You are on page 1of 458

Page 1 of 458

[G.R. No. 131282. January 4, 2002.] lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. acquiescence or even by their express consent. Even if
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and private respondent actively participated in the proceedings
BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents. before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
properly invoked against him because the
question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime
Sua & Alambra Law Offices for petitioner. and at any stage of the action.
Gerardo M. Maglinte for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
SYNOPSIS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY
In a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership EVIDENCE; XEROX COPIES ARE WITHOUT
filed by petitioner Gabriel L. Duero against private EVIDENTIARY VALUE. — Petitioner through counsel
respondent Bernardo A Eradel and two others, private submitted to this Courtpleadings that contain inaccurate
respondent was declared in default for failure to file his statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition, we find that to
answer. As a consequence, judgment was rendered in bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding
favor of the petitioner. Private respondent filed a Motion for that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed
New Trial, but was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, to Annex E of his petition which supposedly is the
he filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San
same ground as in his motion for new trial. But the said Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note:
petition was denied by the trial court. In a motion for Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But it
reconsideration, he alleged that the Regional appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification
Trial Court (RTC) had no jurisdiction over the case since but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property.
the value of the land was only P5,240. Again, it was denied Nowhere does the document contain a notation, "Note:
by the trial court. Private respondent filed a Petition Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The also asked this Court to refer to Annex F, where he said
appellatecourt gave due course to the petition by the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m.,
maintaining that private respondent was not estopped from thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, this petition. complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the
The Court could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that
the RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the

Page 2 of 458

these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for
obviously without evidentiary weight or value. entry ofjudgment and a writ of execution. Under these
circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in
4. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION;
overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL; AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE
was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
THAT IS BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND REMEDIAL. — While
regional trial court.
participation in all stagesof a case before the trial court,
including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES
relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging ONLY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In holding
the court's jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from
an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the
and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must
its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication
applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that
giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a his complaint before a court without appropriate
tool of injustice. jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is
still pending before the proper administrative agency
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In
concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on
the present case, private respondent questions the
jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein
jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal
could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction
grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the
and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private
complaint against private respondent and two other parties
respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that
before the said court, believing that the RTC had
he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his
jurisdiction over his complaint. But by
motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become
controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within
effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the
the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in
RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. . . . Note
estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his
that private respondent raised the
avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case.
issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already
Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he
on appeal, but when the case was still before the RTC that
would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED
ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well
Conflict Case No. 1029 would remain unresolved. Such
as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two
eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an
motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to
reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for

Page 3 of 458

injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the 9. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; IF THE COURT HAS NO
land he now occupies as tenant-lessee. AEScHa JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DEFENDANT HAS
JUSTIFIABLE REASON NOT TO FILE AN ANSWER. —
7. ID.; ID.; NOT A QUESTION OF ACQUIESCENCE AS A
Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case,
MATTER OF FACT BUT AN ISSUE OF CONFERMENT
no error was committed on this score by respondent
AS A MATTER OF LAW. — The fundamental rule is that,
appellate court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit
acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a
was properly his landlord's concern.
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The
appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should
have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. DECISION
Even if private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine ofestoppel
cannot still be properly invoked against him because the QUISUMBING, J : p

question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime
and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a This petition for certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated
general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a September 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an No. SP No. 2340-UDK, entitled Bernardo Eradel vs. Hon.
issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil
nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, Case No. 1075, Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo
barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances. Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional
Trial Court ofTandang, Surigao del Sur.
8. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT;
DECISION OF A COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS The pertinent facts are as follows:
NULL AND VOID. — Indeed, ". . . the trial court was duty-
bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private
jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a respondent Bernardo Eradel 2 entered and occupied
'lawless' thing." Since a decision of a court without petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-
jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become 302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As
final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed
would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private
to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was respondent that the land was his and requested the latter
in order. to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead

Page 4 of 458

threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated that he turned over the complaint and summons to
demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had
refusal to leave the land. a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any
adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a
motion for new trial.
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No. 1029, an administrative
and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo,
Petitioner appended to the complaint the aforementioned Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the
tax declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for Office of the Regional Director of the
extension to file their Answer and was given until July 18, Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas executed a Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR
compromise agreement, which became the trialcourt's Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996.
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC
In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty.
a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same
Eusebio Avila, entered into a Compromise Agreement with
allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that
herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the agreement
unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he
stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves
could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that
to respect the ownership and
the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the
possession of Duero. 3 Herein private respondent Eradel
heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable
was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in
parties, were not impleaded.
default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.4
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13,
Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio
1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor,
who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for
and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate
Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
and turn over Lot No. 1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay
petitioner P2,000 annual rental from 1988 up the time he On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying
vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorney's fees and the the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for
cost of the suit. 5 Private respondent received a copy of the Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged
decision on May 25, 1996. that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the
value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for
under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On
New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as
November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for
a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained
reconsideration.

Page 5 of 458

On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for II.
Execution, which the RTC granted on January 28. On . . . PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY
February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT
27, 1997. On March 12, 1997, private respondent filed his SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. THEREFROM.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, III.
maintaining that respondent is not estopped from assailing . . . THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS
the jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED. 7
del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his
Motion for Reconsideration And/Or The main issue before us is whether
Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it
follows: held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that
private respondent was not estopped from assailing the
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions
Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in
before it. The secondary issue is whether
"Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et al. Civil
Case 1075" filed in the Court a quo, including its the Court of Appealserred in holding that private
Decision, Annex "E" of the petition, and its respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint was
Orders and Writ of Execution and the turn justified.
over of the property to the Private Respondent At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through
by the Sheriff of theCourt a quo, are declared
counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that contain
null and void and hereby SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition, 8we
find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred
SO ORDERED. 6 in holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner
Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that pointed to Annex E 9 of his petition which supposedly is the
the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note:
that: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994". But it
appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification
I. but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property.
. . . THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE Nowhere does the document contain a notation, "Note:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE. Subject for General Revision Effective 1994". Petitioner
also asked this Court to refer to Annex F, 10 where he said

Page 6 of 458

the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and
thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the not merely its equitable enforcement. 14 Hence, estoppel
complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a
these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are tool of injustice. 15
obviously without evidentiary weight or value.
In the present case, private respondent questions the
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal
respondent appellate court acted with grave grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the
abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is complaint against private respondent and two other parties
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment before the said court, 16 believing that the RTC had
which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. jurisdiction over his complaint. But by
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to then, Republic Act7691 17 amending BP 129 had become
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio
hostility. 11 But here we find that in its decision holding that Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito
the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and that Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did
private respondent was not estopped from questioning the not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer
jurisdiction of the RTC, the complaint, private respondent was declared in default.
respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and
its decision is grounded as well as the law and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the
jurisprudence on the matter. 12 Its action was neither suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he
whimsical nor capricious. stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he
had a better right than petitioner over the land
Was private respondent estopped from questioning that
because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted
jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement
possession as bona fide tenant-lessee of the land. 18 But
with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While
his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He
participation in all stages of a case before the trial court,
filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment.
including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved
relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging
for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for
the court's jurisdiction, 13 we note that estoppel has
Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's
become an equitable defense that is both substantive and

Page 7 of 458

lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that circumstances. 23 The Court of Appeals found support for
private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, its ruling in our decision
not when the case was already on appeal, but when the in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
case was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, . . . The point simply is that when a party
denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in
judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider cognizance of the same, such act may not at
that denial of private respondent's motion for relief from once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It
judgment, it went on to issue the order for could have been the result of an honest mistake,
entry of judgment and a writ of execution. or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal
provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party
taking such course of action, part of the blame
Under these circumstances, we could not fault should be placed on the court which shall
the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the
that private respondent was not estopped from questioning
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever
rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an it appears that the courthas no jurisdiction over
action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
their silence, acquiescence or even by their express Rules of Court) Should the Court render a
consent. 19 Further, a party may assail the judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment
jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the may be impeached or annulled for
proceedings and even on appeal. 20 The appellate court did lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid.),
not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself within ten (10) years from the finality of the
barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private same. [Italics supplied] 24
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before Indeed, ". . . the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial
said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to
invoked against him because the do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing." 25
question of lack ofjurisdiction may be raised at anytime and
at any stage of the action. 21 Precedents tell us that as a Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and
general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a void, it could logically never become final and executory,
question ofacquiescence as a matter of fact, but an hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be outof the
issue of conferment as a matter of law. 22 Also, neither question. Resort by private respondent to a petition
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order.
a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional

Page 8 of 458

In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable
from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that
appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must he believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.
be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The
petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1075
his complaint before a court without appropriate
entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that
jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is
private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner,
still pending before the proper administrative agency
and the Writ of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED and
concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on
SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner. aCSDIc
jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein
could not be expected to know the nuances ofjurisdiction SO ORDERED.
and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private
Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that
he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his |||

motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within
the jurisdiction of the municipal trialcourt. To hold him in
estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his
avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case.
Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he
would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED
Conflict Case No. 1029 would remain unresolved. Such
eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an
injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the
land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
Having determined that there was no grave
abuse of discretion by the appellate court in ruling that
private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in
detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the
circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this
score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no

Page 9 of 458

[G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003.] November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a
complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court(Branch
ANTONIO 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible entry and unlawful
T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APP detainer against 43 named defendants and "all unknown
EALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO occupants" of the subject property. 3
BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral
THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month
CAPARAS, ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere
DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they
ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them
GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER a written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said
IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case
LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA against them. 4
PIMENTEL, AURELIO G. ROCERO,
ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private
AND NARCISO YABUT, respondents. respondents, 5 for brevity) filed a consolidated Answer
dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-
payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be
DECISION evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees
security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject
property; and that there was a negotiation for the
purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to
Before us is a "petition for review on certiorari" filed on July continue payment ofrentals and tendered payment to
17, 1997 which should be a petition for certiorari under petitioner's counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while
Resolutions 1 dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. 2 Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
The factual background of the case is as follows: MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994 against
the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate
Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly
real property located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, and severally P10,000.00 per month from the date they last
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131793 paid their rent until the date they actually vacate, plus
issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila on

MORE. petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 47) of Manila (RTC). Decision 8 dated July 5.7 In a I. 1997. Hence. Rule 6 of the Revised Internal SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF Rules of the Court ofAppeals (RIRCA). Reconsideration. Y ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION Undaunted." 17 prejudice. (b) the only SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE decision but copies of the pleadings and other material PROCEEDINGS A DULY portionsof the record as would support the AUTHENTICATED allegations of the petition are not annexed. 1997 the CA denied the Land Reform Law. 15 judgment 6 on the same day sustaining their rights under In a Resolution 16 dated June 23. 11 attaching thereto a photocopy of the B. paragraph b. 28-91. in NO. the RTC sustained the RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVEL decision of the MeTC. the present petition anchored on the following Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as grounds: against the private respondents. the MeTC issued a separate petitioner.000. contrary CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM to Section 3. 28-91. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY theCA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the COMPLIED WITH certification of non-forum shopping was signed by SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR petitioner's counsel and not by petitioner himself. docketed as CA-G. 1996. 41394.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. 9 and. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by COMPLIED WITH SECTION 3. As original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by to the 20 private respondents. petitioner filed a petition for review with BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity). as well as reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated P10. or on April 22. INTERNAL petitioner filed a Supplement 14 to his motion for RULES OF THE COURT OF APPE ALS. Page 10 of 458 interest thereon at the legal rate allowed by law. MORE. BECAUSE: SP No. PETITIONER violation ofRevised Circular No. petitioner himself 12 and the relevant records of the MeTC RULE 6 OF THE REVISED and the RTC. PETITIONER . In a Resolution dated March 21.R. 1997. petitioner filed a Motion for UNITED STATES. A. as not duly warranted by the facts and ruling that "petitioner's subsequent compliance did not cure circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without the defect in the instant petition. 1997. 10 SIGNED AND EXECUTED IN THE On April 17. declaring petitioner's cause of action petitioner's motion for reconsideration and its supplement. 13 Five days later.

IN THIS REGARD. FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DUE COURSE. THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED BRANCH 47. PROPERTY. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC MANILA. Page 11 of 458 SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED DURING THE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT PENDENCY OF THE RULING THAT TENANTS PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE UNDERP. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS OTHER GROUNDS FOR APPEAL. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS EVEN IF THE TERM OF THE LEASE IS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED END OF EACH MONTH. REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE A. THE SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT RULES OFPROCEDURE MUST THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. 1517 MAY BE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE EVICTED FOR NON- CASES BELOW. PAYMENT OF RENT. THAT PRIVATE IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD. TERMINATION OF LEASE OR C. RULING THAT THE ALLEGED "PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE II. LOSE SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT GIVEN B. COMMITTED REVERSIBLE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY MANILA. LOT THEY OCCUPY" DOES NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVEL APPLY WHERE THE Y ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT ALL THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. AS IN THE CASE AT BAR. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS RESPONDENTS' NON- SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE . BRANCH 26.ScTaEA III. AND HE STANDS TO EJECTMENT. C.D.

more G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEAST REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT P10. the petition is meritorious.D. or DOES NOT BAR THE the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with EVICTION OF PRIVATE grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or RESPONDENTS. RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A E. RESULT IN THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVEL WAIVER OF PROTECTION Y ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT AGAINST EVICTION.000. INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 18 FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON- GOING NEGOTIATION FOR THE Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid SALE OF THE SUBJECT rules of technical procedure is called for in view of the PROPERTY AND THAT IT attendant circumstances showing that the objectives of the RENDERS THE rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule EVICTION OF PRIVATE requiring material portions of the record be attached to the RESPONDENTS PREMATURE.000. PLUS COSTS. SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT decision of the CA is a petition for review RULING THAT THE ALLEGED on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. is one of jurisdiction. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVEL Y ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT F.00 PER MONTH FROM THE DATE RULING THAT PRIVATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE SAME. petition have not been glaringly violated and. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS importantly. 2016 SINCE THE ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID. However. GOVERNMENT HAS NO V. the proper remedy available to the . RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED EXPENSES OF LITIGATIONOF AT LEAST REVERSIBLE ERROR IN P20. Page 12 of 458 CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW IV. subject of the recourse. WITH ENTITLED TO PROTECTION LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE UNDER P. CASE FOR CONSIGNATION if the error.00. excess ofjurisdiction.

it falls within the ambit of a special civil counsel of record may be unaware of such action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is so because the promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. or on July Anent the first issue. the other hand. the applicable rule is the mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be three-month reglementary period. 23 The Court has ruled that with respect to the At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals. On We find the instant petition partly meritorious. which error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. in order to determine 17. 1997 and fourteen days later. 22 It provides that the petitioner himself must correctible only by the extraordinary make the certification against forum shopping and a writ of certiorari. 24 . orwith the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his the Court in Fortich vs. Page 13 of 458 aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule April 17. 1997. An error of judgment is one which the court may We now go to the merits of the case. As enunciated by period. violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. 21 Petitioner received notice of the disregarded. officer or a quasi-judicial certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before body without or in excess of jurisdiction. i. the prevailing rule is the newly compliance may be availed of. He filed his motion reconsideration on circumstances. it is necessary to draw a line between an petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15. is well-within the period of extension granted to him.e. 28-91. requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its rendered on March 21. and not. he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or file a "petition for review" which was granted by us. 1997. However. but it does not thereby interdict substantial assailed CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review compliance with its provisions under justifiable on April 4. using up only thirteen days of the 90-day 65 of the said Rules. an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by The requirement regarding the need for a the court. 1997. commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. This error is No. 1997. fact. established by altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely jurisprudence. the rule on substantial on July 17.Corona: 19 motion on July 3. contents of the certification. 1997. 1997.. 20 (Emphasis supplied). even the petition.

Under Section 3. the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. 29 At any We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically rate. we find that petitioner has adequately reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which explained his failure to personally sign the certification calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. Diaz 32 and Piglas-Kamao vs. the CA may require certification. Court of Appeals.S. does not justify the outright dismissal of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself petition. that is. cogent reason to depart from this doctrine. to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary. "a litigation is not a filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner game of technicalities. Rule 6 of the RIRCA. Thus. U. 35 Technical rules of procedure should be used to In like manner. 28 the CA may require the parties resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street." 34 When technicality deserts its himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance. for him to travel from reconsideration. paragraph day reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA.. We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping. We find no which justifies relaxation of the rule.C. 31 the Cour Virginia.S.A.27 The subsequent Needless to stress. U. the CA had were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to orderly administration of justice. pro function of being an aid to justice. which Truly.A. interest of substantial justice.. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the in his motion for reconsideration. 30 In Jaro vs. Virginia. should not be interpreted lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate the expense of a just resolution of the case. National before the Philippine Consul.S. petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent material portions of the records below with his motion for to the petitioner in the United States. the failure of the petitioner to comply with promote. in dismissing the petition for review. 25 petitioner has aptly appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit drawn the Court's attention to the physical additional documents as may be necessary in the impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15. In submitting the petition.A. to . Roanoke. and legitimate objective 26 which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping. While the swift Section 3. U. the Court is justified in hac vice. in order to sign the certification Hernandez vs. not frustrate justice. were he to personally accomplish and sign the and if the petition is given due course. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in t reiterated the doctrine laid down in Cusi- Washington. exempting from its operations a particular case. D. and for him to send back the Labor Relations Commission 33 that subsequent petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary submission of the missing documents with the motion for period. paragraph b. Page 14 of 458 The petition for review filed before the CA contains a append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other certification against forum shopping but said certification material portions of the records as would support the was signed by petitioner's counsel.

Hon. SP No. trials or further proceedings. otherwise better served. Filomeno Arcepe. should be determined on the merits. et al. The petition on the merits without need of remanding the case Resolutions dated March 21. 129638. The case is REMANDED to alleged "priority right to buy the lot they occupy" does not the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G. 2016 since the Trial Court of Manila. the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. nor is the subject property located within a zonal (Donato v. what should guide judicial action is known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Judge of the Regional be entitled to protection under P. Court of Appeals 37 is worth echoing: "cases the petition for review filed before it. Branch 47. entitled. 40 as in within its original and appellate jurisdiction.R. to wit: that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the him to lose life. We are not persuaded. 41394. pursuant to imperfections. or to receive rather than on technicality or some procedural evidence. the ends of justice would be the last paragraph of Section 9. In that way. B. receive technicalities. documents. 41394 are detainer are present in the case.P. ||| improvement area. Donato vs. No. after full opportunity to it is empowered to require parties to submit additional all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses. these do not bar the eviction of respondents. 39 This guideline is especially true when the evidence and perform any and all acts necessary petitioner has satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling the requirements in his motion for reconsideration. honor or property on mere power to try cases and conduct hearings. petitioner prays that we decide the present WHEREFORE.R. that respondents cannot T . The ." government has no intention of acquiring the subject property. as it may find necessary. In addition. including the power to grant and conduct new this case.D. These issues are best addressed to the CA in in Republic vs. to promote the ends of justice. as in the case. Page 15 of 458 unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective. 462 PHIL 676-693) negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending case for consignation of rentals. and. apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the No. Court of Appeals. "Antonio subject property. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present petition for certiorari. 2003]. 129. These are matters that are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action The Court's pronouncement for certiorari. to the CA. G. that assuming that there is a [December 8." 38 Thus. No. Blg. He insists that all the elements of unlawful 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. issues involved are factual issues which inevitably require granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.R. 1997 and June 23. As an appellate court. 36 the weighing of evidence. He further argues that the REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

this instant petition. INC. the Supreme Court ruled that while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total SYNOPSIS nullity and may be assailed at any stage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and HON. Petitioners filed before JESENA. The CA denied the petition and the subsequent motion for Marmen B. alleging that the trial court had no HOMES. 18 so they continued with the did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court's jurisdiction construction of their house. vs. represented by WILSON jurisdiction to try the case. quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract Petitioners then started the construction of their house. DEFENSOR. Second ordered petitioners to pay damages. Page 16 of 458 [G. However. In denying the petition. 18 and 19 and raise the issue of jurisdiction — and it was only because demanded from private respondent that their said decision was unfavorable to them. Private respondent refused. Judge. in the on Lot No. as Manager. RENE GONZAGA and reformation of contract and damages with the Regional LERIO GONZAGA. JR. reconsideration filed by petitioners.CAHTIS The Solicitor General for public respondent.. Trial Court.] executed with respect to Lot No. Not even once offered to buy Lot No. as private respondent proceedings before the trial court. it was petitioners Lot No.. the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for annulment of judgment premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. 19 and was mortgaged to the Social Security themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a Commission (SSS) as security for their housing loan. RTC. In the case at bar. petitioners defaulted during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered Petitioners purchased a parcel of land from private the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its respondent Lucky Homes. Petitioners asserted their cause from the start to finish. Sabio for petitioners. was only after the trial court rendered its decision and Consequently. Iloilo City. 2002.R. not against private respondents. Lot No. writ of execution was issued by the trial court. 18. 19 but on Lot No. Daquilanea for private respondent. It in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. December 27. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and after issued a writ of execution against them did petitioners first which petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. Manila. Hence. petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall Judicial Region. specifically denominated as jurisdiction. petitioners vigorously mistakenly identified Lot No. COURT OF APPEALS. 19. and LUCKY writ of execution. Petitioners thus contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be . 18 as Lot No.. 144025. Thereafter. Branch 36. QUIRICO G. 18. Inc. HON. a Division. No. so petitioners filed an action for SPS. respondents. It appeared that. Sixth Subsequently. Salvador T. petitioners.

THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT WHICH RENDERED THE DECISION WILL BAR PARTIES FROM 2. CASE AT BAR..Court of Appeals. Court ofAppeals. decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction... Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. Thus. ID. Petitioners jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action should bear the consequence of their act. be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy. in the proceedings before the trial court. repudiate. — In the case at bar. ID. REMEDIAL LAW. ID. the court's authority to grant affirmative relief. Salva vs. Court of Appeals. petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to As we held in the leading case of Tjam vs. "It has been held that a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first party cannot invoke the jurisdictionof a court to secure raise the issue of jurisdiction — and it was only because affirmative relief against his opponent and." and attacking it for lack ofjurisdiction if not. but for the reason that such a practice can not decision and then accepting the judge but only if favorable. Natio DECISION . effectively QUESTION THEREOF MAY BE RAISED AT ANY estops such party from later challenging that same court's STAGE OF THE CASE BUT ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN jurisdiction. ACTIONS. which includes invoking 1. Province of Bulacan vs. Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. in Orosa vs. or estoppel by deed or by record. or question that effectively waived their right to question the court's same jurisdiction . JURISDICTION. . [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed. They cannot be or of the parties was not important in such cases because allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and the party is barred from such conduct not because the prejudice of the private respondent. It proceedings in the court which rendered the order or appears that. Ang Ping vs. . It was only after speak of estoppel in pais. . — [W]hile an order or was petitioners themselves who invoked the decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for may be assailed at any stage. This Courtfrowns upon judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for adjudication. Petitioners thus or failing to obtain such relief. Page 17 of 458 effectively waived their right to question the court's nal Steel jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed. . Not even once did petitioners ever raise the "A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question issue of the court's jurisdiction during the entire in different ways and for different reasons.. Sibonghanoy: finish. after obtaining said decision was unfavorable to them. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. . Corporation vs. the trialcourt rendered its decision and issued a and of estoppel by laches. active participation in the reformation of contract against private respondents. it ATTACKING ITS JURISDICTION. Court of Appeals. Thus we proceedings which lasted for two years. ID. this Court affirmed the SYLLABUS rule that a party's active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court.

defendant will be petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore from SSS. 2000 in CA-G. 19 Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and was foreclosed. specifically denominated as Lot No. trial court reads as follows: spouses purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes. Page 18 of 458 CORONA. 19 but on Lot Thereafter TCT No. situated in Iloilo and "Aware of such fact. which was docketed as Civil Case No. 54587. 18 in order to widen their premises. private issued in favor of SSS. contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be "The logic and common sense of the situation executed with respect to Lot No. This prompted petitioners to file. even if petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot allowed. as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18. 19 was foreclosed by (sic). Inc. petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as No. construction of their house. petitioners earlier proposed by the plaintiff. '9') was 18 as Lot No. an action for reformation of contract and damages which parcel of land has been properly indicated . 18. However. Consequently Lot 19 housing loan.000 as moral damages and another P10. 18 and subsequently foreclosed by SSS. Lot No. petitioner. informed obtaining. 28254 and was mortgaged to likewise defaulted in the payment of his loan with the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their the SSS involving Lot 19.000 as attorney's fees. T-29950 was cancelled and No. Consequently. Upon realizing its error. dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and ordering 1999 and its resolution dated June 1. It is house was built therein. sometime in 1970. SP herein petitioners to pay private respondent the No. The pertinent conclusion of the The records disclose that. the trial court 2 rendered its decision decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 29. 17115. Upon the other hand. on June 13. Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the On January 15. 19 under Transfer Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and Certificate of Title (TCT) No. After Lot No.. This being the situation respondent.R. as well as Lot 19 and demanded from private respondent that their 18 where his house is presently standing. Thus. defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. considering that their lean heavily in favor of the defendant. in lieu thereof TCT No. otherwise. through its general manager. 1998. J : p with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. ASTDCH amount of P10. the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on containing an area of 240 square meters. T-86612 (Exh. is no longer continued with the construction of their house. 19. private respondent evident that what plaintiff had bought from the refused. Said lot was the proposal that he would also buy the same. 28254 1996. the reformation ofinstruments. plaintiff will be SSS and petitioners' certificate of title was cancelled and a unjustly enriching himself having in its favor both new one was issued in the name of SSS. Branch 36. not on Lot No. feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the owner of Lot 19. Petitioners then started the was foreclosed and sold at public auction. However.

Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to not important in such cases because the party is decide Civil Case No. it should be stressed that petitioners are the plaintiff. Thus. 17115. relying mainly on the xxx xxx xxx jurisprudential doctrine ofestoppel as laid down in the "It has been held that a party cannot invoke the case of Tijam vs. Because it is not an appeal. repudiate. petitioners filed decisions of this Court have already abandoned the an urgent motion to recall writ of execution. . HIDCTA a question in different ways and for different reasons. petitioner- party from attacking its jurisdiction. besides the plaintiff failed the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here. while an order or decision rendered without (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). the Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment. [T]he question the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by whether the court had jurisdiction either of the applying the principle of estoppel. 1999. a writ of execution was issued by the Petitioners claim that the recent trial court. On June 22. 17115. but for the reason . on September 17. Sibonghanoy. Likewise. to assail the contracts on mutual mistake. . Sibonghanoy. 1998. on June 30. or estoppel by deed or by record." 3 propriety of the decision rendered by the trial court. there is no need to delve into the the same need no longer be reformed. Page 19 of 458 in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by At the outset. The contracts being clear and seeking from us the annulment of a trial court judgment unmistakable. 4 jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and. Sibonghanoy: 6 annulment of judgment. active participation in the proceedings in petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such with the HLURB. barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication. 1998. In countless decisions. they reflect the true based on lack of jurisdiction. 5 We do not the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was agree. even if the Regional subject matter of the action or of the parties was Trial Court. intention of the parties. 1999. or denied. and of estoppel In a decision rendered on December 29. hence Accordingly. alleging that doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. As we held in the spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for leading case ofTijam vs. by laches. premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case "A party may be estopped or barred from raising No. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais. Conformably. contending that question that same jurisdiction . this Court has consistently vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board held that. stage. after obtaining or Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been failing to obtain such relief. petitioners filed this instant petition.

it was petitioners themselves who WHEREFORE. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. 144025. HTAEIS were invoking all along. ||| proceedings which lasted for two years. 14 There is no denying Corporation vs. It is now too estops such party from later challenging that same court's late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they jurisdiction. the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Court of Appeals. in utter disregard of the elementary . It was only after [December 27. No. 442 PHIL 735-742) the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writof execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction — and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. 9 N condemn any double-dealing by parties who are disposed ational Steel to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent Corporation vs. Panganiban. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court's jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed. Instead. Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio- trial court. Court of Appeals. 7 Ang Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly Ping vs. concur.R." judgment but only if favorable. respondents. Court of Appeals. 12 this Court affirmed the that. Page 20 of 458 that such a practice can not be tolerated — submitting his case for decision and then accepting the obviously for reasons of public policy. start to finish. lack ofjurisdiction if not. Court of Appeals. petitioners never raised the rule that a party's active participation in all stages of the issue ofjurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the case before the trial court. 13 Thus. It appears that. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court's jurisdiction during the entire (Sps. effectively themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. Gonzaga v. 2002]. in the proceedings before the Puno. invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private SO ORDERED. 8 Salva vs. 10 Province of Bulacan vs positions. JJ. in this case. which includes invoking trial court. Court of Appeals. and attacking it for Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. they voluntarily and willingly submitted the court's authority to grant affirmative relief. ThisCourt frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party . in Orosa vs. G. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals.. ETHIDa In the case at bar. petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from Morales. 11 PNOC Shipping and Transport principles of justice and good faith.

as well as the under Presidential Decree No. 1990. 1990. 1 The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military On March 19. On February 6. Philippine Currency. When apprised of the said order. Branch 21. February 5. 90- ARNEL ESCOBAL. assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt DECISION Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .00) PESOS. 2004. willfully. mother of This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance the deceased victim. SR.respondents. 1847. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. He petitioner from the service until the case was terminated. Presiding Judge of the this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Regional Trial Court of Naga City. J : p caused his death. a member of the Armed Forces of the suspending the petitioner from the service Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary. Presiding Bombita. 1991. mortal and fatal wounds which CALLEJO. the RTC issued an Order preventively Academy. Naval. 124644. and within the jurisdiction of David C. Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. 21. with intent to kill. Atty. and as a consequence thereof. NUECA. 3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad FRANCIS GARCHITORENA.45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious. 1992 operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Café Bar Special Order No. Jr. Luz N. and Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. in the City of of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan. The Justice of the Sandiganbayan. did. the petitioner was conducting surveillance Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6. On No. Nueca. an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City. unlawfully and feloniously attack. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other. Branch 21. Executive Clerk That on or about March 16.R. accusatory portion of the amended Information reads: DcCITS Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez. 1990. preventively suspending the and Restaurant located along Barlin St.. resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. suffered actual and of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction compensatory damages in the amount of filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 the records of Criminal Case No. Naga. 90-3184 to the Regional (P367. Naga City. petitioner. complainant LUZ N. moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND The petition at bench arose from the following milieu: (P135. Hon. docketed as Criminal Case No. 971.D.] 1991. Page 21 of 458 [G.. Nueca. 91. HON. 2 somehow got involved in a shooting incident. dated June 1.000. the General March 16.95) PESOS. Branch Waiver. No. . then and there. Philippine Currency. as amended by P. vs.107. Philippines.

while accused Bombita remained at large. Page 22 of 458 The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by On October 28. (e) the offense was served the same. Asuncion. 1994. by counsel. pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 408. his drunk when the crime was committed. suspension. the the performance of his official function. he was at the Sa Harong Café Bar and 1994.. 13 the . and. 12 Motion to Dismiss 8 the case. 6 the PNP Region V Headquarters Restaurant. 5 in relation with the petitioner's motion. 6975. the trial court issued an Order declaring Philippines v. No. (b) the offense 25. According to the prosecution. 1994. The RTC denied the motion on petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of March 9. added that upon the enactment of R. (d) the petitioner suspension should last for only 90 days. He alleged that under R. 3 the petitioner. they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was Pending the resolution of the motion. the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. The compassionate justice. It. the prosecution manifested that Motion to Quash 4 the Information alleging that as it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection mandated by Commonwealth Act No. the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p. Presidential Decree No. Pulido. on December 23. on February 22. The petitioner commenced the his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the presentation of his evidence. and the Benjamin Cariño and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated prosecution rested its case. the petitioner filed a In the preliminary hearing. 1994. 7975." 11 wrote Judge David C. 1991.m. 6975. 1995. the petitioner on June not wearing his uniform during the incident. 9 he argued that since he that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in committed the crime in the performance of his duties. not the RTC. Philippine Constabulary. The trial court Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. he should now be reinstated. preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his When arraigned on April 9. 1991. had petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members with the performance of his duties as a member of the and officers. et al. having was in the company of civilians. pursuant to Mission Order No. No. The RTC did not reply. assisted office as a member of the PNP. It reasoned that it had already to Section 1. The the motion to dismiss.A. (c) the petitioner was reinstatement. to conduct surveillance of the order of suspension. Thus. 1993. 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his was committed just after midnight. Thereafter. the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting Restaurant at Barlin St. ordered the conduct of a petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty. however. the court martial. he filed a aforestated date. the RTC issued an Order 10 denying the RTC.. He alleged that he had served on alleged drug trafficking. No. and. on March 15. Citing Republic of the On July 31. and that its evidence showed that the ofR. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioner's For his part.A. 7 Trial thereafter proceeded. On July 20. 1990.A. On committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Café Bar and September 23. Naga City. 1822 and Section 95 rested its case.

which was enacted on March 30. He asserted that R. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider duty as member of the then Philippine the exceptions to the prohibition. Constabulary. the al. No. office. and. It likewise considered Luz of this case. from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re- not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or Amended Information and to allege that the offense by Section 4(a)(1). reiterating that based on his testimony and hearing. Page 23 of 458 issue had become moot and academic. 1995. G. he was on official mission when the shooting (2) After the filing of the Re-Amended occurred.R.A. 7975. was committed by the Accused in the performance of his On November 24. et The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca. Asuncion.. 7975 and the ruling of applied retroactively. No.A. No. to wit: the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions. 1994: mother of the victim. to thereafter The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an transmit the same. and The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration 15 of it is hereby declared that after preliminary the said order. No. nor in relation to his office. this Court has found that the offense those of Benjamin Cariño and Roberto Fajardo. through counsel. the Order dated July 31. It declared that based on the petitioner's receipt hereof. 1995. No. within fifteen (15) days from 1995 Order. (3) thereof. WHEREFORE.A. evidence. 16 the Supreme Court in Republic v. 7975. to the Sandiganbayan. 7975. together with the Nacario Nueca's admission in her complaint before the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire . the complete records controverting evidence thereto. 180208. categorically and (1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the to file a Re-Amended Information People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on alleging that the offense charged an official mission when the crime was committed. conformably to R. could not be Conformably with R. office. Asuncion 14 and R.A. The trial court nevertheless charged was committed by the petitioner in the ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his to the ruling in Republic v. 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED. the offense charged in the Information herein was committed charged was committed by him in relation to his official by the accused in his relation to his function and functions. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce Information. March 11. as well as the complete records with the allegation that the offense charged was not committed by stenographic notes. the RTC made a volte face and duties/functions or in relation to his issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31. The amendatory PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged shooting happened.

R. to return the records of members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below Criminal Case No. 7975 should not be applied jurisdiction over the case. 7975 had already taken The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the effect. 7975provides that crimes committed by Atty. 7975. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez. No. 1861 and Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV. for the petitioner to continue 7975 should be applied retroactively.A. Under Section 4(a) . dismiss on July 31. considering that the petitioner retroactively.D. only those cases where had already rested its case and the petitioner had trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC. the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand Upon the remand of the records.A. 90-3184 to the court of origin. by R. and the crime was committed while in the for appropriate proceedings. It asserts that R. In contrast. as amended by P.D. the Presiding Justice of the although P.D. the RTC set the case for of the case to the RTC. P. It reasoned that under P. the latter court should court.A. information was filed with the RTC on February 6. No. trial on May 3. 1606.A. petitioner. 1991. 17 performance of his duties. Manila. by the time it resolved petitioner's motion to remanding the records of the case to the RTC. are hereby of the decree. with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion through its Clerk of Court. 1606 was still in effect. 1995. because had a salary grade of "23. No. 7975. the Sandiganbayan had exclusive ordered transmitted immediately to jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged the Honorable Sandiganbayan. Thus. No. the amendment thus 1606.A. This is so. 1996." Furthermore. the prosecution under Section 7 ofR. Branch 21. No. the law should be given retroactive effect. No. 18 the RTC retained introduced by R. the court of origin. He further asserts that On January 8. Although the presenting his evidence.D. following effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial the rule on continuity of jurisdiction. 1996. RTC of "27" committed in relation to office are within the exclusive Naga City. as amended by R. temporal. the petitioner asserts. continue with the case and render judgment therein after The private complainant agrees with the contention of the trial. The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the The petitioner contends that when the amended remand of the case to the RTC. jurisdiction of the proper RTC. No. No. Page 24 of 458 proceedings herein.EHTIcD Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave The Ruling of the Court abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC. Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. assailing the by the petitioner when the amended information was filed Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan with the RTC. No. No.A. Instead of adducing his evidence.

for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive corresponding to a salary grade below "27. it is essential that may be. for six (6) years. as the case public officers in relation to their office. 1861. or a fine of P6. 3019.00 . 21 Under the law. ordered the elevation of the records to the No. 6758.000. Metropolitan Trial Court. . It bears stressing that R. otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. No. including those employed in shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial government-owned or controlled Court. 1379.A.D. as under Section 2 of the law: amended. pursuant to their respective penalty prescribed by law is higher jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. whether simple or Court. The jurisdictional and the discharge of his duties. as the complexed with other crimes." He was charged with homicide alleged in the Information. 1995. In the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of this case. or PNP officers (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by occupying the rank of superintendent or higher. as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. Section 2.D. shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. No. even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position However. Republic In cases where none of the principal accused are Act No. The trial court erred when it Under Section 4(a) of P. it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to case continues until the case is terminated. with the offender and the discharge of official duties must be salary grade "23. . and Chapter II. the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector. than prision correccional or imprisonment 129. and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in Sandiganbayan. grade "27" or higher. the RTC had in the Information that the crime charged was committed by exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably . where the case may be.D. 22 The amended Information filed with Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any commencement of the action. 19Such jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the 24. public officers and employees in relation or their equivalent. 1606 was already in effect and (1) Violations of Republic Act No." the proper jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court. unless such statute provides allegation showing the intimate relation between his office for a retroactive application thereof. No. Page 25 of 458 The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is the offender in relation to his office because that would be determined by the allegations in the Information or the a conclusion of law. 1606 as amended by P. Municipal Trial corporations. occupying positions corresponding to salary Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. It is not enough to merely allege punishable by reclusion temporal. 20 include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. . exclusive jurisdiction thereof to their office. Hence. the RTC had requirements must be alleged in the Information. all cases involving the following: 7975 amending P. Hence.

the petition is LOLITA R. 155001. Page 26 of 458 to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. BOÑE. No.A. petitioners. ASSOCIATION (PALEA). HIZON.A. CONRADO G. DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.] amended by Section 2 of R. It bears B. AGAN. REUEL E. 129. HILARIO. MAMERTO law which may be applied retroactively. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA. No. BIENVENIDO C. DIMALANTA. INC. MIASCOR WORKERS UNION-NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU).respondents. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES JJ. May 5. REUNILLA.. No. MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION. stressing that R. Austria-Martinez and Tinga. JOSEPH be applied retroactively has no legal basis. Quisumbing. 7691.. INC. concur. 7975 should not DEMOSTHENES P. DISMISSED. MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION. in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications.. No. 23 S. vs. JOSE MARI B. No pronouncement as to costs. MORY V. CLARA. as [G. and Puno. The petitioner's contention that R. 7975 is a substantive procedural MANUEL ANTONIO B. and MIASCOR . REMEDIOS P.R. ADOLFO. DIMAANO. SO ORDERED.. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING.A. CATAHAN. MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION. MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION. 2003. DOMALAON. MACROASIA-EUREST SERVICES.. JR.

2003. 2003. GAERLAN. LEANDRO M. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS. Erfe for petitioners in G. Jose Espinas for MWU-NLU. Lim Law Office for Asia's Emerging Dragon etc. CEFERINO C. PROSPERO A. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT INC. Bernas for petitioners in G. SECRETARY SIMEON A. in his capacity as Head of the Department of Public Works and Salonga Hernandez & Mendoza for petitioners in G. DEPARTMENT OF AUTHORITY.R. VIRGIE CATAMIN [G. PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS JARAULA. MACARANBON. Angara Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz for petitioners- in-intervention. EDUARDO C. petitioners. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS. MENDOZA. ALFREDO B. DE LEON. in his capacity SECRETARY LEANDRO M. NOGRALES. May 5. NANTES. VALENCIA. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G. MENDOZA. DATUMANONG. and Communications.. WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA. DINA C. Page 27 of 458 LOGISTICS CORPORATION. RAFAEL P.. HARLIN Jose E. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY. SECRETARY PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS. 155547. INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO. CLAVEL A. MA.] RONALD SCHLOBOM. JR. 155661. ANGELITO SANTOS.R. respondents. in as Head of the Department of his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Transportation and Communications.R. ZIALCITA. 155001.. RAMON M.. . Highways.R. PICHAY. LUISA M. INC. petitioners-in. No. [G.petitioners. 155547. No. PALCON and SALACNIB F. vs. 155661. MA. vs. SALES. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO. BATERINA. respondents-intervenors. LOPEZ. LEONARDO DE LA ROSA. intervention.. No. PROSPERO C. Erwin P. PHILIPPINE (SMPP). TERESA V. Marigondon for PALEA. JACINTO V. PARAS.R. and BENASING O.] Arthur D. No. CAST ABAYON. Jose A. No. May 5. respondents.

the Amended and Restated Concession or transferee. This in effect would make the Government Agreement (ARCA) and three Supplements thereto were liable for PIATCO's loans should the conditions set forth in . for respondents- compelled government expenditure without appropriation. On October 5. The Court ruled that in accordance with the provisions (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the of R. for PIATCO. the maximum amount that Government for the development of Ninoy Aquino Security Bank. Congressmen Salacnib Baterina. a disqualified bidder. signed by the Government and PIATCO. Jr. 1997. However. workers of the international airline service providers. Raymund C. the Pre-Qualification Bids and and void. And several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition SYNOPSIS docketed as G. Clavel Martinez and Mario E. Consequently. de Constantino Jaraula. Awards Committee (PBAC) had prequalified the Paircargo Consortium to undertake the project. 155661 assailing the legality of these agreements. Later.. alleging that the said contracts Castro & Angelito S. On July 12. Paircargo As to the validity of the agreements.R. the ARCA obligates Consortium incorporated into Philippine International the Government to pay for all loans. The Paircargo Consortium was the only company prescribed minimum equity investment which is 30% of the that submitted a competitive proposal.08% of the project cost. filed before this The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for MIAA. project cost. as amended. as one of the members of the Paircargo International Airport International Passenger Terminal III Consortium could validly invest. Lazaro. after considering the maximum amounts that endorsed to the National Economic Development Authority may be validly invested by each of its members. The total net worth. Lenders and the latter fails to appoint a qualified nominee Thereafter. which. Jr. Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the said agreements. Jr. Manas. Later. therefore of the Paircargo arrangement pursuant to RA 6957. Thus. And for failure of AEDC obligations arising out of financial facilities extended to to match the price proposal submitted by PIATCO. the service providers joined their cause. No.A. the Chavez & Laureta & Associate and Moises Tolentino.R. Court a petition for prohibition docketed as G. is null Consortium. the should PIATCO default in its loan obligations to its Senior Government signed the 1997 Concession Agreement. 337. The Solicitor General for public respondents. is only 15% of its entire net (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer worth. reviewed and approved it for 6. in turn. Ongkiko. (PIATCO). Fernando F. No. Page 28 of 458 Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & Delos Angeles. It was Consortium. AEDC questioned. 155547. intervenors.R. filed a similar petition docketed as G. No. the award of the contract by the PBAC among others. as amended. advances and Airport Terminals Co. is only (NEDA). the financial capability of Paircargo to the Paircargo Consortium. 155001. 1994. which substantially less than the bidding. the PIATCO for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project project was awarded to PIATCO. No.

ID... terminal is no doubt an undertaking imbued with public 2. the Amended and Restated Concession subsisting concession agreements between MIAA and Agreement and the Supplements thereto were set aside for petitioners-intervenors and service contracts between being null and void. PARTIES. FINANCIAL PREJUDICE IS A interest. v. Moreover. It must despite the clear statutory prohibitions against a direct appear that the person complaining has been or is about to government guarantee would only make a mockery of be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully that the BOT Law seeks to prevent. ID. REMEDIAL LAW. DIRECT AND PERSONAL.. not only are not unmindful of the cases of Imus Electric Co. ID. This is a form of direct government direct injury as a result of its enforcement. ID. petitioners-intervenors in these cases are legitimate INTEREST OF PERSON ASSAILING THE interests sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE MUST BE to file the instant petitions. Thus. Another thing. — Standing is a assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some presentation of issues upon which the court so largely cases. to show. CIVIL PROCEDURE.. it has been held that the interest of government act but by concerned citizens. The Court also ruled entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens that the operation of an international passenger airport or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. the 1997 Concession zealously protected by the Constitution.. They stand to require the Government to break its contractual obligations lose their source of livelihood.TCEaDI international airlines and petitioners-intervenors stand to be nullified or terminated by the operation of the NAIA IPT III SYLLABUS under the PIATCO Contracts. ID. Agreement. a property right which is to the service providers. but also that Municipality of Imus and Gonzales v. ID. Raquiza wherein this he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some Court held that appropriation must be made only on . Although we direct and personal.. by the mere substantial interest to protect by reason of the expedient of claiming an exclusive right to operate. Accordingly. Page 29 of 458 the ARCA arise.. suits are not brought by parties who have been depends for illumination of difficult constitutional personally injured by the operation of a law or any other questions. cannot implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. the privilege given to PIATCO is subject to LEGITIMATE INTEREST SUFFICIENT TO CONFER THE reasonable regulation and supervision by the Government REQUISITE STANDING. — [P]etitioners have a direct and through the MIAA. ID. He must be able. and not merely guarantee and to declare the PIATCO contracts valid that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. COURT MUST BE MORE LIBERAL IN standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a DETERMINING WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to LOCUS STANDI TO FILE A PETITION. taxpayers or a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be voters who actually sue in the public interest. PIATCO.. ID." Accordingly. The financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO Contracts on petitioners and 1. — The question on legal 3. that the law or any government act is invalid.

strictly speaking. "insofar as taxpayers' suits are Constitution. — It is citizens have locus standi to file the instant petition. . it is still within the wide discretion of the instant cases. Both with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi. or orders of various government agencies or proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the instrumentalities. ID. A speedy and decisive resolution CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN THE APPROPRIATE of all the critical issues in the present controversy. Thus. easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the In Kilosbayan. Moreover. considering the nature of the whether or not it should be entertained. JURISDICTION. Guingona. . . taxpayers and CASES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE. they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause provided for in 4. members of Congress. PROCEDURAL BARS MAY BE LOWERED demands that we take a more liberal view in determining TO GIVE WAY FOR THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF whether the petitioners suing as legislators. — It is established questions involved and their impact on public interest. impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious ARBITRATION CLAUSE. cannot be compelled to submit to MAY BE RELAXED WHEN THE REDRESS DESIRED arbitration proceedings." Further. The object of arbitration is precisely to cases at bar. public interest 5. decisions. This redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate objective would not be met if this Court were to allow the courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO Contracts exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. ATaDHC which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve. NOT BINDING TO PERSONS constitutional questions raised. (this Court) is not devoid of discretion as to Regulations. legitimate interests in the resolution of the controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. ordinary petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are taxpayers. for resolution are of first impression and they entail the rulings. Inc. we thatpetitioners in the present cases who have presented resolve to grant standing to the petitioners.. v." As such ". . HIERARCHY OF COURTS the ARCA and hence. they [the petitioners] are not covered by lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the the definition. procedural bars may be if. Page 30 of 458 amounts immediately demandable. Accordingly. Court to waive the requirement and so remove the 6. — The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also those raised by petitioners. The said rule may be relaxed when the allow an expeditious determination of a dispute. acts. even controversy before the Court.. cannot be made before an prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the arbitral tribunal. ID.. including COURTS." In view of the serious legal NOT PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT. the crucial issues submitted the constitutionality or validity of laws.. CIVIL LAW. and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to construction and operation of the country's premier initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question international airport.. ID. and even association of oftranscendental importance as they involve the planters. ID. . this Court held "[i]n line cases at bar that call for the relaxation of the rule. ID. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS. the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and concerned .

755. as the Bid Documents. PRE-QUALIFICATION satisfied the minimum financial. The total net worth NAIA IPT III project at the time of pre-qualification.. . — The purpose of lowest bid and most favorable terms of the project. at the Accordingly. the PBAC should determine the maximum maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in amounts that each member of the consortium may commit the Paircargo Consortium is only P528. 337.55 or only 6. 6957 (BUILD-OPERATE-AND-TRANSFER or the maximum amounts that may be validly invested by BOT LAW).656. . ID.. CONTRACT SHALL BE AWARDED TO THE each of its members is P558. an amount substantially less than the TECHNICAL. . Page 31 of 458 7. ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL prescribed minimum equity investment required for the STANDARDS REQUIRED BY LAW. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. has submitted the THE BIDDER'S FINANCIAL CAPACITY. . . MAXIMUM AMOUNT THAT EACH MEMBER OF THE CONSORTIUM MAY COMMIT WITHOUT 8. — The PBAC has PRESCRIBED MINIMUM EQUITY INVESTMENT determined that any prospective bidder.384.525. . ID.. SHOULD DETERMINE THE have adequate resources.000. pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine. whether allied or non-allied in accordance with the 70:30 debt-to-equity ratio prescribed in accordance with the provisions of R. ID. the ability of the bidder to undertake challenger to the unsolicited proposal of AEDC has to show the project. the law requires the undertake the project in the minimum amount of 30% of the government agency to examine and determine the ability of project cost through (i) proof of the ability to provide a the bidder to fund the entire cost of the project by minimum amount of equity to the project. in the case of Paircargo amended or the General Banking Act[. the entire III project should prove that it has the ability to provide amount of its net worth could not be invested in a single equity in the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost. — Under the BOT project in the amount of P2. ID. technical.00 or 30% of the Law. proponent or members of the consortium are banking with them. TOTAL NET WORTH OF THE DISREGARDING THE INVESTMENT CEILINGS PAIRCARGO CONSORTIUM IS LESS THAT THE PROVIDED BY APPLICABLE LAW. with respect to the bidder's financial that it possesses the requisite financial capability to capacity at the pre-qualification stage. the Paircargo Consortium or any earliest opportunity. REPUBLIC therefore of the Paircargo Consortium. ID... ID. POLITICAL LAW. and (ii) a letter considering the maximum amounts that each bidder may testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project invest in the project at the time of pre-qualification. — We agree with public construction. operation and maintenance of the representing 15% of its entire net worth. in undertaking or enterprise. PUBLIC BIDDING. GOVERNMENT AGENCY MUST DETERMINE and leg standards" required by the law. Thus.A... With . the Consortium. Thus. that they are in good financial standing. ID. in case of a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement. having 9..] . MINIMUM FINANCIAL.55.871. ID. ID. Thus. operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT respondents that with respect to Security Bank. organizational STAGE.cHaADC the contract shall be awarded to the bidder "who. for the REQUIRED FOR THE PROJECT.. the project cost. for the construction. ID. No. ... project cost. ID.08% of BIDDER WHO SATISFIED THE. and that they 10. after considering ACT NO. .095.

and honest. ID. the same BIDDER SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED. upon the same thing. fair and honest. Otherwise. THE SAID standard.. the foundation of a fair open doors to abuse and defeat the very purpose of a and competitive public bidding would be defeated.. ID. and guidelines of the which involves the investment of billions of pesos by the bidding process is the only safeguard to a fair. ID.. This would after the opening of bids. The relevant government authority is competitive public bidding... public possesses the minimum required financial capability to bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the complete the project. ID. Considering of the restrictions imposed by the General Banking Act. Thus the award of the contract by the PBAC to the determines the true maximum amount which a bidder may Paircargo Consortium. void. — [T]he NECESSARY. ID. It has been held that: "The basic the bidder. ID. ID." . PURPOSE. Strict public bidding.. such ceiling or legal restriction bidder." ACIDSc duty-bound to ensure that the awardee of the contract 14. that at the pre-qualification stage. be invested by it would only be 15% of its net worth in view said bidder should be properly disqualified. — A restrictive and conservative application determination of whether or not a bidder is pre-qualified to of the rules and procedures of public bidding is necessary undertake the project requires an evaluation of the financial not only to protect the impartiality and regularity of the capacity of the said bidder at the time the bid is proceedings but also to ensure the financial and technical submitted based on the required documents presented by reliability of the project.. a common basis. This is especially true in the case at bar observance of the rules.. ID. and not designed to injure or the project at the time the bids are submitted falls short of defraud the government. if subject matter. the maximum amount which may the minimum amounts required to be put up by the bidder. In the field of government contract law. ID. ID. fair viability and integrity of the project. a disqualified bidder. not only bidding upon a common OF THE MINIMUM AMOUNTS REQUIRED. ID. ID. Thus: "Competition must be legitimate. the same undertaking. ID... ID. 12... — Thus. To allow the PBAC to estimate the public the best possible advantages through open bidder's future financial capability would not secure the competition. ID. is null and invest in the project. — By its very nature.' but also that it be the maximum amount of equity that a bidder may invest in legitimate. honest and project proponent. ID. RESTRICTIVE AND CONSERVATIVE FINANCIAL CAPACITY OF THE BIDDER MUST BE AT APPLICATION OF THE RULES AND PROCEDURE IS THE TIME THE BID IS SUBMITTED. 11. regulations. The PBAC should not be allowed to speculate rule in public bidding is that bids should be evaluated on the future financial ability of the bidder to undertake the based on the required documents submitted before and not project on the basis of documents submitted. IF THE BIDDER FALLS SHORT competition requires. the maximum amounts Disregarding the investment ceilings provided by applicable which the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project law would not result in a proper evaluation of whether or fell short of the minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC.. EVALUATION OF THE 13.. not a bidder is pre-qualified to undertake the project as for we hold that Paircargo Consortium was not a qualified all intents and purposes.. Page 32 of 458 respect to Security Bank..

. SIGNIFICANT AMENDMENTS IN THE on the contract bidded upon. ID. — An alterations and modifications in the contract executed essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all between the government and the winning bidder must be bidders must be on equal footing. then the essence of fair reduction in the types of fees that are subject to MIAA competition in the public bidding is destroyed. clearly gives PIATCO more favorable terms than what was available to 16.. If the OF FEES THAT MAY BE IMPOSED AND COLLECTED winning bidder is allowed to later include or modify certain BY PIATCO. Concession Agreement. under the 1997 Concession the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same Agreement.. Not simply in terms of such as to render such executed contract to be an entirely application of the procedural rules and regulations imposed different contract from the one that was bidded upon. the change in the currency constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the stipulated for "Public Utility Revenues" under the 1997 contract. by the relevant government agency.. Hence.. ID. Page 33 of 458 15. Finally. ALL BIDDERS MUST BE ON EQUAL proposals previously submitted by other bidders. Each bidder must be able to PIATCO'S DRAFT CONCESSION AGREEMENT. with parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to respect to terminal fees. ID.. would contain Concession Agreement. but more importantly. bidded upon. ID. — When taken as a whole. AMENDMENTS TO CONTRACT BIDDED. the same is further subject to "Interim terms.. 17. It is WINNING BIDDER IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM not very difficult to see that the changes in the 1997 MODIFYING OR AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF Concession Agreement translate to direct and concrete THE CONTRACT THAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE financial advantages for PIATCO which were not available SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL AMENDMENTS. It cannot we concede that a winning bidder is not precluded from be denied that under the 1997 Concession Agreement only modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract "Public Utility Revenues" are subject to MIAA regulation. ID. ID. A public regulation and the relaxation of such regulation with bidding would indeed be a farce if after the contract is respect to other fees are significant amendments that awarded. the changes provisions in the contract awarded such that the contract is under the 1997 Concession Agreement with respect to altered in any material respect. ID. The FOOTING ON THE CONTRACT RIDDED UPON. ID. other bidders at the time the contract was bidded out. in this respect. when taken as a whole. The rationale is obvious. TYPES bid on the same thing. the winning bidder may modify the contract and substantially distinguish the draft Concession Agreement include provisions which are favorable to it that were not from the 1997 Concession Agreement. ID. the determination of whether or not a Adjustments" not previously stipulated in the draft modification or amendment of a contract bidded out Concession Agreement. such changes must not constitute substantial Adjustments of all other fees imposed and collected by or material amendments that would alter the basic PIATCO are entirely within its control.. The 1997 previously made available to the other bidders. gives substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical and/or financial .. Moreover. except terminal fees. ID.. — While at the time the contract was offered for bidding.

— 19. maintains that amendments to the contract bidded upon loaned or advanced funds for the NAIA IPT III project does should always conform to the general policy on public not result in the assumption by the Government of these bidding if such procedure is to be faithful to its real nature liabilities. contract in its entirety for violation of public policy on public Without going into the validity of this provision at this bidding. A strict adherence on the principles. ASSUMPTION BY THE This financial advantage is a significant modification that GOVERNMENT OF THE LIABILITIES OF PIATCO IN THE translates to better terms and conditions for PIATCO.04 in principles in public bidding are (1) the offer to the public. suffice it to state that Section 4.. an option that was not made available in the draft 20. Only in one instance may the Government escape adoption. ID.. the 1997 through open competition. take over as Concessionaire. . EVENT OF THE LATTER'S DEFAULT TRANSLATES BETTER TERMS AND CONDITION FOR PIATCO. as in this case. Government so elects and allows a qualified operator to requirements of financing and borrowing notwithstanding." default by opportunity for competition. ID. the is dependent on the existence and availability of a qualified contract signed by the government and the contract operator who is willing to take over the rights and awardee is an entirely different contract from the contract obligations of PIATCO under the contract. . default by PIATCO THE GENERAL PUBLIC POLICY.... ID. ANY GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH Concession Agreement. (2) relation to the definition of "Attendant Liabilities. [u]nder . acHCSD grants PIATCO a financial advantage or benefit which was not previously made available during the bidding process.. These are the basic parameters which every the assumption of PIATCO's liabilities. when the awardee of a contract bidded out must conform to. ID.04 is an important PERMITS ANY SUBSTANTIAL VARIANCE THEREOF IS . Such default competitive public bidding aims to protect the public does not directly result in any concomitant right or interest by giving the public the best possible advantages obligation in favor of the Government. courts should not hesitate to strike down said that is not entirely within the control of the Government.. a circumstance bidded. It has been held that the three Concession Agreement . ID. Section 4.04 of the 1997 regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to Concession Agreement may be considered a form of preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on security for the loans PIATCO has obtained to finance the the procedure. . In fact. ID. By its very nature and characteristic. Page 34 of 458 PIATCO an added benefit which was not available at the amendment to the 1997 Concession Agreement because it time of bidding.. . Section 4. ID. ID. upon a concrete showing that. However. SHOULD ALWAYS CONFORM TO Under the draft Concession Agreement... i.e. nowhere in the said contract does default and purpose. ID. ID.. ID.. this circumstance Thus.. rules and juncture. project. A regulation of the matter which project triggers the occurrence of certain events that leads excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive to the assumption by the Government of the liability for the character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its loans. of PIATCO's loans figure in the agreement. 18. ID. — [T]his Court of any of its obligations to creditors who have provided. However. ID. and (3) a basis for the exact PIATCO of its loans used to finance the NAIA IPT III comparison of bids..

under certain technology and/or is not part of the list of priority conditions. provided that the proper judicial action. CaHcET government would not have to unnecessarily expend 21. The implementing provisions of those already existing in the failure to meet any of the above conditions will result in the draft Concession Agreement. to curtail favoritism in the award of government government funds to construct the infrastructure and contracts and avoid suspicion of anomalies and it places all development projects necessary for economic growth and bidders in equal footing. — The fact that the . subsidy or concrete financial advantages to PIATCO that were equity is required. These government unit has invited by publication other interested amendments cannot be taken as merely supplements to or parties to a public bidding and conducted the same. above present new terms and conditions which provide . CONCRETE FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES TO PIATCO direct guarantee.. The amendments discussed denial of the proposal. the government would in the end still be at a risk of paying substantial amendments were made on the 1997 the debts incurred by the private entity in the BOT projects. BOT LAW.. ID.. ID.. These amendments convert 23. ID. materials.. the unstable flow of returns. and (3) the government agency or local previously not available during the bidding process. ID. — One of the main possible price under the most favorable terms and impetus for the enactment of the BOT Law is the lack of conditions. — The BOT Law and its implementing rules Concession Agreement. ID. CONDITIONS FOR THE ACCEPTANCE the 1997 Concession Agreement to an entirely different OF THE UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL FOR A BOT agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft PROJECT. ID. This is why private sector resources are permits any substantial variance between the conditions being tapped in order to finance these projects.. of the liabilities of PIATCO directly translates projects.. such as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which warrants minimizing. DIRECTLY TRANSLATES scarcely available funds for the project itself. As such.. ID. . ID. The BOT under which the bids are invited and the contract executed law allows the private sector to participate. (2) no direct government guarantee. It aims to secure for the government the lowest 22. PURPOSE. Concession Agreement renders the same null and void for then the purpose of the law is subverted. Any government action which development. and is in fact after the award thereof is a grave abuse of discretion encouraged to do so by way of incentives. Page 35 of 458 A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. subsidy and equity by the government in THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY NOT AVAILABLE DURING these projects are strictly prohibited. the following conditions must first subject to MIAA regulation or control and the extent thereof be met: (1) the project involves a new concept in and (2) the assumption by the Government. — Public bidding is a financial benefit to PIATCO which may have altered the standard practice for procuring government contracts for technical and financial parameters of other bidders had public service and for furnishing supplies and other they known that such terms were available. .. This is but logical for if THE BIDDING PROCESS. ID. It is not difficult to see that the provide that in order for an unsolicited proposal for a BOT amendments on (1) the types of fees or charges that are project may be accepted. being contrary to public policy.

ID.. Page 36 of 458 24. subsidy and equity in unsolicited proposals that government to the risk of incurring a monetary obligation the mere inclusion of a provision to that effect is fatal and is resulting from a contract of loan between the project sufficient to deny the proposal. resulting from the said proposal. ID. ." The BOT guarantee would not only make a mockery of what the BOT Law clearly and strictly prohibits direct government Law seeks to prevent — which is to expose the guarantee. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ID. but not strikes "unless it is of such implementation of the NAIA IPT III project should PIATCO proportion that would paralyze government service. in the present case. then its Law useless for what it seeks to achieve — to make use of inclusion in the contract executed after the said proposal the resources of the private sector in the "financing. and fair play alone militate against such an occurrence and TEMPORARY TAKEOVER OF BUSINESS AFFECTED must not. and in the exercise of its police power. The basic rules of justice 26. proscription against government guarantee in any form is to temporarily take over the operation of any business one of the policy considerations behind the BOT Law. .. VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. In the 1986 Constitutional Clearly. advances and obligations include threat from external aggression. ID. be allowed to later on be inserted in the contract unfortunately. This to how long the temporary takeover by the government in effect would make the Government liable for PIATCO's would last. has been accepted is likewise sufficient to invalidate the operation and maintenance of infrastructure and contract itself. could ill-afford to finance at this point in time. ." The default in its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders and the duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as latter fails to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee. the inclusion of which development projects" which are necessary for national would result in the denial of a proposal cannot. — It is further provided that that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done the presence of direct government guarantee.. be countenanced particularly in this WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. ID. . subsidy or indirectly. affected with public interest.. This GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE. therefore. the ARCA obligates the Commission. — The national emergency. . ID. the term "national emergency" was defined to Government to pay for all loans. STRICTLY PROHIBITS DIRECT This is a form of direct government guarantee. Section 17 of the 1987 CSDcTA Constitution .. It stands to reason proponent and its lenders and to which the Government is therefore that if a proposal can be denied by reason of the not a party to — but would also render the BOT existence of direct government guarantee. SUBSIDY AND EQUITY IN Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL. calamities or arising out of financial facilities extended to PIATCO for the national disasters.. ID. ID. not. To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite equity will "necessarily. disqualify a proposal from being the clear statutory prohibition against a direct government treated and accepted as an unsolicited proposal. The temporary takeover by the government loans should the conditions as set forth in the ARCA arise.. GOVERNMENT IS NOT instance where the government is exposed to the risk of REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE THE PRIVATE ENTITY- shouldering hundreds of million of dollars in debt.. and should growth and development but which the government. . pertains to the right of the State in times of 25. POLICE POWER. A prohibited provision. OWNER. — Article XII.

. and even provides for their prohibition if eminent domain. ID. CANNOT BE CONTRAVENED BY permitted to exist to aid the government in carrying on an MERE CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION. by mere contractual stipulation. in this case reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the PIATCO. — The determining whether or not to temporarily take over a operation of an international passenger airport terminal is particular business. PRIVILEGE GIVEN TO PIATCO affected with public interest. — A monopoly is "a privilege or peculiar business as there is no transfer of ownership. The private entity-owner affected consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a by the temporary takeover cannot. whether advantage vested in one or more persons or companies. ID." Its exercise therefore must not be unreasonably the government has determined that public interest would hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the be served better if private sector resources were used in its government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness construction and an exclusive right to operate be granted to of its exercise. powers. . Clearly. Nonetheless. CONSTITUTION STRICTLY REGULATES to compensate the private entity-owner of the said MONOPOLIES. . ID. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND ownership thereof. Thus. monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Constitution but may be 27. insistent. which is the government . ID." It is the welfare and interest SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REASONABLE REGULATION of the public which is the paramount consideration in AND SUPERVISION BY THE GOVERNMENT. contravene the and functions in the interest of the public. Clearly. Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a are subject to a higher level of State regulation than an situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate ordinary business undertaking.. ID. ID. In temporary takeover is exercising its police power... likewise. and illimitable of construction. the State in effecting the no doubt an undertaking imbued with public interest. Page 37 of 458 extends only to the operation of the business and not to the 28.. — PIATCO enterprise or to aid in the performance of various services cannot. ID. As monopolies are subject to the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. requiring the government to pay the private entity undertaking the said project. operation and maintenance of NAIA IPT III.. Nonetheless." The properties as the temporary takeover by the government is 1987 Constitution strictly regulates monopolies. they XII. claim just particular business or trade. ID. Government through the MIAA. Police entering into a Build-Operate-and-Transfer contract for the power is the "most essential. .. ETHIDa the government to "temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business 29.." Article abuses that can inflict severe prejudice to the public. or control the sale of a particular commodity. permanent or temporary. ID. the privilege given to PIATCO is property pursuant to the operation of the business subject to reasonable regulation and supervision by the contravenes the Constitution. As such the government is not required PATRIMONY.. ID. public interest so requires.. manufacture a particular compensation for the use of the said business and its article. whether in exercise of its police power and not of its power of private or public.. ID. a Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover determination must first be made as to whether public and obligate the government to pay "reasonable cost for interest requires a monopoly.

ID. ID. REMEDIAL LAW. ID. — In fine. provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement and the has the right and the duty to ensure that it is done in accord ARCA did not strip government.. CANNOT regard to the rights of third parties and above all. — While it is the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. be unduly prejudiced. DIRECT RESORT TO THE SUPREME respective contracts. separate opinion: presently operating at NAIA Terminal 1 do not have an 1.. J. PIATCO. utility as a monopoly. through MIAA. MIAA SHOULD ENSURE THAT the public which it seeks to serve. including NAIA IPT III. thru the MIAA." the same does not mean that and binding contract with the Government. ID. In contrast CANNOT BE DONE IN AN ARBITRARY MANNER TO to the arrastre and stevedoring service providers in the THE DETRIMENT OF THE PUBLIC. those contracts whose duration COURT BY THE EMPLOYEES WHO FEARED LOSS OF extends beyond NAIA IPT III's In-Service-Date should not THEIR JOBS IS JUSTIFIED.. ID. ID. ID. The passenger terminal. ID. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION. PIATCO. as well as not just by the parties thereto but also by third parties. in accord with the Constitutional mandate that a monopoly render a valid and binding contract nugatory. OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY contractual obligations to the service providers. The right granted to the WHOEVER BY CONTRACT IS GIVEN THE RIGHT TO public utility may be exclusive but the exercise of the right OPERATE NAIA IPT III WILL DO SO WITHIN THE cannot run riot. the department to which MIAA is attached.. as well as the other terms and power to protect public interest in the operation of a public conditions thereof cannot be violated.. BY CLAIMING III will do so within the bounds of the law and with due AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO OPERATE. ID. cannot also violate the rights of third parties. cannot require the Government to break its 30. of its right with public interest. BILL OF RIGHTS NON-IMPAIRMENT OF whoever by contract is given the right to operate NAIA IPT OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACT. the mere expedient of claiming an exclusive right to operate. through the MIAA. the efficient functioning exclusively operate NAIA IPT III as an international of NAIA IPT III is imbued with public interest.. Lazaro whose declared policy of the BOT Law to encourage private sector contracts consist of temporary hold-over permits. it is MIAA's responsibility to ensure that 31. the participation by "providing a climate of minimum affected service providers in the cases at bar. the Government. PIATCO's right to operate NAIA IPT III to supervise the operation of the whole NAIA complex.. by which is not prohibited must be regulated. have a valid government regulations. Page 38 of 458 agency authorized to operate the NAIA complex. by law and certainly not by contract. absolute right for the renewal or the extension of their PROHIBITION. As the primary government agency tasked with the job. Government must completely surrender its sovereign whose period of effectivity. These contracts must be respected . the REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO BREAK ITS interest of the public. while PIATCO may be authorized to BOUNDS OF THE LAW.. Thus.. The operation of said public utility can not be done in an arbitrary manner to the detriment of 32.. in the past.. This is PIATCO cannot. DOTC. — We hold that while the service providers PANGANIBAN. TSHIDa CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE SERVICE PROVIDERS. — The Court has. ID.

Besides. many of the significant and members of the House of Representatives. And in the final uncertainty that would be prejudicial to the nation. this Court held that the any event. 4. a resort to the aforesaid provision on arbitration is Piatco is partly correct in averring that petitioners can unavailing. the Piatco contracts are indeed void in their entirety. which of the House of Representatives.. even annul the contracts. and therefore. Petitioners relevant factual questions can be easily addressed by an Baterina et al. ID. In Albano v. And. ID. ID. ID. the analysis. taxpayer and member involving the application of the amended BOT Law. TAXPAYER AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2. — Given issues raised in the Petitions will require delving into factual this Court's previous decisions in cases of similar import. to be inevitable pretermination of contracts of the petitioning undertaken by a panel of three (3) arbitrators appointed in service providers that will follow upon the heels of the accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International impending opening of NAIA Terminal III. direct resort to this Court determine and definitively resolve the constitutional and through the special civil action of prohibition is thus legal questions that have been raised in the Petitions justified.. in light of the feared provided for under Section 10. have locus standi to bring the Petition in GR examination of the documents submitted by the parties. CANNOT ADDRESS. before us. CITIZEN. DETERMINE AND interest was involved. ARBITRATION assailed contract. Page 39 of 458 held that questions relating to gargantuan government LEGAL QUESTIONS. consequent to the Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA). ID.. with standing to bring the suit questioning the validity of the 3. the Petitions raise some novel questions petitioner therein. suing as a citizen. is patently urgent..02 of the Amended and loss of jobs of the petitioning workers. it still cannot bind them inasmuch as they finality of any such judgment would be a prolonged state of are not parties to the Piatco contracts.. being taxpayers and questions of law. it is unarguable that the arbitration process parties and the general public. in view of the important role of the DEFINITIVELY RESOLVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) in the . — BRING SUIT QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF Contrary to Piatco's argument that the resolution of the CONTRACT AFFECTING PUBLIC INTEREST. DISPOSITION THEREOF ULTIMATELY ARE SUFFICIENTLY CLOTHED WITH STANDING TO RUNS ON QUESTIONS OF LAW. — As will be discussed at length contracts ought to be settled without delay. applies with greater force to the instant cases. In No. ID. Nevertheless.. Further. LOCUS STANDI. I submit that their disposition ultimately turns on no one will seriously doubt that. Reyes. the unavoidable granting arguendo that the arbitration clause remained a consequence of having to await the rendition and the valid provision. This holding later. the need for relief Chamber of Commerce. will not be able to address. was sufficiently clothed this Court has seen fit to tackle. The Court cited the fact that public PROCEEDINGS. Respondent thus. CIVIL PROCEDURE. questions. CASE AT BAR. petitioners and petitioners-in- obtain relief from the regional trial courts via an action to intervention have pointed out that. 155547.

petitioners (Messrs. — In the cases presently under are confronted with the prospect of being laid off from their consideration. 5. ID. ID. — Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in exclusive power and prerogative of Congress over the the business of furnishing airport-related services to public purse. ID... Petitioners thus correctly assert that the a monopoly in favor of Piatco. Such development part of government (through the DOTC and the MIAA) to would result from the imminent implementation of certain disburse public funds without prior congressional provisions in the contracts that tend toward the creation of appropriations. IN CASES OF TRANSCENDENTAL illegal disbursement of public funds. affected as taxpayers on account of the illegal disbursement of public funds.. These REPRESENTATIVES ARE DEPRIVED OF DISCRETION. Agan et al. Lopez et al. EMPLOYEES ARE CONFRONTED WITH injury on account of their deprivation of property (business) THE PROSPECT OF BEING LAID OFF FROM THEIR and of the liberty to contract.. ID. ID. have locus standi to bring suit. and Lopez et al. Agan et al. They claim 6.. are employees (or representatives of THE STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOW A SUIT . To prevent such encroachment upon Piatco contracts. without due process of law... MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF Messrs. notwithstanding the fact that existing concession agreements with the MIAA to provide expenditure of public funds was not required under the airport services necessary to the operation of the NAIA and assailed contract. its subsidiaries and related injury to them has a twofold aspect: (1) they are adversely companies. are employees of the MIAA. Page 40 of 458 country's economic development and the magnitude of the employees) of various service providers that have (1) financial consideration. are likewise taxpayers and thus possessed of standing to challenge the 8. petitioners-in-intervention have to enter the legislative privilege and obviate injury to the institution into a written contract with Piatco so as not to be shut out of which they are members. Agan et al. As members of the House of international airlines and passengers in the NAIA and are Representatives. This. since the contractual provisions DEPRIVED OF THEIR PROPERTY AND OF THE requiring the government to incur expenditures without LIBERTY TO CONTRACT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF appropriations also operate as limitations upon the LAW. ID. in IMPORTANCE. and Messrs... they are actually deprived of discretion therefore competitors of Piatco as far as that line of insofar as the inclusion of those items of expenditure in the business is concerned. petitioners' personal and substantial interest jobs and losing their means of livelihood when their in the controversy is shown by the fact that certain employer-companies are forced to shut down or otherwise provisions in the Piatco contracts create obligations on the retrench and cut back on manpower. and (2) they are 7.) CASE AT BAR. petitioners-legislators of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing business there. On account of provisions in the budget is concerned. ID.. CcEHaI (2) service agreements to furnish essential support services to the international airlines operating at the NAIA. Messrs. ID. they are literally at its mercy. ID. ID. ID.. Lopez et al. JOBS. SERVICE PROVIDERS CLAIM TO BE prejudiced qua legislators. THE SUPREME COURT MAY RELAX particular.. — Messrs. Since there is no provision to ensure or safeguard free and fair competition. ID...

prequalification stage are permitted to have their two This amount was only slightly over 6 percent of the envelopes reviewed. prospective bidders minimum project cost and very much short of the required must prequalify by submitting their prequalification minimum equity. ID. ID.871. the peso equivalent of the minimum be conducted under a two-envelope/two-stage system: the equity was P2. which was equivalent to 30 percent of the documents for evaluation. I have at the outset already established that. ID. Converted to pesos at the exchange TWO-STAGE SYSTEM.. To establish LEGAL STANDARDS.. disqualified standing. — Section 5 of this statute rate then of P26. and met the technical." 12. On the other hand.095. which I quote thus: constitutional significance. bidders would be entitled to have their bids opened. a project THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND MEET THE proponent desiring to prequalify must also demonstrate its TECHNICAL. the minimum amount of equity required of any proponent stood 10.384.000. the combined equity or net worth of (IRR) provide that only those bidders that have passed the the Paircargo consortium stood at only P558. POLITICAL LAW. The v. that "in cases of transcendental second and third envelopes of pre-disqualified proponents importance..55..." and allow a suit to prosper even when there is no direct 11. bidders are to be informed of the reason for their given its impact on the public and on national interest. ID. Guingona Jr. ID..239 to US$1. — However. NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE Moreover. in-intervention were not sufficiently clothed with legal evaluated and appreciated.755.. DAHaTc percent of the minimum project cost of US$350 million. first envelope to contain the technical proposal and the second envelope to contain the financial proposal. — Aside from complying with the ACT NO. organizational and legal standards provided in the the minimum amount of equity for the project was set at 30 BOT Law. BIDDER MUST SATISFY experience of the firm and its key personnel).. and to procure the loans or financing needed for it. ID. PROPONENT MUST PROVE THAT IT injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. Hence. ID." IS ABLE TO RAISE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED 9. 6957 (BUILD-OPERATE-AND TRANSFER or legal and technical requirements (track record or BOT LAW). REPUBLIC FOR THE PROJECT. ID. ID. a proponent must prove that it is able to requires the award of a BOT project to the bidder that has raise the minimum amount of equity required for the project satisfied the minimum requirements. MUST BE CONDUCTED UNDER A at US$105 million. this disqualification. the Court may relax the standing requirements will be returned.. ID. I do not hesitate to "Prequalified proponents will be considered eligible to adopt the same position as was enunciated in Kilosbayan move to second stage technical proposal evaluation. and only the pre-qualified .. PUBLIC BIDDING. FINANCIAL. This procedure was confirmed and controversy is laden with transcendental importance and reiterated in the Bid Documents... In other words. Since financial. ID.. Page 41 of 458 TO PROSPER. — And even if petitioners and petitioners.00 (as quoted by the Bangko requires that the price challenge via public bidding "must Sentral ng Pilipinas). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. the 1994 Implementing Rules and Regulations AT BAR. ID. ID. — I must emphasize that the law such capability. ORGANIZATIONAL AND financial capacity to undertake the projects.

16. — To be considered PROCESS WAS FLAWED.. ID. VOID. ID... ORIGINATOR OF THE UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL Capulong teaches that if one bidder is relieved from having ONLY. ID. ID. and amended.. ID.. RATIONALE.. The desired result is to be able to determine the or technology. For this reason. the entire bidding process having been rules. ID. a proposal qualifies as an "unsolicited proposal" be subject to the same guidelines. all things being equal. AND TAINTED FROM THE as utilizing a new concept or technology. Piatco variance between the conditions under which bids are cannot and should not be allowed to benefit from that invited and those under which proposals are submitted and Agreement. — Inasmuch as the Paircargo consortium did not possess the minimum equity equivalent to 30 percent of 13.. after all. RULES.. Such deficiency should have immediately VERY OUTSET... SINCE THE ENTIRE BIDDING 17. ESSENCE. ICDcEA approved. ID. ID. therefore. Section 11. The reason for the essence of public bidding is. according to Section 4-A of the BOT Law as Thus. an opportunity for fair protection accorded proprietary information at all is the fact competition and a basis for the precise comparison of bids." and/or a project that is not on the best offer or lowest bid. each bidder must bid under the same conditions. and the Concession Agreement executed with contrary to the very concept of public bidding to permit a the latter was likewise void ab initio. ID. or awarded by the BOT Law and IRR... VIOLATED prequalified or allowed to participate further in the bidding. The not to those belonging to a challenger. government's list of priority projects.. ID. IN CASE AT BAR. regulations and guidelines for the public bidding flawed and tainted from the very outset. Piatco.... ID. ID. the process. 15. REGULATIONS AND the minimum project cost. Thus. PROTECTION OF THE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION IS APPLICABLE TO THE 14. that. Undersecretary Cal's should therefore not have opened the two envelopes of the findings in effect relieved the consortium of the need to consortium containing its technical and financial proposals.. a project must . in order to place each bidder — actual or potential award of the concession to Paircargo's successor Piatco — on the same footing. — By virtue of the prequalified status The Prequalification and Bidding Committee (PBAC) conferred upon the Paircargo.. ID. Page 42 of 458 project cost. ID. ID.6 of the IRR pertains only to the proprietary that bidder is not contracting in fair competition with those information of the originator of an unsolicited proposal. requirements and when it pertains to a project that involves "a new concept limitations. ID. it should not have been GUIDELINES MUST BE STRICTLY APPLIED. and bidders that propose to be bound by all conditions. This position is unmistakably the Concession Agreement to the consortium's successor- and squarely at odds with the Supreme Court's consistent in-interest. it is unarguably irregular and was void. ID... ID. THE AWARD OF CONCESSION WAS caused the disqualification of the Paircargo consortium. — The "proprietary information" referred to in to conform to the conditions that impose some duty upon it. As there was effectively no public doctrine emphasizing the strict application of pertinent bidding to speak of. ID. ID.. comply with the financial capability requirement imposed required AEDC to match the consortium's bid. ID. — Republic v.

. ID.. intended to discourage collusion and substantially reduce . And to might have unceremoniously slipped through the earlier make the encouragement real. it is likewise based on certain precise sequence of events occurring between the assumptions as to the nature of the business. in order to give the WENT INTO CRAFTING THE COMPETING BID. to aver or minimize the manipulation the blue. REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AGENTS OF the financial and technical proposals of Piatco would have GOVERNMENT TO ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION. the only to prevent delays in the project implementation. — The purpose of having a definite and encourage individuals and groups to come up with creative firm timetable for the submission of the requirements is not innovations.. ID. ID. a bidder must consequences of a failure to meet a particular deadline. BIDDER MUST BE GIVEN ACCESS can be easily circumvented by merely postponing the TO THE ASSUMPTION AND THE CALCULATIONS THAT actual issuance of the Notice of Award. — Nevertheless. the intent of the BOT Law is to PROPONENTS. ID. as were the intelligently match a bid or price challenge. ID. who information in connection with unsolicited proposals. It is thus self-evident that in order to be able to extensions of time were provided for. of the post-bidding process. Definite allowable and so on.. the IRR not only set out the technical and other factors. financial. THE NOTICE OF AWARD. the probable demand for the product or service. ID. through MERELY POSTPONING THE ACTUAL ISSUANCE OF the mechanism of matching a price challenge. fresh ideas and new technology. so to speak. timetables for each such event. This regulated scenario was likewise having him shoot at a target in the dark while blindfolded. To put it government were to act evinced the intent to impose upon more simply. but significance and necessity of protecting proprietary also to expose and weed out unqualified proponents. this provision 18. TO DISCOURAGE COLLUSION AND that went into crafting the competing bid. assumptions will never figure out how the competing bid to the end that the project be prosecuted and implemented came about... ID. ID. a bidder unable to access the competitor's them the duty to act expeditiously throughout the process.. ID. ID. political and other risks.. Patently. — A favored proponent sufficient time to comply with the competing bid is never just any figure conjured from out of requirements. EASILY CIRCUMVENTED BY involving the use of new technology or concepts... Hence. 20. Hence.. ID. it is arrived at after studying economic.. first refusal" to undertake the project they conceptualized. Page 43 of 458 involve the possession of exclusive rights (worldwide or 19. ID. by compelling them to put their such individuals and groups what amounts to a "right of money where their mouths are.. methodology or engineering EXPOSE AND WEED OUT UNQUALIFIED concept. the market completion of the evaluation of the technical bids and the potentials... or possession of intellectual THE SUBMISSION OF THE REQUIREMENTS TO property rights over a design. ID. requiring him to "counter-propose" is like without delay. DEFINITE AND FIRM TIMETABLE FOR regional) over a process. In this instance. — The provided AEDC with the necessary information to enable it highly regulated time-frames within which the agents of to make a reasonably informed matching bid. ID. the law also extends to prequalification process. be given access to the assumptions and the calculations 21. but also specified the the future behavior of cost items. ID. issuance of the Notice of Award.

its failure to subsequently further amended four more times through act on the contract within the specified time frame signifies negotiation and without any bidding. ID.. ID. by the discretion in the course of the award process. The ICC has 15 working days to contractwithout any public bidding... Their attitude flies in the 22. ID.. the only conclusion that can possibly be drawn award the contract and. should December 11. as spirit and intent of the BOT Law. Section 9. and unless otherwise specified. DcTSHa persons in charge of the award process for the time limitations prescribed by the IRR. as well as the still-unexplained delays occurred in the award process. — After the PBAC made its decision on submission shall be for information only. the to a fair. ID. PROCEDURE FOR THE AWARD OF THE face of this Court's solemn pronouncement in Republic v.2 of the contract to Piatco. ID. — Despite process had been concluded on December 11. 1996 to award the contract to Piatco.1 of the 1994 IRR Capulong that "strict observance of the rules. and its issuance must no less! On account of such violation. ID. honest and competitive public bidding. and the Notice itself has to be issued the amendment of the Contract bidded out (the DCA or within seven days thereafter. without any public bidding. 1997 (the Concession Agreement or "CA") differed within seven days of the clearance by the ICC on a no. The actually executed between Piatco and DOTC/MIAA on July head of agency or LGU shall approve the Notice of Award 12. the contract that the agency or LGU may proceed with the award. and after the bidding 23. the there be additional or new provisions different from the latter negotiated changes to the Contract bidded out and original government undertakings. [T]he chronology of events . days after the decision to award is made. If the draft contract includes government OUT RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT undertakings already previously approved. 1996 — is the clear timetables set out in the IRR. PROJECTS. the draft shall have to be ended up with what amounts to a substantially new reviewed and approved. draft concession agreement) — in such substantial manner. VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR.. must be deemed null and void substantial government undertakings as follows: Within 7 from the beginning. 24. However. Page 44 of 458 the opportunity for agents of government to abuse their bespeaks an unmistakable disregard. CHANGES TO THE CONTRACT BIDDED objection basis. several lengthy and violative of public policy on public biddings. — In particular. if not disdain. ID. government unit (LGU) concerned.. then the CONTRACT. the draft contract shall be submitted to the ICC for clearance on a no. the award of the follow within another 7 days thereafter. the Notice is that the BOT law and its IRR were repeatedly violated of Award must be approved by the head of agency or local with unmitigated impunity — and by agents of government. Section 9. regulations prescribed that within 30 calendar days from the time the and guidelines of the bidding process is the only safeguard second-stage evaluation shall have been completed. which undoubtedly gained time and IRR set the procedure applicable to projects involving benefited from the delays. The whole point of going can be observed from the presentation made by the through the public bidding exercise was completely lost.] It goes without saying that objection basis. Thus. This Contract was act thereon. from the contract bidded out[.. Its counsel for public respondents.." From the Committee must come to a decision whether or not to foregoing. within 7 days therefrom. ID.. ID.

has been terminated. The phrase amendments . at their will? amendments negotiated for and introduced after the Public biddings are held for the protection of the public. upon the right of the contracting parties to alter or amend it 3. to give the public the best possible advantages by means 27. or even cancel it. and to the right of the original proponent CONTRACT FOR WHICH A PUBLIC BIDDING HAS "to match the price" of the challenger. SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS TO A competing bidder. it certainly does not include or permit alter or amend the contract. this Court been concluded are understood to remain intact and not be made it clear that substantive amendments to a contract for subject to further negotiation. money and effort invested in an pertaining to public bidding demand strict observance. Page 45 of 458 very rationale was totally subverted by permitting Piatco to INTACT AND NOT BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER amend the contract for which public bidding had already NEGOTIATION. from time to time refers without another public bidding. ID." EaIcAS the expense of government. collusion and fraud in the awarding price challenge had been concluded. The terms. ID. That is the reason why procedural rules in recognition of the time.. — The BOT Law cannot be said to allow been concluded. only the price ALREADY BEEN FINISHED SHOULD ONLY BE proposals are in play. CONDITIONS AND to the CA were necessitated by the demands of its foreign STIPULATIONS OF THE CONTRACTS MUST REMAIN lenders. the revisions and bid. REVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS IN THE of open competition between the bidders.. the very essence which a public bidding has already been finished should of public bidding will be destroyed — there will no basis for only be awarded after another public bidding: "The due an exact comparison between bids. the contracting parties may the price challenge. . ID. However. Competitive bidding aims to obtain the the negotiation of contractual stipulations resulting in a best deal possible by fostering transparency and substantially new contract after the bidding process and preventing favoritism. Piatco claims that the changes 26. contract executed after public bidding may alter or amend it and give further manifestly undue advantage to Piatcoat without another previous public bidding. Section 4-A of the BOT Law specifically refers to a "lower price proposal" by a 25. — In sum. ID. ID. accords its originator the privilege of matching the challenger's bid. TERMS... for otherwise what would a only to those amendments to the draft concession public bidding be good for if after the execution of a agreement issued by the PBAC prior to the submission of contract after public bidding.. — In a stipulations in the contract for which public bidding has relatively early case. no proof whatsoever has been adduced . conditions and AWARDED AFTER ANOTHER PUBLIC BIDDING. unsolicited proposal. and it is obvious that such protection and best possible amendments as embodied in the ARCA constitute very advantages to the public will disappear if the parties to a material alterations of the terms and conditions of the CA. and bidding process. .. of contracts. He who bids or CONTRACTS THAT GIVE UNDUE ADVANTAGE TO THE offers the best terms is awarded the contract subject of the GOVERNMENT IS ILLEGAL. Delgado Brothers.. the BOT Law. Caltex v. ID. Piatco execution of a contract after public bidding is a limitation misinterpreted the meaning behind PBAC Bid Bulletin No. ID. Otherwise. ID.. Moreover. Thus. ID. In fact..

. ID. and understands what motivates them. Piatco had to subcontract the works to a must emphasize that the First Supplement [FS] is void in certain Wintrack Builders.. On the other are provided for in Parts II and III of the SS. leveling. In any event. demolition and disposal of degree that seems quite excessive. it is quite patent that the concessionaire of NAIA Terminal III but as a public works sum total of the aforementioned changes resulted contractor.. hypothetically speaking. listing specific rates concerned to accede to those grossly disadvantageous per cubic meter of materials for each phase of the work — changes.. for which reason it is also void and inoperative. therefore. It sans public bidding renders it utterly void and inoperative. nonetheless the FS. It calls for Piatco. thus September 4. did not undergo any public INEXISTENT ORIGINAL CONCESSION AGREEMENT IS bidding. THIRD SUPPLEMENT IS VOID AB INITIO inexistent and inoperative.. Section 4. ID. CASE AT BAR. SECOND SUPPLEMENT IS ALSO VOID ARCA and FS are valid. removal. But that is another story ARCA. Page 46 of 458 to buttress this claim. backfilling and in my mind that the ARCA was unauthorized and illegal for dewatering. 2000. altered the fundamental depends upon and is intended to supplement the ARCA as terms and stipulations of the ARCA. both 29.1 hand. That the FS was entered into inexistent and not capable of being ratified or amended. acting not as . both of which are void and public bidding all over again. inexistent and inoperative. There is no question excavation. pay government. — I Not surprisingly. subterranean obstructions and waste standpoint of a businessperson who regularly transacts materials at the project site. — The Third Supplement (TS) obligations upon government. Second. Though denominated as Second Supplement. the with banks and foreign lenders. Yet it. it was nothing less than an entirely new public 28. And even if. removal and disposal. ID. thus necessitating a well as the First Supplement. 30. even AS IT CREATED A NEW MONETARY OBLIGATION ON assuming arguendo that the ARCA is somehow remotely THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PRIOR valid. ID. First. too. to undertake — in the government's stead — in drastically weakening the position of government to a the clearing. The amounts collectible by Piatco are to be lack of public bidding and for being patently offset against the Annual Guaranteed Payments it must disadvantageous to government. is familiar with their mind. procedures involved. ID. I can only hazard a guess.AaSHED the ARCA is void. — The Second Supplement ("SS") was government — would in effect alter the terms and executed between the government and Piatco on stipulations of the ARCA in material respects. the Third Supplement — AND INOPERATIVE AS IT DID NOT UNDERGO ANY imposing as it does significant new obligations upon PUBLIC BIDDING.. it follows that the FS too is void. ALSO VOID AND INOPERATIVE.. ID. still. even from the improvements. inexistent and not capable of being ratified or amended. a firm reputedly owned by a two respects. whatever it was that impelled government officials sets out the compensation to be paid. ID.. FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO VOID AND works contract.. ID. in imposing significant new APPROPRIATIONS. since altogether. ID. it is merely an amendment to the former high-ranking DOTC official. The scope of the works. follows that the TS is likewise void. and the obligations of the contractor set. upon which it is wholly dependent.

By the that would require. In GOVERNMENT IS GREATER OF EITHER THE short. and directly incurred by the project proponent in implementing the amount to be paid by government is the greater of the project in case of a loan default. ID. Section 4. the TS created new monetary government into extending a guarantee of payment of the obligations on the part of government. for which there were loan obligations.. Page 47 of 458 necessitating another public bidding. an attempt (albeit unsuccessful) by same token. ID. ID.. proposals. ID. such guarantee is prohibited in unsolicited proposals. Since the TS was not and its banks and other lenders on the other. THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID BY government guarantee.04(c)(iv) to (vi) of the ARCA is diametrically at contractors and subcontractors... But where the subjected to public bidding. government cheerfully assented to re- assuming the risks of the project when it gave the 31. I cannot understand why. void ab initio. — In the final analysis. ID. it is consequently utterly void proponent or its lenders manage to cajol or coerce the as well. including its suppliers. such as the NAIA Terminal III Project. (v) and (vi) reason that government is not in a position to do so. before able to obtain loans to fund the project. operation and maintenance of relevant guarantee. ID. It matters not that there is a roundabout infrastructure and development projects for the simple procedure prescribed by Section 4. shared between the project proponent on the one hand. At any rate. Senior Lenders or to other entities. To the extent that the project proponent is the government regarding the Terminal III facility... — Government's agreement to government or any of its agencies or local government pay becomes effective in the event of a default by Piatco units (will) assume responsibility for the repayment of debt on any of its loan obligations to the Senior Lenders. second." either the Appraised Value of Terminal III or the aggregate amount of the moneys owed by Piatco — whether to the 32. APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROJECT OR THE Section 2(n) of the same legislation defines direct AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF THE MONEYS OWED BY government guarantee as "an agreement whereby the PIATCO. therefore. since it the Senior Lenders to transfer Piatco's rights to a would merely defeat the purpose and raison d'être of a transferee of their choice. ID. first. a direct government construction. REASON. and. ID. it follows that the same is. subsidy or equity is required. those risks are government is required to make good on its guarantee.. Hence. ID. In fine.. .. DIRECT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE IS prohibited guarantee and thus simply negated the very PROHIBITED IN UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS. the risks assumed by the lenders are no prior appropriations. The law agreement already constitutes the prohibited assumption meant to mobilize private resources (the private sector) to by government of responsibility for repayment of Piatco's take on the burden and the risks of financing the debts in case of a loan default. — Section purpose of the BOT Law and the protection it gives the 4-A of the BOT Law as amended states that unsolicited government. in the instant case. this odds with the spirit and the intent of the BOT Law. ID. government guarantee was prohibited..04(c)(iv). ID. CASE AT BAR. may be accepted by government provided inter alia that no direct 33.. In effect. an effort (equally build-operate-and-transfer project to be undertaken by the unsuccessful) to "enter into any other arrangement" with private sector. passed right back to government.

06 of the CA defining the term. in the Section 1. Nevertheless. These phrases were eliminated from the ARCA's them. Indeed. . but the mortgage liens on the facility may still be entirely within the Senior Lenders' power.. in order to avert the brings us back to the guarantee itself. prerogative and foreclosed by the Senior Lenders just the same. the contracts would consistently forward to the ultimate contractual cul-de-sac. the Piatco contracts are also objectionable agree upon "a transferee" or "any other arrangement" for grievously failing to adequately protect government's regarding the terminal facility — to push the process interests. not to the lenders. the Piatco debts sense that Section 4. ID.. In Section 4... the amount which government has guaranteed to facility. ID. not phrases recorded and from time to time outstanding in the to the lenders. — While on this subject. it is of dollars. This has particular reference to Piatco. ID. and/or they may already have had been forthcoming from Piatco as to the possible themselves appointed its attorneys-in-fact for the purpose justification for such a drastic change. As such. This point Lenders and other creditors. they are therefore grossly lopsided in make good on its guarantee of payment. ID. ahead of time. the termination payment is to be made to disclosed in its books. — Piatco also argues that there is the earlier discussion regarding a particularly noticeable no provisorequiring government to pay the Senior Lenders alteration of the concept of "Attendant Liabilities. Such deficiency puts the interests of government at pay as termination payment is the greater of either (i) the great risk. Since no explanation has from government. and even if the loan proceeds that it will necessarily use the same to pay off the Senior were not actually used for the project itself." In in the event of Piatco's default.. regardless of whether or not they are Memorandum. PIATCO CONTRACTS ARE HAVE ALL PIATCO'S DEBTS COVERED BY THE GROSSLY LOPSIDED IN FAVOR OF PIATCO AND/OR GUARANTEE. ID. the only conclusion of collecting and receiving such payments. control — exercisable via a mere refusal or inability to Consequently. ID.04(c)(vi) of ARCA speaks of to be assumed/paid by government were qualified by the government making the termination payment to Piatco. AMENDED AND RESTATED CONCESSION AGREEMENT (ARCA) INTENDS TO 34. ID. favor of Piatco and/or its Senior Lenders.. More accurately. its right to receive such payments definition of Attendant Liabilities. However. if the unthinkable were to happen.. in the devious government would be paying several hundreds of millions labyrinthine process detailed in the aforesaid section. wherein weaken and do away with protection of government government will be compelled to abjectly surrender and interests.04(c)(vi) foreclosure of the mortgage and other liens on the terminal of ARCA. it is well to recall ITS SENIOR LENDERS. This is literally true. and there is no provision those borrowings which were obtained in violation of the anywhere in the contract documents to prevent it from loan covenants requiring Piatco to maintain a minimum diverting the proceeds to its own benefit and/or to ensure 70:30 debt-to-equity ratio. IAEcaH 35. ID. it is almost a certainty that the books of the Concessionaire and actually used for the Senior tenders will already have made Piatco sign over to project. possible is that it intends to have all of its debts covered by as petitioners-in-intervention pointed out in their the guarantee.. Page 48 of 458 What is abundantly clear is the fact that.

but compensation for the project proponent when contract likewise a direct government subsidy for unsolicited termination is due to the proponent's own fault or breach of proposals. Section 8. postpone 37.. and government termination compensation is authorized by the BOT Law. ID. . ID. The interpretation or application. ID. ID.08 the ARCA mandates insurance public bidding anyway?) coverage for the terminal facility. . — It will be due to government's default on certain major contractual recalled that Section 4-A of the BOT Law as amended obligations.. Termination upon the parties' 39. ID. Section 5. — [I]n those instances where such exceed the appraised value of the facility. Termination by the government through no fault of the project proponent 2. in case the government is in unacceptable. not that of BOT Law as amended in effect provides for the following government. The fact that Piatco will pay interest on not in excess of that provided in the contract.2. to the 36. Termination by the proponent SUBSIDY FOR UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS. but all insurance policies are to be assigned.. That provision permits a project Lenders are paid in full first. . That is nothing more or less proponent to recover the actual expenses it incurred in the than the direct government subsidy prohibited by the BOT prosecution of the project plus a reasonable rate of return Law and the IRR. ID.. ID. ID... To emphasize.." By any manner of principle was clearly violated in the Piatco Contracts. Clearly. Page 49 of 458 Appraised Value of the terminal facility or (ii) the aggregate 38. of the Attendant Liabilities. however. This can hardly be considered compliance limited instances when termination compensation may be with law. ID.. it is highly conceivable that their sum may greatly CASE AT BAR. and all proceeds are payable. — Section 7 of the coverage is that of the Senior Lenders..01(d) of ARCA stipulates that government is to pay termination the ARCA clearly mandates the indefinite postponement of compensation to Piatco even when termination is initiated payment of all of Piatco's obligations to the government.. the interest being secured by such COMPENSATION MAY BE ALLOWED.. NOT PRESENT IN sun. Given that the Attendant IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT THE INTEREST OF Liabilities may include practically any Piatco debt under the GOVERNMENT BE DULY INSURED. . of the 1999 IRR defines contract. the law does not permit prohibits not only direct government guarantees. INSTANCES WHEN TERMINATION Senior Lenders. or to be the unpaid amounts owed to government does not change compensated for the equivalent or proportionate contract the situation or render the prohibited subsidy any less cost as defined in the contract. ID.. in by government. b iii. ID. . will . ID. IN TERMINATION COMPENSATION. ID. PROHIBITS A DIRECT GOVERNMENT mutual agreement and 3. VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR.. a direct government subsidy as encompassing "an agreement whereby the Government . DTAIaH default on certain major contractual obligations. In brief. ID. — This any payments due from the proponent. Section 13. it may end up paying very much more than the real worth of is indispensable that the interest of government be duly Terminal III. this condition is not in line with order to ensure that Piatco's obligations to the Senior Section 7 of the BOT Law. (So why did government have to bother with insured. allowed: 1..

Page 50 of 458

40. ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT WILL BE AT THE MERCY Piatco was not merely a franchise, but an "exclusive right"
OF THE FOREIGN LENDERS; CASE AT BAR. — Earlier; I to operate an international passenger terminal within the
mentioned that Section 8.01(d) of the ARCA completely "Island of Luzon." What this grant effectively means is that
eliminated the proviso in Section 8.04(d) of the CA which the government is now estopped from exercising its
gave government the right to appoint a financial controller inherent power to award any other person another
to manage the cash position of Piatco during situations of franchise or a right to operate such a public utility, in the
financial distress. Not only has government been deprived event public interest in Luzon requires it. This restriction is
of any means of monitoring and managing the situation; highly detrimental to government and to the public interest.
worse, as can be seen from Section 8.01(d) above-quoted, While it cannot be gainsaid that an enterprise that is a
the Senior Lenders have effectively locked in on the right to public utility may happen to constitute a monopoly on
exercise financial controllership over Piatco and to allocate account of the very nature of its business and the absence
its cash resources to the payment of all amounts owed to of competition, such a situation does not however
the Senior Lenders before allowing any payment to be constitute justification to violate the constitutional
made to government. In brief, this particular provision of prohibition and grant an exclusive franchise or exclusive.
the ARCA has placed in the hands of foreign lenders the right to operate a public utility. Piatco's contention that the
power and the authority to determine how much (if at all) Constitution does not actually prohibit monopolies is beside
and when the Philippine government (as grantor of the the point. As correctly argued, the existence of a monopoly
franchise) may be allowed to receive from Piatco. In that by a public utility is a situation created by circumstances
situation, government will be at the mercy of the foreign that do not encourage competition. This situation is
lenders. This is a situation completely contrary to the different from the grant of a franchise to operate a public
rationale of the BOT Law and to public policy. The utility, a privilege granted by government. Of course, the
aforesaid provision rouses mixed emotions — shame and grant of a franchise may result in a monopoly. But making
disgust at the parties' (especially the government officials') such franchise exclusive is what is expressly proscribed
docile submission and abject servitude and surrender to by the Constitution.
the imperious and excessive demands of the foreign
42. ID.; ID.; ID.; EASY PAYMENT PLAN OF PIATCO
lenders, on the one hand; and vehement outrage at the
CONTRACTS VIOLATES THE TIME LIMITATION ON
affront to the sovereignty of the Republic and to the
FRANCHISES. — Section 11 of Article XII of the
national honor, on the other. It is indeed time to put an end
Constitution also provides that "no franchise, certificate or
to such an unbearable, dishonorable situation.
any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
41. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NATIONAL ECONOMY utility shall be . . . for a longer period than fifty years." After
AND PATRIMONY; CONSTITUTION EXPRESSLY all, a franchise held for an unreasonably long time would
PROSCRIBES MAKING A FRANCHISE EXCLUSIVE; likely give rise to the same evils as a monopoly. The Piatco
VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — What was granted to Contracts have come up with an innovative way to

Page 51 of 458

circumvent the prohibition and obtain an extension. This exercise is less than sufficient to protect the public
fact can be gleaned from Section 8.03(b) of the ARCA [.] interest[.] It will be noted that Sec. 6.06 (Adjustment of
The easy payment scheme therein is less beneficial than it Non-Public Utility Fees and Charges) has no teeth, so the
first appears. Although it enables government to avoid concessionaire can defy the government without fear of
having to make outright payment of an obligation that will any sanction. Moreover, Section 6.06 — taken together
likely run into billions of pesos, this easy payment plan will with Section 6.03(c) of the ARCA — falls short of the
nevertheless cost government considerable loss of income, standard set by the BOT Law as amended, which
which it would earn if it were to operate Terminal III by expressly requires in Section 2(b) that the project
itself. Inasmuch as payments to the concessionaire proponent is "allowed to charge facility users appropriate
(Piatco) will be on "installment basis," interest charges on tolls, fees, rentals and charges, not exceeding those
the remaining unpaid balance would undoubtedly cause proposed in its bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the
the total outstanding balance to swell. Piatco would thus be contract . . ."
entitled to remain in the driver's seat and keep operating
45. ID.; ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROHIBITION AGAINST
the terminal for an indefinite length of time.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS; VIOLATED IN CASE AT
BAR. — By the In-Service Date, Terminal III shall be the
43. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONOPOLY; ELUCIDATED: — only facility to be operated as an international passenger
Gokongwei Jr. v. Securities and Exchange terminal at the NAIA; thus, Terminal I and II shall no longer
Commission elucidates the criteria to be employed: "A operate as such, and no one shall be allowed to compete
'monopoly' embraces any combination the tendency of with Piatco in the operation of an international passenger
which is to prevent competition in the broad and general terminal in the NAIA. The bottom line is that, as of the In-
sense, or to control prices to the detriment of the public. In Service Date, Terminal III will be the only terminal where
short, it is the concentration of business in the hands of a the business of providing airport-related services to
few. The material consideration in determining its existence international airlines and passengers may be conducted at
is not that prices are raised and competition actually all. Consequently, government through the DOTC/MIAA
excluded, but that power exists to raise prices or exclude will be compelled to cease honoring existing contracts with
competition when desired." service providers after the In-Service Date, as they cannot
44. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PIATCO CONTRACTS GIVE THE be allowed to operate in Terminal III. In short, the CA and
CONCESSIONAIRE LIMITLESS POWER OVER THE the ARCA obligate and constrain government to break its
CHARGING OF FEES, RENTALS AND SO FORTH. — existing contracts with these service providers.
Aside from creating a monopoly, the Piatco contracts also 46. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION AGAINST DEPRIVATION
give the concessionaire virtually limitless power over the OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS; VIOLATED
charging of fees, rentals and so forth. What little "oversight IN CASE AT BAR. — Notably, government is not in a
function" the government might be able and minded to position to require Piatco to accommodate the displaced

Page 52 of 458

service providers, and it would be unrealistic to think that Both the service providers and their client airlines will be
these service providers can perform their service contracts deprived of the right to liberty, which includes the right to
in some other international airport outside Luzon. enter into all contracts, and/or the right to make a contract
Obviously, then, these displaced service providers are — in relation to one's business.
to borrow a quaint expression — up the river without a
48. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PROHIBITION
paddle. In plainer terms, they will have lost their
AGAINST DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS
businesses entirely, in the blink of an eye. Moreover, since
WITHOUT VALID APPROPRIATION; EFFECT. — Clearly
the displaced service providers, being unable to operate,
prohibited bythe Constitution is the disbursement of public
will be forced to close shop, their respective employees —
funds out of the treasury, except in pursuance of an
among them Messrs. Agan and Lopez et al. — have very
appropriation made by law. The immediate effect of this
grave cause for concern, as they will find themselves out of
constitutional ban is that all the various agencies of
employment and bereft of their means of livelihood. This
government are constrained to limit their expenditures to
situation comprises still another violation of the
the amounts appropriated by law for each fiscal year; and
constitution prohibition against deprivation of property
to carefully count their cash before taking on contractual
without due process. True, doing business at the NAIA may
commitments.
be viewed more as a privilege than as a right. Nonetheless,
where that privilege has been availed of by the petitioners- 49. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF APPROPRIATIONS AND
in-intervention service providers for years on end, a THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS ARE INDISPENSABLE
situation arises, similar to that in American Inter-fashion v. TO THE EXECUTION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.
GTEB. We held therein that a privilege enjoyed for seven — [T]his Court has held that "(I)t is quite evident from the
years "evolved into some form of property right which tenor of the language of the law that the existence of
should not be removed . . . arbitrarily and without due appropriations and the availability of funds are
process." Said pronouncement is particularly relevant and indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua
applicable to the situation at bar because the livelihood of non for the execution of government contracts. The
the employees of petitioners-intervenors are at stake. DaIACS obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a
priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract."
47. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION AGAINST DEPRIVATION
OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS; VIOLATED IN 50. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER THE PUBLIC
CASE AT BAR. — The Piatco Contracts by locking out PURSE; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — But the
existing service providers from entry into Terminal III and particularly sad thing about this transaction between MIAA
restricting entry of future service providers, thereby and DPWH is the fact that both agencies were maneuvered
infringed upon the freedom — guaranteed to and into (or allowed themselves to be maneuvered into) an
heretofore enjoyed by international airlines — to contract agreement that would ensure delivery of upgraded roads
with local service providers of their choice, and vice versa. for Piatco's benefit, using funds not allocated for that

Page 53 of 458

purpose. The agreement would then be presented to existing storm drainage master plan; and coordination with
Congress as a done deal. Congress would thus be obliged DPWH for the completion of the three left-turning
to uphold the agreement and support it with the necessary overpasses before the In-Service Date, as well as
allocations and appropriations for three years, in order to acquisition and delivery of additional land for the
enable DPWH to deliver on its committed repayments to construction of the T2-T3 access road. Conversely, failure
MIAA. The net result is an infringement on the legislative to deliver on any of these obligations may conceivably
power over the public purse and a diminution of Congress' result in substantial prejudice to the concessionaire, to
control over expenditures of public funds — a development such an extent as to constitute a material breach of the
that would not have come about, were it not for the Piatco Contracts. Whereupon, the concessionaire may
Supplements. Very clever but very illegal! outrightly terminate the Contracts pursuant to Section 8.01
(b)(i) and (ii) of the ARCA and seek payment of Liquidated
51. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS;
Damages in accordance with Section 8.02(a) of the ARCA;
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE BEST-
or the concessionaire may instead require government to
EFFORTS BASIS WILL APPLY. — To determine whether
pay the Incremental and Consequential Losses under
the additional obligations under the Supplements may
Section 1.23 of the ARCA. The logical conclusion then is
really be undertaken on a best-efforts basis only, the
that the obligations in the Supplements are not to be
nature of each of these obligations must be examined in
performed on a best-efforts basis only, but are unarguably
the context of its relevance and significance to the Terminal
mandatory in character.
III Project, as well as of any adverse impact that may result
if such obligation is not performed or undertaken on time. 53. ID.; ID.; PIATCO CONTRACTS ARE VOID AB INITIO
In short, the criteria for determining whether the best-efforts AND INOPERATIVE. — I find that all the Piatco contracts,
basis will apply is whether the obligations are critical to the without exception, are void ab initio, and therefore
success of the Project and, accordingly, whether failure to inoperative. Even the very process by which the contracts
perform them (or to perform them on time) could result in a came into being — the bidding and the award — has been
material breach of the contract. riddled with irregularities galore and blatant violations of
law and public policy, far too many to ignore. There is thus
52. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBLIGATIONS IN THE SUPPLEMENTS
no conceivable way, as proposed by some, of saving one
ARE MANDATORY IN CHARACTER AND NOT FOR
(the original Concession Agreement) while junking all the
BEST-EFFORTS COMPLIANCE ONLY. — Viewed in this
rest. Neither is it possible to argue for the retention of the
light, the "Additional Special Obligations" set out in Section
Draft Concession Agreement (referred to in the various
4 of the FS take on a different aspect. In particular, each of
pleadings as the Contract Bidded Out) as the contract that
the following may all be deemed to play a major role in the
should be kept in force and effect to govern the situation,
successful and timely prosecution of the Terminal III
inasmuch as it was never executed by the parties. What
Project: the obtention of land required by PIATCO for the
Piatco and the government executed was the Concession
taxilane and taxiway; the implementation of government's

Page 54 of 458

Agreement which is entirely different from the Draft 56. ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT SHOULD PAY ALL
Concession Agreement. REASONABLE EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF TERMINAL III. — Should
54. ID.; ID.; ID.; KEEPING PIATCO ON AS
government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in
CONCESSIONAIRE IS UNCONSCIONABLE. —
the construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should,
Ultimately, though, it would be tantamount to an
otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense
outrageous, grievous and unforgivable mutilation of public
of Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and
policy and an insult to ourselves if we opt to keep in place a
investors — both local and foreign. After all, there is no
contract — any contract — for to do so would assume that
question that the State needs and will make use of
we agree to having Piatco continue as the concessionaire
Terminal III, it being part and parcel of the critical
for Terminal III. Despite all the insidious contraventions
infrastructure and transportation-related programs of
of the Constitution, law and public policy Piatco
government. In Melchor v. Commission on Audit, this Court
perpetrated, keeping Piatco on as concessionaire and even
held that even if the contract therein was void, the principle
rewarding it by allowing it to operate and profit from
of payment by quantum meruit was found applicable, and
Terminal III — instead of imposing upon it the stiffest
the contractor was allowed to recover the reasonable value
sanctions permissible under the laws — is unconscionable.
of the thing or services rendered (regardless of any
It is no exaggeration to say that Piatco may not really mind
agreement as to the supposed value), in order to avoid
which contract we decide to keep in place. For all it may
unjust enrichment on the part of government. The principle
care, we can do just as well without one, if we only let it
ofquantum meruit was likewise applied in Eslao v.
continue and operate the facility. After all, the real money
Commission on Audit, because to deny payment for a
will come not from building the Terminal, but fromactually
building almost completed and already occupied would be
operating it for fifty or more years and charging whatever it
to permit government to unjustly enrich itself at the
feels like, without any competition at all. This scenario must
expense of the contractor. The same principle was applied
not be allowed to happen. EAHDac
in Republic v. Court of Appeals.

55. ID.; ID.; ID.; AEDC SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO 57. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSIBLE PRACTICAL SOLUTION IS TO
OPERATE THE TERMINAL III. — If the Piatco contracts BID OUT THE OPERATION OF TERMINAL III. — One
are junked altogether as I think they should be, should not possible practical solution would be for government — in
AEDC automatically be considered the winning bidder and view of the nullity of the Piatco contracts and of the fact
therefore allowed to operate the facility? My answer is a that Terminal III has already been built and is almost
stone-cold 'No.' AEDC never won the bidding, never signed finished — to bid out the operation of the facility under the
any contract, and never built any facility. Why should it be same or analogous principles as build-operate-and-transfer
allowed to automatically step in and benefit from the greed projects. To be imposed, however, is the condition that the
of another? winning bidder must pay the builder of the facility a price

Page 55 of 458

fixed by government based on quantum meruit; on the real, of the contradictory factual submissions made by the
reasonable — not inflated — value of the built facility. How parties. As the Court has so often exhorted, it is not a trier
the payment or series of payments to the builder, funders, of facts.
investors and contractors will be staggered and scheduled,
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
will have to be built into the bids, along with the annual
ARE COGNIZABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
guaranteed payments to government. In this manner, this
— The petitions, in effect, are in the nature of actions for
whole sordid mess could result in something truly beneficial
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The
for all, especially for the Filipino people.
Rules provide that any person interested under a contract
VITUG, J., separate dissenting opinion: may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION;
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
SUPREME COURT IS BEREFT OF JURISDICTION OVER
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. The Supreme
CASES INVOLVING NULLIFICATION OF CONTRACTS.
Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
— This Court is bereft of jurisdiction to hear the petitions at
relief which are cognizable by regional trial courts.
bar. The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
shall exercise original jurisdiction over, among other actual 4. POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; COURT
controversies, petitions for certiorari, prohibition, MAY NOT INTRUDE INTO EVERY AFFAIR OF
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The cases GOVERNMENT. — As I have so expressed in Tolentino
in question, although denominated to be petitions for vs. Secretary of Finance, reiterated in Santiago vs.
prohibition, actually pray for the nullification of the PIATCO Guingona, Jr., the Supreme Court should not be thought of
contracts and to restrain respondents from implementing as having been tasked with the awesome responsibility of
said agreements for being illegal and unconstitutional. overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Pervasive and limitless,
such as it may seem to be under the 1987 Constitution,
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF
judicial power still succumbs to the paramount doctrine of
FACTS. — The rule is explicit. A petition for prohibition
separation of powers. The Court may not at good liberty
may be filed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer
intrude, in the guise of sovereign imprimatur, into every
or person, exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
affair of government. What significance can still then
functions. What the petitions seek from respondents do not
remain of the time-honored and widely acclaimed principle
involve judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. In
of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
prohibition, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal,
tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the
independent and coordinate branch in our system of
basis of undisputed facts. The parties allege, respectively,
government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties
contentious evidentiary facts. It would be difficult, if not
that such an undue interference can lead to.
anomalous, to decide the jurisdictional issue on the basis

Page 56 of 458

DECISION terminal building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report
to the DOTC in December 1989.
Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John
PUNO, J :p
Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan,
George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant
Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
construction and operation of a new international airport
of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport
terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project,
Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and
they formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC)
Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from
which was registered with the Securities and Exchange
implementing the following agreements executed by the
Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993. CSaITD
Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA
and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited
(PIATCO): (1) the Concession Agreement signed on July proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for
12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated Concession the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal
Agreement dated November 26, 1999, (3) the First III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer
Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA
Agreement dated August 27, 1999, (4) the Second 7718 (BOT Law). 1
Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession
On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No.
Agreement dated September 4, 2000, and (5) the Third
94-832 constituting the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT
Agreement dated June 22, 2001 (collectively, the PIATCO
III project.
Contracts).
On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia
The facts are as follows:
endorsed the proposal of AEDC to the National Economic
In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised proposal,
Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study however, was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA
determine whether the present airport can cope with the Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) — Technical
traffic development up to the year 2010. The study Board favorably endorsed the project to the ICC — Cabinet
consisted of two parts: first, traffic forecasts, capacity of Committee which approved the same, subject to certain
existing facilities, NAIA future requirements, proposed conditions, on January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996,
master plans and development plans; and second, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved
presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger the NAIA IPT III Project.

Page 57 of 458

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3
publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for amending the Bid Documents. The following amendments
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's were made on the Bid Documents:
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA
a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed
6957, as amended. The alternative bidders were required
Payment, the proponent shall include
to submit three (3) sealed envelopes on or before 5:00 p.m.
in its financial proposal an additional
of September 20, 1996. The first envelope should contain
percentage of gross revenue share of
the Prequalification Documents, the second envelope the
the Government, as follows:
Technical Proposal, and the third envelope the Financial
Proposal of the proponent. i. First 5 years 5.0%
On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was issued, ii. Next 10 years 7.5%
postponing the availment of the Bid Documents and the iii. Next 10 years 10.0%
submission of the comparative bid proposals. Interested
firms were permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal b. The amount of the fixed Annual
Documents beginning June 28, 1996, upon submission of a Guaranteed Payment shall be subject
written application and payment of a non-refundable fee of of the price challenge. Proponent may
P50,000.00 (US$2,000). offer an Annual Guaranteed Payment
which need not be of equal amount,
The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among but payment of which shall start upon
others that the proponent must have adequate capability to site possession.
sustain the financing requirement for the detailed
engineering, design, construction, operation, and c. The project proponent must have
maintenance phases of the project. The proponent would adequate capability to sustain the
be evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum financing requirement for the detailed
amount of equity to the project, and its capacity to secure engineering, design, construction,
external financing for the project. and/or operation and maintenance
phases of the project as the case may
be. For purposes of pre-qualification,
On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 2 this capability shall be measured in
inviting all bidders to a pre-bid conference on July 29, terms of:
1996. i. Proof of the availability of the project
proponent and/or the consortium
to provide the minimum amount
of equity for the project; and

Page 58 of 458

ii. a letter testimonial from reputable indicative and that other revenue sources may be included
banks attesting that the project by the proponent, subject to approval by DOTC/MIAA.
proponent and/or the members Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those fees and
of the consortium are banking charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be
with them, that the project subject to regulation, and those charges which would be
proponent and/or the members actually deemed Public Utility Fees could still be revised,
are of good financial standing, depending on the outcome of PBAC's query on the matter
and have adequate resources. with the Department of Justice.
d. The basis for the prequalification shall be In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5,
the proponent's compliance with the entitled "Answers to the Queries of PAIRCARGO as Per
minimum technical and financial Letter Dated September 3 and 10, 1996." Paircargo's
requirements provided in the Bid queries and the PBAC's responses were as follows:
Documents and the IRR of the BOT 1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to
Law. The minimum amount of equity meet the required minimum equity requirement
shall be 30% of the Project Cost. CSaITD
as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the Bid
e. Amendments to the draft Concession Documents considering that the capitalization of
Agreement shall be issued from time each member company is so structured to meet
the requirements and needs of their current
to time. Said amendments shall only
respective business undertaking/activities. In
cover items that would not materially order to comply with this equity requirement,
affect the preparation of the Paircargo is requesting PBAC to just allow each
proponent's proposal. member of (sic) corporation of the joint Venture
On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was to just execute an agreement that embodies a
commitment to infuse the required capital in case
held where certain clarifications were made. Upon the
the project is awarded to the Joint Venture
request of prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & instead of increasing each corporation's current
Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC warranted authorized capital stock just for prequalification
that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing purposes.
Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed
Annual Guaranteed Payment submitted by the challengers In prequalification, the agency is interested in
would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' one's financial capability at the time of
prequalification, not future or potential capability.
technical and financial proposals would remain confidential.
The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources A commitment to put up equity once awarded the
contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely project is not enough to establish that "present"
financial capability. However, total financial

a final version will be issued before the award of e. the PBAC opened the first The PBAC then proceeded with the opening of the second envelope containing the prequalification documents of the envelope of the Paircargo Consortium which contained its Technical Proposal. September Consortium. The Secretary of the DOTC Bank Corp. The lack of corporate approvals and as one of the documentary financial capability of PAGS. for changes would be made known to prospective prequalification purposes. . 1996. AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the Paircargo 2. The appointment of Lufthansa as the contract. informing submit the same with the required Bid Security. shall be acceptable. Paircargo is negotiating with banks Consortium. However. requirements. which include: and other institutions for the extension of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the a. 1996. the PBAC prequalified the Paircargo Consortium. and challengers through bid bulletins. AEDC that it had considered the issues raised by the latter.SECAHa facility operator. At present. the consortium composed of and the established prequalification criteria. (PAGS) and Security undertake the project. However. Inc. Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. (Security Bank) (collectively. Inc. The lack of corporate approvals and event that the Concessions Agreement (sic) is financial capability of PAIRCARGO. could legally invest in the project. Page 59 of 458 capability of all member companies of the Paircargo Consortium. awarded to them. Paircargo is being required to submit a copy of the draft concession b. On September 26. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor included in the Bid Documents. found that the challenger. as that they'd (sic) be furnished copy of the approved negotiated agreement between the amended (the General Banking Act) PBAC and the AEDC at the soonest possible on the amount that Security Bank time. On the following day. respective companies' audited financial statements. in view of the Philippine requirement in the operation The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign of a public utility. On September 23.. (Paircargo). 1996. Paircargo. and that based on the documents submitted by Paircargo On September 20. Paircargo is requesting c. 1996. to be established by submitting the 24. had prequalified to Phil. Air and Grounds Services. the PBAC had People's Air Cargo and Warehousing Co. Supplement C of the Bid Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin Project) and to The PBAC gave its reply on October 2. A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is d. Paircargo approved the finding of the PBAC. 1996. The prohibition imposed by RA 337. Therefore. Any material of the PAIRCARGO Joint Venture.

the project would be awarded to Paircargo. AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court containing their respective financial proposals. in addition to the On April 17. On July 12. 1996 within which to match the said bid. Inc.. raised were addressed. Alvarez. Intermediaries. and gave AEDC 30 working days or until the project to PIATCO. of the BOT agreement between the DOTC and Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the government a total PIATCO. through its As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day President. On October 7. 1996.5% share in gross revenues his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical for the next ten years of operation. However. AEDC again manifested its objections and requested that it be furnished AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue with excerpts of the PBAC meeting and the accompanying preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections technical evaluation report where each of the issues they as regards the prequalification of PIATCO. the Government. and 10%. issued a notice to Paircargo Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport . the NEDA merely noted the agreement. 1996. As the ad referendum gathered only four (4) of of P17. 1997. on a no-objection P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years while basis. the DOTC issued the notice of award for Consortium. in view of the restrictions imposed by Section 21-B of On February 27. Secretary Arturo T. the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the Paircargo On July 9. signed the "Concession period. 1997. the DOTC submitted the concession On October 16. in first five years of operation. on Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer December 11. the Manual Regulations for Banks and Other Financial (PIATCO). 1996. 1997.75 billion for the same period. Both of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal Proceedings. Consortium regarding AEDC's failure to match the particularly with respect to Paircargo's financial capability. Page 60 of 458 On October 3. revenues for the last ten years of operation. AEDC offered to pay the government a total of referendum to facilitate the approval. Enrile. November 28. Go. then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo. the PBAC opened the third envelope agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA-ICC. in accordance with the Bid Documents. Paircargo Consortium incorporated theGeneral Banking Act and Sections 1380 and 1381 of into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co. 1997. 1996. 7. the Chairman of the PBAC. the to pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. 1997. 1997. Mandamus and Injunction against the III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government and Secretary of the DOTC. and PIATCO. CSaITD the required six (6) signatures. submitted by AEDC and the Paircargo Consortium On April 16. AEDC reiterated its objections. the NEDA-ICC conducted an ad foregoing. share in gross Committee. On April 11. Thus. Henry T. proposal. through then DOTC otherwise.

and consequential costs and losses consequent to the .10 with respect to the temporary take-over of operations by The Second Supplement to the ARCA contained provisions GRP. rentals and other charges in September 4. 1. Sec. Sec. 6. The First Supplement also provided a stipulation as On November 26. 2. and Sec. 5. providing additional special obligations on the part of GRP aside from those already enumerated in Sec. Sec. Sec. accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 2001 (collectively.04 inserting an introductory paragraph.02 (a) dealing with the exclusivity of the Disposition of Terminal Fees. At the end of the and/or replacement of all airport facilities and equipment concession period. and the changes in the timetable.02 of the ARCA by franchise given to the Concessionaire. 3. 2000. 1999.01 (c) of the ARCA pertaining to the of GRP. The Agreement provided The First Supplement to the ARCA amended Sec. 5. and may be 2.36 of that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) the ARCA defining "Revenues" or "Gross Revenues". duties and other concerning the clearing. Subsequently.02 providing for the venue of the arbitration proceedings and the consideration for the same which the GRP shall in case a dispute or controversy arises between the parties pay PIATCO.08 (c) dealing Share in Gross Revenues. The First Supplement was and maintain the said terminal during the concession signed on August 27.16 pertaining to the taxes. it provided provisions on the termination of the contract.05 pertaining to the Special Obligations amended Sec. 1998.05 of the ARCA. the Government and PIATCO signed three The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate Supplements to the ARCA. for the procedure for the demolition of the said structures 10. demolition or disposal of imposts that may be levied on the Concessionaire. Sec. and the Third Supplement on June 22. PIATCO shall transfer the development which are owned or operated by MIAA. It defined the scope of works. 2. interest in the Development Facility. maintenance. Page 61 of 458 Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). Sec. the Government and PIATCO regards the construction of a surface road to connect NAIA signed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement Terminal II and Terminal III in lieu of the proposed access (ARCA). 4. 5.03 as regards the periodic adjustment of public utility fees site of the construction of the terminal by the and charges. 1997 Concession Agreement. and Sec. Sec. repair exceeding twenty-five (25) years. it provided for time extensions. between GRP and PIATCO regarding the improvement of 1. CSaITD with the proceeds of Concessionaire's insurance. Sec. It also completion". the entire Article VIII concerning the Concessionaire. and further facility to MIAA. the Second Supplement on period and to collect the fees.02 (a) (iii) concerning the assignment by Concessionaire of its of the ARCA referring to the Payments of Percentage. removal. years commencing from the in-service date. the swapping of obligations Agreement that were amended by the ARCA were: Sec.11 pertaining to the definition of "certificate of Sales Road. subterranean structures uncovered or discovered at the 6. 6. 6. Sec. Among the provisions of the 1997 Concession tunnel crossing Runway 13/31.05 (d) of the ARCA referring to the obligation of MIAA to renewed at the option of the Government for a period not provide sufficient funds for the upkeep. incremental to the agreement. Supplements).

several employees of the MIAA additional obligations on the part of PIATCO as regards the likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various said structures. are the dominant players in the industry with an Respondent PIATCO filed its Comments to the present aggregate market share of 70%. Zialcita. passenger handling. as in-flight catering." 5 (PAL). the service providers. 2 argument. 2002. 2002. Page 62 of 458 existence of such structures. aircraft maintenance and provisions. "honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch's DNATA and MacroAsia. international airlines at the NAIA. on November 29. Prospero A. of the Concessionaire as regards the construction of the Hon. the Third Supplement provided for the obligations On December 11. surface road connecting Terminals II and III. challenged contracts. Pichay. Macaranbon. agreements. 2002. petitions on November 7 and 27. the Court then resolved On October 15. moved to intervene in the case as maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II. the MIAA which is charged with the O. filed a motion for their respective Memoranda in amplification of the issues intervention and a petition-in-intervention. 2002. Nograles. Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing Meanwhile. Nantes. 2002. They filed their Comment-In- had existing concession contracts with various service Intervention defending the validity of the assailed providers to offer international airline airport services. Prospero C. Miascor. Villarama. filed before this Court a petition for On December 10. The Office of the On September 17. the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government . Jacinto V. and the MacroAsia Group. CSaITD Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula filed a similar petition with this Court. claiming that they stand to lose Corporate Counsel filed their respective Comments in their employment upon the implementation of the behalf of the public respondents. together with Philippine Airlines legal offices have concluded (as) null and void. 2002. DNATA-Wings Aviation Awards at Malacañang Palace. another group of Congressmen. and other services. joining the in open court to require the parties to file simultaneously cause of the petitioning workers. the Court heard the case on oral prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements. 3 In their consolidated Memorandum. handling and warehousing.. Willie B. ramp and ground support. heard in the oral arguments within 30 days and to explore the possibility of arbitration or mediation as provided in the On October 24. such agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions. the workers of the international Solicitor General and the Office of the Government airline service providers. Rafael P. Eduardo C. Congressmen Salacnib Baterina. Some of these service 2002. questioned agreements. stated that she will not Systems Corp. cargo During the pendency of the case before this Court. Paras. 2002. 4 Finally. Jr. Respondents-Intervenors. and it provided for some On November 6. After the oral argument. in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export providers are the Miascor Group.. to several President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

No. Each of the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 155661. shirked from its solemn duty to dispense justice and Petitioners-Intervenors allege that as tax-paying resolve "actual controversies involving rights which are international airline and airport-related service operators. legally demandable and enforceable. cargo handling and it makes today. These petitioners filed the instant action for Commerce. resolution of the instant controversy. ramp and ground support. Regulations. acting through the DOTC and MIAA.R. concession agreements with MIAA and with various We shall first dispose of the procedural issues raised by international airlines which they allege are being interfered respondent PIATCO which they allege will bar the with and violated by respondent PIATCO. G. Petitioners-Intervenors in the same case are all In the present cases. Also included as On March 6. No. the Court is again faced with the task corporations organized and existing under Philippine laws of resolving complicated issues made difficult by their engaged in the business of providing in-flight catering.R.R. In G. intersecting legal and economic implications. Petitioners anchor their petition for prohibition on the ." 6 To be sure. aircraft aware of the far reaching fall out effects of the ruling which maintenance and provisions. International Court of Arbitration (ICC) by filing prohibition as taxpayers and as parties whose rights and a Request for Arbitration with the Secretariat of the ICC interests stand to be violated by the implementation of the against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines PIATCO Contracts. passenger handling. cargo handling and warehousing and other services. the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and catering. aircraft maintenance and provisions. 155001 and 155661 sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in MIAA. 2003. Page 63 of 458 Corporate Counsel prayed that the present petitions be In G. The Court is passenger handling. petitioners-intervenors have separate and subsisting this Court will not begin to do otherwise today. this Court has never airlines at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. 155001 individual petitioners are employees of given due course and that judgment be rendered declaring various service providers 7 having separate concession the 1997 Concession Agreement. respondent PIATCO informed the Court petitioners are labor unions MIASCOR Workers Union- that on March 4. For more than a century and whenever the warehousing and other services to several international exigencies of the times demand it. 2003 PIATCO commenced arbitration National Labor Union and Philippine Airlines Employees proceedings before the International Chamber of Association. ramp and ground support. Nos. and to determine each one of them stands to be irreparably injured by the whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. petitioners constitute employees of Petitioners' Legal Standing to File MIAA and Samahang Manggagawa sa Paliparan ng the present Petitions Pilipinas — a legitimate labor union and accredited as the a. the ARCA and the contracts with MIAA and continuing service agreements Supplements thereto void for being contrary to the with various international airlines to provide in-flight Constitution.

" 9 Accordingly. Petitioners contract with PIATCO alone for such services. the Government shall cause the closure Contracts. and public policy. international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon. the 1997 Concession Agreement sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court and the ARCA uniformly provide that such services or so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional operations will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III and questions. petitioners assail the provisions in the 1997 thereafter. they entered into their respective contracts with the MIAA with the understanding that the said contracts will be in force for the stipulated period. With respect The question on legal standing is whether such parties to existing concession agreements between MIAA and have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the international airport service providers regarding certain controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which services or operations. NAIA IPT III. there being no plain. they stand to lose employment. upon the commencement of operations of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. by entering into said assurance that subsisting contracts with MIAA and other contracts. The specific provisions of the BOT Law and its Implementing petitioning service providers will thus be compelled to Rules and Regulations. remedied only by a writ of prohibition. Petitioning service amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which can be providers stress that despite the very competitive market. renewed so as to allow each of the petitioning Concession Agreement and the ARCA which grant service providers to recoup their investments and obtain a PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial reasonable return thereon. They filed the petition as taxpayers and With respect to the petitioning service providers and their persons who have a legitimate interest to protect in the employees. and In particular. 8 NAIA IPT III. it has been held that the interest PIATCO is under no obligation to permit such carry over of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must . the substantial capital investments required and the high speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. rate of fees. with no contend that the DOTC and the MIAA. passengers will be diverted to the NAIA IPT III. of Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I and II as international passenger terminals. have committed grave abuse of discretion international airlines will be respected. Page 64 of 458 nullity of the contracts entered into by the Government and except through a separate agreement duly entered into PIATCO regarding the build-operate-and-transfer of the with PIATCO. Petitioning employees of various service providers at the except those international airports already existing at the NAIA Terminals I and II and of MIAA on the other hand time of the execution of the agreement. The contracts allege that with the closure of the NAIA Terminals I and II further provide that upon the commencement of operations as international passenger terminals under the PIATCO at the NAIA IPT III. they allege that they will be effectively barred Petitioners in both cases raise the argument that the from providing international airline airport services at the PIATCO Contracts contain stipulations which directly NAIA Terminals I and II as all international airlines and contravene numerous provisions of the Constitution.

members of Congress. petitioners filed the petition for organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute prohibition as members of the House of Representatives. because the contracts compel the "insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned . .R. Raquiza 14 wherein this Court held that appropriation nullified or terminated by the operation of the NAIA IPT III must be made only on amounts immediately under the PIATCO Contracts. Guingona. In the abovementioned cases. G. In Kilosbayan. 10 treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. or orders of various House of Representatives. They stand to who have been personally injured by the operation of a law lose their source of livelihood. 155547. No. v. No. Moreover. acts. zealously protected by the Constitution. Page 65 of 458 be direct and personal.R. decisions." 12 We hold that petitioners have the requisite standing. It must Government. actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or citizens and taxpayers. 155547 and even association of planters." 16 Further. they are especially interested in government agencies or instrumentalities. ordinary taxpayers. subsisting concession agreements between MIAA and Although we are not unmindful of the cases of Imus Electric petitioners-intervenors and service contracts between Co. to show. (this Court) Government and/or the House of Representatives to is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be . He must be able. taxpayers and citizens have locus standi to file interests sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing the instant petition. The financial prejudice demandable. contrary to the mandate of or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained the Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the of. 11 They cite provisions of the PIATCO Contracts he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some which require disbursement of unappropriated amounts in direct injury as a result of its enforcement. suits are not brought by parties implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.public interest demands that we take a more brought about by the PIATCO Contracts on petitioners and liberal view in determining whether the petitioners suing as petitioners-intervenors in these cases are legitimate legislators. Inc. and not merely compliance with the contractual obligations of the that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. 15 this to file the instant petitions. They allege that as members of the validity of laws. not only appropriate funds necessary to comply with the provisions that the law or any government act is invalid. taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. CSaITD Court held "[i]n line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi. b. but also that therein. They allege that the Government obligations appear that the person complaining has been or is about to in the PIATCO Contracts which compel government be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully expenditure without appropriation is a curtailment of their entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens prerogatives as legislators. v. and non-profit civic In G. . petitioners have a direct and Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law substantial interest to protect by reason of the because in some cases. rulings. the PIATCO Contracts. a property right which is or any other government act but by concerned citizens. Municipality of Imus 13 and Gonzales international airlines and petitioners-intervenors stand to be v.

In so ruling. considering the nature of the Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is controversy before the Court. 20 even established and. pursuant to Section 10. The Court is aware that arbitration proceedings had before the trial courts. Both within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are requirement and so remove the impediment to its of transcendental importance as they involve the addressing and resolving the serious constitutional construction and operation of the country's premier questions raised." 17 As such ". need not be determined by a trial after finding that the arbitration clause in the Distributorship court. we resolve to for resolution are of first impression and they entail the grant standing to the petitioners. The facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well In Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Thus. they It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in [the petitioners] are not covered by the definition. instant controversy involves significant legal questions. even if. the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Other Procedural Matters Regulations. including the arbitration clause primary jurisdiction. their assigns and and compelling circumstances justify availment of a heirs.02 of the ARCA have been filed at the instance of respondent PIATCO. resolve. . hence. we hold that After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues the arbitration step taken by PIATCO will not oust this involved. Page 66 of 458 entertained. There is one more procedural obstacle which must be following the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that trial of Arbitration Proceedings by courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with PIATCO respect to a special civil action for prohibition and hence. Moreover. . only the parties to the Distributorship Agreement are remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's bound by its terms. 19 . Court of Appeals. this Court held that as contracts be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional produce legal effect between the parties. the crucial issues submitted involved and their impact on public interest. proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution. it is still the cases at bar that call for the relaxation of the rule. resort must first be overcome. this Court affirmed the trial court's The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this decision denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court at the first instance is a violation Legal Effect of the Commencement of the rule on hierarchy of courts. strictly speaking. Agreement in question is valid and the dispute between the parties is arbitrable." 18 In view of the serious legal questions international airport. procedural bars may be without jurisdiction to review the instant cases as factual lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the issues are involved which this Court is ill-equipped to instant cases. Again. The Proceedings pursuant to the arbitration clause under the said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot contract. this Court is of the view that the crux of the Court of its jurisdiction over the cases at bar. Moreover.

000. cannot be compelled does not have the financial resources to put up the to submit to arbitration proceedings. cannot as amended or the General Banking Act that a commercial be made before an arbitral tribunal. they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause capability of the Paircargo Consortium on the ground that it provided for in the ARCA and hence. we ruled that the interest of justice would PIATCO relies. a on the other hand would. suits. They Jr. sufficient to meet the equity It is established that petitioners in the present cases who requirements of the project. to the merits of the instant controversy. No. as clarified through Bid to the PIATCO Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not Bulletin Nos. 21 held that to tolerate allege that in computing the ability of the Paircargo the splitting of proceedings by allowing arbitration as to Consortium to meet the minimum equity requirements for some of the parties on the one hand and trial for the others the project. duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. on the strength of the best be served if the trial court hears and adjudicates the Memorandum dated October 14.700. Considering that there PIATCO's predecessor. 22 Thus. 1996 issued by the DOTC case in a single and complete proceeding. of the [Paircargo] Consortium. In the said Memorandum. This objective would not be met Undersecretary Cal opined: if this Court were to allow the parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-parties The Bid Documents. the Challenger was found to have a combined I net worth of P3. on the other hand. should not be considered. citing its previous ruling in Salas. this Court.000. This resolution of all the critical issues in the present contention is based on the restriction under R. determination of a dispute. in effect.926. require that financial be equipped to resolve. Undersecretary Primitivo C. The object of bank cannot invest in any single enterprise in an amount arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious more than 15% of its net worth. Page 67 of 458 stipulated therein. result in multiplicity of member of the consortium. the entire net worth of Security Bank.000. Laperal Realty Corporation. required under the BOT Law and the Bid Documents. capability will be evaluated based on total financial capability of all the member companies Now. 337. 3 and 5.00 that could . This Court ruled that arbitration Is PIATCO a qualified bidder? proceedings could be called for but only with respect to the Public respondents argue that the Paircargo Consortium. The said Memorandum was in have presented legitimate interests in the resolution of the response to a letter from Mr. Ramos questioning the financial Accordingly. was not a duly pre-qualified bidder are parties to the case who are neither parties to the on the unsolicited proposal submitted by AEDC as the Distributorship Agreement nor heirs or assigns of the Paircargo Consortium failed to meet the financial capability parties thereto. A speedy and decisive required minimum equity of P2.A. including those raised by petitioners. In this connection.421. parties to the contract in question.000. controversy. President Fidel V. v.900.00.242. Cal stating that the Paircargo Consortium is found to have a combined net worth of P3. Antonio Henson of AEDC to controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts.00.

and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable Challenger has complied with this requirement. having satisfied the minimum financial. R. in case of a build-operate-and.4 of the same document). (Italics supplied) comply with the required 30% equity. financial project proponent and/or the consortium to capability may also be established by testimonial provide a minimum amount of equity to the letters issued by reputable banks.1 No. Financial Capability: The project proponent Billion. 1996 amending the financial IRR of the BOT Law) but not for pre-qualification capability requirements for pre-qualification of the project (Section 5. No. 23 proponent as follows: Under the BOT Law.A. The project. The basis for the pre-qualification shall be on technical.A. the minimum amount of enough basis to believe that the challenger can equity needed. the contract shall be awarded to the bidder "who. 3 dated August 16. Page 68 of 458 support a project costing approximately P13 c. 3. Section 5. CSaITD must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirements for the detailed It is not a requirement that the net worth must be engineering design. Basis of Pre-qualification transfer arrangement. construction and/or "unrestricted. measured in terms of (i) proof of the ability of the As stated in Bid Bulletin No. project. the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin conditions for award of contract (Section 12. has submitted the lowest bid and most favorable minimum technical and financial terms of the project. proof of sufficient equity is required as one of the Pursuant to this provision. the 1994 Implementing requirements provided in the Bid Documents Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law provide: and in the IRR of the BOT Law. organizational and legal standards" required by the compliance of the proponent to the the law. For purposes of The financial statement or the net worth is not pre-qualification. Statement should not be taken as the amount of and that they have adequate resources. that they are in good financial standing.4 Pre-qualification Requirements. The minimum amount of equity to which the xxx xxx xxx proponent's financial capability will be based shall be thirty percent (30%) of the project . banks attesting that the project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with To recap. this capability shall be the sole basis in establishing financial capability. The the money to be used to answer the required government agency/LGU concerned shall thirty percent (30%) equity of the challenger but determine on a project-to-project basis and rather to be used in establishing if there is before pre-qualification." To impose that as a requirement operation and maintenance phases of the now will be nothing less than unfair. as the case may be. 6957. In fact. 6. 24 Further. net worth reflected in the Financial them. as amended by R. 7718.

(c) the equity investment of the bank. 28 (35%) of the voting stock in that enterprise. the necessary to further national development Paircargo Consortium or any challenger to the unsolicited objectives or support national priority projects. the powers of the consortium are banking with them. The provisions in this or in any other financing should not exceed 70% of the Act to the contrary notwithstanding.00.650. and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable thereof exercise.000. 27 Security Bank's Audited Financial Statements as thirty-five percent (35%) of the total equity in the of 1995 show that it has a net worth equivalent to its capital enterprise nor shall it exceed thirty-five percent funds in the amount of P3.504.700. invest in the equity of a non- allied undertaking.00 respectively.6.000.000.00.515.00 to invest as its equity for the single non-allied undertaking shall not exceed project.000. and (d) the equity investment in other banks shall be deducted from the investing bank's net worth for . (b) the equity investment in any one Paircargo's Audited Financial Statements as of 1993 and enterprise whether allied or non-allied shall not 1994 indicated that it had a net worth of P2. as amended or the General Banking Act: agreement.523. and that they have adequate resources.01a of the draft concession of R. in a P26.00 and exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the net worth of P3. a proposal of AEDC has to show that it possesses the bank authorized to provide commercial banking requisite financial capability to undertake the project in the services.00 or roughly P9. 26 PAGS' Audited Financial the bank.183. The debt portion of the project Sec. the Monetary actual project cost.00. or own a majority or all of the As the minimum project cost was estimated to be equity in a financial intermediary other than a US$350. as well as a government-owned and minimum amount of 30% of the project cost through (i) controlled bank.A. 25 the commercial bank or a bank authorized to provide Paircargo Consortium had to show to the satisfaction of the commercial banking services.377.735.755.592. Provided.095.123. This is to correlate with the be invested in a single undertaking or enterprise. fifty percent (50%) of the net worth of the bank. the entire amount of its net worth could not Documents. that they are in good an Investment House as provided in Presidential financial standing. 21-B. whether required debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30 in allied or non-allied in accordance with the provisions Section 2. 129.4 of the Bid Security Bank. 337. Statements as of 1995 indicate that it has approximately or of its wholly or majority-owned subsidiary. Decree No. Board. may authorize a commercial bank.783. That (a) PBAC that it had the ability to provide the minimum equity the total investment in equities shall not exceed for the project in the amount of at least P2. whenever it shall deem appropriate and Accordingly. to operate under an expanded proof of the ability to provide a minimum amount of equity commercial banking authority and by virtue to the project. in addition to powers banks attesting that the project proponent or members of authorized for commercial banks. based on the above provisions of law. Page 69 of 458 cost instead of the twenty percent (20%) We agree with public respondents that with respect to specified in Section 3. No.

Thus. the undertake the project on the basis of documents submitted.000. In any single enterprise.55. Thus. in restrictions shall also apply regarding equity accordance with the 70:30 debt-to-equity ratio prescribed in investments of banks. the PBAC should determine the maximum investments of banks in any single enterprise amounts that each member of the consortium may commit shall not exceed at any time fifteen percent for the construction. with respect to the speculate on the future financial ability of the bidder to bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification stage. the determination of whether or not a bidder is pre- P2. — The equity Consortium. law requires the government agency to examine and This would open doors to abuse and defeat the very determine the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost of purpose of a public bidding. not a bidder is pre-qualified to undertake the project as for after considering the maximum amounts that may be all intents and purposes.871. representing 15% of its entire net worth. the 1993 Manual of Regulations for Banks The PBAC has determined that any prospective bidder. operation and maintenance of the (15%) of the net worth of the 'investing bank as NAIA IPT III project at the time of pre-qualification.55 determines thetrue maximum amount which a bidder may or only 6.08% of the project cost. in the case of Paircargo a. validly invest in the Paircargo Consortium is only Disregarding the investment ceilings provided by applicable P528. The PBAC should not be allowed to bidder to undertake the project. Page 70 of 458 purposes of computing the prescribed ratio of net bidder may invest in the project at the time of pre- worth to risk assets. law would not result in a proper evaluation of whether or The total net worth therefore of the Paircargo Consortium.5. Other Limitations and IPT III project should prove that it has the ability to provide Restrictions.095. With defined in Sec.656. the ability of the by the bidder.384.525. such ceiling or legal restriction validly invested by each of its members is P558. the maximum amount that Security Bank could of the restrictions imposed by the General Banking Act. qualified to undertake the project requires an evaluation of the financial capacity of the said bidder at the time the bid The purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to is submitted based on the required documents presented determine.00 or 30% of the project cost. the Bid Documents. xxx xxx xxx Further. operation and maintenance of the NAIA SECTION X383. CSaITD respect to Security Bank. This is especially true in the the project by considering the maximum amounts that each case at bar which involves the investment of billions of .755. X121. X106 and Subsec. at the earliest opportunity. the maximum amount which may be invested by it would only be 15% of its net worth in view Thus. 29 an amount invest in the project. for provides: the construction. — The following limitations and equity in the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost. substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity investment required for the project in the amount of Further. qualification.

if the maximum amount of equity that a bidder may AEDC. that the Concession process is the only safeguard to a fair. Said amendments shall only cover the contract by the PBAC to the Paircargo Consortium. and that this intention was clear to all participants. regulations. Considering that at the pre-qualification stage. honest Agreement attached to the Bid Documents is intended to and competitive public bidding. we hold that Paircargo Agreement shall be issued from time to Consortium was not a qualified bidder. While it would be proper at this juncture to end the resolution of the instant controversy.. 30 be a draft. A restrictive complete resolution thereof. Strict observance of the rules. The relevant government the disqualification of respondent PIATCO's predecessor authority is duty-bound to ensure that the awardee of the would come into play and necessarily result in the nullity of contract possesses the minimum required financial all the subsequent contracts entered by it in pursuance of capability to complete the project. as the legal effects of . the 6. said bidder should be properly disqualified. the Court feels that it is necessary to discuss in estimate the bidder's future financial capability would not full the pressing issues of the present controversy for a secure the viability and integrity of the project. alteration or modification. They maintain documents submitted before and not after the that a substantial departure from the draft Concession opening of bids. however. Amendments to the Draft Concessions maximum amounts which the Paircargo Consortium may Agreement invest in the project fell short of the minimum amounts Amendments to the Draft Concessions prescribed by the PBAC. and DOTC/MIAA. and conservative application of the rules and procedures of II public bidding is necessary not only to protect the impartiality and regularity of the proceedings but also to Is the 1997 Concession Agreement valid? ensure the financial and technical reliability of the project. i. a items that would not materially affect the disqualified bidder. 3 short of the minimum amounts required to be put up by the issued by the PBAC which states: bidder. To allow the PBAC to the project. Page 71 of 458 pesos by the project proponent. the foundation of a Agreement is a violation of public policy and renders the fair and competitive public bidding would be 1997 Concession Agreement null and void. preparation of the proponent's proposal. Otherwise. and guidelines of the bidding PIATCO maintains. It argued further that said invest in the project at the time the bids are submitted falls intention is expressed in Part C (6) of Bid Bulletin No. is null and void. including Thus. It Petitioners and public respondents contend that the 1997 has been held that: Concession Agreement is invalid as it contains provisions The basic rule in public bidding is that bids that substantially depart from the draft Concession should be evaluated based on the required Agreement included in the Bid Documents.e. subject to change. defeated. Thus the award of time.

the pertinent portion of which was application of the procedural rules and regulations imposed quoted above. the winning bidder may modify the contract and basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a include provisions which are favorable to it that were not denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the previously made available to the other bidders." winning bidder is allowed to later include or modify certain provisions in the contract awarded such that the contract is While we concede that a winning bidder is not precluded altered in any material respect. If the proposal. would contain specifications in such biddings provide the common ground or basis for the bidders. upon the substantial provisions beneficial to him. Thus: same terms. a common basis. The substantially different terms and conditions that would have specifications should. accordingly. when taken as a whole. amendments shall only cover items that would not on the contract bidded upon. A public contract bidded upon. Each bidder must be able to materially affect the preparation of the proponent's bid on the same thing. but more importantly. Thus: contract for public work to the lowest responsible bidder. the proposals and specifications Competition must be legitimate. therefore must be so framed as to permit free In the field of government contract law. not same thing. Hence. 32 proposals previously submitted by other bidders. 3 cited by PIATCO to An essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all support its argument that the draft concession agreement bidders must be on equal footing. fair specifications upon which the bids were and honest. Not simply in terms of is subject to amendment. operate the effect of altering the technical and/or financial equally or indiscriminately upon all bidders. in the PBAC Bid Bulletin No. The rationale is obvious.' but also that it be legitimate. the PBAC also clarified that "[s]aid by the relevant government agency. then the essence of fair from modifying or amending certain provisions of the competition in the public bidding is destroyed. such changes must not constitute bidding would indeed be a farce if after the contract is substantial or material amendments that would alter the awarded. The alterations and modifications in the contract executed The same rule was restated by Chief Justice Stuart of the between the government and the winning bidder must be Supreme Court of Minnesota: . the determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded out It is inherent in public biddings that there shall be constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the a fair competition among the bidders. and not designed to injure or invited. municipal authorities can only let a through open competition. not only bidding upon a contract with the best bidder containing common standard. Nor can they enter into a competition requires. the same included or contemplated in the terms and undertaking. and full competition. as in this interest by giving the public the best possible advantages case. 31 In fact. the same subject matter. The contract. public bidding aims to protect the public The law is well settled that where. Page 72 of 458 By its very nature. 33 defraud the government. fair and honest.

and to give the public the best to Administrative Order No. the question that comes to fore is this: is the 1997 subject to periodic adjustment in accordance with a Concession Agreement the same agreement that was prescribed parametric formula and effective only upon offered for public bidding. i.. and (3) new fees and bidding. 35 For fees under the first category.. i. Inc. or even cancel it. pursuant the public.e. is null and void: Concession Agreement may be classified into three distinct categories: (1) fees which are subject to periodic The Court agrees with the contention of counsel adjustment of once every two years in accordance with a for the plaintiffs that the due execution of a prescribed parametric formula and adjustments are made contract after public bidding is a limitation upon the right of the contracting parties to alter or effective only upon written approval by MIAA. He who bids or Agreement and the 1997 Concession Agreement lie in the offers the best terms is awarded the contract types of fees included in each category and the extent of subject of the bid. Delgado collected by PIATCO Brothers. those which are Hence. Inc. the contracting parties may alter or charges that may be imposed by PIATCO which have not amend the contract. 34 this Court quoted with approval the ruling of the trial court that an amendment to a contract awarded The fees that may be. imposed and collected by PIATCO through public bidding. possible advantages by means of open The glaring distinctions between the draft Concession competition between the bidders. 1. for than those included in the first category which may be otherwise what would a public bidding be good adjusted by PIATCO whenever it deems necessary without for if after the execution of a contract after public need for consent of DOTC/MIAA. (2) fees other amend it without another public bidding. Page 73 of 458 such as to render such executed contract to be an entirely a.. Modification on the Public different contract from the one that was bidded upon. as amended. v. at their been previously imposed or collected at the Ninoy Aquino will? Public biddings are held for the protection of International Airport Passenger Terminal I. Series of 1993. respects: . when such subsequent amendment under the draft Concession Agreement and the 1997 was made without a new public bidding. the draft Concession written approval by MIAA. the draft Concession Agreement attached to the Bid Documents? A close Agreement includes the following: 36 comparison of the draft Concession Agreement attached to the Bid Documents and the 1997 Concession Agreement (1) aircraft parking fees.e. and it is obvious that such the supervision and regulation which MIAA is allowed to protection and best possible advantages to the public will disappear if the parties to a contract exercise in relation thereto. executed after public bidding may alter or amend it without another previous public bidding. CSaITD Utility Revenues and Non-Public Utility Revenues that may be In the case of Caltex (Philippines). reveals that the documents differ in at least two material (2) aircraft tacking fees.

check-in-counter Under the 1997 Concession Agreement. fees which are rentals and porterage fees shall be allowed only subject to adjustment and effective upon MIAA approval once every two years and in accordance with the are classified as "Public Utility Revenues" and include: 37 Parametric Formula attached hereto as Annex F. and approval of the MIAA. said parametric formula. rentals and airline offices. The full text of said (4) rentals and airline offices. groundhandling fees. The first adjustment shall be made prior to the In-Service Date of the The implication of the reduced number of fees that are Terminal. fees. groundhandling fees. While the vehicular parking fee. further. under the 1997 Concession On the other hand. under Section 6. rentals from airline Concession Agreement reads: offices and porterage fees are no longer subject to MIAA Section 6. shall be contingent only on the conformity of the adjustments with the above (4) Terminal Fees. upon written approval of MIAA. Such regulation End Users are not unreasonably deprived of may be made by periodic adjustment and is effective only services. regulation. Provided. (1) aircraft parking fees. aircraft tacking fees. 39 operations of the Terminal and the Terminal Complex. Adjustments in the aircraft parking (6) porterage fees. Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges.03 Periodic Adjustment in Fees. of the MIAA. The MIAA reserves the right to regulate under Under the 1997 Concession Agreement. MIAA reserves the right to regulate (1) lobby (c) Concessionaire shall at all times be judicious in fixing fees and charges constituting Non- and vehicular parking fees and (2) other new fees and Public Utility Revenues in order to ensure that charges that may be imposed by PIATCO. fees which the foregoing terms and conditions the lobby and PIATCO may adjust whenever it deems necessary without vehicular parking fees and other new fees and need for consent of DOTC/MIAA are "Non-Public Utility charges as contemplated in paragraph 2 of Section 6. Page 74 of 458 (3) groundhandling fees. and Section 6. Provided that adjustments shall be made effective only after the written express approval (2) aircraft tacking fees. subject to MIAA approval is best appreciated in relation to fees included in the second category identified above.03 of the draft Concession Agreement. the equivalent provision under the 1997 Agreement." 38 Thus.01 if in its judgment the users of the Revenues" and is defined as "all other income not airport shall be deprived of a free option for the classified as Public Utility Revenues derived from services they cover. and Charges. provision is quoted below: (5) check-in counter rentals.03. . xxx xxx xxx Further. that such (3) check-in counter fees.

i. draft Concession Agreement from the 1997 Concession under the 1997 Concession Agreement. Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I. By stipulating that "Public regulation by MIAA with respect to the particular fees that Utility Revenues" will be paid to PIATCO in US Dollars may be charged by PIATCO.. (2) porterage fee and (3) the types of fees that may be subject to "Interim greeter/well wisher fee. under the draft Thus. respect. In the draft Concession Agreement. 42 However. clearly gives PIATCO more favorable terms than what was available to other bidders at the time the contract was bidded out. in this under the third category is not subject to MIAA regulation." 43 PIATCO to explain and justify the fees set by PIATCO. It is not very difficult to see that the . the changes under the 1997 reserved the right to regulate the same under the same Concession Agreement with respect to reduction in the conditions that MIAA may regulate fees under the first types of fees that are subject to MIAA regulation and the category. There Philippine Pesos.. PIATCO is able to enjoy the benefits of may be imposed and collected by PIATCO. terminal fees are not included in to (1) vehicular parking fee. "Public opinion of GRP the said fees have become Utility Revenues" are subject to an "Interim Adjustment" of exorbitant resulting in the unreasonable deprivation of End Users of such services. This classification is significant may set from time to time. under the 1997 Concession Agreement.03 thereof while porterage fee is US Dollars 44 while payments to the Government are in covered by the first paragraph of the same provision. under Section 6. no is an obvious relaxation of the extent of control and such stipulation was included.03 of the draft Concession AgreementMIAA has When taken as a whole. while being effectively and charges that may be imposed by PIATCO which have insulated from the detrimental effects of exchange rate not been previously imposed or collected at the Ninoy fluctuations. 40 fees upon the occurrence of certain extraordinary events specified in the agreement. 41 as shown earlier. are denominated in paragraph of Section 6. new fees depreciations of the Philippine Peso. this was included within the Concessionaire. all that MIAA can do is to require Adjustment." except terminal fees.e.e. with respect to the third category of fees that Agreement. The 1997 Concession Agreement. GRP may intervene and require category of "Public Utility Revenues" under the 1997 Concessionaire to explain and justify the fee it Concession Agreement. periodic adjustment of once every two years relaxation of such regulation with respect to other fees are in accordance with a prescribed parametric formula and significant amendments that substantially distinguish the effective only upon written approval by MIAA. under the 1997 Concession Agreement. adjustment of fees Agreement. if in the reasonable because under the 1997 Concession Agreement. In the draft Concession Agreement. Page 75 of 458 porterage fee and greeter/well wisher fee With respect to terminal fees that may be charged by constitute Non-Public Utility Revenues of PIATCO. i. with respect Concession Agreement. vehicular parking fee is Finally. CSaITD while payments by PIATCO to the Government are in Philippine currency under the 1997 Concession Moreover. However. "Public subject to MIAA regulation and approval under the second Utility Revenues.

04 Assignment. GRP thereof shall be deemed to have elected to take over the Under the draft Concession Agreement. default by PIATCO Development Facility with the concomitant of any of its obligations to creditors who have provided. except terminal fees. GRP shall. Finally. either (i) take over the Development Facility and assume the currency stipulated for "Public Utility Revenues" under the Attendant Liabilities. allow the not result in the assumption by the Government of these Unpaid Creditors to be substituted as liabilities. to be substituted as PIATCO an added benefit which was not available at the concessionaire and operator of the Development time of bidding. Provided that PIATCO in the if at the end of the 180-day period GRP shall not event have served the Unpaid Creditors and of the latter's default Concessionaire written notice of its choice. or designate a qualified the Government operator acceptable to GRP to operate the Development Facility. gives Creditors. Page 76 of 458 changes in the 1997 Concession Agreement translate xxx xxx xxx to direct and concrete financial advantages for (b) In the event Concessionaire should default in PIATCO which were not available at the time the contract the payment of an Attendant Liability. or (ii) allow the Unpaid 1997 Concession Agreement. the 1997 Concession Agreement. It cannot be denied that under the default has resulted in the acceleration of the 1997 Concession Agreement only "Public Utility Revenues" payment due date of the Attendant Liability prior are subject to MIAA regulation. under inform GRP in writing of such default. likewise under the terms of the liabilities of and conditions of this Agreement. Assumption by conditions hereof. and the was offered for bidding. Moreover. the Unpaid fees imposed and collected by PIATCO are entirely within Creditors and Concessionaire shall immediately its control. loaned or advanced funds for the NAIA IPT III project does (c) If GRP should. acceptable to GRP within one hundred eighty . In fact. Such default organize a concession company qualified to take does not directly result in any concomitant right or over the operation of the Development Facility. with respect to terminal fees. the change in the Creditors and Concessionaire. the concession company should elect to designate an operator for the Development However. the 1997 Concession Agreement provides: Facility. the concession company shall in good faith identify and designate a qualified operator Section 4. if qualified. the latter shall form and of PIATCO's loans figure in the agreement. nowhere in the said contract does default concessionaire. If obligation in favor of the Government. the same is further within one hundred eighty (180) Days from subject to "Interim Adjustments" not previously stipulated in receipt of the joint written notice of the Unpaid the draft Concession Agreement. aSTAIH Facility in accordance with the terms and b. Adjustments of all other to its stated date of maturity. by written notice. assumption of Attendant Liabilities.

It loans. reimbursements and draft Concession Agreement which resulted in the 1997 other related expenses. penalties.04 is an important Attendant Liabilities. it was the lenders who proposed the amendments to the surcharges. They claim that interests. suffice it to state that Section 4. this circumstance contract bidded upon should always conform to the general is dependent on the existence and availability of a qualified policy on public bidding if such procedure is to be faithful to operator who is willing to take over the rights and its real nature and purpose. Page 77 of 458 (180) days from receipt of GRP's written notice. associated fees. This financial advantage is a significant modification that translates to better terms and conditions for PIATCO. However. security for the loans PIATCO has obtained to finance the then GRP shall at the end of the 180-day period project. amendment to the 1997 Concession Agreement because it The term "Attendant Liabilities" under the 1997 Concession grants PIATCO a financial advantage or benefit which was Agreement is defined as: not previously made available during the bidding process. when the seek alternate sources of funds to support the project. including all Documents permit financing or borrowing. loaned or advanced funds Agreement is subject to amendment because the Bid actually used for the Project. project triggers the occurrence of certain events that leads compliance by the project proponent of its undertakings to the assumption by the Government of the liability for the therein would involve a substantial amount of investment. Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded and from time to time outstanding in the books of PIATCO. a circumstance characteristic. an option that was not made available in the draft take over the Development Facility and assume Concession Agreement. the public interest by giving the public the best possible . By its very nature and obligations of PIATCO under the contract. Be Government so elects and allows a qualified operator to that as it may.e. Expectedly. this Court maintains that amendments to the take over as Concessionaire.04 in relation the winning bidder to obtain financing for the project. Section 4. charges. competitive public bidding aims to protect that is not entirely within the control of the Government. Without going into the validity of this provision at this If the concession company. PIATCO of its loans used to finance the NAIA IPT III operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III. acting in good faith juncture. to the definition of "Attendant Liabilities. and further including Concession Agreement.. Only in one instance may the Government escape is therefore inevitable for the awardee of the contract to the assumption of PIATCO's liabilities. argues that the parties to the bidding the Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid Creditors procedure acknowledge that the draft Concession who have provided. contractors and sub-contractors. however. is unable to designate a Concession Agreement may be considered a form of qualified operator within the aforesaid period. i. We agree that it is not inconsistent with the rationale and purpose of the BOT Law to allow the project proponent or Under the above quoted portions of Section 4.04 of the 1997 and with due diligence. amounts owed by Concessionaire to its suppliers." default by especially in this case which involves the construction. indemnities.

These contract signed by the government and the contract amendments cannot be taken as merely supplements to or awardee is an entirely different contract from the contract implementing provisions of those already existing in the bidded. A regulation of the matter Concession Agreement. III Public bidding is a standard practice for procuring Direct Government Guarantee government contracts for public service and for furnishing supplies and other materials. It is not difficult to see that the which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive amendments on (1) the types of fees or charges that are character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its subject to MIAA regulation or control and the extent thereof adoption. under certain awardee of a contract bidded out must conform to. courts should not hesitate to strike down said draft Concession Agreement. concrete financial advantages to PIATCO that were Thus.06.04(b) and (c). 47 Any government action which permits any substantial variance (b) In the event Concessionaire should default in between the conditions under which the bids are invited the payment of an Attendant Liability. A strict adherence on the principles. the procedure. rules and financial benefit to PIATCO which may have altered the regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to technical and financial parameters of other bidders had preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on they known that such terms were available. Page 78 of 458 advantages through open competition. It aims to secure for the Article IV. 45 It has been held being contrary to public policy. the fact that the foregoing inform GRP in writing of such default. These amendments convert that the three principles in public bidding are (1) the offer to the 1997 Concession Agreement to an entirely different the public. conditions. and the and the contract executed after the award thereof is a default resulted in the acceleration of the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of payment due date of the Attendant Liability prior jurisdiction which warrants proper judicial action.04 Assignment award of government contracts and avoid suspicion of xxx xxx xxx anomalies and it places all bidders in equal footing. The amendments discussed contract in its entirety for violation of public policy on public above present new terms and conditions which provide bidding. GRP shall substantial amendments were made on the 1997 within one hundred eighty (180) days from Concession Agreement renders the same null and void for receipt of the joint written notice of the Unpaid . Section 4. in relation to Article 1. the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire shall immediately In view of the above discussion. upon a concrete showing that. and (3) a basis agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft for the exact comparison of bids. the previously not available during the bidding process. government the lowest possible price under the most of the 1997 Concession Agreement provides: favorable terms and conditions. as in this case. to curtail favoritism in the Section 4. of the liabilities of PIATCO directly translates requirements of financing and borrowing notwithstanding. 46 These are the basic parameters which every and (2) the assumption by the Government. to its stated date of maturity. (2) opportunity for competition.

penalties. or (ii) allow the Unpaid the Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid Creditors. including all interests. likewise under the terms expenses. whatever option the Government chooses to take in operator within the aforesaid period.06. reimbursements and company qualified to takeover the operation of other related expenses. allow the Unpaid amounts include "all interests. acting in good faith and with due qualified operator within the prescribed period. that by Concessionaire to its suppliers. If the concession Government to pay PIATCO's creditors upon PIATCO's company should elect to designate an operator default would arise if the Government opts to take over for the Development Facility. If the concession creditors should the latter be unable to designate a company. surcharges. or designate a qualified associated fees. charges. by written notice. penalties. Attendant Liabilities qualified operator within the period provided for in the . then the event of PIATCO's failure to fulfill its loan obligations. 51 In diligence. Page 79 of 458 Creditors and Concessionaire. the concession NAIA IPT III. 49 These (c) If GRP. operator acceptable to GRP to operate the indemnities. the latter shall form and organize a concession charges. which is to allow designate a qualified operator acceptable to PIATCO's unpaid creditors operate NAIA IPT III. loaned or concessionaire and operator of the Development advanced funds actually used for the facility in accordance with the terms and Project. indemnities. GRP It is clear from the above-quoted provisions shall be deemed to have elected to take over the that Government. is unable to designate a qualified effect. either (i) take Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded over the Development Facility andassume the and from time to time outstanding in the books of Attendant Liabilities. GRP shall at the end of the 180-day period take over the Development Facility and assume the Government is still at a risk of assuming PIATCO's Attendant Liabilities. Provided. associated fees. is obligated to pay "all amounts recorded assumption of Attendant Liabilities. if qualified to be substituted as Creditors who have provided. outstanding loans. and further including amounts owed and conditions of this Agreement. surcharges. conditions hereof. and from time to time outstanding from the books" of PIATCO which the latter owes to its creditors. It should be noted. This is due to the fact that the Government would only be free from assuming PIATCO's xxx xxx xxx debts if the unpaid creditors would be able to designate a Section 1. Creditors to be substituted as concessionaire. that even if the company shall in good faith identify and Government chooses the second option. however." 50 This obligation of the the Development Facility. 48 have served the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire written notice of its choice. the GRP within one hundred eighty (180) days from Government is still at a risk of being liable to PIATCO's receipt of GRP's written notice. reimbursements and other related Development Facility. in the event that PIATCO defaults in its Development Facility with the concomitant loan obligations. contractors if at the end of the 180-day period GRP shall not and subcontractors.

It is of no moment that the relevant sections are subsumed under the title of "assignment". This is why private The fact that the ARCA superseded the 1997 Concession sector resources are being tapped in order to finance these Agreement did not cure this fatal defect. inter alia. direct guarantee. then the purpose of agreement shall be subject to the approval of the the law is subverted. The BOT law allows the private sector to 4. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). As such. the Senior Lenders shall have the . infrastructure and development projects necessary for economic growth and development. the unstable flow of Section 4. availability and attendant liabilities. which consists of PIATCO's unpaid willingness of a qualified operator. and is in fact encouraged to do so by way of provides: incentives. Article IV. Page 80 of 458 contract. with regard. in such form as may be reasonably acceptable to both GRP and Section 2(n) of the BOT Law defines direct guarantee as Senior Lenders.04 Security returns. Section 1. Thus. circumstances provided for in the 1997 Concession Clearly by providing that the Government "assumes" the Agreement is at the mercy of the existence. such as minimizing. PIATCO in the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project. in relation to Article 1. the Government's assumption of liability is implementing the project in case of a loan virtually out of its control. to the follows: following parameters: (n) Direct government guarantee — An xxx xxx xxx agreement whereby the government or any of its (iv) If the Concessionaire [PIATCO] is in default agencies or local government units assume under a payment obligation owed to the Senior responsibility for therepayment of debt directly Lenders. and as a result thereof the Senior incurred by the project proponent in Lenders have become entitled to accelerate the Senior Loans.06. The provisions providing for One of the main impetus for the enactment of the BOT direct government guarantee which is prohibited by law is Law is the lack of government funds to construct the clear from the terms thereof. of the ARCA participate. or in the end still be at a risk of paying the debts incurred by with an agent of such Senior Lenders (which the private entity in the BOT projects. 52 provided that the government would not have to unnecessarily expend scarcely available funds for the xxx xxx xxx project itself. The above contractual debts. subsidy and equity (c) GRP agrees with Concessionaire (PIATCO) by the government in these projects are strictly that it shall negotiate in good faith and enter into prohibited. the 1997 Concession Agreement provided for a provisions constitute a direct government guarantee which direct government guarantee for the debts incurred by is prohibited by law.04(c). The Government under the default. 53 This is but logical for if the government would direct agreement with the Senior Lenders. Section projects.

the Government is obligated to directly the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] shall negotiate and enter into an agreement relating to NAIA IPT be transferred by the Concessionaire [PIATCO] III with the Senior Lenders. 54 (180) days. acting in good faith facilities to Concessionaire [PIATCO]for the and using reasonable efforts. reimbursements. including. if greater.01 (c) hereof. interest. Page 81 of 458 right to notify GRP of the same. should the latter fail to appoint to GRP or its designee and GRP shall make a termination payment to Concessionaire a qualified nominee or transferee who will take the place of [PIATCO] equal to the Appraised Value (as PIATCO. and other related within one hundred eighty (180) days after giving expenses (including the fees. then at the end thereof its Senior Lenders. and without Liabilities. If no agreement relating to the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] is It is clear from the foregoing contractual provisions that in arrived at by GRP and the Senior Lenders within the event that PIATCO fails to fulfill its loan obligations to the said 180-day period. If the Senior Lenders and the Government are hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility unable to enter into an agreement after the prescribed [NAIA Terminal 3] or the sum of the Attendant period. contractors and sub- GRP) within the following one hundred eighty contractors. upon . charges and GRP notice as referred to respectively in (iv) or expenses of any agents or trustees of such (v) above.06. suppliers. whether payable at maturity. then GRP and the Senior Lenders persons or entities). loaned. to time owed or which may become owing by Concessionaire [PIATCO] to Senior Lenders or xxx xxx xxx any other persons or entities who have provided. to either in good faith identify and designate a xxx xxx xxx nominee which is qualified under sub-clause (viii)(y) below to operate the Development Section 1. this Agreement shall be deemed Lenders or any Senior Lenders' agent may have terminated upon the transfer of the Development (including without limitation under security Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] to GRP pursuant interests granted in favor of the Senior Lenders). or advanced funds or provided financial (vi) if the Senior Lenders. all principal. shall endeavor in good faith to enter into any by acceleration or otherwise. associated fees. without designate a nominee or effect a transfer in terms limitation. are unable to Project [NAIA Terminal 3]. hereto. and conditions satisfactory to the Senior Lenders charges. the Government must then pay PIATCO. Notwithstanding Section prejudice to any other rights of the Senior 8. and further other arrangement relating to the Development including amounts owed by Concessionaire Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] (other than a turnover [PIATCO] to its professional consultants and of the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] to advisers. Attendant Liabilities Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] or transfer the Concessionaire's [PIATCO] rights and Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts in each obligations under this Agreement to a transferee case supported by verifiable evidence from time which is qualified under sub-clause (viii) below.

but is not limited to. the ARCA obligates the to its lenders in connection with NAIA IPT III. in the present case. Worse. The only way the — in case no qualified nominee or transferee is appointed Government would not be liable for PIATCO's debt is for a by the Senior Lenders and no other agreement relating to qualified nominee or transferee to be appointed in place of NAIA IPT III has been reached between the Government PIATCO to continue the construction. As such the It is clear from the foregoing that the ARCA provides for a Government is virtually at the mercy of PIATCO (that it direct guarantee by the government to pay PIATCO's loans would not default on its loan obligations to its Senior not only to its Senior Lenders but all other entities who Lenders). whether guarantee by the government as the existence. the Government to pay for all loans. and other related expenses . The payment equal to the appraised value of the project or the Government was not even given an option as to what value of the attendant liabilities whichever is greater. operation and and the Senior Lenders — includes. . the Government is then automatically amount of PIATCO's debt that the Government would have obligated to "directly deal and negotiate" with the Senior to pay as a result of PIATCO's default in its loan obligations Lenders regarding NAIA IPT III. should the conditions as The proscription against government guarantee in any form stated in the contract occur. availability payable at maturity. advanced funds or provided any other Should the Senior Lenders fail to make such an type of financial facilities to PIATCO for NAIA IPT III. will not take the contract out of the ambit of a direct reimbursements. interest. . course of action it should take in case PIATCO defaulted in Attendant liabilities as defined in the ARCA includes all the payment of its senior loans. This "pre-condition". maintenance of NAIA IPT III. associated fees. advances and obligations conditions that would make the Government liable for arising out of financial facilities extended to PIATCO for the PIATCO's debts is triggered by PIATCO's own default of its implementation of the NAIA IPT III project should PIATCO loan obligations to its Senior Lenders to which loan default in its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders and the . would be merely notified by the Senior only to the Senior Lenders with whom PIATCO has Lenders of the same and it is the Senior Lenders who are defaulted in its loan obligations but to all other persons who authorized to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee. Lenders fail to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee does not detract from the fact that. the Senior Lenders (that they would appoint a provided PIATCO funds or services upon PIATCO's default qualified nominee or transferee or agree to some other in its loan obligation with its Senior Lenders. termination contracts the Government was never a party to. by acceleration or otherwise." 55 and willingness of a qualified nominee or transferee is totally out of the government's control. Government to pay any and all amounts owed by PIATCO Clearly. may have loaned. charges. however. The appointment. Page 82 of 458 transfer of NAIA IPT III to the Government. The Government. The fact that arrangement with the Government) and the existence of a the Government's obligation to pay PIATCO's lenders for qualified nominee or transferee who is able and willing to the latter's obligation would only arise after the Senior take the place of PIATCO in NAIA IPT III. the ARCA still obligates the is one of the policy considerations behind the BOT Law. "all principal. upon amounts owed or thereafter may be owed by PIATCO not PIATCO's default.

unsolicited proposals that the mere inclusion of a provision to that effect is fatal and is sufficient to deny the proposal." 57 The BOT Law clearly and strictly prohibits growth and development but which the government. This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal The BOT Law and its implementing rules provide that in maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be order for an unsolicited proposal for a BOT project may be done indirectly. and should not. The basic reasonable terms prescribed by it. This is a form of direct government guarantee. and (3) the the government to the risk of incurring a monetary government agency or local government unit has invited by obligation resulting from a contract of loan between the publication other interested parties to a public bidding and project proponent and its lenders and to which the conducted the same. temporarily rules of justice and fair play alone militate against such an take over or direct the operation of any privately occurrence and must not. therefore. the Section 17. 58 To declare the PIATCO contracts valid accepted. interest then its inclusion in the contract executed after the said proposal has been accepted is likewise sufficient to Article XII. inclusion of which would result in the denial of a proposal when the public interest so requires. 56 The failure to meet any of the Government is not a party to — but would also render the above conditions will result in the denial of the proposal. A prohibited provision. during the emergency and under in the contract resulting from the said proposal. direct government guarantee. the following conditions must first be met: (1) the despite the clear statutory prohibition against a direct project involves a new concept in technology and/or is not government guarantee would not only make a mockery of part of the list of priority projects. It BOT Law useless for what it seeks to achieve — to make is further provided that the presence of direct government use of the resources of the private sector in the "financing. It IV stands to reason therefore that if a proposal can be denied Temporary takeover of business affected with public by reason of the existence of direct government guarantee. (2) no direct government what the BOT Law seeks to prevent — which is to expose guarantee. could ill-afford to finance at this point in time. subsidy and equity in unfortunately. be allowed to later on be inserted may. subsidy or equity will "necessarily. . guarantee. In times of national emergency. Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: invalidate the contract itself. disqualify a operation and maintenance of infrastructure and proposal from being treated and accepted as an unsolicited development projects" 59 which are necessary for national proposal. This exposed to the risk of shouldering hundreds of million of in effect would make the Government liable for PIATCO's dollars in debt. the State cannot. loans should the conditions as set forth in the ARCA arise. be countenanced owned public utility or business affected with particularly in this instance where the government is public interest. subsidy or equity is required. Page 83 of 458 latter fails to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee.

become the "reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or subject matter of or be included in any notice. any loss or damage to the likewise. Concessionaire shall be service." 63 Article XII. Terminal Complex. if the temporary ownership. by mere contractual stipulation. Page 84 of 458 The above provision pertains to the right of the State in by written notice to Concessionaire. the Concession period shall of such proportion that would paralyze government commence to run again. Concessionaire is still servicing debts owed to project lenders). and in the exercise of its take over the operations of the Terminal and/or police power. immediately times of national emergency. If the parties cannot agree on the the government is in exercise of its police power and not of reasonable compensation of Concessionaire.10 (c) of the 1997 Concession shall be resolved in accordance with Section 10. seizure or appropriation by GRP in the times necessitate the government to "temporarily take times of war or national emergency. 61 The temporary takeover which compensation shall take into account the by the government extends only to the operation of the reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal business and not to the ownership thereof. whether permanent or temporary. In the 1986 GRP. and other consequential business and its properties as the temporary takeover by damages. Any amount determined to be Agreement provides: payable by GRP to Concessionaire shall be Section 5. operations shall be returned to Concessionaire.10 Temporary Take-over of operations offset from the amount next payable by by GRP. section 17 of the 1987 notification. the matter Article V. the term "national emergency" suspended. hostilities or national emergency. Section 5. to temporarily take over the operation of any the Terminal Complex. or its power of eminent domain. that upon termination of war. or declaration concerning or relating Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of to acquisition. (c) In the event the development Facility or any contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary part thereof and/or the operations of government takeover and obligate the government to pay Concessionaire or any part thereof. provided. the Concession Period shall be Constitutional Commission. . (which is in the the government is not required to compensate the private amount at least equal to the debt service entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of requirements of Concessionaire." 60 The duration of the emergency itself is the entitled to reasonable compensation for the determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover duration of the temporary take over by GRP. but not strikes "unless it is at which time.01 [Arbitration]. GRP shall. The private take over should occur at the time when entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot. on the liability of GRP as aforesaid. As such and/or Terminal Complex. During such take over by business affected with public interest. claim just compensation for the use of the said Development Facility. by the government would last. 62 xxx xxx xxx PIATCO cannot. Concessionaire to GRP. the was defined to include threat from external aggression. calamities or national disasters.

under the 1997 Concession unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of Agreement and the ARCA. Terminals 1 and 2 of NAIA would cease to function as A monopoly is "a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in international passenger terminals. is granted the "exclusive right to obligation by the government in the absence of damage operate a commercial international passenger terminal due to arbitrariness of its exercise. in view of No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair the exclusive right granted to PIATCO. Special Economic Zone ("SBFSEZ"). Clearly. manufacture a particular article. Police power is the "most essential. a determination must welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount first be made as to whether public interest requires a consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily monopoly." 66 The 1987 Constitution strictly compete with NAIA IPT III in the latter's operation as an regulates monopolies. or control the sale deem appropriate except those activities that would of a particular commodity. they are subject to a effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police higher level of State regulation than an ordinary business power. Regulation of Monopolies upon commencement of PIATCO's operation of NAIA IPT III. the State in inflict severe prejudice to the public. illimitable of powers. Clark Special V Economic Zone ("CSEZ") and in Laoag City. 69 As such. and even international passenger terminal. PIATCO. requiring the within the Island of Luzon" at the NAIA IPT III. contracts of the service providers currently servicing Clearly. 19. This. 65 Thus." It is the interest of the public. Article XII. Agreement and the ARCA further provide that. The state shall regulate or prohibit the option of the government. 72 Both the 1997 Concession monopolies when the public interest so requires. 70 The right granted to provides for their prohibition if public interest so PIATCO to exclusively operate NAIA IPT III would be for a requires. however." 64 Its exercise therefore must not be In the cases at bar. does not one or more persons or companies. and undertaking. whether private or public. 68 This is government to pay reasonable compensation for the with the exception of already existing international airports reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of in Luzon such as those located in the Subic Bay Freeport the business contravenes the Constitution. the concession competition shall be allowed. Section 19 of the 1987 period of twenty-five (25) years from the In-Service Constitution states: Date 71 and renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at Sec. As monopolies are subject to abuses that can take over a particular business. monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Terminals 1 and 2 would no longer be renewed and those Constitution but may be permitted to exist to aid the concession contracts whose expiration are subsequent to government in carrying on an enterprise or to aid in the . consisting in the prevent MIAA to use Terminals 1 and 2 as domestic exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business passenger terminals or in any other manner as it may or trade. Page 85 of 458 over or direct the operation of any privately owned public performance of various services and functions in the utility or business affected with public interest. insistent. 67 Nonetheless.

155001 stated that there are two service providers interest. In 3. which is the government DOTC/MIAA. has the right counsel for the petitioners-in-intervention for G. 2002.01(e) of the 1997 Concession Agreement and date. operation and maintenance of NAIA IPT III." 76 the same operator.01 Concession Period entering into a Build-Operate-and-Transfer contract for the construction. 75 While it is the declared policy of the BOT Concessionaire becomes involved in any Law to encourage private sector participation by "providing litigation initiated by any such concessionaire or a climate of minimum government regulations. through the MIAA. In the event regulated. Page 86 of 458 the In-Service Date would cease to be effective on the said Section 3. 73 the ARCA provide: The operation of an international passenger airport terminal is no doubt an undertaking imbued with public interest. while PIATCO may be authorized to exclusively under this Agreement. 74 Terminal and the Concessionaire is under no legal obligation to permit such carry-over except This is in accord with the Constitutional mandate that a through a separate agreement duly entered into monopoly which is not prohibited must be with Concessionaire. . the operation of a public utility as a monopoly. and the duty to ensure that it is done in accord with public No. the Government. confirms that these services and agency authorized to operate the NAIA complex. The right granted to the public utility may deductible by way of an offset from any amount be exclusive but the exercise of the right cannot run riot. xxx xxx xxx the government has determined that public interest would (e) GRP confirms that certain concession be served better if private sector resources were used in its agreements relative to certain services and construction and an exclusive right to operate be granted to operations currently being undertaken at the the private entity undertaking the said project. which the Concessionaire is bound to pay GRP Thus. The including the cost of litigation and the reasonable operation of said public utility can not be done in an fees paid or payable to Concessionaire's counsel arbitrary manner to the detriment of the public which it of choice. all such amounts shall be fully seeks to serve. GRP undertakes and hereby holds does not mean that Government must completely Concessionaire free and harmless on full indemnity basis from and against any loss and/or surrender its sovereign power to protect public interest in any liability resulting from any such litigation. the privilege given to PIATCO is Terminal I have a validity period extending subject to reasonable regulation and supervision by the beyond the In-Service Date.R. in this case Ninoy Aquino International Airport passenger PIATCO. as well as operations shall not be carried over to the DOTC. PIATCO's right to operate NAIA IPT III cannot also whose contracts are still existing and whose validity violate the rights of third parties. the terminal. GRP through Government through the MIAA. the department to which MIAA is attached. operate NAIA IPT III as an international passenger During the oral arguments on December 10. Nonetheless.

PIATCO. the MIAA. The Supplements. whose period of effectivity. require the Government to break its contractual obligations The provisions under Sections 4. please see separate opinion VI . the affected service providers prohibited by.06 of the ARCA. PIATCO had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession cannot. These contracts must be respected not just by material and substantial amendments. the 1997 Concession Agreement is expedient of claiming an exclusive right to operate. Trading Corporation v. of its right to supervise the operation of the whole NAIA complex. Bellosillo. including NAIA IPT III. the award by the for the renewal or the extension of their respective PBAC of the contract for the construction.. In contrast to the arrastre and Section 1. this Court rules that in view of the absence of the We hold that while the service providers presently requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium. operating at NAIA Terminal 1 do not have an absolute right predecessor of respondent PIATCO. Further. Sandoval- government agency tasked with the job. through MIAA. the efficient functioning of NAIA IPT III is imbued Amended and Restated Concession Agreement and the with public interest. Corona and Carpio Morales. the interest of the public. Jr. TcEaAS violated. Agreement and the ARCA did not strip government. the In fine. which amendments the parties thereto but also by third parties. cannot similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. Page 87 of 458 extends beyond the In-Service Date.. One contract remains CONCLUSION valid until 2008 and the other until 2010. responsibility to ensure that whoever by contract is given JJ. 79 it is MIAA's Gutierrez. C.04(c) in relation to Section 1. Lazaro 78 whose contracts consist of which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly temporary hold-over permits. WHEREFORE.04(b) and (c) in relation to to the service providers. Ynares-Santiago.. operation and contracts. are likewise null and void. J. those contracts whose duration extends beyond maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.J. being accessory contracts to the as well as the other terms and conditions thereof cannot be ARCA.. the 1997 Concession Agreement. by the mere contract bidded upon. NAIA IPT III's In-Service-Date should not be unduly considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains prejudiced. The provisions of the 1997 Concession Supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. by law and certainly not by contract. the BOT Law and its in the cases at bar. Austria Martinez. concur. the right to operate NAIA IPT III will do so within the Vitug. please see separate (dissenting) opinion bounds of the law and with due regard to the rights of third parties and above all.. render a valid Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the and binding contract nugatory. void. J. 77 In sum. Panganiban. have a valid and binding contract with Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and the Government.06 of the 1997 Concession Agreement and stevedoring service providers in the case of Anglo-Fil Section 4. thru SO ORDERED. among others. As the primary Davide.

: of undisputed facts. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. and As I have so expressed in Tolentino vs. J. among other actual parties. petitions for certiorari.. Guingona... judicial power still commanding the respondent to desist from succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of . The rule is explicit. quo warranto. Pervasive and limitless. board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis VITUG. such as it may certainty and praying that judgment be rendered seem to be under the 1987 Constitution. declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. contentious evidentiary facts. A petition for prohibition may be filed against a tribunal. or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. concur with separate further proceedings in the action or matter (dissenting) opinion of J. Secretary of there is no appeal or any other plain. The contracts and to restrain respondents from implementing Rules provide that any person interested under a contract said agreements for being illegal and unconstitutional. Sr. are in the nature of actions for prohibition. 1 The cases in question. speedy and Finance. bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any Section 2. 7 the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. mandamus.. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. In prohibition. exercising judicial. a Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been person aggrieved thereby may file a verified tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the petition in the proper court. may. corporation. and for a "When the proceedings of any tribunal. It would be difficult. 5 jurisdiction. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. alleging the facts with entire bureaucracy. of facts. Jr. although denominated to be petitions for The petitions. What the petitions seek from respondents do not involve judicial." Callejo. Separate Opinions only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal. J. specified therein. it is not a trier controversies. if not This Court is bereft of jurisdiction to hear the petitions at anomalous. whether Supreme Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for exercising judicial. before breach or violation thereof. JJ. in effect. Vitug. actually pray for the nullification of the PIATCO declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. officer or person. respectively.. Carpio. to decide the jurisdictional issue on the basis bar. took no part. Panganiban. The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of the contradictory factual submissions made by the shall exercise original jurisdiction over. officer or person. 4 The corporation. 3 As the Court has so often exhorted. Page 88 of 458 Quisumbing and Azcuna. prohibition. concurs with separate opinion of J. 6 reiterated in Santiago vs. are without or in excess of its or his courts. board. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states: question of construction or validity arising. and habeas corpus. 2 The parties allege. board. J. quasi-judicial or ministerial declaratory relief which are cognizable by regional trial functions.

Standing and Arbitration coordinate branch in our system of government. Fiat iustitia ruat coelum. while entailing the investment of billions of pesos replete with outright violations of law. objections to these Petitions. The subject contracts pertain to the construction Accordingly. and duty of determining whether the other agencies of government have acted within the limits of the Constitution . the Court allows itself to pass The Procedural Issue: upon at will the disposition of a co-equal. and (c) the alleged lack of sufficient personality. Public interest will inevitably be affected with a retelling thereof. independent and Jurisdiction. J. as well as other The facts leading to this controversy are already well provisions equally offensive to law. I shall not burden the readers Constitution. do petitioners have locus standi and should this hierarchy of courts. are contracts. must now be set aside. the country abroad. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue Definitely and surely. at every turn. The first issue is procedural: Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the Petitions? Thus.: that will play a major role in the country's economic The five contracts for the construction and the operation of development and serve to project a positive image of our Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal III. being in the main procedural matters. The five build-operate-&-transfer (BOT) subject of the consolidated Petitions before the Court. in the public policy to such an extent as to render all of them void guise of sovereign imprimatur. arbitration? standing or interest. and the operation of the country's premiere international airport terminal — an ultramodern world-class public utility PANGANIBAN. require the disbursements of public funds sans may. What significance can still then remain of the My answer to all the above questions is a firm "Yes." time-honored and widely acclaimed principle of separation of powers if. I vote for the dismissal of the petition. the issues involved in these Petitions interference can lead to. The Court may not at good liberty intrude. I will cut to the chase and thereby. (b) the need for arbitration prior to court Court decide the cases without any mandatory referral to action. as they have been in past cases. directly address the two sets of gut issues: 1. The only proper thing to do is declare them all dollars in loans. Instead. the laws. contain provisions that tend to establish a null and void ab initio and let the chips fall where they monopoly. The second one is substantive in character: Did the This Court must be permitted to perform its constitutional subject contracts violate the Constitution. 2. public policy and the presented in the ponencia. CSTDIE are clearly of transcendental importance and of national interest. grounded upon (a) the Corollarily. into every affair of and inexistent? government. public policy and the in capital and the availment of several hundred millions of Constitution. and provide government guarantees in violation of statutory prohibitions. appropriations. Page 89 of 458 powers.

in the past. the Piatco contracts Contrary to Piatco's argument that the resolution of the are indeed void in their entirety. in light of the feared loss of jobs of the petitioning void agreement will not be rendered operative by the workers. including Section 10. the unavoidable consequence of having to all contractual provisions. In inasmuch as they are not parties to the Piatco contracts. Nevertheless. and therefore.02 of the await the rendition and the finality of any such judgment ARCA. a resort to the issues raised in the Petitions will require delving into factual aforesaid provision on arbitration is unavailing. the parties and the general public. To would be a prolonged state of uncertainty that would be support its stand. 2 This holding applies with greater force to Concession Agreement. consequent to the inevitable pretermination of parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their contracts of the petitioning service providers that will follow respective prestations. 3 As will be discussed at length later. questions. it is unarguable that the arbitration involving the application of the amended BOT Law. the Petitions raise some novel questions And in the final analysis. it still cannot bind them examination of the documents submitted by the parties.02 of the ARCA. to this Court has seen fit to tackle. however. It produces no direct resort to this Court through the special civil action of legal effect at all. insisting that there averring that petitioners can obtain relief from the regional can be no arbitration based on Section 10. vests no rights and creates no obligations. Besides. many of the significant and that. its amendments and supplements. be undertaken by a panel of three (3) arbitrators appointed in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Arbitration International Chamber of Commerce. Presidential Commission on Good Government: 6 "The And.02 of the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement Hierarchy of Courts (ARCA) provides for arbitration under the auspices of the The Court has." prohibition is thus justified. trial courts via an action to annul the contracts.02 of the ARCA. A contract that violates upon the heels of the impending opening of NAIA Terminal the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and III. 1 recourse? Respondent Piatco claims that Section 10. inexistent and inoperative. since all the Piatco contracts are void ab initio. 4 I submit that their disposition ultimately turns petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention have pointed out on questions of law. the instant cases. Respondent Piatco is partly correct in The government disagrees. are likewise void. Page 90 of 458 and the laws. the government cites Chavez prejudicial to the nation. or if they have gravely abused the discretion Should the dispute be referred to arbitration prior to judicial entrusted to them. the need for relief is patently urgent. v. which process provided for under Section 10. held that questions relating to International Chamber of Commerce to settle any dispute gargantuan government contracts ought to be settled or controversy or claim arising in connection with the without delay. determine and definitively resolve the . thus. 5 Further. Therefore. will not be able to address. even granting arguendo that the arbitration clause relevant factual questions can be easily addressed by an remained a valid provision. any event.

Agan et al. Lopez et al. Agan et al. are employees of expenditure of public funds was not required under the the MIAA. suing as a citizen. Agan et al and Lopez et al. are likewise taxpayers No.) are confronted with the prospect of In the cases presently under consideration. insofar as the inclusion of those items of expenditure in the budget is concerned.. notwithstanding the fact that On the other hand. The Court cited the fact that public existing concession agreements with the MIAA to provide interest was involved. Page 91 of 458 constitutional and legal questions that have been raised in of Representatives. in of the House of Representatives. its subsidiaries and related companies. no one will seriously doubt that. in view of the important role of the airport services necessary to the operation of the NAIA and Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) in the (2) service agreements to furnish essential support country's economic development and the magnitude of the services to the international airlines operating at the NAIA. financial consideration. On account of provisions in the limitations upon the exclusive power and prerogative of Piatco contracts. taxpayer and member disbursement of public funds. are employees (or representatives of with standing to bring the suit questioning the validity of the employees) of various service providers that have (1) assailed contract. 155547. petitioners-legislators import. being taxpayers have locus standi to bring suit. 7 this Court held that the and thus possessed of standing to challenge the illegal petitioner therein. petitioners' being laid off from their jobs and losing their means of personal and substantial interest in the controversy is livelihood when their employer-companies are forced to shown by the fact that certain provisions in the Piatco shut down or otherwise retrench and cut back on contracts create obligations on the part of government manpower... As members of the House into a written contract with Piatco so as not to be shut out . they are actually deprived of discretion the Petitions before us. contracts that tend toward the creation of a monopoly in favor of Piatco. This. In Albano v. and (2) they are prejudiced qua legislators. and assailed contract. Petitioners Baterina et al. since the international airlines and passengers in the NAIA and are contractual provisions requiring the government to incur therefore competitors of Piatco as far as that line of expenditures without appropriations also operate as business is concerned. Messrs. Lopez et al. Reyes. have locus standi to bring the Petition in GR Messrs. Messrs. These petitioners (Messrs. petitioners-in-intervention have to enter Congress over the public purse. Such development would result from the (through the DOTC and the MIAA) to disburse public funds imminent implementation of certain provisions in the without prior congressional appropriations. Messrs. was sufficiently clothed particular. To prevent such encroachment upon Locus Standi the legislative privilege and obviate injury to the institution Given this Court's previous decisions in cases of similar of which they are members. Petitioners thus correctly assert that the injury to them has a twofold aspect: (1) they are adversely affected as Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in the taxpayers on account of the illegal disbursement of public business of furnishing airport-related services to funds. and members of the House of Representatives.

for the submission of comparative or competitive claiming the right of judicial review. without due process of law. It even won the bidding and was helped "Sec. Violations of the Constitution and the Laws From the Outset. submitted by the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation Since there is no provision to ensure or safeguard free and (AEDC) to the Department of Transportation and fair competition. this controversy is laden which in turn reviewed it on the basis of its scope. but was nevertheless permitted to do so. . And even if petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention were The draft of the concession agreement as negotiated not sufficiently clothed with legal standing. along by what appears to be a series of collusive and corrosive acts. After studying the documents submitted and arguments organizational and legal standards provided in the BOT advanced by the parties.. and significance. financial indicators and risks. I have no doubt that.e. proposal. Section 5 of this statute states: outset. Jr. public and on national interest. 8 that "in cases of transcendental importance. financial. having satisfied the minimum Passenger Terminal III comes under the category of an financial. "In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement. . Guingona The DOTC/MIAA then prepared the Bid Documents. organizational and legal "unsolicited proposal. and met the technical." 9 proposals. the Bidding At this point. 5. technical." which is the subject of Section 4-A standards required by this Act. right at the Law. Hence. I have at the between AEDC and DOTC/MIAA was endorsed to the outset already established that. position as was enunciated in Kilosbayan v. I do not hesitate to adopt the same thereafter approved it for bidding. given its impact on the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA-ICC). has submitted the of the BOT Law. Piatco was not qualified to participate in the bidding process for the Terminal III project. . the Court incorporating therein the negotiated Draft Concession may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to Agreement. I must emphasize that the law requires the Process Was Flawed and Tainted award of a BOT project to the bidder that has satisfied the minimum requirements. They claim Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International injury on account of their deprivation of property (business) Airport Authority (MIAA). Piatco's predecessor-in-interest. Page 92 of 458 of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing business there. prosper even when there is no direct injury to the party i. which reviewed and approved the and of the liberty to contract. the Paircargo The Substantive Issue: Consortium. 10 The unsolicited proposal was originally lowest bid and most favorable terms for the . with transcendental importance and constitutional economic viability. they are literally at its mercy. Public bidding of projects. and published invitations for public bidding.. the contract shall be awarded to The build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) project for the NAIA the bidder who. was the only company that submitted a competitive bid or price challenge.

095. To establish such capability. disqualified bidders are to be informed of the reason them. — To to the prescribed minimum design and pre-qualify. and/or the financial proposal. . rehabilitated. operated and maintained according "Sec. Financial Capability. The project proponent public bidding "must be conducted under a two." Moreover.4(c) of the 1994 IRR proposed tolls." 11 Since the minimum amount of equity for the project was set at 30 percent 12 of the minimum project cost of US$350 Aside from complying with the legal and technical million. Prequalification Requirements. fees. a project proponent must comply performance standards. rentals and charges over a provides: fixed term for the facility to be constructed. 5.) xxx xxx xxx The same provision requires that the price challenge via "c. On the other members of the consortium are banking with hand. the minimum amount of move to second stage technical proposal evaluation. based on the present value of its financing needed for it. a project proponent desiring to prequalify the exchange rate then of P26. as the case may be. and that they have adequate resources.4. The equity needed. the 1994 Implementing operation and maintenance phases of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) provide that only those project.000. The for their disqualification. construction. For purposes of bidders that have passed the prequalification stage are prequalification. . in terms of: (i) proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a In other words. the peso equivalent of the project. Page 93 of 458 project." (Italics supplied..00 (as quoted must also demonstrate its financial capacity to undertake by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). this capability shall be measured permitted to have their two envelopes reviewed. evaluated and appreciated. Converted to pesos at key personnel). .239 to US$1. that they are in good financial standing. . and "Prequalified proponents will be considered eligible to before prequalification. Section 5. plans and specifications.755. the minimum amount of equity required of any requirements (track record or experience of the firm and its proponent stood at US$105 million. a letter testimonial from reputable banks and only the pre-qualified bidders would be entitled to have attesting that the project proponent and/or their bids opened." (Italics supplied) second and third envelopes of pre-disqualified proponents will be returned. and (ii) submitting their prequalification documents for evaluation. prospective bidders must prequalify by minimum amount of equity to the project. This procedure was confirmed and government Agency/LGU concerned shall reiterated in the Bid Documents. prove that it is able to raise the minimum amount of equity required for the project and to procure the loans or . which I quote thus: determine on a project-to-project basis. must have adequate capability to sustain the envelope/two-stage system: the first envelope to contain financing requirements for the detailed the technical proposal and the second envelope to contain engineering design. with the following requirements: . . a proponent must the minimum equity was P2.

and be subject to the same Statement should not be taken as the amount of money to guidelines. 12. that bidder is not contracting in requirement that the networth must be `unrestricted. requirements and limitations.55.871. This matter was brought to the attention of the the public bidding process.' To fair competition with those bidders that propose to be impose this as a requirement now will be nothing less than bound by all conditions. DOTC public bidding to permit a variance between the conditions Undersecretary Primitivo C. 15 Thus. Page 94 of 458 However." relieved from having to conform to the conditions that To justify his conclusion. the opened the two envelopes of the consortium containing its Paircargo consortium was deemed prequalified and thus technical and financial proposals. that "the Challenger (Paircargo consortium) was found to have a combined net worth of P3. each bidder must He further opined. an opportunity for fair competition and a basis for the precise comparison of bids." to participate further in the bidding. which was equivalent to 30 This position is unmistakably and squarely at odds with the percent of the project cost. required AEDC to match permitted to proceed to the other stages of the bidding the consortium's bid. it should not have been prequalified or allowed not for prequalification (Sec. declared in a Memorandum dated 14 October 1996 proposals are submitted and approved.926.1 of IRR of the BOT Law) but project cost. the combined equity or net worth of the By virtue of the prequalified status conferred upon the Paircargo consortium stood at only Paircargo. 13 This amount was only slightly over 6 the consortium of the need to comply with the financial percent of the minimum project cost and very much short of capability requirement imposed by the BOT Law and IRR. all of the challenger but rather to be used in establishing if things being equal. 16 or awarded the Concession process. Such deficiency should have Supreme Court's consistent doctrine emphasizing the strict immediately caused the disqualification of the Paircargo application of pertinent rules. concurrent chair of the under which bids are invited and those under which PBAC. 5. In fact. it is unarguably irregular and contrary to the very concept of Notwithstanding the glaring deficiency. regulations and guidelines for consortium. actual or potential — on the same footing.4 of same document). Cal. The desired result be used to answer the required thirty (30%) percent equity is to be able to determine the best offer or lowest bid. Thus. he asserted: "It is not a impose some duty upon it.421.242. . in order to place each bidder — Prequalification and Bidding Committee (PBAC).384.00 that Republic v. unfair. there is enough basis to believe that the challenger can comply with the required 30% equity. The essence of public bidding is." after all. proof of Inasmuch as the Paircargo consortium did not possess the sufficient equity is required as one of the conditions for minimum equity equivalent to 30 percent of the minimum award of contract (Sec. The Prequalification and Bidding Committee (PBAC) should therefore not have On the basis of the foregoing dubious declaration. Capulong 14 teaches that if one bidder is could support a project costing approximately P13 billion. the required minimum equity. Undersecretary Cal's findings in effect relieved P558. "(T)he networth reflected in the Financial bid under the same conditions.

the significance and necessity of protecting Price Challenge proprietary information in connection with unsolicited In DOTC PBAC Bid Bulletin No.6 of the IRR pertains bidder must be given access to the assumptions and the only to the proprietary information of the originator of an calculations that went into crafting the competing bid. Paircargo's successor Piatco was void. the law Cal declared that. according to In this instance. the projects. protected and financial. the award of the concession to To be considered as utilizing a new concept or technology. which provides that of the blue. I believe. And to make the encouragement real. and not to those belonging to a challenger. It is thus self-evident that in order to misapplication of the mentioned provision. the financial and technical proposals of Section 4-A of the BOT Law as amended. 18 Patently. qualifies as an "unsolicited proposal" when it pertains to a Piatco. it is arrived at after studying economic. it is likewise based treated with utmost confidentiality. the probable demand for the product or service. unsolicited proposal. Undersecretary proposals. Page 95 of 458 Agreement to the consortium's successor-in-interest. Piatco cannot and intellectual property rights over a design. involving the use of new technology or proposed Annual Guaranteed Payments submitted by concepts. and the a project must involve the possession of exclusive rights Concession Agreement executed with the latter was (worldwide or regional) over a process. 3). project that involves "a new concept or technology. and is therefore not to on certain assumptions as to the nature of the business. or possession of likewise void ab initio. For this reason. 4 (par. the future behavior of cost items. a information" referred to in Section 11. and so on. and not to the latter's financial and technical challenge. The reason for the protection accorded proprietary information at all is the fact that. the market potentials. therefore. 17 engineering concept. fresh ideas and new technology. form part of the bidding/tender and related documents. for purposes of matching the price also extends to such individuals and groups what amounts challenge of Piatco. factors. entire bidding process having been flawed and tainted from the very outset. political and This pronouncement. The "proprietary be able to intelligently match a bid or price challenge.6 of the 1994 IRR. through the mechanism of matching a price Piatco. AEDC as originator of the unsolicited to a "right of first refusal" to undertake the project they proposal would be permitted access only to the schedule of conceptualized. This was supposedly in keeping with A competing bid is never just any figure conjured from out Section 11. proprietary information is to be respected. a proposal Piatco would have provided AEDC with the necessary . methodology or should not be allowed to benefit from that Agreement. was a grievous other risks." and/or a project that is not on the government's list of priority As there was effectively no public bidding to speak of. proposals that constituted the basis for the price challenge in the first place. Right to Match PIATCO's Hence. technical and other. the intent of the BOT Law is to encourage individuals and groups to come up AEDC Was Deprived of the with creative innovations.

Section 9. clearance on a no-objection basis. Page 96 of 458 information to enable it to make a reasonably informed expose and weed out unqualified proponents. the Notice of Award must be Section 9. as were the At the end of the day. though. To put it more simply. within 7 days therefrom. in order to give the favored proponent sufficient technical proposals containing the critical information it time to comply with the requirements.1 of the 1994 IRR prescribed that within 30 calendar days from the time the second-stage Delayed Issuance of the evaluation shall have been completed. the Committee must Notice of Award Violated come to a decision whether or not to award the contract the BOT Law and the IRR and. by compelling them to put their how the competing bid came about. IRR not only set out the precise sequence of events One could say that AEDC did not have the benefit of a occurring between the completion of the evaluation of the "level playing field. Definite allowable extensions of time were provided for. jointly and severally responsible for the obligations of the the draft contract shall be submitted to the ICC for project proponent under the contract. a bidder unable to have unceremoniously slipped through the earlier access the competitor's assumptions will never figure out prequalification process. and indications of Section 9. the deprived AEDC of the ability to match the price challenge. in the case of joint projects involving substantial government undertakings as ventures. and its issuance must follow within bidding (and therefore the prospective awardee) shall another 7 days thereafter." It seems to me. merely postponing the actual issuance of the Notice of By withholding from AEDC the challenger's financial and Award. the bottom line is that the validity and consequences of a failure to meet a particular deadline. but was actually shut out of the game altogether. also specified the timetables for each such event. In particular. who might matching bid. Hence. submit the prescribed performance security.5 of the IRR requires that the Notice of Award approved by the head of agency or local government unit must indicate the time frame within which the winner of the (LGU) concerned. to prevent delays in the project implementation. that AEDC technical bids and the issuance of the Notice of Award. Undersecretary Cal actually and effectively minimize the manipulation of the post-bidding process. "counter-propose" is like having him shoot at a target in the Nevertheless. so to speak. then the submission shall be for information submission of the aforementioned requirements is not only only. an agreement showing that the members are follows: Within 7 days after the decision to award is made. and. proof of commitment of equity contributions. the propriety of the award to Piatco had been irreparably impaired. If the draft contract includes government undertakings already previously The purpose of having a definite and firm timetable for the approved. requiring him to money where their mouths are. this provision can be easily circumvented by dark while blindfolded.2 of the IRR set the procedure applicable to sources of financing (loans). to avert or needed. but also to .

therefore. This specified.1 IRR. should there be additional or new provisions "01 April 1997 — The PBAC resolved that a different from the original government undertakings. issued to PIATCO. the copy of the final draft of the Concession draft shall have to be reviewed and approved. as can be observed from the presentation made were to be assumed that the release of NEDA's by the counsel for public respondents." match and that negotiations preparatory to Notice of Award should be commenced. This regulated scenario was submitted to it for review. or lengthy and still-unexplained delays occurred in the award the 28th of January 1997. its failure to act on the contract within the resolution came more than 3 months too late as it should have been made on the 20th of specified time frame signifies that the agency or LGU may December 1996 at the latest. by the persons in charge of the commenced the running of the 7-day period to award process for the time limitations prescribed by the approve the Notice of Award. This This chronology of events bespeaks an unmistakable was the decision to award that should have disregard. The ICC has Agreement be submitted to the NEDA for 15 working days to act thereon. In both cases. if not disdain. Page 97 of 458 However. as per Section 9. observance of the rules. or to submit the draft contract to the pronouncement in Republic v. Their attitude flies in the face of this Court's solemn of the IRR. The highly regulated time-frames within which the agents "18 April 1997 — NEDA approved the Concession Agreement. 1996 — The Paircargo Joint Venture release of the Notice of Award occurred in a was informed by the PBAC that AEDC failed to decidedly less than timely fashion. and the period of signing the Concession Agreement be Notice itself has to be issued within seven days thereafter. the hereinbelow: Notice of Award should have been issued on the 9th of May 1997. Again this is more than of government were to act evinced the intent to impose 3 months too late as the NEDA's decision should upon them the duty to act expeditiously throughout the have been released on the 16th of January 1997 process. several issued fourteen days after NEDA's approval. proceed with the award. the Notice of Award should have been Despite the clear timetables set out in the IRR. 19 quoted approval on the 18th of April was timely. Following the provisions of the IRR. The head of agency or LGU shall approve the Notice of Award within seven days of the "16 April 1997 — The PBAC resolved that the clearance by the ICC on a no-objection basis. and unless otherwise clearance on a no-objection basis. the "11 Dec. Capulong 20 that "strict ICC for approval conformably with Section 9. regulations and guidelines of the . even if it process. to the end that the project be prosecuted and or fifteen days after it should have been implemented without delay.2. extended by 15 days. In any case. likewise intended to discourage collusion and substantially reduce the opportunity for agents of government to abuse "09 July 1997 — The Notice of Award was their discretion in the course of the award process.

must be deemed null fault of government. and four more times through negotiation and without any assistance to Piatco in securing site bidding. the contract actually executed between utilities. The CA provided that government is to competitive public bidding. government shall and void from the beginning. pay all expenses that Piatco incurred for the project plus the appraised value Further Amendments Resulted of the Terminal.02 of the DCA (the draft concession agreement or "DCA") in the following requires government to refrain from very significant respects: competing with the contractor with 1. the latter negotiated changes additional land at the government's to the Contract bidded out and ended up with what expense for construction of road amounts to a substantially new contract without any public networks required by Piatco's bidding. The CA provided that in case of award of the contract to Piatco. acquisition of award the contract to Piatco. This Contract was subsequently further amended approved plans and specifications. the 3. 23 in a Substantially Different Contract. 1997 (the Concession permits. no less! On account of such violation. The CA imposed new and special Public Bidding obligations on government. Page 98 of 458 bidding process is the only safeguard to a fair. honest and 2.02(b) of the CA business of providing airport-related excludes and prohibits everyone. which undoubtedly gained termination of the contract due to the time and benefited from the delays. 21 indirectly competing with Piatco. Where Section 3. 1996 to for the terminal. Thus. the only conclusion that can possibly term Attendant Liabilities) in the event be drawn is that the BOT law and its IRR were repeatedly Piatco fails to pay its senior lenders. including But the violations and desecrations did not stop there. licenses and authorizations." answer for Piatco's unpaid loans and debts (lumped under the From the foregoing. 24 Agreement or "CA") differed from the contract bidded out 5. 22 violated with unmitigated impunity — and by agents of government. services for international airlines and including government. NAIA Terminal . Section 3. with respect to the operation of. as well as operations in. from directly or passengers. Awarded Without 4. After delivery of clean possession of the site the PBAC made its decision on December 11. as well as all necessary Piatco and DOTC/MIAA on July 12. The CA inserted stipulations creating a respect to the operation of NAIA monopoly in favor of Piatco in the Terminal III.

But per airlines. adjustments to these fees and charges reimbursements and other related subject to or limited by any parametric expenses. food services. such as payment of lease rentals transportation utility concessions. the are denominated in US Dollars. and performance of other obligations groundhandling. the approval of MIAA: lease/rental term attendant liabilities refers charges.33 of the CA. carpark fees. greeter/well-wisher Agreements.01 of the DCA. loaned Section 6. 25 amounts owed by [Piatco] to its . But groundhandling fees. Under Section 6. the CA as books of (Piatco) as owing to Unpaid executed with Piatco provides in Creditors who have provided.06 of the CA. However. obligations under the Tenant porterage fees. whatever kind that may be imposed on Moreover. Neither are the surcharges. charges and assessments of VIP facilities fees and others. intervention. Page 99 of 458 III. aircraft tacking fees. advertising fees. fees. adjustments to the NAIA Terminal III or parts thereof.06 that all the aforesaid fees. the miscellaneous concession fees. Attendant porterage fees are permitted only once Liabilities refers to unpaid debts of every two years and in accordance Piatco: "All amounts recorded and with a parametric formula. adjusted without MIAA's approval or penalties. operating within Terminal III. all the prohibition. Section 1. including all interests. following fees are subject to the written 8.07 of the DCA. and payment of all taxes. concession privilege fees for to liabilities pertinent to NAIA Terminal passenger services. aforesaid fees save the terminal fee 6. per DCA from time to time outstanding in the Section 6. check-in counter of the businesses of providing various fees and other fees are to be quoted airport-related services to international and paid in Philippine pesos. associated fees. Under Section 8. fees.29 of the DCA provides that the commercial business enterprises terminal fees. indemnities. III. catering and under the Land Lease Agreement. Operations in is sufficiently broad to encompass all retail and other 7. and further including formula. inclusive aircraft parking fees. rentals and in Section 1. charges. or advanced funds actually used for rentals and charges may be the Project. within the scope of the Section 1.03.

whether on account concluded. 26 of Piatco's debts or (b) permit the qualified unpaid creditors to be In a relatively early case. Its very rationale was totally where government is the one in breach subverted by permitting Piatco to amend the contract for of the contract. contractors and event of government's breach of subcontractors. and after the bidding process had been concluded on Government will be obligated to December 11. such contractor's creditors to assign the delay does not necessarily constitute Project to another entity acceptable to breach of contract. But under Section which public bidding had already been 8." contract. of the terminal and its operations. Competitive bidding aims to obtain the best of Piatco's breach of contract or its deal possible by fostering transparency and preventing inability to pay its creditors. any delay by Piatco in contract and select one of four options: the payment of the amounts due the (a) take over the terminal and assume government constitutes breach of all its attendant liabilities. Page 100 of 458 suppliers.06(b) of the CA. per terminal at a price established by Section 8. per Section 8. on account of the contractors breach. without any public bidding.04(d) of the CA. Under the DCA. collusion and fraud in the awarding of contracts. Caltex v. Piatco may compel it to purchase the terminal at fair market 9. government may. or (d) purchase the claims of its secured creditors. (b) allow the contract. under the CA. (c) pay the contractor permitted to suspend payments to the rent for the facilities and equipment the government in order to first satisfy the DOTC may utilize.06(a) of the CA. And in the amendments to a contract for which a public bidding has . government may bidded out (the DCA or draft concession agreement) — in take immediate possession and control such substantial manner. government is obliged to either (a) That is the reason why procedural rules pertaining to public take over Terminal III and assume all bidding demand strict observance. independent appraisers. 27 this Court made it clear that substantive designate a new operator. 1996 — is violative of public policy on public compensate the contractor for the biddings." but only exercise was completely lost. Depending on It goes without saying that the amendment of the Contract the option selected. favoritism. rescind the 10. The whole point of going through the public bidding costs actually disbursed. as well as the spirit and intent of the BOT "equivalent or proportionate contract Law. Per Sections 8. since Piatco is DOTC/MIAA.04 and 8. Delgado substituted in place of Piatco or to Brothers. However. value.06 of the DCA.

In fact. open competition between the bidders. after the same had been awarded of a contract after public bidding. San Diego. He who This prohibition. Perhaps it believed that if the been concluded. PBAC Bid Bulletin No. in recognition of the changes were made to a contract already won through time. Mata v. refers to a change in bids or offers the best terms is awarded the vital and essential particulars of the agreement contract subject of the bid. at their will? Public biddings are held the bidding and whatever advantages the for the protection of the public. the contracting after a public bidding. however. money and effort invested in an unsolicited proposal. or even such modification serves to nullify the effects of cancel it. 3 states: "[A]mendments to the Draft The aforementioned case dealt with the unauthorized Concession Agreement shall be issued from time to amendment of a contract executed after public bidding. . and it is obvious that which results in a substantially new contract. is not allowed because parties may alter or amend the contract. the winning bidder (Piatco) did not even stipulations resulting in a substantially new bother to wait until after actual execution of the contract contract after the bidding process and price challenge had before rushing to amend it." such protection and best possible advantages to Piatco's counter-argument may be summed up thus: There the public will disappear if the parties to a was nothing in the 1994 IRR that prohibited further contract executed after public bidding may alter negotiations and eventual amendments to the DCA even or amend it without another previous public bidding. The BOT ended is tantamount to permitting it to put in anything it Law cannot be said to allow the negotiation of contractual wants." 28 after the bidding had been concluded. bidding (DCA) instead of waiting until it is executed. In fact. proposal. "The due execution of a contract after public In a later case. 29 this Court reiterated bidding is a limitation upon the right of the its ruling as follows: IcaEDC contracting parties to alter or amend it without another public bidding. Be that as it may. the amendments were made also materially affect the preparation of the proponent's after the bidding. and to give the Government had secured thereby and may also public the best possible advantages by means of result in manifest injustice to the other bidders. Allowing the winning bidder to I submit that accepting such warped argument will result in renegotiate the contract for which the bidding process has perverting the policy underlying public bidding. for otherwise what would "It is true that modification of government a public bidding be good for if after the execution contracts. Said amendments will only cover items that would not the situation before us. but prior to execution. Here." the same rationale underlying Caltex applies to the present situation with equal force. the accords its originator the privilege of matching the challenger's bid. Page 101 of 458 already been finished should only be awarded after another amendments would not be noticed or discovered by the public bidding: public. in time. the BOT Law.

Piatco — third party under its direct or indirect once more without bothering with public bidding — control to comply with the special negotiated with government for still more substantial obligations imposed on government. conditions and stipulations in the contract for due to breach by Piatco. The insurance policies obtained by Piatco Concession Agreement (ARCA) executed on November covering the terminal are now required 26. Government's right to appoint a include or permit amendments negotiated for and comptroller for Piatco in case the latter introduced after the bidding process. has been terminated. The Liquidated Damages which Moreover. for which repair and rehabilitate the facility in government may be required to case of damage. the very essence of public bidding is designated to take over the will be destroyed — there will be no basis for an exact operation of the terminal. 1998. Otherwise. 3. Government is made liable for Incremental Amended. Piatco misinterpreted the meaning behind PBAC government becomes liable for in case Bid Bulletin No. 35 answer. The definition of Attendant Liabilities was as security for the loans. 32 concession agreement issued by the PBAC prior to the submission of the price challenge. Thus. further amended with the result that their proceeds were to be used to the unpaid loans of Piatco. 2. from time of its breach of contract were to time refers only to those amendments to the draft substantially increased. The following changes were introduced: to be assigned to the Senior Lenders 1. 31 comparison between bids. it will not be which public bidding has been concluded are understood liable to pay the government any to remain intact and not be subject to further Liquidated Damages if a new operator negotiation. it certainly does not 4. The phrase amendments . . only the price proposals are in play. The result was the Amended and Restated 6. 33 Piatco's Concession Agreement Was Further 5. Page 102 of 458 Section 4-A of the BOT Law specifically refers to a those loans recorded in Piatco's books "lower price proposal" by a competing bidder. and to the or loans whose proceeds were actually right of the original proponent "to match the price" of the used in the Terminal III project. 34 changes. are no longer limited to only . . Although the contract may be terminated The terms. encounters liquidity problems was deleted.30 challenger. 3. previously. (ARCA) Again and Consequential Costs and Losses Without Public Bidding in case it fails to comply or cause any Not satisfied with the Concession Agreement.

. The illegality and unenforceability of the declared illegal. Government bound itself to set the initial created in favor of Piatco's Senior rate of the terminal fee. permit Piatco to input its more costly short-term borrowing rates instead of 11. charges condition contravenes the BOT or fees of any kind except as required Law provision on termination by law. levies. if the termination occurs made payable on demand — net of before the In-Service Date. DOTC/MIAA's right of intervention in 8. government is still liable to pay Piatco the appraised 14. 43 compensation. 42 breach by Piatco. Page 103 of 458 7. 10. duties. at previously. The Parametric Formula in the contract. 15. Government is now also obligated to the longer-terms rates in the perform and cause other persons and computations for adjustments. thus 9. Amounts due from and payable by value of Terminal III or the Attendant government under the contract were Liabilities.39 No such obligation and terminal fee). imposts. to be charged Lenders. with the entities under its direct or indirect end result that the changes will control to perform all acts necessary to redound to its greater financial benefit.e. an amount higher than US$20. check-in counter fee Revenues. Government waived its defense of the instances where Piatco's Non-Public illegality of the contract and even Utility Revenues become exorbitant or agreed to be liable to pay damages to excessive has been removed. Even though government may be entitled constituting a ground for Piatco to to terminate the ARCA on account of terminate the ARCA. collection and utility revenues (i. 41 Piatco in the event the contract was 13. was revised to existed previously. 36 12. 37 ARCA or any of its material provisions was made an event of default on the part of government only. 40 No such obligation existed when Terminal III begins operations. aircraft parking application of all Public Utility and tacking fees. perfect the security interests to be . Government is obligated to take the which is utilized to compute for administrative action required for adjustments/increases to the public Piatco's imposition. 38 This taxes.

since they are part and parcel of the project as described in There is no question in my mind that the ARCA was Clause 1. 45 lenders. However. of public bidding. The MIAA is obligated to provide funding for the maintenance and repair of the The Three Supplements airports and facilities owned or Imposed New Obligations on operated by it and by third persons Government.3 of the Bid Documents. accordance with defined performance The First Supplement Is standards as a pre-condition for as Void as the ARCA government's acceptance of the terminal facility. 44 In the First Supplement ("FS") executed on August 27. and obligation to construct an Access understands what motivates them. Tunnel connecting Terminals II and III. Also Without under its control. The amounts payable by Piatco to alterations of the terms and conditions of the CA. 3. Made part of the properties which to buttress this claim. Page 104 of 458 16. The Certificate of Completion simply After Piatco had managed to breach the protective rampart deleted the successful performance. It will also be liable to Prior Public Bidding . government is obliged to construct In any event. the following changes were made to the ARCA: In sum. in lieu of its foreign lenders. I can only hazard a guess. no proof whatsoever has been adduced 2. Piatco claims that the changes to Revenues in which government is the CA were necessitated by the demands of its foreign supposed to participate. and give government were reduced by allowing further manifestly undue advantage to Piatco at the additional exceptions to the Gross expense of government. 46 unauthorized and illegal for lack of public bidding and for being patently disadvantageous to government. is familiar with their mind-set. On the other hand. even from the standpoint of a construction of this access road is the businessperson who regularly transacts with banks and obligation of Piatco. 1999. obligations. it recklessly went on a rampage of further testing of the terminal facility in assaults on the ARCA. whatever it was that impelled government officials and (b) the taxilane and taxiway — concerned to accede to those grossly disadvantageous these are likewise part of Piatco's changes. the foregoing revisions and amendments as embodied in the ARCA constitute very material 1. it is quite patent that the sum total of the and/or maintain and keep in good aforementioned changes resulted in drastically repair are (a) the access road weakening the position of government to a degree that connecting Terminals II and III — the seems quite excessive.

Page 105 of 458 Piatco for the latter's losses. improvement of Nichols MIAA will also be liable for the Interchange. 47 (e) Dealing directly with BCDA and the 4. in case MIAA fails to Andrews Avenue and Manlunas perform such obligations. repair and and damages as well as liability to resurfacing of Sales Road. expenses involving widening.. 51 and a road upgrade exclusive benefit. and removal of incremental and consequential costs of squatters along Andrews the remedial work done by Piatco on Avenue. All payments from Piatco to government Tramo to Andrews Ave. third persons.). 54 (b) Providing through MIAA the land required by Piatco for the 6. and Manlunas Road to Sales payments are to accrue to the latter's Ave. 55 This (d) Coordinating with DPWH the amendment enables Piatco to benefit financing. government from building up its foreign Service Date: three left-turning exchange reserves. together with government's percentage share in (c) Implementing the government's the gross revenues of Piatco." additional land or right of way for including the following: the road upgrade and improvement program. Government's share in the terminal fees taxilane and one taxiway at no collected was revised from a flat rate cost to Piatco 49 of P180 to 36 percent thereof.53 (a) Working for the removal of the general aviation traffic from the 5. Air Force in acquiring (10) "Additional Special Obligations. while preventing following works before the In. The FS also imposed on government ten Phil. Road. the existing storm drainage master amount will be remitted to government plan 50 in pesos instead of US dollars. overpasses (EDSA to Tramo St. 7.. 52 account of the former's default. the implementation from the further erosion of the peso- and the completion of the dollar exchange rate. In addition. 56 This move and improvement program . Government is required to work for the NAIA airport complex 48 immediate reversion to MIAA of the Nayong Pilipino National Park. and are now to be invoiced to MIAA.

respects. with respect to the surface road connecting The Second Supplement Is Terminals II and III. removal surface access road (now called the T2-T3 Road) was to and disposal. and the and parcel of the Terminal III project. 57 for it as well.3[B][i] declared that the said government's stead — the clearing. in Section 5 of the First Supplement. 2001. a firm reputedly owned by a or amended. but for and disposal of improvements. backfilling and dewatering. in The Third Supplement Is imposing significant new obligations upon government. removal. Page 106 of 458 appears to be in support of the funds Though denominated as Second Supplement. the tunnel was supposed to be part The scope of the works. inexistent and not capable of being ratified certain Wintrack Builders. since the Not surprisingly. therefore. The Third Supplement ("TS"). collectible by Piatco are to be offset against the Annual Since it was plainly in substitution of the tunnel. 2000. government certain obligations of Piatco as Terminal III concessionaire. The amounts be constructed by Piatco to connect the two terminals. The Bid but as a public works contractor. Similarly Void and Inexistent By way of background.1. it is merely an amendment to the ARCA. In lieu thereof. it was MIAA advanced to DPWH. at the inception of and forming part The Second Supplement ("SS") was executed between the of the NAIA Terminal III project was the proposed government and Piatco on September 4. upon which it is wholly dependent. leveling. to undertake — in the Documents in Section 4. for which reason I must emphasize that the First Supplement is void in two it is also void and inoperative. the proponent should submit a bid and waste materials at the project site.2. Section 4. subterranean obstructions purposes of the bidding. the surface Guaranteed Payments it must pay government.1 sets out the compensation to be declared that the access tunnel was not economically paid. executed between the That the FS was entered into sans public bidding renders it government and Piatco on June 22. It calls for construction of an access tunnel crossing Runway 13/31. But that is another story and inoperative. road construction should likewise be considered part and . ARCA is somehow remotely valid. nothing less than an entirely new public works contract. Piatco had to subcontract the works to a ARCA is void. acting not as concessionaire of NAIA Terminal III which would connect Terminal III to Terminal II. even assuming arguendo that the altogether. listing specific rates per cubic meter of materials for viable at that time. the parties III of the SS. passed on to the utterly void and inoperative. the procedures involved. Yet it. Piatco. inexistent former high-ranking DOTC official. it follows that the FS too is void. obligations of the contractor are provided for in Parts II and However. too. First. Therefore. Likewise Void and Inexistent altered the fundamental terms and stipulations of the ARCA. demolition access tunnel was subject to further negotiation. did not undergo any public bidding. thus necessitating a public bidding all over again. the parties agreed that a each phase of the work — excavation. Second. nonetheless the FS.

the TS created new monetary government some of the obligations pertaining to the obligations on the part of government. 59 Certainly the most discussed provision in the parties' arguments is the one creating an unauthorized. 60 Section 4-A of the BOT Law as amended states The TS depends upon and is intended to supplement the that unsolicited proposals. 2. it is consequently utterly void would construct the T2-T3 Road. Road. behalf. Hence it follows that the same is void ab initio. 58 There was no outright irregularity and wholesale violations of law and similar obligation on the part of public policy. government guarantee of Piatco's obligations in favor of maintenance and repair of the T2-T3 the lenders. Piatco changes in the contracts and highlight the more prominent may undertake it on government's objectionable features. provisions or obligation as above described. thus imposing as it does significant new obligations upon producing significant savings for Piatco. Should government fail to carry out its In the meantime. nevertheless shifted to as well. government — would in effect alter the terms and stipulations of the ARCA in material respects. to do with the five Piatco contracts is discussed later on. while confirming that Piatco subjected to public bidding. the Third Supplement — price tag in the vicinity of about P100 million. as follows: no prior appropriations. I noted that the on the site where the T2-T3 road is to whole process was riddled with significant lapses. both to cost about P800 million. the surface road would have a ARCA and FS are valid. for which there were former. Since the TS was not Yet. and therefore part of Piatco's amended. hypothetically speaking. Government is now obliged to remove at its own expense all tenants. direct 3. the Third Supplement. such as the NAIA Terminal III ARCA as well as the First Supplement. still. And even if. The rationale of beginning at the beginning. government insofar as the access so to speak. both of which are Project. At any rate. thus necessitating another public bidding. inexistent obligation as well. Page 107 of 458 parcel of the same project. 1. if not be constructed. While the access tunnel was estimated and inoperative. I shall take up specific. MIAA will answer for the operation. subject to the terms and Government Directly conditions (including compensation Guarantees Piatco Debts payments) contained in the Second Supplement. may be accepted by government provided inter void and inexistent and not capable of being ratified or . squatters. In patiently tracing the progress of the Piatco contracts improvements and/or waste materials from their inception up to the present. will become evident when the question of what tunnel was concerned. It follows that the TS is likewise void.

then GRP and the Senior the Senior Lenders. .06 of the ARCA as follows: proponent in implementing the project in case of a loan "Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts in each default. all principal. Section 2(n) of the same legislation hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility defines direct government guarantee as "an agreement or the sum of the Attendant Liabilities.04 of the CA. the Senior Lenders may after written professional consultants and advisers. this agreement already period. In effect. whether payable at maturity. . charges. then at the end thereof the Development constitutes the prohibited assumption by government of Facility shall be transferred by the responsibility for repayment of Piatco's debts in case of a Concessionaire to GRP or its designee and GRP loan default. to enter into any government is the greater of either the Appraised Value of other arrangement relating to the Development Terminal III or the aggregate amount of the moneys owed Facility. subsidy or equity shall make a termination payment to is required. . contractors and the Senior Lenders within the said 180-day subcontractors. including its suppliers. . suppliers." government units (will) assume responsibility for the In turn. . the term Attendant Liabilities is defined in Section repayment of debt directly incurred by the project 1. . . provides thus: advanced funds or provided financial facilities to Concessionaire for the Project. . . reimbursements. owing by undeniably create such prohibited government guarantee. therefore. . . . transfer the contractors and sub-contractors. . . Government's agreement to pay becomes effective in the (vi) if the Senior Lenders . and the amount to be paid by Lenders shall endeavor . by acceleration or otherwise. GRP of the same . are unable to . a direct government guarantee. In short.04 (c)(iv) to (vi) of the ARCA." case supported by verifiable evidence from time Both the CA and the ARCA have provisions that to time owed or which may become. interest... Page 108 of 458 alia thatno direct government guarantee. event of a default by Piatco on any of its loan obligations to effect a transfer . if greater . . charges and become entitled to accelerate the Senior Loans. Concessionaire to Senior Lenders or any other Section 4. .. without "(iv) that if Concessionaire is in default under a limitation. . . such guarantee is prohibited in Concessionaire equal to the Appraised Value (as unsolicited proposals. associated fees. In fine. which is similar to persons or entities who have provided. expenses of any agents or trustees of such the Senior Lenders shall have the right to notify persons or entities). notification to GRP. including. . . and other related and as a result thereof the Senior Lenders have expenses (including the fees. and further including amounts owed by Concessionaire to its (v) . payment obligation owed to the Senior Lenders. If no agreement relating to the by Piatco — whether to the Senior Lenders or to other Development Facility is arrived at by GRP and entities. loaned or Section 4. whereby the government or any of its agencies or local ." Concessionaire's rights and obligations to a transferee .

discussion regarding a particularly noticeable alteration of the concept of "Attendant Liabilities. first. its right to receive such payments from government. More accurately. in the devious labyrinthine Consequently.04(c)(vi) of ARCA speaks of government making Concessionaire and actually used for the project. Indeed. This has particular Nevertheless. This is literally true. ahead of time. As such. but the mortgage liens on the facility may still be required to make good on its guarantee. it is almost a certainty that the Senior Lenders Attendant Liabilities. 61 the termination payment is to be violation of the loan covenants requiring Piatco to maintain made to Piatco." In Section 1. (v) and (vi) that would Senior Lenders and other creditors. possible is that it intends to haveall of its receiving such payments. ultimate contractual cul-de-sac. debts covered by the guarantee. the Piatco contracts are also objectionable process detailed in the aforesaid section. the Piatco debts to be assumed/paid government to pay the Senior Lenders in the event of by government were qualified by the phrases recorded and Piatco's default. if the unthinkable were to happen. phrases were eliminated from the ARCA's definition of However. Such deficiency puts the interests of government at choice. from diverting the proceeds to its own benefit and/or to . an attempt (albeit unsuccessful) by the Senior foreclosure of the mortgage and other liens on the terminal Lenders to transfer Piatco's rights to a transferee of their facility. not to the lenders. it is well to recall the earlier guarantee of payment. the its attorneys-in-fact for the purpose of collecting and only conclusion. Since no explanation has been forthcoming from Piatco as and/or they may already have had themselves appointed to the possible justification for such a drastic change. These the termination payment to Piatco. Page 109 of 458 It matters not that there is a roundabout procedure ensure that it will necessarily use the same to pay off the prescribed by Section 4. What is foreclosed by the Senior Lenders just the same. "enter into any other arrangement" with the government government would be paying several hundreds of millions regarding the Terminal III facility. before government is of dollars. an effort (equally unsuccessful) to great risk. and there is no a minimum 70:30 debt-to-equity ratio. as petitioners-in-intervention pointed out in reference to those borrowings which were obtained in their Memorandum. second. abundantly clear is the fact that.04(c)(iv). in the sense that from time to time outstanding in the books of the Section 4.06 of the Piatco also argues that there is no proviso requiring CA defining the term. will already have made Piatco sign over to them. in order to avert the require. not to the lenders. wherein government will be compelled to abjectly surrender and make good on its While on this subject. it is entirely within for grievously failing to adequately protect government's the Senior Lenders' power. prerogative and control — interests. regardless of whether or not they are disclosed in its books. and. and even if the loan provision anywhere in the contract documents to prevent it proceeds were not actually used for the project itself. the contracts would consistently exercisable via a mere refusal or inability to agree upon "a weaken and do away with protection of government transferee" or "any other arrangement" regarding the interests. they are therefore grossly lopsided in terminal facility — to push the process forward to the favor of Piatco and/or its Senior Lenders.

termination: Provided. accredited by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner: Provided. In Section the project when it gave the prohibited guarantee and thus 4. the is diametrically at odds with the spirit and the intent of the Government shall compensate the said project BOT Law. loans to fund the project. The law meant to mobilize private resources (the proponent for its actual expenses incurred in the private sector) to take on the burden and the risks of project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon financing the construction. and its banks and "In the event that the government defaults on other lenders on the other. Contract Termination.04(c)(vi) of ARCA. cancellation or simple reason that government is not in a position to do so. But where the proponent or its certain major obligations in the contract and such lenders manage to cajol or coerce the government into failure is not remediable or if remediable shall extending a guarantee of payment of the loan obligations. operation and maintenance of not exceeding that stated in the contract as of relevant infrastructure and development projects for the the date of such revocation. in the instant case. government guarantee was prohibited. government agency or local government unit government cheerfully assented to re-assuming the risks of specifying the turn-over date. cancelled or terminated In the final analysis. remain unremedied for an unreasonable length of time. That the interest of the By the same token. 7. those risks are shared between the project proponent on the one hand. terminate the . it is highly conceivable that their sum may greatly exceed the appraised value of the facility. Section 4. I cannot understand why. (So why did government have to "Sec. Given that the Provisions in the Piatco Attendant Liabilities may include practically any Piatco debt Contracts Are Void under the sun. finally. and The BOT Law as amended provides for contract government may end up paying very much more than the termination as follows: real worth of Terminal III. the project proponent/contractor may. — In the event bother with public bidding anyway?) that a project is revoked. either (i) the Appraised Value of the terminal facility or (ii) Contract Termination the aggregate of the Attendant Liabilities. the amount which government has simply negated the very purpose of the BOT Law and the guaranteed to pay as termination payment is thegreater of protection it gives the government. by the risks assumed by the lenders are passed right back to prior notice to the concerned national government.04(c)(iv) to (vi) of the ARCA by the government through no fault of the project proponent or by mutual agreement. That the cost of the insurance coverage shall be included in the terms and conditions of the bidding referred to To the extent that the project proponent is able to obtain above. Government in this instances [sic] shall be duly since it would merely defeat the purpose and raison insured with the Government Service Insurance d'être of a build-operate-and-transfer project to be System or any other insurance entity duly undertaken by the private sector. Page 110 of 458 This point brings us back to the guarantee itself.

" compliance. this condition is not in line with Section 7 of the This principle was clearly violated in the Piatco Contracts. or non-performance The foregoing statutory provision in effect provides for the of other terms and conditions hereof which is following limited instances when termination hereby deemed a material breach of this compensation may be allowed: Agreement . . . the law does not permit compensation for terminal facility or (b) the aggregate of the Attendant the project proponent when contract termination is due to Liabilities. and it is nevertheless required under the 3. whichever amount is greater! the proponent's own fault or breach of contract. major contractual obligations. willful violation. Termination by the proponent due to ARCA to make termination compensation to Piatco even government's default on certain major though unauthorized by law. or to be compensated for "(i) Failure of Concessionaire to finish the Works the equivalent or proportionate contract cost as defined in in all material respects in accordance with the the contract. The project proponent/contractor shall an ownership structure violative of statutory or be reasonably compensated by the Government constitutional limitations. BOT Law. .. in case the government is in default on certain Tender Design and the Timetable. transfer or insured. a change in control of Concessionaire indispensable that the interest of government be duly arising from the sale. . it is (iii) . such compensation is to be contractual obligations equivalent to the payment amount guaranteed by government — either a) the Appraised Value of the To emphasize." The effect of this insertion is that in those instances where 2. the ARCA also inserted fault of the project proponent into Section 8. . compensation is authorized by the BOT Law. Termination upon the parties' mutual government may terminate the contract on account of agreement Piatco's breach. but all insurance policies are to be assigned. in those instances where such termination breach of this Agreement . That provision permits a project proponent to The ARCA stipulates that government is to pay termination recover the actual expenses it incurred in the prosecution compensation to Piatco even when termination is initiated of the project plus a reasonable rate of return not in excess by government for the following causes: of that provided in the contract.08 the ARCA mandates insurance other disposition of capital stock which results in coverage for the terminal facility. for equivalent or proportionate contract cost as (iv) A pattern of continuing or repeated non- defined in the contract. to the . Section 5. Page 111 of 458 contract. Clearly.01 the phrase "Subject to Section 4. Termination by the government through no As if that were not bad enough." 62 1. assignment. and all proceeds are payable. . (ii) Commission by Concessionaire of a material Furthermore.04.

Concessionaire shall give prompt 8.01 (d) of the ARCA have been corrected and the cash position of provides thus: Concessionaire should indicate its ability to meet its maturing obligations. This can hardly be considered compliance provision for administrative expenses and with law." (Italics supplied) reasonable opinion that it shall be unable to meet a payment obligation owed to the Senior By any manner of interpretation or application. postpone grace period up to the day of full payment. in the event outstanding amounts owed to the Senior that at any time Concessionaire is of the Lenders. then the provisions set "(d) The provisions of Section 8.04(d) of the CA.01(a) forth under this Section 8. will . Section 8." the temporary illiquidity of Concessionaire shall Despite the statutory ban. shall be earmarked for the payment of all sums payable by Concessionaire A Prohibited Direct Government Subsidy. not that of Representative) may ensure that after making government. with interest per annum at the rate "bolder and badder" version of Section 8. When any payments due from the proponent. b. and for the purpose of apply. payment obligations. in order to ensure that . In such circumstances. iii. Still another contractual provision offensive to law and then the unpaid balance shall be payable within a 90-day grace period counted from the relevant public policy is Section 8. which is a due date. Section Lenders. the cash resources of Concessionaire shall first be used and applied to In essence.01(d) of the ARCA. If by reason of the Which at the Same Time Is an Assault foregoing GRP should be unable to collect in full on the National Honor all payments due to GRP under this Agreement. of the 1999 IRR defines spread of five (5%) percent over the applicable 91-day Treasury Bill Rate shall be added on the a direct government subsidy as encompassing "an unpaid amount commencing on the expiry of the agreement whereby the Government . . If payment is not effected by but likewise a direct government subsidy for unsolicited Concessionaire within the grace period. this time in favor of Piatco.01(d) shall cease to notwithstanding. to GRP under this Agreement. In brief.2. Any excess cash. the interest being secured by such Senior Lenders (or the Senior Lenders' coverage is that of the Senior Lenders.01(d) of the ARCA clearly mandates notice to GRP. after meeting such guarantee. . equal to the average 91-day Treasury Bill Rate It will be recalled that Section 4-A of the BOT Law as as of the auction date immediately preceding the amended prohibits not only direct government guarantees. through DOTC/MIAA and to the the indefinite postponement of payment of all of Piatco's Senior Lenders. The foregoing remedial measures shall be preventing a disruption of the operations in the applicable only while there remains unpaid and Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. Page 112 of 458 Senior Lenders. then a proposals. depreciation. the ARCA provisions on termination meet all payment obligations owed to the Senior compensation result in another unauthorized government Lenders. . relevant due date. . the obligations to the government. Section 13.

the Department of public policy. on the other. I mentioned that Section 8. . Not only has government been deprived by the Constitution of any means of monitoring and managing the situation. Series of 1995. on the one hand. as can be seen from Section 8. It is indeed time to put an end amounts owed to government does not change the to such an unbearable. for the entire term of the concession agreement. and disgust at the parties' (especially the government the constitutional prohibition against the exclusivity of a officials') docile submission and abject servitude and franchise applies to the franchise for the operation of NAIA Terminal III as well.02 of the ARCA spoke of granting to Piatco the Senior Lenders have effectively locked in on the right to "a franchise to operate and maintain the Terminal exercise financial controllership over Piatco and to allocate Complex." completely contrary to the rationale of the BOT Law and to In its Opinion No. Page 113 of 458 Piatco's obligations to the Senior Lenders are paid in full surrender to the imperious and excessive demands of the first.01(d) of the ARCA completely eliminated the I will now discuss the manner in which the Piatco Contracts proviso in Section 8. justice held that "the NAIA Terminal III which . is a The aforesaid provision rouses mixed emotions — shame 'terminal for public use' is a public utility. Earlier. . the hands of foreign lenders the power and the authority to determine how much (if at all) and when the Philippine Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution prohibits the government (as grantor of the franchise) may be allowed to grant of a "franchise. dishonorable situation. While Section 2. situation or render the prohibited subsidy any less unacceptable. In that situation. the Senior Lenders before allowing any payment to be "the exclusive right to operate a commercial international made to government. and vehement outrage at government subsidy prohibited by the BOT Law and the the affront to the sovereignty of the Republic and to the IRR. That is nothing more or less than the direct foreign lenders.01(d) above-quoted. there are larger Violate Constitutional Injunctions issues involved in the ARCA." Section 3.02(a) of the same ARCA granted to its cash resources to the payment of all amounts owed to Piatco.04(d) of the CA which gave offended the Constitution." Consequently. passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon" with the exception of those three terminals already existing 63 at the In brief. 078. worse. government the right to appoint a financial controller to The Exclusive Right Granted to Piatco manage the cash position of Piatco during situations of to Operate a Public Utility Is Prohibited financial distress. this particular provision of the ARCA has placed in time of execution of the ARCA. The fact that Piatco will pay interest on the unpaid national honor. certificate. . The Piatco Contracts Unarguably But beyond the clear violations of law. or any other form of receive from Piatco. government will be at authorization for the operation of a public utility" that is the mercy of the foreign lenders. This is a situation "exclusive in character.

a privilege granted by consistently reached or exceeded its design government. necessary in carrying out any future plan for an but an "exclusive right" to operate an international inter-modal transportation system in Luzon. In the case of the Clark prohibit monopolies is beside the point.000 passengers per annum and the a situation created by circumstances that do not encourage operation of new terminal facilities therein until competition. Perez expressed this point well in his supplied) Memorandum for the President dated 21 May 2002: While it cannot be gainsaid that an enterprise that is a "Section 3. 65 As counsel for public respondents . But making such franchise exclusive is what per year for three (3) consecutive years during is expressly proscribed by the Constitution. This restriction is highly detrimental to government and prejudice of the local constituencies that are to the public interest. Clark Piatco's contention that the Constitution does not actually and Laoag City. Actually. As correctly International Airport.02 on 'Exclusivity' public utility may happen to constitute a monopoly on account of the very nature of its business and the absence "This provision gives to PIATCO (the of competition. it also guaranteed provision. such as the airports at Subic. Former Secretary of Justice being benefited by its operation. it imposes an unreasonable grant effectively means is that the government is now restriction on the operation of the Clark estopped from exercising its inherent power to award any International Airport which could adversely affect other person another franchise or a right to operate such a the operation and development of the Clark public utility." (Italics Hernando B. the aforementioned Section 3. such a situation does not however Concessionaire) the exclusive right to operate a constitute justification to violate the constitutional commercial international airport within the Island of Luzon with the exception of those already prohibition and grant an exclusive franchise or exclusive existing at the time of the execution of the right to operate a public utility. however. passenger terminal within the "Island of Luzon. This situation is different from the grant of a after the new NAIA Terminal III shall have franchise to operate a public utility. It effectively grants PIATCO that the government will not improve or expand the facilities a monopoly in Luzon and ties the hands of at Clark — and in fact is required to put a cap on the government in the matter of developing new latter's operations — until after Terminal III shall have been airports which may be found expedient and operated at or beyond its peak capacity for three consecutive years. the provision argued. Page 114 of 458 What was granted to Piatco was not merely a franchise. Agreement. Of course. the grant of a franchise may result capacity of ten (10) million passenger capacity in a monopoly." What this "Additionally. the concession period. in the event public interest in Luzon requires Special Economic Zone to the economic it. 64 the existence of a monopoly by a public utility is restricts its operation beyond its design capacity of 850.02 of the ARCA "This is an onerous and disadvantageous more than just guaranteed exclusivity.

Termination Procedure and Consequences of Termination. 8. conveyor systems. certificate or any other form of likely run into billions of pesos. two monopolies were actually a) . The first and more obvious b) In the event the Agreement is terminated one refers to the business of operating an international pursuant to Section 8. . it may take many years before Terminal III Terminal Complex and shall be entitled to retain sees three consecutive years' operations at peak capacity. Piatco would thus be to circumvent the prohibition and obtain an extension. (Piatco) will be on "installment basis. Although it enables government to avoid Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution also provides having to make outright payment of an obligation that will that "no franchise. . The for their aircraft. the business end of which Concessionaire shall be entitled to collect the involves providing international airlines with parking space Liquidated Damages specified in Annex 'G'. this easy payment plan will authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be .03(b) of the ARCA. created by the Piatco contracts. security equipment and precedent to the transfer by Concessionaire to GRP of the Development Facility. ." The Piatco Contracts Violate The aforesaid easy payment scheme is less beneficial than the Time Limitation on Franchises it first appears. and withhold all payments to GRP for the The Diosdado Macapagal International Airport may thus purpose of offsetting the same against the Liquidated Damages. . Indeed. check-in counters. This entitled to remain in the driver's seat and keep operating fact can be gleaned from Section 8. GRP on 'as-is-where-is' basis. Page 115 of 458 pointed out. the terminal for an indefinite length of time. — Monopolies for Piatco By way of background. Concessionaire shall ensure greater profits for Piatco. in the real world where the rate of influx of Concessionaire shall to the extent practicable international passengers can fluctuate substantially from continue to operate the Terminal and the year to year. immigrations and customs processing payment of the Liquidated Damages. information Liquidated Damages shall be a condition systems. which I quote thus: The Contracts Create Two "Sec.01 (b) hereof. . and airline passengers with the use of full payment by GRP to Concessionaire of the departure and arrival areas. nevertheless cost government considerable loss of income. for a longer period than fifty years. Upon full payment of the end up stagnating for a long time. the economic progress of immediately transfer the Development Facility to a region has had to be sacrificed. Prior to the full paraphernalia. in order to Liquidated Damages.03. a franchise which it would earn if it were to operate Terminal III by held for an unreasonably long time would likely give rise to itself." After all. Inasmuch as payments to the concessionaire the same evils as a monopoly. passenger terminal in Luzon." interest charges on the remaining unpaid balance would undoubtedly cause The Piatco Contracts have come up with an innovative way the total outstanding balance to swell.

I am not not operate at Terminal III and render the airport-related acutely concerned with this particular monopolistic services needed by international airlines. the government and The aforementioned provisions vest in Piatco effective and Piatco are the only ones engaged in the business of exclusive control over which service provider may and may operating an international passenger terminal.01(d) 69 and (e) 70 of both the ARCA and the that can serve to restrict. It government." 71 implementation of the Piatco Contracts. particularly Worse.02(a) of the ARCA makes provider and/or impose any term or condition it may see fit Terminal III the only international passenger terminal at the in any contract it enters into with a service provider. and aircraft repair and maintenance services. not to allow service announced 72 that it has accredited three groundhandlers . It thereby situation. concessionaire's discretion and power to reject any service On the one hand. This intention is exceedingly clear in the declaration by These are lines of business activity in which are engaged Piatco that it is "completely within its rights to exclude any many service providers (including the petitioners-in.01(e) of the ARCA requires In furtherance of the first monopoly. through the DOTC and MIAA. unless they first allowed to compete with Piatco in the operation of an enter into a separate agreement with Piatco. there is no safeguard whatsoever to ensure free and Complex where the business of providing airport-related fair competition in the service-provider sector. Section 3. not to allow stipulate that the NAIA Terminal III will be the only facility to service providers — those with subsisting concession be operated as an international passenger terminal. Section 3. their contracts to render airport-related services to airlines. such. who will be adversely affected upon full III. there is nothing whatsoever in the Piatco Contracts Sections 3. Piatco is first in line. 66 that agreements for services and operations being conducted at NAIA Terminals I and II will no longer be operated as Terminal I — to carry over their concession agreements. Meanwhile. Page 116 of 458 areas. By necessary implication. restaurants providers with expired MIAA contracts to renew or extend and shops. in-flight catering. On the In the meantime. cargo handling. services to international airlines may be conducted. and not surprisingly. 68 Given that. Section 3. possesses the power to exclude competition.01(d) of the ARCA requires ready to exploit the unique business opportunity. at this time. control or regulate the CA. ACaTIc international passenger terminal in the NAIA Complex. it also has effective control over the fees and There was however another monopoly within the NAIA charges that will be imposed and collected by these service created by the subject contracts for Piatco — in the providers. and amenities such as comfort rooms. other hand. the Piatco Contracts government. business of providing international airlines with the following: groundhandling. 67 and that no one (including the government) will be services and operations to Terminal III. and therefore the only place within the NAIA brief. party that it has not contracted with from NAIA Terminal intervention). In NAIA. through the MIAA.

monopolizing trade and commerce exclusively authorized by (PIATCO) to in a certain commodity. Secretary of the Department of Energy. or PAGS. Aside from the Philippine Airlines. The desirability of competition is the related services within the Site. controlling its production. Inc. Inc. engage in the provision of ground. 78 of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. 80 the Court Ground Services. or control the sale or the whole create a monopoly and combinations in restraint of trade: supply of a particular commodity. Inc. proscribed by our Constitution are the monopoly accredited entities are the Philippine Airport and Ground and the restraint of trade being fostered by the Piatco Services Globeground. Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end. be the only entities "Section 19. catering and fueling services with freedom of trade without statutory authority. at all times association. ruled: owned subsidiary of Friendship Holdings. Article XII of our Constitution is anti- authorized to construct and operate a trust in history and in spirit. Page 117 of 458 for Terminal III. On the other hand. holding company. ("PAGSGlobeground") and the Contracts through the erection of barriers to the entry of Orbit Air Systems. [S]ection 19 of Article XII of the turn owned 80 percent by PAGS. No combinations in restraint designated contractor-operator for NAIA Terminal III. trade is an agreement or understanding between b. . 76 it is a regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public stockholder of 35 percent of Piatco 77 and is the latter's interest so requires. distribution and price. or otherwise interfering handling. In Tatad wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Airport and v. Airport and Ground two or more persons. That PAIRCARGO and/or its designated Affiliate shall. manufacture a 1999. pool. within the Terminal Complex. That (Phil." . .) PAGS and/or its trust. be competition. following provisions contained in the First Addendum to the consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry Piatco Shareholders Agreement. on a particular business or trade. . c. . ("Orbit"). which appear to constitute a sort of master plan to particular article. for the purpose of unduly restricting during the Concession Period. Inc.. Services. The Shareholders shall ensure: dominate the total sales of a product or service. PAGSGlobeground is a other service providers into Terminal III. in the form of a contract. a combination in restraint of a. 75 PAGS is a service Constitution .' Such entry into and domination of the airport-related "A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage services sector appear to be very much in line with the vested in one or more persons or companies. . mandates: 'The State shall provider owned 60 percent by the Cheng Family. . Inc. 79 executed on July 6. or other form of designated Affiliates shall. It espouses warehouse for all cargo handling and competition. 74 which is in ". the other Precisely. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms "11. . 73 while Orbit is a wholly. during the "xxx xxx xxx Concession Period.

it is the concentration of business in the hands of a deprivation of End Users of such services.06. the reason for the interdiction of unfair in fixing fees and charges constituting Non- competition. contract . Securities and Exchange Concessionaire. rentals and so forth.01(e) 84 of both the CA without need for the consent of GRP or any and the ARCA requires government. through DOTC/MIAA." few. Due Process Public Utility Revenues. What little "oversight tolls. . the Piatco contracts also which expressly requires in Section 2(b) that the project give the concessionaire virtually limitless power over the proponent is "allowed to charge facility users appropriate charging of fees. 6. so the concessionaire can defy the government excluded. rentals and charges not exceeding those function" the government might be able and minded to proposed in its bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the exercise is less than sufficient to protect the public interest.03(c). GRP may require Commission 82 elucidates the criteria to be employed: "A Concessionaire to explain and justify the fee it 'monopoly' embraces any combination the tendency of may set from time to time. and the reason for regulation of Public Utility Revenues in order to ensure that unmitigated monopolies. fees. rentals and charges constituting Non. but that power exists to raise prices or exclude without fear of any sanction." 83 (Italics supplied) taken together with Section 6. . 6. Aside from creating a monopoly. Too short of the standard set by the BOT Law as amended. . Moreover. .06 — competition when desired. Section 6. Article XII of services. Concessionaire may make any adjustments it deems appropriate Earlier. . government agency subject to Sec. Competition is thus the End Users are not unreasonably deprived of underlying principle of [S]ection 19.The material consideration in determining its existence It will be noted that the above-quoted provision has no is not that prices are raised and competition actually teeth.03(c) of the ARCA — falls The Contracts Encourage Monopolistic Pricing. Adjustment of Non-Public Utility Fees Constitutional Prohibitions and Charges Against Impairment of Contracts and Deprivation of Property Without "For fees. our Constitution. While the vehicular parking fee. if in the reasonable which is to prevent competition in the broad and general opinion of GRP the said fees have become sense. In exorbitant resulting in the unreasonable short..03(c) in turn provides: operating at Terminal I with subsisting contracts." as can be gleaned from the following provisions: The Piatco Contracts Violate "Sec." 81 porterage fee and greeter/wellwisher fee constitute Non-Public Utility Revenues of Gokongwei Jr. I discussed how Section 3." not to permit the carry-over to Terminal III of the services and operations of certain service providers currently Section 6. Page 118 of 458 reason for the prohibition against restraint of "(c) Concessionaire shall at all times be judicious trade. or to control prices to the detriment of the public. . v.

85 thus. impair the obligation of contracts and contravene the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law. freedom — guaranteed to and heretofore enjoyed by international airlines — to contract with local service What we have here is a set of contractual provisions that providers of their choice. as they the NAIA. Nonetheless. of property without due process. In plainer terms. the CA and the ARCA obligate and constrain and applicable to the situation at bar because the livelihood government to break its existing contracts with these of the employees of petitioners-intervenors are at stake. in the blink of an eye. where that international airlines and passengers may be conducted at privilege has been availed of by the petitioners-in- all. Obviously. then. thereby infringed upon the have lost their businesses entirely. The Piatco Contracts Violate Notably. Terminal III shall be the only facility respective employees — among them Messrs. Terminal III will be the only terminal where True. they will future service providers. . . 86 and no one shall be allowed to compete with means of livelihood. and vice versa. This situation comprises still another Piatco in the operation of an international passenger violation of the constitution prohibition against deprivation terminal in the NAIA. arbitrarily and without due process. as they cannot be seven years "evolved into some form of property right allowed to operate in Terminal III. will be forced to close shop. their . Agan and to be operated as an international passenger terminal at Lopez et al. similar to that in American Inter-fashion compelled to cease honoring existing contracts with service v. as of the In. being deprived of the right to liberty. Terminals I and II shall no longer operate will find themselves out of employment and bereft of their as such. which includes the right to unable to operate. these displaced The Piatco Contracts by locking out existing service service providers are — to borrow a quaint expression — providers from entry into Terminal III and restricting entry of up the river without a paddle. a situation Consequently. — have very grave cause for concern. 87 The bottom line is that. and it would Deprivation of Liberty Without be unrealistic to think that these service providers can Due Process perform their service contracts in some other international airport outside Luzon. since the displaced service providers. government through the DOTC/MIAA will be arises. which should not be removed . GTEB. intervention service providers for years on end. doing business at the NAIA may be viewed more as the business of providing airport-related services to a privilege than as a right. 88 Both the service providers and their client airlines will be Moreover. government is not in a position to require Piatco to Constitutional Prohibition Against accommodate the displaced service providers. Service Date. 89 We held therein that a privilege enjoyed for providers after the In-Service Date. Page 119 of 458 By the In-Service Date." Said pronouncement is particularly relevant In short. service providers.

Notwithstanding the constitutional ban. this Court has held 292. The certificate signed by the proper of public funds out of the treasury. exceeding the estimated consumption for three In the First Supplement ("FS") dated August 27. 1999." fundamental law." 93 obligations. except in pursuance of accounting official and the auditor who verified it. 46. statutory mandates and Jurisprudential precedents. 92 The immediate effect of shall be attached to and become an integral part this constitutional ban is that all the various agencies of of the proposed contract. — Except in the case of a the ARCA. the three Supplements to "Sec. that "(I)t is quite evident from the tenor of the language of provide as follows: the law that the existence of appropriations and the "Sec. 47. . the (3) months. no contract involving the expenditure of public funds • To construct. Page 120 of 458 enter into all contracts. maintain and keep in good by any government agency shall be entered into repair and operating condition all . free of other contract. Sections 46 and 47 of Executive Order Referring to the aforequoted provisions. which were not approved by NEDA. and expenditure for any other purpose until the to carefully count their cash before taking on contractual obligation of the government agency concerned commitments. and . Appropriation Before Entering into availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or Contract. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. or banking transactions of following requirements were imposed on the government: government-owned or controlled banks. imposed on contract for personal service. the as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed unexpended balance of which. subject to verification by the auditor Clearly prohibited by the Constitution is the disbursement concerned. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions unless there is an appropriation therefor. 90 and/or the right to make a or authorized unless the proper accounting contract in relation to one's business. for supplies for government the additional burden of spending public current consumption or to be carried in stock not moneys without prior appropriation. otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. and the sum so government are constrained to limit their expenditures to certified shall not thereafter be available for the amounts appropriated by law for each fiscal year. 91 official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation By Creating New Financial Obligations for Government. is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure. . Giving flesh and form to the injunction of the under the contract is fully extinguished. that funds have been duly appropriated for the Supplements to the ARCA Violate the Constitutional purpose and that the amount necessary to cover Ban on Disbursement of Public Funds Without Valid the proposed contract for the current calendar Appropriation year is available for expenditure on account thereof. an appropriation made by law. — (1) No contract involving the conditions sine qua non for the execution of government expenditure of public funds shall be entered into contracts.

at no equipment and infrastructure owned cost to Piatco and/or operated by MIAA.." including the following: Requiring government to work for the immediate reversion to MIAA Providing thru MIAA the land of the Nayong Pilipino National required by Piatco for the Park. MIAA will also be liable for squatters along Andrews the incremental and consequential Avenue costs of the remedial work done by Piatco on account of the former's Dealing directly with BCDA and the default. Andrews Avenue and damages as well as for the latter's and Manlunas Road. implementation and taxiways and runways completion of the following works before the In-Service • To obligate the MIAA to provide funding for Date: three left-turning the upkeep. in order to permit the . and removal of addition. facilities. expenses of Sales Road. Philippine Air Force in acquiring additional land or right of way for • Section 4 of the FS imposed on the road upgrade and government ten (10) "Additional improvement program Special Obligations.. financing. which are Implementing the government's not part of the Project or which are existing storm drainage master located outside the Site. and operated by it and by third persons Manlunas Road to Sales Ave. in case MIAA improvement of Nichols fails to perform such obligations. taxilane and one taxiway. Page 121 of 458 airport support services. maintenance and repair of overpasses (Edsa to Tramo St. in Interchange. liability to third persons. repair and resurfacing Piatco for the latter's losses. and holding MIAA liable to widening. even though plan constructed by Concessionaire — including the access road connecting Coordinating with DPWH the Terminals II and III and the taxilane. the airports and facilities owned or Tramo to Andrews Ave.) under its control in order to ensure and a road upgrade and compliance with international improvement program involving standards.

the on government the expenditures of public funds not concessionaire may outrightly terminate the Contracts included in any congressional appropriation or authorized pursuant to Section 8. the "Additional Special Obligations" set access road (T2-T3) will be out in Section 4 of the FS take on a different aspect. or the concessionaire may Administrative Code by characterizing them as stipulations instead require government to pay the Incremental and for compliance on a "best-efforts basis" only. the nature of each of these obligations must be efforts basis only. a surface Viewed in this light. but are unarguably mandatory in examined in the context of its relevance and significance to character.02(a) of the ARCA.23 of the To determine whether the additional obligations under the ARCA. whether failure to perform them (or to perform parallel taxiway them on time) could result in a material breach of the contract. the government to deliver. Andrews and Manlunas whether the best-efforts basis will apply is whether the Roads (which provide access to the Terminal III site) prior obligations are critical to the success of the Project and. • Section 5 of the FS also provides that in lieu of the access tunnel.01(b)(i) and (ii) of the ARCA and by any other statute. In short. each of the following may all be deemed to play government to expend funds to a major role in the successful and timely prosecution of the purchase additional land from Nayong Terminal III Project: the obtention of land required by Pilipino and to clear the same in order PIATCO for the taxilane and taxiway. Page 122 of 458 building of the second west accordingly. may conceivably result in substantial prejudice to the concessionaire. Consequential Losses under Section 1. the Terminal III Project. clean possession of the land on which the T2-T3 Conversely. within 120 days from date thereof. as required in coordination with DPWH for the completion of the three Section 5(c) of the FS. Piatco however attempts to take these seek payment of Liquidated Damages in accordance with stipulations out of the ambit of Sections 46 and 47 of the Section 8. to such an extent as to constitute a The foregoing contractual stipulations undeniably impose material breach of the Piatco Contracts. . as well as of any adverse impact Regarding MIAA's obligation to coordinate with the DPWH that may result if such obligation is not performed or for the complete implementation of the road upgrading and undertaken on time. as well as acquisition and delivery of additional land for the On the other hand. and of the site to Piatco. Whereupon. the implementation of to be able to deliver clean possession government's existing storm drainage master plan. the Third Supplement ("TS") obligates construction of the T2-T3 access road. the criteria for determining improvement program for Sales. left-turning overpasses before the In-Service Date. failure to deliver on any of these obligations Road is to be constructed. This provision requires particular. 94 The logical conclusion then is that the obligations Supplements may really be undertaken on a best-efforts in the Supplements are not to be performed on a best- basis only. In constructed.

2002: What do we do with the Piatco program for the crucially situated access roads prior to the Contracts and Terminal III? 96 (Feeding directly into the targeted opening date of Terminal III. Reimburse all advance payments to maneuvered into) an agreement that would ensure delivery MIAA including but not limited to interest. The agreement would then be CY2004 and CY2006 with payment of no less presented to Congress as a done deal. Hence. 95 For that reason. when the Terminal itself has consequence. to the legislative power over the public purse and a diminution ensure that the advances are fully repaid by of Congress' control over expenditures of public funds — a CY2006. had MIAA resolution of the decisive question is the other nagging not agreed to lend the P410 Million. For this purpose. and that. in order to enable DPWH to deliver on its committed its CY2004 to CY2006 budget allocation the repayments to MIAA. there remains but one ultimate It can be easily inferred.9. Page 123 of 458 to the In-Service Date. DPWH would not have issue: Why should we bother with determining the legality been able to complete the program on time. fees. the necessary allocations and appropriations for three "2. government would have been in breach of a already been built and is practically complete?) material obligation." In the final analysis. Perform all acts necessary to include in years. As a and validity of these contracts. it is essential to take note of the fact government may likewise not be construed as being for that there was a pressing need to complete the program best-efforts compliance only. DPWH shall include development that would not have come about. were it not the amounts to be appropriated for for the Supplements.2. the MIAA was compelled to enter into a memorandum of agreement with the DPWH in order to ensure the timely They also Infringe on the Legislative completion of the road widening and improvement Prerogative and Power Over the Public Purse program. which I raised during the Oral Argument on enough funds to be able to complete the upgrading December 10.2. Very clever but very illegal! reimbursement to MIAA in the "Not Needing Clearance" column of their Agency Budget EPILOGUE Matrix (ABM) submitted to the Department of What Do We Do Now? Budget and Management. MIAA agreed to advance the total amount of But the particularly sad thing about this transaction P410. using funds not plus other costs of money within the periods allocated for that purpose. then. of upgraded roads for Piatco's benefit. before the opening of Terminal III. this particular undertaking of . that DPWH did not set aside question. Congress would than One Hundred Million Pesos (PhP100M) thus be obliged to uphold the agreement and support it with every year. The net result is an infringement on repayments for the advances made by MIAA.11 million to DPWH for the works.8. while the latter between MIAA and DPWH is the fact that both agencies was committed to do the following: were maneuvered into (or allowed themselves to be "2.

This scenario must — has been riddled with irregularities galore and blatant not be allowed to happen. the principle of Despite all the insidious contraventions of the Constitution. grievous and unforgivable mutilation of public Terminal III. AEDC never won Neither is it possible to argue for the retention of the Draft the bidding. there is no Ultimately. Page 124 of 458 Prescinding from all the foregoing disquisition. otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the Agreement which is entirely different from the Draft expense of Piatco and. For all it may to permit government to unjustly enrich itself at the care. 97 this Court held that for Terminal III. are void ab initio. facility? My answer is a stone-cold 'No'. it being part and parcel of the critical policy and an insult to ourselves if we opt to keep in place a infrastructure and transportation-related programs of contract — any contract — for to do so would assume that government. and the law and public policy Piatco perpetrated. keeping Piatco on contractor was allowed to recover the reasonable value of as concessionaire and even rewarding it by allowing it to the thing or services rendered (regardless of any operate and profit from Terminal III — instead of imposing agreement as to the supposed value). If the Piatco contracts are junked altogether as I think they There is thus no conceivable way. After all. the real money the Piatco contracts. we can do just as well without one. far too many to ignore. in particular. in order to avoid upon it the stiffest sanctions permissible under the laws — unjust enrichment on the part of government. of should be. should not AEDC automatically be considered saving one (the original Concession Agreement) while the winning bidder and therefore allowed to operate the junking all the rest. contractors Concession Agreement. as proposed by some. without any competition at all. After all. Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses inasmuch as it was never executed by the parties. but from actually and therefore inoperative. we agree to having Piatco continue as the concessionaire In Melchor v. 98 because to deny payment for a It is no exaggeration to say that Piatco may not really mind building almost completed and already occupied would be which contract we decide to keep in place. of quantum meruit was likewise applied in Eslao v. if we only let it . its funders. never signed any contract. even if the contract therein was void. Commission on Audit. Commission on Audit. What incurred in the construction of the Terminal? Indeed it Piatco and the government executed was the Concession should. though. and never built any Concession Agreement (referred to in the various facility. without exception. it would be tantamount to an question that the State needs and will make use of outrageous. Why should it be allowed toautomatically step in pleadings as the Contract Bidded Out) as the contract that and benefit from the greed of another? should be kept in force and effect to govern the situation. Even the very process by which operating it for fifty or more years and charging whatever it the contracts came into being — the bidding and the award feels like. payment by quantum meruit was found applicable. aATESD violations of law and public policy. The principle is unconscionable. and investors — both local and foreign. I find that all continue and operate the facility. will come not from building the Terminal.

R. 2003]. vs. JR. [May 5. 2 dated 15 Inc. Series of 2002. for being patently contrary to law. on the real. and THE CITY COUNCIL fixed by government based on quantum meruit. otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.. 1 and respondent City Mayor's (Agan. 155547. Court of Appeals. the metropolitan Manila Chapter. especially for the Filipino people. OF MANILA. PHIL 744-902) The antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines. Series of 2002. 154599. No. In this manner. 99 One possible practical solution would be for government — in view of the nullity of the Piatco contracts and of the fact G. .. 2004. this whole sordid mess could result in something DAVIDE. HON.respondents. G. I vote to grant the Petitions and to declare Court seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. Page 125 of 458 expense of the contractor. This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of WHEREFORE. petitioner. which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. To be imposed. however. is the condition that the MAYOR OF MANILA. The same principle was applied in Republic v. along with the annual guaranteed payments to government. funders. constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities.. January 21. 450 August 2002.R. 155001. THE CITY projects. ||| Executive Order No. 011. C. investors and contractors will be staggered and DECISION scheduled. Philippine International Air Terminals Co. 155661. and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. No. 7160.. Jr. JOSE winning bidder must pay the builder of the facility a price ATIENZA. provincial chapters. will have to be built into the bids. 8039. the subject contracts NULL and VOID. JR.J :p truly beneficial for all. reasonable — not inflated — value of the built facility. How the payment or series of payments to the builder. v.] that Terminal III has already been built and is almost finished — to bid out the operation of the facility under the THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY same or analogous principles as build-operate-and-transfer NATIONAL.

metropolitan. office or department. a vice. 3. . 5 Section 1.g. Article I of On 28 June 2002. By virtue of the above-cited provision. Page 126 of 458 Section 493 of that law provides that "[t]he liga at the convene all the duly elected Component municipal. . by the Punong Barangay ." All other matters not provided for in the law public place within its area of jurisdiction for the purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local and directors of the provincial. metropolitan political subdivision. and HUC/ICC chapters barangay elections.1 above Barangay shall be represented in the said Liga was held. 4 Section 1. all the On 16 March 2000. 6 setting on 21 October 2002 the promulgated by the National Liga Executive synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters. by the kagawad duly government agency. current elected Punong Barangays (for president. respondent City Council of Manila the Liga Election Code states: enacted Ordinance No. independent component city. the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and Metropolitan. together with existing laws. . elected for the purpose among its members. Constitution and By-Laws states: The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga Election and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code" or such other rules as may be Code of 2002. which must always conform to the assisted by the government officer provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. and metropolitan chapters. . or. third paragraph. . shall notify. City/Municipal Chapter Presidents and all the and national levels directly elect a president.2. in writing. . city. provincial. shall . for the election of representatives of 1. There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the provincial. Series of 2002. Section 3(A) and (B) of the assailed to be held on the third Monday of the month ordinance read: immediately after the month when the SEC. in concerned duly assisted by the proper his absence or incapacity. . among other things. provincial. the Liga adopted and ratified its own above concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the exact Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal date. Board in conformity with the provisions of such as the Liga Chapter of Manila. e. — Every synchronized elections in paragraph 1. metropolitan or government units shall be governed by their respective HUC/ICC Liga chapters. 8039. Representation Chapters. Article XI of said meeting. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional Director. the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. place and requirements of the said organization. 3 aforementioned. and five (5) members of the board of HUC/ICC) of the respective chapters in any directors. time. Said president duly constitution and by-laws. The incumbent Liga chapter president Chapters .2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial. providing. HUC/ICC Chapters.

reason. Atienza. upon. Auditor and create CHAPTERS OF THE LIGA NG MGA other positions as it may deem necessary BARANGAYS FOR THAT MATTER. approval. the petition raising the following issues: manner of conducting the Liga elections other than what I has been provided for by the Liga Constitution and By-laws . 011. and Executive Order No. or even assume. themselves a President. the Hence. to implement the and are therefore invalid. Series of 2002. the Liga argues that City Respondent Mayor. DESPITE THE Board and they shall elect from among FACT THAT SAID CHAPTER'S ELECTIONS. 7 In support of its petition. through legislation. for the Manila City Council to encroach upon. Vice-President and five (5) WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. . however. 2002 PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE B. . Vice-President. Page 127 of 458 A. Series of 2002. 8039 S. 2002. a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. the functions of the Liga through 011 TO IMPLEMENT THE QUESTIONED CITY ORDINANCE NO. the Liga filed the instant functions of the Liga by prescribing. ARE BY for the management of the chapter. 8039 S. 011.. LAW MANDATED TO BE GOVERNED BY THE The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS AND City Mayor Jose L. still MAYOR OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE unnumbered and yet to be officially released. or even assumed. upon being informed that the ordinance WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY had been forwarded to the Office of the City Mayor. signed and approved the Ordinance No. Series of 2002. AND THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER Secretary. 8039. II On 16 July 2002. Treasurer. contradict the Liga Election Code assailed city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. not to mention the absence of legal basis. District Chapter WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE All elected Barangay Chairman in each ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO District shall elect from among themselves LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. for his signature and THE LIGA ELECTION CODE. Jr. on 27 August 2002. the President. legislation. There exists neither rhyme nor ordinance. members of the Board. the Liga sent ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached WHEN HE ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. . City Chapter ELECTIONS OF THE MANILA CHAPTER OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS AND WHICH The District Chapter representatives shall PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF automatically become members of the ELECTING ITS OFFICERS.

as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga government administration. it argued that the On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or hierarchy-of-courts rule. Hence. assailed ordinance prescribing for an "indirect manner of election" amended. Barangay Chairman Arnel Peña. 7160. the petitioner cites as reason therefor the fact that cannot prevail against the decree. order. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. the subject Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and. in effect. Thus. District Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular barangay elections. Accordingly. . as virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the such. as amended. the OSG posits that technical rules preliminary injunction would be imperative to prevent the of procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. Thus. It also violated and curtailed the dismissal of the present petition on the following the rights of the petitioner and intervenor. and (4) the act sought to be supports the petition of the Liga.ETDAaC this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the On 25 October 2002. Regional Trial Court (RTC). and crystallization of issues affecting barangay executive order. to vote is unavailing. 8 He supports the position of the Liga and prays in the sanggunians for the immediate ventilation. filed a Complaint in Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local Intervention with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga Injunction. The of this petition is a must. for the declaration of the questioned ordinance and articulation. the Manila effect of law. As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining the enactments in question. 129. Page 128 of 458 and the Liga Election Code. the Office of the Solicitor General subject ordinance and executive order.A. (3) the petitioner is (OSG) filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment. should be declared null and void. city ordinance and executive order are clearly inconsistent with the express public policy enunciated in R. arguing that the assailed enjoined is fait accompli. (2) the petition should not be entertained by and be voted upon in a direct election. in the City Chapter of Manila. which are local in origin. the exigency of the present in his capacity as a member of the Liga ng mga Barangay petition. While Batas Pambansa Blg. as well as the grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court other 896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila. the respondents defend the validity of Government Code of 1991. calls for the relaxation of this rule. however. the immediate resolution Barangay pursuant thereto. which provides for the election the assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for of the Liga officers at large. No. 9 It guilty of forum shopping. to be null and void. which has the force and under Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance. grants original jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the On 12 September 2002. the provisions of the Local On the other hand. national legislature. implementation of the ordinance and executive order.

" They are both within for certiorari with an application for provisional remedies the prerogatives. speedy. As a matter First. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure petitioner may ask the RTC or the Court of Appeals the provides: relief being prayed for before this Court. officer. and adequate remedy in the . the two other cases. which are all akin to the present petition in the board. Clearly. powers. the not the "board" and "officer" contemplated in Rule 65 of the respondents maintain that the same had become moot and Rules of Court because both do not exercise judicial academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga functions. Moreover. we resolve to The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot dismiss this petition for certiorari. they represent the same interest. Thus. claim that it has no other recourse in addressing its grievance other than this petition for certiorari. Although the parties in the other plain. 10 Since and executive functions. — When any attending the present petition that would warrant tribunal. the Section 1. for quo civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal. according to the respondents. the or quasi-judicial prerogatives. tribunal. A petition forcertiorari under other. of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi- of fact. the petition forcertiorari must be dismissed. where the records show that and City Mayor of Manila. quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. the petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling reasons SECTION 1. this petition within the ambit of "judicial functions. or with grave Besides. the petitioner has abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess transgressed the proscription against forum-shopping in of jurisdiction. respectively. do not fall the acts to be enjoined are now fait accompli. The City Council and City Mayor of Manila are order and/ or preliminary injunction in its petition. Petition for certiorari. respectively. abuse of discretion. for declaratory relief) and three in the Court of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special Appeals (one is for prohibition. Page 129 of 458 The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary pending cases and in this petition are different individuals remedy available to one aggrieved by the decision of a or entities. or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial With regard to petitioner's prayer for temporary restraining functions. the during the pendency of the case certain events or petition failed to show with certainty that the respondents circumstances had taken place that render the case moot acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave and academic. The enactment of the subject ordinance and ng mga Barangay on 15 September 2002 and their issuance of the questioned executive order are legislative subsequent assumption to their respective offices. and authority of the City Council must necessarily fail. or any filing the instant suit. there are two cases pending before Branches 33 judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial and 51 of the RTC of Manila (one is for mandamus. After due deliberation on the pleadings filed. Furthermore. and there is no appeal. or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial sense that the relief being sought therein is the declaration functions. and thus. warranto). board or officer exercising judicial or cognizance of the present petition by this Court.

discretion. required to investigate (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases facts or ascertain the existence of facts. on the other hand. and granting such incidental functions. modifying the proceedings of such tribunal. for certiorari. or officer alone. is "a term which following powers: applies to the actions. must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of Second. 13 court. it is necessary that there be a law that appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property Court may provide. not original. On this score quasi-judicial functions. and then jurisdiction. prohibition. speedy. the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed legislative and executive functions. board. 5. etc.. Before a tribunal. thus. 11 Sec. or affirm on quasi-judicial acts. board. hold hearings. and not against a tribunal. in essence. and over petitions for certiorari. board. or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial board or officer."12 and habeas corpus. enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the Elsewise stated. certiorari will not lie. reverse. and lower courts in: the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal. final judgments and orders of under which adverse claims to such rights are made. A respondent is said to be exercising judicial partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief function where he has the power to determine what the law over which this Court has only appellate. quo warranto. of public administrative officers or bodies . mandamus. Article VIII of the Constitution undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate provides: upon the rights of the parties. modify. although the instant petition is styled as a petition jurisdiction. Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. . As correctly pointed out by the respondents. Page 130 of 458 ordinary course of law. is and what the legal rights of the parties are. It. or officer exercising judicial or of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. board. or officer may exercise judicial or (2) Review. it seeks the declaration by this and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. or officer clothed with power and authority (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. for a writ of certiorari to issue. and (3) there is no appeal or any plain. the reliefs as law and justice may require. alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal. The Supreme Court shall have the Quasi-judicial function. international or . board. respectively. a person aggrieved to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of thereby may file a verified petition in the proper the contending parties. (2) the tribunal. . revise. other public ministers draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official and consuls. and affecting ambassadors. 14 Section 5.

Vasquez.15 prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to Third. it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay. Aguirre 19 is misplaced that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule writs against first level ("inferior") courts should was not an issue therein. important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the As we have said in Santiago v. Besides. unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefore not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired will be directed. as this Court important reasons therefor. but is concurrent with the Regional Trial instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. Cuaresma: 16 as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court This concurrence of jurisdiction is not. which in some not exclusive. clearly and does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for specifically set out in the petition. and those decree. A instruction. It is a policy necessary to involved. 18 for the extraordinary writs. and courts. with the Court of Appeals. No special and Court's docket. we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will of the writs an absolute. (Italics supplied). quo warranto. in the adjudication of cases. As aptly court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure. ordinance. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates Petitioner's reliance on Pimentel v. is not a trier of facts. there is here a and to prevent further over-crowding of the clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the venue of appeals. jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and As such. law. what was sought to be . ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari. presidential be filed with the Regional Trial Court. and (2) a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition. determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. proclamation. in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be We have held that this Court's original jurisdiction to issue an imposition upon the precious time of this Court. or stated in People v. 17 the propensity intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts allowed. Page 131 of 458 executive agreement. and also serves as a general availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari. intended mandamus. This is [an] declaratory relief even if only questions of law are established policy. or regulation is in direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original question. however. this petition must necessary fail. order. to be taken as according to parties seeking any Thus. even granting arguendo that the present petition is those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. habeas corpus and injunction) is or otherwise. against the latter. There is after all a hierarchy of cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts.

the parties in this case and in the alleged other pending Roy. ||| department is seriously alleged to have infringed the G. EDDY NG would amount to res judicata in the other case. the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties. even assuming that those five petitions are indeed pending SYNOPSIS before the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals. Moreover. (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. which would SO ORDERED.R. 2004]. No. such that any judgment that may be rendered in the MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE pending case. the petition is DISMISSED. settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of forum-shopping. considering that the respondents failed to against the petitioner. Page 132 of 458 nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein WHEREFORE. thus. [January 21. 20 KOK WEI. regardless of which party is successful. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President. 139791. Enrico C. cases are different individuals or entities. Petitioner allegedly failed to deliver furnish this Court with copies of the said petitions. City Mayor of Manila.R. respondent. petitioner. For litis pendentia to exist. We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative (Liga ng mga Barangay National v. and (3) identity [G. 154599. Santos for petitioner. or at least such parties as are representing the same interests in both actions. the condominium unit to the respondent on the date . 465 PHIL 529-544) Constitution. In the instant petition. vs. who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress.] with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases. No. December 12. CORPORATION. shopping cannot be said to exist. have greatly affected all local government units. IEAHca was an act of the President of the Philippines. and as admitted by the respondents. 2003. we can Respondent instituted before the Makati Regional Trial only guess the causes of action and issues raised before Court a complaint for specific performance and damages those courts. the reliefs being founded on the same facts. forum- Rogelio Velarde for respondent. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.

cHCSDa buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. when adverse. COURTS. delay. petitioner confirmed and ratified issue. suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. In submitting its case for decision and then accepting the effect. JURISDICTION. — Pursuant to Section 1 (c) due to unreasonable delay in the delivery of the of Presidential Decree No. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. — While it may be true that the trial trial court is without jurisdiction over respondent's court is without jurisdiction over the case. — On petitioner's claim that it did not incur 1. HAS again. IcCDAS The Supreme Court has consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot owner or 2. On the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the petitioner's claim that it did not incur delay. 1344. A PARTY condominium buyer against the owner or developer falls WHO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land PROCEEDINGS IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE Use Regulatory Board. this is a factual Appellate Court. FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL the Court of Appeals. Time and HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD. EVIDENCE. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. it is the condominium unit to respondent. The Court ruled that the factual findings of the trial the trial court's jurisdiction over this case. it is court are given weight when supported by substantial now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court's evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the jurisdiction. and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction over the case. In effect. petitioner's active complaint. only if favorable. ID. such lack of it. petitioner failed to raise can no longer question the trial court's jurisdiction. Page 133 of 458 specified in the Contract to Sell. The Court affirmed in toto the decision of 3. After due trial. REMEDIAL LAW. Here. IHDCcT Court of Appeals. the trial OR CONDOMINIUM UNIT BUYER AGAINST THE court found the petitioner liable for payment of damages OWNER OR DEVELOPER. we have ruled that "the factual findings of the trial EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER COMPLAINTS FOR court are given weight when supported by substantial SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES BY A LOT evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the . We court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. it is now in estoppel and jurisdiction. petitioner's active participation in the participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. STcEIC COURT GIVEN WEIGHT WHEN SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND CARRIES MORE SYLLABUS WEIGHT WHEN AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.. while it is true that the LACK THEREOF. The decision of the trial HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. petitioner failed to raise the question of practice of a party participating in the proceedings and jurisdiction before the trial court and the appellate court. petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court's judgment. Hence. as amended. We have held that it is an undesirable Furthermore. However. have consistently held that complaints for specific this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court. Certainly. Thus.

1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. upon receipt of petitioner's Eddy Ng Kok Wei. On November 29. Mr. in a lack of water and electric facilities.R.. condominium unit. through its President. is limited to respondent. through its Senior Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Assistant Vice-President. however. respondent. — The jurisdiction of this Court in a Consequently. 1990. J : p In a letter dated April 5. NOT OF FACT." DECISION Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand. 1990.922. LIMITED TO REVIEW OF ERRORS OF LAW. 1990. of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860. 1990. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. respondent again businessman who ventured into investing in the flew back to Manila. Mario G. The contract expressly states that the subject reviewing only errors of law. addressed to its building administrator advising the latter . expressed his intention to purchase Once more." and cement shortage). typhoon and steel Insurance Corporation. petitioner. and that misapprehension of facts. APPEALS. ON CERTIORARI. 1999 and Resolution 2 dated respondent of the substantial completion of his August 5. Manila Bankers Life forces (such as coup d'etat attempts. 1988. On January 16. 1989. the final turnover is reset to May 31. respondent returned to the Philippines sometime in April. on July 5.830. respondent paid and thus. as amended. a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner). unless the factual condominium unit "shall substantially be completed and findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on delivered" to the respondent "within fifteen (15) months" record or the impugned judgment is based on a from February 8.00. due to various uncontrollable 40504. 1990. petitioner. ID. executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the Rules of Civil Procedure. petitioner issued another notice to move-in a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation. He found the unit still uninhabitable for Philippines. respondent paid 4. Mr. liable to pay damages as a result thereof are petitioner a reservation fee of P50. Antonio petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 G. Puyat. petitioner. PETITION FOR REVIEW 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729. These exceptions are not "(S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) present here.000. The factual antecedents as borne by the records are: Meanwhile. 1989 or on May 8. TEHDIA to deliver the unit on the date specified. is a Singaporean notice of delivery dated May 31.00. Zavalla. CV No. informed Decision 1 dated March 26.00 for the purchase indeed factual questions. 1990." Whether or not petitioner incurred delay Subsequently or on December 5. not of fact. entitled "Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. respondent. 1988. Page 134 of 458 Court of Appeals.

90-3440. Unsatisfied.00 by way of attorney's fees. But petitioner ignored such Hence. 1992.000. provides: On December 18. 1990. affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner incurred docketed as Civil Case No. 957. Thus. respondent to respondent.000. 5. In the exercise of its functions to Decision 3 finding the petitioner liable for payment of regulate the real estate trade and business and damages due to the delay in the performance of its in addition to its powers provided for obligation to the respondent. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid xxx xxx xxx defendant. Makati City. respondent's cause of jurisdiction over the instant case. developer. Branch 150. 1990 demanding payment for the August 5. The dispositive portion reads: in Presidential Decree No. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but Exasperated. dealer. On appeal. On petitioner's contention that the trial court has no 1991. affirmed in toto the trial court's award of damages in favor of the respondent. the trial court rendered a "SECTION 1. contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units 3.000. and salesman. 1999. "C.00 as exemplary damages. in a Decision dated 1990. Page 135 of 458 that respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22. P25. Petitioner demand. ordering Regulatory Board (HLURB)] 4 shall Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide pay plaintiff Eddy Ng Kok Wei the following: cases of the following nature: 1. damages he sustained. P100. a complaint against instant case. occupied the same. as amended. the Court of Appeals. On October 5." "SO ORDERED. respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still unlivable. unreasonable delay in the delivery of the condominium unit Meanwhile. March 26. he was constrained to send petitioner a letter was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated dated November 21. of Presidential Decree No. prompting respondent to file with the Regional contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Trial Court. Cases involving specific performance of 2. the National "WHEREFORE. broker or 4." . against the owner. 1344. Section 1(c) action has been limited to his claim for damages. finally accepted the condominium unit and on April 12. this petition for review on certiorari. P50. xxx xxx xxx. judgment is hereby rendered in Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use favor of plaintiff and against defendant. and that the Court of Appeals erred in the former for specific performance and damages. during the pendency of the case. Cost of suit.00 as moral damages. 1999.

] thus. not of fact. over the case. 5 August 5. 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction AFFIRMED IN TOTO. 6 Wei. when adverse. v. complainant. liable to pay damages as a result thereof. G. petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. petitioner's active participation in the Costs against the petitioner. as amended." 7 Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and [A. No. Eddy Ng Kok ||| decision and then accepting the judgment. the petition is DENIED. proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. 1999 and Resolution dated HLURB. We have consistently judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. it is the HLURB which are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned has jurisdiction over the instant case. April 25. SARDIDO. No. 2003]. by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or WHEREFORE. 2003.M. participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for (Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. No. suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Certainly. Page 136 of 458 Pursuant to the above provisions. The assailed developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Decision dated March 26. only if favorable. petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court's jurisdiction over this case. 8These held that complaints for specific performance with damages exceptions are not present here. are indeed (formerly A. In effect.R. is limited to reviewing only errors AGUSTIN T. it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court's jurisdiction. 463 PHIL 871-878) Here. JUDGE Procedure. we have ruled that "the factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Municipal Trial of law. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review OFFICE OF THE COURT on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil ADMINISTRATOR. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party SO ORDERED. [December 12. Time and again. unless the factual findings being assailed . 139791. and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction. MTJ-01-1370. 00-11-238-MTC) factual questions. On petitioner's claim that it did not incur delay.M. vs.

Page 137 of 458 Court of Koronadal. 3-89. — Under Circular No. formerly presiding judge of the Municipal from an administrative case against him and the dismissal Trial Court of Koronadal. The Court further ruled that whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is SYNOPSIS of no moment. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Circular No. the 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices Court has directed the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. exercises the exclusive power to discipline administratively and not the trial courts. Judge Sardido reasoned out that he Respondent Judge Agustin T. JUDGES. South IBP.respondent. Judge Hurtado is not an administrative case filed with the . In reasonable doubt which is required in criminal cases.000. to refer all administrative cases justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts. A criminal The Office of the Court Administrator charged respondent case against an attorney or judge is distinct and separate Agustin Sardido. The certain Judge Braulio Hurtado. filed against justices of appellate courts and judges of Circular No. PUBLIC Hurtado was charged with falsification of public document OFFICERS. OFFENSES COMMITTED. but a criminal case filed with the trial court under its Cotabato. the Court lower courts. with gross of the criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of an ignorance of the law. The case filed against erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. 3-89 directs Thousand Pesos (P10. CIRCULAR NO. TRIAL COURTS RETAIN The Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of gross JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THE ignorance of the law. Sardido was fined Ten excluded Judge Hurtado because Circular No. South Cotabato. jurisdiction. Respondent allegedly excluded a administrative case arising from the same set of facts.00). It is clear from the Circular directing the IBP. POLITICAL LAW. JUSTICES OF APPELLATE COURTS OR JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS. According to the Court. Koronadal. and not proof beyond a case for Falsification and Use of Falsified Document. the IBP to forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against lower courts to the Supreme Court. Trial courts for appropriate action all administrative cases filed with IBP retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses against justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower committed by justices of appellate courts and judges of courts. Jr. 3-89 DOES NOT as a notary public while he was still the Clerk of Court of REFER TO CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST ERRING the Regional Trial Court. especially so in this case where Judge 1. North Cotabato as one of the accused in preponderance of evidence. South Cotabato. As mandated by the Constitution. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. of the Regional Trial quantum of evidence that is required in the latter is only Court of Kabacan. Judge Sardido claimed that the Circular likewise SYLLABUS applies to courts in cases involving justices or judges of the lower courts. his Explanation.

. aDSIHc 2. Judge Sardido offense. Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado issued an Order dated 20 October 1998 excluding Judge relates to an act committed before or after he became a Braulio Hurtado. for gross ignorance of the law. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an administrative case filed with the IBP. ID. Judge Sardido failed in this regard. case against Judge Hurtado to the Court. formerly presiding The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal.. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed DECISION by law... Jr. ID. 3-89 requires that Judge separate from an administrative case against him. J :p FROM AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM.. and not the trial courts. ID. He directing the IBP. ID. then presiding judge of the acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT The Case WARRANT THE DISMISSAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE This is an administrative case against respondent Judge CASE ARISING FROM THE SAME SET OF FACTS. to refer all erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in administrative cases filed against justices of appellate the Amended Information and in forwarding the criminal courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. 1 Judge Sardido ruled that criminal case against an attorney or judge is distinct and Supreme Court Circular No. ID. — Agustin T. Neither is it material that an MTC Court of Kabacan.. ID. called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory was raffled to Judge Sardido. Sardido ("Judge Sardido"). The Hurtado be dropped from the Amended Information and his dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the case be forwarded to the Court. DIEACH dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same The Facts set of facts. He should strive for excellence and seek the judges of lower courts. A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST AN ATTORNEY OR JUDGE IS DISTINCT AND SEPARATE CARPIO. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW: A judge is Hurtado. ID. North Cotabato as one of the accused in judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case." 2 The Amended Information included Judge 3. ID. ID.. 14071.. docketed as Criminal Case No. Page 138 of 458 Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled offenses committed by justices of appellate courts and doctrines. The quantum of evidence that is required in the latter is only preponderance of evidence. This is clear from the Circular truth with passion. South same time both a criminal act and an administrative Cotabato. ("Judge Hurtado") of the Regional Trial judge is of no moment. The case. "Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document. A an Amended Information.. He must . and not proof Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused beyond reasonable doubt which is required in criminal Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of the crime of cases.

000. For reasons being. whether or not such complaints functions. an RTC Judge of the agreed to pay for the capital gains tax. such as acts of immorality. falls within the and the other vendors signed was a Deed of Absolute Sale purview of the afore-said Circular No. crimes of office. In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993. it would sound. etc. represented by initiated case. Judge Hurtado asserted that since the Secondly.023. the same should be forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to Circular No. estafa. Revenue assessed the vendors a deficiency capital gains tax of P1. whether Judge Hurtado claimed that Circular No. the offense charged was accused Ong. who at that time was the Clerk of Court of court and ex-officio notary public. The consideration in Regional Trial Court of Kabacan. with co-accused Pagunsan.00. 3-89 dated 6 or not such complaints deal with acts apparently February 1989 requires "all cases involving justices and unrelated to the discharge of their official judges of the lower courts. notarized the On 20 October 1998. 3-89 since it is not an IBP- to Davao Realty Development Corporation. case against him is one involving a judge of a lower court. Judge Sardido issued an Order. pertinent portions of which read: However. Page 139 of 458 Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal. Under the law on Legal Hermeneutics. falls within the meaning and intent of undervalued. the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993 which whether the case of Judge Hurtado. Subsequently. without any qualification whether the crime was committed before or during his tenure official functions. North the 8 August 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale was apparently Cotabato. arguing that the case against Judge Hurtado is not 33633 and located at the commercial district of Koronadal. 3-89. the Bureau of Internal the said circular. against persons and property. South Cotabato ("MTC. Supreme Court. private complainant Magbanua and six other vendors allegedly The Provincial Prosecutor opposed Judge Hurtado's sold two parcels of land. dated 6 August 1996 for a consideration of It is the humble submission of the Court that the P16. committed in 1993 when Judge Hurtado was still a clerk of Judge Hurtado. who is states that the consideration for the sale was only charged for acts committed prior to his P600.000. RTC-Koronadal and ex-officio notary public. to the mind of the . Koronadal"). Under the terms of the sale. within the scope of Circular No.375. as broker.00.000. private complainant Magbanua denies signing The issue to be resolved in the instant case is. firstly." to be forwarded to the if the law does not qualify we must not qualify. covered by TCT Nos. Moreover. the vendee case of Judge Hurtado. Supreme Court for appropriate action.00. Private complainant asserts that what she appointment as an RTC Judge. the said circular provides that all cases involving justices and Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal judges of lower courts shall be forwarded to the complaint against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court. and regardless of the nature of the deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their crime. the Deed of Absolute Sale. 3-89. 47873 and motion.

this Court can not and In his Explanation dated 26 January 2001. is ordered excluded from the involving justices or judges of the lower courts. the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for Accordingly. report and recommendation. The OCA found that Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Thus. dated February 9. The Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed OCA's Findings and Conclusions before trial courts against such justices and judges. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints honesty and good faith. ." filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. For reasons afore-stated. The Circular does not apply to ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the . South Cotabato. Judge Sardido filed his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001 stating that he is submitting the case for decision Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. 3-89. Page 140 of 458 Court. South the OCA submitted a Memorandum recommending that Cotabato. which is Judge Sardido's basis in returned to the MTC-Koronadal together with the records of issuing the Order of 20 October 1998. Acting Clerk of Court II of the MTC-Koronadal." Judge Sardido considered. Judge Hurtado's case to the Court. claims that the Circular likewise "applies to courts in cases Hurtado. in the Resolution of 6 December 2000. 14071. Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving Wherefore. On 10 July 2001. Maxima S. The Court directed Judge Sardido to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices explain in writing why he should not be held liable for gross and judges of lower courts. the Court Information in Criminal Case No. Borja ("Borja"). criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator for appropriate action. Judge Sardido shall not try this case as against Judge Hurtado. . The OCA held directed that the letter of Acting Clerk of Court Borja be that Circular No. Jr. awkward for a first level court to be trying Amended Information and for transmitting the records of an incumbent judge of a second level court. In the Resolution of 28 March 2001. Benipayo issued a based on the pleadings and records already filed. Stenographer I and evaluation.. pursuant to the afore-said Circular No. the foregoing premises duly justices and judges of lower courts . 3-89 directs the IBP to "forward to the order otherwise. the name of Judge Braulio L. reasoned out that he excluded Judge Hurtado because unless the Honorable Supreme Court would Circular No. Judge Memorandum dated 25 October 2000 pointing out that Sardido insisted that he did "what he had done in all Circular No. 3- was still the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of 89 of the Supreme Court. wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. refers to the criminal case." 1989. the 11th Judicial Region in Koronadal." especially amended information and the case against him so in this case where "Judge Hurtado was charged with is ordered forwarded to the Honorable Supreme falsification of public document as a notary public while he Court.

crimes against persons and property. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute administrative clarifying the En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988. cases against erring lawyers. or at the instance Acting Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. the Court has directed the IBP to refer to (1) The IBP (Board of Governors and the Supreme Court for appropriate action all administrative Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to cases filed with IBP against justices of appellate courts and the Supreme Court for appropriate action all judges of the lower courts. Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline authority as provided in Section 11. stated that the power to discipline justices and judges of the lower courts is within the Court's exclusive power and However. initiate and prosecute proper Justices Reynato Puno 4 and Alfredo Marigomen 5 of the charges against erring attorneys including those Court of Appeals. 3-89. Nocon 3 and Associate of any person. All administrative cases against justices of appropriate action the complaint 6 filed by Atty. seeking clarification of the Court's En The IBP Board of Governors may. Balaoing had filed a complaint As clarified. including justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. . Puno and service" in Section 1 of Rule 139-B does not include Marigomen relating to a petition filed before their division. 3-89 in response to a letter of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states that: dated 19 December 1988 by then IBP President Leon M. A certain Atty. the phrase "attorneys .000. under Circular No. The OCA recommended that a fine of P5. Garcia. (Emphasis supplied). 3-89 provides in part as follows: Circular No.HTSaEC immorality. The Court has vested the The Court issued Circular No. the Court exercises the exclusive power to . . . whether or not such complaints deal with courts. in the government service. justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts In its En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988. motu BancResolution of 29 November 1998 in RE: Letter of then proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers. 3-89 are Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988 by issuing administrative cases for disbarment. Page 141 of 458 criminal cases filed against justices and judges of lower courts. the Court who are not subject to the disciplining authority of the required the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for IBP. Balaoing appellate courts and judges of lower courts fall with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The Court exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 3-89 clarified the second paragraph. . (Emphasis supplied) The Court's Ruling Circular No. such as acts of law. 17 dated 20 December 1988. estafa. . discipline of attorneys. in the government against Court of Appeals Justices Nocon. suspension or Circular No. The cases referred to in Circular No. 8 However. 7 The Court Administrator publicized the En nature.00 be acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of imposed on Judge Sardido for gross ignorance of the their official functions. As mandated bythe cases involving justices and judges of lower Constitution.. Article VII of the 1987 of Attorneys which is administrative and not criminal in Constitution. Section 1 The Court issued Circular No. etc. Eduardo R.

3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against administrative case for disbarment or erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. For this reason. In a criminal case. The quantum of evidence that is required in the ". proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. respondent's acquittal does not filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed necessarily exculpate him administratively. Disciplinary proceedings against latter is only preponderance of evidence. a prosecutor therein. 'clearly preponderant evidence' is all Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of that is required. it would be well to remember the dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the Court's ruling in In re Almacen. they may proceed independently of civil and Accordingly. but Inc. same vein. there is neither a plaintiff nor criminal cases. v. and not the trial courts. . administrative case filed with the IBP. This is clear from the Circular same facts and circumstances are attendant in directing the lBP. SHEIDC differ. A altogether different from administrative matters. a criminal prosecution will offenses committed by justices of appellate courts 9 and not constitute a prejudicial question even if the judges of lower courts. Page 142 of 458 discipline administratively justices of appellate courts and The burden of proof for these types of cases judges of lower courts. involve a trial of an action or a suit. the criminal case will not necessarily result in a The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an finding of liability in the administrative case. and not proof lawyers are sui generis. . criminal case against an attorney or judge is distinct and such that the disposition in the first two will not separate from an administrative case against him. they do not cases. In the by law. suspension. Neither purely beyond reasonable doubt which is required in criminal civil nor purely criminal. [they class of their own. to refer all the administrative proceedings. which we quote: dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of facts. [They] may be . Thus. They are distinct from and are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. administrative cases filed against justices of appellate It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. in an Circular No. The basic judge is of no moment. Neither is it material that an MTC premise is that criminal and civil cases are judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. It is a criminal case Conversely. Naldoza: 11 are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. 10 As held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool. Not Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a being intended to inflict punishment. Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado disposition in the civil action absolve the relates to an act committed before or after he became a administrative liability of the lawyer. The inevitably govern the third and vice versa. the trial court's finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the a similar finding in the administrative action same time both a criminal act and an administrative before this Court. Neither will a favorable offense.

000. 15 the Court fined Judge upon a member of the Bar to account for Sardido P5. reemployment in any branch of the government or any of He erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the its agencies or instrumentalities. 39- disciplinary powers. his an attorney. except accrued doctrines. . Judge Sardido. the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit In RE: Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Agustin T. He must time the Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the service be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled with forfeiture of his retirement benefits. including government- accused in the Amended Information and in forwarding the owned and controlled corporations. proper and honest administration of In Almeron v. The records of the OCA further disclose that Judge Sardido One last point. criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court. Torcende v. The Court gave with the end in view of preserving the a stern warning to Judge Sardido that a commission of the purity of the legal profession and the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. the fine of judiciary. 14 the Court reprimanded Judge Sardido for such. 17 the Court found Judge Sardido again guilty of A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory gross ignorance of the law and of gross misconduct. person to be allowed the privileges as Sardido.00 for gross prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to ignorance of the law.000. The amendment cannot apply impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the retroactively to Judge Sardido's case. This acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Such an unflattering service record erodes the classifying gross ignorance of the law a serious offense people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Judge Sardido. Hence.00 for gross ignorance of the law. In a more recent administrative case.00 but not of every member of the bench to avoid any impression of exceeding P40." dismissal from the service.000. In Cabilao v. This administrative case against Judge has other similar administrative complaints 18 still pending Sardido started before the amendment 13 of Rule 140 against him. Judge Sardido.00 recommended by the OCA is too light a penalty . 12 Judge Sardido failed in this regard. He should strive for excellence and seek the leave credits. in the exercise of its issuing a hold-departure order contrary to Circular No. grave his actuations as an officer of the Court abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. 19 The Court may still impose a fine on Judge P5. Page 143 of 458 initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public considering that this is not the first offense of Judge interest is [their] primary objective. the Court merely calls 97. 16 the Court imposed on justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have Judge Sardido a stiffer fine of P10. if warranted. He was again sternly warned that the be entrusted with the duties and commission of the same or similar act in the future would responsibilities pertaining to the office of be dealt with more severely including. It is the duty punishable by a fine of more than P20.000. .00. The dismissal was with prejudice to truth with passion. However. and Sardido. .000.

(Office of the Court Administrator v." 4 . DECISION "WHEREFORE. the action may be dismissed motu proprio by ignorance of the law. respondents.000. The fine may be deducted from his the Court of Appeals. protect. 2001 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as agricultural land.] acquired through fraud is the State. the petitioner's action is deemed misplaced as he GEORGE KATON. for review on different grounds. LORENZO AGUSTIN. 2004. the dismissal of SO ORDERED.R. J : p service. A. 2000 Decision 2 and the November 20. Jr. even if the case has been elevated accrued leave credits. the petition is hereby DISMISSED. MANUEL really does not have any right to assert or PALANCA JR. 151149. 449 PHIL 619-631) Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No. ||| The Case MTJ-01-1370. Page 144 of 458 Sardido in the instant case despite his dismissal from the PANGANIBAN. Sardido is cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. No pronouncement as to cost. assailing the December 8. 57496.. [April 25. Verily. What he had during the time he requested for the re-classification of the land was JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN the privilege of applying for the patent over the FRESNILLO. September 7. same upon the land's conversion from forest to agricultural. it appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca. respondent Judge Agustin T. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in question. petitioner. 2003]. the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles [G. such cases appropriately ends useless litigations. In addition. thus. Sardido..00) for gross the trial court. No. lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a WHEREFORE. vs.M. Where prescription.

On November 22. 1965. Lucio Valera. approximately 18 hectares. on the other hand. ordered the as Sombrero Island had been classified from inspection. Puerto Princesa. Land Act. Palawan. Mr. herein [P]etitioner [George co-applicants of the petitioner.L. for authority to survey on Classification Investigator) undertook the November 15. 1965. cSEaDA Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. per BF Map LC No. "Thereafter. Palawan. Palawan. 10-C agricultural land for disposition under the Public of Aborlan. Jr. Palawan. and thereafter for George [l]and investigator of the District Land Office. Palawan. (alleged to survey ten (10) hectares of Sombrero Island overseer of petitioner) who went to the island . It affirmed work. for the re-classification of a piece of Director of Forestry R. However. Katon to apply for a homestead patent. located Director of Lands. 1965. Aborlan. that since the subject in Tagpait. Said property is the same is therefore certified and released as within Timberland Block of LC Project No. investigation and survey of the land forest land to agricultural land and certified subject of the petitioner's request for eventual available for disposition upon his request and at conversion or re-classification from forest to his instance. not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court. denied the from time to time to undertake development Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. "In a letter dated September 23. the RTC's dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. On December 10. Clemente The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows: Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as "On August 2. R III-342-65 was issued authorizing claimed to have been planted by petitioner and Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador [R]espondent Manuel Palanca. but Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction. there were no actual occupants on the hectares each. Utleg informed the real property known as Sombrero Island. Survey island but there were some coconut trees Authority No.J. 1963. During said Island for the respondents consisting of five (5) survey. the Bureau of Forestry District "Petitioner contends that the whole area known Office. Jr. Katon] filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa. favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. 1582. like planting of additional coconut trees. his brother Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his cousin. Page 145 of 458 The assailed Resolution. Manila. Puerto Princesa. "The application for conversion of the whole 3231. a second investigation. instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero [R]espondent Manuel Palanca. which consists of land was no longer needed for forest purposes. The The Antecedent Facts names of Felicisimo Corpuz. then Asst. then agricultural land. inspection and survey of the area endorsement was issued by Palawan District in the presence of the petitioner. "Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land and Lorenzo Agustin.

homestead patent over the whole island since it Palanca said that petitioner never filed any was he who requested for its conversion from homestead application for the island. STaHIC improvements on the island. 145927 and OCT No. as the reconveyance of the whole island in his [R]espondents Fresnillo. The petitioner claims that he has the already occupied their respective areas and exclusive right to file an application for introduced numerous improvements. Jr. 1996.5 hectares. portions and have declared said portions for Respondent Manuel Palanca.84 "Respondents contend that the petitioner has no hectares of Sombrero Island. Jr. On December 23. 1999. Page 146 of 458 for the respondents. On June 30. petitioner seeks to nullify the "On the other hand. G. he said he was acting for himself in developing [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead his own area and not as anybody's caretaker. 1977 5 with an area of 6.3 hectares. forest land to agricultural land. "According to Mandocdoc. Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. 1990. claims that he himself requested for title issued in favor of the respondents covering the reclassification of the island in dispute and certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well that on or about the time of such request. legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is "Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead concerned because an action for reconveyance patents and original certificates of title covering can only be brought by the owner and not a certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is favor of respondents on the ground that the guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to same were obtained through fraud. In addition. 7089 on March 3. was issued taxation purposes and that they have been Homestead Patent No. Petitioner assert his right over the land for an unreasonable prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in and unexplained period of time. "In the instant case. his favor. the island was [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a homestead uninhabited but the respondents insist that they patent application for a portion of the subject already had their respective occupancy and island consisting of an area of 4." 6 Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or island. Palanca and Gapilango favor. [R]espondent Manuel homestead patents and original certificates of Palanca. faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial . patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8. Records also reveal "Respondents aver that they are all bona fide that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a and lawful possessors of their respective homestead application on June 8. 1972. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because "Records show that on November 8.

the property. because he neither discretion. the homesteader's right thereto stands. Hence. Unless and until the government takes steps to should have been taken within ten years from the issuance annul the grant. the CA ruled on the merits. he never applied for the title issued upon a homestead patent. it appears Finally. for being a third and prohibited the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five motion. he of the land to the public domain. The Motion to Dismiss was 1999 Motion for Reconsideration. First. members — with two justices dissenting — pursuant to its petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his Rules of Court. Finally. Second. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA. 1999. the appellate court Ruling of the Court of Appeals opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of reconveyance of the disputed land. he was petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca already barred by laches for having slept on his right for had been occupying six hectares of the island since 1965. 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated Nonetheless. had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case.IAEcCT never acquired title to that land. the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by December 17. 1999. such action grantee. almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palanca's title or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to had been issued. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29. Respondent Gapilango. jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10. His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the In the Assailed Resolution. It agreed . granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive from the submission (Annex "F" of the Complaint) of right to apply for a patent to the land in question. Under the Public Land Act. first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. From the allegations of the Complaint. of the homestead certificate of title. and for reversion a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Page 147 of 458 court's Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus with petitioner that the trial court had acted without effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased. It held that while held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion. the CA acknowledged that it Civil Code. It petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of Island from forest to agricultural land. it ruled that prescription had already barred the The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a action for reconveyance. on the erroneous ground granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29. petitioner's action was homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the brought 24 years after the issuance of Palanca's State were matters between the latter and the homestead homestead patent.

Settled is the doctrine that the sole office alleged 'residual prerogative' under Section 1. this Petition. The Court's Ruling Second Issue: The Petition has no merit. 2001 Resolution. complexity and "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the seeming importance of the interests and issues Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts involved in the case below. 2000 Decision. of its December 8. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed "1. Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction First Issue: Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its Propriety of Ruling on the Merits "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition the propriety of the CA's ruling on the merits. five in all. and was in fact." 9 in the answer are deemed waived. petitioner raises the following issues: it further. as follows: exercise even after perfection of an appeal. Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in jurisdiction. reluctance of the judges. may still validly itself in its November 20. 7 That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. "Upon another review of the case. the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its and been waylaid by the variety. raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition? raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner's Motion for "2. as in this case. Hence. Such writ does not include a review of the the Petition?" 8 evidence. (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the . defenses confusing. and the volume of the conflicting. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not when the only issue that could have been. with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court. to hear the case. submissions bearing on incidental and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or matters. We stand corrected. the apparent over cases appealed to the CA. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its Reconsideration. (2) litis pendentia. He raised it for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court. there is no need to discuss In his Memorandum. 10 more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court. except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The CA even corrected in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Page 148 of 458 Hence. The CA's Resolution on this point has rendered Issues petitioner's issue moot. often Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

when there is allow withdrawal of the appeal. the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or on appeal filed in due time. change. Rule 9. proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. "A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject The CA's motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's Complaint could not have been based. and jurisdiction over the subject matter. and original record or the record on appeal. failed to prosecute his action for an jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof unreasonable length of time or neglected to upon the approval of the records on appeal filed comply with the rules or with any order of the in due time and the expiration of the time to court. [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of traditionally limited to instances when the court the appeals filed in due time and the expiration clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the time to appeal of the other parties. Under the new rules. Outside of these instances. the court loses ". 13 In either instance. permit of appeal in due time. effect thereof . Rule 17. on residual . — records or the records on appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of On the other hand. or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost of limitations. the A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice issue protective orders. . Larin 11 we explained thus: "In appeals by notice of appeal. prior to the transmittal of the qualifying and expanding Section 2. appeals of indigent litigants. and when the plaintiff did not appear during "In appeals by record on appeal. the court loses trial. Except for "In either case. any motu appeal of the other parties. . of the Revised Rules of may issue orders for the protection and Court. therefore. In Gumabon v. Perfection of appeal. a court may motu approve compromises. but prior to the transmittal of the original "SEC. 9." (Italics supplied) another cause of action pending between the The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a same parties for the same cause. permit appeals of proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the indigent litigants. approve compromises." 12 (Italics supplied) jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. order execution pending appeal pleadings or evidence on record that it has no in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39. "residual jurisdiction" is embodied the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. . . order execution pending appeal. as follows: cCTESa records on appeal. . the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil preservation of the rights of the parties which do Procedure brought about no radical not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. In the four excepted matter thereof upon the approval of the record instances. and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. Page 149 of 458 pleadings or the evidence on record. action. the court Section 3.

. made the request for authority to intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic] . 145927 and OCT No. Respondent] Manuel intending the effects with natural necessity arise Palanca Jr. pending the disposition of the as mentioned earlier. for a Agustin. prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts xxx xxx xxx to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds 2." 18 petitioner averred: xxx xxx xxx "2. trust. Lorenzo Agustin.1. 17 In his Complaint for done fraudulently and in bad faith. .3. In stating in his application for mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and homestead patent that he was applying under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 14 of the same rules. [despite being] fully aware that judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied of Respondents Agustin. . 1965. . . petitioner prayed. fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court's lack of jurisdiction" 15 and for prescription of the action. Lorenzo Agustin. "3." 20 survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and that of his Co-[Respondent] Thereupon. Undeniably. Page 150 of 458 jurisdiction under Rule 41. Fresnillo and Gapilango as well or requested for re-classification and as Homestead Patent No. G-7089 in certification of the same land from forest the name of Respondent Palanca. the same constituted another clear case of fraud when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more and misrepresentation. in connivance knowing from such act or omission. among others. without the ". and (2) ordering the . [Respondent with his co-[respondent]. Jesus is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[. . Palanca] on account of his blood relation. are ipso "Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original facto null and void and of no effect Certificate of Title No. for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero To be sure. . G-7089 in the name of matter. the CA had the excepted instances in mind Island where there was none. a clear case of case on appeal. That on November 10. and the filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and of [respondents]. .] having been character of the relief sought. such order of land to agricultural land which request dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation was favorably acted upon and approved of the rights of the parties. the only power it has is to dismiss the action. [petitioner's] cousin. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of whatsoever. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and knowledge of [petitioner. when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject 145927 and OCT No.. Indeed. interdependence and 2." 19 Title. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 16 [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. What the CA referred to as residual intrinsic fraud and misrepresentation. first fraudulently and in bad faith: degree cousins. . .

over which the trial court could have Act. 24 As with an annulment of title. when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the In an alternative action for reconveyance. the nullity arises not from fraud for reversion or any other action that would have the effect or deceit. Section title to the defendant. 25 Therefore. and (2) that the homestead may be validly claimed only by the applicant. the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the and the proper party who may bring action is the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in government. 30 A private person may not bring an action plaintiff. result that the land thereby covered would again form part hence. not being the real party in interest. if admitted. the certificate of disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the title is also respected as incontrovertible. but from the fact that the director of the Land of canceling a free patent and its derivative title. nowhere in the Complaint did action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land certificate of title or. would has no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance. 34 . On the contrary. a homestead applicant. the defendant who acquired the Bureau of the former's final proof of homestead patent. 32 A mere the defendant's name. did the Complaint sufficiently allege an In the present case. but the transfer of title is canceled or amended. he acknowledged that the it plead merely for reversion? disputed island was public land. Page 151 of 458 director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and Sombrero Island to petitioner. vested rights over the land applied for under a that the plaintiff was the owner of the land. hence. and who consequently prays for its nullity. defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the after approval by the director of the Land Management property. and that he had not applied for The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land such actions. 23 Thus. complaint must allege two facts that. 26 The question is. 29 plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of Neither can petitioner's case be one for reversion. to which the property will revert. 22 In these cases. the action is for reversion. does not state a cause of action. 27 that it had never been privately titled in his name. the complaint must contain the following allegations: annulment. for reconveyance? Or did in question. the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab of the public domain. 21 reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the title thereto. HECTaA party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its by fraudulent means. with the Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title. such 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the complaint must be dismissed. 33 As it entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) is. and 2) that the defendant 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the such an action. 28 This Court has held that a complaint by a private exercised jurisdiction. alternatively. 31 initio.

Jan. Bambao v. or even if the defense has not been asserted at all. as a party-plaintiff. 100 SCRA 250. as in this case. administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent. however. Rule 16). Intermediate Appellate defendant has been declared in default (PNB Court 42 ruled that a certificate of title. Sinaon v. issued under an v. the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not In Aldovino v. and it may do so on the basis of a motion Certificate of Title was issued to Palanca on February 21. Alunan. et al. Perez. f. Rule 16. evidence. PNB v. 43 the Court has held that when the only because of lack of jurisdiction. invoke. Rules of Court).. Cordova. Pacific issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in Commission House. or 1977. 136 SCRA not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original 408). or even if the date of the issuance of the Certificate. the 1958. Page 152 of 458 Consequently. Clearly. 38 (Francisco v. 84 SCRA 705). 5. 1954. What is essential only. 1961. assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring Jan. Convets. 40 while the Complaint was filed only on October 6. as where no It must likewise be stressed that Palanca's title — which statement thereof is found in the pleadings attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the (Garcia v. to repeat. 97. . Sison v.v. record. 50 O. Ericta. Indeed. 15. 1958. Feb. 821). or where a ground of actual fraud. Finally. 27 SCRA 766.Mathis. 97 Phil. Dioso. an answer which sets up such ground as an 1998. the jurisdiction of the court. In Gicano v. is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the registration proceeding one year from its issuance. NDC. 32 case should still be dismissed for being time-barred. 36 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the Rules of Court 37 ordains that every action must be defendant. 14. the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance. Gegato. Chua Lamco February 1977 — is no longer open to review on the v. Feb. Robles. Cordova v. 16 SCRA 270). Lednicky. who stands to be benefited or injured by the dismiss an action on the ground of prescription judgment in the suit. such action may be dismissed even if the respondents in their Answer. Ybanez v. . 1. 44 we also explained thus: prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in ". the suit was brought way past ten years from affirmative defense (Sec. the prescriptive the ground is alleged after judgment on the period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real merits.G. that the land covered by it is disposable complaint. to dismiss (Sec. [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to interest. 35 a defense raised by prescribed. as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer property. 28." 45 (Italics supplied) . 41 v. 39 It is SCRA 529. either in the averments of the plaintiff's provided. McQuaid. 28. Sorongan. but also because of the plaintiff's own complaint shows clearly that the action has utter absence of a cause of action. one who has no right or when the parties' pleadings or other facts on interest to protect has no cause of action by which to record show it to be indeed time-barred. Inc. or otherwise established by the public land.

an information 3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the Sandoval-Gutierrez and petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of (Katon v. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise DECISION the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this . 22697. for the first time. the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the VENANCIO FIGUEROA y damages awarded. The dismissal of the (CA) in CA-G. PEOPLE OF Dissatisfied.R. courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to When is a litigant estopped by laches from prevent future litigations. Finding no other ground to reverse the [G. 1994. and the February 28. vs. 147406. DcCIAa Complaint in Civil Case No. Jr. among others. G. Palanca. After all. 1998. proceedings: SO ORDERED. Page 153 of 458 Clearly then. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 46 assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the WHEREFORE.R. 5 Trial on the merits 2004]. 481 PHIL 168-188) ensued and on August 19. in the challenged decision. Costs against petitioner. 2008. thus. if and when they are able to do so. the trial court's jurisdiction. 7 The appellate court. however. the Petition is hereby DENIED. the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. 2235-M-94. No. he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. the petitioner filed the instant petition THE PHILIPPINES. Branch 18. ||| Bulacan. July 14. 1 petitioner. for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution: a. J : p case.. considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC. CR No. the petitioner questioned. 6 In his appeal before the CA. 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. 151149.] trial court's decision. the CA did not err in dismissing the present NACHURA. failure to state a cause of Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and action and prescription. 8 CERVANTES.R. [September 7. respondent. AEIDTc On July 8. No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

and regardless of other and. against the petitioner does not contain an including the civil liability arising from such allegation to that effect? EcHAaS offenses or predicated thereon. Sibonghanoy. 129 11 had already been amended by Republic Act No. more importantly. when no evidence falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan. and Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is Courts in Criminal Cases. 10 In this case. the prosecution during the trial of this case? the Metropolitan Trial Courts. 32. 12 The said c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in exercise: convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct xxx xxx xxx designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all homicide") with violation of the Land offenses punishable with imprisonment not Transportation and Traffic Code when the exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the prosecution did not prove this during the trial amount of fine.) Blg. unless such statute provides for a b. Transportation and Traffic Code. constitute defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim laches in relation to the doctrine laid down unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him in Tijam v. constitute Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was enough incriminating evidence to warrant his filed. at the difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is time the criminal information for reckless imprudence running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile unexpectedly crossed the road. amount to estoppel? conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. irrespective of . Does the uncontroverted testimony of the prosecutor before the wrong court. Municipal Trial Courts. Section 32 (2) of Batas conviction for the crime charged? Pambansa (B. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in provision thus reads: considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Sec. does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the case. 7691. — Except in cases only 20 kilometers per hour. Page 154 of 458 case. the information filed imposable accessory or other penalties. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is retroactive application thereof.P. which is initiated and filed not by him but jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is by the public prosecutor. which was initiated and filed by the public e. notwithstanding the fact getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not that said issue was immediately raised in enough evidence to acquit him of the crime petitioner's appeal to the Honorable Court of charged? 9 Appeals? Conversely. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall d.

continuously confounds the bench and the bar. nature. jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches.. the court may dismiss the months and 1 day to 6 years. 496). (4 Ill. That in offenses involving damage to jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal. The operation of the principle of estoppel jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be on the question of jurisdiction seemingly raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. on . and As the imposable penalty for the crime charged large array of cases there cited). try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts 79.. value or amount thereof: Provided.S.aCTADI had no jurisdiction. and herein is prision correccional in its medium and indeed.S. 12. Clearly. counters that the lack of 4. in People v. 17 the Court without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. which on appeal. 2235-M-94. the party who induced it to Santa 15 that: adopt such theory will not be permitted. as that the court had no jurisdiction. As depends upon whether the lower court undue delay is further absent herein. & Pr. for his part. 861-863). no court or tribunal can act on a matter the case was heard and decided upon a given submitted to it. Chipman vs. of Pl. The explained: petitioner. and property through criminal negligence. either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. . vol. but the case was tried To settle once and for all this problem of and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction. we shall for the same "must exist as a matter of analyze the various Court decisions on the matter. proceedings. 59 Conn. proceeding is conferred by the sovereign While both the appellate court and the Solicitor authority which organizes the court. and may not be conferred by consent of As early as 1901. and legislative act. therefore. De La theory. where the subject-matter is not within maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years. they nevertheless are of only by law and in the manner prescribed by law the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has and an objection based on the lack of such already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. this Court has declared the parties or by estoppel" (5 C. the parties are not barred. . 133. Casiano.. law. such. from assailing such jurisdiction. (MTCs). they shall subject to objection at any stage of the have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. the RTC of Bulacan does Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 189. 190 Ind. If it laches will not be applicable. 14 We went on to state in U. It has been frequently held that a lack of however.J. if the lower court had jurisdiction. that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some However. p. the principle of actually had jurisdiction or not. 13 jurisdiction to hear and proceeding ex mero motu. Waterbury.. for instance. v. 4 the jurisdiction. 16 jurisdiction of the RTC — the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and Later. it is given General acknowledge this fact. . Page 155 of 458 kind..

Thus. . the jurisdiction of this granted an instruction based on its Court was never impugned until the adverse defective character directing the jury to decision of this Court was handed down. where. 1959. when conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they subsequently indicted.S. accused cannot a parallel case. . made the that the lower court had jurisdiction. Our minute resolution in accused's motion quashed the information G. Filipinas on the erroneous assumption that the Compaña de Seguros. . he the latter's jurisdiction until decision is is estopped subsequently to assert. the court on Court (over P200..Republic Act No.S. undesirable practice of appellants Dans. No. and does not It is surprising why it is only now. 1960. In such notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act case. court had no jurisdiction. Hyson Tan. thus: DaIACS new information.. p. et al. Here. 19 the Court. Corpus Juris appellee presents the question of this Court's Secundum says: DcaSIH jurisdiction over the case..J. having voluntarily waived so much of his that such court had jurisdiction. (22 C. decision has been rendered. the following observations: principle of estoppel applies. 378). without questioning that the court was without jurisdiction. 388-389. et al. such whether the indictment in the former conduct being born out of a conviction that the prosecution was good or actual real value of the properties in question bad. The acquit. to assert that the must have always been of the belief that former indictment was valid. or has been Notwithstanding this fact. 2613 was enacted on August 1. This case Where accused has secured a decision was argued on January 29. in not sustaining the plea of lack of submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of . he is estopped. italics ours).R. that an appellant who files his brief Where accused procured a prior and submits his case to the Court of conviction to be set aside on the ground Appeals for decision. after the jury was actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this impaneled and sworn. there may be a new prosecution 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case. pp. 252. L-10096. should be considered as support of a defense of previous jeopardy. Page 156 of 458 appeal.000). that the indictment is void. v. vs. 1956. Similarly. that the plaintiff- has no bearing thereon. 18 said Appellate Court.J. Inc. . The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law. ." (22 claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of C. for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co. after the depend upon the will of the parties. sec. is applicable to the conduct of successfully plead former jeopardy to a plaintiff-appellee in this case. . to assume an inconsistent position — jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein. in rendered therein. of March 23.

after obtaining or 1962. a question in different ways and for different reasons. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. 283. 715. an adverse decision on the merits. Page 157 of 458 favorable judgment.. 35 L. 127. . 16 Wyo. 58.. DCScaT based upon grounds of public policy which Upon this same principle is what We said in the requires.Young Men Labor . only if enforced or asserted. jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief Dans et al. diligence. valid and conclusive as an adjudication. 141 U. the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the discouragement of stale claims and.R. 1963 (supra) — to statute of limitations. it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power Laches. 61 L. 86 A.L. G. to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is escape a penalty.S. St. and of estoppel voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering by laches. to do that which. against his opponent and. 37 S.Ct.R. 659). we speak of estoppel in pais. McBride. but for We expounded. favorable. of the subject matter of the action or of the Sibonghanoy 21 that a party may be barred by laches parties was not important in such cases because from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the the party is barred from such conduct not purpose of annulling everything done in the case with because the judgment or order of the court is the active participation of said party invoking the plea. thus: the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public A party may be estopped or barred from raising policy. 273. September 26. by way decision be unfavorable: . 20 of explaining the rule. it has also been held that after estoppel by deed or by record. vs. Ed. 79). 136 Or. warranting a affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in presumption that the party entitled to assert it a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief. L-15092. Montelibano et al. attacking its jurisdiction should the 694. 243 for an unreasonable and unexplained length of U.. Louis time. by exercising due etc. G.R. Burgess. of the court (Pease vs. . In the case just cited. repudiate or question Milling Co. vs.S. is failure or neglect. it is negligence or omission to assert a Court said that it is not right for a party who has right within a reasonable time. Bacolod-Murcia failing to obtain such relief. Ed. could or should have been done And inLittleton vs. and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction. of Furthermore. vs. it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either Then came our ruling in Tijam v. either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Inc. in a general sense. Thus.. Rathbun-Jones etc. the earlier. unlike the Court of Appeals of May 20. is not a mere question of the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable time but is principally a question of the inequity practice" of a party submitting his case for or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be decision and then accepting the judgment. L-14591. Dean. for the peace of society. but with intent of that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.

1948. lack of jurisdiction. have applied the principle of such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. virtually finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were overthrowing altogether the time-honored we to sanction such conduct on its part. This doctrine has Surety became a quasi-party on July 31. Thus. numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court warranting a presumption that the party entitled . in Calimlim v. contemplated therein. by general rule rather than the exception: exercising due diligence. in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of after the questioned ruling had been rendered. instead a blanket doctrine had obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final been repeatedly upheld that rendered the adjudication on the merits.. G. DIcTEC the present case since it was commenced on July 19. that the holding in said case had been involved which. it is negligence or omission to acceptance and upheld in decisions so assert a right within a reasonable time. the defense of lack of 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their jurisdiction of the court that rendered the Calvary once more. as well as in the Court justified the departure from the accepted concept of Appeals. The exceptional It failed to do so. agreement of the parties. was applied to situations which were obviously not within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. As defined in said case. In Sibonghanoy. p. 26. according to the law then in force. Feb. and Mejia of law and may not be conferred by consent or vs. 22 aTcIAS estoppel by laches. L-20307. even on appeal. It was ruled that the lack of For quite a time since we made this jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in pronouncement in Sibonghanoy. Lucas. could or should have A rule that had been settled by unquestioned been done earlier. Ramirez. Instead. laches estoppel by laches. vs. it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and. at several stages of the circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which proceedings in the court a quo. The inequity and unfairness of this questioned ruling was held to be barred by is not only patent but revolting. but rather the general rule. 1965. We would in principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in by waiver or by estoppel. courts and tribunals. for an unreasonable and pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a unexplained length of time. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the The facts of this case show that from the time the proceedings.R. 277. It is to be regretted. It was only after an adverse supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it exception. 23 we is "failure or neglect. The Court of Industrial Relations over the subject-matter of the action is a matter et al. the present action by reason of the sum of money however. it could been qualified by recent pronouncements which have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of case of Sibonghanoy. Page 158 of 458 Union etc. 100 Phil. to do that which.

and who later court. The Court accorded barred petitioner by estoppel from supremacy to the time-honored principle that the challenging the court's jurisdiction. Fastforms Philippines. . 1989 when it filed its to mention. petitioner did not question the Yet. court's decision that petitioner raised the As such. court . Inc. in Soliven v. the second amended complaint on April 16. we note that petitioner did not 26 and therefore. it had no jurisdiction question at all the jurisdiction of the lower over the subject matter of the case.we held: with both sections 12 and 13 of RA Moreover. In PNOC Shipping and Transport reconstitution of titles) failed to comply Corporation vs. which by sheer volume are too plentiful December 29." In the instant case. vs. No.R. of the lower court after it had received an Q-60161(93). Similarly. Cabrigas. It was only on after Calimlim. "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. As this Court held it. Inc. 1985. Q-60161(93) that private especially when an adverse judgment has been respondents (who filed the petition for rendered. issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by Notably. private respondents never amended complaint and the second questioned the trial court's jurisdiction amended complaint. (italics ours) cAaDCE any time. despite the fact that the one who 1993. as foretold motion for reconsideration of the lower in Calimlim. Court of Appeals (G. respondent is estopped from court in its 30 September 1996 decision in challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. It did so only in its over its petition for reconstitution motion for reconsideration of the decision throughout the duration of LCR Case No. from the time it filed its answer to estoppel. vs.. Page 159 of 458 to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert adverse decision.became the rule rather than the exception. we the proceedings before the trial court and ruled: invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative In the case at bar. the Sibonghanoy doctrine. in subsequent cases decided lower court's jurisdiction. Inc. 25 the question of the lower court's lack of Court ruled: jurisdiction. LCR Case No. participation benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the in all stages of the case before the trial one who invoked the court's jurisdiction. we refused to in asking for affirmative relief. that included invoking its authority obtained an adverse judgment therein. it was found by the trial relief. 491). 105180. effectively apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. In Calimlim. On the contrary. Clearly. Lucia respondent actively participated in all stages of Realty and Development. July 5. private . in its answers to both the However. Court of Appeals. 24 in Pantranco North Express. . Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at own inaction. 224 SCRA 477. in the subsequent case of Sta.

Court of Appeals. Page 160 of 458 respondents actively participated in the Electric Cooperative. from being raised for the first time on appeal by a only if favorable. when adverse (Producers done in a trial in which it has actively Bank of the Philippines vs. Sibonghanoy. Inc. 297 SCRA 402 considering that a full-blown trial had already [1998]). The above argument is anchored on estoppel by repudiate or question that same laches. They invoked the trial court's jurisdiction Noteworthy. In effect. NLRC. The party may be barred from questioning a court's Court frowns upon the undesirable jurisdiction after being invoked to secure practice of a party participating in the affirmative relief against its opponent. is that. cAHIST jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel. that the ruling The Court has constantly upheld the in Sibonghanoystands as an exception.Tijam v. vs. in Francel Realty Corporation v. trial court's dismissal of its case was erroneous. thus. 298 participated. 300 SCRA 579 on lack of jurisdiction. Private the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the respondents have thus foreclosed their National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by appeal. Metromedia. however. proceedings and submitting his case for laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction decision and then accepting judgment. in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based Court of Appeals. invocation of its authority in asking for Sycip. and attacking it for lack litigant whose purpose is to annul everything of jurisdiction. 27 where reconstitution of their titles. Province of Bulacan vs. (italics ours) 26 pleadings and presenting its evidence. rather than doctrine that while jurisdiction may be the general rule. Court of which this doctrine was espoused.TcEaAS SCRA 517 [1998]. 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). which has been used quite successfully jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. was not estopped assailed at any stage. in the 2005 case in order to obtain affirmative relief — the of Metromedia Times Corporation v. we stated. in [1998]. a litigant's from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before participation in all stages of the case the NLRC on appeal. 28 before the trial court. including the Later. NLRC. it contends that lack of jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground relief against his opponent and after for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. bars such party from challenging the court's jurisdiction (PNOC Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Pastorin. 29 the Court clarified that: affirmative relief. citing Ilocos Sur . held that a Appeals. obtaining or failing to obtain such relief. 241 reconstitution proceedings by filing SCRA 36 [1995]). A party cannot invoke the been conducted. In fine. after examining the doctrines of their own actions.

lack of of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly proceedings. and lack of it entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to affects the very authority of the court to take assert it. In such controversies. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases lost by waiver or by estoppel. It is to be circumstances in Tijam vs. warranting a presumption that jurisdiction has been ignored and. said: agreement of the parties. the party invoking lack of said case had been applied to situations jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a . ThatSibonghanoy applies only to cognizance of and to render judgment on the exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim action. The exceptional circumstance do that which. regretted. to therein. is not the general rule but an stemmed principally from the ruling in the exception. Sibonghanoy. but The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of rather the general rule. the Court. even on appeal. in Mangaliag v. not by the defenses contained in the answer. instead the party entitled to assert it either has a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly abandoned it or declined to assert it. Catubig-Pastoral. reiterating the doctrine may not be conferred by consent or in Calimlim. by exercising due diligence. it is the departure from the accepted concept negligence or omission to assert a right within a of non-waivability of objection to reasonable time. the general rule remains: a court's lack should be clearly present. that is. that the holding in In Sibonghanoy. by recent pronouncements which however. laches Indeed. Moreover. virtually jurisdiction is. Such. Ramirez. which we quote: the averments of the complaint. This doctrine has been qualified through active participation in the trial. could involved in Sibonghanoy which justified or should have been done earlier. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any Private respondent argues that the defense of stage of the proceedings. jurisdiction is determined by v. however." upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception. in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. Page 161 of 458 Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an which were obviously not contemplated unreasonable and unexplained length of time. even on lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel appeal. 30 HScDIC A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in Also. 31 even if decisions so numerous to cite is that the the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the jurisdiction of a court over the subject. best characterized by the peculiar cited case ofSibonghanoy. trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek matter of the action is a matter of law and exoneration. the exception rather than overthrowing altogether the time-honored the rule. The reason is that as to warrant the presumption that the party jurisdiction is conferred by law. however.

by exercising due diligence. it is the negligence or omission to assert in the court a quo as well as in the Court of a right within a reasonable time. 32 submitted its case for final adjudication on the And in the more recent Regalado v. finally woke up to raise the question of thus:TAIaHE jurisdiction. warranting a Reconsideration assailing the said court's presumption that the party entitled to assert it jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. laches should have been clearly present. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the milieu of Sibonghanoy. could bar. which was defined therein as failure or jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 length of time to do that which. single piece of pleading to that effect could not Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction be considered as an active participation in the by estoppel is the exception rather than the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within rule. At several stages of the proceedings. 34 cEaTHD controversies. could or should have been done rendered. by exercising due years after the questioned ruling had been diligence. promptly filed a Motion for reasonable length of time. that is. Regalado. Sibonghanoy is an had abandoned or declined to assert it. it is the the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court which the factual milieu is analogous to that in that could lead to dire consequences that the cited case. Regalario that was based she should not be cited for contempt and filing a on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. In such impelled her to comply. the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of presumption that the party entitled to assert has the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and abandoned it or declined to assert it. to in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at do that which. 33 the merits. Her compliance with the appellate court's directive to show cause why The ruling in People v. it is the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty negligence or omission to assert a right within a of contempt. It was only when the adverse decision Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable. Page 162 of 458 stage when the proceedings had already been presumption that the party entitled to assert it elevated to the CA. Go. earlier. wavered on when to apply the been raised so belatedly as to warrant the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De . Petitioner Atty. warranting a Appeals. Rather. the factual settings attendant unreasonable and unexplained length of time." initiating the action. lack of jurisdiction must have The Court. the defense of lack of laches. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an Clearly. after the receipt of or should have been done earlier. thus. exceptional case because of the presence of In Sibonghanoy.

a judgment and not by mere consent of the parties. the fact that a person attempts to invoke applied with great care and the equity must be strong in unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him its favor. as it has always been. has not sought to enforce them until the relief prayed for.the Court therein considered the patent be acquired through. material allegations therein and the character of knowing his rights. and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court and other causes. if the rights be then enforced. however. does not of the proceedings. however. Page 163 of 458 La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. though agency. The doctrine must be Indeed. 40 Hence. 37 The same. Sibonghanoy. since such jurisdiction must arise by law accomplishment of injustice. to bar a We note at this point that estoppel. 39 Moreover. even on appeal. This is rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is especially true where the person seeking to invoke void. being in the litigant from asserting the court's absence or lack of nature of a forfeiture. the doctrine of estoppel from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the may be a most effective weapon for the subject matter. irrespective of whether the the condition of the party pleading laches has in good petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to such reliefs. 36 In applying the principle of otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the estoppel by laches in the exceptional case nature or subject matter of the action. only supervenes in exceptional cases applied rarely — only from necessity. and is not lost by obtain in the instant case. 38 When misapplied. or waived by. At that time. Nor can it of Sibonghanoy. True. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal. delay alone. will not sustain the defense of "estoppel petition or complaint is determined by the by laches" unless it further appears that the party. 42 the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. Constitution and the law. no considerable period had yet elapsed for including a quasi-judicial officer or government laches to attach. considering that he raised v. change of title. judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage more or less 15 years. Heirs of Alberto Cruz. 35 ITScHa cases. is not favored by law. 41 As we have petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro the jurisdiction of the RTC. extraordinary circumstances. waiver or by estoppel. No laches will even attach when the judgment is Applying the said doctrine to the instant case. The and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the general rule should. Jurisdiction over the nature and his former state. any act or . Estoppel by laches. intervention of equities. over the nature and subject matter of a unreasonable. due to subject matter of an action is conferred by the loss of evidence. the null and void for want of jurisdiction. the Revised Rules of Court provides for unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or secure any advantage or the adverse party does not tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned suffer any harm. and only in similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. It is to be jurisdiction. be.

are null and void. 43cIADaC When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the With the above considerations. we find it paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the February 28. CR No. J : p decision. the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. Criminal Case No. Page 164 of 458 omission of the parties. July 14. by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss.] not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. the petitioner questioned. 1 petitioner. vs. thus. the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is CERVANTES. considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC. 2235-M-94. . 147406. . in the challenged decision. . 147406. PEOPLE OF not affected by the defenses or theories set up THE PHILIPPINES. . imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the (Figueroa y Cervantes v. 6 In his appeal before the CA. G. 580 PHIL 58-78) Bulacan. for the first time. he was already . No. 1994. No. hence. People. Moreover. the trial court's jurisdiction. the petition Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and for review on certiorari is GRANTED. 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals petition. [July ||| petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of 14.R. premises considered. however. respondent. 22697. 5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or DECISION the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Branch 18. among others. 2008. proceedings: 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.R. 2008]. . On July 8. susceptible to direct and collateral attacks. estoppel does [G. an information 3 for reckless SO ORDERED. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction.R. DcCIAa WHEREFORE. 1998. . 7 The appellate court. including its NACHURA. (CA) in CA-G. VENANCIO FIGUEROA y Indeed.

) Blg.P. the CA affirmed the petitioner's d. Finding no other ground to reverse the the prosecution during the trial of this case? trial court's decision. unless such statute provides for a running at 40 kilometers per hour for the retroactive application thereof. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts. subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial only 20 kilometers per hour. Sibonghanoy. 10 In this case. Section 32 (2) of Batas c. which is initiated and filed not by him but Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the by the public prosecutor. more importantly. 12 The said Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land provision thus reads: Transportation and Traffic Code. 7691. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in Pambansa (B. 129 11 had already been considering the place of accident as falling within amended by Republic Act No. constitute e. the petitioner filed the instant petition designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land for review on certiorari raising the following issues for Transportation and Traffic Code when the our resolution: prosecution did not prove this during the trial a. notwithstanding the fact unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him that said issue was immediately raised in getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not petitioner's appeal to the Honorable Court of enough evidence to acquit him of the crime Appeals? Conversely. at the purpose of avoiding a person who time the criminal information for reckless imprudence unexpectedly crossed the road. does the active charged? 9 participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case. the information filed the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this against the petitioner does not contain an case. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the convicting the petitioner for homicide through damages awarded. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise and. and Sec. 32. Page 165 of 458 estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by of jurisdiction. constitute resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile enough incriminating evidence to warrant his Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was conviction for the crime charged? filed. when no evidence Courts in Criminal Cases. 8 reckless imprudence (the legally correct Dissatisfied. amount to estoppel? jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is b. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the laches in relation to the doctrine laid down defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim in Tijam v. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is of the action. which was initiated and filed by the public allegation to that effect?EcHAaS prosecutor before the wrong court. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of .

we shall (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all analyze the various Court decisions on the matter. v. the principle of the Metropolitan Trial Courts. 496). proceedings. Casiano. & Pr. irrespective of Santa 15 that: kind. 13 jurisdiction to hear and proceeding ex mero motu. where the subject-matter is not within maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years. Chipman vs. proceeding is conferred by the sovereign While both the appellate court and the Solicitor authority which organizes the court.S.. they nevertheless are of only by law and in the manner prescribed by law the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has and an objection based on the lack of such already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. p. and herein is prision correccional in its medium and indeed. including the civil liability arising from such submitted to it. undue delay is further absent herein. 189. no court or tribunal can act on a matter imposable accessory or other penalties. 59 Conn. the RTC of Bulacan does Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. this Court has declared exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some amount of fine. in People v. for his part.. offenses punishable with imprisonment not As early as 1901. nature. That in offenses involving damage to jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal. 2235-M-94. either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. 12. De La offenses or predicated thereon. they shall subject to objection at any stage of the have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (4 Ill. As depends upon whether the lower court . Clearly. and regardless of other legislative act. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches.. The operation of the principle of estoppel jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be on the question of jurisdiction seemingly raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. the court may dismiss the months and 1 day to 6 years. 133. it is given General acknowledge this fact. 16 with the petitioner actively participating therein and Later. 17 the Court without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. jurisdiction of the RTC — the trial went on for 4 years . try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts 79. of Pl. Page 166 of 458 Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan.. therefore. 14 We went on to state in U. . which xxx xxx xxx continuously confounds the bench and the bar. (MTCs). It has been frequently held that a lack of however. Municipal Trial laches will not be applicable. . vol. aCTADI Courts. and As the imposable penalty for the crime charged large array of cases there cited). counters that the lack of 4. value or amount thereof: Provided. 4 the jurisdiction. The explained: petitioner. and property through criminal negligence. 190 Ind. Waterbury.

the jurisdiction of this that the indictment is void. or has been Court was never impugned until the adverse granted an instruction based on its decision of this Court was handed down. et al. such case. after the jury was Court (over P200. If it new information. This case was argued on January 29. 1959.J. Where accused has secured a decision Notwithstanding this fact. and C.S. Similarly. Inc. had no jurisdiction.. Thus. from assailing such jurisdiction. the parties are not barred. Hyson Tan. he for the same "must exist as a matter of is estopped subsequently to assert. The rule that It is surprising why it is only now. Page 167 of 458 actually had jurisdiction or not.J. 1960." (22 However. sec. . Here. that the plaintiff- depend upon the will of the parties. there may be a new prosecution conduct being born out of a conviction that the whether the indictment in the former actual real value of the properties in question prosecution was good or actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this bad.. thus: DaIACS successfully plead former jeopardy to a . for instance. that the court was without jurisdiction. The defective character directing the jury to conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they acquit. to assume an inconsistent position — following observations: that the lower court had jurisdiction. but the case was tried pp.000). on the erroneous assumption that the a parallel case. In such 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case. 378). is applicable to the conduct of court had no jurisdiction. 18 the case was heard and decided upon a given theory. to assert that the notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act former indictment was valid. when must have always been of the belief that subsequently indicted. et al. and decided upon the theory that Where accused procured a prior it had jurisdiction.R. 19 the Court. italics ours). . L-10096. v. 861-863). the parties or by estoppel" (5 C. Filipinas accused's motion quashed the information Compaña de Seguros. No. and does not decision has been rendered. he is estopped. Our minute resolution in impaneled and sworn. the court on G. vs. that such court had jurisdiction. had no jurisdiction. . 388-389. Secundum says: DcaSIH 2613 was enacted on August 1. Corpus Juris jurisdiction over the case. and may not be conferred by consent of support of a defense of previous jeopardy. the party who induced it to Dans. made the appeal.J. where. in law. in not sustaining the plea of lack of adopt such theory will not be permitted. conviction to be set aside on the ground on appeal. accused cannot plaintiff-appellee in this case. such. on jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein. (22 C.S.. p. as that the court But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co. of March 23. if the lower court had jurisdiction. after the jurisdiction is conferred by law. the principle of estoppel applies. appellee presents the question of this Court's has no bearing thereon. 252.Republic Act No.. 1956.S.

35 L. attacking its jurisdiction should the 694. but with intent of that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. to do that which. 715. 659). that an appellant who files his brief The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is and submits his case to the Court of based upon grounds of public policy which Appeals for decision. unlike the rendered therein. after obtaining or Court of Appeals in expectation of failing to obtain such relief.R. the right within a reasonable time. is not a mere question of having voluntarily waived so much of his time but is principally a question of the inequity claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be said Appellate Court. but for We expounded. 136 Or. Rathbun-Jones etc. for the reason that a enforced or asserted. . 58. Page 168 of 458 . reasons. thus: the reason that such a practice cannot be A party may be estopped or barred from raising tolerated — obviously for reasons of public a question in different ways and for different policy.Ct. Dean. . it is too late Laches. in a general sense. Burgess. repudiate or question favorable judgment. McBride. voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits.L. for the peace of society. it has also been held that after by laches. 243 time. by exercising due U. 273. without questioning requires. Ed. 37 S. warranting a Court said that it is not right for a party who has presumption that the party entitled to assert it affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication. we speak of estoppel in pais. contrary rule would encourage the It has been held that a party cannot invoke the undesirable practice of appellants jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief submitting their cases for decision to the against his opponent and. . could or should have been done etc. it was further said that the Then came our ruling in Tijam v. 283. 127.S. 86 A. should be considered as statute of limitations. 16 Wyo. question whether the court had jurisdiction either Sibonghanoy 21 that a party may be barred by laches of the subject matter of the action or of the from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the parties was not important in such cases because purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the party is barred from such conduct not the active participation of said party invoking the plea. by way decision be unfavorable: . for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power for an unreasonable and unexplained length of of the court (Pease vs. 141 U. Thus. 61 L. .S.. 79). the the latter's jurisdiction until decision is discouragement of stale claims and. St. vs. it is negligence or omission to assert a And inLittleton vs. and of estoppel Furthermore. Louis diligence. 20 of explaining the rule. In the case just cited. is failure or neglect. of estoppel by deed or by record. earlier. . Ed. a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief.

1963 (supra) — to resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable lack of jurisdiction. but rather the general rule. it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final been ignored and. p. We would in principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in by waiver or by estoppel. the present action by reason of the sum of money however. pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. and Mejia of law and may not be conferred by consent or vs.R. and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction. Lucas. September 26. courts and tribunals. Inc. L-14591. virtually finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. 1948.R. Page 169 of 458 to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to Calvary once more. DIcTEC the present case since it was commenced on July 19. Thus. Montelibano et al. general rule rather than the exception: Dans et al.R. that the holding in said case had been involved which. The Court of Industrial Relations over the subject-matter of the action is a matter et al.. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the The facts of this case show that from the time the proceedings. 26. A rule that had been settled by unquestioned 1962. The inequity and unfairness of this escape a penalty. It is to be regretted. contemplated therein. vs. It was only after an adverse supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it exception. according to the law then in force. was applied to situations which were obviously not within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. vs. DCScaT is not only patent but revolting. Ramirez. 22 aTcIAS Upon this same principle is what We said in the For quite a time since we made this three cases mentioned in the resolution of the pronouncement in Sibonghanoy. L-15092. 100 Phil. 277. as well as in the Court justified the departure from the accepted concept of Appeals. Bacolod-Murcia acceptance and upheld in decisions so Milling Co. at several stages of the circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which proceedings in the court a quo.. it could been qualified by recent pronouncements which have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of case of Sibonghanoy. instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the adjudication on the merits. only if favorable. vs. Instead. 23 we decision and then accepting the judgment. the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the . G. L-20307. G. G. 1965. Feb. This doctrine has Surety became a quasi-party on July 31. in Calimlim v. even on appeal. in Court of Appeals of May 20.. have applied the principle of practice" of a party submitting his case for estoppel by laches. Were overthrowing altogether the time-honored we to sanction such conduct on its part. The exceptional It failed to do so. agreement of the parties.. 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their In Sibonghanoy.Young Men Labor numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court Union etc.

It was ruled that the lack of relief. Fastforms Philippines. in subsequent cases decided 16. from the time it filed its answer to estoppel. for an unreasonable and question at all the jurisdiction of the lower unexplained length of time. to do that which. . As this Court held it. laches Moreover. Lucia respondent actively participated in all stages of Realty and Development. . which by sheer volume are too plentiful lower court's jurisdiction. a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years especially when an adverse judgment has been after the questioned ruling had been rendered. 24 in Pantranco North Express. 25 the question of the lower court's lack of Court ruled: jurisdiction. despite the fact that the one who of Appeals (G. It did so only in its assert a right within a reasonable time. Inc. issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by Notably.R. No. It was only on to mention. 1989 when it filed its in Calimlim. motion for reconsideration of the decision warranting a presumption that the party entitled of the lower court after it had received an to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert adverse decision. the Sibonghanoy doctrine. that included invoking its authority apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. Cabrigas. 224 SCRA 477. in Soliven v. Inc. we note that petitioner did not is "failure or neglect. July 5. benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the 1993. as foretold December 29. Petitioner thus foreclosed its While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its any time.we held: barred by laches. Page 170 of 458 questioned ruling was held to be barred by invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative estoppel by laches. vs. 1985. petitioner did not question the after Calimlim.became the rule rather than the exception. by court . As defined in said case. Inc. vs. we the proceedings before the trial court and ruled: . motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the As such. in its answers to both the exercising due diligence. rendered. in the subsequent case of Sta. (italics ours) cAaDCE has not supervened." In the instant case. 491). effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from supremacy to the time-honored principle that the challenging the court's jurisdiction. "this rule presupposes that estoppel own inaction. could or should have amended complaint and the second been done earlier.. Court of Appeals. it is negligence or omission to amended complaint. respondent is estopped from jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. participation one who invoked the court's jurisdiction. 105180. we refused to court. Clearly. The Court accorded in asking for affirmative relief. Similarly. Court In Calimlim. the second amended complaint on April Yet. and who later in all stages of the case before the trial obtained an adverse judgment therein. In PNOC Shipping and Transport such a plea may no longer be raised for being Corporation vs.

private respondents never decision and then accepting judgment. Pastorin. Court of reconstitution of titles) failed to comply Appeals. NLRC. obtaining or failing to obtain such relief. it contends that lack of jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground relief against his opponent and after for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. A party cannot invoke the been conducted. is that. after examining the doctrines of their own actions. thus. it was found by the trial repudiate or question that same court in its 30 September 1996 decision in jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). in the 2005 case in order to obtain affirmative relief — the of Metromedia Times Corporation v. . 297 SCRA 402 considering that a full-blown trial had already [1998]). The with both sections 12 and 13 of RA Court frowns upon the undesirable 26 and therefore. 27 where reconstitution of their titles. we stated. In effect. rather than doctrine that while jurisdiction may be the general rule. a litigant's from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before participation in all stages of the case the NLRC on appeal. Q-60161(93) that private Court of Appeals. and attacking it for lack over its petition for reconstitution of jurisdiction. NLRC. trial court's dismissal of its case was erroneous. Bank of the Philippines vs. citing Ilocos Sur respondents actively participated in the Electric Cooperative. LCR Case No. 28 before the trial court. Court of Appeals. that the ruling The Court has constantly upheld the in Sibonghanoystands as an exception. when adverse (Producers throughout the duration of LCR Case No. including the Later. cAHIST jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel. 300 SCRA 579 respondents (who filed the petition for [1998]. 29 the Court clarified that: affirmative relief. (italics ours) 26 pleadings and presenting its evidence. bars such party from challenging the court's jurisdiction (PNOC Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Page 171 of 458 In the case at bar. Province of Bulacan vs. Private the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the respondents have thus foreclosed their National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by appeal. Inc. 298 Q-60161(93). questioned the trial court's jurisdiction only if favorable. vs. 241 reconstitution proceedings by filing SCRA 36 [1995]). invocation of its authority in asking for Sycip. Metromedia. in Francel Realty Corporation v. however. proceedings and submitting his case for However. private SCRA 517 [1998]. it had no jurisdiction practice of a party participating in the over the subject matter of the case. They invoked the trial court's jurisdiction Noteworthy. On the contrary. was not estopped assailed at any stage.

virtually bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases overthrowing altogether the time-honored in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not the cited case. held that a matter of the action is a matter of law and party may be barred from questioning a court's may not be conferred by consent or jurisdiction after being invoked to secure agreement of the parties. Page 172 of 458 The above argument is anchored on estoppel by A rule that had been settled by laches. Moreover. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to rather the general rule. Ramirez. even on appeal. could therein. jurisdiction is determined by . This doctrine has been qualified litigant whose purpose is to annul everything by recent pronouncements which done in a trial in which it has actively stemmed principally from the ruling in the participated.Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. lack of Indeed. The lack of affirmative relief against its opponent. It is to be regretted. the exception rather than in Sibonghanoy not as the exception. that the holding in Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an said case had been applied to situations unreasonable and unexplained length of time. it is involved in Sibonghanoy which justified negligence or omission to assert a right within a the departure from the accepted concept reasonable time. instead abandoned it or declined to assert it." a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of upheld that rendered the supposed ruling jurisdiction is. the general rule remains: a court's lack jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the as to warrant the presumption that the party proceedings. jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction stage of the proceedings. should be clearly present. but the rule. however. which we quote: action. to which were obviously not contemplated do that which. even on from being raised for the first time on appeal by a appeal. by exercising due diligence. and lack of it assert it. laches lost by waiver or by estoppel. In fine. however. that is. The exceptional circumstance or should have been done earlier. The reason is that entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to jurisdiction is conferred by law. warranting a presumption that of non-waivability of objection to the party entitled to assert it either has jurisdiction has been ignored and. in jurisdiction of a court over the subject- which this doctrine was espoused. ThatSibonghanoy applies only to affects the very authority of the court to take exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim cognizance of and to render judgment on the v. which has been used quite successfully unquestioned acceptance and upheld in in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based decisions so numerous to cite is that the on lack of jurisdiction.TcEaAS cited case ofSibonghanoy. In such controversies.

best characterized by the peculiar controversies. Page 173 of 458 the averments of the complaint. the defense of lack of laches. 33 the was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly finally woke up to raise the question of present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of In Sibonghanoy. is not the general rule but an the cited case. the Court. At several stages of the proceedings. Regalado. not by the negligence or omission to assert a right within a defenses contained in the answer. promptly filed a Motion for . which the factual milieu is analogous to that in however. it is of contempt. that is. Petitioner Atty. could the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty or should have been done earlier. by exercising due diligence. Catubig-Pastoral. Go. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it Also." the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek The ruling in People v. to bar. thus:TAIaHE Clearly. the factual settings attendant Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at unreasonable and unexplained length of time. said: by estoppel is the exception rather than the Private respondent argues that the defense of rule. Regalario that was based exoneration. jurisdiction. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction in Calimlim. 31 even if either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. after the receipt of do that which. by exercising due years after the questioned ruling had been diligence. It was only when the adverse decision And in the more recent Regalado v. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in through active participation in the trial. which was defined therein as failure or jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 length of time to do that which. in Mangaliag v. reiterating the doctrine on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. laches should have been clearly circumstances in Tijam vs. lack of jurisdiction must have In Sibonghanoy. could or should have been done rendered. earlier. Sibonghanoy. it is the negligence or omission to assert in the court a quo as well as in the Court of a right within a reasonable time. In such exception. present. 30 HScDIC reasonable length of time. elevated to the CA. 32 submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. the party invoking lack of been raised so belatedly as to warrant the jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a presumption that the party entitled to assert it stage when the proceedings had already been had abandoned or declined to assert it. warranting a Appeals. the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of presumption that the party entitled to assert has the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and abandoned it or declined to assert it. Such.

36 In applying the principle of The Court. more or less 15 years. however. even on appeal. and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 41 As we have Applying the said doctrine to the instant case. no considerable period had yet elapsed for appellate court's directive to show cause why laches to attach. Estoppel by laches. Her compliance with the At that time. The doctrine must be Indeed. only supervenes in exceptional cases applied rarely — only from necessity. however. will not sustain the defense of "estoppel single piece of pleading to that effect could not by laches" unless it further appears that the party. thus. since such jurisdiction must arise by law accomplishment of injustice. be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within knowing his rights. Rather. This is rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is especially true where the person seeking to invoke void. The judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after general rule should. 39 Moreover. to bar a We note at this point that estoppel. and other causes. the Revised Rules of Court provides for unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or secure any advantage or the adverse party does not tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned suffer any harm. the fact that a person attempts to invoke applied with great care and the equity must be strong in unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him its favor. 37 The same. if the rights be then enforced. change of title. the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing . Page 174 of 458 Reconsideration assailing the said court's the jurisdiction of the RTC. True. intervention of equities. 38 When misapplied. as it has always been. and only in similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. delay alone. 40 Hence. 34cEaTHD loss of evidence. it is the the condition of the party pleading laches has in good natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to that could lead to dire consequences that his former state. the doctrine of estoppel from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the may be a most effective weapon for the subject matter. It is to be jurisdiction. considering that he raised jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court.the Court therein considered the patent to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. of the proceedings. 35 ITScHa cases. being in the litigant from asserting the court's absence or lack of nature of a forfeiture. though she should not be cited for contempt and filing a unreasonable. is not favored by law. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. a judgment and not by mere consent of the parties. wavered on when to apply the estoppel by laches in the exceptional case exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when of Sibonghanoy. has not sought to enforce them until the milieu of Sibonghanoy. initiating the action. be. extraordinary circumstances. due to impelled her to comply. does not that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage obtain in the instant case.

CLARAVALL. Heirs of Alberto Cruz. HON. hence. any act or omission of the parties. Indeed. Nor can it be acquired through. G. we find it Presiding Judge of Branch 60. . 147406. Regional unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the Trial Court of Baguio City. . 580 PHIL 58-78) the relief prayed for. petitioners. 173915. EDILBERTO direct and collateral attacks. respondents. No. . over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the (Figueroa y Cervantes v. in his capacity as With the above considerations. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction. 43cIADaC T.R. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of [G. 2008]. are null and void. vs. or waived by. 2010. . 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. Moreover. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal. and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. and VITA N.R. Page 175 of 458 stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro WHEREFORE. . KALASHIAN. Criminal Case No. premises considered. susceptible to SANTE. . No. the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. including its IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO decision. 42 for review on certiorari is GRANTED. agency. [July ||| material allegations therein and the character of 14. . Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law. the petition v.] the controversy. People. petition. February 22. including a quasi-judicial officer or government SO ORDERED.

Thus.000.000.00. docketed as Civil Case No. petitioner Aggrieved. P20. Petitioners also with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim.000. as (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio.000. you have last night with your boss.R. 85465. The assailed decision affirmed the orders of the the total claim. Inc.000. filed by petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante over the case.000. 2004 8 and July 19.00. on July 14. presence of other persons and police officers. 2004. Integrated Port Services.00 which was above On April 5. respondent and her bitch!"Bert refers to Albert Gacusan. J : p litigation expenses. culled from the records.. and in the motion for reconsideration. 2004. JR. SP No. 2004.00. SP No. 2006 and the for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional Resolution 3 dated June 23.00 attorney's fees. 2006 of the Seventeenth amount of P300. 2004.000.000. that had jurisdiction amended. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 5 on the Before this Court is a petition for certiorari 1 under ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. EIDaAH Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. a Irene Sante uttered words. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss killing of petitioners' close relative.000.R.00 VILLARAMA.00 as exemplary damages. which when translated in Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. In her complaint. exemplary damages should be excluded in computing 87563. Pangasinan telling trial court denied their motion in an Order 12 dated people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects September 17. are as follows: respondent amounted to P420. 7. Branch 60. P50. before the Court of Appeals. respondent filed before the RTC the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro of Baguio City a complaint for damages 4 against Manila. and costs of suit. 9 respectively reiterating its 5794-R. The trial court also later issued Orders on July petitioners. respondent's friend husband filed an Amended Complaint 11 increasing the and one (1) of her hired personal security guards claim for moral damages from P300. "How many rounds of sex did as CA-G. because the claim for Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. respondent alleged that while she was inside denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners' the Police Station of Natividad. 6 the trial court denied the damages filed by respondent Vita Kalashian against motion to dismiss citing our ruling in Movers-Baseco them. petitioners filed on August 2. respondent prayed that . Cyborg Leasing Corporation. 7The trial court held that the total claim of The facts. 2004. in the aforesaid killing. P50. v. Page 176 of 458 DECISION petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300. denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for On June 24. Pangasinan. Bert? You fuckin' Meanwhile. but the allegedly went around Natividad. 2004.00 to detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the P1. They argued that the amount of the claim assailing the Decision 2 dated January 31. 10 docketed English are as follows.

the appellate court held that the total Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals. as follows: claims for exemplary damages and attorney's fees are WHEREFORE. petitioners are now before The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly us raising the following issues: falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the I.R. Branch 60. constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. EASCDH Baguio. 85465. Appeals did not find merit in petitioners' posture that the SP No. or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint On January 23. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON claim rule used for determining which court had THE PART OF THE (FORMER) jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case SEVENTEENTH DIVISION OF THE because plaintiff's claim for exemplary damages was HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT RESOLVED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL not a separate and distinct cause of action from her COURT OF BAGUIO CITY BRANCH 60 HAS claim of moral damages.000. The Court of Seventh Division. 87563. Appeals. The assailed Orders P1. on the ground that the trial court has are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. SP No. the Court of Appeals. SP No.R. this that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion time in CA-G. Page 177 of 458 Hence. entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the Rules. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER .00.000.00 to for certiorari is GRANTED. The case was raffled to the the said decision.000.000. claiming On January 31.R. 2004 and July [19]. rendered a decision in allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase affirming the September 17. Civil Case No. finding grave abuse of discretion merely incidental to the main cause and should not be on the part of [the] Regional Trial Court of included in the computation of the total claim. SO ORDERED. 2004 respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the in Civil Case No. docketed as CA-G.000. in rendering the assailed The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that Orders dated June 24. 14 Unable to accept the decision.000. 2006. In P1. 5794-R the instant petition amount of moral damages from P300.000. but merely incidental to it. 2004 Order of the RTC the amount of moral damages from P300. 2006. petitioners again filed a Petition Thus.00 to denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam. 5794-R for damages is ordered jurisdiction over the original complaint and respondent is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300.00. which WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO MTCC. promulgated a decision in CA-G.00. the Court of Appeals. the prayer for exemplary damages should be for Certiorari and Prohibition 13 before the Court of excluded in computing the total amount of the claim. 87563.

Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the attorney's fees. The total claim being (INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES P420.00) or.000.00. SEVENTH DIVISION.00 in the original complaint. exclusive of the abovementioned items should not be included in the computation of the exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos jurisdictional amount. moral damages in order to confer jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in civil cases. DOCKETED petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in view of AS CA G. 7691 further provides: grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the . Act No. 85465.000.000. 15 the issues raised. should be included in COMPLAINANT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT determining jurisdiction. such as attorney's BRANCH 60 FOR ALLOWING THE fees and litigation expenses. 19. 18 states: 1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the SEC.00 TO CONFER JURISDICTION complaint. and costs or exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC. exclusive of interest. we treat as a APPEALS.000. is the main in such other cases in Metro Manila. in the amount of One hundred thousand pesos (P100. the RTC acted with Section 5 of Rep. The exemplary damages being discretionary demand. the subject matter of the case. including the THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF exemplary damages as well as the other damages THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO alleged and prayed in the complaint.00. 7691. OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A PETITION We deny the petition. NO. II. the RTC has jurisdiction over the TO 1. They maintain that the value of the property in controversy exceeds the claim for moral damages. 17 as are: amended by Republic Act No.000. As ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF such. P300. the totality of the claim for damages. 129. aDSHCc In essence.00). In her Comment.000. where the action. And having no jurisdiction over (P200. 16 respondent averred that the WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE nature of her complaint is for recovery of damages. — Regional case? and Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: 2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment xxx xxx xxx of the complaint? (8) In all other cases in which the demand. Page 178 of 458 OF THE CASE FOR DAMAGES AMOUNTING amendment of the complaint to increase the claim for TO P300. which although FOR CERTIORARI FILED AT THE COURT OF denominated as a petition for certiorari.R. damages of whatever kind. the basic issues for our resolution Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. litigation expenses.000.

Hence. Administrative Circular No. and (8). Page 179 of 458 SEC. and Sec. expenses. principally sought an award of moral and exemplary 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator damages. 09-94 19 is this Act.. No. (4). exemplary damages claimed regardless of kind and nature. they were at a police station in Pangasinan. be used? . there is no question that respondent by reason of petitioners' utterance while at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5. as amended by R.g. 5.A. the abovementioned incidental to or a consequence of the main cause jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five of action. Blg. Supreme Court Circular No. are as exemplary damages. However. 21-99 was such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.000. issued declaring that the first adjustment in jurisdictional (Emphasis ours. After five (5) years from the effectivity of In this regard. and not merely incidental to or consequences of the main attorney's fees.00. one of the causes of action. such damages.00 to P300. The complaint February 22. In the instant case. nominal damages. It is settled the MTCC's jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts P300.000. Five (5) years thereafter. 20 It is clear.00 took effect on March 20. e.) amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila from P100. plaintiff's causes of action. The exclusion of the term "damages of (P200. 7691. however. 19(3).000.000.00). as well as attorney's fees and litigation on May 13.000. for the alleged shame and injury suffered by Based on the foregoing.000. in cases where the claim (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four for damages is the main cause of action. the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in instructive:AICDSa Sec. Meanwhile. 129.000. alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the But where damages is the main cause of action. (P300. 2004.. based on the should the amount of moral damages prayed for in the allegations of the complaint. or hundred thousand pesos (P400. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.00 became effective on alleged malicious acts of petitioners. the second adjustment from Case No. 2004. the amount of Relatedly.P.00). such whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) Three hundred thousand pesos of B. that respondent's main complaint be the sole basis for determining which court action is for damages. 129as amended by this Act. 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. attorney's fees and litigation expenses.00): Provided. That in the applies to cases where the damages are merely case of Metro Manila. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the P200. etc.00 to P200.000. the other forms of has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages being claimed by respondent. shall xxx xxx xxx be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos 2. the complaint filed in Civil 1999.

the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.000. much less grave abuse of discretion. 173915. 22 the Court has held: No costs. the amount of the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original such claim shall be considered in determining the complaint and amendment of the complaint was then jurisdiction of the court. 2006 and June 23. Branch 60 is DIRECTED to continue claims including the claims for damages was the basis with the trial proceedings in Civil Case No.06 in damages and WHEREFORE. Also. equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of appearance was held to represent the monetary Appeals dated January 31. whether the claims for 2010]) damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.000. The Regional Trial Court Court therein held that the total amount of monetary of Baguio City.00 to P1. The amount of damages claimed is within the SO ORDERED. 5794-R with to determine the jurisdictional amount. the still a matter of right. Soriano. action. jurisdiction of the RTC. the petition is DENIED. 2006.00. since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining (Sante v. cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction In Mendoza v.000.000 attorney's fees plus P500 per court merit. xxx xxx xxx Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420. While it is . for lack of P25.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. 21 it was held that in over the original complaint and the purpose of the cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. No. G.000. on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC's order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300.R. The respectively. Claravall. In the said case. ||| the jurisdiction of courts. Purganan. 23 here. Page 180 of 458 action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment complaint. [February 22. in Iniego v. or one of the causes of action.000. deliberate dispatch. we find no error. are AFFIRMED. Lastly. 24 ICcDaA respondent's claim of P929.

PERLAS-BERNABE. respondents. 5 The law provides forprotection orders from the barangay and the DECISION courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC. 1 Yet. Bacolod City. for the years 2000-2003.) No. Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private "female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of respondent) filed.i. 9262. Regional Trial Court.A. law enforcers. No. Prescribing Penalties HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. 27. entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children. Jesus C. vs. a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. or with whom the woman has a common child. for herself and in behalf that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against of minor children." It took effect on March Presiding Judge. after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups.8 million Filipinos — or 93 percent of a total population of 93. 9262 is a landmark legislation JAYPE-GARCIA. and an undue church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent. . health care providers. J : p social workers.A. GARCIA. THE Protective Measures for Victims.A. Therefor. On March 23. the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino The Factual Antecedents women. and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia. 4 aHDTAI Branch 41. namely: JO-ANN. Providing for JESUS C. for herself and in behalf of her minor abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported children. or delegation of judicial power to barangay officials. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse.A. women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's JOSEPH EDUARD. 2006. and ROSALIE R. 2004. or any surnamed GARCIA. 2004. DRILON. prosecutors and court personnel. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that. boasts of 86. JESSE ANTHONE.R. the Philippines or requests for assistance. June 25. petitioner. on March 8. even to curb.e. and for Other Purposes. 9262. 2013. Page 181 of 458 Thus. 9262 as being violative of the equal their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the protection and due process clauses. 06-797) before cases were committed by the women's intimate partners the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the such as their husbands and live-in partners. person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship. husband.. former husband." 3 issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband.3 million — adhering to the teachings of A husband is now before the Court assailing the Jesus Christ. Garcia (petitioner).] Act (R. all intimate partners. and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials. pursuant to R. the admonition for husbands to love constitutionality of R. Congress enacted Republic [G. 179267.

petitioner hit senior. that he was just Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager. who is of Filipino-Chinese small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. who is the godmother of one of their sons. who had seen the text messages he Garcia. Bacolod apologized or showed pity on her. 2005. petitioner would beat her up. at home. When private respondent informed the management of Petitioner told private respondent. Page 182 of 458 emotional. 12 him about it in 2004. namely: Jo-Ann J. Jessie Anthone J. On the latter leaves. private City. 7 private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. with bank. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. at one point She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. 6 years old. petitioner. petitioner got angry with her for . Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if faithful wife. nor affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank. 9 simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. At another time. daughter. petitioner grabbed private respondent Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she on both arms and shook her with such force that caused was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her bruises and hematoma. whose life revolved around her husband. Petitioner threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. Since then. private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some Garcia. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit. In Private respondent's claims one of their quarrels. 3 years sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing old. Garcia. Even the the other hand. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive while at home. 8 on him. who is the natural child of petitioner bleeding. Jo-Ann. 11 friends. psychological. descent. and Joseph Eduard J. 10EHTIcD threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left financial support. wife still catches the eye of some men. controlling. They have three (3) children. and even when she was already working part time at a law office. He forbade private beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent to pray. she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. petitioner All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay respondent to the brink of despair. and deliberately isolated her from her respondent. 17 years old. he would obedience from his wife and children. and economic violence as a using the woman because of their accounts with the result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. Petitioner respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted week and is taking anti-depressant medications. When private respondent decided to leave Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and petitioner. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their but whom private respondent adopted. When she took up law. though. and demands absolute Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up. is dominant. On December 17.

and J-Bros Trading Corporation — of which home within 24 hours from receipt of the he and private respondent are both stockholders. petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60. Inc.00 a month are paid for by private (Republic Act No. Household expenses amounting to under the name of 236 Realty Holdings.000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Inc. 13 Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent Private respondent is determined to separate from danger of violence against the private respondent and her petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children children exists or is about to recur. He then packed his things conducted. IcADSE On the other hand. the Negros enforceable notwithstanding that the house is Rotadrill Corporation. private respondent merely draws a monthly from the conjugal dwelling. petitioner be assisted by police officers when re-entering forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building. the RTC issued a from her and deprive her of financial support. 17 cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with Action of the RTC of Bacolod City her. she would not get a single centavo.000. contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said ordering that he be removed by police officers corporations. and enjoys After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling. Until the filing of the good. In Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses.. Petitioner TPO 18 on March 24. or anytime the unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal thousands of pesos from the corporations. petitioner has not given private respondent with them in the family home. had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle which is quoted hereunder: with him. which. ownership"). Jesus Chua Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly Garcia. He is the President of three corporations — 326 Realty Holdings.00 from one corporation only. Negros Rotadrill a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family Corporation. thereby depriving her of access to full and told private respondent that he was leaving her for information about said businesses. where all the businesses of the corporations are . 14 Respondent (petitioner herein). 9262 states "regardless of respondent through the use of credit cards. Mandalagan. is hereby: the construction of deep wells. who lives petition a quo.000. in turn. not less than P200. this order is salary of P20. 15 cDCIHT conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent. He even told private respondent's mother. 2006 effective for thirty (30) days. the family home. that private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not had helped raise to millions of pesos. the Petitioner shall respondent confronted him about the affair. 16 After private dwelling to remove things. this is to allow the Petitioner are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for (private respondent herein) to enter the utilities. Page 183 of 458 jeopardizing the manager's job.

Petitioner police assistance on Sunday. d) To surrender all his firearms including a the trial court issued an amended TPO. and educational and medical expenses. upon motion 19 of private respondent. j) The petitioners are given the continued use e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and occupation of the house in Parañaque. whenever they go to Manila. . which himself and as from her when he arrives from Manila and finds President of the corporations and his out about this suit. mother and all her household help the Comptroller. under and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision pain of Indirect Contempt of Court. 20 effective for . the or contact directly or indirectly her children. the and the children. Manila. bonuses and other cash he received March 2006 because of the danger that the from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 Respondent will attempt to take her children up to 31 March 2006. f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business. Thereafter. Comptroller. 26 benefits. On April 24. telephone. must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner directly or indirectly. every 15 days of the month. 2006. or through other persons. flowers. He should also Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using be ordered to surrender any unlicensed in Negros Occidental. KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE cards. and c) Not to harass. annoy. aCTHEA k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace.000 meters. sues she will not get a single centavo. Petitioner. rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future. firearms in his possession or control. in two sufficient sureties. Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO mother and household help.9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and thirty (30) days. Visitation MILLION PESOS. letters and the like. Page 184 of 458 The Chief of Police shall also give the g) To render an accounting of all advances. including rental of a house for continued use of the Starex van in Metro them. which included the following additional ordering the Philippine National Police provisions: Firearms and Explosives Unit and the i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the are given the continued use of the Nissan Respondent's firearm licenses. nor send gifts. in two sufficient sureties. copy furnished to the and driver from a distance of 1. contact or considering the financial resources of the otherwise communicate with the Petitioner. h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite. an accounting of b) To stay away from the petitioner and her all these funds shall be reported to the court by children. where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

DaHSIT On May 24.00) per month until the remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling matter of support could be finally resolved. 2006. application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. petitioner moved 22 for the receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his his counsel. 2006.00 and Php50. Capitolville Subdivision. the J-Bros Trading Corporation. contempt of Court. the TPO was renewed and extended yet e) That respondent surrender his two firearms again. Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the petitioners have left. otherwise be declared in indirect children.000..00 for rental P100. and (2) contain a notice of hearing. so that the petitioner the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day Rosalie and her representatives can remove notice rule. and Php25.000. but subject only to the following modifications and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of prayed for by private respondent: Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel. to its rightful owner.000. a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of f) That respondent shall pay petitioner Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus educational expenses of the children upon Ramos.000.000. equipment asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one and other things in the conjugal home. Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php150. petitioner filed an Temporary Protection Order by his counsel. otherwise be declared in Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of Indirect Contempt of Court. private respondent filed another house in Pitimini St. 2006. co-counsel for Petitioner.000. and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from d) Deliver full financial support of P5.00 to a more manageable level at Php200. Page 185 of 458 l) To give monthly support to the petitioner Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Temporary Protection Order by his counsel. She . 23 Order by his counsel. or on April 26. on May 23. He further things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture. within 24 presentation of proof of payment of such hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection expenses.00) per c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to Pesos (Php50.000. financial support. which vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same shall be submitted to the Court. b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list and committed new acts of harassment against her and of furniture and equipment in the conjugal their children.00. cAaDCE within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Two days later.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from Subsequently.000. failed to faithfully comply with the TPO.

was driven to through his friends. private respondent and the children.A. from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Jo-Ann. laundrywoman Mercedita her. which reads as follows: 5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Respondent (petitioner herein). Garcia's three brothers. her mother Primitiva Jaype. otherwise he respondent. and support in arrears . incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go Garcia and her children. and Jo-Ann Bornales. also known as the "Special distance of 1. petitioner's lawyers initiated Furthermore. Finding some of her schools and the TPO will be rendered things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the nugatory. security guard Darwin Gayona and subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father the petitioner's other household helpers from a for violation of R. and shall not enter Protection of Children Against Child Abuse. ostensibly to pay for private respondent. Jesus Chua Php200. private respondent filed a case for qualified 4) Directed to surrender all his firearms theft against Jamola. boys. 2006. by the arm and threatened Hontiveros. 25 3) Required to stay away.00 a month and Php50.000. annoying. relatives. A writ of replevin was telephoning. Rosalie J. 28 effective for PPK to the Court. contacting or otherwise served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven communicating in any form with the offended policemen with long firearms that scared the two small party. with the end in view of of violence against the offended party. personally or While Joseph Eduard. then three years old. as well as from the schools of the three children. went to said home to get will have access to the children through the her and her children's belongings. On another occasion.. 26 The incident was reported to the police. Exploitation the gate of the subdivision where the and Discrimination Act.000 meters.9MM caliber firearm and a Walther On August 23. petitioner allegedly cook Novelita Caranzo. maids' room. Inc. either directly or indirectly. 7610. personally or through another. This came about after private their tuition or other fees directly. recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by 2) Prohibited from harassing. is hereby: rental for the period from August 6 to September 6. 2006." Petitioners are temporarily residing.00 for Garcia.000. the RTC issued a TPO. armed with a TPO. employees or school. back to school. Page 186 of 458 alleged inter alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit 1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or against himself by J-Bros Trading. driver Romeo grabbed their daughter. two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him. of which the latter committing. Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. thirty (30) days. Aside from the replevin suit. acts was purportedly no longer president. 27CDTHSI including . that respondent shall not contact the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home the schools of the children directly or indirectly of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against in any manner including. which agents.

Upon petitioner's Bros Tading. 2006 is Rosalie J. 8) Ordered not to dissipate. it appearing further that the hearing could which are conjugal assets or those in which the not yet be finally terminated.B. manifestation. or modified. the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles. for thirty (30) days." 33 any person. Garcia and respondent 23. Page 187 of 458 from March 2006 to August 2006 the total Garcia.STHAaD Bacolod City and E. and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the 9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of court. and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner show cause why the TPO should not be renewed. the trial court Nissan Patrol with Plate No. sell." "I-1.00 and sale of these properties to defraud her or the Php25. lease or otherwise dispose of the the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6. an Order 32 dated a day earlier. name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in Nonetheless. 7) Directed to allow the continued use of a In its Order 29 dated September 26. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No.312. conjugal partnership of gains. encumber. alienate. 2006. Pitimini St. 2006.000. FFD 991 and should extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days. Capitolville Subdivision." including properties covered by TCT Nos. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder: AacDHE have an interest in. 14. until T-186325 and T-168814. the Temporary conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Protection Order issued on August 23. which the conjugal partnership of gains of the had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August Petitioner Rosalie J. encumbrance or private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing disposition of these above-cited properties to that it would only be an "exercise in futility. October 5. further orders.. Proceedings before the CA . 2006 conjugal assets. entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. sale.000. and other properties . after each expiration. another vehicle which is the one taken by J extended." and days and continuously extended and renewed "I-2. CIaDTE presence of the Register of Deeds. PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to allow the transfer. Bacolod City. or those real properties in the that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO. due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will 6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or 2006-2007 the amount of Php75. who shall affix her signature in the amount of Php1. especially the conjugal xxx xxx xxx home located in No.00. . Garcia and the respondent have an hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) interest in and listed in Annexes "I.000. 30 however. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY After having received a copy of the foregoing Order.00. .

V. Page 188 of 458 During the pendency of Civil Case No. with prayer for II. which is clothed with IV. No. having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14. 38 THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT The Ruling of the Court THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT. 01698).A. before the trial court in the civil case. PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision INSTITUTION." VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION On May 26. challenging (1) the constitutionality of R. Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A against the constitutionality of R. I. the appellate court issued a 60-day CLAUSE. 06-797. on January 24. 9262 IS validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for DISCRIMINATORY. 2007. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for failure of DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings CONSTITUTION. Temporary Restraining Order 35 (TRO) against the III. jurisdiction to resolve the same. however. EcHIAC prohibition (CA-G. the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.A. No. enforcement of the TPO. the challenge to the validity of R.A. UNJUST. we shall first . 9262. 9262 through a petition for prohibition THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO court constituted a collateral attack on said law.A. petitioner is now before us alleging that — THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY The Issues ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R. the THAT R.R. 2006. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING Subsequently. AND being "an unwanted product of an invalid law. CEB-SP. 2007. and (2) the SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R. petitioner COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for OF THE LAW. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 9262 for being violative of the THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED due process and the equal protection clauses. Secondly.A.A. injunction and temporary restraining order.

of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. criminal. (Emphasis supplied) HIAESC 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City." 41 whether civil. treaty.M. "[p]lainly the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should Court in each of several key cities identified. appeal." family courts have exclusive original law. international or executive agreement. EDIHSC SEC. 01698) law. the RTC of the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases constitutionality." Section 5. it will not be considered on under this law. 8369. it must be stressed that Family Courts are the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental special courts. viz. 44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to Family Courts have authority resolve the constitutionality of a statute. special proceedings. 45 "this authority and jurisdiction to consider the being embraced in the general definition of the judicial constitutionality of a statute. v. CA 48 that. treaty or law. jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence presidential decree. naturalization. instruction. power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by At the outset. — The Regional Trial Court As a general rule. guardianship. ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial. petitioner argues that Inspite of its designation as a family court.A. Tuason and Co." 46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review Under R. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding Court where the crime or any of its elements it. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows: .R. but in all RTCs. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed. otherwise known as the "Family Courts or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a Act of 1997.A. 42 In accordance with said regulation not only in this Court. and if violence against women and their children not raised in the trial court. ordinance. 43 To achieve have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any harmony with the first mentioned law. order. complainant. Inc. registration.. Section 7 of R. 47 We said law. 40 was committed at the option of the In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. the question of constitutionality must be designated as a Family Court shall have raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of pleadings.: filed by petitioner. No. CEB-SP. Venue. or against women and children. Page 189 of 458 tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter of the petition for prohibition (CA-G. the Supreme Court designated from among the in J. 7. admiralty or insolvency. land We disagree. law. for it speaks of appellate review of final 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated judgments of inferior courts in cases where such as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive constitutionality happens to be in issue.

indemnity. IHcSCA SEC. Thus. Therefore. All cases in which the We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner constitutionality or validity of that. or opposing party. or will sustain. file against a person not a party to earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for the action for contribution. the this Court. since a counterclaim. The Supreme Court shall have the permanent protection order should not be following powers: issued. 04-10-11-SC. it cannot be denied that this issue affects the respondent may file an opposition to the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private petition which he himself shall verify. as action which could be the subject thereof may the law or the Rules of Court may be litigated in a separate civil action. international or complaint are to be excluded from the opposition. revise. aADSIc claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the xxx xxx xxx transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. final judgments and orders (Emphasis supplied) of lower courts in: a. the issue of a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party constitutionality of R. the issue executive agreement. provide. reverse. the Rule on Violence could be the subject of a counterclaim. 51 Finally. or or third-party complaint. law. 5. is any regulation is in question. it is not prohibited from of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim to the petition and not an answer. contrary to the posturing of petitioner. cross-claim and third-party any treaty. cross-claim 2. It must be respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by shall show cause why a temporary or petitioner who has sustained. unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that Section 20 of A. in respect of his opponent's claim. No. with leave of court. but any cause of affirm on appeal or certiorari. ordinance. cross-claim or a Against Women and Their Children. which had other relief.M. 20. of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. — (a) The Moreover. direct injury as . relief which a defending party may have against an instruction. xxx xxx xxx (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim. lays down a new kind third-party complaint. Page 190 of 458 SEC. 9262 could have been raised at the may. Leonardo-de Castro. modify. presidential decree. 49 Thus: expressio unius est exclusio alterius. order. 52 As jurisdiction to determine the same.A. on the other hand. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other proclamation. subrogation or any protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City. subject to the review of pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Opposition to petition. Review. 50 A cross-claim.

However. 25. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of (a) Facts undisputed and admitted. the amended TPOs that have been marked and will be presented. it may issue an order containing the honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court.A. the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. Order for further hearing. Hence. (Emphasis supplied) which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time. It may for the non-issuance of a protection order. mandamus or prohibition against (b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved. 56 should not be enjoined. Page 191 of 458 a result of its enforcement. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary unconstitutional or invalid. Moreover. 9262 is. No. likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of That the proceedings in Civil Case No. CEB- SEC. a review of the case by appeal (e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. a valid cause days each time until final judgment is rendered. a petition for certiorari. and As the rules stand. No. 01698). Harris. affidavits. Section 22 (j) of A.R. The question relative to constitutional issues.M. the appellate court correctly others. No. to appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall the extent possible. and it (d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course present their direct testimonies in the form of in an expeditious and summary manner. The alleged unconstitutionality extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) of R. without necessarily running afoul of the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary not need to be supported by evidence. Section 26 (b) The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be of A. any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. within the 30-day period of not stay its enforcement. DcAaSI Section 25 of A. including objects and documents against the enforcement of the TPO. With the private respondent given ample summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from protection. 06-797 are the parties. 57 In Younger v. To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary. among In view of all the foregoing. the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case (c) Evidence. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues. if the both parties which shall be done in one day. . the trial court may to have the same enjoined. does not of itself entitle a litigant protection order issued is due to expire.M. for all intents and purposes. No.M. and other orders pursuant thereto was improper. Petitioner may have proceeded upon an case the court determines the need for further hearing. viz. he following: could be granted an injunctive relief. 54 Be that as it may.: dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G. — In SP. 55 with more reason that a TPO. procedure. petitioner could proceed to litigate the raising the same in his Opposition.

And spouses or the female partners in a so we shall. reveals that while member of the community is immune from the sponsor. or these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women issues of first impression. Mr.. 58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared.A. as well as other members of the household. it was eventually quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. 61 which became R. 60 IHTaCE be granted as a matter of course. 2723. and with more reason that this would weaken the efforts to address now. relationship. time and again. (Citations omitted) leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status violence and abuse. Some women's Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws. 9262 to rest. I just wanted to place this VAWC. with far-reaching implications. even if such A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill statutes are unconstitutional.A. 64 nonetheless. hence. the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" which exerts its extraordinary powers only to and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who Act" 63 — providing protection to "all family members. We would like to place that on record. however. To issue an injunction against such Wednesday. How does the good Senator respond to Intent of Congress in this kind of observation? enacting R. that protection orders are measure. in good faith. 9262 is intended to thus: prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations: granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. No citizen or No. on record. the challenge to the constitutionality of R. they fear final arbiter of constitutional issues. Petitioner claims that since R. . had originally proposed what she though alleged to be unauthorized and. Page 192 of 458 Jr.A. in view of private respondent's plea in her domestic violence of which the main victims or Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we should put the the bulk of the victims really are the wives. 9262. gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the their separate and distinct prohibitions. discharged our solemn duty as including children or the husband. 9262. December 10. President. for his alleged criminal acts. we shall not groups have expressed concerns and relayed shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues. It agreed that men be denied protection under the same bears stressing. 2003 orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against Senator Pangilinan. which Federal injunctions against state criminal could very well be committed by either the husband or the statutes. Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known prosecution. seeks its aid. namely. called a "synthesized measure" 62 — an amalgamation of unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity two measures.A. We have. The imminence of such a prosecution even as Senator Loi Estrada). are not to husband/father of the remedies under the law. either in their entirety or with respect to wife.

Yes. prescribing decade. included in this proposed measure since the Senator Legarda. They As I said earlier. The understanding that I in the domestic environment where the macho have is that we would be having a broader Filipino man would always feel that he is scope rather than just women. Madam sponsor. there are nameless. I am playing safe so I spouses. Page 193 of 458 Senator Estrada. if I remember stronger. . Mr. Yes. President. women and not to families which was the issue we are not given equal opportunities especially of the AWIR group. What does the As a matter of fact. . However. their live-in partners after years. 2004 I think that the sponsor. Whether we like it or there was the discussion whether to limit this to not. if not placed here members of the family. common-law wives. President. Mr. xxx xxx xxx Senator Estrada. may the Chair remind the group that not. Mr. do not want to include men in this domestic countless. of battery and abuse. based on our earlier conversations. While wrong. more superior to the Filipino woman. . Whether we like it or Also. xxx xxx xxx President. Mr. SDITAC their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. This includes the men. If we broaden penalties therefor and providing protective the scope to include even the men. it is an unequal world. and those their spouses. then it would not equalize the related with the family. But plenty of men are also being the opportunity to file a case against their abused by women. one reason incidentally why the measure . The President Pro Tempore. concurs with this position. Mr. live-in. correctly. 65 already difficult situation for women. the committee came up with this I think Senator Sotto has something to say to bill because the family members have been that. aIcDCA Wednesday. they can at all be abused by the women or children. voiceless women who have not had violence. that was brought up by sponsor say? Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period. January 14. assuming measures for victims. there is to protect women's rights especially in the this group of women who call themselves domestic environment. Senator Estrada. I am xxx xxx xxx sure that the men in this Chamber who love The President Pro Tempore. before accepting this. the reason I other members of the family other than women am in support of the measure. no matter how empowered the women are. Do not get me are also possible victims of violence. I believe that there is a need women are most likely the intended victims. President. President. "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship.

Is there any compelled to include other family members as objection? a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs. EcATDH have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their xxx xxx xxx immediate family members. women alone. Page 194 of 458 focuses on women. Although Republic Act No. Yes. President. for instance. I am worried that there may not be enough The President Pro Tempore. The President Pro Tempore. Yes. Senator Sotto. Senator Sotto. would be removing the "men and children" in fearing that they may use this law to justify this particular bill and focus specifically on their abusive behavior against women. Mr. President. our courts which give credence to evidentiary Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada. with the permission of the more or less. The same law is inadequate. Hearing the rationale are established procedures and standards in mentioned by the distinguished sponsor. abused children. President. Yes. Sen. children. The amendment is accepted. the fact remains that in experts. Mr. always the helpless victims of violence. I presume that the effect of the I am aware that some groups are apprehensive proposed amendment of Senator Legarda about granting the same protection to men. with the protection extended to other family members permission of the other senators. President. particularly children who are excluded. men also stand to sectors. I believe we amendment. said law. we should also recognize that there proposed amendment. While I prefer to focus mainly on women. Mr. I am not sure now support and cannot just arbitrarily and whether she is inclined to accept the proposed whimsically entertain baseless complaints. cSCADE amendment of Senator Legarda. President. this measure is intended to I am willing to wait whether she is accepting harmonize family relations and to protect the this or not because if she is going to accept family as the basic social institution. I was The President Pro Tempore. addresses the special needs of two ladies on the Floor. Though I this. Sotto III is recognized. 7610. particularly Senator Estrada. xxx xxx xxx . Mr. I will propose an amendment to the recognize the unequal power relations between amendment rather than object to the men and women in our society. That will be the net effect of that However. Sen. be victimized and that children are almost Senator Sotto. Vicente Protection orders for one are not available in C. sports groups and other affected some relatively few cases. Mr.

By the principle of separation of seen 14. Senator Sotto. Congress has made its Senator Sotto. Mr. the remedy against it is to seek its amendment limited to seven. Mr. Because of the inadequate existing law on However. none was sufficiently shown in this case. 9262 does not violate prevent the abuse of children and not only the guaranty of equal protection women. Senator Sotto. 9262 to women and The President Pro Tempore. President. this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully R. I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished Senator Estrada. The President Pro Tempore. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but fact.A. as amended. Mr. abuse of children. May I propose an Therefore. As a matter of judgment. Kung may maaabuso. it The President Pro Tempore. Okey lang iyan. . yes. Mr. Page 195 of 458 Senator Sotto. No proper challenge on said grounds may be amendment. President. As a matter of The President Pro Tempore. 5-year-old children. . policy. six. . To the children only. But I cannot It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom. the mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. is approved. adequacy. it is the legislative that determines the necessity. Is there any fact. I have or repeal by the legislative. objection? [Silence] There being none. proceed. even by their mothers. we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children. Senator Sotto. with the Minority Leader. may I propose an amendment that. President. proponent of the amendment. Yes. it is not limited to minors. DEScaT of the laws.A. the choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this children are very much abused. 68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. The President Pro Tempore. President. amendment to the amendment. — more than the women. I tend to agree. Yes. The abuse is not even then. Yes. Before we act on the amendment? Senator Legarda. wisdom and expediency of any law. President. Mr. their fathers. I agree. amendment. 66 At saka iyong mga lalake. It is accepted. SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS . agree that we remove the children from this justice. puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. we particular measure. dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of So. please will be women AND CHILDREN. or expediency of a statute. Effectively then. 67 Hence. 15-year-old children being abused by powers. if I may propose an amendment — the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R. entertained in this proceeding.

so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the inequality in no manner determines the matter of National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's constitutionality. 9262 is based on a valid classification as according to the circumstances surrounding shall hereinafter be discussed and. did not violate them. IDAaCc as though they were the same. (Emphasis every man. as in the other departments of knowledge states. As Justice McIntyre succinctly in law. that it must not be limited to existing conditions only. legislation which is limited either in the object to The unequal power relationship between women and men. It does not prohibit distinctions. Elizalde Rope differences.A. Page 196 of 458 Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things classification is that it be reasonable. violence against women (VAW) is deemed . of violence. . as such. All that is required of a valid Empowerment). . which similarly situated should be treated alike. in order to avoid the based on a reasonable foundation or rational constitutional prohibition against inequality. that it must be germane to the Workers' Union 69 is instructive: cSICHD purpose of the law. It is not. "the accommodation of differences . is the or practice. and the widespread gender bias and prejudice The equal protection of the laws clause of the against women all make for real differences justifying the Constitution allows classification. The very between men and women idea of classification is that of inequality. a requirement. The Constitution does not require that as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State things which are different in fact be treated in law extends its protection. R. that basis and is not palpably arbitrary. Classification classification under the law. satisfied if the classification or distinction is therefore." 70 speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. but on persons we find that R. It guarantees equality. on persons merely as such.A. 9262 rests on substantial as to things that are different. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick. woman and child should be affected supplied) alike by a statute. not identity of the equal protection clause by favoring women over men rights. A law is not A. which it is directed or by the territory within which the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims it is to operate. both as to rights means that the classification should be based on conferred and responsibilities imposed. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination I. is the grouping of things in essence of true equality. and that it The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is must apply equally to each member of the not a guaranty of equality in the application of class. Unequal power relationship invalid because of simple inequality. The oft-repeated substantial distinctions which make for real disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. This Court has held that the standard is the laws upon all citizens of the state.

Judaism. Women were seen in and take on dominant roles in society while women are virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically nurturers. common developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW. and take on and intellectually. men's companions and supporters. men's expression of controlling women to retain In law. The inflict corporeal punishment ceased. and that male control over women. However. Even then. no thicker than their thumb. legal History reveals that most societies sanctioned recognition of these rights to chastise wives or the use of violence against women. which has long recognized VAW as a The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed human rights issue. And VAW is a form of were under the authority of men. in his law developed the rule of thumb. husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27. concubine or wife. they were treated as power. or even kill. Even the eminent violence against women is one of the crucial social Blackstone has been quoted in his mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate commentaries as saying husband and wife were positions. 71HSaIET property. 2004. December 20. Puno traced the historical English common law began to limit the right of and social context of gender-based violence and husbands to chastise their wives. Page 197 of 458 to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship Traditions subordinating women between women and men otherwise known as "gender. This perception leads to men Western societies. which allowed remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R. The United Nations. In ancient subordinate roles in society. need to control to retain that power. With power comes the whether slave. compared with men. passed its Resolution 48/104 on the the husband to beat. control. Societal norms and traditions dictate patriarchy — the institutional rule people to think men are the leaders. have a long history rooted in based violence". which have led to domination dominated structure of society. of men. patriarch of a family was accorded the right to the preservation of the family was given more use force on members of the family under his importance than preventing violence to women. Then Chief Justice Reynato S." 72 one and that one was the husband. I quote the early studies: . over and discrimination against women by men and to the English feudal law reinforced the tradition of prevention of the full advancement of women. providers. his wife if she Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on endangered his property right over her.A. pursuers. women gaining more power over women.TcDAHS the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: In the later part of the 19th century. 1993 stating that "violence against women is Christianity and other religions oriented towards a manifestation of historically unequal power relations the patriarchal family strengthened the male between men and women. in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s. Thus.

to pull her hair. and himself. approximately two common law. those who the husband can invoke for do not speak English well. to own property. In a 1985 survey. Association] views these figures spit in her face or kick her about as "marked underestimates. . "researchers on family had a simple focus. the Supreme Court of million women are the victims of Alabama became the first appellate court to severe assaults by their male strike down the common law right of a husband partners. the wife is entitled to the because surveys typically same protection of the law that exclude the very poor. incidence of partner violence is Hence. to beat one's wife with a past year. in 1992 their male partners. In 1871. estimates. to beat his wife: women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had The privilege. the women's advocacy institutions or hospitals when the movement became more organized. the feminist movement was on the roll. Page 198 of 458 The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the In an average 12-month period in United States followed that of the English this country. is not now incidents discourages women acknowledged by our law. No less than women are severely assaulted by the United States Supreme Court. they demonstrated and picketed saloons. women who are homeless or in As time marched on. In from reporting them." cIDHSC suffragette movements.000 into an important public concern. They fought for women's that from one-fifth to one-third of right to vote." the floor. noted: these incidents involve sexual . These leagues the AMA. . expanding the liberation Studies on prevalence suggest movement's agenda. nearly 11. choke her. Since all women will be physically then. . Many of case Planned Parenthood v. Casey. and person. The survey is conducted. According to temperance leagues initiated it. ancient though it assaulted their wives during the may be. probably double the above bars and their husbands' other watering holes. their crusade was joined by assaulted women per year. however. invisibility of the domestic violence to the public Thus on an average day in the gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue United States. They considered the evils of violence agree that the true alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. . assaulted by a partner or ex- The feminist movement exposed the private partner during their lifetime. and more. or to inflict upon her like because the nature of these indignities. The [American Medical stick. or four million severely Soon.

Thirty percent of female homicide B. physical injuries had the highest number of States Charter and the Universal Declaration of cases at 5. one's abuser can be dangerous. .63% of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human . . World troubling picture. . . Act No. Providing for Protective Measures for that 8. . official statistics on violence against women and children In the International front. The UN itself abuse. enacted the Violence Against Women Act. Physical conferences on the role and rights of women violence is only the most visible have been regularly held in Mexico City. In 1993. particularly forced social established a Commission on the Status of and economic isolation of Women. moreover. enacted Rep. The Philippines has been in cadence with the Many victims of domestic half — and full — steps of all these women's violence remain with their movements. Many abused women who find and to ensure the fundamental equality before temporary refuge in shelters the law of women and men. adopted the landmark Convention on the child abuse is often present as Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against well. 9262. Returning to cap it all. Our Senate has return to their husbands. In 1979. CHTcSE victims of violence.058 in 2002 representing 55. Finally in 1994. perhaps because they our 1987 Constitutionmandates the State to perceive no superior alternative . Prescribing Penalties therefor and for victims in the United States are other Purposes. the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Other studies fill in the rest of this Elimination of Violence Against Women. Psychological Copenhagen. in large ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on part because they have no other the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. . To source of income. form of abuse. .8 percent of all homicide Victims. Congress. 2004. Women are the "usual" and victims are killed by their male "most likely" partners. The United . on March 8. 2723. recognize the role of women in nation building . entitled "An Act Recent Federal Bureau of Defining Violence Against Women and Their Investigation statistics disclose Children. Article II of abusers. No less than Section 14." (Citations omitted) killed by their spouses . Page 199 of 458 assault. the UN General Assembly beating takes place. the women's struggle show that — for equality was no less successful. the United States Congress At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. is also common. In families where wife beings. Women (CEDAW). . TEaADS women. Nairobi and Beijing. .

485 15.948 Incestu ==== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ous 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23 = = = = = = = = Rape *2011 report covers only Attempt from January to August ed 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201 Source: Philippine National Police — Women and Rape Children Protection Center (WCPC) . 2004-2011* Vexatio 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155 n Report —— 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ed —— Cases ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— — Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1. there were 2.599 5.091 DSWD cases out of a total number of ment 3.104 12.471 cases for the first semester of 2003.354 cases which represent ousnes 54. .307 1.905 9.335 1. (T)here are Harass 1.269 2. Page 200 of 458 total cases reported (9.271 5.021 9262 all forms of abuse and violence and more than Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213 90% of these reported cases were committed Seducti by the women's intimate partners such as their 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15 on husbands and live-in partners. .417 physically abused/maltreated cases Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63 out of the total of 5.608 cases.31%.505 1.A. 9262 ranking first among the different 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22 on/ VAW categories since its implementation in Kidnap 2004.042 832 Total 6.903). 74 thus: ADECcI ping Table 1. there Injuries are 1. the Philippine Commission on Women presented inage comparative statistics on violence against women across RA 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62 9208 an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with Abducti violations under R. .974 9.588 l Development (DSWD) for the year 2002.881 5.381 reported Lascivi cases out of 4.387 3.892 1. . And for the first Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625 semester of 2003. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Unjust Women.729 6.018 1. . RA Female violence comprised more than 90% of 218 924 1. .374 4. 73 Concub 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128 Recently.285 9. (T)he total number of women in s especially difficult circumstances served by the Physica Department of Social Welfare and 3.553 2.498 2.

Jr. of their spouses. 79 highways. and women constituted 89% of all those who had of the right to equal protection. who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands From the initial report to the police through prosecution. but similarly pass through Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor. indeed. although not utilized. parks or alleys." 77 The mere fact that the legislative number of men who had ever experienced domestic classification may result in actual inequality is not violative violence. victims of rape or domestic violence. Clauses. 9262 invalid.A. 76 CADSHI Biden. streets. Page 201 of 458 On the other hand. 32% of women therein merely occasional. but the law is not thereby rendered violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause invalid. woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. many cases of physical violence by a treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. because many men will not even attempt to number must be negligible and their appearance report the situation. In fact. animals. subjecting them to gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or "double victimization" — first at the hands of the offender discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public and then of the legal system. In the United Kingdom. 2723 that "(w)henever violence protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and occurs in the family. Gender bias and prejudices percent). while there may be non-vehicle-drawing Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low animals that also traverse the city roads. perhaps. the police treat it as a private matter drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. in defending the While there are. compared with 11% of the smaller community. 75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal in some degree. said ordinance Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal Speech for Senate Bill No. has institutionalized historic prejudices against requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up. Congress' and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines. the authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection same cannot render R. for every classification of experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality violence.. and sentencing. 78 TcSHaD injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 C. chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). the same streets. many years of physical or emotional abuse. no reliable estimates may be obtained The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the on domestic abuse and violence against men in the reason that. compared to the rig-drawing who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or ones. relatively few cases of violence civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U. as not to constitute a menace to the health of the five (or more) times. Men. plazas. crimes against women are often assault.S. "but their and. the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it .S. and much less likely to experience sexual trial. now Vice President. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance the U.

as well." Human Rights." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he reinforces the escalating. freedoms guaranteed underthe Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of that R. as follows: "illegitimate relationship. 1981.DHECac prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of In 1979. which is to address violence under R.A. recurring and often serious paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence nature of domestic violence. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's respect for human rights. calling her as "only a live-in partner" and committed against women and children. This lack of response or either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution women. Towards this end. the Against Women." Judge Amila even called her a SEC. 9262." and "hate-men" law deserves scant Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination consideration. 2011. the Convention on the "husband-bashing." 80 from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police. Sadly. — It is hereby "prostitute.A. 2. our own courts." and accused her of being motivated by declared that the State values the dignity of "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested women and children and guarantees full property. Declaration of Policy. The State also prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity. Convention on the Rights of the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to Child and other international human rights modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men instruments of which the Philippines is a and women. He used derogatory and irreverent language in The distinction between men and women is germane to the reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO purpose of R. spelled out in presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an itsDeclaration of Policy. II. Judge Venancio J. ." 85 and biases against our women. The classification is germane to the In a recent case resolved on March 9. with a view to achieving the elimination of party. 82 Petitioner's contention.A. As a State Party to the CEDAW. have exhibited prejudices the prosecution and the judges. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male.A. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. which the Philippines ratified on August 5. from violence and threats to their personal discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices safety and security. against women. 9262. recognizes the need to protect the family and The enactment of R. 9262 aims to address the its members particularly women and children. the State shall exert efforts to addressing or correcting discrimination through specific address violence committed against women and measures focused on women does not discriminate children in keeping with the fundamental against men. the U. we fined RTC purpose of the law. Page 202 of 458 might later be withdrawn. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW. 83 therefore. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.N.

It includes. forcing her/him to watch obscene R. the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was includes. 89 It is. coercion. women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women. The classification is not limited to a) rape. treating a to all members woman or her child as a sex object. . Page 203 of 458 Subsequently. thus. committed against a woman or the Child and its two protocols. or against a woman with whom the person wife and mistress/lover to has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It . forcing the wife. but to future suggestive remarks. 86 This acts:SACHcD Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to A. or economic abuse including attempting to cause the threats of such acts. or live in the conjugal home with whom he has a common child. 2003. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC shows or forcing the as: woman or her child to do . any act or a series of acts committed by any indecent acts and/or make person against a woman who is his wife. conditions as well. body. "Sexual violence" refers to an Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of act which is sexual in nature. making Moreover. assault. but is not Conventions and their respective protocols. which result in or is abuser. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who publications and indecent suffer violence and abuse. or against or sleep together in the her child whether legitimate or illegitimate. sexual. former films thereof. within same room with the or without the family abode. acts of conditions only.A. bound by said her child. 9262 is not limited to the demeaning and sexually existing conditions when it was promulgated. "Physical Violence" refers to women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take acts that include bodily or all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against physical harm.88 The B. . for as long as the safety and security of physically attacking the women and their children are threatened by violence and sexual parts of the victim's abuse. likely to result in physical.A. psychological b) acts causing or harm or suffering. and apply equally lasciviousness. but is not limited to. limited to: III. sexual existing harassment. battery. victim to engage in any harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. the following also ratified by the Philippines on October 6. the application of R.

business or physical or other harm or activity. physical or any legitimate profession. mental infidelity. the make a woman financially argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what dependent which includes. other harm or threat of occupation. except in cases coercion. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the . likely to cause mental or 2. property owned in repeated verbal abuse and common. deprivation or threat of emotional suffering of the victim deprivation of financial such as but not limited to resources and the right to intimidation. sexual or property. grounds as defined in C. the use and enjoyment of stalking. Page 204 of 458 sexual activity by force. 90 Hence. the conjugal."Psychological violence" refers Article 73 of the Family to acts or omissions causing or Code. wherein the other spouse/partner objects on c) Prostituting the woman valid. destroying household witness the physical.CDEaAI exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. serious and moral or child. Declaration on acts that make or attempt to the Elimination of Violence Against Women. to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the and/or visitation of common aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has children. controlling the victims' of the family to which the victim own money or properties belongs. "Economic abuse" refers to described here are also found in the U. psychological abuse of a member 4. damage to property. It includes causing or allowing the victim to 3. harassment. community or public ridicule or humiliation. The acts D.N. but is constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent not limited to the following: action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous. or to witness or solely controlling the pornography in any form or to conjugal money or witness abusive injury to pets or properties. victim from engaging in threat of force. 1.

the use of the gender-neutral daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating control of their life. An act will not be held invalid merely and reputation. future employment are clearly delineated." Clearly.A. and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. guns. job. is opportunity to respond. anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. Spouses Tan. were held to be provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the prohibited acts. acts of violence against women and their children. without an inkling because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or of what happened. They are worded with sufficient allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can community of design and purpose in tormenting her by understand what conduct is prohibited. it does the victim. Says he: "On the basis precision or mathematical exactitude." 95 detailed in its provisions. rather than meticulous specificity. or a sexual or dating relationship. 94 the parents-in- The acts enumerated above are easily understood and law of Sharica Mari L. Page 205 of 458 There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Its purpose is to safeguard the offended a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or parties from further harm. harassing and at its meaning nor differ in its application. specifically in "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree the issuance of POs." R. and practically no to suggest. the victim. 9262 is not violative of the "marital infidelity. emotionally. we have stressed that the Petitioner bewails the disregard of R." and "causing mental or emotional due process clause of the Constitution. Go-Tan. and in insists 92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to repeatedly abusing her verbally. 91 Yet. all in a matter of seconds. the husband is stripped of family. remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to former marriage. and need not guess giving her insufficient financial support.A.A. petitioner pressuring her to be ejected from the family home. their 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. 9262." "solely physically. in the case of Go-Tan v. of all protections afforded by the due of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute process clause of the Constitution. 93 A protection order is an order issued to prevent further There is likewise no merit to the contention that R. mentally and deprive the woman or her child of a legal right. VAWC may likewise be committed "against necessary reliefs. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater not preclude the application of the principle of risk of violence. minimize any disruption in their dating relationship. to accord the victim and any designated . and to grant other defined above. permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute property. Flexibility. while the law provides that the ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage. as petitioner seems of unsubstantiated allegations. However.TCIEcH controlling the conjugal or common money or properties. Moreover. children. 96 relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian "The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to relationships. As family or household members. Thus. money.

The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before from service on the respondent. to prevent safety and security. and possibly seconds. Since "time is of the essence in cases of be served immediately on the respondent by the court VAWC if further violence is to be prevented. 103 among which is protection of women also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor and children from violence and threats to their personal children to protect the children from violence. therefore. copies of the petition and TPO allegation therein. the court shall likewise order that notice be The rules require that petitions for protection order be in immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an writing. property. criminal or civil. all in a matter of experiences in the hands of her tormentor. the fear of petitioner of being abscond or dispose of his property. It public interests. Moreover. commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. for every court shall order that notice. 106 HSCcTD challenged as violative of the right to due process. 101 witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot. 100 The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the There need not be any fear that the judge may have no merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. must be accompanied by the affidavits of also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. limb or property of the Where no TPO is issued ex parte. The essence of due such acts could be prevented. children. the undertaking full responsibility. the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing future employment and reputation. guns. Page 206 of 458 family or household member safety in the family residence. if notice and hearing were required before product of an overactive imagination. be permanent protection order should not be issued. which is about to recur. prevent such violence. The victim is The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself required not only to verify the allegations in the petition. 102 in the same way. money. 105 rational basis to issue an ex parte order."97 parte. signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby opposition within five (5) days from service. but shall verify. their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex financial support. It is a constitutional process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be ." 99 the court is sheriffs. without an inkling of what happened" is a mere even death. Thus. job. "stripped of family. Just like It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without petition for protection order should be apprised of the notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to will take could be enough to enable the defendant to present his side. 104 notice and hearing when the life. the court will victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service.

the court shall direct visitation rights to his children. If the respondent must remove personal motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him effects from the residence. gave him five days (5) the respondent has gathered his things and within which to show cause why the TPO should not be escort him from the residence. petitioner may be removed and excluded from questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) private respondent's residence. the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. How then can complain that he was denied due process of law. he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in xxx xxx xxx futility. there is no denial of procedural due process. 04-10-11-SC. however. renewed or extended. virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. and that he could prevent the continued renewal ownership. 2006 of ownership of the residence. the law has done violence to the avowed policy any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. remain there until Order dated September 26. one may be heard also through any. Reliefs available to the offended one's defense. is accorded." 109 Under Section 23 (c) of A. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent Having failed to do so. the private respondent just claim any property and Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of appropriate it for herself. on May 23. the latter. some or all of the following reliefs: pleadings. It of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic states:aIETCA autonomous social institution. Still. either temporarily an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal for the purpose of protecting the offended party. either through xxx xxx xxx oral arguments or pleadings. 107 (c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party. does not by counseling. 2006." conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the Indubitably. the trial court in its a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence. only temporarily for the purpose of protecting of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Page 207 of 458 heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of SEC. 108 Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments. as petitioner seems to suggest? the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of The non-referral of a VAWC case the victim. petitioner may not now be heard to only where no property rights are violated. is to a mediator is justified. regardless It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26. of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April or permanently where no property rights are 24. . 2006. regardless of ownership of the residence. No. petitioner filed a violated. 11.M. 2006. instead of encouraging mediation and The wording of the pertinent rule. regardless of each time. Where opportunity to be heard. Likewise. Yet. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal party. — The protection order shall include arguments in court.

If the Punong Barangay is referring parties to mediation in a proceeding unavailable to act on the application for a BPO. thus. If the BPO is bargaining positions voluntarily reach issued by a Barangay Kagawad. Violence. under the Constitution. 111 The pertinent provision reads. (Emphasis effect its personal service. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs). the order consensual agreement about the issue at must be accompanied by an attestation by hand. Mediation is a the application shall be acted upon by any process by which parties in equivalent available Barangay Kagawad. It is the power of carrying Who May Issue and How. and to determine whether or courts as may be established by law" and. supplied) The parties may be accompanied by a non- There is no undue delegation of lawyer advocate in any proceeding before judicial power to barangay officials. 14. A process which involves parties Barangay was unavailable at the time of the mediating the issue of violence implies that the issuance of the BPO." 113 protection order issued by the Punong As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision. A Punong Barangay who Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on receives applications for a BPO shall issue the Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110 protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis This section prohibits a court from ordering or of the application. or direct any barangay official to protection order has been sought. Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to exercise of judicial power which. Page 208 of 458 The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the (b) of this Act. for fifteen (15) days. is settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower demandable and enforceable. — Barangay the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the observance. in his unavailability. for an order for protection. the Punong Barangay.112 On the other hand. is not a subject for the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong compromise. by . protests not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or protection orders. enforce and administer the laws. the Punong order of protection is problematic because the Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall petitioner is frequently unable to participate personally serve a copy of the same on the equally with the person against whom the respondent. Immediately after the mediation of issues in a proceeding for an issuance of an ex parte BPO. follows:HCDAac executive power "is generally defined as the power to SEC. however. In addition. the BPO Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and issued by the Punong Barangay or. BPOs shall be effective victim is somehow at fault. as instrumentality of the Government.

merely orders the consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the peace and order. purely executive in nature.A. must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. The same holds true the fight against the violence of law itself. it would be very unlikely that they WHEREFORE.A. violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was an executive. assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is SO ORDERED. the constitutionality of R." plenary powers. and passed laws with full knowledge of the the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the advancing the welfare of the majority. however. concededly. woman and her children exists or is about to recur that We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. If we keep that in with the issuance of a BPO. and (2) threatening to cause the Conclusion woman or her child physical harm. of acquittal are nil. violence and abuse. as it should be." 115 Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains co-equal executive department. . or a clear conflict Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances." 114 argumentative one. Such function of the Punong Barangay is. As we said in Estrada v. 9262. woman or her child. and that the chances on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. thus. DHEcCT mind.116 In the instant case. Page 209 of 458 any available Barangay Kagawad. not a judicial. no and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his concrete evidence and convincing arguments were official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial unconstitutionality of R. agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of 9262 is. law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner women for equality but will be its that since barangay officials and other law enforcement fulfillment. As already stated. function. In We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is other words. Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government voided. through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there Sandiganbayan. The preliminary history of the women's movement against domestic investigation conducted by the prosecutor is. sustained. the grounds for nullity must be beyond required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts reasonable doubt." 118Accordingly. not merely a doubtful or public order in the barangay." and to "maintain with the Constitution. an unequivocal breach of. which is an act of powers. the instant petition for review would remain objective and impartial. 117 courts must assume that the is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

. Bacolod City.R. I concur with the conclusion reached in the ponencia ably acting as a Family Court.. Branch 41. 01698 dismissing the Petition for Vera.The constitutional issue was raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals by petitioner and not at LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.. concurring: the earliest opportunity. as it was held in People v. 9262. it should be stressed that the Court of Brion.. Abad and Leonen. see: concurring opinion. as the ponencia of Justice Bernabe. wife of petitioner. Bersamin. pass upon the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No.. 9262. which should be before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the said Leonardo-de Castro. concur. and the This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails: (1) the latter's decision on the matter may be reviewed on appeal Decision dated January 24. see separate Decision. J. and women who are given differential treatment in the law. With due Garcia.The constitutionality of Republic Act No. Velasco. did not Peralta. is on official leave. instituted a Petition for respect. I submit that the test to determine an Temporary and Permanent Protection equal protection challenge against the law. CA-G. otherwise known denied due course to the Petition for Prohibition "for being as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children fraught with fatal technical infirmities" and for not being ripe Act of 2004. J.. against her statutory remedies to men who are similarly situated as the husband. 2007. 9262 and instead dismissed the Petition for Prohibition on technical grounds. aITDAE concurring opinion. and (2) the Resolution dated August 14. JJ. At the outset. More . Nevertheless. C. Garcia under the Villarama. the inferior court having jurisdiction on the action may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute. where private respondent Rosalie written by the Honorable Estela Perlas-Bernabe. Mendoza and Reyes..J. 9262. J. in its assailed Decision and Resolution. however. CEB-SP No." and sought a temporary restraining order for judicial review. four out of the five issues and/or injunction to prevent the implementation of the raised by the petitioner here dealt with the alleged Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and criminal unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. Appeals. on the basis of sex or gender. denying Order[s] 1 under Republic Act No. prosecution of herein petitioner Jesus A. Page 210 of 458 Sereno. JJ. Garcia. should be at the level of 2. Del Castillo. as follows: Separate Opinions 1. Perez. law. 2007 of the Court of Appeals in and not by a writ of prohibition. Carpio. petitioner Jesus C. Jr. 9262 can only intermediate scrutiny or middle-tier judicial be questioned in a direct action and it cannot be the scrutiny rather than the rational basis test used in subject of a collateral attack in a petition for prohibition.. the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2 Prohibition with Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Petition for Prohibition) which questioned the Hence. Jr.

PETITION WAS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW. (A. Opposition to Petition. It must be below after the above-quoted first issue is disposed of. is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN constitutionality of a law.M. particularly paragraph reasons: IDEHCa (b) thereof. 9262 provides: Under the circumstances. of Constitutionality in a Summary (b) Respondent shall not include in the Proceeding Before the RTC opposition any counterclaim. THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT. respondent may file an opposition to the petition 9262shall be a separate subject matter that is tackled which he himself shall verify. from touching at all those four substantive issues of cross-claim or third party claim. all of which are personal to constitutionality. in accordance with the rule that the question of CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. its limited jurisdiction is inadequate to point that can be raised against the Court of Appeals tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. 04-10-11-SC). accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent On the Propriety of Raising the Issue protection order should not be issued. The error of such reasoning is that it treats "any cause of . whether this Court should consider this Petition for Review as a proper occasion to Sec. The Rules on Violence Against Women and Children constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3 Section 20 of A. Since the proceedings before the Family Court are In this instant Petition for Review. — (a) The pass upon the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6 Decision and Resolution is the first one cited as a ground I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC. the Court of Appeals refrained expressly prohibit him from alleging any counterclaim. which I quote: Family Court. 9262 can be resolved in a summary THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF proceeding.M. No. (Emphasis Opposition 4 to private respondent's petition for protective supplied. Page 211 of 458 accurately put. but any cause of action which Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals ruling that he should could be the subject thereof may be litigated have raised the issue of constitutionality in his in a separate civil action. cross-claim or third- Designated as a Family Court party complaint.)HEacAS orders pending before the RTC for the following Petitioner cites the above provision. 20. however. 04-10-11-SC. 2. the Rule on Republic Act No. the only issue directly in summary in nature. No. he cannot impugn the faulted for any erroneous ruling on the aforesaid constitutionality of the law by way of affirmative defense. 5 substantive constitutional issues. particularly Section 20 thereof. The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be him and therefore with more reason. 9262 in his Opposition. designated as a for the appeal. as one of his grounds for not challenging the 1. and that the constitutionality DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE of Republic Act No. THE otherwise it may not be considered on appeal.

the MCTC him. 9 the respondent. as follows: 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court (a) A negative defense is the specific denial of from granting the petition for protection order against the the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading petitioner. in a complaint before the Court of Appeals to question the constitutionality for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Republic Act No. which may be purpose of determining whether or not it possessed either negative or affirmative. the material allegations in the pleading of the party complaint. 9262 in such Opposition. the language (b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a of said section clearly refers to a cause of action that is new matter which. Rule 6 of jurisdiction over the case. estoppel. as there was nothing in the rules that or permanent protection order should not be issued against barred it from admitting the Answer. In fact. In fact. the MCTC's lack of What obviously escapes petitioner's understanding is that jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy the contents of the Opposition are not limited to mere relationship between him and the petitioner. 10DEaCSA the Rules of Court define negative and affirmative defenses Similarly. statute of limitations. While it is true that A. Section any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. would nevertheless prevent or bar litigated in a separate civil action. 20 (b) cannot even be invoked as a basis for filing the separate special civil action of Petition for Prohibition In Bayog v. cross-claim. cross-claim or third-party complaint" referred of action. The affirmative defenses constitutionality is not a "cause of action" that is a subject include fraud. which is barred and which may be claimant. The MCTC refutations of the allegations in the petition for temporary applied the Rule on Summary Procedure and issued an and permanent protection order. it should have met and ruled squarely on the directs petitioner to state in his Opposition why a temporary issue of jurisdiction. statute of frauds. 04-10-11-SC requires the respondent to file Answer. Section 20 (a) ejectment. 9262. illegality. while hypothetically admitting the "subject" of the counterclaim. Page 212 of 458 action" mentioned in Section 20 (b) as distinct from the of the claimant essential to his cause or causes "counterclaim. On the contrary. Natino. to in the said Section 20 (b). Section 5 (b). of the aforementioned prohibited pleadings. and allege "claims which arepersonal to him. Thus. discharge in bankruptcy. This means that petitioner should have raised in his should have heard and received evidence for the precise Opposition all defenses available to him. release. petitioner admitted that such prohibited pleadings would former recovery. raised as one of his defenses. Hon. 8 it does not prevent while the MCTC was correct in applying the Rule on petitioner from challenging the constitutionality of Republic Summary Procedure as the complaint was one for Act No. The issue of recovery by him. or third." 7 Hence. petitioner should have raised it in his . cTACIa (MCTC). Order stating that it could not take cognizance of the No. payment.M. This Court ruled that an Opposition and not an Answer. Hence. for being filed belatedly. the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.

this authority that can be the subject of such separate action if it were being embraced in the general definition of not for the issuance of the TPO against the petitioner. would still Specifically. subject of a separate action. constitutional question is necessary to determine whether the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Article X. even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his must be raised at the earliest opportunity. . or regulation is in before a competent court that can resolve it. This Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings instruction." 12 The decision upon the protection order against him. (Citation omitted. particularly void by a competent court. competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue. An action Court.M. the challenge to the constitutionality of the law estimation. BP 129 vests in the regional trial have to be the issuance of the TPO. Page 213 of 458 Opposition as a defense against the issuance of a considered on appeal. it cannot be considered at the trial. Monterey Foods Corporation. the filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of . This 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. ordinance.) is not raised in the pleadings. The settled rule appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and is that courts will not anticipate a question of orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutional law in advance of the necessity of constitutionality or validity of any treaty. which is the subject of courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the another case in the RTC. . more so when the as they contravene the Bill of Rights. such that "if it question. subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary Moreover. their conformity to the fundamental law. law. 13 held: questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of Thus. presidential decree. of the The question of constitutionality must be raised Constitution vests in the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity. proclamation. the Petition for Prohibition should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an filed before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC was ultimately directed against the issuance of the TPO. In Dasmariñas defense the constitutionality of a law he is Water District v. and. No. (Citation omitted. Moreover. 11 we said: charged with violating and of the A law is deemed valid unless declared null and proceedings taken against him. an handling the protection order proceedings.)IEcaHS international or executive agreement. Such question For all intents and purposes. Lim. Section 5(2). which was the interlocutory order. in Drilon v. if not considered at the trial. which under Section 22 (j) of A. it cannot be Furthermore. deciding it. . issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. This We stress at the outset that the lower court is not technically feasible because there will be no had jurisdiction to consider the justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action constitutionality of Section 187. the controversy. whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC. . order. emphases ours.

The filing of a separate whether of the same or different levels in the judicial action to question the constitutionality of the law amounts hierarchy. It caused the delay in the actions. in a summary proceeding. 9262 would result to interest in the case such that he has sustained. Verily. or practical ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged had a basis to disallow the constitutional challenge to a law. and separate petitions for review before this Court — the exact scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits Moreover. "the law and the courts Court of Appeals countenanced the evil that the law and frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of the rules sought to avoid. whether it is an appellate court or a trial court. aSITDC the requisite of "ripeness. it is clear that the proper forum to challenge does create the danger of having inconsistent and the constitutionality of the law was before the RTC handling conflicting judgments between the two separate courts." 14HIaSDc proceedings and inconvenience. cannot of the protection order issued against him. the resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action controversy became ripe only when he was in danger of or without affecting the petition for the issuance of a TPO. These two judgments would eventually be the to splitting a cause of action that runs counter to the policy subject of separate motions for reconsideration. the filing of the Petition for Prohibition with the is avoiding. there is no statutory. If the he would sustain if and when the law is enforced against proceedings for the protection order is not suspended. it him. Page 214 of 458 unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 was on the basis court." This is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. was directly adversely affected by the statute mandating Bringing a separate action for the resolution of the issue of the issuance of a protection order against him. review is subject to other limitations. or will multiplicity of suits. 15 constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order In this case. appeals. the protection order proceedings. It is clear that the issues of sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This which is sought to be enforced. The RTC where the opportunity" requirement. the petitioner's challenge on the raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. direct adverse effect on the individual will also be the basis This is particularly true considering that the issue of a of his standing as it is necessary that the person statute's constitutionality is a question of law which may be challenging the law must have a personal and substantial resolved without the reception of evidence or a full-blown . Two of which are the instead of being doubted. to be able to exercise its existence of an actual case or controversy and standing. reglementary. Thus. Therefore. separate against multiplicity of suits. jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of constitutionality within An aspect of the actual case or controversy requirement is the mandatory period set by the rules. direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. the court's power of judicial petition for protection orders is filed should be trusted. As we previously held. Another constitutionality of Republic Act No. hardship and expense on the part of the parties due to the multiplicity of suits It must be remembered that aside from the "earliest between them at different court levels. a question is In gist. He derives constitutionality will result in an unresolved prejudicial his standing to challenge the statute from the direct injury question to the validity of issuing a protection order.

I SOCIAL INSTITUTION. Hence. Notable is the fact that not only the 9262 AS INVALID AND petitioner. 9262 at the earliest opportunity. but the private respondent as well. UNJUST. NO. present Petition. it VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION cannot be raised in the separate Petition for Prohibition CLAUSE. "An Aside from the technical ground raised by petitioner in his Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" first assignment of error. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO On the Court Resolving the THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE Issue of Constitutionality of CONSTITUTION. DISCRIMINATORY. GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R. petitioner questions the is already pejorative and sex-discriminatory because it constitutionality of Republic Act No. Indeed. when public JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue OFFICIALS.A. 18 providing remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men. 9262 for making a gender-based classification. 9262 on the following means violence by men against women. Republic Act No. 17 pray that UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT the Court resolve the constitutional issue considering its ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF novelty and paramount importance. as correctly ruled by the latter. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED nor in a separate action before the RTC. thus. NO. concur that the Court. in the exercise of its sound THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY discretion. He claims that even the title of the law. He adds that gender alone is SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the . 20 The law also grounds: EcIDaA does not include violence committed by women against THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED children and other women. NO.A. and in keeping with this Court's duty of determining On the Constitutional Right to Equal whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of Protection of the Laws government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act them. AND Bacolod City and for failure of the petitioner to do so. Page 215 of 458 trial. procedure and resolve the constitutional issue. before the Court of Appeals. 9262 IS earliest opportunity in the proceedings before the RTC.A. 19 raised. the Court may brush aside technicalities of No. said issue should have been raised at the CONCLUDE THAT R. 16 should still pass upon the said issue in the ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R. 9262 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO petitioner's failure to raise the issue of constitutionality PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC of Republic Act No.

is permitted. "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. to wit: 1. The said remedies are classification on a reasonable basis. But and punish spousal violence. germane to the purposes of the law. or supplied. unequivocal breach of the Constitution." Of course. There made arbitrarily or capriciously. which requires "only that government Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand must not impose differences in treatment departments of our government and on the except upon some reasonable subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions differentiation fairly related to the object of thereof.) IECcAT property without due process of law. emphasis No person shall be deprived of life. taxation and eminent domain. the equal protection must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences. Constitution states: and must apply equally to each member of the class." Simply put. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of In our jurisdiction. three levels of tests were developed. Intermediate Scrutiny — requires that the denial of the equal protection of the laws is a classification (means) must serve question not always easily determined. 25 States. it must Pertinently. (Emphasis supplied. Page 216 of 458 remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and favoring others is prohibited. coupled with a deferential The above provision was lifted verbatim from the 1935 and attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to 1973 Constitutions. however. Rational Basis Scrutiny — the traditional This basic individual right sheltered by the test. objective (ends) and is substantially Class legislation discriminating against some related to the achievement of such . that the classification in the The equal protection of the laws. and not discriminatory against the husband/male gender. fold test to measure the reasonableness of a classification depending on the subject matter 24 involved: under the equal protection clause. 23 Amendment 14 21 of the United States Constitution. sententiously statute reasonably relates to the observes the Supreme Court of the United legislative purpose. over time. being no reasonable difference between an abused The classification. (Citations omitted. it must be guarantee is violated. to be reasonable husband and an abused wife. Vera 22 the four- which are to be applied in equal protection cases. Section 1. Article III of the 1987 not be limited to existing conditions only. like regulation. No rule an important governmental that will cover every case can be formulated. In 1937. and on many constitutional powers. the standard and analysis of equal the laws. what may be regarded as a 2.) protection challenges in the main have followed the foregoing "rational basis" test. liberty. the Court established in People v. it merely demands the police power. TSEAaD However. which in turn was a slightly modified invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and version of the equal protection clause in Section 1.

. Inc. This level is used when protection by the Constitution. and the legislative discretion economic policy. judicial scrutiny ought to be more classification. This is true whether the actor committing the Echoing the same principle. 27 primary role as the vanguard of constitutional Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need guaranties. a statutory classification that would be given deferential treatment. v. A classification based on sex is Congress retains its wide discretion in providing the best-established example of an for a valid classification. the Court will impinged on a fundamental right. In British American limitations. Tobacco v. and require a stricter and more to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the exacting adherence to constitutional constitutionality of classifications. it strict. Camacho. 30 (Citations omitted. When these suspect classifications or fundamental violations arise. The deference stops where classification serve a compelling state the classification violates a fundamental interest and is necessary to achieve right. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the It has been held that "in the areas of social and "rational basis" test. this Court must discharge its rights are involved. or the against equal protection challenge if there is perpetuation of prejudice against persons any reasonably conceivable state of facts that favored by the Constitution with special could provide a rational basis for the protection. Strict Scrutiny — requires that the of the Constitution. 26 be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul 3. Rational basis should not suffice. A weak and watered down view would call is sufficient that the legislative classification is for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to rationally related to achieving some legitimate strike down any law repugnant to the State interest." Under the rational basis test. . . or prejudices persons accorded special such interest. . Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association. 31 stated: IcESDA ." 29 We added: power.) Constitution and the rights it enshrines. then "the rational basis exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of constitutionality. speaking through unconstitutional act is a private person or the then Chief Justice Puno in Central Bank (now Bangko government itself or one of its instrumentalities. 28 this Court held that since the case xxx xxx xxx therein neither involved a suspect classification nor Under most circumstances. DEcTIS neither proceeds along suspect lines nor But if the challenge to the statute is premised infringes constitutional rights must be upheld on the denial of a fundamental right. this Court. Page 217 of 458 objective. and its policies should intermediate level of review. recognizing the broad discretion the assailed law in the face of an equal protection given to Congress in exercising its legislative challenge. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

but the classification. Chief Justice Puno expounded on this in his Separate suspect class. religion. The presumption is in favor of the years. In omitted. Commission on Elections. is the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny. In classification disadvantages a "quasi- fact." then the courts will mere rationality. if the classification. the presumption of adopt the appropriate scrutiny in deciding cases where the constitutionality fades because traditional issue of discrimination based on sex or gender is raised. This is a relatively relaxed employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall standard reflecting the Court's awareness that unless the government can demonstrate that the the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is classification has been precisely tailored to serve peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable a compelling governmental interest. then the statute will be tested for a "fundamental right. a heightened level of review should have justification for the classification must be genuine been applied and not just the rational basis test. 34 (Citations omitted. Over the one. Page 218 of 458 of the character or nature of the actor. He said that intermediate or heightened review. to wit: cCESaH illegitimacy. the United States Supreme Court has classification. and the government action will be This was reiterated in League of Cities of the Philippines v. although applying the rational basis test.) AHcaDC is that where legislation affects discrete and This case presents us with the most opportune time to insular minorities. 33 wherein the Court. on race. the law must not only struck down. the State bears a heavy burden of justification. which and must not depend on broad generalizations. especially not facially invidious. (Citations political processes may have broken down. or if a those involving suspect classes and fundamental rights. quasi-suspect classes include elucidate on the three levels of scrutiny and the classes classifications based on gender or falling within each level. national origin. To survive although the assailed resolutions therein were correctly intermediate scrutiny. since the classification was based on further an important governmental interest and gender or sexual orientation." it will be treated under Concurring Opinion in the Ang Ladlad case. alienage. The underlying rationale of this theory emphases supplied. ancestry. nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties. noted that there are tests. v. If a legislative classification disadvantages a If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is "suspect class" or impinges upon the exercise of appropriate. Chief Justice Puno continued to case. 32 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party purpose. and of legitimate protection purposes include classifications based grounds of distinction. . closely scrutinized in light of its asserted Commission on Elections. of the reasonableness and determined that suspect classes for equal fairness of state action. while which are more appropriate in other cases. a quasi-suspect be substantially related to that interest. and on which the State acted. and of special interest to us in this American authority. Citing Noteworthy.) such a case. On the other hand. if any such grounds exist.

economic abuse including threats of such acts. This may be (a) "Violence against women and their children" predominantly true. stereotype relationship. Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made battery. to test whether Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Republic Act or not the classification in Republic Act No. Definition of Terms. 9262 which denies the same protection orders to the equal protection clause. we should be open to realities which may challenge the dominant conception SEC. among other provisions. "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men" 35 the level of scrutiny applicable. stressed that under aforecited section of said law violence may not only be physical or sexual but also psychological To survive intermediate review. is the middle-tier scrutiny or husbands who are victims of wife-abuse. and (2) be substantially related to the The Honorable Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. 3. the rational basis test may be too wide The aforesaid law also institutionalized remedies such as and liberal to justify the statutory classification which in the issuance of protection orders in favor of women and effect allows different treatment of men who are similarly children who are victims of violence and prescribed public situated. statutory protection. arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 36 concurring opinion notes that "Husband abuse maybe an under reported form of family violence. It should be the intermediate standard of judicial review. Leonen in his achievement of those objectives. or with whom he has a common all men as tormentors or make invisible the child. the classification in the and economic in nature. harassment or available to men. (Emphases regardless of their number. coercion. men may also want to seek succor against acts which result in or is likely to result in physical. but even those in marginal refers to any act or a series of acts committed by cases deserve fundamental constitutional and any person against a woman who is his wife. illegitimate. psychological harm or suffering. In the context of the constitutional policy to penalties for violation of the said law.) domestic violence. or an expeditious manner. oragainst a woman with whom the correcting historical and cultural injustices. . who are also suffering from supplied. .