 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation (undated).
56 ( Another slide describing captor motives states: establish absolute control, induce dependence to meet
needs, elicit compliance, shape cooperation. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation (undated). In other
JPRA materials, techniques designed to achieve these goals include isolation or solitary confmement, induced
physical weakness and exhaustion, degradation, conditioning, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, disruption of
sleep and biorhythms, and manipulation of diet. Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against
American Prisoners and Detainees.
57 Level C Peacetime Governmental Detention Survival JPRA Instructor Guide, Exploitation: Threats and
Pressures, Module 6.0, Lesson 6.1, para 5.3.1 (Version GO1. 1).
58 Ibid. at para 5.3.3.
59 Ibid.
60 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4,2007) at 22.
61 Ibid.

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II ( JPRA materials also describe "sensory deprivation" and its place in the
exploitation process. 62 In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Witsch described hooding (placing a
hood over the head of a student) and white noise (such as radio static) as sensory deprivation
methods used on students in SERE school. 63 In materials provided to Department of Defense
lawyers in July 2002, JPRA explained that "[w]hen a subject is deprived of sensory input for an
[un]interrupted period, for approximately 6-8 hours, it is not uncommon for them to experience

training. 6
II Mr. Witsch could not recall the discussion of "sensory deprivation" at the.
visual, auditory and!or tactile hallucinations. If deprived of input, the brain will make it up." 64

(U) When used in the context of simulated interrogations conducted at SERE school,
JPRA uses the term "physiological pressures" synonymously with approved physical pressures. 66

III
Mr. Witsch could not recall what the discussion of "physiological and psychological
pressures" at 7 He said that he provided" personnel with a ''vision of how
we (JPRA) prepare, train, and equip our personnel" in SERE school. 68 Mr. Witsch could not
recall if physical pressures were discussed at the training. 69 Dr. Jessen, the senior SERE
psychologist who also provided instruction t o . personnel, said that physical pressures were

to_
not discussed at the March 8, 2002 training. 70

_ ( Following the training, Dr. Jessen sent an email to JPRA Commander


Col Randy Moulton stating that the JPRA team "provided instruction personnel on
the content of US Level "c" Resistance to Interrogation training and how this knowledge can be
used to exploit al Qaeda detainees.,,71 Level "c" training includes the physical and
psychological pressures used at SERE school. Dr. Jessen also stated, however, that the JPRA
team provided suggestions on "how to exploit al Qaeda detainees for intelligence within the
confines of the Geneva Conventions."n Dr. Jessen told the Committee, however, that he would

62 Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.
63 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 23-24.
64 Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees; See Section II
D, infra.
6' Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 22.
66 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July 11,2002).
67 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007).
68 Ibid. at 44.
69 Ibid. at 25.
70 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July 11,2002).
71 Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (March 12, 2002).
72 Ibid.

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not have known at the time if isolation, degradation, sensory deprivation, or other topics
referenced in the slides would have been within the confmes ofthe Geneva Conventions. 73

_ Days later, Dr. Jessen sent Col Moulton another email with his thoughts about
additional training for interrogators. Dr. Jessen explained that for future training, one day would
be sufficient to "cover the basics of DOD Level 'C' Resistance training and the special
contingency information" that they addressed_ However, he said that if he added "role
play" to the curriculum, he would need at least four days. 74

_ Dr. Jessen stated: "My impression is


requires a more 'exploitation oriented' approach than the students received. [JPRA's Personnel
Recovery Academy (PRA)] instructors do this better than anyone. If JPRA provided role play it
would be manpower intensive, require more time and space (rooms) and video monitor
equipment (which PRA has).,,7s Dr. Jessen recommended that he come up with a course
curriculum with input from others, if JPRA planned to "go[] this direction.,,76

E. JPRA Recommendationsfor GTMO (U)


trainin was not the fIrst time JPRA provided advice to GTMO
personnel. Just before training, JPRA prepared a memo on "Prisoner Handling
Recommendations" at GTMO for Col Cooney, the Executive Officer for the Directorate of
Operations (13) at SOUTHCOM. 77 The memo had been drafted by Dr. Jessen, the senior SERE
psychologist, and Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office (OSO).78
The memo noted that its recommendations were based on a "limited understanding ofthe
procedures and conditions that exist[ed]" at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. 79

_ ( The JPRA memo contained specifIc recommendations for GTMO,


including that GTMO "enforce the strictest 'base line' prison behavior policy possible within
[Rules of Engagement]" b im osin and enforcin unishment conse uences more restrictive
than base line rules and
80 JPRA also recommended that GTMO tailor punishment to maximize
cultural undesirability and tailor rewards to maximize cultural desirability.

73Dr. Jessen told the Committee that, at the time, he did not know that the scope of the Geneva Conventions
protections were different for Prisoners of War than they were for al Qaeda or Taliban detainees. Committee staff
interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2(07).
74 Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton et a1. (March 18, 2002).
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77Memo forCol Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002), attached to email from Bruce
Jessen to Joseph Witsch (March 13,2002).
78 Email from Bruce Jessen to Joseph Witsch (March 13,2(02). Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen
(November 13, 2007).
79 Memo for Col Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002).
~emo for Col Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002), attached to email from Bruce
Jessen to Joseph Witsch (March 13,2002).

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F. Colonel Herrington's Assessment ofGTMO (U)


(U) At the time ofthe JPRA memo, GTMO was seeking assistance from other quarters as
well. In March 2002, Commander of Joint Task Force 170 (ITF-170) Major General (MG)
Michael Dunlavey invited Colonel Stuart A. Herrington (Ret.), an experienced Army intelligence
officer, to Guantanamo Bay to conduct an assessment of operations at the facility. 81 Following
his three day assessment visit, COL Herrington submitted a formal written report on March 22,
2002 to MG Dunlavey as well as to the Command at SOUTHCOM and the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence. 82

(U) At the time of COL Herrington's visit, the mission at Guantanamo was under the
control oftwo different task forces, each commanded by a different Major General: ITF-170 for
intelligence exploitation and ITF160 for detention and security operations. s3 COL Herrington
noted in his assessment that there was ''unanimity among all military and interagency
participants in TF-170 that the security mission is sometimes the tail wagging the intelligence
dog" and stated:

To effectively carry out its intelligence exploitation mission, TF 170 and its
interagency collaborators need to be in full control of the detainees' environment.
Treatment, rewards, punishment, and anything else associated with a detainee
should be centrally orchestrated by the debriefing team responsible for obtaining
information from that detainee. 84

(U) COL Herrington also expressed concern that actions (positive or negative) which
guards might take as routine, such as singling a detainee out for a shakedown or providing an
extra chaplain's visit, might impact the ability of interrogators and debriefers from setting the
tone ofthe questioning sessions. 85

(U) COL Herrington found that facilities and procedures at GTMO for handling detainees
posed serious problems. He said that design flaws at GTMO's current and planned detention
sites hampered intelligence collection, noting that the "open" facilities, for example, facilitated
communications among the detainees and discouraged detainee cooperation by permitting
detainees to support each other's resistance efforts. 86

81 COL Herrington had acquired experience in interrogation and debriefIng during more than thirty years of military
service. Memo from COL Stuart Herrington to MG Michael Dunlavey, Report ofVisit and Recommendations
(March 22,2002) at 8.
82See COL Herrington, Report ofVisit and Recommendations; COL Herrington also provided an additional list of
"suggestions" for MG Dunlavey and his 12, LTC Ron Buikema. See Memo from COL Stuart Herrington to MG
Michael Dunlavey, Suggestions (March 25, 2002)
83 ITF-160was established at Guantanamo Bay in the mid-l 990s to support relief and migrant processing centers for
Haitian and Cuban migrants.
84 COL Herrington, Report of Visit and Recommendations at 1-2.
8' Ibid. at 2.
86 Ibid. at 3.

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(U) COL Herrington also warned that certain security procedures in place at the time
could have a negative impact on intelligence collection, stating:

The austere nature ofthe facilities and the rigorous security movement procedures
(shackles, two MPs with hands on the detainee, etc.) reinforces to detainees that
they are in prison, and detracts from the flexibility that debriefers require to
accomplish their mission... These views have nothing to do with being "soft" on
the detainees. Nor do they challenge the pure security gains from such tight
control. The principal at work is that optimal exploitation of a detainee cannot be
done from a cell ... 87

(U) Specifically, COL Herrington recommended that MPs not be in the room during
interrogations and warned that, while shackling a detainee might make sense from a security
standpoint, it could be counterproductive to intelligence collection:

Shackling one of the detainee's feet to the floor during interrogation might make
sense from a security perspective (although, with one or two MPs present, it is
arguable overkill). However, such shackling is either a) humiliating, or b) sends a
message to the detainee that the debriefer is afraid of him, or c) reminds him of
his plight as a prisoner. 88

(U) COL Herrington observed that most of the interrogators at GTMO lacked the
requisite training in strategic elicitation or the experience required to be effective with the
detainees. 89 He said that, ofthe 26 interrogators present at the time, only one had enough Arabic
language experience to interrogate without an interpreter. 9o

II
A memo written by Colonel Mike Fox (SOUTHCOM's Director ofIntelligence
Operations) just a month after COL Herrin on's r ort, also discussed how conditions at GTMO
inhibited successful interrogations.

87 Ibid. at 4.
88COL Herrington also identified additional deficiencies in intelligence collection, which he said could be improved
by arming GTMO with the ability to translate and review relevant documents onsite and monitor interrogations
using video technology. Ibid.
89 Ibid. at 6.
90COL Herrington's report also criticized the screening criteria in place, which may have resulted in detainees with
less intelligence value being sent to GTMO and those with more valuable detainees being set free. COL Herrington,
Report o/Visit and Recommendations at 6.
91 COL Mike Fox, JTF-170 Methods and Techniques Info Paper (April 22, 2002).

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G. JPRA Prepares Draft Exploitation Plan (U)


(U) As experienced intelligence officers were making recommendations to improve
intelligence collection, JPRA officials with no training or experience in intelligence collection
were working on their own exploitation plan. In April 2002, senior SERE psychologist Bruce
Jessen drafted an exploitation plan and circulated that plan to Commander of the JPRA, Col
Randy Moulton, and the senior civilian leadership of the organization. 94

_ T h e exploitation plan drafted by the senior SERE psychologist contained


recommendations for JPRA involvement in the detainee exploitation process at an undisclosed
facility.
_( The "Exploitation Draft Plan," which was circulated on April 16, 2002,
stated that its objective was to "[h]old, manage and exploit detainees to elicit critical
information.,,9S The Ian 0 osed an "e loitation facility" be established at a
ff limits to non-essential ersonnel
observers.,,9 The Ian also described the fundamentals

'exploitation of select al Qaeda detainees." 7

_ ( The first option was for JPRA to field, deploy, direct, and sustain an
entire interrogation team. 98 The plan recommended that JPRA not pursue this course stating,
"No - Too much ofa manpower drain and we [JPRA] are not prepared to provide this kind of
support infrastructure.,,99 A second option was for JPRA to field a "lead captivity/ exploitation
expert (JPRA Senior SERE Psychologist) to advise and support" the exploitation process and to

92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Email from Dr. Bruce Jessen to Christopher Wirts, Mike Dozier and Randy Moulton (April 16, 2002).
9~Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation Draft Plan (undated), attached to email from Bruce Jessen to Col
Randy Moulton, Christopher Wirts, and Mike Dozier (April 16, 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Exploitation Draft
Plan'").
96 Ibid

98 Ibid
99 Ibid.

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have a "sponsor" provide all other personnel and direct the process. This option was also
rejected as "ineffective," noting that if JPRA could "direct" the exploitation process, there would
bea
"good chance of [JPRA] making a real difference," but "if not," there are "too many other
responsl"b"l"
1 Ittes t 0 expend "." energy on. ,,100

_( The third option was described as follows:

JPRA fields and deploys core captivity/exploitation team - This team directs the
process under the lead of the JPRA Senior SERE Psychologist and receives all
additional specified support from a sponsor - Those sponsor individuals who
directly assist in the exploitation process will receive training from the JPRA
cadre. 101

_ ( While this option was recommended as the "[b]est match of expertise


and capability," the plan cautioned that JPRA "need[ed] to be careful in establishing this
relationship" and that JPRA should retain ''the authority to direct the entire process or current
mistakes will be repeated (GTMO, lack of experience of in-theater interrogators, ineffective
captivity handling and facility routine) - [The] JPRA plan should be implemented from the start
of detention through holding, transport, and exploitation.,,102

_ Dr. Jessen's draft exploitation plan described the means by which JPRA would
implement that recommendation, and included requirements for an undisclosed exploitation
facility and the means by which detainees would be transported and held there. 103

_ ( A section of Dr. Jessen's draft exploitation plan also identified "Critical


Operational Exploitation Principles" for interrogation operations. Those principles included:

(l'he only restricting factor should be the Torture Convention), [7] Established
latitude and ocess to offer and validate information for concessions

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103The plan also described requirements for the management of the facility identical to those included in the
"Prisoner Handling Recommendations" previously prepared by JPRA for SOUTHCOM. Ibid.; Memo for Col
Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002).
104 JPRA, Exploitation Drqft Plan (emphasis added).

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_ ( When asked about the plan, which his email referred to as "my" plan,
Dr. Jessen said that there are elements that he did not draft. 105 For example, he told the
Committee that he did not believe that the Torture Convention was the only controlling authority
for exploitation Rules of Engagement. 106 Dr. Jessen, however, did not reject the idea of having
JPRA support the exploitation process. Dr. Jessen said that he knew how to set up training
programs, had observed numerous "interrogations" at SERE school, and thought that some JPRA
instructors could make excellent interrogators. 107 He also told the Committee that he supported
having SERE psychologists observe interrogations and provide advice and assistance to
interrogators, but that that he did not support having SERE psychologists in the interrogation
booth with interrogators and detainees.

(U) Upon receiving the plan, JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton asked Dr. Jessen to
craft a briefmg to ''take up for approval," which included "why we (USG) need it, how it falls
within our chartered responsibilities (or if not, why we should do it) and then make a
recommendation,,108 Col Moulton testified to the Committee that he did not recall any
subsequent JPRA briefmgs for U.S. Joint Forces Command on Dr. Jessen's draft exploitation
plan and did not remember whether or not the plan was implemented. 109

II. Development of New Interrogation Authorities (U)


A. CIA's Interrogation Program and the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah (U)
(U) Abu Zubaydah was captured by Pakistani and CIA forces on March 28, 2002.
According to former CIA Director George Tenet, once Zubaydah was in custody, the CIA "got
into holding and interrogating high-value detainees" (HVDs) "in a serious way."uo Then
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that "in the spring of2002, CIA sought policy
approval from the National Security Council to begin an interrogation program for high-level al
Qaida terrorists."lll Then-NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that he asked CIA to have the
proposed program reviewed by the Department of Justice and that he asked CIA to seek advice
not only ~om DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) but also from the Criminal Division. 112 Ms.
Rice said that she asked Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to briefNSC Principals on
the proposed CIA program and asked Attorney General Ashcroft "personally to review the

10~ The Department of Defense confmned that the "Exploitation Draft Plan" in the Committee's possession was, in
fact, attached to Dr. Jessen's April 16,2002 email, making it the same document Dr. Jessen referred to as "my initial
draft plan."
106 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July 11,2007).
107 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2007).
108 Email from Col Randy Moulton to Bruce Jessen, Christopher Wirts, Mike Dozier (April 17, 2002).
109 The Authorization of Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) Techniques for Interrogations in Iraq: Part
II of the Committee's Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 110 Congo (September 25,2008) (hereinafter "SASC Hearing (September 25,2008)").
110 George Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm (New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2007) at 241.
III Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
112 John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

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legality of the proposed program. ll3 She said that all ofthe meetings she attended on the CIA's
interrogation program took place at the White House and that she understood thatDoJ's legal
advice "was being coordinated by Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales.,,114

(U) According to President Bush, the agency developed an "alternative set" of ,"tough"
interrogation techniques, and put them to use on Zubaydah and other HVDs. 115 Though virtually
all ofthe techniques that were used on Zubaydah remain classified, CIA Director Michael
Hayden confirmed that waterboarding was used on Zubaydah. 116 Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Steven Bradbury testified before Congress that the "CIA's
use ofthe waterboarding procedure was adapted from the SERE training program.,,117 When
asked whether she was present for discussions about physical and/or psychological pressures
used in SERE training, Secretary Rice recalled "being told that U. S. military personnel were
subjected in training to certain physical and psychological interrogation techniques." 118 Mr.
Bellinger, the NSC Legal Advisor, stated that he was "present in meetings at which SERE
training was discussed.,,119

(U) Public reports have identified a retired U.S. Air Force SERE psychologist, Dr. James
Mitchell, as having participated in the CIA's interrogation ofZubaydah. 120 Dr. Mitchell, who
retired from the Air Force in 2001, agreed to speak to the Committee about his time at DoD.

113 Secretary Rice said that in 2002-2003, she 'participated in a number of discussions of specific interrogation
techniques proposed for use by the CIA" Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from
Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008). .
114 Ibid.
115 In a September 6,2006 speech, President Bush stated that since September 11, 2001, a "small number of
suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United
States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency." The President stated that the CIA used
"an alternative set of procedures" in interrogating the detainees. According to the President, the CIA techniques
"were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary." The President identified Abu Zubaydah as one
detainee who was subject to the CIA's alternative techniques. Press Briefmg with President George W. Bush
(September 6,2(06); see also Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm at 241.
116 Current and Projected National Security Threats, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1lOth Congo (February
5,2008).
117 Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110th Congo (February 14, 2008).
118 Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
119 John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
120 Jane Mayer, The Experiment, The New Yorker (July 11-18,2005); Jane Mayer, The Black Sites, The New Yorker
(August 13, 2007) ("According to an eyewitness, one psychologist advising on the treatment of Zubaydah, James
Mitchell, argued that he needed to be reduced to a state of 'learned helplessness.' (Mitchell disputes this
characterization)."); Katherine Eban. Rorschach and Awe, Vanity Fair Online (July 17, 2007), available at
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007107Itorture200707.
121 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2007); Letter to Senator Carl Levin (June 22,2007).

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(U) An unclassified version of a May 2008 report by the Department of Justice (Dol)
Inspector General (IG) confirmed that FBI agents "initially took the lead in interviewing
Zubaydah at the CIA facility," but that "CIA personnel assumed control over the interviews"
when they arrived at the facility. 125

122 Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (December 21,2007).

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

123 DoJ IG Report at 68.


126 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2007); Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent

(December 21,2007).

127 Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (December 21,2007).

128 Ibid.

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(U) The FBI Special Agent told the DoJ Inspector General that he also "raised objections
to these techniques to the CIA and told the CIA it was 'borderline torture. ",130 According to the
unclassified DoJ Inspector General's report, a second FBI agent present did not have a "'moral
objection'" to the techniques and noted that he had "undergone comparable harsh interrogation
techniques as part ofthe U.S. Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE)
training. ,,131

(U) According to the DoJ Inspector General's report, FBI Counterterrorism Assistant
Director Pat D' Amuro gave the instruction to both FBI agents to "come home and not participate
in the CIA interrogation." The first FBI Special Agent left immediately, but the other FBI agent
remained until early June 2002. 133 The report said that around the time of Zubaydah's
interrogation, FBI Director Robert Mueller decided that FBI agents would not participate in
interrogations involving techniques the FBI did not normally use in the United States, even
though the OLC had determined such techniques were legal. 134 Then-National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice said that she had a "general recollection that FBI had decided not to
participate in the CIA interrogations" but "was not aware that FBI personnel objected to
interrogation techniques used or proposed for use with Abu Zubaydah." 135

B.
As.
JPRA Assistance to Another Government Agenq' (U)
interro ation of Abu Zubaydah was ongoing,
The Chief of JPRA's Operational Support
ittee that he had five or fewer meetings withlll
interrogations. 136

130 U. S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review ofthe FBI's Involvement in and
Observations ofDetainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (May 2008) at 68 (hereinafter
"DoJ IG Report'').
131 Ibid. at 69.
131 Committee staff interview ofFEI Special Agent (December 21,2007).
133 DoJ IG Report at 69; see also Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. (Months later, in an October 2,
2002 meeting with DoD officials at Guantanamo Bay, Chief Counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center (CTC)
reportedly Jonathan Fredman conftrmed that "[w]hen the CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in the
past, the FBI has pulled their personnel from theater.")
134 DoJ IG Report at 73.
m Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

136 Committee staff interview of Christophe (Janumy 4, 2007); see also JPRAlOSO,. conca
Operationsfor JPRA support to anticipate re uirements (October 3,2002). The memo states, has made
informal requests for JPRA support to prepar to use exploitation/interrogation techniques ... Five
separate meetings have been conducted betwee and JPRArepresentatives..."

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_ _ At some noint in the first six months of 2002, JPRA assisted with the
preparation of~sent to interrogate a high level al Qaeda operative. 137 In a June
20,2002 memo to JPRA's Commander Randy Moulton, JPRA's Deputy Commander Col John
Prior, characterized the assistance as ''training'' and noted that the psychologist had suggested
"exploitation strategies" to officer. 138

11_ Dr. Bruce Jessen JPRA's senior SERE psychologist, told the Committee
that he had met with a who was en route to an interrogation L39 He said h e .
have offered the but that he did not discuss

_ JPRA also conduct~ and pre-mission preparation for a group of


~ o On June 17,2002~~entarequesttotheJoint~D
a oval for two-da JPRA training. 1 That request was drafted by a n ~
and Mr. Wirts, JPRA's OSO Chief. L42 DoD General Counsel Jim
Haynes told the Committee that he had been made aware ofa . request for IPRA training at
least as early as late surmner 2002.L43

re uest asked that IPRA provide training on


topics such a deprivation techniques," "exploitation and questioning
techniques," and "deviiloing countermeasures to resistance techniques.,,144 The training was
intended to "prepare officers for rotations in Afghanistan and elsewhere...145

_ In response to that request, IPRA Deputy Commander Col John Prior


recommended to the JPRA Commander:

I~Memofrom Col John Prior II to JPRNCC (Col Randy Moulta1), Requestfrom"or Interrogation
Training Support (J\U1e 20, 2002).
l]8lbid.
13ll.Initially, the s~or SERE psychologist could not recall ifhe provided this assistance to the
while he was still working at JPRA or if the assistance had ~r
he left JPRA After he left JPRA in 2002.
the senior SERE psychologist began working as a contractor t but was restricted from discussing the

nature of his work with the Committee. Committee staff interview ofBrucc Jessen (November 13, 2(07).

140 .Memo from Focal Point Bran~ to Joint Sta~


....3LQW. Special Activities Branch, (U) Request/or JPRA Personnel/or Training (June 17, 20(2) (hcreina~
_ _ Request/or JPRA Personnel/or Training (J\Dle 17, 2002)").
141 Request/orJPRA Personnel/or Training (J\Dle 17,2002).
142
11 Fax cover sheet f r o m _ t o Christopher Wirts (via Colin Junkins) (June 18, 20(2).
lei Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2(08) at 40.
144 Request/or JPRA Personnel or Training (June 17, 2(02). In a draft of the request written
by JPRA's OSO Chief Christopher Wirts and sent to 14, 2002, Mr. Wirts identified the same topics
for training. Mr. Wilts explained to his point of contact a that their ability to support the request was
hindered Py Dr. Jessen's availability, who Mr. Wilts described 88 "critical in .: .... .:.A !.II' that
I Iis requiring." Memo from Christopher Wilts ( v i a _ to
Support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (June 14,2002).
J4' IRequest/orJPRA Personnel/or Training (June 17,2002).

20

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Because of the urgent need to extract information from captured al Qaeda


operatives, and because JPRA has the sole repository ofthe r~
JPRA personnel should provide this expertise and training t o _

To prevent compromise and inadvertent modification of JPRA's charter,


personnel will avoid linking JPRA directly to this training.

. . . Having the true exploitation and captivity environment experts and specialists,
JPRA may be called upon in extremis to actually participate in fhture exploitation
offoreign prisoners; this request would clearly fall outside JPRA's chartered
responsibilities; ifthis request is made, JPRA would require a SecDefpolicy
.. 146
detennmabon ...

_ C o l Prior's memo stated that the JFCOM J-3 or his office had be~sed of
support requests. 147 A Joint Staff Action Processing Fonn indicated that_ _ request
was endorsed by JPRA, JFCOM, Joint Staff, and the Office ofthe Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy and approved on June 27, 2002. 148

_( In advance ofthe training, JPRA developed a two day lesson f o r _


~overingthe "full spectrum [of] exploitation," including both explanations and
demonstrations ofphysical pressures that were approved for use at JPRA's SERE school. 149 At
the time, JPRA-approved teclmiques included body slaps, face slaps, hooding, stress positions,
walling, immersion in water, stripping, isolation, and sleep deprivation, among others. 150

_ T h e two day training took place at_headquarters on July 1_2,2002. 151


Accordin to a Jul 16 2002 after action memo re ared for Col Moulton, the trainin covered

Time was also set aside for


recently been conducting interrogations in Mghanistan to discuss their experiences. Other time
was spent covering the physical and psychological pressures used at SERE school. Dr. Gary

1 4 6 " Memo from Col John Prior II to JPRAlCC (Col Randy Moulton), Requestjrom_jor Interrogation
Training Support (June 20, 2002).
14~Memo from Col John Prior II to JPRAlCC (Col Randy Moulton), Requestjrom~orInterrogation
Training Support (June 20, 2002). Although Col John Prior told the Committee that he could not recall the June 20,
2002 memo, JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton recalled receiving it at the time. Since the Committee's
interview of Col Prior, the Department of Defense has provided the Committee with a copy of the memo that was
signed by him.
148 11
Joint Staff Action Processing Form, (U) JPRA Personneljor Training (June 27, 2002).
149 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4,2007) at 63-64,69.
150 Ibid. at 64-69.

~~mo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation TrainingjoJ.
_ ( J u l y 16,2002).
152 Ibid.

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Percival, a JPRA instructor at the training, said that in their demonstration of ph~sical pressures,
JPRA instructor Joseph Witsch acted as the "beater" while he was the "beatee." 53

_ In addition to explaining and demonstrating the physical pressures used at SERE


school, the JPRA personnel also provided instruction on waterboarding. 154

(D) At the time, waterboarding was only used by the U.S. Navy SERE school and its use
was prohibited at the JPRA, Anny, and Air Force SERE schools. 155 The U.S. Navy has since
abandoned its waterboarding at its SERE schools. None ofthe JPRA personnel who provided
the assistance had ever conducted waterboarding and would not have been qualified to do so at
SERE school. 156

_ The July 16, 2002 after action memo stated that al


personnel were also present for the training. 157 According to the memo, personnel
"requested and were granted time to present the legal limits of physiological and psychological
pressures that were acceptable at the present time." 158 The after action memo described the legal
briefing:
Their 30-40 [minute] brief was very supportive. Basically, _ were told
they could use all forms of psychological pressure discussed and all of the
physiological pressures with the exception of the 'water board.' They were
advised that should they feel the need to use the water board, they would need
prior approval. They were also briefed on the ramifications for participating in
torture, which under international law is defined as a 'capital crime' and could
result in a death sentence if convicted. An eye opener to say the least. 159

_ The JPRA instructors who conducted the training did not recall_lawyers
providing any further guidance about how to seek approval for use ofthe waterboard in an
. . 160
mterrogallon.

(D) However, Chief Counsel to the Jonathan


Fredman later described an approval process for the use of aggressive interrogation techniques

153 Committee staff interview of Gary Percival (July 25, 2007).

"4 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4,2007) at 69.

m Memo from Dr. Percival to JPRA CC (Col Moulton), Comments on Physical Pressures usedfor cae Training

(June 18, 2004).


156 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4,2007) at 69.
IS~mo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, E~ploitation Training/mil
_ (July 16, 2002).
1S8 Ibid.
"9 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
160 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 75.

22

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reportedly explaining that "[t]he CIA makes the call internally on most ofthe types of
techniques," but that "[s]ignificantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ.,,161

_ In his after action memo f r o m _ training, JPRA instructor Joseph Witsch


stated that ''the training seemed well received and beneficial for the majority ofthe personnel
present.,,162 He observed that some ofthe class participants had "little to no[ ] experience" in
interrogation and others had "recently returned from conducting actual interrogations in
Mghanistan.,,163

( III In his memo, Mr. Witsch also commented on JPRA's future support to
interrogations, writing:

I believe our niche lies in the fact that we can provide the ability to exploit
personnel based on how our enemies have done this type of thing over the last
five decades. Our enemies have had limited success with this methodology due to
the extreme dedication of [American] personnel and their harsh and mismanaged
application of technique. The potential exists that we could refine the process to
achieve effective manipulation/exploitation. We must have a process that goes
beyond the old paradigm of military interrogation for tactical information or
criminal investigation for legal proceedings. These methods are far too limited in
scope to deal with the new war on global terrorism.,,164

_ Mr. Witsch recommended that JPRA develop two courses for future JPRA
customers - a basic course and an advanced course to deal with "senior, hardcore, and resistance
trained detainees. ,,165 The courses, he said, will need "immediate attention and will require a
total role reversal from current methodology and our standard approaches to training. It will take
a cross section of SERE experienced personnel-SERE instructors, psychologists, MDs and
intelligence personnel to effectively develop this new approach to captive handling and
manipulation.,,166

C. Senior SERE Psychologist Detailed From Department ofDefense to Other


Government Agency (U)

II
In July 2002, after the JPRA training f o r _ the senior SERE
psychologist, Dr. Bruce Jessen was detailed to~S.167 At the conclusion of

161 Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4.


16~ Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation Trainingjo_
_ (July 16,2(02).
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
16' Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July 11, 2007).

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this assignment, Dr. Jessen retired from the Department of Defense and began working as an
independent contractor t~ 168

(U) Dr. Jessen did tell the Committee that, in some circumstances, physically coercive
techniques are appropriate for use in detainee interrogations. He said that the use of physically
coercive techniques may be appropriate when (1) there is good reason to believe that the
individual has perishable intelligence, (2) the techniques are lawful and authorized, (3) they are
carefully controlled with medical and psychological oversight, (4) someone (who is not
otherwise involved in the interrogation) can stop the use ofthe techniques, and (5) the techniques
do not cause long-term physical or psychological harm. 170 Dr. Jessen acknowledged that
empirically, it is not possible to know the effect of a technique used on a detainee in the long
term, unless you study the effects in the long-term. However, he said that his conclusion about
the long-term effects of physically coercive techniques was based on forty years oftheir use at
SERE school. 171

(U) Subsequent to his retirement from DoD, Dr. Jessen joined Dr. Mitchell and other
former JPRA officials to form a company called Mitchell Jessen & Associates. Mitchell Jessen
& Associates is co-owned by seven individuals, six of whom either worked for JPRA or one of
the service SERE schools as employees and/or contractors. I72 As of July 2007, the company had
between 55 and 60 employees, several of whom were former JPRA employees. 173

D. Department ofDefense General Counsel Seeks Information on SERE


Techniques From JPRA (U)
(U) Just weeks after the JPRA provided assistance to the OGA, DoD Deputy General
Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffrin contacted JPRA Chief of Staff Daniel Baumgartner
seeking a list of exploitation and interrogation techniques that had been effective against
Americans. 174 In testimony to the DoD Inspector General (IG), Mr. Shiffrin stated that he made

168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.; Letter to Chainnan Levin (June 22,2(07).
Iii) Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2007). Lawyers for Dr. Mitchell informed the

Committee that he shares the same view as his colleague, Dr. Jessen.
171 Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2007).
172 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2007); Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July II,
2007).
173 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2(07); Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts
(January 4, 2008).
174 Email from Lt Col Dan Baumgartner to Col Randy Moulton et al. (July 25, 2002).

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the request after several conversations with General Counsel Jim Haynes. 175 Mr. Shiffiin later
said that everything he asked for from JPRA was to respond to requests from Mr. Haynes. 176 Mr.
Haynes testified to the Committee that he could not remember "specifically" asking Mr. Shiffiin
for infonnation on SERE techniques, but that he "asked generally" about that subject sometime
in the summer of2002. He also said that he remembered being "interested" in that infonnation,
and that ifhe had requested it, he would have requested it through Mr. Shiffrin. 177 Although Mr.
Haynes did not say why he was interested in this infonnation, when asked whether he had
discussed "SERE techniques with [] Messrs. Gonzales, Addington, Rizzo, Y 00, or any ofthe
other senior lawyers" he met with "regularly," Mr. Haynes testified to the Committee that he
"did discuss SERE techniques with other people in the administration. ,,178

(U) JPRA Chief of Staff Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner said that when the request from the
General Counsel's office came in, he called Col Moulton and Brig Gen Thomas Moore, the
JFCOM Director for Operations (13), and received pennission to provide the requested
infonnation to the General Counsel's office. 179 JPRA initially responded to the General
Counsel's inquiry on July 25,2002 with a memorandum signed by Lt Col Baumgartner. 180

II ( The JPRA memorandum stated that "JPRA has arguably developed into the
DoD's experts on exploitation." It continued:

Recognizing the typical training for strategic debriefers in the intelligence


community did not include either SERE training (as a student) or grounding in
exploitation strategy and associated interrogation techniques, JPRA offered
assistance to intelli ence or anizations char ed with interviewin
detainees. JPRA
will brief the Criminal Investigative Task
Force (CITF) next Tuesday to determine their requirements. 181

(U) JPRA attached several lesson plans on exploitation and interrogation to the memo. 182
In closing, the memo stated:

173 DoD!G, Interview of Richard Shiffrin (July 24,2006) at 6.


176 Committee staff interview of Richard Shiffrin (May 22,2007).
177 SASC Hearing (June 17, 2(08).
178 Ibid.
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007); see also email from Col Moulton to
179
(June 30, 2006) ("We [JPRA] initially received a call from OSD General Counscil (sic) requesting
information about resistance techniques used against U.S. POWs. I believe this was early on in Operation Enduring
Freedom. We were requested to provide that information within hours and were authorized by JFCOM to forward it
to OSD.... Once we understood what OSD/GC was looking for, we provided an list of techniques.")
180 Memo from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Exploitation
(July 25, 2002).
181 Ibid. at 1.
182 Ibid. at 2-3.

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The enclosed documents provide a thorough academic grounding in exploitation


and were built on what has been effective against Americans in the past. The
ability to exploit, however, is a highly specialized skill set built on training and
experience. JPRA will continue to offer exploitation assistance to those
governmental organizations charged with the mission of gleaning intelligence
from enemy detainees. 183

(U) The memorandum and its attachments were delivered to the Deputy General Counsel
Richard Shiffrin by a JPRA employee and were emailed to relevant personnel at both JPRA and
Brig Gen Moore's office at JFCOM. I84 DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes did not recall whether
or not he saw the memo at the time, but said that "in all likelihood," he would have received the
memo, and that the timing ofthe memo coincided with his recollection of his meeting with JPRA
personnel. 18S

(U) According to Lt Col Baumgartner, prior to the July 25, 2002 memo being delivered
to the General Counsel's office, Mr. Shiffrin called him to ask for additional information,
including a list of techniques used by JPRA at SERE school. Mr. Shiffrin testified to the
Committee that he was ''under pressure" from Mr. Haynes to get the material to his office as
. k1 Y as pOSSI'bl e. 186
qUlC

(U) Lt Col Baumgartner said that he thought the General Counsel's office was asking for
information on exploitation and physical pressures to use them in interrogations. Mr. Shiffrin
confirmed that one ofthe ~urposes for seeking information from JPRA was to "reverse
engineer" the techniques. 1 7 Lt Col Baumgartner said that he wanted to be helpful, but that he
told Mr. Shiffrin that JPRA's techniques were designed to show Americans the worst possible
treatment that they may face, and that any recommendation for the use oftechniques on
detainees would require Administration approval. 188

(U) On July 26, 2002, JPRA completed a second memorandum with three attachments to
respond to the additional questions from the General Counsel's office. The memo stated that
"JPRA has arguably developed into the DoD's experts on exploitation and as such, has
developed a number of physical pressures to increase the psychological and physical stress on
students ... ,,189

183 Ibid. at 2; see also email from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Col Randy Moulton et al. (July 25, 2002) (Thanking
''the 'exploitation answer stuckee' team" for "an outstanding job answering IJ Mr. Hanes (sic) and Mr. Schiffren
(sic) (OSD Dep GC for Intel) on their question 'what exploitation techniques have worked against Americans?")
184 Email from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Col Randy Moulton et aI., copying Darrell Venture (JFCOM
Directorate of Operations) (July 25,2002).
IS' Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 51,59.
186 SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).
187 Ibid.
188 Committee staff interview of Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007).
189 Memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Exploitation and
Physical Pressures (July 26, 2002) at 1.

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_ ( In the memo, JPRA informed the General Counsel's office that it had
already "assist[ed] in the training of interrogator/exploiters from other governmental agencies
charged with OEF exploitation of enemy detainees.,,190 The memo also stated:

Within JPRA's evolving curriculum to train interrogators/exploiters many


interrogation approaches are taught along with corresponding options for physical
pressures to enhance the psychological setting for detainee interrogation. Several
of the techniques highlighted (Atch 1) as training tools in JPRA courses, used by
other SERE schools, and used historically may be very effective in inducing
learned helplessness and 'breaking' the OEF detainees' will to resist.,,191

( The ftrst attachment to the July 26,2002 memo was'''Physical Pressures used in
Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.,,192 That attachment
included a list oftechniques used to train students at SERE school to resist interrogation. The
list included techniques such as the facial slap, walling, the abdomen slap, use of water, the
attention grasp, and stress positions. 193 The ftrst attachment also listed techniques used by some
ofthe service SERE schools, such as use of smoke, shaking and manhandling, cramped
conftnement, immersion in water or wetting down, and waterboarding.

( JPRA's description ofthe waterboarding technique provided in that ftrst


attachment was inconsistent in key respects from the U.S. Navy SERE school's description of
waterboarding. According to the Navy SERE school's operating instructions, for example, while
administering the technique, the Navy limited the amount of water poured on a student's face to
two pints. However, the JPRA attachment said that "up to 1.5 gallons of water" may be poured
onto a "subject's face." While the Navy's operating instructions dictated that "[n]o effort will be
made to direct the stream of water into the student's nostrils or mouth," the description provided
by JPRA contained no such limitation for subjects ofthe technique. While the Navy limited the
use ofthe cloth on a student's face to twenty seconds, the JPRA's description said only that the
cloth should remain in place for a "short period oftime." And while the Navy restricted anyone
from placing pressure on the chest or stomach during the administration ofthis technique,
JPRA's description included no such limitation for sQbjects ofthe technique. 194

( Attachment one also listed tactics derived from JPRA SERE school lesson plans
that were designed to "induce control, dependency, complia[n]ce, and cooperation," including
isolation or solitary conftnement, induced physical weakness and exhaustion, degradation,

190 Ibid.
191 Memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense Geneml Counsel, Exploitation and
Physical Pressures (July 26, 2002) at 1.
192 JPRA, Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees, attached
to memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel (July 26,2(02).
193 Ibid.
194Compare FASO Detachment Brunswick Instruction 3305.C (January 1, 1998) at E-5 with Physical Pressures
Used In Resistance Training and'Against American Prisoners and Detainees at 3-4.

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conditioning, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, disruption of sleep and biorhythms, and
. IatIon
manlpu 0 fdIe.t 195

(U) DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes told the Committee that although he could not
recall ifhe had seen the specific list of SERE physical pressures sent to his office on July 26,
2002, he knew that he had seen a list of physical pressures used in JPRA resistance training. 196

II Mr. Haynes also recalled that he may have been "asked that information be given to
the Justice Department for something they were working on," which he said related to a program
he was not free to discuss with the Committee, even in a classified setting. 197

(U) A second attachment to the July 26, 2002 JPRA memo to the General Counsel's
office was entitled "Operational Issues Pertaining to the use of Physical/Psychological Coercion
in Interrogation.,,198 In attachment two, JPRA stated that the memo did not purport to address
the "myriad legal, ethical, or moral implications oftorture; rather, [the memo focused onJ the key
operational considerations relative to the use of physical and psychological pressures.,,19

(U) Attachment two described operational risks associated with using "physical and/or
psychological duress" (a phrase that JPRA used interchangeably with ''torture'' throughout most
of attachment two) in interrogations. 20o The attachment said that one risk was that the use of
these methods would increase the "prisoner's level of resolve to resist cooperating.,,201 JPRA
explained that "[0 ]nce any means of duress has been purposefully applied to the prisoner, the
formerly cooperative relationship cannot be reestablished. In addition, the prisoner's level of
resolve to resist cooperating with the interrogator will likely be increased as a result of harsh or
brutal treatment. ,,202

(U) According to attachment two, another risk to using techniques that increase physical
and psychological duress was that it created doubts about the reliability and accuracy of
information obtained. 203 JPRA explained in attachment two that "[i]f an interrogator produces
information that resulted from the application of physical and psychological duress, the
reliability and accuracy ofthis information is in doubt. In other words, a subject in extreme pain
may provide an answer, any answer, or many answers in order to get the pain to stop." 204

195 Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.
196 Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 87.
197 Ibid. at 88.
198 JPRA, Operational Issues Pertaining to the Use ofPhysicallPsychological Coercion in Interrogation (undated),
attached to memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel (July 26, 2002).
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.

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(U) A third operational risk was the potential impact that the physical and psychological
duress could have on treatment of US. personnel. 205 JPRA explained in attachment two that:

Another important aspect of the debate over the use of torture is the consideration
of its potential impact on the safety of US. personnel captured by current and
future adversaries. The unintended consequence of a US. policy that provides for
the torture of prisoners is that it could be used by our adversaries as justification
for the torture of captured US. personnel. While this would have little impact on
those regimes or organizations that already employ torture as a standard means of
operating, it could serve as the critical impetus for those that are currently
weighing the potential gains and risks associated with the torture of US. persons
to accept torture as an acceptable option. 206

(U) The third attachment to JPRA's July 26, 2002 memo was a memo from the Chief of
Psychology Services at the Air Force SERE school, Jerald Ogrisseg, on the "Psychological
Effects of Resistance Training.,,207 That memorandum, which was generated in response to a
specific request from the General Counsel's office, described available evidence on the long
term psychological effects of Air Force SERE training on US. personnel and commented from a
psychological perspective on the effects ofusing the waterboard.

(U) JPRA Chief of Staff Daniel Baumgartner said that when the General Counsel's office
requested a memo on the psychological effects ofresistance training, he called Dr. Ogrisseg at
the Department ofthe Air Force's Air Education and Training Command. 208 Dr. Ogrisseg said
that Lt Col Baumgartner asked his opinion during the phone call about his thoughts on
waterboarding the enemy.209 Dr. Ogrisseg recalled asking, "wouldn't that be illegal?,,210
According to Dr. Ogrisseg, Lt Col Baumgartner replied that people were asking "from above"
about using waterboarding in real world interrogations. 211 Dr. Ogrisseg recalled telling Lt Col
Baumgartner, "aside from being illegal, it was a completely different arena that we in the
Survival School didn't know anything about." 212

(U) Subsequent to that call, Dr. Ogrisseg reviewed the data on the effects of Air Force
SERE resistance training on students and produced his memo, concluding that "ifthere are any
long-term psychological effects of [US. Air Force Resistance Training], they are certainly

20' Ibid.
206 Ibid.
Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, Psychological Effects ofResistance Training (July 24, 2002), attached to memo from Lt Col
'lIY1
Daniel Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel (July 26,2002) (hereinafter
"Psychological Effects ofResistance Training''').
208Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, the Chief of Psychology Services at the Department of the Air Force's Air Education and
Training Command, told the Committee that he had accepted a position at JPRA prior to writing the memo but had
yet to officially change jobs. Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).
209 SASC Hearing (June 17,2(08).
210 Ibid.
2ll Ibid.
212 Ibid.

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minimal." 213 The memo attributed this conclusion to efforts the Air Force SERE program
undertook to minimize the risk oftemporary psychological effects ofresistance training
becoming long-term effects. 214 The Air Force minimized the risk by, among other things,
performing three extensive debriefings during training. Dr. Ogrisseg said that "affording
students these opportunities to discuss their training experiences in open group environments
mitigates the risk ofturning a 'dramatic' experience into a 'traumatic' experience." 215 He told
the Committee that there are numerous controls in place at SERE school to ensure that the
training does not become "traumatic" for its students. 216

(U) Dr. Ogrisseg said that Lt Col Baumgartner also asked him "to comment on both the
physical and psychological effects of the waterboard," which he described in his memo as an
"intense physical and psychological stressor" used at the U.S. Navy SERE school. 217 Although
Dr. Ogrisseg had not used the waterboard himself, he had observed its use in a visit to the Navy
SERE School. He stated that, based on that visit, he did not believe that the ''waterIJ board
posed a real and serious physical danger to the students" who experienced it at the SERE school,
stating that the "Navy had highly qualified medical personnel immediately available to intervene,
and their students had all been medically screened prior to training. Psychologically, however,
the water[] board broke the students' will to resist providing information and induced
helplessness." 218 .

(U) Dr. Ogrisseg said that he was surprised when he found out later that Lt Col
Baumgartner had forwarded his memo to the General Counsel's office along with a list ofthe
physical and psychological techniques used in SERE school. 219 Dr. Ogrisseg said that his
analysis was produced with students in mind, not detainees. He stated that the conclusions in his
memo were not applicable to the offensive use of SERE techniques against real world detainees
and he would not stand by the conclusions in his memo if they were applied to the use of SERE
resistance training techniques on detainees.

(U) In a written response to a question posed by Senator Carl Levin after the
Committee's June 17,2008 hearing, Dr. Ogrisseg elaborated on that point noting several
"important differences between SERE school and real world interrogations that would limit [the]

2lJ Psychological Effects o/Resistance Training


214 Psychological Effects o/Resistance Training at 1.
m Ibid.

216 Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).


217 SASC Hearing (June 17,2008); Psychological Effects o/Resistance Training at 2.
21s_When providing this memo to the General Counsel's office, Lt Col Bawngartner stated: "While there is
not much empirical data on the long term effects of physical pressures used in SERE schools (which fall well short
of causing' grave psychological damage'), the psychological staff at the Air Force SERE school makes some
interesting observations [] that suggest training techniques can be very effective in producing compliance while not
causing any long term damage." Memo from Lt Col Bawngartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General
Counsel, Exploitation and Physical Pressures (July 26, 2002); Psychological Effects o/Resistance Training at 2.
219 Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).

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conclusions [in his memo] to the SERE school training population." 220 Among those differences
Dr. Ogrisseg identified were (1) the extensive physical and psychological pre-screening
processes for SERE school students that are not feasible for detainees, (2) the variance in injuries
between a SERE school student who enters training and a detainee who arrives at an
interrogation facility after capture, (3) the limited risk of SERE instructors mistreating their own
personnel, especially with extensive oversight mechanisms in place, compared to the risk of
interrogators mistreating non-country personnel, (4) the voluntary nature of SERE training,
which can be terminated by a student at any time, compared to the involuntary nature of being a
detainee, (6) the limited duration of SERE training, which has a known starting and ending point,
compared to the often lengthy, and unknown, period of detention for a detainee, and (7) the
underlying goals of SERE school (to help students learn from and benefit from their training)
and the mechanisms in place to ensure that students reach those goals compared to the goal of
interrogation (to elicit information).

(U) In addition, Dr. Ogrisseg also stated that, since writing his memo in July 2002, he had
reviewed studies about the effects of near death experiences, and that he had become concerned
about the use of waterboarding even as a training tool. 221 The U.S. Navy SERE school
abandoned its use ofthe waterboard in November 2007.

(U) Lt Col Baumgartner testified to the Committee that, subsequent to sending his two
memos and their attachments - including the list of SERE techniques - to the General Counsel's
office, another government agency asked for the same information. Lt Col Baumgartner said
that he provided that information to the OGA. 222

IIIn his interview with the Committee, Lt Col Baumgartner said that. personnel had
contacted him requesting a copy ofthe same information that had been sent to the DoD General
Counsel. Lt Col Baumgartner recalled speaking to ~ d a psychologist a t _
about the request and sending the information to the - - . 2 2 3

E. The Department ofJustice Changes the Rules (U)


(U) On August 1,2002, less than a week after JPRA sent the DoD General Counsel's
Office its memoranda and attachments, the Department of Justice issued two legal opinions
signed by then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Jay Bybee.

(U) Before drafting the August 1,2002 opinions, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
the OLC John Y 00 had met with Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales and Counsel to the
Vice-President David Addington to discuss the subjects that he intended to address. 224 Then

220Dr. Ogrisseg also explained that "[w]hile long-term psychological harm can occur from relatively brief
distressing experiences, the likelihood of psychological harm is generally increased by more lengthy and uncertain
detentions." Responses of Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28, 2008).
221 Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).
222 SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).
223 Committee staff interview ofLt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007).
224 According to Mr. Addington, he met "regularly" with a group of lawyers that included DoD General Counsel Jim
Haynes, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, and the CIA General Counsel John Rizzo. This group that met

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National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she understood that the Department of
Justice's legal advice to the CIA "was being coordinated by Counsel to the President Alberto
Gonzales.,,225

(U) The first ofthe two August 1,2002 OLC memoranda, known to many as the "First
Bybee" memo, presented OLC's narrow interpretation of what constituted torture under U.S.
law. The memo stated that the federal anti-torture statute of 1994 prohibited "only extreme acts"
and that in order to constitute torture, physical pain would have to be equivalent in intensity to
that accompanying "serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
functions or even death.,,226 For mental pain to rise to the level oftorture, according to the
memo, it would have to result in "si~flcant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g.,
lasting for months or even years.,,22 The First Bybee memo also found that the federal anti
torture statute may not be applicable to interrogations ordered by the President ifhe acted
pursuant to his Constitutional commander-in-chief powers. Further, the memo argued that even
if the federal anti-torture statute could be construed to apply to such interrogations, the defenses
of necessity and self-defense could potentially eliminate criminal liability under the statute. 228

(U) The First Bybee memo also effectively dispensed with the "specific intent"
requirement of the federal anti-torture statute by narrowly defining that requirement. The federal
anti-torture statute states that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be "specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.,,229 The First Bybee memo stated that in
order "for a defendant to have acted with specific intent, he must expressly intend to achieve the
forbidden act.,,230 Under that interpretation, to violate the law, a person must expressly intend to
commit torture and the memo stated that "knowledge alone that a particular result is certain to
occur does not constitute specific intent."

regularly - which Mr. Addington said was referred to as the "War COWlcil" by Mr. Haynes - also included OLC
lawyers John Yoo and Tim Flanigan. According to Mr. Addington, the group of lawyers met about a "range of
issues," including interrogation of enemy combatants in the war on terror. When Mr. Haynes was asked whether he
had discussed "SERE techniques with [] Messrs. Gonzales, Addington, Rizzo, Y00, or any of the other senior
lawyers" he met with "regularly," Mr. Haynes testified to the Committee that he "did discuss SERE techniques with
other people in the administration." These conversations occurred prior to the Decem her 2, 2002 approval of
aggressive interrogation techniques, including those derived from SERE, by the Secretary of Defense. See From the
Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules, Part
III, House Committee on the JudiciaI)', Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 11 Oth
Congo (JWle 26, 2008) (Testimony of David Addington); SASC Hearing (JWle 17, 2008) (Testimony of William 1.
Haynes II); The Terror Presidency at 22.
125 Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
226The memo was leaked to the press in JWle 2004 and was rescinded by the OLC later that month. Memo from
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards o/Conduct/or
Interrogation under 18 U.S.c. 2340-2340A (August I, 2002).
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 18 U.S.c. 2340(1) (2008).
230 Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards 0/
Conduct/or Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (August I, 2002).

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(U) Jack Goldsmith, who succeeded Jay Bybee as Assistant Attorney General of the OLC
in 2003, described the First Bybee memo's conclusions and their effect:

[V]iolent acts aren't necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a
defense; and even if you don't have a defense, the torture law doesn't apply if you
act under color of presidential authority. CIA interrogators and their supervisors,
under pressure to get information about the next attack, viewed the opinion as a
'golden shield,' as one CIA official later called it, that provided enormous
comfort. 231

(U) The second August 1,2002 OLC legal opinion was also signed by Assistant Attorney
General Jay Bybee. 232 According to a declaration made to the United States District Court for
the Southern District ofNew York. by the Information Review Officer for the CIA, the so-called
"Second Bybee" memo is an I8-page legal memorandum from the OLC to the Office of General
Counsel ofthe CIA containing "information relating to the CIA's terrorist detention and
interrogation program" and "advice to' the CIA regarding potential interrogation methods." 233
According to the filing, the CIA requested the legal guidance from the Department of Justice. 234
A February 1, 2005 letter from the Justice Department to Senator Arlen Specter, then-Chairman
ofthe Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the Second Bybee memo gave the CIA "specific
advice concerning specific interrogation practices, concluding that they are lawful." 235 And the
unclassified report of the Department ofJustice Inspector General explained that the opinion
analyzed "specific techniques approved for use on Zubaydah includ[ing] waterboarding ... ,,236

-" ----- - - --- - - - -

231 Former Assistant Attorney General for the OLC Jack Goldsmith, who rescinded the memo, criticized the First
Bybee memo as legally flawed, redundant and one-sided, tendentious in tone, unnecessarily narrow in its defInition
of torture, and widely broader than necessary in its assessment of Presidential authorities. The Terror Presidency at
143-51.
232 The Second Bybee memo has been withheld from the Committee.
233Sixth Dec!. of Marilyn A Dorn, ~ 56, American Civil Liberties Union, et aL v. Department ofDefense, et aL, No.
04-Civ. 4151 (January 5, 2007).
234Sixth Dec!. of Marilyn A Dorn, ~ 62, American Civil Liberties Union, et aL v. Department ofDefense, et aL, No.
04-Civ. 4151 (January 5, 2007).
23'Letter from Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella to Chairman of the Senate judiciary Committee
Arlen Specter (February 1, 2005); see also The Terror Presidency at 150-151 (According to Jack Goldsmith, the
First Bybee memo "analyzed the torture statute in the abstract, untied to any concrete practices" and then the Second
Bybee Memo, "applied this abstract analysis to approve particular" interrogation techniques.)
236 DoJ IG Report at 101, fn. 73; see also From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration
Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules, Part IIL House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110lh Congo (June 26, 2008) (prepared testimony of John Y00)
("OLC was asked to evaluate the legality of interrogation methods proposed for use with Zubaydah.")
237 DoJ IG Report.

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that he "expressed concern that the proposed CIA interrogation techniques comply with
applicable u.s. law, including our international obligations. 238

(U) The Committee has been denied the Second Bybee memo and does not know which
specific interrogation practices, other than waterboarding, were analyzed in the memo. A
heavily redacted version ofthe Second Bybee memo, released on July 24, 2008, provides no
further details about the specific interrogation practices that were analyzed by the OLC. 239 The
unredacted sections only make clear that the OLC applied its analysis in the First Bybee memo to
240
a set of (redacted) facts at issue in the Second Bybee memo. And while public sources have
suggested that the OLC's analysis applied to Zubaydah, then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo suggested in recent testimony that it "perhaps" applied to others "similarly situated.,,241

(U) According to Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, the techniques that the OLC
analyzed in the Second Bybee memo were provided by his office. In his testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Rizzo stated that his office was "the vehicle" for
getting the interrogation practices analyzed in the Second Bybee memo to the Department of
Justice.,,242

II
to.
Lt Col Baumgartner, the JPRA Chief of Staff, recalled sending a copy ofthe same
information that he had sent to the DoD General Counsel - including the list of SERE techniques
and Dr. Ogrisseg's memo on the pS1.;chological effects of Air Force SERE training and on
waterboarding - attorney. 43 Mr. Haynes, the DoD General Counsel, recalled that in the
context of reviewing the list of SERE techniques provided to his office, that he may have been
"asked that information be given to the Justice Department for something they were working
on.,,244

(U) With respect to the issues addressed in Dr. Ogrisseg's memo relating to the
psychological effects of resistance training, Mr. Haynes said that he knew that there was a

238 John Bellinger answers to July 31,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
239 The remainder of the Second Bybee memo has not been released publicly.
240Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the OLC John Y00, who participated in the drafting of the Second Bybee
memo, added that in the context of the Zubaydah interrogation, application of the federal anti-torture statute to the
facts "depend[ed] not just on the particular interrogation method, but on the subject's physical and mental
condition." From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration
Interrogation Rules, Part llI, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties, 110th Congo (June 26, 2008).
141From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation
Rules, Part III, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties, 11 Oth Congo (June 26, 2008).
141Nomination of John Rizzo to be CIA General Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 110th Congo
(June 19, 2007).
143 Committee staff interview ofLt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007).
144 Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 88.

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government interest in that subject, but that he did not know if that information was used as
support in any OLC legal analysis, and ifhe did know, he did not recall. 245

(U) Then-NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that some ofthe legal analysis of
proposed interrogation techniques prepared by the DeEartment of Justice referred to ''the
psychological effects of military resistance training." 46 In fact, Jay Bybee, the Assistant
Attorney General who signed the two August 1,2002 opinions, said that he saw an assessment of
the psychological effects of military resistance training in July 2002 in meetings in his office
with John Y 00 and two other OLC attorneys. Judge Bybee said the assessment - which to the
best of his recollection had been provided by the CIA - informed the August 1, 2002 OLC legal
opinion that has not been released publicly.247 In his June 26, 2008 testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee, John Y00 refused to say whether or not he ever discussed or received
information about SERE techniques as the August 1, 2002 memos were being drafted. 248

(U) While Judge Bybee said that he did not recall "any written advice provided to any
governmental agency prior to August 1, 2002, on the meaning of the standards of conduct
required for interrogation under the federal anti-torture statute or on specific interrogation
methods," the August 1,2002 memos were not the only occasion on which DOJ provided legal
advice on the CIA's interrogation program. 249 John Bellinger, the NSC Legal Advisor, said that
he understood that in 2002 and 2003, the OLC provided "ongoing advice to CIA regarding CIA's
interrogation program.,,250 And then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she
was present at "several" meetings in the White House at which Mr. Yoo provided legal advice. 251
Ms. Rice said that she asked Attorney General John Ashcroft "personally to review and confIrm"
DoJ's legal guidance. 252

F. JPRA's Special Program In Support o.(U)


1. August 2002 Training Proposal (U)
On Au t 12,2002, a week and a half after the OLC issued its two legal
opinions, the sent JPRA Chief of Staff Lt Col
Baumgartner and JPRA OSO Chief Christopher Wirts a draft memorandum outlining t h e _

145Ibid. at 104, 106; see also Redacted version of Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, Interrogation
of[redacted} (August 1,2002) (In the unredacted sections of the Second Bybee memo, the memo states: "Your
review of the litemture uncovered no empirical data on the use of these procedures, with the exception [redacted].")
246 John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

147 Jay Bybee answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (October 14, 2008).

148From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administmtion Lawyers and Administmtion Interrogation

Rules, Part ill, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil

Liberties, 1101b Congo (June 26, 2008).

149 Jay Bybee answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (October 14, 2008).

250 John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

251 Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

252 Ibid.

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[I]nformation that your organization has already provided, coupled with our
officers' experience confIrms our opinion that JPRA assets are more than capable
of rovidin the necess trainin that we need to start our initiatives. Basically,
consisting
of academic training and practical exercises aimed at learning both interrogation
and resistance to interrogation techniques. 255
_ ( _ draft described four areas of"trainin
(1) "Academic Training," including legal perspectives,'
(2)
'Resistance Training," including academic lessons in interrogation and resistance to
interrogation techniques, such as psychological or physiological pressures; (3) "Practice
InterrogationslResistance to [I]nterrogations/[F]eedback," including practice on "[p]hysical
pressures techniques and training"; and (4) "Review and Training of Resistance Training
Operating Instructions. ,,256

m_ Memo from_to Chief of Staff, JPRA (Lt Col Daniel Baumgartn~hief, Mission Support
(Christopher Wirts), Requestfor Training Support (August 12, 2002) (hereinafter _ t o JPRA, Requestfor
Training Support (August 12, 2002)").
254 Ibid. (emphasis added).
255 Ibid.
2 5 6 _ to JPRA, Requestfor Training Support (August 12, 20~ did not have the
~o teach "legal perspectives" and in his discussions w i t h " - " ' - about the training,
_ _ indicated that JPRA would not be expected to teach that topic. Committee staff interview of Christopher
Wirts (January 4, 2008).
2 5 7 _ to JPRA, Requestfor Training Support (August 12, 2002).
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.

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(U) The Operating Instruction used to implement DOD directive 1300.7 are those
instructions that JPRA uses to implement its SERE-school training program.

2. JPRA Creates Project 22B (U)


_ ( Also o~st 12,2002, a meeting was held at JPRA headquarters "to
discuss future JPRA sUPE0rt t o . actions to obtain actionable intelligence from Detained
Unlawful Combatants." 66 A memo from JPRA's Co Col Randy Moulton describing
that meeting reported that the JPRA training performed to date had been well-received
and that "information and training that JPRA has provided
th
~
nfi
. ..
d that JPRA t tha bl f . .
coupled with feedback from
.d' .:. th .

_ ( Col Moulton directed his team to develop a Concept of Operations


(CONOP) for continued support, stating that the JPRA CONOP would be staffed through the
Joint Staffand Office ofthe Secretary of Defense "to ensure proper oversight and approval prior
to execution ofthe plan." 269 A draft ofthat CONOP, circulated later in the year, described how
JPRA planned to f u l f i l l _ requirement for training, including how they would facilitate
the practice int~tion sessions - i.e., with JPRA members "portray[ing] resisters of different
skill levels" and_interrogators "demonstrat[ing] the ability to use exploitation methods and
concepts taught ... as well as us[ing] authorized physical pressures." 270 Among the risks

26.l Ibid.
164 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
26~ Ibid.
266 Memo from JPRAlCC (Col Randy Moulton) to JPRA B/J7/PRA, II Support t . Project 22B (August 13,
2002) at 1.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
270 Memo from JPRA asa, I Concept ofOperationsfor JPRA support to anticipated. requirements (October
3,2002).

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described in that CONOP was "injury [to JPRA personnel] as a result of physical pressures
administered by during the training.,,271

(U) At the August 12, 2002 meeting, JPRA created a special program which it called
Project 22B, to "limit JPRA distribution of sensitive activities in support ofliliiiil,,272

_ In his memo, Col Moulton wrote that protecting information associated with these
activities was "of paramount concern" t o _ and noted that~anticipatesa
congressional investigation into this activity at some time in the future."

III. Guantanarno Bay as a "Battle Lab" for New Interrogation Techniques (U)

JPRA was also developing a plan to support Department of Defense


interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). In the summer of 2002, following a
request from the Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC) to develop a training ~men
for GTMO interrogation personnel, JPRA modified the training plan it had developed for
_ to produce a plan to train the GTMO personnel. In September, JPRA sent a team of
instructors, ~two instructors who had discussed and demonstrated SERE physical
pressures to_ _ officers in July, to Fort Bragg, North Carolina to provide instruction at a
four day conference attended by the GTMO personnel.

(U) Just weeks after the JPRA training at Fort Bragg, two GTMO personnel who attended
the Fort Bragg training drafted a memo proposing the use of physical and psychological
pressures in interrogations at GTMO, including some pressures used at SERE schools to teach
U.S. soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that do not follow the Geneva Conventions.

(U) On October 11,2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commander ofGTMO's

Joint Task Force 170 (JTF-170), submitted a modified version ofthat memo for approval by his

Chain of Command. On December 2,2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved many of

those techniques for use in interrogations at GTMO.

A. GTMO Stands Up a Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) (U)


(U) In June 2002, members ofthe Army's 85 th Medical Detachment's Combat Stress
Control Team deployed to Guantanamo Bay. ~ee members ofthe team
psychiatrist Major Paul Burney, psychologist _ and a psychiatric technician
were informed that MG Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170, had assigned them to
support interrogation operations as part of a newly created Behavioral Science Consultation
Team (BSCT) at the JTF. This assignment came as a surprise to MAl Burney a n d _
because, when they were deployed, the two understood that their mission would be to care for

271 Ibid.
Memo from JPRNCC (Col Randy Moulton) to JPRA J3/J7IPRA,.SuPPOrl t o . Project 22B (August 13,

272
2002) at 1.

273 Ibid.

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u. S. soldiers dealing with deployment-related stress. 274 In a written statement provided to the
Committee, MAJ Burney described the assignment:

Three of us; [the enlisted psychiatric technician], and I, were


hijacked and immediately in processed into Joint Task Force 170, the military
intelligence command on the island. It turns out we were assigned to the
interrogation element because Joint Task Force 170 had authorizations for a
psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a psychiatric technician on its duty roster but
nobody had been deployed to fill these positions. Nobody really knew what we
were supposed to do for the unit, but at least the duty roster had its positions
filled. 27,

(U) MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he was in the hospital for much ofthe month
of June and did not know who initiated the creation of the ITF-170 BSCT. 276
(U) Prior to their arrival at GTMO, neither MAJ Burney n~ had any training
to support interrogations and there was no standard operating procedure in place for the team at
GTMO. 277 MAJ Burney told the Committee that the team was "very aware of how little we
knew about the whole spectrum of detention and interrogation, we decided we needed help.278

B. Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) Personnel Contact the Army


Special Operations Command (USASOC) (U)
(U) Shortly after arriving at GTMO, the BSCT contacted the Chief ofthe Psychological
Applications Directorate (PAD) at the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC),
LTC Louie "Morgan" Banks. 279 At the time LTC Banks was also the senior Army SERE
Psychologist. The BSCT psychologist.iiiiiilliliil had met LTC Banks prior to deploying to
GTMO but told the Committee that he was unaware at the time ofthe connections LTC Banks
had with the Army's SERE School.

174Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview of
(September 12, 2007).
175 Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).
176 Committee staff interview ofMG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).
177. A standard operating procedure was drafted in November 2002, several months after the BSCT was
established. It described BSCT tasks including: consulting on interrogation approach techniques, conducting
detainee file reviews to construct personality profiles and provide recommendations for interrogation strategies;
observing interrogations and providing feedback to interrogators on detainee behavior, flow of the interrogation
process, translator and cultural issues and possible strategies for further interrogation; and providing
consultation/training on specific behavioral science interviewing and observational techniques that promote
productive interrogation. The November SOP also stated that the BSCT "does not conduct medical evaluation or
treatment of detainees and does not participate in determining medical treatment protocols for detainees." While the
Committee does not know whether the SOP was ever approved, it comports with what BSCT members told the
Committee about their activities. J1F GTMO-BSCT Memoran~ord,BSCT Standard Operating
Procedures (November 11, 2002); Committee staff interview o~ (September 12, 2(07); Committee staff
interview of Paul Burney (August 21,2007).
178 Written statement ofMAJ Paul Burney (August 21,2007).
179 Committee staff interview o~(September 12, 2007).

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II LTC Banks told the Committee that it was apparent to him that the BSCT28olacked the
proper training for the mission and that, when asked to help, he felt obliged to assist. LTC
Banks contacted the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) for assistance in organizing
training for the BSCT. 281 After speaking to Col Moulton, the JPRA Commander, LTC Banks
informed the BSCT that JPRA was willing to modify its prior interrogation
training sessions to suit the BSCT's needs. 282

(U) BSCT members told the Committee that they sought the training to better understand
the interrogation process. 283 They also told the Committee, however, that GTMO's Director for
Intelligence (J-2), LTC Jerald Phifer, approved their trip with the expectation that the BSCT
would learn about and bring back interrogation techniques that could be considered for use in
interrogations at GTMO; a point that the LTC Phifer confirmed in his testimony to the
Department ofthe Army Inspector General (Army IG).284 The Staff Judge Advocate at GTMO,
LTC Diane Beaver, confmned LTC Phifer's account, but said that MG Dunlavey told staffhe
had been considering a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques and that
MG Dunlavey'S purpose in sending the staffto the training was to "fmd out what could be
used.,,28s

(U) MAJ Burney said that he a n d _ made LTC Banks "aware that there was
interest within JTF-170 to see if we could use' SERE tactics' to try to elicit information from
detainees.,,286 _ t o l d the Committee that he believed that the two discussed the GTMO
command's interest in obtaining a list ofresistance training techniques with LTC Banks. 287 The
JPRA Operational Support Office Chief Christopher Wirts, told the Committee that he believed
that he and LTC Banks also talked about the need to demonstrate physical pressures used in
SERE schools at the Fort Bragg training. 288 LTC Banks, however, told the Committee that he
did not recall a discussion of physical pressures at the training and that he was surprised when he
later learned that the BSCT had expected to become familiar with resistance training techniques
used in SERE school while at the training session. 289

280 Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (July 2, 2(07).


281 Ibid.
282 Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney (July 15, 2002).
283 Committee staff interview of (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul
Burney (August 21,2007).
284 Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16,2006) at 8; Army IG, Interview ofMAJPaul Burney (April
28,2006) at 14.
285 SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).
286 Written statement ofMAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007) at 4.
287 Committee staff interview o~ (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul
Burney (August 21, 2007).
288 Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008).
289 Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (July 2, 2007).

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(D) At the time, there was a view by some at GTMO that interrogation operations had not
yielded the anticipated intelligence,29O MAl Burney testified to the Army IG regarding
interrogations:

[T]his is my opinion, even though they were giving information and some of it was
useful, while we were there a large part ofthe time we were focused on trying to establish
a link between AI Qaeda and Iraq and we were not being successful in establishing a link
between AI Qaeda and Iraq. The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish
this link .. , there was more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce
.
more Imme d'late resu Its. 291

_The GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief, David Becker told the
Committee that at one oint interro ation personnel were required to question
but that he was unaware ofthe source of that
requirement. 292 Others involved in IfF -170 interrogation operations agreed that there was
pressure on interrogation personnel to produce intelligence, but did not recall pressure to identify
links between Iraq and al Qaeda. 293

( Mr. Becker told the Committee that during the summer of 2002, the IfF -170
Commander, MG Dunlavey, and his Director for Intelligence (J-2), LTC Phifer, had urged him
to be more aggressive in interrogations. 294 Mr. Becker also told the Committee that MG
Dunlavey and LTC Phifer repeatedly asked him during this period why he was not using stress
positions in interrogations, even though the August 2002 Standard Operating Procedure for IfF
170 expressly prohibited the use ofthe technique. 295 MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he
did not recall asking his staff why they were not using stress positions or telling them that they
should be more aggressive. 296

II
Mr. Becker also told the Committee that, on several occasions, MG Dunlavey had
advised him that the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had called to express
concerns about the insufficient intelligence production at GTMO. 297 Mr. Becker recalled MG
Dunlavey telling him after one ofthese calls, that the Deputy Secretary himself said that GTMO

290Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6; Committee staff interview o~
(September 12, 2007).
291 Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6.
292The ICE Chief told the Committee that interrogators identified only "a couple of nebulous links." Committee
staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
293 Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview o~
(September 12, 2007).
294 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
295 .JTF-170J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures (August 20, 2(02) (emphasis in original)
(Detainees being interrogated will "remain seated and secured to the floor. DETAINEES WILL NOT BE PLACED
IN STRESS POSITIONS"); see also Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17,2007).
296 Committee staff interview ofMG Michael Dunlavey (November 30,2007).
2Y1 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

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should use more aggressive interrogation techniques. 298 MG Dunlavey told the Committee that
he could not recall ever having a phone call with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz or his staff 299

c. U.S. Southern Command Seeks External Review ofGTMO (U)

II Just as the JTF-170 BSCT was reaching out to LTC Banks for assistance,
SOUTHCOM was looking for advice to improve GTMO operations. In June 2002, Major
General Gary Speer, the Acting Commander of SOUTHCOM, requested that the Joint Staff
conduct an external review of intelligence collection operations at Guantanamo Bay.300 In
response, the Joint Staff directed COL John P. Custer, then-assistant commandant of the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, to lead a review team.

COL Custer's team visited GTMO in August and submitted its findings to the Joint
Staff on September 10,2002. 301 Like COL Herrington's assessment six months earlier, the
Cst" "d ffi d b f' ha .
. ~ GTMO" t 11' .:. 11 ct'

IIcOL Custer also noted deficiencies in interrogation approaches used by JTF-170,


stating that:

II
COL Custer recommended that SOUTHCOM, in coordination with JTF-170, provide
written guidance "delineating what tools and measures are available and permissible to leverage
control over the detainees while providing acceptable guidelines for questioning.,,304 He also
recommended combining the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit and the JTF-170 BSCT to use both
military and law enforcement approaches to create an environment that would be "conducive to
extracting information by exploiting the detainee's vulnerabilities.,,305

198 Ibid.
299 Committee staff interview ofMG Michael Dunlavey (November 30,2007).
300 _ COL John Custer,. CJCS Extemal Review ofGuantanamo Bay Intelligence Operations (U) (September
2002) (hereinafter "Custer Report"); see also BriefIng Slides, GTMO Review: Joint StaffExtemal Review of
Intelligence Operations at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba (September 10, 2002).
Custer's team included subject matter experts from Fort Huachuca, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of
301
Defense.
302 With respect to personnel, Custer cited a dearth of linguists, noted a lack of cultural training among interrogators,

and called the entire mission "woefully undermanned." Custer Report at 2.


303 Ibid. at I I.
304 Ibid. at I 2.
30' Ibid. I I-12.

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II
In his report, COL Custer referred to GTMO as "America's 'Battle Lab'" in the
global war on terror, observing that "our nation faces an entirely new threat framework," which
must be met by an investment of both human capital and infrastructure. 306

(U) Several witnesses expressed concerns to the Committee about using the term "Battle
Lab" to describe operations at GTMO. 307 In written answers to questionnaires from Senator Carl
Levin, COL Britt Mallow, the Commander of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF),
stated:

MG Dunlavey and later MG Miller referred to GTMO as a "Battle Lab" meaning


that interrogations and other procedures there were to some degree experimental,
and their lessons would benefit DOD in other places. While this was logical in
terms of learning lessons, I personally objected to the implied philosophy that
interrogators should experiment with untested methods, particularly those in
which they were not trained. 308

(U) CITF's Deputy Commander, Mark Fallon, echoed the CITF Commander's concern.
Mr. Fallon stated that CITF did not concur with the Battle Lab concept because the task force
"did not advocate the application ofunproven techniques on individuals who were awaiting
trials.,,309 He emphasized that the CITF position was that "there were many risks associated with
this concept ... and the perception that detainees were used for some'experimentation' of new
unproven techniques had negative connotations.,,310

(U) MG Dunlavey told the Committee he did not think he would have used the term to
describe GTMO. 311 MG Miller told the Committee that he did not recall using the term and that
it would be inappropriate to apply it to an operational unit. 312

D. GTMO Personnel Attend Training at Fort Bragg (U)


(U) On September 16,2002, less than a week after COL Custer submitted his report to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seven personnel from JTF -170 at GTMO, including three members of
the BSCT and four interrogators, arrived at Fort Bragg for training organized by LTC Banks and
JPRA They were joined by a CIA psychologist and several Army personnel. 313 Joint Forces

306 Ibid. at 2.
307Committee staff interviews ofMAJ Sam McCahon (June 15, 2007); COL Britt Mallow (May 7, 2007); Timothy

James (May 18, 2007).

308Responses of COL Britt Mallow to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006). Two other
witnesses also told the Committee that the term "Battle Lab" was used by Major General Dunlavey to describe
GTMO operations. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of
Tim James (May 18, 2007).
309 Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (November 15, 2006).
310 Ibid.
3ll Committee staff interview ofMG Michael Dunlavey (November 30,2007).
312 Committee staff interview ofMG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).
313 Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton, Col John Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner and Christopher Wirts,
_ USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction in Support ofOperation Enduring Freedom

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Command (JFCOM) was formally notified on September 5, 2002 that JPRA intended to provide
training support to Army psychologists, but did not mention Guantanamo Bay or interrogation. 314

(U) JPRA sent senior SERE psychologist Gary Percival, who had recently assumed that
position after Dr. Jessen's departure, and two instructors to conduct the training at Fort Bragg.

II Dr. Percival and one ofthe two trainers, Joseph Witsch, had been instructors at the
exploitation training f o r . in July, where they had discussed and demonstrated physical
pressures. 315 In testimony before the Committee, the other JPRA trainer, Terrence Russell,
stated that the team had designed the training to provide attendees a "familiarization with the
academic or the theoretical application of exploitation from a SERE perspective.,,316 A
contemporaneous email from JPRA Operational Support Office (OSO) Chief Christopher Wirts,
who was involved in planning the training, explained that it was intended to be "similar in nature
to what we did for OGA on the last iteration." 317 None ofthe three instructors sent by JPRA to
Fort Bragg was a trained interrogator. 318

_ According to a JPRA plan of instruction dated August 28, 2002, the fIrst day of
training included instruction on the stages 0
The next three da s oftrainin in the

_(
including one called
A slide from that presentation stated that ''the
exploitation process is fairly simple but needs to be adhered to [to] be successful ifthe goal is to
increase the likelihood of obtaining useful intelligence information from enemy prisoners... ,,320
The esentation listed a number of"Critical 0 erational Ex loitation Princi les" includin

The "Principles" listed in the Fort Bragg training presentation

(OEF) (September 24, 2002) (hereinafter "USASOC Requirement to Pravide Exploitation Instruction (September
24, 2002)").
314 JPRA to USClNCSOC, RequestJPRA Support, DTG: 052135ZSEP02 (September 5, 2002).

~ Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation Trainingfo'"

III(Ojjfcers (July 16, 2(02); Committee staff interview of Dr. Gary-Percival (July 25,2(07).

316 Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 79.

317 Email from Christopher Wirts to JPRA Staff (August 8, 2002).

318 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2(07) at 14; Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 25.

319 Memorandum from Joseph Witsch to JPRNCC, JPRNCD, JPRNCOS, JPRNOSO, Plan ofInstruction (POI)

320"
for USASOC Training Support (U) (August 28, 2002).
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation ofCaptive, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort

Bragg (September 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Exploitation ofCaptive").

321 Ibid. at 4.

44

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were substantially the same as those described in the Exploitation Draft Plan, circulated by Dr.
Jessen in April, which described a JPRA-directed exploitation process. 322

_ Though GTMO was a facility that dealt with detainees after they had been
removed from the battlefield, the presentation also included information on "Tactical
estionin "statin that tactical interro ators should
,,323 Mr. Witsch, the JPRA instructor
who acted as Team Chief for the training, testified to the Committee:

Rough handling is you would pull the person up to their feet, you would move
them rapidly in the direction that you were going to take them... basically, they
have no control. They would feel like the person that has them is in total control
ofthem. That's what we mean by rough handling. 324

_ Presentation slides used for the trainin also listed a number of other
recommendations for handling detainees including
,,325 Mr. Witsch testified to the Committee that he did not
know what was meant by those statements and he could not recall any discussion about what
punishments might be culturally undesirable for Arab or Islamic detainees. 326

_ ( The presentation stated that "all daily activities should be on random


schedules" and should, among other things "disrupt prisoner sleep cycles.,,327 Mr. Witsch said
that denying detainees the ability to predict and determine their schedules "keeps them somewhat
off guard and guessing.,,328

_ ( A second JPRA presentation delivered at Fort Bragg described methods


to deal with detainees who were trained to resist interrogation. 329 The presentation, entitled
"Counter Measures to Defeat al Qaeda Resistance Contingency Training Based on Recently
Obtained AL-QA'IDA Documents" listed several countermeasures to deal with resistant
detainees including "invasion of personal space by female.,,33o Mr. Witsch explained that "[i]n a
lot of cases, it's uncomfortable for a male to have a female in their space. It could also be looked
at as uncomfortable having a female in front of an Arab... What this is is a form of pressure in

32l Compare JPRA, Exploitation ofCaptive with JPRA, Exploitation Drqft Plan.

323 JPRA, Exploitation ofCaptive.

324Hearing to Receive Information Relating To The Treatment of Detainees, Senate Committee on Armed Services,

110th Congo (September 6,2(07) (Testimony of Joseph Witsch) at 12, 34 (hereinafter "Testimony of Joseph Witsch

(September 6, 2(07)").

m JPRA, Exploitation ofCaptive.

326 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6,2(07) at 16.

321 JPRA, Exploitation ofCaptive.

328 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2(07) at 18.

329 Ibid. at 25.

330JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa 'ida Resistance, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort Bragg

(September 2(02) (hereinafter "JPRA, Counter A-!easures to Defeat al-Qa 'ida Resistance").

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that situation.,,331 He testified that lPRA might have become aware that the invasion of the
personal space by a female might make an Arab detainee uncomfortable while conducting
research m preparatIon
. lor
J!:
t h e trammg.
.. 332

_ ( The presentation on countenneasures to defeat al Qaeda resistance also


explained that "[i]fthe prisoner believes that Americans are immoral barbarians and what he sees
counters those beliefs then his core beliefs have been shaken and he is more likely to cooperate..
. . If his core beliefs are reinforced by his treatment he is more likely to stick to his resistance.,,333
Mr. Witsch told the Committee that it was "hard to say" what the effect 0

would have on a detainee's resistance - whether it would make the detainee more or
less likely to cooperate. 334

(U) In his testimony to the Army IG, MAl Burney, the GTMO BSCT psychiatrist who
attended the training, stated that JPRA personnel at Fort Bragg, "described some of the stuffthat
they would do in SERE school as far as keeping people in some sort of solitary confinement for a
period of time" or "finding out what their fears were before they came so that they would try and
use those against them, whether it was fear of spiders, of the dark or whatever...,,335 An
interrogator from GTMO who attended the training also recalled a discussion about the use of
phobias. 336

(II Members ofthe GTMO BSCT who attended the Fort Bragg training
recalled discussions with the JPRA instructors about how they administered physical
pressures. 337 MAl Burney told the Committee that instructors talked about techniques the SERE
schools used to teach resistance to interrogation, such as walling, and exposing students to cold
until they shiver. 338 _ t o l d the Committee that hooding and hitting in a way that was not
injurious were both mentioned at Fort Bragg. 339 An interrogator from JTF-170 who attended the
training also recalled a discussion about the use of physical pressures. 340

(U) That same interrogator said that the instructors spoke about using existing procedures
at GTMO to enhance interrogations. 341 For example, the interrogator told the Committee that
there was a discussion with lPRA personnel that military working dogs, already present at

331 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2(07) at 26.


332 Ibid. at 27.
333 JPRA, COWJter Measures to Defeat al-Qa 'ida Resistance.
334 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2(07) at 30.
m Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (April 28, 2(06) at 14.
336 Committee staff interview of GTMO Interrogator (November 6, 2007).
337 Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2(07) at 92.
338 Committee staff interview of MAl Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).
339 Committee staff interview of (September 12, 2(07).
340 Committee staff interview of GTMO Interrogator (November 6, 2007).
341 Ibid.

46

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GTMO for security, could enhance detainee exploitation. Similarly, the interrogator said that the
instructors pointed out that hoods, goggles, and ear muffs were already in use with detainees at
GTMO for security purposes, and that existing processes utilizing those techniques could also be
used to enhance interrogations. The interrogator also recalled requesting additional JPRA
training for GTMO personnel on the use of physical pressures.

(U) Neither LTC Banks nor any ofthe JPRA instructors from the Fort Bragg training
could recall if there were discussions of physical pressures. 342 LTC Banks told the Committee
that using physical pressures desiFed for students at SERE school in actual interrogations would
almost always be unproductive. 34 For example, he told the Committee that slapping a person
would harden their resistance.

(U) Despite the apparent instruction on physical pressures, MAJ Burney told the Army
IG that instructors at Fort Bragg believed that the techniques used in SERE training should not
be brought back for use at GTMO and that "interrogation tactics that rely on physical pressures
or torture, while they do get you information, do not tend to get you accurate information or
reliable information.,,344 In a written statement provided to the Committee, MAJ Burney
reiterated that point, stating that "[i]t was stressed time and time again that psychological
investigations have proven that harsh interrogations do not work. At best it will get you
information that a prisoner thinks you want to hear to make the interrogation stop, but that
information is strongly likely to be false.,,34s

( II During the Fort Bragg training, the GTMO personnel also discussed
conditions at GTMO that they felt were hampering intelligence collection efforts. In his after
action report summarizing the training, JPRA instructor and trainin Team Chief Jos h Witsch
described some of those conditions statin for exa Ie that

,346 Mr. Witsch also stated in his after action report that "[a] lot of interrogation
techniques used in the past are no longer effective against the individual detainees because they
have developed an awareness and countermeasures to deal with them.,,347 Mr. Witsch added that
some ofthe interrogators had become "frustrated over the controls placed on their ability to
extract actionable information," such as restrictions on bringing detainees together in a room to
confront inconsistencies or on interrogating detainees for "12-15-20 hours at a time.,,348 While
Mr. Witsch noted that rapport building had proved to be the most effective interrogation
technique in eliciting information and that the positive treatment of detainees at GTMO was

342LTC Banks added that he was not present for all of the training sessions. Committee staff interview of LTC
Morgan Banks (June 15,2007); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 79; Testimony of Joseph Witsch
(September 4,2007) at 99.
343 Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (June 15, 2007).
344 Army IG, Interview ofMAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 8.
345 Written statement ofMAJ Paul Burney (August 21,2007).
Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Moulton, Col Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner, Mr. Wirts, U.s. Army Special
346
Operations Command (USASOC), Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002).
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.

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having some effect, he stated that the positive effect appeared limited to the "younger,
inexperienced" detainees. ,,349 .

( II In his after action report, Mr. Witsch expressed concerns about JPRA
involvement in GTMO operations, writing:

I highly recommend we continue to remain in an advisory role and not get directly
involved in the actual operations - GITMO in particular. We have no actual
experience in real world prisoner handling. The concepts we are most familiar
with relate to our past enemies and we have developed our Code of Conduct
procedures based on those experiences. Without actual experience with current
[Designated Unlawful Combatants] we are making the assumption that
procedures we use to exploit our personnel will be effective against the current
detainees. 350

( A week later, Mr. Witsch prepared a follow up memo for Mr. Wirts, JPRA's
OSO chief, expressing concern about lPRA's involvement with detainee exploitation, stating:

What do we bring to the table? We are Code of Conduct instructors with a vast
amount of experience training highly intelligent, disciplined, and motivated DoD
personnel to resist captivity... We base our role-play laboratories on what we
know our fonner enemies have done to our personnel in captivity. It is based on
illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50
years...

_( Mr. Witsch continued:

I believe the techniques and tactics that we use in training have applicability.
What I am wrestling with is the implications of using these tactics as it relates to
current legal constraints, the totally different motivations of the detainees, and the
lack of direction of senior leadership within the [U.S. Government] on how to
unifonnly treat detainees.

I think we are well within our sphere of influence if we stick to providing


methods to counter resistance trained [Designated Unlawful Combatants]. We are
out of our sphere when we begin to profess the proper ways to exploit these
detainees. We are now attempting to educate lower level personnel in DoD and
OGAs with concepts and principles that are somewhat foreign to them and while
it all sounds good they are not in a position nor do they have the depth of
knowledge in these matters to effect change and do it in reasonable safety.

The handling of [Designated Unlawful Combatants] is a screwed up mess and


everyone is scrambling to unscrew the mess ... If we want a more profound role in
this effort we need to sell our capabilities to the top level people in the USG and

349 Ibid.
3'0 Ibid.

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not spend our time trying to motivate the operators at the lower levels to sway
their bosses. This is running the train backwards and that is a slow method to get
somewhere. There are a lot of people in the USG intelligence community that
still believe in the old paradigm and wonder just what we're doing in their
business. 351

_ T h e memo concluded with the warning, "[w]e don't have an established track
record in this type of activity and we would present an easy target for someone to point at as the
problem. The stakes are much higher for this than what you and I have done in any activity
before.,,352

E. Delegation ofSenior Government Lawyers VISits Guantanamo (U)


(U) On September 25, 2002, less than a week after GTMO personnel returned from the
training at Fort Bragg, Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President
David Addington, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo,
Assistant Attorney General ofthe Criminal Division Michael Chertoff, and other senior
administration officials travelled to Guantanamo Bay and were briefed on future plans for
detention facilities as well as on intelligence successes, failures, and problems at the JTF. 353

II( According to a trip report prepared by a Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at


SOOUTHCOM, MG Dunlavey held private conversations with Mr. Haynes and a few others and
briefed the entire group on a number of issues including "policy constraints" affecting
interrogations at the JTF. 354 For example, MG Dunlavey told the group that JTF-170 would
"like to take Koran away from some detainees - hold it as incentive" but that the issue was
355
undergoing a policy determination by SOUTHCOM. The trip report noted that Mr. Haynes
"opined that JTF-170 should have the authority in place to make those calls, per POTUS order,"
adding that he "[t]hought JTF-170 would have more freedom to command.,,356 MG Dunlavey
told the Committee that he may have told the group during their visit that JTF-170 was working
357
on a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques. Mr. Haynes said he did
not recall discussing specific interrogation techniques or GTMO's work on a request for
authority to use additional interrogation techniques. 358

m_Memo from Joseph Witsch to Christopher Wirts, (U) Concerns withJPRA Involvement in Operation
Enduring Freedom Exploitation o/Detained Unlawful Combatants (October 1, 2002).
mIbid.
3~3 JTF-GTMO Distinguished Visitors Roster (September 27, 2002). Col Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD
General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27, 2002). While the September 27, 2002 trip report states that the
visit occurred on September 25 th, Jack Goldsmith, another senior official on the trip, recounts that the visit took
place on September 26, 2002. Goldsmith notes that Patrick Philbin. then-Chertoff Chief of Staff Alice Fisher, and
"several Pentagon lawyers" also went on the trip. The Terror Presiden2)' at 99-100.
3~4 Col. Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27,2002).
m Ibid.
356 Ibid.
m Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).
3~8 Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes n (April 25, 2008) at 139-42.

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F. JTF-170 BSCT Produces Interrogation Policy Memo (U)


(U) According to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) at GTMO, LTC Diane Beaver, there
was discussion among senior staff at GTMO as to whether or not the JTF required explicit
authorization to use interrogation approaches that had not been taught to interrogators at the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. While some felt that JTF-170 already had
the authority to use additional interrogation techniques, MG Dunlavey directed his staff to draft a
request for new authorities to submit to SOUTHCOM for approval. 359

(U) The JTF-170 Director for Intelligence, LTC Jerald Phifer, told the Committee that
MG Dunlavey wanted to get new techniques on the table and that MG Dunlavey pressured him
to draft a memo requesting additional techniques. 36o LTC Phifer asked the BSCT to draft an
interrogation policy that could be formally submitted up the chain of command for review. 361
According to MAJ Burney, the BSCT psychiatrist, "by early October there was increasing
pressure to get 'tougher' with detainee interrogations but nobody was quite willing to define
what 'tougher' meant.,,362 MAJ Burney added that there was "a lot ofpressure to use more
coercive techniques" and that if the interrogation policy memo that LTC Phifer had asked him to
write did not contain coercive techniques, then it "wasn't going to go very far.,,363

(U) According to MAJ Burney, he and~wrote a memo of suggested detention


and interrogation policies in the course of an evening. MAJ Burney told the Committee that
some of the interrogation approaches identified in the memo came from their JPRA training in
Fort Bragg and other approaches were simply made up by the BSCT. 365 _ the BSCT
psychologist, also told the Committee that the BSCT used information from the JPRA training at
Fort Bragg to draft the memo. 366
_ The BSCT memo, dated October 2, 2002, began:

3'9 Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2(07).

360 Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27,2007).

361 Written statement ofMN Paul Burney (August 21,2007).

362 Ibid.

363 Army IG, Interview ofMAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11.
364 Ibid.
36'Committee staff interview ofMN Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). However, in testimony to the Army IG, MAJ
Burney said he did not know whether the memo incorpomted tactics from the Fort Bragg training. Army!G,
Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11.
366 Committee staff interview o~ (September 12, 2007).

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_ The memo identified a number of conditions at GTMO that the BSCT judged to
be hindering intelligence collection and stated:

_ The October 2, 2002 memo proposed three categories of interrogation techniques


''for use in the interrogation booth to develop rapport, promote cooperation, and counter
resistance.,,369 Category I techniques included incentives and "mildly adverse approaches" such
as telling a detainee that he was going to be at GTMO forever unless he cooperated. 370 The
memorandum stated that an interrogator should be able to ascertain whether a detainee is being
cooperative by the end ofthe initial interrogation and said that if Category I approaches failed to
induce cooperation, the interrogator could request approval for Category II approaches. 371

_ Category II techniques were designed for 'lligh priority" detainees, defined in the
memo as "any detainee suspected of having significant information relative to the security ofthe
United States.,,372 Category II techniques included stress positions; the use of isolation for up to
30 days (with the possibility of additional 30 day periods, if authorized by the Chief
Interrogator); depriving a detainee of food for up to 12 hours (or as long as the interrogator goes
without food during an interrogation); the use of back-to-back 20 hour interrogations once per
week; removal of all comfort items including religious items; forced groominfi; handcuffmg a
detainee; and placing a hood on a detainee during questioning or movement. 3

36~ MAl Paul Burney and Memorandum for Record, Counter-resistance Strategies (October
2,2002) at 1 (hereinafter "BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies").
368 Ibid. at 2.
369 Ibid.
370 Ibid.
371 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
Ibid. at 2-3. There is evidence that stress positions were used at GTMO prior to the BSCT memo. Lt. Col.
373
Ronald Buikema, who served at Guantanamo from January 2001 until Jme 2001 as the ITF-170 J2 and
Commanding Officer of the Joint Interagency Interrogation Facility (JIIF) indicated in his response ~o a Navy IG
questionnaire that stress positions were used in some interrogations at GTMO. Email from Lt. Col. Ron Buikema to
Victoria Gnibus (July 21,2004). .

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_ The memo reserved Category III techniques "ONLY for detainees that have
evidenced advanced resistance and are suspected of having significant infonnation pertinent to
national security.,,374 Category III techniques included the daily use of20 hour interrogations;
the use of strict isolation without the right of visitation by treating medical professionals or the
International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC); the use of food restriction for 24 hours once a
week; the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee he might experience a painful or
fatal outcome; non-injurious physical consequences; removal of clothing; and exposure to cold
weather or water until such time as the detainee began to shiver. 375

_ In addition to suggesting interrogation techniques, the BSCT memo made


recommendations for the treatment of detainees in the cell blocks. Specifically, it proposed that
resistant detainees might be limited to four hours of sleep a day; that they be deprived of comfort
items such as sheets, blankets, mattresses, washcloths; and that interrogators control access to all
detainees' Korans. 376 The BSCT memo described using fans and generators to create white
noise as a fonn of psychological pressure and advocated that "all aspects ofthe [detention]
environment should enhance capture shock, dislocate expectations, foster dependence, and
support exploitation to the fullest extent possible.,,377

(II MAl Burney a n d _ t o l d the Committee that they were not


comfortable with the memo they were asked to produce, and therefore included a statement in
the memo reflecting their concerns about the techniques, including concerns about the "long term
physical and/or mental impact ofthe techniques.,,378 They wrote:

Experts in the field of interrogation indicate the most effective interrogation


strategy is a rapport-building approach. Interrogation techniques that rely on
physical or adverse consequences are likely to garner inaccurate information and
create an increased level of resistance...There is no evidence that the level offear
or discomfort evoked by a given technique has any consistent correlation to the
volume or quality of information obtained. . .The interrogation tools outlined
could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health of the
detainee. Physical and/or emotional hann from the above techniques may emerge
months or even years after their use. It is impossible to determine if a particular
strategy will cause irreversible hann if employed. . .Individuals employing
Category II or Category III interrogation techniques must be thoroughly trained ..
. carefully selected, to include a mental health screening (such screenings are SOP
for SERE and other Special Operations personnel). 379

374 BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 3 (emphasis in original).


m Ibid.
376 Ibid. at 4.
J77 Ibid. at 4-5.
378Committee staff interview of MAl Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview o~
(September 13, 2007).
379 BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 6.

52

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(U) The BSCT provided a copy oftheir memo to LTC Banks at U.S. Anny Special
Operations Command (USASOC), who had helped organize their JPRA training. Upon
reviewing the memo, LTC Banks praised the BSCT for their "great job" on the memo, but also
raised concerns about the suggested use of physical pressures in interrogation, noting that
physical pressures are used with students in SERE school to increase their resistance to
interrogation, not break. it down. 380

(U) LTC Banks wrote:

II ( The use of physical pressures brings with it a large number of


potential negative side effects... When individuals are gradually exposed to
increasing levels of discomfort, it is more common for them to resist harder. That
is one of the reasons we use it [in SERE school] - to increase the resistance
posture of our soldiers. If individuals are put under enough discomfort, i.e. pain,
they will eventually do whatever it takes to stop the pain. This will increase the
amount of information they tell the interrogator, but it does not mean the
information is accurate. In fact, it usually decreases the reliability of the
infonnation because the person will say whatever he believes will stop the pain.
Now, there are certain exceptions, like with all generalizations, but they are not
common. Bottom line: The likelihood that the use of physical pressures will
increase the delivery of accurate information from a detainee is very low. The
likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the level of resistance in
a detainee is very high...

II ( It is important to remember that SERE instructors use these


techniques [physical pressures] because they are effective at increasing resistance.
. . Because of the danger involved, very few SERE instructors are allowed to
actually use physical pressures...everything that is occurring [in SERE school] is
very carefully monitored and paced... Even with all these safeguards, injuries
and accidents do happen. The risk with real detainees is increased exponentially.
(U) My strong recommendation is that you do not use physical pressures ...[If
GTMO does decide to use them] you are taking a substantial risk, with very
limited potential benefit. 381

G. CIA Lawyer Advises GTMO on Interrogations (U)


(U) On October 2, 2002, the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver convened a
meeting to discuss the BSCT memo. Minutes from that meeting reflect the attendance of ITF
170 personnel and the then-chief counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center Jonathan
Fredman. 382

380 Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAl Paul Burney an~(October 2, 2002).
381 Ibid.
382 Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 2. The meeting minutes stated that questions and comments
from the meeting were paraphrased.

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(U) Mr. Fredman's visit took place just a week after the acting CIA General Counsel
John Rizzo and DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes's September 25,2002 visit to GTMO. Mr.
Haynes did not recall discussing with Mr. Rizzo during their visit the possibility of having a CIA
lawyer travel to GTMO to talk to DoD personnel there. 383 Mr. Haynes said he later found out in
a discussion with Mr. Rizzo that a CIA lawyer had gone to GTMO and discussed legal
authorities applicable to interrogations, but said he could not recall when he ftrst learned ofthat
CIA lawyer's visit.

(U) While LTC Beaver could not recall what she or others said, the minutes ofthe
October 2, 2002 meeting indicate that it began with a brieftng by the BSCT on the JPRA training
at Fort Bragg. 384 The BSCT briefer told the group that rapport building and the "friendly
approach" were proven methods to overcome resistance, while "fear based approaches" were
''unreliable'' and "ineffective in ahnost all cases.,,385 According to the meeting minutes,
however, the BSCT did report that psychological stressors such as sleep deprivation, withholding
food, isolation, and loss oftime were "extremely effective." 386 The BSCT also identified "camp
wide, environmental strategies designed to disrupt cohesion and communication among
detainees" as potentially helpful to improve the effectiveness of interroations and explained that
the detention "environment should foster dependence and compliance." 87

(U) Despite the BSCT comment on the effectiveness of rapport building, the meeting
minutes reflect little discussion ofthat approach. In fact, according to the meeting minutes, the
GTMO Director for Intelligence LTC Jerald Phifer questioned the BSCT assessment, stating that
"harsh tec~d on our service members have worked and will work on some, what about
those?,,388 _ _ responded that force was "risky, and may be ineffective.,,389
Nevertheless, the remainder ofthe meeting appears to have revolved around a discussion of
aggressive interrogation techniques and how to obtain the approval to use them.

(U) Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker noted at the meeting that
there were many reports about sleep deprivation used at Bagram in Afghanistan. 390 According to
the meeting minutes, LTC Beaver agreed but stated that "officially it is not happening.,,391
Nevertheless, LTC Beaver suggested that sleep deprivation could be used on GTMO detainees
''with approval.,,392 The group also discussed ways to manage the detainees' sleep cycles, i.e., by

383 Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 145-47.
384 SASC Hearing (June 17,2008); Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3.
38' Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid. at 2.
390 Ibid
391 Ibid. at 3. It is unclear how and when JTF-170 personnel became aware of the use of sleep deprivation at
Bagram, though LIC Beaver told the Committee that she had seen a version of a standard operating procedure for
interrogations in use at Bagram on a classified DoD internet system.
392 Ibid.

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letting the detainee rest ''just long enough to fall asleep and wake him up about every thirty
minutes and tell him it's time to pray again.,,393

(U) According to the meeting minutes, LTC Beaver suggested that the IfF might "need
to curb the harsher operations while [the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC;~ is
around," and that it would be "better not to expose them to any controversial techniques."
LTC Beaver explained that "[t]he ICRC is a serious concern. They will be in and out,
scrutinizing our operations, unless they are displeased and decide to protest and leave. This
would draw a lot of negative attention.,,395 The minutes reflect that the CIA lawyer added his
view:

In the past when the ICRC has made a big deal about certain detainees, the DOD
has 'moved' them away from the attention of the ICRC. Upon questioning from
the ICRC about their whereabouts, the DOD's response has repeatedly been that
the detainee merited no status under the Geneva Convention. 396

(U) At the meeting, the minutes reflect that CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman also discussed
whether or not the techniques in the BSCT memo complied with applicable legal standards. Mr.
Fredman explained:

Under the Torture Convention, torture has been prohibited by intemationallaw,


but the language of the statutes is written vaguely. Severe mental and physical
pain is prohibited. The mental part is explained as poorly as the physical. Severe
physical pain [is] described as anything causing permanent damage to major
organs or body parts. Mental torture [is] described as anything leading to
permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality. It is basically subject
to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong. So far the techniques
we have addressed have not proven to produce these types of results, which in a
way challenges what the BSCT paper says about not being able to prove whether
these techniques will lead to permanent damage. Everything in the BSCT
[memo] is legal from a civilian standpoint. 397

(U) According to the minutes, when the participants of the meeting discussed whether or
not to videotape the "aggressive sessions or interro&ations," Mr. Fredman said that videotaping
of "even totally legal techniques will look 'ugly. ,,,3 8 Mr. Becker, who agreed with the CIA
lawyer's assessment, added that "videotapes are subject to too much scrutiny in court." 399

393 Ibid. at 5.
394 Ibid. at 3.
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid.
397According to the meeting minutes, the CIA lawyer added "The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment. The US did not sign up to the second part, because of the 8th amendment ..
.That gives us more license to use more controversial techniques." Ibid.
398 Ibid. at 5.
399 Ibid. at 3.

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(U) When an attendee at the meeting mentioned that law enforcement agents (presumably
referring to CITF and FBI) had concerns about the use of aggressive tactics, the minutes reflect
that Mr. Fredman responded that "[w]hen CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in
the past, the FBI has pulled their personnel from theatre. In those rare instances, aggressive
techniques have proven very helpful.,,4O LTC Beaver added that there was no legal reason why
law enforcement personnel could not participate in those operations. 401

(U) While LTC Beaver testified in 2008 that she was aware that SERE training was not
designed for offensive use with detainees, the minutes of the October 2,2002 meeting reflect that
she nevertheless asked about use ofthe "wet towel" technique in SERE school. 402 The CIA
lawyer replied:

If a well-trained individual is used to perfonn this technique it can feel like you're
drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you're suffocating, but your
body will not cease to function. It is very effective to identify phobias and use
them (i.e., insects, snakes, claustrophobia). The level of resistance is directly
related to person's experience. 403

(U) According to the meeting minutes, ICE Chief David Becker asked whether GTMO
could get blanket approval for the use of techniques or whether techniques would be approved on
a case-by-case basis. 404 Mr. Fredman responded that the "CIA makes the call internally on most
ofthe techniques found in the BSCT" memo and referenced in their meeting, but that
"significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOl,,405 As to whether Geneva
Conventions would apply, Mr. Fredman noted that the "CIA rallied for it not to.,,406

(U) The meeting minutes also reflect Mr. Fredman thoughts on other interrogation
techniques, such as threats of death. Mr. Fredman noted that such threats "should be handled on
a case by case basis. Mock executions don't work as well as friendly ~proaches, like letting
someone write a letter home, or providing them with an extra book.,;40

400 Ibid.
401 Ibid.
402 SASC Hearing (June 17, 2(08); BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 4.
403
11Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. LTC Beaver said that she had learned about the wet towel
technique from a Navy doctor who had been assigned to the Hospital at Guantanamo and who described to her its
use at the Navy SERE school. It is unclear, however, to whom LTC Beaver is referring. The Committee
interviewed a Navy Lieutenant Commander who was deployed to GTMO and who had previously worked at the
Navy SERE school at the Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine. The Lieutenant Commander told the Committee
that he discussed with ITF-GTMO staff physical pressures used to teach students at SERE school how to resist
interrogations. However, the Lieutenant Commander was not deployed to GTMO until November 2002.
Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October II, 2007); see Committee staff interview of
(August 22, 2007); Travel voucher.
404 Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4.
40' Ibid.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid. at 3.

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(U) Weeks later, CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon wrote an email to CITF's Chief
Legal Counsel Major Sam McCahon regarding the meeting minutes:

Quotes from LTC Beaver regarding things that are not being reported give the
appearance of impropriety. Other comments like "It is basically subject to
perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong" and "Any of the
teclmiques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a
highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any
possible accidents." Seem to stretch beyond the bounds of legal propriety. Talk.
of "wet towel treatment" which results in the lymphatic gland reacting as if you
are suffocating, would in my opinion; shock the conscience of any legal body
looking at using the results of the interrogations or possibly even the
interrogators. Someone needs to be considering how history will look back at
thiS. 408
II
The October 2, 2002 meeting minutes indicated that the group discussed Mohammed
al Khatani, a high value detainee suspected of being connected to the September 11, 2001
attacks. A week before the meeting, JTF-170 had assumed the lead on Khatani's
interrogation. 409 By the October 2, 2002 meeting, JTF-170 had already developed an aggressive
interrogation plan for Khatani. .

IITwo days after the meeting, BSCT psychiatrist MAl Paul Burney sent an email to
LTC Banks, stating that "persons here at this operation are still interested in pursuing the
potential use of more aversive interrogation teclmiques ... Were more aversive teclmiques
approved for use in the future by appropriate people, the operation would like to have a few task
force personnel specifically trained in various techniques.,,410 MAl Burney asked whether LTC
Banks knew "where task force personnel could go to receive such training" and whether he knew
of"any consultants who could assist ifany ofthese measures are eventually approved.,,411

_ LTC Banks replied "I do not envy you. I suspect I know where this is coming from.
The answer is no, I do not know of anyone who could provide that training... The training that
SERE instructors receive is designed to simulate that of a foreign power, and to do so in a
manner that encourages resistance among the students. I do not believe that traininf
interrogators to use what SERE instructors use would be particularly productive.,,41

H. DoD Takes Lead on the Interrogation ofMohammed al Khatani (U)


_ According to the Department of Defense, Pakistani authorities captured
Mohammed al Khatani along the Pakistani-Afghanistan border on December 15, 2001 and

408 Email from Mark Fallon to MAl Sam McCahon et aI. (October 28, 2002).
409 _ LTG Joseph Jnge, DEPSECDEF Inquiry Regarding Location o/Inte"ogation Plan/or ISN 063 (August
24, 2006) at 5 (hereinafter "Jnge Report'').
410 Email from MAl Paul Burney to LTC Morgan Banks (October 4, 2002).
411 Ibid.
412 Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAl Paul Burney (October 4, 2002).

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413
turned him over to U.S. forces on December 26, 2001. He was transferred to Guantanamo
Bay on February 13,2002, where he was initially interrogated by JTF170, CITF and FBI
personnel at Camp X-Ray.

_ ( In the summer of2002, Khatani was identified as a possible "twentieth


414
hijacker" ofthe September 11 attacks. From July 27,2002 until September 19,2002, Khatani
was questioned by the FBI. 415 During this period, Khatani was held at the recently built Camp
Delta until August 8,2002 when he was transferred to the Naval Brig at Guantanamo Bay.416
While he was in FBI custody, JTF-170 began drafting an interrogation plan for Khatani.

(U) On September 23, 2002, the CITF Special Agent in Charge sent a memorandum to
CITF's Deputy Commander raising concerns about JTF-170's proposed interrogation plan for
Khatani. The memo stated:

DoD Intelligence personnel contacted FBI [Supervisory Special Agent] in order to


conduct an interview of a detainee assigned to the FBI. The DoD personnel
indicated that they intend to employ the following interrogation techniques: drive
the hooded detainee around the island to disorient him, disrobe him to his
underwear, have an interrogator with an Egyptian accent (it is known among the
detainees that Egyptians are aggressive interrogators and commonly use coercion,
to include maiming) ...

As a law enforcement agency, CITF is clearly prohibited from participating in


these techniques and we also do not want to tum a deaf ear when we learn of
these issues...417

413Memo from COL John Redis (ITF-GlMO Chief ofStafl) to SOUTRCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005),
attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24,2006).
414Khatani was identified as a possible twentieth highjacker after it was determined that he had tried to enter the
U.S. in August 2001 but was detained at the Orlando, Florida airport and later deported. When Khatani arrived at
the Orlando airport. Mohammed .Atta was waiting. JTF-GlMO, Analyst Support Summary (March 18, 2003),
attached as Tab 22 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006).
415 Inge Report at 5.
416Memo from COL John Redis (ITF-GlMO Chief of Stafl) to SOUTRCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005),
attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006); Inge Report at 5.
417 Memo from J.K. Sieber (CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD
Interrogation Techniques Issue (September 23, 2002).
418 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

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(U) While MG Dunlavey's memo stated that the request had "been reviewed by my Staff
Judge Advocate and determined to be legally sufficient," the SJA, LTC Diane Beaver, told the
Committee that she had not been consulted on the interrogation plan and did not recall reviewing
the memo or providing the Commander with guidance regarding the legal sufficiency of the
request. 42S Major General Dunlavey said that he did not recall whether or not he personally
consulted with LTC Beaver, that the letter would likely have been drafted by his Director for
Intelligence, LTC Jerald Phifer, and that it was possible that the statement in the letter that LTC
Beaver had been consulted was based on a representation by his staff. 426

419The memo was provided to the Committee as an appendix to the AR-15-6 Report completed by Lieutenant
General Randall Schmidt and Brigadier General John T. Furlow into FBI allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay
(hereinafter "Schmidt-Furlow Report''). The memo is unsigned but contains a handwritten notation "/I//signed on 1
Oct 02////." Committee staff requested the Department of Defense provide a signed copy or advise the Committee of
any reason why the Committee should not rely on the document. The Department provided neither.
420 Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to ITF-160 Commander, Inte"ogation Plan for ISN 063 (October 1, 2002),
attached as exhibit 40 to Schmidt-Furlow Report.
421 Ibid.

422 Ibid.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
42'Ibid.; Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October 11, 2007); see also Memo from lK. Sieber
(CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD Interrogation Techniques
Issue (September 23, 2002) ("the JTF 170 SJA had not been briefed on the plan prior to her contact with the FBI
SSA When she learned of the plan, she sought guidance from up her chain of command and also sought guidance
from DOD legal and other intelligence agencies. She wants to ensure that even if these techniques are not legally
objectionable, her chain of command is aware that these types of techniques are being utilized and that the personnel
on the ground are properly trained to conduct these techniques.")
426 Committee staff interview ofMG Michael Dunlavey (November 30,2007).

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IIFrom October 2 until October 10,2002, ITF-170 personnel interrogated Khatani.


According to multiple witness accounts, on or about October 5,2002, military working dogs
were brought into the room where Khatani was being interrogated. 427 A summarized statement
oftestimony provided by one ofthe FBI agents present at the time indicated that the FBI
objected to the use of dogs and raised those objections to Mr. Becker, the ITF-170 ICE Chief. 428
In testimony to the Army IG, Mr. Becker acknowledged that he permitted the military working
dog to enter the interrogation in order to raise the detainee's stress level. 429

II Mr. Becker told the Committee that he had authorized dogs entering the interrogation
room on two occasions and that the dog barked but was not pennitted to place its paws on
Khatani. 430 ~lr. Becker also told the Committee that LTC Phifer provided verbal authority for
the dogs to be used in this manner. LTC Phifer recalled discussing dogs with Mr. Becker as a
teclmique because Arabs "saw dogs as a dirty animal and they didn't like them," not because
they should be "used as a fear factor.,,431 LTC Phifer told the Army IG, however, that Mr.
Becker never told him that he had approved the use of a dog during the Khatani interrogation.
However, in written answers to questions posed by Vice Admiral Church, LTC Phifer stated that
dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation and that "[w]e would bring the dog around to within
10 feet [of Khatani] and he would be somewhat Ulmerved by it. We did it to keep him off
balance as well as to enhance security.'.432 Major General Dunlavey said that he did not recall
being aware that a dog was used in the interrogation of Khatani. 433

II( In an October 8,2002 email to his colleague, an FBI agent described ITF
170's interrogation of Khatani, stating that DoD had tried "sleep deprivation," "loud music,
bright lights, and 'body placement discomfort,' all with negative results" and that DoD
interrogators planned to stop the interrogation. 434 Mr. Becker told the Committee that the
interrogation plan did not work and that ITF-170 ceased the interrogation after approximately a
week and moved Khatani back to the Navy brig. 435

427Summarized witness statement of David Becker (March 3, 2005), exhibit 21 to Schmidt-Furlow Report~
summarized witness statement of ENS Mary Travers (February 23,2005), exhibit 33 to Schmidt-Furlow Report;
summarized witness statement of Agent Robert Morton (January 20, 2005), exhibit 36 to Schmidt-Furlow Report;
summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20,2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow Report.
428 Summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20,2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow
Report.
429 Army IG, Interview of David Becker (September 20,2005) at 30.
430 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17,2007).
431 Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 13.
432Responses of LTC Jerald Phifer to questionnaire of VADM Church (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those
written answers whether LTC Phifer was referring to the use of dogs in ITF-170's October 2002 interrogation of
Khatani or in the subsequent interrogation of Khat ani that began in late November.
433 Committee staff interview of Major General Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).
434 Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2002).
m Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

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(U) Another FBI agent reflected upon the failed interrogation in his own email of October
8, 2002, observing that "I think we should consider leaving him alone, let him get healthy again
and do something 'different. ",436

IV. GTMO Seeks Authority to Use Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U)

A. GTMO Requests Counter-Resistance Techniques Influenced by SERE (U)

(U) On October 11, 2002, just days after the JTF-170 moved Khatani back to the Navy
Brig and shortly after meeting with the ChiefCounsel ofthe CIA's CounterTerrorist Center
Jonathan Fredman, LTC Phifer submitted a memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Dunlavey
requesting approval to use "counter-resistance" interrogation techniques. 437 LTC Phifer's
memo was largely drawn from the October 2, 2002 memorandum that the GTMO Behavioral
Science Consultation Team (BSCT) had written upon their return from the JPRA training at Fort
Bragg. 438 The memo requested approval for three categories of progressively more aggressive
interrogation techniques, many of which were similar to techniques used at SERE schools to
increase U.S. soldiers' resistance to illegal enemy interrogation. 439

(U) Ofthe three categories of proposed techniques, those in Category I were the least
aggressive. Category I proposed yelling at the detainee and using certain "techniques of
deception," such as using multiple interrogators or having an interrogator "identifY himself as a
citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh
treatment of detainees. ,,4040

(U) The proposed Category II techniques were more aggressive and included several
techniques similar to those used in SERE schools, such as stress positions, isolation, deprivation
oflight and auditory stimuli, using a hood during transport and questioning, removal of clothing,
and using detainees' individual phobias to induce stress. 441

II
An August 19,2002 email from LTC Beaver reflected discussions among JTF-170
staff about stress positions, which she said resulted in an agreed upon policy of "no stress

436 Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2(02).
437Memo from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Requestfor Approval ofCounter-Resistance Strategies
(October II, 2(02) (hereinafter LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Requestfor Approval ofCounter-Resistance
Strategies').
438MAl Burney told the Army IG that the October II, 2002 memo "wasn't the exact same document that we had
written but the general structure and overall organization-a lot of the things did remain intact from our original
brainstorm to what was eventually requested." Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (August 21, 2(07) at 11.
439 The October 11 memo also stated that "current guidelines for interrogation procedures at GTMO limit the ability
of interrogators to counter advanced resistance." LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, RequestforApproval of
Counter-Resistance Strategies".
440 Ibid
441Additional Category II techniques included use of falsified documents or reports, interrogating the detainee in an
environment other than the standard interrogation booth, use of 20 hour interrogations, removal of all comfort items
(including religious items), switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs, and forced grooming. Ibid

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positions" at GTMO. 442 When asked how stress positions came to be included in LTC Phifer's
memo, given the agreement referenced in her earlier email, LTC Beaver said that she did not
know, but added that LTC Phifer later advocated for their use. 443 LTC Beaver said that she
relied on Mr. Becker and LTC Phifer to decide which techniques to put in the memo and that she
never commented or changed their drafts. 444

(U) The proposed Category III techniques in the October 11, 2002 request were the most
aggressive and included the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or
severely painful consequences were imminent for him and/or his family; exposure to cold
weather or water; the use ofa wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of
suffocation; and the use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the
chest with the fmger, and light pushing. 44S According to the October 11,2002 memo, Category
III techniques "and other aversive techniques, such as those used in u.s. military resistance
training or by other U.S. government agencies" would be utilized to interrogate "exceptionally
resistant detainees," which LTC Phifer estimated as "less than 3%" of the detainees held at
GTMO. 446

(U) Two ofthe Category III techniques in LTC Phifer's memo - the use of phobias and
the use ofthe wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation - were not
derived from the October 2,2002 BSCT memo. 447 CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman, however, had
reportedly discussed both ofthese techniques during his October 2, 2002 meeting with GTMO
personnel, noting that the use ofphobias was "very effective" and that the use ofthe "wet towel
technique" makes a body react as is if it's suffocating. 448 Mr. Becker told the Committee that he
(the ICE Chief) may have recommended adding those two techniques to the request for
authority. 449
4So
(U) LTC Phifer said that he drafted his memo with Mr. Becker.Mr. Becker, however,
told the Committee that he was provided a draft only after it was nearly complete. He said that

442Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, Review ofDepartment ofDefense Detention Operations and Detainee
Inte"ogation Techniques (March 7,2005) (hereinafter "Church Reporfj at 109 (citing email from LTC Beaver
(August 19, 2002)).
443 LTC Beaver told the Committee that LTC Phifer advocated the use of stress positions in the interrogation of
Mohammed al Khatani (discussed below). Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9,2007).
444 Ibid.
44' LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Requestfor Approval ofCounter-Resistance Strategies.
446 Ibid.
447 The use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning appears to describe
waterboarding. The Navy is the only service that used waterboarding in SERE training. which it ceased in
November 2007.
448Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 5 (The CTC Chief Counsel explained that if a "well-trained
individual is used to perform" the "wet-towel technique," it can "feel like you're drowning. The lymphatic system
will react as if you're suffocating but your body will not cease to function.")
449 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
4'0 Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).

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THE Inter-American Senate Investigations into CIA
on Human Rights byInterrogation Programs
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se

he thought the techniques memo was "stupid," though he did not share his view with LTC Phifer
at the time. 451 LTC Phifer told the Committee that he was uncomfortable with the idea of using
some ofthe techniques in his memo but that MG Dunlavey pressured him to fmish the request. 452

B. GTMO StaffJudge Advocate Conducts "Legal Review ofAggressive


Interrogation Techniques" (U)

(U) The October 11, 2002 techniques memo was accompanied by a cover memo and
legal briefwritten by GTMO's Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) LTC Diane Beaver. The cover
memo stated simply that ''the proposed strategies do not violate applicable federal law.,,453

(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she drafted the legal brief with her staff over the
course of the 2002 Columbus Day weekend. 454 She told the Committee that she had not seen
either ofthe legal memoranda produced by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel on
August 1, 2002 and that she did not receive input on the legal brief from anyone outside of
GTMO. The minutes ofthe October 2, 2002 meeting with CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman,
however, reflect that LTC Beaver was present when he discussed the Torture Convention (and
the federal law implementing the treaty). In that discussion, Mr. Fredman described "severe
physical pain" as "anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body partS.,,455 The
idea that "severe physical pain" constituting torture had to rise to the level of "organ failure,
irnpainnent of bodily functions or even death" had been discussed in the OLC legal memo of
August 1 2002, known as the First Bybee memo. 456

(U) LTC Beaver began her analysis ofthe "aggressive" techniques by stating that the
"detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay ... are not protected by the Geneva
Conventions.'.457 LTC Beaver stated that the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense "had not
adopted specific guidelines regarding interrogation techniques for detainee operations at GTMO"
and she dismissed the longstanding guidance on interrogation of detainees contained in the Army
Field Manual (FM) 34-52 as not binding. 458

m Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).


m Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).
Memo from LTC Diane Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Review ofAggressive Interrogation
453
Techniques (October 11, 2002).
454 Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).
m Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3.
Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards of
456
Conductfor Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002).
457 Memo from LTC Diane Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter
Resistance Strategies (October II, 2002) (hereinafter" LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies").
458 The SJA concluded that because the techniques in the Army FM 34-52 are "constrained by, and conform to the
Geneva Conventions and applicable intemationallaw," and that the Geneva Conventions do not apply as a matter of
law, the Field Manual was "not binding." See LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies
at 1.

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(U) In her memo, LTC Beaver stated that U. S. obligations under the Convention Against
Torture restricted only those cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts that were also prohibited by the
"current standard articulated in the Eighth Amendment" against "cruel and unusual
punishment. ,,459 The memo concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques would be
consistent with the Eighth Amendment standard so long as any force used could "plausibly have
been thought necessary ... to achieve a legitimate governmental objective and it was applied in a
good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.,,460

(U) LTC Beaver also concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques would not
violate the federal anti-torture statute so long as they were not specifically intended to cause
severe physical pain or suffering or prolonged mental harm. LTC Beaver conducted her analysis
with the "assum[ption] that severe physical pain [would not be] inflicted" and "absent any
evidence that any ofthese strategies [would] in fact cause prolonged and long lasting mental
harm.,,461 LTC Beaver told the Committee that she did not conduct any research to determine
whether the use of the techniques described in the accompanying request for authority would, in
fact, result in long-term mental harm. 462

II ( The October 2, 2002 BSCT memo, however, had specifically cautioned that
the techniques "could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health ofthe
detainee ... [and that] physical and/or emotional harm from the ... techniques may emerge
months or even years after their use.,,463

(U) LTC Beaver also found that some ofthe proposed tactics would constitute a "per se
violation" ofthe Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article that prohibits military
personnel from committing assault, and could violate the Article that prohibits military personnel
from communicating a threat.464 As a result, LTC Beaver said it would be "advisable to have
permission or immunity in advance from the convening authority for military members utilizing
these methods.,,465 In a November 4,2002 letter to the Joint StaffJ-5, the Marine Corps
commented on the SJA's recommendation to convey "permission or immunity in advance,"
noting that "[w]e are unaware of any authority that would allow a convening authority to give
'permission or immunity' in advance to commit a criminal violation.,,466 Likewise, military
lawyers from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School later said that LTC
Beaver's "proposal to immunize interrogators, given that a number ofthe proposed techniques in

459 LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 2.


460 Ibid. at 5.
461 Ibid.
462 Committee staff interview ofLTC Diane Beaver (November 9,2007).
463 BSCT, Counter-Resistance Strategies (October 2, 2002).
464 LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 5.
465 Ibid.
466 Memo from Marine Corps Service Plarmer to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques
(November 4, 2002) see also Section IV D, infra.

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issue constituted violations of the UCMJ, was not only unprecedented, but lacked any basis in
law.,,467

(U) Based on her legal review, LTC Beaver recommended that the "proposed methods of
interrogation be approved," but that interrogators be trained to use the methods and that
"interrogations involving category II and III methods" undergo a legal, medical, behavioral
science, and intelligence review prior to commencement.468

(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she called the SOUTHCOM Staff Judge
Advocate COL Manny Supervielle, like?, on Sunday, October 10, 2002 and sent SOUTHCOM a
draft of the legal memo that same day.46 She said that she told COL Supervielle that she "really
needed some help" but that she received no comments from SOUTHCOM prior to submitting the
final memo the next day. 470 LTC Beaver said that she also talked to the Legal Counsel to the
Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CAPT Jane Dalton and asked for her help, but was told that
she should talk to COL Supervielle. 471 CAPT Dalton said that she did not recall that
conversation with LTC Beaver.472 LTC Beaver also told the Committee that MG Dunlavey did
not comment on drafts of the memo and that she did not discuss it with him after it was
completed. 473

C Chain o/Command Considers the Request/or Interrogation Techniques as


CITF and FBI Raise Objections (U)

(U) On October 11, 2002, MG Dunlavey submitted LTC Phifer's memo and LTC
Beaver's legal analysis to General James Hill, the Commander ofthe United States Southern
Command (SOUfHCOM). He also sent his own memo requesting approval to use the
interrogation techniques. 474 MG Dunlavey wrote:

I am fully aware of the techniques currently employed to gain valuable


intelligence in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Although these
techniques have resulted in significant exploitable intelligence, the same methods
have become less effective over time. I believe the methods and techniques
delineated in the accompanying J-2 memorandum will enhance our efforts to
extract additional infonnation. Based on the analysis provided by the JTF-170

467Lt Col Kantwill et al., Improving the Fighting Position, A Practitioner's Guide to Operational Law Support to
the Interrogation Process, 2005 Army Lawyer (July 2(05) at 12, 14.
468 LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 7.
469 Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2(07).
4'71l SASC Hearing (June 17, 2(08); Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9,2007).
471 SASC Hearing (June 17, 2(08).
471 Ibid.
473 Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2(07) .
474Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to USSOUTHCOM Commander GEN James Hill, Counter-Resistance
Strategies (October 11, 2002) (hereinafter "MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies. '')

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SJA, I have concluded that these techniques do not violate u.s. or international
475
laws.

(U) On October 25,2002, GEN Hill forwarded the JTF-170 request to Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Richard Myers, with a memorandum stating that "despite our best
efforts, some detainees have tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods.,,476 He
continued: "[0]ur respective staffs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Task Force
170 have been trying to identify counter-resistant techniques that we can lawfully employ.'.477
When later asked, GEN Hill could not recall whether SOUTHCOM ~roduced a written opinion
analyzing the GTMO request separate from LTC Beaver's opinion. 4 8

(U) As to techniques in the GTMO request for interrogation techniques, GEN Hill said
that he "did discuss the topic of SERE training in a general manner with MG Dunlavey.,,479
Years later, in a June 3, 2004 press briefing, GEN Hill noted the influence ofthe Fort Bragg trip
and SERE school techniques on the request, stating:

The staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to


our SERE school and developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided
and looked at, said were OK. I sent that list oftechniques up to the Secretary and
said, in order for us to get at some of these very high-profile, high-value targets
who are resistant to techniques, I may need greater flexibility. But I want a legal
review of it and you to tell me that, policy-wise, it's the right way to do
business.480

(U) In his October 25, 2002 memo, GEN Hill stated that, although he believed Categories
I and II techniques were "legal and humane," he was uncertain about techniques in Category III
and was "particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death ofthe detainee
or his family.'.481 Nevertheless, GEN Hill said that he "desire[d] to have as many options as
possible at [his] disposal" and asked that Departments of Defense and Justice attorneys review
the Category III techniques. 482

m MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies.


476Memo from GEN James Hill to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffGEN Richard Myers, Counter-Resistance
Techniques, (October 25,2002) (hereinafter "GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques. 'J
477 GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques.
47ll GEN James 1. Hill answers to July 31,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (August 20,2008).
479 Ibid.
480 June 3, 2004 Media Availability with Commander U.S. Southern Command.
481 GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques.
482GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques; In testimony to the Army IG, the SOUTHCOM Commander
said that he thought the request "was important enough to where there ought to be a high level look at it... There
ought to be a major policy discussion of this and everybody ought to be involved." Army IG, Interview of GEN
James T. Hill (October 7, 2005), at 7.

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(U) One SOUTHCOM Assistant Staff Judge Advocate LTC Mark Gingras testified to the
Army IG that lawyers for SOUTHCOM had concerns about Category II and Category III
techniques. 483 Regarding the GTMO request for techniques, LTC Gingras told the Anny IG:

As lawyers we're talking about adherence to the rule of law being important, and
that's what we're trying to tell everybody as we travel around the world to these
other countries. That's paramount to democracy. And so suddenly we look like
we're brushing this aside or we're twisting the law. The feeling was that decision
makers within the Pentagon didn't much care about that. They cared about
winning the War on Terrorism. And ifthat meant you had to pull out fmgernails
you'd pull out fmgernails, figuratively speaking.484

D. Military Services React to GTMO Request/or Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) On October 30,2002, after receiving Gen Hill's memo and the GTMO request, the
Joint Staff J-5 requested that the military services comment on the request. 485

(U) On November 1,2002, the Air Force responded, expressing "serious concerns
regarding the legality of many ofthe proposed techniques" and stating that "some ofthese
techniques could be construed as 'torture,' as that crime is defmed by 18 U.S.C. 2340.'.486 The
Air Force memorandum added that, with respect to potential prosecutions, the use ofCatego~
III techniques would "almost certainly" result in any statements obtained being inadmissible. 87
The memorandum stated that admissibility of evidence obtained using Categories I and II
techniques, the latter of which included stress positions, the use of dogs, removal of clothing, and
deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli, among other techniques, would be "fact specific, but
the same concerns remain. ,,488 The Air Force memo continued: "Additionally, the techniques
described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military
order to treat detainees humanely... Implementation of the proposed techniques would require a
change in Presidential policy.,,489 The memo stated that the Air Force "concurs in the need to
conduct an in-depth legal and policy assessment, as recommended by [the SOUTHCOM
Commander], prior to implementation of the proposed counter-resistance interrogation
techniques.,,490

(U) On November 4, 2002, the Navy responded to the Joint Staff's request for comment,
stating that it "concur[red] with developing a range of advanced counter-resistance techniques,"

483 Army IG, Interview of LIe Mark Gingras (October 11, 2005) at 20.
484 Ibid.
48~ Joint Staff Action Processing Form (SJS 02-06697), Counter-Resistance Techniques (October 30,2002).
Department of the Air Force Memo for UN and Multilateral Affair Division (1-5), Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance
486
Techniques (November 1, 2002).
487 Ibid. at 1.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid. at 2.
490 Ibid. at 1.

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but recommending "a more detailed interagency legal and policy review be conducted on the ...
proposed techniques.,,491

(U) That same day, the Marine Corps submitted its written comments, which concluded
that "several ofthe Category II and III techniques arguably violate federal law, and would
expose our service members to possible prosecution.,,492 The Marine Corps memo stated that the
use ofthe techniques would also create "exposure to criminal prosecution under the UCMJ.,,493
Again, Category III techniques included the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee
that death or severely painful consequences were imminent for him or his family, exposure to
cold weather or water, use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of
suffocation, and non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking and light pushing. 494
Category II included such techniques as stress positions, deprivation oflight and auditory
stimuli, the use of a hood during questioning, 20 hour interrogations, removal of clothing, and
the use of detainee phobias, such as dogs, to induce stress. The memo also stated the Marine
Corps "disagree[d] with the position that the proposed plan is legally sufficient.,,495

(U) A few days later, the Army submitted comments from both the Office of the Judge
Advocate General (OTJAG) and the CITF. 496 The Army's cover memo stated that "Army
interposes significant legal, policy and practical concerns regarding most of the Category II and
all ofthe Category III techniques proposed" and that the Army "concurs in the recommendation
for a comprehensive legal review ofthis proposal in its entirety by the Department of Defense
and the Department of Justice.,,491 The OTJAG's memorandum, which was attached, stated that
Category III techniques "violate the President's order [on humane treatment] and various UCMJ
articles" and that the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely
painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family and the use of a wet towel and
dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation "appear to be clear violations ofthe
federal torture statute.,,498 The OTJAG memorandum also stated that Category II techniques of
stress positions, deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli, and using individual phobias to induce
stress "crosses the line of 'humane' treatment, would likely be considered maltreatment under

491 Department of the Navy Memo for the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (1-5) Joint Staff, Navy
Planner's Memo WRT Counter-Resistance Techniques (SJS 02-06697) (November 4, 2002).
492 Memo from Marine Corps Service Planner to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques
(November 4,2002).
493 Ibid.
494 LTC Phifer to MG Dunlavey, Requestfor Approval ofCounter-Resistance Strategies.
m Memo from Marine Corps Service Planner to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques
(November 4, 2002).
496Memo from the Army Deputy to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Joint Affairs) to
the Joint Staff, J-51UNMA [UN and Multilateral Affairs Division], SJS 02-06697 (November 7,2002); Memo from
Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate (International and Operational Law) to The Office of the
Army General Counsel, Review-Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques (undated) (hereinafter "DAJA(IO)
Memo for Army General Counsel. Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques.")
497 DAJA(IO) Memo for Army General Counsel, Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques.
498 Ibid.

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Article 93 of the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], and may violate the Federal torture
statute.,,499 The memo continued that that removal of clothing and forced grooming "may be
considered inhumane" if done only for interrogation pu~oses and stated "if we mistreat
detainees, we will quickly lose the moral high ground." 0 The Army concurred with GEN
Hill's request for a legal review before techniques were adopted. 501

(U) Military lawyers were not the only personnel to object to GTMO's request for
aggressive techniques. CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon told the Committee that it was
CITF's view that the techniques proposed by JTF-170 would actually strengthen, rather than
weaken, detainee resistance. He explained:

Our view was that employing techniques that validated [the detainees] prior
training and adverse views would serve to harden resistance and reinforce what
they had been told to expect... We pointed out that SERE school tactics were
developed to better prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations and not
as a means of obtaining reliable information. CITF was troubled with the
rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations would be the
basis for the utilization oftechniques to obtain information. 502

(U) CITF's legal view was reflected in a November 4,2002 memo from CITF Chief
Legal Advisor MAJ Sam McCahon, which was also attached to the Army's response to the Joint
Staff. MAJ McCahon wrote:

[Category] III and certain [Category] II techniques may subject service members
to punitive articles of the UCMJ... CITF personnel who are aware of the use or
abuse of certain techniques may be exposed to liability under the UCMJ for
failing to intercede or report incidents, if an inquiry later determines the conduct
to be in violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice or 18 U.S.C. 2340. 503

(U) MAJ McCahon also raised concerns about the impact ofthe techniques on
evidentiary proceedings:

One detainee subjected to these techniques could taint the voluntary nature of all
other confessions and information derived from detainees not subjected to the
aggressive techniques. 504

499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
502 Responses of Mr. Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006) at 7.
503 Memo from CITF Chief Legal Advisor MAl Sam McCahon to CITF Commander, Assessment of.TFF-170
Counter-Resistance Strategies and the Potential Impact on CrrF Mission and Personnel (November 4, 2002)
(hereinafter "McCahon to CDR CITF, Assessment of.TFF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies.'j
504 McCahon to CDR CITF, Assessment of.TFF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies.

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(U) MAl McCahon added that "[b]oth the utility and legality ofapplying certain
techniques" in the October 11, 2002 memo are "questionable," and recommended that CITF
personnel not participate in or even observe the use of aggressive techniques. 505 MAl McCahon
concluded:

I cannot advocate any action, interrogation or otherwise, that is predicated upon


the principle that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are not aware
of how we conduct our business. 506

(U) MAl McCahon told the Committee that his memorandum prompted a subsequent
meeting at the Pentagon. 507

(U) When the October 11,2002 GTMO request arrived in the DoD General Counsel's
office, DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson said
that she was asked to provide her thoughts on the request. Ms. Davidson said that she had a brief
conversation with Mr. Haynes where she told him that the GTMO request needed further
assessment. 508 Mr. Haynes stated that he did not "recall that specifically.,,509

E. Department ofDefense General Counsel Quashes Joint StaffLegal Review (U)

(U) When the October 11,2002 GTMO request arrived at the Joint Staff, CAPT Jane
Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chainnan ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it was "obvious to
[her] that there were some legal issues" with the request. 510 She said that techniques in Category
II ofthe request "needed to be looked at closely" and that Category III techniques "had
significant, significant concerns." 511 CAPT Dalton found LTC Beaver's legal analysis
''woefully inadequate" and said it relied on a methodology and conclusions that were "very
strained.,,512 Rather than simply deny the request, however, CAPT Dalton said that "she owed it
to the combatant commander to do a full and complete review.,,513 She subsequently directed her
staffto set up a secure video teleconference with representatives from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the Army's intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), and GTMO to find out more infonnation about the techniques in the request and
to "begin discussing the legal issues to see if we could do ... our own independent legal
analysis.,,514

505 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Committee staff interview ofMAJ Sam McCahon (June 15,2(07).
508 Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (May 23, 2008).
509 SASC Hearing (June I7, 2(08).
510 Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2(08) at 33.
m Ibid. at 45.
m Ibid. at 41.

m Ibid. at 33.
514 Ibid. at 34.

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(U) CAPT Dalton recalled making Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
Myers aware of the concerns expressed by the military services. 515 The Chairman said, however,
that he did "not specifically recall the objections ofthe Services being raised" to his attention at
that time. 516

(U) CAPT Dalton also recalled that her staff briefed the DoD General Counsel's office
about the concerns submitted by the military services and that the General Counsel himself "was
aware ofthe concerns.,,517 In a February 2008 interview, DoD Associate Deputy General
Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson recalled that the service comments were made
available to the General Counsel's office. 518 DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes stated, however,
that he "did not recall seeing" the memos at that time and "didn't know they existed.,,519 He
stated that he did not recall being infonned by anyone that the military services had concerns
about the legality of Category II techniques in the request and that he did not have a "specific
recollection" of CAPT Dalton making him aware that there were concerns about the legality of
techniques in the GTMO request. 520

(U) According to CAPT Dalton, after she and her staff initiated their analysis, CJCS GEN
Myers directed her to stop that review. CAPT Dalton said that GEN Myers returned from a
meeting and "advised me that [DoD General Counsel] Mr. Haynes wanted me ... to cancel the
video teleconference and to stop" conducting the review because of concerns that "people were
going to see" the GTMO request and the military services' ana1~sis of it. 521 According to CAPT
Dalton, Mr. Haynes "wanted to keep it much more close hold." 22 When CAPT Dalton "learned
that [the DoD General Counsel] did not want that broad based legal and policy r.eview to take
place," she and her staff stopped their review. 523 This was the only time that CAPT Dalton had
ever been asked to stop analyzing a request that came to her for her review. 524

_ CAPT Dalton recalled that prior to bein~ directed to stop the review, her staffhad
begun writing draft comments on the GTMO request. 52 An undated draft of a memorandum
from GEN Myers to SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill, analyzing the October 11, 2002

m SASC Hearing (Jooe 17, 2008).


516 Responses of General Richard Myers to written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30, 2008).
m SASC Hearing (Jooe 17, 2008).
518 Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (February 21, 2008). Ms. Davidson said in a subsequent interview
that she was not aware of the military services' comments before discussing the October II, 2002 GTMO request
with the DoD General Counsel. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (May 23,2008).
519 SASC Hearing (Jooe 17,2008).
520 Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 163-65.
m Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 34.
522 Ibid. at 35.
523 SASC Hearing (Jooe 17,2008).
524 Ibid.
m Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 37.

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GTMO request, stated "We do not believe the proposed plan is legally sufficient.,,526 The draft
memo stated that "several ofthe Category III techniques arguably violate federal law, and could
expose interrogators to possible prosecution" under the federal anti-torture laws. 527 The draft
stated that techniques in the request "may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the
requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely" and recommended an
"in-depth technical, policy, and legal assessment" ofthe techniques prior to their
implementation. 528

(U) GEN Myers said that he had "no specific recollection" of discussing with CAPT
Dalton her efforts to conduct an analysis of the October 11, 2002 GTMO request. 529 He said
that while he "did not dispute" asking her to stop working on her analysis and acknowledged that
Joint Staffrecords indicated that she did stop work on her analysis, he had "no recollection or
doing so" and did "not recall anyone suggesting" to him that she stop her review. 530 DoD
General Counsel Jim Haynes said that while it was "possible" that the issue could have come up
in a conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he did not "recall that specific
conversation" or expressing any opinion ofany kind with respect to CAPT Dalton's review. 531

F. GTMO and JPRA Plan for Additional Interrogation Training (U)

_ While GTMO's request for approval to use aggressive interrogation techniques was
pending, JPRA staff was developing an agenda for possible follow-up training for interrogation
personnel at GTMO.

In mid-October 2002, JPRA developed a plan of instruction to provide training on the


techniques to GTMO interrogators. 532 The training plan was virtually identical to a draft agenda
developed for the Fort Bragg training ofGTMO personnel that took place in September, which
included instruction ofthe ''use of physiological pressures.,,533

(FODO) David Becker, the GTMO ICE Chief, told the Committee that once they
received authority to use the techniques in the October 11, 2002 memo, GTMO interrogators
would need training on the techniques. 534 A draft message order circulated between GTMO and
JPRA staff in late October requested "mission critical training support" for "approximatelyll

'26 Draft memo from CJCS Richard Myers to Commander, United States Southern Command, Counter-Resistance
Techniques (undated).
mIbid.
,:zs Ibid.
'29 Responses of GEN (Ret.) Richard Myers to April 16, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30,
2008).
'30 Ibid.
m Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 168.
m Memorandum From Joseph Witsch to JPRNCC, JPRNCD, JPRNCOS, JPRNOSO, Plan ofInstruction (POI)
for TF-170 Training Support (October 16, 2002).
'33 See Section III D, supra; Plan ofInstruction (pOI)for TF-170 Training Support (October 16, 2002).
'34 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

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personnel" at GTMO. 535 The draft message order stated that the training would "provide the
necessary tools ITF-GTMO interrogators require to accomplish their mission critical tasks. 536

_( A November 15,2002 staffmemo to the Joint Staff J-2 stated that ITF
GTMO had requested training on the SERE school techniques and that the trainers were
expected to arrive in the ftrst week of December.537 The JPRA Operational Support Office
(OSO) Chief Christopher Wirts told the Committee that the requirement for JPRA to provide the
training was never approved and that his agency never conducted the training. 538 However, in
January 2003, two instructors from the Navy SERE school, John Rankin and Christopher Ross,
travelled to GTMO to train interrogators on the use of physical pressures, including slapping,
walling, and stress positions. 539

v. Command Change at Guantanarno as Dispute over Aggressive Techniques


Continues (U)
A. Major General Geoffrey MiUer Takes Command ofJTF-GTMO (U)

(U) In November 2002 a new Commander, MG Geoffrey Miller, took command of ITF
GTMO. At the time, MG Miller had no ftrst-hand experience with detainees or
interrogations.540

(U) MG Miller told the Committee that prior to taking command, he met with
SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill and his staff. 541 During those meetings, MG Miller got the
impression that MG Dunlavey, the previous Commander, had bypassed the chain of command
by raising issues directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense staff. MG
Miller told the Committee that GEN Hill authorized him to speak directly with the Joint Staff
and the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, but that he told SOUTHCOM he would keep
SOUTHCOM informed ofthose communications.542

(U) MG Miller said that, while he was in Command at GTMO, he had direct discussions
with the DoD General Counsel's office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC).543 MG Miller also testifted to the
Army IG that he and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz ''talked once a week when I

m Email from Chris Wirts to , Richard Driggers, Joseph Witsch, and Gary Percival
(October 29,2002) (hereinafter ..Email from Chris Wirts (October 29,2002).")
536 Email from Chris Wirts (October 29,2(02).
m ITF-170 and ITF-l60 were combined to form JIF-GTMO in October 2002; Memo from to
[Joint Stafl], GTMO Detainee (November 15, 2002).
m Committee staff interview of Chris Wirts (Januaty 4, 2008).
m See Section VII C, infra.
540 Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 5.
541 Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.

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was in Guantanamo.,,544 Lt Col Ted Moss, the ITF-GTMO ICE Chiefwho began his tour of
duty at GTMO in December 2002, said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was in phone contact
with MG Miller "a 101.,,545 However, MG Miller told the Committee that he misspoke when he
testified to the Army IG and that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not speak to Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz on the phone while he was at GTMO, but only briefed him quarterly, in
person, on GTMO operations.546

(U) Shortly after MG Miller arrived at GTMO, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) LTC
Phifer informed him ofthe October 11,2002 request 547 Although he later approved an
interrogation plan that included reference to Category III techniques, MG Miller told the Army
IG that he believed that the techniques in Category III and some techniques in Category II were
"overly aggressive" and that he had not intended to use them. 548 MG Miller said he had concerns
with stress positions, removal of clothing, and use of dogs, among other techniques.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that those techniques were used at GTMO while he was in
command. MG Miller told the Committee that he thought he discussed his concerns about the
techniques with LTC Beaver in early November before the Secretary approved their use, but that
he did not raise it with SOUfHCOM because he wanted to see which techniques would be
approved.549

(U) MG Miller told the Army IG that when he arrived at GTMO, there was significant
tension between JTF-GTMO, CITF, and FBI and that he sought to get all three organizations to
work in concert. 550 Despite MG Miller's stated intent, his decision to approve an interrogation
plan for Mohammed al Khatani that was opposed by the CITF and FBI, drove a deeper wedge
between his organization and both CITF and FBI.

B. Khatani Interrogation Plan Fuels Dispute Over Aggressive Techniques (U)

(U) After their unsuccessful interrogation of Khatani in October 2002, JTF-GTMO staff
spent several weeks drafting an extensive new interrogation plan. The plan was the first "Special
Interrogation Plan" at GTMO and it would encounter strong resistance from both CITF and the
FBI. One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that he thought Khatani's interrogation would
defme the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO and therefore they "had to get it right.,,55